

# DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY

1918-1945

From the Archives of the  
German Foreign Ministry

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Series D      Volume I

FROM NEURATH TO RIBBENTROP

*September 1937 - September 1938*

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LONDON

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In June 1946 the British Foreign Office and the United States Department of State agreed jointly to publish documents from captured archives of the German Foreign Ministry and the Reich Chancellery. Although the main body of the captured archives goes back to the year 1867, it was decided to limit the present publication to papers relating to the years after 1918, since the object of the publication was "to establish the record of German foreign policy preceding and during World War II". The editorial work was to be performed "on the basis of the highest scholarly objectivity". The editors were to have complete freedom in the selection of the documents to be published. Publication was to begin and be concluded as soon as possible. In April 1947 the French Government, having requested the right to participate in the project, accepted the terms of this agreement.

The documents covering the period from July 1936 to the outbreak of War in September 1939 have now been selected jointly by the three Allied Editorial Staffs. They comprise six volumes, and form the first and larger portion of Series D, which will carry the history of German foreign relations to the end of the Second World War.

Volume I, the present volume, deals with Germany's foreign policy from the end of September 1937 to September 1938, covering particularly the seizure of Austria in March 1938.

Volume II, which will appear very shortly, will deal with Germany's relations with Czechoslovakia from October 1937 to the Munich agreement of September 1938.

Volume III, which is in active preparation, will cover the Spanish Civil War from July 1936 to July 1939.

Series A to C are designed to cover the period from 1918 to 1937.

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GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY  
1918-1945**

**FROM THE ARCHIVES OF THE  
GERMAN FOREIGN MINISTRY**

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DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY  
1918-1945

SERIES D (1937-1945)

VOLUME I

FROM NEURATH TO RIBBENTROP  
*(September 1937-September 1938)*

## GENERAL INTRODUCTION

In June 1946 the British Foreign Office and the United States Department of State agreed jointly to publish documents from captured archives of the German Foreign Ministry and the Reich Chancellery. Although the captured archives go back to the year 1867, it was decided to limit the present publication to papers relating to the years after 1918, since the object of the publication was "to establish the record of German foreign policy preceding and during World War II." The editorial work was to be performed "on the basis of the highest scholarly objectivity." The editors were to have complete independence in the selection and editing of the documents. Publication was to begin and be concluded as soon as possible. Each Government was "free to publish separately any portion of the documents."<sup>1</sup> In April 1947 the French Government, having requested the right to participate in the project, accepted the terms of this agreement.

The three Governments realized the unique nature of the enterprise. Captured enemy documents had been published in the past, and especially by the Germans themselves, but only documents which supported a propaganda thesis. Never had three victorious powers set out to establish the full record of the diplomacy of a vanquished power from captured archives "on the basis of the highest scholarly objectivity."

The editors wish to state at the outset that they have not only been permitted, but enjoined, to make their selection on this basis alone. In the selection of documents for publication, and in the editing of the documents, the editors have had complete freedom. No effort has been made at any time by any of the participating Governments to influence their work. The editors, therefore, accept complete responsibility for the volumes as published.

## II

The archives of the German Foreign Ministry came into Anglo-American custody partly as a result of planning, partly by accident, but chiefly through the incomplete execution of orders to destroy the most important portions. During hostilities, the Allied military forces were instructed to keep close watch for enemy archives, and teams of experts were assembled behind the lines so that the examination of

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<sup>1</sup>It was in accordance with this provision that the Department of State, in January 1948, published the volume of documents entitled *Nazi-Soviet Relations, 1939-1941*.

captured documents might begin without delay. In April 1945 units of the United States First Army discovered more than 300 tons of Foreign Ministry papers in various storage places in the Harz Mountains. The Anglo-American experts were immediately summoned. They located other parts of the archives in the Harz Mountains and Thuringia. Their most important discoveries were a box containing memoranda summarizing conversations of Hitler and Ribbentrop with foreign statesmen, and a quantity of German microfilm which, when made into continuous rolls and printed at the Air Ministry in London, was found to record some 10,000 pages of the working files of the Foreign Minister (*Büro RAM*).

Under the supervision of the Anglo-American experts, the captured archives were assembled at Marburg Castle, in the American zone of Germany. Later the collection was moved to Berlin. Finally, in the summer of 1948, the archives were moved to England, where they are to remain until conditions in Germany become more stable. Between 1945 and 1948 the collection was augmented by many tons of Reich Chancellery documents and other smaller collections.

### III

When the Foreign Ministry archives were captured in April 1945, the question was considered whether they had been deliberately placed in the path of the Anglo-American armies and spurious documents added to the collection, with the purpose of sowing discord among the enemies of Germany. Documentary evidence and interrogation of surviving German officials have completely dispelled these suspicions. Actually, the German Government made efforts to prevent the capture of the documents, both by moving them from place to place and by ordering the destruction of the files for the Nazi period only a few days before the arrival of the American First Army.

The dispersal of the archives began in 1943, when the air attacks on German cities had become intense. It was then decided to keep only a skeleton staff and the current files of the Foreign Ministry in Berlin; the rest of the staff with their files were moved to less vulnerable parts of Germany. Most went to Krummhübel, a resort in the Riesengebirge, but some branch offices were sent as far away as Lake Constance. The archives were also dispersed to castles in the Harz and south and east of Berlin. In the summer and autumn of 1944 the Soviet advance enforced the transfer of those archives which had been stored south and east of Berlin to the Harz region. Orders were given for the destruction of the nonessential secret documents at Krummhübel and for the removal of the remainder to Thuringia. It is impossible to determine with precision what was destroyed by accident

NOTE : The gap in the files on Anglo-German relations from the spring of 1938 to the spring of 1939, mentioned on p. ix, line 16 from bottom, has now been filled. The State Secretary file on the Halifax visit, November 1937—April 1939, has been identified as the file thought to be missing and is identical with film serial No. 375 (cf. Appendix III, p. 1200) and was used in the preparation of this volume.

or design in the hurried movement which followed. It is known that these transfers were not entirely completed before the arrival of Soviet troops. Only in the early months of 1945, therefore, were the Foreign Ministry archives concentrated in the west.

By spring the German armies were in full retreat. Early in April 1945 the evacuation center at Meisdorf received a list of categories of documents which were to be prepared for destruction. These included all important files for the Nazi period. On April 10 an order was received by telephone to commence immediately the destruction of these categories. When the American troops arrived a few days later, only a small fraction had actually been destroyed.

#### IV

Including the accessions received since April 1945, the captured documents now in the joint custody of the United States Department of State and the British Foreign Office weigh about 400 tons. The tens of thousands of bundles of papers have been repeatedly packed, moved by train, truck, or plane, and then unpacked and shelved. The packing, the moving, the unpacking and the shelving were done hurriedly, under war conditions. Until the contents of every bundle in the collection have been examined, therefore, it will not be possible to be certain that the selection for publication has been made from all the surviving documents on a particular problem or year.

An analysis of the files in Anglo-American custody is appended to this volume. Summarizing this analysis, the situation is roughly as follows: For the years from 1867 to 1920 the collection seems complete; there are gaps in the files dealing with 1920-1936, but they appear to be relatively unimportant. Thereafter, the gaps become increasingly a problem. For instance, the obviously important files concerned with Anglo-German relations from the spring of 1938 to the spring of 1939 are missing. Fortunately many copies were made of most documents, and it is possible to find enough papers in other files to fill in the significant lines of the picture. This or that document may be lost completely, but other documents give the essential material. That is not always true, but until 1940 it is usually true. After 1940, and until 1943, one is continually reminded of a half-finished picture: the outlines are obvious; some parts are completed with minute detail; other parts are only sketched in; there are blank spaces. From 1943 the materials are fragmentary, but peculiarly valuable because there is so little other evidence on these years.

The most important defect of the captured archives for the period from 1936 is the absence of the registers and journals in which were recorded the departmental file number and the distribution of each paper, with a summary of its contents. The captured Foreign Min-

istry archives are not a single, coherently organized file of the Ministry as a whole. They are the working files of officials, such as the Foreign Minister and the State Secretary; of parts of the Ministry, such as those of the Political Department and the Legal Department. The documents in these captured files are arranged so as to facilitate the work of these individual departments and officials: sometimes the arrangement is alphabetical (by countries, by subjects, or by individuals), sometimes it is chronological, sometimes it is topical. Sometimes secret papers are segregated; sometimes they are not. The captured documents do not, therefore, constitute a central Ministerial file, and there is no uniform filing system. There is no place where, for instance, all the telegrams from the Embassy in London may be found. Ten or twenty copies of one telegram may be found in various files; the only surviving copy of another telegram may be found in the file of another mission abroad to which it was sent for information (bearing the departmental file number, and not the telegram number given in London); occasionally no copy can be found.

Theoretically, the registers and journals could be reconstructed by collating the surviving files, but the resources for this gigantic task are not available. As their work in the Foreign Ministry archives progresses, the editors are learning from experience which departments, individuals, and missions abroad were likely to receive copies of papers, and where the papers were likely to be filed. Beginning with Series D, Volume III, it will be possible to make a clear distinction between papers which are not printed because unimportant, and papers not printed because not found. In Volumes I and II of Series D it is not possible to make this distinction with confidence, so the footnote "Not printed" is used for both categories of omission.

Some of the documents missing from the Foreign Ministry archives are in the possession of the Soviet Government, but the extent of its collection is not known. Beginning in June 1946 the Soviet Government has published several volumes of German Foreign Ministry documents. Usually, but not always, other copies of these documents are in the Foreign Ministry files, together with other much more voluminous material on the same subject.

## V

The editors learned only by trial and error the limitations of the available material and the difficulties inherent in exploiting disordered and incomplete archives. The filming of the Foreign Ministry archives, begun in 1945 by American and British experts for intelligence purposes, and continued by historians representing the three Governments participating in the publication of these records, will facilitate scholarly investigation in the future. More than a million

pages of the most important documents for the years from 1914 to 1945 have by now been preserved on microfilm.

At the outset, the selection of documents for publication was made from these microfilms by historians working in London, Paris, and Washington. It was found, however, that this method was too cumbersome, and all except the final selection is now made by an international team of American, British, and French historians working on the original files. In the work of the tripartite team, and in the periodic conferences of the editors-in-chief, the international character of historical scholarship is convincingly demonstrated.

## VI

In selecting documents for publication the fundamental test has been their value for an understanding of German foreign policy. Since the German estimate of the policy of other powers was one of the most important factors shaping German policy, these estimates have been included. They should, of course, be viewed with caution. Very often German diplomats wrote what they thought would please Hitler. Even those who wished to convey unpleasant truths used language which would carry conviction to the Nazi Party leaders.

Even so far as German foreign policy is concerned it is necessary to remember the peculiar characteristics of Nazi diplomacy. A large proportion of the officials in the Foreign Ministry and of the German representatives abroad were career diplomats who were kept at their posts only because Hitler found them indispensable. He did not trust them, sometimes with reason, and he often kept them in ignorance of his intentions. The attentive reader will frequently see evidence of this situation and will realize that their reports and instructions do not always reflect the actual policy of the Reich.

Two categories of evidence which bulk large in the archives of the German Foreign Ministry find little place in these volumes: the press summary and the intelligence report. Undoubtedly a minute examination of the material in the press summaries and of the rumor and gossip set down in tens of thousands of reports by confidential agents will some day yield results of significance for an understanding of German policy. But such an examination requires study of all the evidence, and all the evidence would fill hundreds of volumes. This is true also of the analyses produced by the prolific and imaginative members of Ribbentrop's private information service, the *Dienststelle Ribbentrop*. The editors have agreed, therefore, that press summaries, intelligence reports, and the analyses prepared in the *Dienststelle Ribbentrop* will be included only where there is clear evidence that they directly influenced German policy.

Even after excluding all but a few examples from this material, the sheer mass of evidence presents baffling problems. In this age of shorthand and the typewriter, documents grow in number and length. Bismarck's conversations were usually summarized in a few hundred words; the summaries of Hitler's conversations often run to thousands of words. When Embassy reports are dictated, a lengthy report requires less thought and time than a brief report. The editors have often been tempted to summarize, or to print excerpts, but they have decided to do neither. Except in a few cases, which are clearly indicated, every document has been printed without omissions or alterations. In every case, too, significant material such as file numbers and marginal comments have been included. Where there is no important difference between the preliminary draft and the despatch as sent, the latter has been preferred; where there are differences, they have been described. To save space the telegraphic summary has been used if it includes all essential points; otherwise, the detailed report has been used; if the telegraphic summary is not complete, but action was taken before the report was received, both the telegram and the report are printed.

The order in which documents should be presented in a collection such as this has long been a disputed subject among historians. The editors have agreed that documents should be grouped by topics; within each topic they are presented in the chronological order in which they originated. It should be borne in mind that a report from a mission abroad might be received after action had been taken in Berlin, although the report bears an earlier date than the document recording the action. Where the date of receipt in Berlin can be determined, it is given. Each document is preceded by an editorial heading and by reference to the serial number of the film and the frame number on the film.<sup>2</sup> A list of film serial numbers is appended to each volume, showing the description of the corresponding German Foreign Ministry file; this permits identification of the location in the archives of the copy of the document published. As each volume is published, the pertinent films will be made available for study by scholars so that the specialist may be able to fill in the details of the record.

Because the immediate origins of the Second World War, and the course of the war, are of most immediate interest and of most obvious importance, the editors have decided to begin their work with the fourth series (D). This series will include documents dating from 1936 or 1937, the starting point depending on the topic, and continuing through the war. The three series of volumes to be published subsequently will include the documents for the earlier years.

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<sup>2</sup> For an explanation of these terms, see Appendix III.

## VII

After the joint selection of documents to be included in a volume is completed, the task of preparing the editorial notes is entrusted to the editors in one of the three capitals, subject to review by the other editors. Similarly, the task of preparing the English translation is divided by volumes, or sections of a volume. Each volume will contain a statement on responsibility for the preparation of notes and translations. The translations prepared in London are made by a staff recruited by the Foreign Office expressly for this purpose. The translations made in Washington are made by the Division of Language Services of the Department of State. In both capitals the translations are reviewed by the editors.

Translation from the German presents peculiar difficulties, particularly since, under Hitler, there was no one style of diplomatic German, as there had been under Bismarck. Some of the writers use "Nazi-German," which conveys only a foggy impression in German and translates into completely opaque English. The translation is therefore often inelegant, but the editors believe that where the meaning is clear in German the English can be understood. In general, they have preferred to sacrifice grace to precision. Paraphrase has been used only where the German is clear but exact translation resulted in ambiguity.

The parallel series in German, giving the original text of the documents, will enable those interested to check the translation.

In printing the translated version of the documents the editors have not aimed at giving a facsimile reproduction of the German original as regards arrangement and spacing. All important notes and marginalia are, however, included either in the text or as footnotes, the only exception being purely routine notations.

The editorial notes have been kept to the minimum necessary for the factual elucidation of the text. They do not attempt interpretation except where this is necessary to establish the date or identity of a document. No attempt is made to correct German reports by reference to other sources, even when the German reports present a false or one-sided picture. It is as a source-book for the study of history, and not as a finished interpretation of history, that these documents are presented.

## PREFACE TO VOLUME I, SERIES D

The responsibility for the selection of the documents printed in this volume rests with the American and British editors acting jointly, although they have had the advice of the French editors in the later stages. The translations were made in the Division of Language Services of the Department of State and reviewed by the American editors. The responsibility for the editorial notes also rests with the American editors. They wish to record their gratitude to the many officers of the Department of State and to the American political and military authorities in Germany who have given assistance at every stage of the work. On questions of policy the American editors have profited from the advice of an Advisory Committee, the members of which are Sidney B. Fay, Guy Stanton Ford, Carlton J. H. Hayes, Hajo Holborn, William L. Langer, Conyers Read, Bernadotte E. Schmitt, and Charles Seymour.

The series of which this is the first volume will contain documents important for an understanding of German foreign policy from September 1937. That date is a logical starting point for the study of the immediate origins of World War II. The visit of Mussolini to Berlin ended all doubt of the firmness of the Axis; the visit of Lord Halifax to Germany in November 1937 was the first major step in the Anglo-French policy of appeasement; from the autumn of 1937 those objectives and methods of German diplomacy which had earlier been only sporadically apparent came increasingly to dominate German foreign policy.

To print only documents dating from September 1937 for all problems and for the relations of Germany with all countries would, however, give a misleading impression; very often, events after September 1937 are inextricably linked to earlier events. For each problem, therefore, the presentation of the evidence is begun at the date which marks the beginning of a definite stage in the development of that problem.

The documents in this volume center around two main topics: the relations between Germany and the other Great Powers in 1937-1938, and the annexation of Austria in March 1938. The relations of Germany with the Great Powers are not completely treated here. Where they converge on Czechoslovakia or on the Spanish Civil War, the relevant documents are reserved for printing in Volumes II and III,

respectively. Documents on German relations with the smaller powers in 1937-1938 will form a part of Volume IV. However, documents on German relations with the Holy See are printed in this volume because these relations so obviously affected opinion in other countries. For an understanding of the annexation of Austria there is no suitable starting point later than the agreement of July 11, 1936; subsequent Austro-German negotiations are invariably related to that agreement.

Readers of these documents will soon become aware of one peculiarity of German diplomacy under Hitler: the fact that for a long period of time there might be not one, but several, German policies, and that the adherents of one policy might be in partial or complete ignorance of what the adherents of other policies were doing. On October 19, 1937, for instance, the Foreign Ministry stated that Germany preferred a separate Italo-Japanese agreement rather than the adherence of Italy to the German-Japanese Anti-Comintern Agreement. On October 20, however, the Italians were told by one of Ribbentrop's agents that Germany wished Italy to adhere to the German-Japanese Agreement. Again, in the history of German relations with Austria there were, almost to the end, several German policies. These divisions within the German Government were of great importance, particularly because they so often confused and misled other governments. It is necessary, therefore, to bear in mind that, at least until Hitler had spoken, and not always even then, it was not safe to assume that any line of policy or any expression of opinion represented settled German policy.

It should also be borne in mind that German foreign policy was the concern of many individuals, such as Göring, and of many agencies, particularly Party organizations, outside the Foreign Ministry, and that, consequently, the Foreign Ministry archives do not always contain all the evidence needed for an understanding of policy. Usually, however, some indication of these activities finds its way into the Foreign Ministry documents, so that the fact of outside activity can be established, even though it cannot be observed in detail. Even where parts of the Foreign Ministry archives are known to be missing, sufficient evidence has survived to give a substantially complete story of one of the most fateful years in modern history.

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# ANALYTICAL LIST OF DOCUMENTS

## CHAPTER I. GERMANY AND THE GREAT POWERS OF WESTERN EUROPE, SEPTEMBER 30, 1937-MARCH 11, 1938

### A. THE SETTING, SEPTEMBER 30-NOVEMBER 10, 1937

Date and Doc. No.	Subject	Page
1937 Sept. 30 1	<i>The German Foreign Ministry to All German Diplomatic Missions in Europe and to the Consulate General at Geneva</i> During Mussolini's visit to Germany <i>rapprochement</i> with Britain was discussed; there was recognition of the special interests of Italy in the Mediterranean and particularly in Spain, and of Germany in Austria.	1
Oct. 2 2	<i>Memorandum</i> Enclosing an account of conversations with Mussolini, who expressed his views on exiles, racialism, British foreign policy, the Axis, various diplomats, the Spanish Civil War, and the rights and duties of the masses.	2
Oct. 2 3	<i>Memorandum</i> The French Ambassador complained of the tone of Mussolini's speeches in Germany; Mackensen was reassuring.	7
Oct. 5 4	<i>The German Chargé d'Affaires in Great Britain (Woermann) to the German Foreign Ministry</i> In response to protests against the anti-German statements of Herbert Morrison, the British Foreign Office expressed regret but stated that no action was possible.	9
Oct. 8 5	<i>The German Ambassador in Italy (Hassell) to the German Foreign Ministry</i> Ciano and Mussolini are much pleased by the results of the visit to Germany, and much impressed by Nazi achievements.	10
Oct. 13 6	<i>The German Consul General at Milan (Bene) to the German Foreign Ministry</i> On his official tour he found the South Tyrolese confused by the visit of Mussolini to Germany, but confident that Hitler would not forget them.	11
Oct. 15 7	<i>Memorandum</i> A review of Franco-German relations.	12
Oct. 19 8	<i>Memorandum by the Foreign Minister</i> The French Ambassador reported that opinion in France was much disturbed by Italian policy, particularly in Spain; Neurath blamed France for the situation in Spain; Czechoslovakia was also discussed.	13
Oct. 19 9	<i>The German Foreign Ministry to the German Embassy in Italy</i> Both Germany and Japan prefer an Italo-Japanese agreement rather than Italian accession to the German-Japanese Anti-Comintern Agreement.	15

CHAPTER I. GERMANY AND THE GREAT POWERS OF WESTERN EUROPE,  
SEPTEMBER 30, 1937-MARCH 11, 1938—Continued

Date and Doc. No.	Subject	Page
1937 Oct. 20 10	<i>The German Ambassador in Italy (Hassell) to the German Foreign Ministry</i> When told the purpose of Ribbentrop's visit, Ciano reviewed his discussions with Japan; he was puzzled by the sudden proposal that a tripartite agreement be signed, and incredulous when told the German-Japanese Anti-Comintern Agreement contained no secret provisions.	16
Oct. 26 11	<i>The German Ambassador in Italy (Hassell) to the German Foreign Ministry</i> A discussion with the British Ambassador on the prospects for an Anglo-Italian agreement.	18
Oct. 27 12	<i>The German Ambassador in Italy (Hassell) to the German Foreign Ministry</i> Italy will not be in a financial position to wage war for 5 to 10 years; the Spanish undertaking is a heavy drain, with only the concealed import of ore as recompense; the Six Year Plan will fail.	19
Oct. 27 13	<i>The German Minister in Belgium (Richthofen) to the German Foreign Ministry</i> Eden would like to meet with Neurath in Brussels.	20
Oct. 29 14	<i>The German Ambassador in Italy (Hassell) to the German Foreign Ministry</i> Eden had requested a conference with Ciano at Brussels; Ciano had rejected the proposal, and requested that the German Government also decline.	21
Oct. 31 15	<i>The German Foreign Ministry to the German Minister in the Union of South Africa (Leitner)</i> A review of the attitude of South Africa toward German colonial claims, and a request that South Africa be induced to urge the British Government to initiate colonial discussions.	22
Nov. 2 16	<i>The German Chargé d'Affaires in Great Britain (Woermann) to the German Foreign Ministry</i> Eden's speech of November 1 contains attacks on Italy and Germany, and shows a desire to be on good terms with Franco.	25
Nov. 6 17	<i>Protocol</i> Accession of Italy to the German-Japanese Anti-Comintern Agreement of November 25, 1936; Italy is to be considered an original signatory.	26
Nov. 10 18	<i>The German Ambassador in Italy (Hassell) to the German Foreign Ministry</i> Opinions of various diplomats in Rome on the importance of the Anti-Comintern Agreement.	27
Nov. 10 19	<i>Memorandum</i> The Hossbach Memorandum, summarizing Hitler's views on foreign policy. Since neither autarchy nor increased participation in the world economy provided a solution, the aim was to win space for the German racial community. Conquest of Czechoslovakia and Austria would provide this space. These conquests must be made by 1943-45, and very probably French internal paralysis or an Anglo-French war against Italy would permit their conquest in 1938.	29

CHAPTER I. GERMANY AND THE GREAT POWERS OF WESTERN EUROPE,  
SEPTEMBER 30, 1937-MARCH 11, 1938—Continued

## B. THE VISIT OF LORD HALIFAX, NOVEMBER 1937

Date and Doc. No.	Subject	Page
1937 Nov. 10 20	<i>The German Chargé d'Affaires in Great Britain (Woermann) to the German Foreign Ministry</i> Tells of a report in the <i>Evening Standard</i> that Lord Halifax was to visit Germany to discuss Anglo-German relations with Hitler.	39
Nov. 10 21	<i>Memorandum</i> An outline by Weizsäcker of a possible agreement between Britain and Germany, based on the assumption that Germany could not for a long time consider fighting a war with Britain as an opponent, and that time was in Britain's favor.	40
Nov. 11 22	<i>The German Ambassador in Austria (Papen) to the German Foreign Minister</i> Encloses a memorandum summarizing the report he had made to Hitler on his visit to Paris. From conversations with French statesmen he concludes that, internally and in world politics, France is growing stronger, and that Germany should, therefore, take advantage of the present eagerness of France to effect a lasting settlement with Germany.	41
Nov. 13 23	<i>The German Foreign Ministry to all German Embassies and Legations and to the Consulate General at Geneva</i> In recent speeches by British Ministers, the League is either ignored or called a failure; in conversations, point this out.	45
Nov. 15 24	<i>The German Ambassador in Great Britain (Ribbentrop) to the German Foreign Ministry</i> Halifax expresses pleasure at the opportunity to discuss Austria, Czechoslovakia, and colonies with Hitler; an Anglo-German conflict would mean the end of civilization.	46
Nov. 15 25	<i>Memorandum</i> The British Chargé d'Affaires expressed alarm at the Nazi press reaction to British press reports on Halifax's visit; Mackensen said the British Government must put pressure on the press.	47
Nov. 16 26	<i>The German Ambassador in Italy (Hassell) to the German Foreign Ministry</i> Ciano did not believe in British good will, and therefore expected nothing from Halifax's visit; Ciano had declined a second invitation to meet Eden in Brussels.	49
Nov. 17 27	<i>The German Ambassador in Italy (Hassell) to the German Foreign Ministry</i> Ciano did not think the adherence of other states to the Anti-Comintern Agreement desirable now; Neurath, in a marginal note, concurs.	49
Nov. 17 28	<i>The German Minister in Ireland (Hempel) to the German Foreign Ministry</i> The Irish believe that the Anti-Comintern Agreement strikes mainly at Britain; that Britain, realizing her weakened position, is eager for an agreement with Germany, and that Halifax's attitude will be affected by the impression he receives of the religious situation in Germany.	50

CHAPTER I. GERMANY AND THE GREAT POWERS OF WESTERN EUROPE,  
SEPTEMBER 30, 1937-MARCH 11, 1938—Continued

Date and Doc. No.	Subject	Page
1937 Nov. 18 29	<i>The German Embassy in Great Britain to the German Foreign Ministry</i> Chamberlain's press chief told the D.N.B. representative that the German press was hurting Anglo-German relations by reports of differences between Chamberlain and Eden, and that, while Halifax's visit was an important beginning, a <i>rapprochement</i> could come only slowly.	52
Nov. 19 30	<i>Memorandum</i> Mackensen told the Italian Ambassador that he had no knowledge of an invitation to Neurath to visit London.	54
Nov. 20 31	<i>The German Foreign Minister to the British Ambassador in Germany (Henderson)</i> Enclosing a memorandum summarizing Halifax's conversation with Hitler. The main problems discussed were disarmament, colonies, Austria, Czechoslovakia, Danzig, the League of Nations, and the question of whether subsequent negotiations were to be through normal diplomatic channels or by direct contact of leading statesmen. There was much discussion of the influence of parties and the press on foreign policy, and of the relative advantages of a general settlement or of agreement on specific issues by the powers immediately involved.	54
Nov. 22 32	<i>The German Ambassador in Great Britain (Ribbentrop) to the German Foreign Ministry</i> Has received no information on the Halifax visit.	68
Nov. 22 33	<i>The German Foreign Ministry to the German Embassies in Italy, Great Britain, France, and the United States</i> Halifax's visit was satisfactory, although there were no concrete results; his conversation with Hitler summarized.	68

## C. THE TRAVELS OF M. DELBOS, NOVEMBER-DECEMBER 1937

1937 Nov. 22 34	<i>The Head of the Political Department in the German Foreign Ministry (Weizsäcker) to the German Ambassador in Italy (Hassell)</i> Passes on a report that Italy had been pressing for an agreement with Britain.	71
Nov. 23 35	<i>The Head of the Political Department in the German Foreign Ministry (Weizsäcker) to the German Ambassador in Austria (Papen)</i> What, specifically, is France willing and able to do, particularly in eastern Europe, to get a general agreement with Germany?	72
Nov. 23 36	<i>The German Chargé d'Affaires in Poland (Wühlisch) to the German Foreign Ministry</i> While in Warsaw, Bullitt is reported to have championed French policy, and urged Poland to support that policy.	73

CHAPTER I. GERMANY AND THE GREAT POWERS OF WESTERN EUROPE,  
SEPTEMBER 30, 1937-MARCH 11, 1938—Continued

Date and Doc. No.	Subject	Page
1937 Nov. 24 37	<i>Telephone Message From London, November 24, 1937, 1 p.m.</i> After inquiry had been made at the British Foreign Office, the German Embassy was told that the British Government had invited Chautemps and Delbos to London; the purpose was to reassure the French concerning the visit of Halifax to Germany.	74
Nov. 24 38	<i>The German Foreign Ministry to the German Embassy in Italy</i> Gives the text of Neurath's letter to Ciano summarizing the results of Halifax's visit, emphasizing the British desire for a general settlement, with quadripartite discussions as the final goal.	75
Nov. 24 39	<i>The German Ambassador in Italy (Hassell) to the German Foreign Ministry</i> Ciano thinks that Halifax's visit was not very successful; the Anglo-Italian negotiations had not been resumed.	76
Nov. 25 40	<i>Memorandum</i> To end misleading reports, Berlin editors had been told that Germany was through with the League and collectivism; if other countries made a return to Geneva a condition for negotiations, and this was presumably the British position, negotiations were impossible.	77
Nov. 25 41	<i>The German Minister in Czechoslovakia (Eisenlohr) to the German Foreign Ministry</i> Conflicting statements about the Halifax visit have created uneasiness in Prague.	78
Nov. 25 42	<i>The German Embassy in Great Britain to the German Foreign Ministry</i> An informant's report on the requests France was supposed to have made to Britain before Halifax's visit.	79
Nov. 26 43	<i>The German Embassy in Great Britain to the German Foreign Ministry</i> Describes British press reports on Halifax's visit.	79
Nov. 27 44	<i>Minute</i> The Italian Ambassador remarked to Weizsäcker that there had been differences between the official and the Party treatment of the Halifax visit.	80
Nov. 27 45	<i>The German Chargé d'Affaires in the Soviet Union (Tippelskirch) to the German Foreign Ministry</i> The first press commentaries on Halifax's visit reflect alarm over the ignoring of the U.S.S.R.	81
Nov. 27 46	<i>The German Ambassador in France (Welczek) to the German Foreign Minister</i> The Halifax visit was regarded from the beginning with uneasiness, which the invitation to the French Ministers only partly removed; the Ministers themselves seem confident of continued Anglo-French solidarity.	81

CHAPTER I. GERMANY AND THE GREAT POWERS OF WESTERN EUROPE,  
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Date and Doc. No.	Subject	Page
1937 Nov. 30 47	<i>The German Ambassador in Great Britain (Ribbentrop) to the German Foreign Ministry</i> The visit of the French Ministers is encouraging in that Britain and France state that Halifax's visit produced a more favorable atmosphere and that the colonial question will be examined; however, the insistence on a general settlement continues.	84
Dec. 1 48	<i>The German Ambassador in Great Britain (Ribbentrop) to the German Foreign Ministry</i> In confidential statements to the British press, Eden said that the conversations with the French had covered all problems, and that there had been agreement on all; the colonial question could be solved only as part of a general settlement in which all interested powers must participate.	86
Dec. 2 49	<i>The German Ambassador in France (Welzbeck) to the German Foreign Ministry</i> The French press and Government are satisfied with the conversations in London, and feel that Delbos starts on his eastern visits backed by Britain in his desire to secure mutual assistance pacts.	87
Dec. 2 50	<i>The German Ambassador in Great Britain (Ribbentrop) to the German Foreign Ministry</i> Eden tells of the positions taken by the British in the talks with the French Ministers: examination of the colonial question in connection with a security agreement; solution for Austrian and Czech difficulties with Germany, without resort to force; initiation of negotiations with Italy. On all points France was in agreement.	88
Dec. 2 51	<i>The German Ambassador in Great Britain (Ribbentrop) to the German Foreign Ministry</i> Suggests that the press constantly refer to Germany's claim to all her former colonies, stressing that this claim is not a bargaining point and therefore is not connected with political questions.	91
Dec. 2 52	<i>The German Foreign Ministry to the German Legation in Portugal</i> Deny rumors that Germany, during the Halifax visit, suggested that the Belgian Congo and Angola be placed under German control.	92
Dec. 2 53	<i>Minute</i> The Polish Chargé d'Affaires insistently stated to Weizsäcker that Beck wished to know the purport of the Halifax conversations before talking with Delbos.	92
Dec. 2 54	<i>Memorandum</i> With certain omissions and changes of emphasis, the Polish Chargé d'Affaires was given an account of the Halifax conversations by Weizsäcker.	93

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Date and Doc. No.	Subject	Page
1937 Dec. 3 55	<i>Memorandum by the Foreign Minister</i> In conversation with Neurath, Delbos gave assurances that in his London visit there was no talk of blocking German development, and that there was no such purpose in his trip to Central Europe; Neurath complained that the communiqué on the London visit suggested an attempt to dictate to Germany, and that the western press was filled with malicious lies.	94
Dec. 4 56	<i>The German Foreign Ministry to the German Embassy in Poland and the German Legations in Czechoslovakia, Rumania, and Yugoslavia</i> Since it was to be expected that Delbos would repeat the French complaints that the offer of an understanding, made to Schacht, had been ignored, a review of this episode is given to demonstrate that France was responsible for the failure.	95
Dec. 4 57	<i>The German Foreign Ministry to Various German Diplomatic Missions</i> Summarizes reports on the Anglo-French talks in London so far as they concerned Central Europe. Asks for reports on Delbos' activities, particularly as they concern a general mutual assistance pact.	97
Dec. 4 58	<i>Memorandum</i> In response to an inquiry, Weizsäcker told the Italian Ambassador most of what Ribbentrop had reported on the Anglo-French talks.	98
Dec. 4 59	<i>The German Ambassador in Great Britain (Ribbentrop) to the German Foreign Ministry</i> Details the ways in which the account of the Anglo-French talks given by Eden to Grandi differed from that given to Ribbentrop.	99
Dec. 4 60	<i>The German Embassy in Great Britain to the German Foreign Ministry</i> On a report that Halifax said he had discussed Belgium and Angola with some important person in Berlin.	100
Dec. 4 61	<i>The German Minister in Portugal (Huene) to the German Foreign Ministry</i> On the rumor that Schacht had discussed Angola with Halifax.	100
Dec. 4 62	<i>The German Ambassador in Italy (Hassell) to the German Foreign Ministry</i> After describing Grandi's conversation with Eden, Ciano said the British would be told that Italy was ready to negotiate at any time if the question of recognition of the Empire was included; there was no reason for conversations with France.	101
Dec. 4 63	<i>The German Ambassador in Austria (Papen) to the Head of the Political Department in the German Foreign Ministry (Weizsäcker)</i> Had received the impression that France was very ready for a settlement, not only of the colonial question, but of Central European questions, on the basis of an evolutionary extension of German influence.	102

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Date and Doc. No.	Subject	Page
1937 Dec. 7 64	<i>The German Chargé d'Affaires in Poland (Wühlisch) to the German Foreign Ministry</i> Delbos' visit took place in a cordial atmosphere, but was without concrete results.	104
Dec. 7 65	<i>The German Minister in Rumania (Fabricius) to the German Foreign Ministry</i> Doubts if Delbos will bring up the question of a mutual assistance pact, and is certain Rumania would refuse to conclude such a pact.	107
Dec. 10 66	<i>The German Ambassador in France (Welczeck) to the German Foreign Ministry</i> The French regard the conversation between Delbos and Neurath as a good beginning for a <i>détente</i> .	109
Dec. 11 67	<i>The German Chargé d'Affaires in Italy (Plessen) to the German Foreign Ministry</i> Ciano said in confidence that tonight the Fascist Grand Council would decide to withdraw from the League.	109
Dec. 11 68	<i>The German Ambassador in Poland (Moltke) to the German Foreign Ministry</i> Beck optimistically reviewed the international situation, emphasizing the similarity of German and Polish interests; he said Delbos had not proposed any new groupings for Eastern Europe.	110
Dec. 13 69	<i>The German Minister in Rumania (Fabricius) to the German Foreign Ministry</i> In his conversations, Delbos expressed optimism about the prospects for a Franco-German agreement; his visit confirmed Franco-Rumanian friendship, although no political agreement was signed.	113

D. THE BASES FOR A SETTLEMENT WITH FRANCE, DECEMBER 1937

1937 Dec. 13 70	<i>Memorandum</i> François-Poncet complained that, after Schacht's visit in the spring of 1936, Berlin had not responded to the suggestion for an agreement; instead of talking with Britain and France, Germany had gone over to bloc politics; the results would be disastrous for Germany, as the United States would side with France and Britain. Rintelen made no detailed reply.	117
Dec. 13 71	<i>Memorandum</i> François-Poncet's remarks are evidently explained by the fact that Blum had proposed negotiation to Schacht; Schacht's memorandum only recently came to Weizsäcker's attention.	118
May 25-29 72	<i>Memorandum</i> Schacht's detailed account of his visit to Paris in May 1937; Blum said, as an official communication, that France was ready for negotiations on a general settlement with Germany and that he awaited a German reply.	119

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Date and Doc. No.	Subject	Page
1937		
Dec. 14 73	<i>The German Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Schulenburg) to the German Foreign Ministry</i> The failure of Delbos to visit Moscow created in authoritative Soviet circles the uneasy feeling of being ignored, and every effort is being made to make the French believe that the U.S.S.R. is a more reliable ally than Poland.	122
Dec. 14 74	<i>The German Ambassador in Great Britain (Ribbentrop) to the German Foreign Ministry</i> Eden said that a considerable delay seemed inevitable before Britain and France would be ready to begin negotiations with Germany.	124
Dec. 14 75	<i>The German Ambassador in Great Britain (Ribbentrop) to the German Foreign Ministry</i> Despite Ribbentrop's objections, Halifax insisted that Britain must receive something in return for concessions in the colonial field; Halifax seems at least skeptical about the outcome of the negotiations.	124
Dec. 14 76	<i>The German Foreign Ministry to the German Embassy in France</i> Expressing approval of Italy's withdrawal from the League.	125
Dec. 14 77	<i>The German Foreign Ministry to the German Legation in the Union of South Africa</i> A note for the South African Government, stating that Germany never assented to the idea that the future of Southwest Africa lay with the Union.	126
Dec. 15 78	<i>Minute</i> Prentiss Gilbert believes that the British Cabinet is divided on the best method to conduct the Anglo-German negotiations, with Eden leading one group and Hoare the other; Gilbert believes Germany must handle British opinion carefully.	127
Dec. 16 79	<i>The German Minister in the Union of South Africa (Leitner) to the German Foreign Ministry</i> The desire for a quick colonial settlement with Germany is decreasing, and confidence that Southwest Africa can be retained is rising; a public declaration of Germany's colonial demands is needed to offset these tendencies.	128
Dec. 16 80	<i>The German Ambassador in Austria (Papen) to the Head of the Political Department in the German Foreign Ministry (Weizsäcker)</i> Reviews his conversations in Berlin with Hitler and with François-Poncet; the latter urged that if colonies were to be ceded, in return European peace must be strengthened.	129

CHAPTER I. GERMANY AND THE GREAT POWERS OF WESTERN EUROPE,  
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Date and Doc. No.	Subject	Page
1937 Dec. 17 81	<i>The German Ambassador in Great Britain (Ribbentrop) to the German Foreign Ministry</i> Chamberlain said sentiment in Parliament favored a settlement with Germany, but the colonial question would not be ready for discussion before February or March; limitation of armaments, Austria, and Czechoslovakia were discussed, and Ribbentrop refused to link these with colonies; Ribbentrop suggested that the repeated rebuffs Hitler had suffered in his efforts for an Anglo-German understanding showed a lack of desire for understanding; this Chamberlain vehemently denied.	131
Dec. 17 82	<i>Memorandum by the Chief of the Presidential Chancellery (Meissner)</i> In conversation with the chairman of the <i>Comité Franco-Allemand</i> , Hitler said there was nothing which could come between Germany and France; the League should be dissolved and a new organization attempted.	134
Dec. 17 83	<i>Memorandum</i> François-Poncet brought Blum's summary of his conversation with Schacht in May and expressed regret that Germany had shown no willingness to negotiate. In the summary Blum says that neither Britain nor France, but Germany, was responsible for the failure of the earlier discussions; Blum reiterates his desire for a settlement with Germany, but such a settlement should not begin with colonies nor end by making it impossible for France to honor her existing treaty obligations.	135
Dec. 18 84	<i>Second Secret Protocol</i> Lists the products to be exchanged between Germany and Italy for stockpiling, and examines the limitations which transport facilities will impose on this trade in "abnormal" times.	141
Dec. 19 85	<i>The German Minister in Yugoslavia (Heeren) to the German Foreign Ministry</i> Stoyadinovich says that he evaded discussion of a mutual assistance pact during Delbos' visit.	147
Dec. 20 86	<i>Memorandum</i> Weizsäcker supports the conclusion of an enclosed memorandum by Rintelen, urging that negotiations with Britain for the peaceful alteration of the <i>status quo</i> are to the advantage of Germany even if they fail, while a refusal to negotiate would force Britain to support completely the French policy of alliances in eastern Europe.	147
Dec. 21 87	<i>The Head of the Political Department in the German Foreign Ministry (Weizsäcker) to the German Ambassador in France (Welcke)</i> Summarizes the conversations of Flandin with Neurath, Goebbels, and Göring; evidently Flandin went away with the conviction that there was little in common between German and French views.	152

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1937 Dec. 21 88	<i>The German Foreign Ministry to the German Embassy in France</i> France is seeking to place on Germany the responsibility for failure to reach an understanding; Germany has repulsed, and will continue to oppose, efforts to restrict German freedom of action in Central and Eastern Europe; Germany continues to desire a settlement, but not at the expense of freedom in the east.	154
Dec. 22 89	<i>The German Embassy in Great Britain to the German Foreign Ministry</i> At the second annual dinner of the Anglo-German Fellowship, the fundamental theme was the necessity to promote an understanding.	157
Dec. 23 90	<i>The Head of the Political Department in the German Foreign Ministry (Weizsäcker) to the German Ambassador in France (Welczeck)</i> Believes the French are beginning to realize that they have taken the wrong path in their relations with Germany.	157
Dec. 24 91	<i>The German Foreign Ministry to the German Embassy in France</i> The suggestions for a settlement made by Blum to Schacht would have stabilized the French alliance system and paralyzed German freedom of action; the French apparently now realize the necessity for a new approach; Germany will await the Anglo-French proposals.	158
Dec. 31 92	<i>The German Ambassador in Italy (Hassell) to the German Foreign Ministry</i> Encloses a report from a usually well-informed source, stating that Mussolini is alarmed by the attempts to reach an understanding between Germany and France and England. To the Italians, Germany seems wavering between faith in traditional diplomacy and the new dynamism of the Axis.	161

## E. THE POSSIBILITIES OF AGREEMENT WITH GREAT BRITAIN, JANUARY 1938

1938 Jan. 2 93	<i>Memorandum for the Führer</i> Ribbentrop argues that if Germany advances eastward, France will fight and automatically bring Britain in on her side. The neutrality of France and Britain is probable only if Germany wins quickly and if war would jeopardize the existence of the British Empire. Therefore, while continuing to discuss an Anglo-German settlement, Germany should recognize that Britain is her most dangerous enemy, and should bend every effort to solidify the alliance with Italy and Japan so that Britain will face the prospect of war in the Mediterranean and Asia as well as in Europe; only then will Britain restrain France and seek a settlement with Germany. An understanding is impossible now.	162
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Date and Doc. No.	Subject	Page
1938 Jan. 5 94	<i>The German Ambassador in Italy (Hassell) to the German Foreign Ministry</i> Mussolini was worried by the tension and the lack of understanding in high places; he did not anticipate much good in 1938.	168
Jan. 5 95	<i>The German Embassy in Great Britain to the German Foreign Ministry</i> It could not be said yet whether the appointment of Vansittart as Chief Diplomatic Adviser was a promotion or a demotion, but it was not likely that one of the outstanding British diplomats had lost his influence.	169
Jan. 10 96	<i>The Head of the Political Department in the German Foreign Ministry (Weizsäcker) to the German Ambassador in Austria (Papen)</i> Until recently, France hoped to induce Germany to give up her freedom in the east in exchange for colonies; there are now signs that France and England realize that Germany cannot simply be blocked; this encourages hopes of a peaceful settlement.	171
Jan. 12 97	<i>The German Minister in Hungary (Erdmannsdorff) to the German Foreign Ministry</i> Ciano said only great powers should be signatories of the Anti-Comintern Agreement; he would welcome the accession of Poland, Spain, and Brazil.	173
Jan. 13 98	<i>Memorandum by the Foreign Minister</i> Henderson asked for patience, particularly in the press, on the colonial question while Chamberlain worked out a proposal; Neurath replied that Germany was patient.	173
Jan. 13 99	<i>Memorandum by the Foreign Minister</i> In an <i>aide-memoire</i> , the British Government asked if Hitler's remarks during his conversation with Halifax meant that Hitler would not be averse to the abolition of bombing airplanes. Neurath replied the first stage would be the prohibition of bombing outside a certain combat zone.	174
Jan. 13 100	<i>Memorandum</i> Weizsäcker argues that limitation of armaments should not be treated negatively in conversations with the British since Germany can make concessions in that field.	175
Jan. 14 101	<i>The German Chargé d'Affaires in Great Britain (Woermann) to the German Foreign Ministry</i> While opinions still differ, it would seem that Vansittart's removal from the Foreign Office resulted from the fact that he was considered too pro-French; a definite change in British foreign policy is unlikely since Cadogan's views seem largely to coincide with Eden's.	176
Jan. 15 102	<i>Memorandum</i> An outline of past attempts to limit armaments; concludes that the most to be hoped for is some limitation of particular weapons of attack and possibly an air pact with the Western Powers.	177

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1938 Jan. 17 103	<i>Minute</i> Weizsäcker suggests that, since Germany can make concessions to Britain in no other field, possible limitations of armament should be discussed with the War Ministry.	182
Jan. 19 104	<i>Memorandum</i> Enclosing a copy of a letter of December 6, 1937, from Lord Londonderry to Mr. Gall arguing that Germany is striving for hegemony and that, unless definite limits are set to German ambitions, further appeasement would lead to war in 1939.	183
Jan. 20 105	<i>Minute</i> Contact is to be established with the War Ministry on possible limitation of armaments. Weizsäcker says Neurath wishes no reply to be made to the British inquiry concerning the abolition of bombing planes.	185
Jan. 25 106	<i>The German Chargé d'Affaires in Great Britain (Woermann) to the German Foreign Ministry</i> The Italian Embassy reports that in the conversation of Grandi with Eden on January 19 the possibility of opening Anglo-Italian discussions was explored but with no more result than earlier.	185
Jan. 26 107	<i>The German Foreign Ministry to Various German Diplomatic Missions</i> A review of the conference of the Rome Protocol states, Italy Hungary, and Austria. The communiqué is compared with information received from the participants. The conference meant a further coordination of the Rome Protocols and the Axis.	186
Jan. 26 108	<i>Memorandum by the Foreign Minister</i> Henderson, before leaving for London for consultation, receives from Neurath the German position on colonies, limitation of bombing, the League of Nations, Czechoslovakia, and Austria; Neurath steadily insists that Germany will not make concessions on other questions in order to obtain colonies.	190
Jan. 26 109	<i>The German Chargé d'Affaires in Great Britain (Woermann) to the Head of the Political Department in the German Foreign Ministry (Weizsäcker)</i> Cadogan said that it would be some time before Britain would be ready to take up the subjects discussed by Halifax and Hitler.	191
Jan. 29 110	<i>The German Ambassador in France (Welzcek) to the German Foreign Ministry</i> A review of Communist activity in France, and the results of this activity for the Popular Front.	192

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## F. ANGLO-ITALIAN CONVERSATIONS BEGUN, FEBRUARY 1938

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1938		
Feb. 10 111	<i>Memorandum by the Foreign Minister</i> In conversation with Ribbentrop, the Italian Ambassador reviewed the recent Anglo-Italian conversation and said that, since Britain was now prepared to discuss the recognition of the Roman Empire, negotiations could begin, although the prospects for success were poor.	195
Feb. 11 112	<i>Memorandum</i> Strempel and Welzsücker tell of reports that Henderson has returned from England with the offer of a "generous" colonial settlement; in return, Germany was to make a contribution to safeguard peace.	197
Feb. 11 113	<i>The German Chargé d'Affaires in Great Britain (Woermann) to the German Foreign Ministry</i> A discussion with Grandi of the differences of opinion within the British Government on the subject of appeasement of the Axis.	198
Feb. 11 114	<i>The German Ambassador in France (Welczeck) to the German Foreign Ministry</i> The British and French Navies, like the Air Forces, work together, although probably no written agreement exists.	199
Feb. 12 115	<i>Memorandum</i> Mackensen reviews the subjects likely to be taken up by the French Ambassador in his first conversation with Ribbentrop.	200
Undated 116	<i>The German Embassy in Italy to the German Foreign Ministry</i> Italy will not decline negotiations with Britain, but will not initiate or hasten them; Eden has made it clear that recognition of the Roman Empire is to be used to get Italy out of Spain.	202
Feb. 17 117	<i>The German Chargé d'Affaires in Great Britain (Woermann) to the German Foreign Ministry</i> The British Government is glad that Henderson will see Hitler before February 20.	205
Feb. 17 118	<i>Minute</i> Magistrati complained to Welzsücker of German activities in South Tyrol, giving specific examples.	205
Feb. 18 119	<i>The German Chargé d'Affaires in Great Britain (Woermann) to the German Foreign Ministry</i> Grandi reported a long but inconclusive conversation with Chamberlain and Eden on the possibility of an Anglo-Italian agreement.	207
Feb. 21 120	<i>The German Chargé d'Affaires in Great Britain (Woermann) to the German Foreign Ministry</i> The immediate cause of Eden's resignation was divergence over conversations with Italy, but the more profound divergence was over Germany; for the present, Chamberlain is stronger, but one must continue to reckon with Eden.	208

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1938 Feb. 21 121	<i>The German Chargé d'Affaires in Great Britain (Woermann) to the German Foreign Ministry</i> According to Chamberlain's speech, the Italians asked for conversations, and since they accepted the British proposals, conversations would begin in Rome after the British Ambassador had received instructions.	210
Feb. 22 122	<i>Memorandum</i> The Italian Counselor of Embassy said the initiative for Anglo-Italian conversations had been taken by the British.	210
Feb. 23 123	<i>Memorandum by the Foreign Minister</i> Italy gives assurance that the negotiations with Britain, which will include all pending problems, will not impair the Axis.	212
Feb. 23 124	<i>Memorandum</i> François-Poncet complained that Germany was increasingly aggressive in Czechoslovakia and Austria, while Chamberlain was turning to Germany and Italy without regard for French interests; Neurath said France should recall the fate of Napoleon III.	212
Feb. 24 125	<i>The German Ambassador in France (Welczeck) to the German Foreign Ministry</i> The French feel that recent events, particularly the fall of Eden, strike at the foundations of French foreign policy; attacked from the right and the left, the Government is waiting to see the results of Chamberlain's conciliation of the Axis.	214
Feb. 25 126	<i>The German Foreign Ministry to the German Embassies in France, Poland, and Italy</i> Woermann and Grandi agree that Chamberlain will stress the cooperation of the Anglo-French and Italo-German groups, excluding the Soviet Union; if Chamberlain fails, a new government headed by Eden and including Churchill is possible.	217
Feb. 25 127	<i>The German Chargé d'Affaires in Great Britain (Woermann) to the German Foreign Ministry</i> A review of the relations between Eden and Chamberlain. The central differences, which existed from the outset, were over the League and over relations with Italy, Germany, and the Soviet Union.	218
Feb. 25 128	<i>Memorandum</i> Butler said the Eden crisis meant the decline of the old pro-French foreign service and the ascendancy of the new generation of men like Neville Henderson. Butler is sympathetic toward Germany; Sir Horace Wilson, Chamberlain's closest adviser, is decidedly pro-German.	223
Feb. 25 129	<i>The German Chargé d'Affaires in Italy (Plessen) to the German Foreign Ministry</i> Encloses an agent's report stating that the drift of German policy, particularly in Austria, has awakened fear in Italy that Germany may weaken the Axis and end the possibility of agreement between the Axis and the Western Powers.	225

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1938 Feb. 28 130	<i>Memorandum</i> Chamberlain had told Grandi that he and Halifax thought the Axis was a pillar of peace; Chamberlain wished to negotiate with Berlin also.	227

G. CONVERSATIONS WITH GREAT BRITAIN BEGUN, AND INTERRUPTED, MARCH 1938

1938 Mar. 1 131	<i>Memorandum by the Foreign Minister</i> The British Ambassador asked for an audience with Hitler to make a positive proposal concerning the colonial question; in return, something in the way of security must be offered the British people.	228
Mar. 1 132	<i>The German Ambassador in France (Welczeck) to the German Foreign Ministry</i> Flandin, who has been trying to be the spokesman for a policy of understanding with Germany, proposed solutions of the Austrian and Czech questions and warned that, by pushing the armaments race, Germany and Italy were driving an impoverished Europe to Bolshevism.	228
Mar. 1 133	<i>The German Ambassador in France (Welczeck) to the German Foreign Ministry</i> Reviews the recent parliamentary debates on French foreign policy, concluding that the resoluteness of French policy is crippled by the domestic situation and that, despite many words about unity in face of danger, there is doubt whether the country can concentrate its forces.	231
Mar. 2 134	<i>The German Chargé d'Affaires in the Soviet Union (Tippelskirch) to the German Foreign Ministry</i> Has learned that the French Ambassador had protested against Stalin's assertion that it was the duty of the working classes in other countries to organize to aid the Soviet Union in war.	235
Mar. 3 135	<i>The British Ambassador in Germany (Henderson) to the German Foreign Ministry</i> The British Government feel that the press must be told of Hitler's interview with Henderson.	235
Mar. 3 136	<i>Memorandum by the Foreign Minister</i> Ribbentrop gave Magistrati a communication of the British Government to the French Government stating that Britain desires to learn German views on colonies, and what contribution Germany is prepared to make regarding Southeastern Europe and disarmament. Ribbentrop then gave a summary of the conversation between Hitler and Henderson. Magistrati gave a copy of Chamberlain's statement to Grandi on British recognition of the Axis and desire for a treaty with Germany as well as Italy.	236

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SEPTEMBER 30, 1937-MARCH 11, 1938—Continued

Date and Doc. No.	Subject	Page
1938 Undated 137	<i>Memorandum</i> A draft statement of the German position on the colonial question: Germany demands as a right the return of her former colonies; until concrete proposals are made, Germany can take no stand on a possible exchange of German colonies for other territories.	239
Mar. 4 138	<i>The German Foreign Minister to the British Ambassador in Germany (Henderson)</i> Enclosing a memorandum summarizing the conversation between Henderson and Hitler on March 3. Henderson outlined a possible colonial settlement, stressed British interest in the limitation of armaments, and stated that apprehension over German intentions in Austria and Czechoslovakia made a general settlement more difficult. Hitler denounced the British press, said that if necessary Germany would fight to protect Germans from injustice, intimated that the U.S.S.R. made arms limitation impossible, and refused to discuss the colonial proposal.	240
Mar. 4 139	<i>The British Ambassador in Germany (Henderson) to the German Foreign Minister</i> Henderson denies that, in his conversation with Hitler, he said he had spoken in favor of the <i>Anschluss</i> , and requests that this paragraph be omitted.	249
Mar. 4 140	<i>The British Ambassador in Germany (Henderson) to the German Foreign Minister</i> To rectify a misapprehension in Hitler's mind, describes the composition and functions of the new committee for co-ordination of British publicity abroad.	250
Mar. 5 141	<i>Draft Letter From the Foreign Minister to the British Ambassador in Germany (Henderson)</i> The passage to which Henderson objected has been eliminated from the summary of his conversation with Hitler; Ribbentrop requests the insertion of an additional paragraph on German colonial claims.	251
Mar. 5 142	<i>The British Ambassador in Germany (Henderson) to the German Foreign Minister</i> Accepts the additional paragraph, with the omission of one word.	251
Mar. 6 143	<i>The German Foreign Minister to the British Ambassador in Germany (Henderson)</i> Will transmit to Hitler Henderson's letter on the committee on publicity.	252
Mar. 8 144	<i>Memorandum by the Foreign Minister</i> Ribbentrop told Magistrati Italy would be informed of the German reply to the very vague British proposals.	252

CHAPTER I. GERMANY AND THE GREAT POWERS OF WESTERN EUROPE.  
SEPTEMBER 30, 1937-MARCH 11, 1938-Continued

Date and Doc. No.	Subject	Page
1938 Mar. 10 145	<i>Memorandum</i> A summary by Halifax, to which additional material from a German summary has been added, of his conversation with Ribbentrop. The topics discussed were colonies, limitation of armaments, Austria, and Czechoslovakia. Halifax stressed the desire of the British for a general settlement, his disappointment with the Hitler-Henderson conversation, and his fear that German action in Austria might precipitate a general war. Ribbentrop praised Chamberlain's realistic policy, and repeated the arguments Hitler had used when talking with Henderson.	253
Mar. 10 146	<i>The German Foreign Minister to the Führer and Chancellor</i> On the basis of his conversations, concludes that Chamberlain wishes an agreement and that, since his policy is based on peace, his continuance in office serves German interests; if Germany acts quickly in Austria, the other powers will not intervene.	262
Mar. 10 147	<i>Memorandum</i> A German summary of the first part of the Halifax-Ribbentrop conversation; the objectives of German policy are emphasized.	264
Mar. 10 148	<i>Memorandum</i> In conversation with Erich Kordt, Sir Horace Wilson urges that Germany recognize the British desire for an understanding, and the advantages of such an understanding.	269
Mar. 11 149	<i>Memorandum by the Foreign Minister</i> Inskip, in conversation with Ribbentrop, said England would not interfere in Austria unless Germany used force; if there was a conflict, England could become involved.	272
Mar. 11 150	<i>Memorandum by the Foreign Minister</i> While Ribbentrop was talking with Chamberlain and Halifax, telegrams were brought in saying that Schuschnigg had been forced to cancel the plebiscite in Austria and that Schuschnigg's resignation had been demanded. The reaction of Chamberlain was much less violent than that of Halifax.	273
Mar. 13 151	<i>Memorandum by the Foreign Minister</i> Chamberlain asked Ribbentrop to tell Hitler that it was Chamberlain's firm determination to clear up Anglo-German relations.	276

CHAPTER II. GERMANY AND AUSTRIA, JULY 1936-JULY 1938

A. THE AGREEMENT OF JULY 11, 1936, AND ITS EXECUTION, JULY-OCTOBER 1936

1936 July 11 152	<i>The German-Austrian Agreement of July 11, 1936</i> The secret Gentlemen's Agreement to relax discriminatory restrictions, particularly in the field of cultural activity, to seek a solution of the Austrian <i>émigré</i> problem, to associate members of the "National Opposition" with the Austrian Government, and to pursue a common foreign policy.	278
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1936		
July 11 153	<i>Text of the German-Austrian Communiqué</i> A summary of some provisions of the Gentlemen's Agreement.	281
July 11 154	<i>The German Foreign Ministry to Various German Diplomatic Missions</i> The Austro-German Agreement is to be described as a milestone in Hitler's work for peace.	282
July 11 155	<i>The German Ambassador in Italy (Hassell) to the German Foreign Ministry</i> Mussolini, in a conference with Hassell, welcomed the Austro-German Agreement because Austria would no longer be a football of foreign interests, and because it removed the last mortgage on Italo-German relations; other subjects discussed were the Locarno Treaties, Abyssinia, the Franco-Russian treaty, Czechoslovakia, Turkey, and Danzig.	283
July 13 156	<i>Memorandum</i> The Austrian Minister expressed skepticism concerning the attitude of the Nazi Party toward the Austro-German Agreement; Dieckhoff advised patience.	286
July 14 157	<i>Memorandum</i> Neurath asks that Schuschnigg be requested to avoid discussion of the question of the restoration of the Hapsburgs.	286
July 21 158	<i>The German Ambassador in Austria (Papen) to the German Foreign Ministry</i> A conversation with Schuschnigg on the specific measures necessary to implement the general provisions of the Austro-German Agreement.	287
July 22 159	<i>The Foreign Minister to Ministerial Director Dieckhoff</i> Hitler approves Papen's proposed procedure in the Austrian question.	289
July 23 160	<i>The German Ambassador in Austria (Papen) to the German Foreign Ministry</i> The provisions of the Austrian amnesty; its far-reaching character.	289
July 28 161	<i>The German Ambassador in Austria (Papen) to the Führer and Chancellor</i> After initial confusion, Austrian Nazis are coming to welcome the Austro-German Agreement; the monarchists are disheartened and the clericals are divided; Papen is convinced that real union of Austria with Germany will be possible only after the ending of the conflict between the Church and Germany.	290
Aug. 17 162	<i>Memorandum</i> Efforts of the Foreign Ministry to exclude "radical influences" in Germany from questions growing out of the Austro-German Agreement described by Altenburg.	293
Aug. 29 163	<i>Dr. Karl Megerle to the Foreign Minister</i> Megerle met with an enthusiastic popular reception on a motor trip through Austria; he advises that Guido Schmidt be invited to Berlin because Schmidt had Schuschnigg's confidence and was eager to work with Germany.	294

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1936 Sept. 10 164	<i>Professor Franz Wehofsich to Dr. Altenburg of the German Foreign Ministry</i> Enclosing a bulletin of the Austrian Nazi Party, and directing attention to the prohibition contained therein against communication with Party offices in Germany.	298
Sept. 22 165	<i>Memorandum</i> Altenburg describes the dissension in the Austrian Nazi Party, centering around Leopold. Leopold was in Munich, and Reich Party officials would impress on him the need for compromise.	299
Oct. 1 166	<i>Memorandum</i> The German Military Attaché in Vienna gave a most pessimistic account of the opposition in Austria to the Austro-German Agreement.	300
Oct. 7 167	<i>Memorandum</i> The <i>Auslandsorganisation</i> plans to rebuild the N.S.D.A.P. in Austria; Papen, assisted by an experienced jurist, is to secure an agreement with the Austrian Government.	301
Oct. 12 168	<i>The Reich and Prussian Minister of the Interior (Frick) to the State Secretary and Chief of the Reich Chancellery (Lammers)</i> A request that the questions of German financial support for Austrian <i>émigrés</i> , and of the maintenance of these <i>émigrés</i> in camps in Germany, be reexamined in the light of the Austro-German Agreement. Details of this financial support and of the numbers in camps are given.	302
Oct. 13 169	<i>Memorandum Concerning the Meeting Between the Prussian Minister President, Colonel General Göring, and Austrian Federal Chancellor Schuschnigg</i> Göring was favorably impressed with Schuschnigg and thought it would be possible to work with him. Cooperation on economic and military problems was discussed.	306
Undated 170	<i>Memorandum of the Discussions Concerning the 1936 Budget for the Austrian Hilfswerk, Held on October 13 and 14, 1936, in the Reich and Prussian Ministry of the Interior</i> A detailed analysis of the budget, detailing the operations of the <i>Hilfswerk</i> , with discussion of the probable effects of the Austro-German Agreement on the problem of refugee relief.	309

## B. GUIDO SCHMIDT IN GERMANY, NOVEMBER 1936

1936 Nov. 4 171	<i>The German Ambassador in Austria (Papen) to the Führer and Chancellor</i> The new Austrian Cabinet represents a distinct success for those who support the Austro-German Agreement. The evolution of Austrian politics in a "National" direction has now begun.	314
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1936 Nov. 5 172	<i>The German Foreign Ministry to the German Legation in Austria</i> Economic negotiations are to be opened with Austria but, since an economic agreement is desired by Germany only as a means of securing more satisfactory political conditions, the outcome of the negotiations would be dependent on political developments.	317
Nov. 6 173	<i>The German Foreign Ministry to the German Legation in Austria</i> Tell Schmidt that, during his visit, the German Government wishes to clarify certain parts of the Agreement of July 1936; if he approves this discussion in principle, specific proposals will be made.	319
Nov. 9 174	<i>Memorandum</i> Altenburg lists the German complaints against Austrian execution of the Agreement of July 1936; the complaints are to be brought to Schmidt's attention.	320
Nov. 10 175	<i>The Finance Minister (Schwerin-Krosigk) to the Foreign Ministry</i> Protests on financial grounds against the continuance of assistance to Austrian refugees, giving the amounts expended.	321
Nov. 11 176	<i>The German Foreign Ministry to the Reich and Prussian Ministry of the Interior, etc.</i> Negotiations with Austria have resulted in an agreement for the re-establishment of the N.S.D.A.P. in Austria, and in an understanding that 500 <i>émigrés</i> are to be re-admitted in advance of the amnesty.	322
Nov. 12 177	<i>The German Foreign Ministry to the German Legation in Austria</i> Enclosing the text of a protocol to be signed while Schmidt is in Berlin. The protocol establishes a common policy on Communism and on collaboration with Danubian states, and clarifies numerous provisions of the Agreement of July 11.	325
Nov. 13 178	<i>Memorandum</i> Papen reports Schmidt's comments on the proposed protocol.	328
Undated 179	<i>Protocol</i> The revised German draft protocol, and the Austrian counterproposal, with longhand revisions by Neurath.	329
Nov. 15 180	<i>The German Ambassador in Austria (Papen) to the Foreign Minister</i> Suggestions for an exchange of compliments during Schmidt's visit; Papen's estimate of the Austrian counterproposal for the protocol.	337
Nov. 20 181	<i>The Chief of the Presidential Chancellery (Meissner) to the Foreign Minister</i> Encloses a memorandum summarizing Hitler's conversation with Schmidt. Hitler said that Bolshevism was the determining factor in his policy; he argued against the claims of Hungary to territorial revision; he urged that all authoritarian states leave the League of Nations; he boasted that German rearmament had induced Britain to treat Germany as an equal.	338

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1936 Nov. 21 182	<i>Protocol</i> The text as signed by Neurath and Schmidt. In addition to the promise of a common policy toward Communism and toward coalitions of Danubian states, detailed provision was made for the execution of the Agreement of July 11, 1936.	342
Nov. 21 183	<i>The German Foreign Ministry to Various German Diplomatic Missions</i> Information on Schmidt's visit for guidance in conversation.	346
Nov. 21 184	<i>Memorandum by the Foreign Minister</i> In conversation with Schmidt, Neurath emphasized the necessity for more favorable treatment of the National and National Socialist elements in Austria; otherwise the Agreement of July 11, 1936, would be repudiated by German opinion. Schmidt promised to work in this direction.	347
Nov. 24 185	<i>The German Ambassador in Austria (Papen) to the Führer and Chancellor</i> Schmidt in particular, but also the other members of the Austrian Government, are much pleased by the cordial reception given him; Papen fears that the Austrians, misinterpreting this cordiality, no longer appreciate the necessity for concessions.	348

C. GERMAN DISILLUSIONMENT WITH SCHUSCHNIGG AND PRESSURE ON ITALY,  
NOVEMBER 1936-JANUARY 1937

1936 Nov. 27 186	<i>The German Legation in Austria to the German Foreign Ministry</i> A summary of the speech at Klagenfurt in which Schuschnigg described Austrian Nazism as an enemy of the Government, and denied that the Austro-German Agreement of July 11 had effects on domestic policy.	350
Nov. 28 187	<i>The German Foreign Ministry to the German Legation in Austria</i> Papen is to express Neurath's astonishment at Schuschnigg's Klagenfurt speech.	351
Nov. 28 188	<i>The German Foreign Ministry to Various German Diplomatic Missions and to the Consulate General at Geneva</i> For information only, a full description is given of the subjects discussed with Guido Schmidt: Austro-German relations, the Hapsburg question, Austria's relations with Italy and Czechoslovakia, and Germany's relations with Italy and Yugoslavia.	352
Nov. 28 189	<i>The Foreign Ministry to the Deputy of the Führer (Hess), etc.</i> A summary of the negotiations with Guido Schmidt on press matters and Austrian exiles.	355

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1936 Nov. 30 190	<i>Memorandum by the Counselor of the German Legation in Austria (Stein)</i> Schuschnigg tried to justify his Klagenfurt speech; an extended discussion followed on the possibility of drawing the National Socialists into the Government, on the extent of the Communist danger, on the possibility of restoring the Hapsburgs, on Catholicism in Germany and Austria, and on Czechoslovakia.	358
Dec. 2 191	<i>The German Ambassador in Austria (Papen) to the Führer and Chancellor</i> In reply to Papen's energetic protest against the Klagenfurt address, Schuschnigg asserted his loyalty to the Agreement of July 11 and his desire to effect a reconciliation with Germany. Papen reports discontent with Leopold among the Austrian Nazis.	360
Dec. 18 192	<i>The German Ambassador in Austria (Papen) to the German Foreign Ministry</i> Warns against official Reich interference in Austrian internal affairs through credit-aid to Austrian supporters of National Socialism.	362
Dec. 18 193	<i>The Austrian Section of the Auslandsorganisation of the N.S.D.A.P. to the German Foreign Ministry</i> Intercepted Austrian instructions order harsher treatment for National Socialists than for Communists.	363
1937 Jan. 9 194	<i>The German Ambassador in Austria (Papen) to the Führer and Chancellor</i> Neustädter-Stürmer's proposals for the pacification of the National Opposition will be tested by a request to the Austrian Government for approval of a new organization to promote the German national idea.	364
Jan. 9 195	<i>The German Ambassador in Austria (Papen) to the Führer and Chancellor</i> The Legitimist movement is gaining ground, aided by the Austrian Government.	365
Jan. 12 196	<i>The German Ambassador in Austria (Papen) to the Führer and Chancellor</i> A review of developments in Austria during 1936: the fall of Starhemberg; the antecedents and consequences of the Agreement of July 11; the policy of the other powers toward Austria; the Legitimists and Clericals as enemies of Germany; Papen's view of the future.	366
Jan. 13 197	<i>The State Secretary and Chief of the Presidential Chancellery (Meissner) to the Foreign Minister</i> Hitler requests that Papen be instructed to remind Schuschnigg that Austrian Nazis are still in the concentration camp at Wöllersdorf.	374
Jan. 14 198	<i>The German Ambassador in Austria (Papen) to the German Foreign Ministry</i> Schuschnigg defends Austrian execution of the Agreement of July 11, 1936, by citing the large number of Nazis freed and the small number still in prison.	375

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1937 Jan. 16 199	<i>Memorandum by the German Ambassador in Italy (Hassell)</i> Hassell had unsuccessfully tried to dissuade Göring from telling Mussolini that Italy must recognize German claims to Austria; Göring's remarks received, apparently, a cool reception from Mussolini.	376
Jan. 16 200	<i>The German Chargé d'Affaires in Austria (Stein) to the German Foreign Ministry</i> Since July 11, 1936, a total of 18,684 National Socialists have been amnestied; but it is estimated that 4,000 have been arrested.	378
Jan. 18 201	<i>The German Ambassador in Austria (Papen) to the German Foreign Ministry</i> It is reported that the National Socialists in Wöllersdorf will leave this month.	379
Jan. 19 202	<i>Memorandum</i> Papen stated that, in his report of December 18, 1936, he had merely dissociated himself officially from the credit-aid program in Austria; personally, he felt the program should continue, but without involving the Legation.	379
Jan. 21 203	<i>Memorandum by the Counselor of the German Embassy in Italy (Plessen)</i> The Austrian Minister requests that inaccurate statements made by Göring in Rome be corrected.	380
Jan. 23 204	<i>Memorandum by the Counselor of the German Embassy in Italy (Plessen)</i> Göring had instructed him to express to the Austrian Minister in Rome Göring's dissatisfaction with the trend in Austria; restoration of the Hapsburgs would mean the end of Austria.	381
Jan. 27 205	<i>Memorandum by the Counselor of the German Embassy in Italy (Plessen)</i> Plessen spoke to the Austrian Minister somewhat as instructed by Göring.	382
Jan. 27 206	<i>The German Foreign Ministry to the German Ambassador in Austria (Papen)</i> Papen is to tell Schuschnigg that, by continuing the persecution and imprisonment of Austrian National Socialists, Austria is violating the letter and spirit of the Agreement of July 11, 1936.	383
Jan. 30 207	<i>Memorandum by the German Ambassador in Italy (Hassell)</i> Hassell summarizes the discussions between Göring and Mussolini concerning Austria; Mussolini had obviously been upset by the suggestion that Germany might annex Austria, but Göring was certain that Italy was too dependent on Germany to offer effective resistance.	384

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1937 Undated 208	<i>The German Ambassador in Italy (Hassell) to the Foreign Minister</i> Enclosing a letter to Göring describing Ciano's reaction to Göring's statements on Austria. Ciano emphasized that the Austro-German Agreement of July 11, 1936, was one of the pillars of Italo-German friendship, and expressed pleasure that Göring had promised to consult Italy before taking any action regarding Austria.	386

## D. SCHUSCHNIGG EVADES GERMAN DEMANDS, FEBRUARY-MAY 1937

1937 Feb. 13 209	<i>The German Ambassador in Austria (Papen) to the Führer and Chancellor</i> Suggests means of countering the growing agitation for the restoration of the Hapsburgs.	388
Feb. 13 210	<i>The German Ambassador in Austria (Papen) to the Führer and Chancellor</i> Summarizes negotiations between a "National" committee and Schuschnigg in which the latter promised great concessions; encloses a letter from the committee to Schuschnigg.	389
Feb. 18 211	<i>The German Ambassador in Austria (Papen) to the German Foreign Ministry</i> Schuschnigg's speech to the Fatherland Front shows that he hopes to control both the Legitimists and the National Opposition.	394
Feb. 25 212	<i>Memorandum by the Foreign Minister</i> Summarizes his conversation in Vienna with Schmidt, on the position of Reich-Germans in Austria, on cultural relations, on the amnesty and refugee questions, and on the <i>Auslandsorganisation</i> in Austria.	396
Feb. 27 213	<i>Memorandum by the Foreign Minister</i> In conversations with Schmidt and Schuschnigg in Vienna, Neurath warned against a restoration of the Hapsburgs; Schuschnigg replied that the question was not acute.	399
Mar. 3 214	<i>The German Ambassador in Austria (Papen) to the Führer and Chancellor</i> The visit of Neurath favorably influenced the Austrian Government and demonstrated the power of Austrian National Socialism.	401
Mar. 8 215	<i>Memorandum Regarding the Negotiations of the German-Austrian Cultural Committee From February 26 to March 2, 1937</i> Discussion of censorship and cultural relations has made little progress, Twardowski reports.	404

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1937		
Mar. 13 218	<i>The German Ambassador to Austria (Papen), Temporarily in Berlin, to the German Foreign Ministry</i> Papen had reported to Hitler that Britain was working for the fall of Schuschnigg because of his conciliatory policy toward Germany; Italy was, he said, also working against Germany; Germany should therefore try to strengthen Schuschnigg's position.	407
Mar. 20 217	<i>The German Ambassador in Austria (Papen) to the German Foreign Ministry</i> The negotiations between the National Opposition and Schuschnigg are moving well; whether Schuschnigg will, or can, fulfill his promises is not yet certain.	409
Mar. 21 218	<i>The German Ambassador in Austria (Papen) to the German Foreign Ministry</i> Glaise had decided to remain in office because of the concessions to be offered to the National Opposition.	411
Apr. 3 219	<i>The German Chargé d'Affaires in Austria (Stein) to the German Foreign Ministry</i> Glaise reported to Stein that Schuschnigg, while rebuffing efforts to draw Austria away from Germany, was forced by fear of the Clericals to conceal his concessions to Germany.	412
Apr. 17 220	<i>The German Ambassador in Austria (Papen) to the Führer and Chancellor</i> Encloses two intercepted Austrian despatches, and concludes from these and from other information that Schuschnigg is desperately trying to escape dependence on Germany by appeals for the support of Britain and Italy.	413
Apr. 19 221	<i>The German Ambassador in Austria (Papen) to the German Foreign Ministry</i> The Austrian security police have prepared a chart showing illegal SA and SS formations in Styria; probably Schuschnigg will take the chart when he visits Italy.	418
May 8 222	<i>The German Foreign Ministry to the German Embassy in France and the German Legations in Austria and Czechoslovakia</i> In Rome, Neurath stated that Austria was not fulfilling her obligations and that Germany would not tolerate a restoration of the Hapsburgs. Mussolini said he had warned Schuschnigg against a restoration and against overtures to France or Czechoslovakia.	419
May 12 223	<i>The German Ambassador to Austria (Papen), Temporarily in Berlin, to the Führer and Chancellor</i> In a police raid on the Austrian Nazi Party office in Vienna, most incriminating evidence had been seized.	420
May 14 224	<i>The German Ambassador in Italy (Hassell) to the German Foreign Ministry</i> Ciano's speech emphasized that Austro-Italian friendship was compatible with Italo-German friendship.	421

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1937 May 26 225	<i>The German Ambassador in Austria (Papen) to the Führer and Chancellor</i> To Schmidt, who had returned much encouraged from London and Paris, Papen gave warning that Austrian policy must be changed at once and that Germany would not tolerate British interference in Central Europe.	422
May 26 226	<i>The German Ambassador in Austria (Papen) to the German Foreign Ministry</i> Papen had urged the Italian Minister to impress on Schuschnigg the necessity of taking the National Opposition into the government.	424
May 26 227	<i>The German Ambassador in Austria (Papen) to the Führer and Chancellor</i> Papen told Schuschnigg that sabotage of the July Agreement had created an intolerable situation. Schuschnigg promised renewed efforts at pacification but evaded Papen's suggestion that leaders of the National Opposition be taken into his Cabinet.	425

## E. SCHUSCHNIGG ISOLATED, JUNE-OCTOBER 1937

1937 June 1 228	<i>The German Ambassador in Austria (Papen) to the Führer and Chancellor</i> In conversation with Papen, the new British Ambassador to Germany, Sir Neville Henderson, had said that all other viewpoints should be subordinated to the menace of Bolshevism, and that the British Government would, given time, accept the Reich-German solution of the Austrian problem.	427
June 5 229	<i>The German Ambassador in Austria (Papen) to the German Foreign Ministry</i> Enclosing a memorandum in which Papen orders the Legation staff to break off all relations with the Austrian Nazi Party.	428
June 5 230	<i>The German Foreign Ministry to Certain German Diplomatic Missions</i> Warns that the Austrian Government has sought a guarantee of the <i>status quo</i> in the Danube countries from Britain and France.	430
June 8 231	<i>Herr In der Maur to the German Ambassador in Austria (Papen)</i> Austrian Nazis have been forbidden to have any contact with the Legation.	430
June 8 232	<i>From a Letter From Party Member In der Maur to a National Socialist Party Member in the Reich</i> A detailed denunciation of Papen's activities in Austria.	431
	<i>Editors' Note:</i> On the "Directive for the Uniform Preparation of the Wehrmacht for War," dated June 24, 1937.	433

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1937 July 1 233	<p><i>The German Ambassador in Austria (Papen) to the Führer and Chancellor</i></p> <p>Analyzes events since the conclusion of the Agreement of July 11, 1936, and concludes that the agreement had accomplished all Germany had anticipated, that the continuance of the agreement is essential for the success of German foreign policy, and that, to insure that continuance, Austrian fears of annexation by Germany must be removed.</p>	434
July 7 234	<p><i>Minute</i></p> <p>In conversation with Weizsäcker in Vienna, Schmidt showed eagerness for closer Austro-German cooperation and for public recognition of his services.</p>	438
Undated 235	<p><i>Memorandum</i></p> <p>A frank discussion by German and Austrian representatives of the importance of the Agreement of July 11, 1936, and of means to strengthen Austro-German relations.</p>	439
July 9 236	<p><i>Memorandum</i></p> <p>Hornbostel had brought up various examples of interference in Austrian domestic affairs by the Party in Germany. Altenburg expresses relief that the Austrians apparently have so little evidence.</p>	440
July 10 237	<p><i>Memorandum</i></p> <p>In a conference of German and Austrian officials, Schuschnigg emphasized both Austrian desire to cooperate with Germany, and Austrian insistence on independence; the Germans pressed for more rapid and greater concessions to the National Opposition. A summary of Austrian Nazis amnestied is appended.</p>	441
July 12 238	<p><i>Memorandum</i></p> <p>In conversation with Schmidt, Weizsäcker had raised the question of joint efforts to combat Communism; the discussion was brief and vague.</p>	443
July 12 239	<p><i>Memorandum</i></p> <p>Schmidt is most anxious to be invited to Germany this month; he needs German recognition of his activities.</p>	444
July 12 240	<p><i>Memorandum</i></p> <p>The Austro-German discussion of July 6-10 summarized.</p>	445
July 13 241	<p><i>Memorandum</i></p> <p>Hitler has put Keppler in charge of Austrian affairs as they affect the German Nazi Party.</p>	448
July 14 242	<p><i>The German Ambassador in Austria (Papen) to the Führer and Chancellor</i></p> <p>Seyss-Inquart reports that his conversations with Schuschnigg have gone very well; it is imperative that the Austrian Nazis cooperate with Seyss-Inquart and that there be no evidence of instructions from German Nazis to Austrian Nazis.</p>	448
July 17 243	<p><i>Circular Letter From the Chief of Staff of the Deputy of the Führer (Bormann)</i></p> <p>Party offices are reminded that political connections with Austria are forbidden.</p>	449

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1937 July 19 244	<i>Memorandum</i> Göring will not hurry his invitation to Schmidt.	450
July 21 245	<i>Minute</i> Keppler, after talking with Seyss-Inquart, is most optimistic about political trends in Austria.	450
Aug. 10 246	<i>The Foreign Minister to the Führer and Chancellor</i> Enclosing a memorandum of his conversation with Schmidt; the conversation was fruitless.	451
Aug. 10 247	<i>Memorandum by the Foreign Minister</i> He had told Schmidt of his complete dissatisfaction with Austrian political developments; Schmidt evaded his suggestion that a customs union with Germany would end the economic misery in Austria. As a result of the conversation, Neurath is skeptical of the value of the Agreement of July 11, 1936.	451
Aug. 18 248	<i>Dr. Seyss-Inquart to the Commissioner of the Führer and Chancellor for Economic Problems (Keppler)</i> Complains of the abuse Leopold had heaped on him and his associates.	452
Aug. 20 249	<i>The Commissioner of the Führer and Chancellor for Economic Problems (Keppler) to Dr. Seyss-Inquart</i> Advises patience and tolerance regarding the factional quarrels within the Austrian Nazi Party.	453
Aug. 21 250	<i>The German Ambassador in Austria (Papen) to the Foreign Minister</i> Papen agrees that Schmidt's usefulness for Germany is exhausted, and that, temporarily at least, the opponents of the July 11, 1936, Agreement are in the ascendant in Austria.	454
Sept. 1 251	<i>The German Ambassador in Austria (Papen) to the Foreign Minister</i> In a long conversation Schuschnigg emphasized his determination to maintain Austrian independence. Papen is now convinced that Germany, while avoiding a violent solution, should bring about a change of chancellors.	456
Sept. 20 252	<i>Memorandum</i> At a conference between Neurath, Mackensen, and Papen, it was agreed that, while Mussolini is in Berlin, Italian noninterference in Austria is to be secured; a façade of Austrian independence is to be maintained.	458
Sept. 30 253	<i>Memorandum</i> Weizsäcker told the Austrian Minister that there were no differences of opinion between Germany and Italy with respect to Austria.	459
Sept. 30 254	<i>The German Chargé d'Affaires in Austria (Stein) to the German Foreign Ministry</i> Schmidt denied that the meeting of Schuschnigg and Hodza had political importance. Schmidt complained that his efforts to promote good Austro-German relations had met with little response in Germany. Stein doubts Schmidt's sincerity.	460

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CHAPTER II. GERMANY AND AUSTRIA, JULY 1936-JULY 1938--Continued

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1937 Oct. 1 255	<i>Memorandum of a Conversation With Reichsleiter Bormann on September 30, 1937</i> Bormann agreed that Leopold must be held to strict discipline or dismissed; the provision of funds for work in Austria, and for Austrian refugees, was discussed.	462
Oct. 1 256	<i>Memorandum of a Conversation With Foreign Minister Baron von Neurath on October 1, 1937</i> Neurath reported that Mussolini had agreed to support the German policy in Austria, i.e., an evolutionary solution, unless the problem was exploded by a third party, in which case Germany would intervene.	463

F. DIVIDED NAZI COUNSELS, OCTOBER 1937-JANUARY 1938

1937 Oct. 4 257	<i>Memorandum</i> Details of Leopold's attacks on Seyss-Inquart and Keppler.	464
Oct. 7 258	<i>Minute</i> Altenburg gives details of Leopold's conduct and requests that Leopold not be received by Göring.	466
Oct. 7 259	<i>The German Chargé d'Affaires in Austria (Stein) to the German Foreign Ministry</i> Has received reports of efforts by Schuschnigg to improve the relations of Austria and Hungary with the Little Entente; loyal cooperation with Germany cannot be expected from Schuschnigg, but the people of Austria remain faithful to their German mission.	467
Oct. 8 260	<i>Memorandum of Call on Minister President Göring in the Company of Landesleiter Leopold on October 8, 1937</i> Göring orders Leopold to work in the closest cooperation with Seyss-Inquart.	469
Oct. 13 261	<i>Memorandum of the Report to Reichsführer-SS Himmler of October 12, 1937</i> Hitler sets the size and composition of the SA-Hilfswerk Nordwest.	470
Oct. 13 262	<i>Memorandum of the Visit to the Reichsschatzmeisterei in Munich on October 13, 1937</i> Agreement reached on the legal and illegal Austrian activity of the German Nazi Party.	471
Oct. 14 263	<i>The German Chargé d'Affaires in Austria (Stein) to the German Foreign Ministry</i> A description of the ways in which Schuschnigg oppresses Nazism and favors Legitimism.	472
Oct. 22 264	<i>The German Chargé d'Affaires in Austria (Stein) to the German Foreign Ministry</i> Glaise-Horstenau reports that Schuschnigg, disillusioned by the results of the Agreement of July 11, 1936, intends to work for closer relations with the other Succession States and Poland.	474

## CHAPTER II. GERMANY AND AUSTRIA, JULY 1936-JULY 1938—Continued

Date and Doc. No.	Subject	Page
1937		
Oct. 22 265	<i>The German Chargé d'Affaires in Austria (Stein) to the German Foreign Ministry</i> Glaise reports that Göring may be invited to visit Austria.	475
Oct. 23 266	<i>The German Chargé d'Affaires in Austria (Stein) to the German Foreign Ministry</i> Seyss-Inquart reports that Schuschnigg hopes to maintain the <i>status quo</i> in Austria until German policy becomes more moderate; then closer Austro-German relations would be possible.	476
Nov. 2 267	<i>Memorandum of Conversation With Reichsleiter Bormann on November 2, 1937, at 11 a.m.</i> Keppler reports on his activities; Bormann agrees that, in accordance with Hitler's wishes, the Austrian Nazis must accept an evolutionary course.	477
Nov. 5 268	<i>The German Ambassador in Italy (Hassell) to the German Foreign Ministry</i> Reports of Schuschnigg's efforts to unite the Succession States and Poland.	478
Nov. 19 269	<i>Memorandum of the Confidential Conversation of Dr. Megerle With State Secretary Schmidt, in the Grand Hotel, Vienna, on November 17, 1937, From 9:30 p.m. to 10:30 p.m.</i> Schmidt urges that Göring visit Austria; the visit would improve Austro-German relations.	479
Dec. 7 270	<i>The German Ambassador in Austria (Papen) to the German Foreign Ministry</i> Urges that the interference of the Austrian Episcopate in Reich religious controversies demonstrates the need for measures against Schuschnigg.	481
Dec. 7 271	<i>The German Ambassador in Austria (Papen) to the Commissioner of the Führer and Chancellor for Economic Affairs (Keppler)</i> New complaints of Austrian Nazi intrigues against Papen.	481
Dec. 10 272	<i>The Commissioner of the Führer and Chancellor for Economic Affairs (Keppler) to the German Ambassador in Austria (Papen)</i> He will speak to Leopold about Papen's complaints.	483
Dec. 21 273	<i>The German Ambassador in Austria (Papen) to the Führer and Chancellor</i> In an interview with Schuschnigg, Papen states the reasons for German dissatisfaction with Austrian policy, and warns that the tension cannot long endure.	483
Dec. 22 274	<i>The Austrian Minister in Great Britain (Franckenstein) to the Austrian Foreign Ministry</i> An intercepted despatch analyzing the attitude of various British groups toward German ambitions in general, and toward Austria and Czechoslovakia in particular.	486

## CHAPTER II. GERMANY AND AUSTRIA, JULY 1936-JULY 1938—Continued

Date and Doc. No.	Subject	Page
1938 Jan. 8 275	<i>The German Ambassador in Austria (Papen) to the German Foreign Ministry</i> Describes incidents which justify the charge that Germany is interfering in Austrian domestic affairs.	489
Jan. 8 276	<i>Memorandum</i> Keppler reports that Seyss-Inquart intends to resign, but Göring says he must remain at his post; new examples of Leopold's insubordination.	491
Jan. 15 277	<i>The German Ambassador in Austria (Papen) to the Führer and Chancellor</i> Describes the difficulties created for Austro-German relations by the controversy between Nazism and the churches.	491
Jan. 17 278	<i>The German Ambassador to the Holy See (Bergen) to the German Foreign Ministry</i> Suggests that the activities of the anti-Nazi Father Muckermann in Vienna be scrutinized.	492
Jan. 27 279	<i>The German Ambassador in Austria (Papen) to the German Foreign Ministry</i> The plans for a Nazi <i>Putsch</i> , seized in the raid on the Austrian Nazi headquarters, have convinced Schuschnigg that the present situation cannot continue.	493
Jan. 29 280	<i>The German Chargé d'Affaires in Austria (Stein) to the German Foreign Ministry</i> Describes the police raids and arrests in Vienna, and their political repercussions.	494
Jan. 29 281	<i>Memorandum by the Foreign Minister</i> The Austrian Minister described, and complained of, the activities of the Austrian Legion; Neurath replied that he was not informed.	495

## G. BERCHTESGADEN, FEBRUARY 1938

1938 Feb. 2 282	<i>The Commissioner of the Führer and Chancellor for Economic Affairs (Keppler) to the Foreign Minister (Neurath)</i> Gives Seyss-Inquart's report on the concessions which the latter had won from Schuschnigg concerning the treatment of Austrian Nazis.	497
Feb. 3 283	<i>The German Chargé d'Affaires in Italy (Plessen) to the German Foreign Ministry</i> Reports of plans for a Nazi <i>Putsch</i> in Austria have been received in Rome.	498
Feb. 4 284	<i>The German Ambassador in Austria (Papen) to the Führer and Chancellor</i> Since Schuschnigg is showing willingness to make concessions, the situation is favorable for the contemplated conversations with him; Leopold is trying to force intervention by ordering terrorist acts.	499

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1938		
Feb. 7 285	<i>The Commissioner of the Führer and Chancellor for Economic Affairs (Keppler) to the Foreign Minister (Ribbentrop)</i> Reviews Austro-German relations and concludes that Schuschnigg's recent willingness to make concessions brightens the prospect for an evolutionary solution.	500
Feb. 8 286	<i>The German Foreign Ministry to the German Legation in Austria</i> Keppler requests that influence be used to end the opposition of Leopold and Glaise to Seyss-Inquart's negotiations with Schuschnigg.	502
Feb. 8 287	<i>The German Ambassador in Austria (Papen) to the German Foreign Ministry</i> Reports that the negotiations are going well; requests that Göring instruct Leopold to refrain from any action.	503
Feb. 8 288	<i>Memorandum</i> The Austrian Minister endeavors, without success, to learn the reasons for the recent changes in the German Government and whether the changes mean a shift in German policy toward Austria.	503
Feb. 10 289	<i>The Commissioner of the Führer and Chancellor for Economic Affairs (Keppler) to the Foreign Minister</i> Argues that a common currency would serve the interests both of Germany and of Austria; gives details of Leopold's disobedience to instructions.	504
Feb. 10 290	<i>Memorandum on the Present State of German-Austrian Relations</i> Schuschnigg has evaded all efforts to force him to execute the Agreement of July 11, 1936, and has sought to divide the Austrian Nazis; recently, he has shown willingness to cooperate, but his past record makes skepticism advisable.	507
Feb. 11 291	<i>The German Ambassador in France (Welzeck) to the German Foreign Ministry</i> The French press believes the immediate German objective has shifted from Czechoslovakia; in face of the expected crisis, the press implies that there is little France can do.	508
Feb. 12 292	<i>The German Ambassador in Austria (Papen) to the German Foreign Ministry</i> Tells of violently anti-Nazi statements attributed to Father Muckermann; Papen hopes, through Cardinal Innitzer, to silence Father Muckermann.	510
293	<i>Undated Report</i> On the progress of negotiations in Austria; Schuschnigg is disposed to yield the essentials, but he must be definitely committed.	512
Feb. 12 294	<i>Protocol of the Conference of February 12, 1938</i> A draft calling for changes in Austria, including the appointment of specified "Nationals" to the Cabinet, which would make possible the unimpeded development of National Socialism; prepared for the Hitler-Schuschnigg conference at Berchtesgaden.	513

## CHAPTER II. GERMANY AND AUSTRIA, JULY 1936-JULY 1938—Continued

Date and Doc. No.	Subject	Page
1938 Undated 295	<i>Protocol of the Conference of February 12, 1938</i> The signed protocol, in substance similar to the draft, but less categorical in form.	515
Feb. 14 296	<i>Memorandum by the Foreign Minister</i> Explained to Attolico the failure to inform Italy in advance of the Berchtesgaden meeting and gave him some information about the meeting, but said nothing about the signing of a protocol.	517
Feb. 14 297	<i>The German Ambassador in Austria (Papen) to the German Foreign Ministry</i> Schuschnigg, although under pressure from France and Britain as well as from domestic opponents, is still holding to his agreement, but he asks that the Agreement of July 11, 1936, be reaffirmed in the communiqué; Seyss-Inquart asks the removal of Leopold and Tavs to Germany.	518
Feb. 14 298	<i>The German Ambassador in Austria (Papen) to the German Foreign Ministry</i> Gives the Austrian draft communiqué, which relates the Berchtesgaden agreements to the Agreement of July 11, 1936; Papen suggests a revision of the draft.  <i>Editors' Note:</i> On Hitler's approval of Keitel's plan for creating the impression of impending military action against Austria.	519  520
Feb. 15 299	<i>Memorandum</i> Summarizes telephone conversations with Vienna concerning the text of the communiqué and official Austrian acceptance of the measures promised at Berchtesgaden; the text of the Austrian acceptance is given.  <i>Editors' Note:</i> On the broadcasting of communiqués on the Berchtesgaden conversations.	520  521
Feb. 16 300	<i>The German Foreign Minister to the Austrian Foreign Minister (Schmidt)</i> Congratulates Schmidt on the conclusion of the Austro-German agreements.	522
Feb. 16 301	<i>The German Foreign Ministry to Various German Diplomatic Missions and Consular Offices.</i> For information, summarizes the Berchtesgaden Protocols; in conversations, interpret the results as progress in Austro-German relations and as a contribution to European peace.	522
Feb. 16 302	<i>The German Embassy in France to the German Foreign Ministry</i> French opinion is depressed by the success of German diplomacy in Austria; few believe that France and Britain will intervene to preserve Austrian independence.	523
Feb. 16 303	<i>The Foreign Minister to the Führer's Deputy (Hess)</i> Requests renewal of ban on interference in Austria by German Nazis.	524

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## CHAPTER II. GERMANY AND AUSTRIA, JULY 1936-JULY 1938—Continued

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1938 Feb. 16 304	<i>The Personal Adjutant of the Führer's Deputy (Leitgen) to the Foreign Minister</i> Hess has renewed the ban on interference in Austria.	525
Feb. 17 305	<i>The German Chargé d'Affaires in Great Britain (Woermann) to the German Foreign Ministry</i> Events in Austria have aroused uneasiness in Britain, but no strong reaction is to be expected.	525
Feb. 17 306	<i>The German Chargé d'Affaires in Austria (Stein) to the German Foreign Ministry</i> Reviews events since February 12; analyzes the composition of the new Austrian Government; concludes that while a promising beginning has been made, experience suggests that the actions of the new Government must be sharply supervised.	526
Undated 307	<i>Proposal for the Speech of the Führer and Chancellor</i> Suggests that Hitler praise Schuschnigg's concessions and promise cooperation.	528
Feb. 17 308	<i>Memorandum by the Foreign Minister</i> The French Ambassador sought repeatedly to obtain assurances that Germany would continue to respect Austrian independence; Ribbentrop denied the right of France to intervene in Austro-German relations, and stated that Germany would not shrink from war to protect the Germans living on her borders.	529

## H. AN ACCELERATED EVOLUTIONARY SOLUTION, FEBRUARY-MARCH 1938

1938 Feb. 18 309	<i>Memorandum</i> Papen telephoned the revised text of the communiqué on the rights of Austrian Nazis; he urged acceptance, and, in order to put an end to rumor, requested publication of a statement that the measures agreed on at Berchtesgaden had now been carried out.	531
Feb. 18 310	<i>Memorandum by the Foreign Minister</i> In response to the request of the British Ambassador for information on Austria, Ribbentrop made, in more conciliatory form, the statements he had made to the French Ambassador.	532
Feb. 18 311	<i>Memorandum</i> Magistrati showed great curiosity about the next moves in Austria.	533
Undated 312	<i>Draft Press Release</i> Austrian Nazis now have the opportunity for legal activity; German Nazis will not interfere in Austrian domestic politics.	534
Undated 313	<i>Report on the Austrian Situation up to February 18, 1938, 7 p.m.</i> Describes the panic in Vienna; concludes that Hitler can make new gains in Austria if he so desires.	534

## CHAPTER II. GERMANY AND AUSTRIA, JULY 1936-JULY 1938—Continued

Date and Doc. No.	Subject	Page
1938		
Feb. 19 314	<i>Memorandum</i> The Hungarian Minister said that Hungary welcomed the Berchtesgaden visit.	537
Feb. 19 315	<i>Memorandum</i> Ribbentrop wishes the Italian Ambassador to be cursorily informed of the Berchtesgaden Protocol.	537
Feb. 19 316	<i>The German Chargé d'Affaires in Great Britain (Woermann) to the German Foreign Ministry</i> The Austrian Minister reports that, on instructions from Vienna, he is using every effort to reassure the British Government on Austro-German relations.	538
Feb. 19 317	<i>The Commissioner of the Führer and Chancellor for Economic Affairs (Keppler) to the Foreign Minister</i> Thanks for instructions to make independent decisions on Austria.	539
Feb. 22 318	<i>Memorandum of the Reception by the Führer on the Afternoon of February 21, 1938, in the Presence of Field Marshal Göring</i> Hitler bitterly reproached Leopold, and for the future excluded Leopold and his assistants from Austria. Klausner was appointed leader of the Austrian Nazis and ordered to pattern his activities after those Bürckel had earlier pursued with success in the Saar. Hitler comments on Austrian and general European developments.	539
Feb. 22 319	<i>The Commissioner of the Führer and Chancellor for Economic Affairs (Keppler) to the Reichsschatzmeister of the N.S.D.A.P. (Schwarz)</i> Tells of Hitler's decisions on financing of Party activities in Austria.	541
Feb. 22 320	<i>Memorandum</i> Weizsäcker told Magistrati cursorily of the contents of the Berchtesgaden Protocol, but did not tell him all the provisions or mention that there was a Protocol.	542
Feb. 22 321	<i>The German Minister in Yugoslavia (Heeren) to the German Foreign Ministry</i> The Yugoslav Government had rebuffed a French invitation to join in a protest against a possible Anschluss.	543
Feb. 22 322	<i>The German Chargé d'Affaires in Great Britain (Woermann) to the German Foreign Ministry</i> Encloses the <i>aide-mémoire</i> defending the results of the Berchtesgaden meeting which the Austrian Minister had handed to Eden on February 16.	543
Feb. 23 323	<i>The Commissioner of the Führer and Chancellor for Economic Affairs (Keppler) to SA-Obergruppenführer Reschny of the SA-Hilfswerk Nordwest</i> Tells of Hitler's decisions on the <i>Hilfswerk Nordwest</i> .	544
Feb. 24 324	<i>The German Ambassador in Austria (Papen) to the German Foreign Ministry</i> Schuschnigg had refused the request to deny in his speech that brutal force had been used at Berchtesgaden as many, including the British Minister, were saying.	545

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1938 Feb. 25 325	<i>The German Ambassador in Austria (Papen) to the German Foreign Ministry</i> Papen, on leaving Austria, feels that events are moving according to plan, and that Schuschnigg's reiterated determination to preserve Austrian independence need not, therefore, be taken too seriously.	546
Feb. 26 326	<i>Memorandum</i> Papen called and said that Schuschnigg intended to dissociate himself from the debate in the French Chamber on Austrian independence.	546
Feb. 26 327	<i>Memorandum by the German Ambassador in Austria (Papen)</i> A more extended account of Papen's farewell conversation with Schuschnigg. Schuschnigg had said that, at Berchtesgaden, concessions had been wrung from him by pressure.	547
Feb. 28 328	<i>Memorandum</i> Hitler notified the deposed Austrian Nazi leaders that he wished to try an evolutionary policy in Austria, and that, while they would be well cared for and might be used later, they were to remain in Germany. Hitler entrusted the Austrian problem to Keppler.	548
Feb. 28 329	<i>Memorandum</i> Seyss-Inquart reports that labor is flocking to the Nazis, but that the Government, encouraged by foreign powers, is trying to sabotage the agreement.	550
Undated 330	<i>Memorandum</i> Summarizing the international agreements for the preservation of Austrian independence.	551
Mar. 4 331	<i>The German Embassy in Great Britain to the German Foreign Ministry</i> Analyzes the debate on Austria in the Commons on March 2, and notes that Chamberlain did not accept the French view on the importance of Austrian independence.	553
Mar. 4 332	<i>The German Minister in Hungary (Erdmannsdorff) to the German Foreign Ministry</i> Schuschnigg, in conversation with Kanya, affirmed his determination to cooperate with Germany, while preserving Austrian independence.	555
Undated 333	<i>Conversation With Minister Guido Schmidt in Vienna on March 4, 1938</i> Keppler tried to secure redress for many grievances, but found Schmidt unwilling to accept responsibility.	556
Undated 334	<i>Conversation With Minister Guido Schmidt and Federal Chancellor Schuschnigg in Vienna on March 5, 1938</i> Schuschnigg expressed anger at the threats made at Berchtesgaden, but the discussion soon became friendly, and Keppler concludes that Schuschnigg will come along if force is not used.	557

## CHAPTER II. GERMANY AND AUSTRIA, JULY 1936-JULY 1938—Continued

Date and Doc. No.	Subject	Page
1938 Undated 335	<i>Memorandum of Trip to Vienna, March 3 to 6, 1938</i> Keppler's report that the Nazi Party is in fine shape, but is being restrained so that increasing concessions can be won from Schuschnigg; Seyss-Inquart is proving skillful, and is advancing Party interests steadily.	559
Mar. 7 336	<i>The Commissioner of the Führer and Chancellor for Economic Affairs (Keppler) to the Austrian Minister of the Interior (Seyss-Inquart)</i> A request for a discussion of police protection for Hitler when he goes to Italy in May.	561
Mar. 7 337	<i>Memorandum for the German Counselor of Embassy in Vienna (Stein)</i> On Otto of Hapsburg's information concerning events in Austria.	561
Mar. 8 338	<i>Memorandum</i> A third-hand report that on March 4 a conference of Austrian political leaders decided to hold elections in Austria as soon as possible.	562

## I. CONQUEST, MARCH 1938

1938 Mar. 9 339	<i>The German Foreign Ministry to the German Embassy in Great Britain</i> The Austrian Government intends to hold a plebiscite Sunday; Keppler will fly to Vienna to prevent or modify the plebiscite.	562
Mar. 10 340	<i>The German Foreign Ministry to the German Embassy in Great Britain</i> Summarizes Schuschnigg's Innsbruck speech announcing a plebiscite; obviously, this is an attempt to take the National Socialists off guard.	563
Mar. 10 341	<i>The German Chargé d'Affaires in Austria (Stein) to the German Foreign Ministry</i> Schmidt explained that the plebiscite was Schuschnigg's personal wish; the Cabinet was not consulted; Schmidt was holding aloof.	564
Mar. 10 342	<i>The German Foreign Ministry to the German Embassy in Great Britain</i> Hitler had instructed Seyss-Inquart to engage in no negotiations.	564
Mar. 10 343	<i>The Chief of the Sicherheitshauptamt of the Reichsführer-SS to SS-Gruppenführer Keppler</i> Encloses a description of the organization of the Austrian Nazi Party.	565
Mar. 10 344	<i>The German Chargé d'Affaires in Austria (Stein) to the German Foreign Ministry</i> Describes the background of the plebiscite and events since the announcement.	566

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1938	<i>Editors' Note:</i> On Göring's telephone conversations during period March 11-14 and on plans for the invasion of Austria.	568
Mar. 11 345	<i>The German Chargé d'Affaires in Austria (Stein) to the German Foreign Ministry</i> Reports of Austrian military preparations.	569
Mar. 11 346	<i>The German Ambassador in France (Welczeck) to the German Foreign Ministry</i> Delbos expressed uneasiness concerning rumors of an impending war over Austria; Welczeck said that this was a family quarrel and others should stay out; Delbos replied that Europe as a whole was a family.	569
Mar. 11 347	<i>Memorandum</i> Bräuer tells Weizsäcker of alarm in France; France, however, was unlikely to intervene.	570
Mar. 11 348	<i>Minute</i> Magistrati asked about rumors of military moves, and requested that Italy be informed of German decisions; Weizsäcker gave very general information and assurances.	570
Mar. 11 349	<i>Minute</i> Magistrati reads a telegram stating that Mussolini had advised against the plebiscite.	572
Mar. 11 350	<i>The German Chargé d'Affaires in Italy (Plessen) to the German Foreign Ministry</i> Ciano said that Mussolini had advised against the plebiscite in Austria and that Italy had rejected a French proposal for joint action.	572
Mar. 11 351	<i>The German Foreign Ministry to the German Legation in Yugoslavia</i> Yugoslav Minister had said Yugoslavia considered Austria an internal German affair.	573
Mar. 11 352	<i>The Führer and Chancellor to Benito Mussolini</i> Explains that Schuschnigg's failure to abide by the Berchtesgaden Agreement, and above all the impending plebiscite, make German intervention inevitable; states that the Brenner is recognized as the frontier; and reminds Mussolini of the support given to Italy by Germany in the past.	573
Undated 353	<i>Communication From the British Ambassador in Germany (Henderson) to Reich Minister von Neurath</i> Halifax warns against interference in the Austrian plebiscite since no one could say what the end or limit of an explosion would be.	576
Mar. 11 354	<i>The British Ambassador in Germany (Henderson) to Reich Minister von Neurath</i> Halifax had warned Ribbentrop of the effect in England if Germany insists on the resignation of Schuschnigg.	577

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Mar. 11 355	<i>The British Ambassador in Germany (Henderson) to Reich Minister von Neurath</i> If reports of German coercion backed by force are accurate, the British Government protests in the strongest terms.	578
Mar. 11 356	<i>The French Ambassador in Germany (François-Poncet) to Reich Minister von Neurath</i> In view of reports of German coercion backed by force, the French Government protests most emphatically.	578
Mar. 11 357	<i>The German Foreign Ministry to Various German Diplomatic Missions</i> Explains that, on receipt of Seyss-Inquart telegram, Germany considers the dispatch of troops to Austria necessary.	579
Undated 358	<i>The Austrian Minister of the Interior (Seyss-Inquart) to the Führer and Reich Chancellor</i> Requests that troops be sent as soon as possible.	580
Mar. 12 359	<i>The German Chargé d'Affaires in Great Britain (Woermann) to the German Foreign Ministry</i> The British press says Austria will hamper Anglo-German relations, but there is no suggestion of intervention.	580
Mar. 12 360	<i>The German Ambassador in France (Welczeck) to the German Foreign Ministry</i> The French press, admitting that the British and French protest will not save Austria, regards the protest as a barrier to further German expansion; there is great bitterness against Italy.	581
Mar. 12 361	<i>The German Chargé d'Affaires in Italy (Plessen) to the German Foreign Ministry</i> Details of his conversation with Ciano, who, while rebuffing the advances of France, was disconcerted by events in Austria.	582
Mar. 12 362	<i>The German Ambassador in the United States (Dieckhoff) to the German Foreign Ministry</i> Hull gave the impression that he thoroughly understood the German action in Austria.	583
Mar. 12 363	<i>The German Chargé d'Affaires in Yugoslavia (Janson) to the German Foreign Ministry</i> Semi-officially, the Yugoslav attitude was sympathetic to Germany.	583
Mar. 12 364	<i>Minute</i> Seyss-Inquart, through Muff, unsuccessfully tries to prevent German troops from crossing the Austrian frontier.	584
Mar. 12 365	<i>Memorandum</i> Neurath's formulation of the bases of German action in Austria.	585
Mar. 12 366	<i>The German Foreign Ministry to Various German Diplomatic Missions</i> Repeats the substance of the German reply to the British and French protests: denies both the responsibility of Germany for the crisis and the right of other powers to interfere.	586

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Mar. 12 367	<i>Memorandum</i> Mackensen had told the military that the political situation in the west permitted the slowing down of precautionary measures there.	587
Mar. 12 368	<i>Minute</i> The War Ministry has no reports of military moves by other European states.	588
Mar. 12 369	<i>Memorandum</i> Report on the progress of the invasion of Austria.	588
Mar. 12 370	<i>Memorandum</i> On efforts to discover whether, as reported, Miklas had been presented with one or more German ultimatums.	588
Mar. 12 371	<i>Memorandum</i> Enclosing a Muff report on the ultimatum to Austria, and reporting efforts to suppress the facts.	589
Undated 372	<i>Telephone Message</i> Telling of an agent's report from France on the military and political repercussions of the invasion of Austria.	590
Mar. 13 373	<i>The German Chargé d'Affaires in Italy (Plessen) to the German Foreign Ministry</i> The Italian press now agrees with the German position on Austria.	591
Mar. 13 374	<i>Memorandum</i> The provisions of the Austrian law on reunion with Germany, as reported by telephone; Austrian missions abroad would now place themselves at the disposal of the corresponding German chief of mission.	591
Mar. 13 375	<i>Memorandum</i> A telephone report on military operations and on military measures of other powers.	592
Mar. 13 376	<i>The British Ambassador in Germany (Henderson) to Field Marshal Göring</i> The British Government took note of Göring's assurance that German troops would be withdrawn from Austria and free elections held.	593

## J. THE REPERCUSSIONS, MARCH-JULY 1938

1938		
Mar. 14 377	<i>Memorandum</i> Clodius reports the decisions made in Vienna concerning the treaties and financial obligations of Austria.	593
Mar. 14 378	<i>The German Foreign Ministry to All German Diplomatic Missions (Except Vienna)</i> To give notification of the text of the German law on the unification of Austria with Germany.	594

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Mar. 14 379	<i>The German Ambassador in China (Trautmann) to the German Foreign Ministry</i> Chiang welcomes union of Austria and Germany.	595
Mar. 14 380	<i>The German Ambassador in France (Welczeck) to the German Foreign Ministry</i> Recognition is spreading that nothing can be done about Austria; fear is growing that Czechoslovakia will be the next victim of German aggression.	596
Mar. 14 381	<i>The German Chargé d'Affaires in Great Britain (Woermann) to the German Foreign Ministry</i> Had complained to Cadogan about the misrepresentation in the British press concerning the German action in Austria and concerning Ribbentrop's conversations in London.	597
Mar. 14 382	<i>The German Minister in Switzerland (Köcher) to the German Foreign Ministry</i> Motta expressed admiration for the way in which the <i>Anschluss</i> had been executed; Köcher said the fears expressed in the Swiss press were absurd.	598
Mar. 14 383	<i>Memorandum</i> Magistrati had complained to Welzslücker concerning anti-Italian demonstrations by German troops in Innsbruck.	599
Mar. 14 384	<i>Memorandum</i> Speaking personally, Magistrati said that, in the light of German racial policy, and of German recognition of the Brenner frontier, a definitive solution of the problem raised by the Germans in the South Tyrol was necessary.	600
Mar. 14 385	<i>Memorandum</i> Magistrati conveyed Mussolini's thanks for Hitler's letter.	600
Mar. 14 386	<i>The German Chargé d'Affaires in Great Britain (Woermann) to the German Foreign Ministry</i> An analysis of Chamberlain's statement in Commons on Austria.	601
Mar. 15 387	<i>The German Chargé d'Affaires in Japan (Noebel) to the German Foreign Ministry</i> Describes the enthusiasm the <i>Anschluss</i> aroused in Japan.	602
Mar. 15 388	<i>The German Ambassador in France (Welczeck) to the German Foreign Ministry</i> France has written off Austria, but a more active policy has been initiated regarding Spain and Czechoslovakia; the Czechs have been promised immediate armed assistance in case of attack.	603
Mar. 15 389	<i>The German Ambassador to the Holy See (Bergen) to the German Foreign Ministry</i> Suggests that the intolerable Austrian Concordat be ignored.	603
Mar. 15 390	<i>The German Minister in Rumania (Fabricius) to the German Foreign Ministry</i> On the failure of Beneš to secure a meeting of the Little Entente.	604

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1938 Mar. 15 391	<i>The German Ambassador in the United States (Dieckhoff) to the German Foreign Ministry</i> The State Department, taking its cue from London and from the Jews, is now hostile to the German action in Austria.	604
Mar. 15 392	<i>Memorandum</i> The factual basis of the statement of Under Secretary Butler in the Commons on March 14 is challenged by Bismarck, and no effective reply is made by Kirkpatrick.	605
Mar. 16 393	<i>Memorandum</i> On the need to distinguish clearly between "German nationals abroad" and "the racial German element," and to avoid the expression "Racial-German Reich."	607
Mar. 16 394	<i>Memorandum</i> An endeavor to discover whether the Foreign Ministry had participated in the drafting of the law on the union of Austria with Germany.	607
Mar. 16 395	<i>Memorandum</i> Clodius explains his limited participation in the drafting of the law on the union of Austria with Germany.	608
Mar. 17 396	<i>Memorandum for the Führer</i> Magistrati asked that Hitler's letter to Mussolini be published in Germany, or that Hitler, in his Reichstag speech, recognize the Brenner frontier again.	610
[Mar. 17] 397	<i>The Italian Ambassador in Germany (Attolico) to the German Foreign Minister</i> Emphasizing the necessity for a definite statement on the Brenner frontier.	610
Mar. 19 398	<i>The German Embassy in France to the German Foreign Ministry</i> An informant says that the Russian proposal for a conference to prevent a repetition of attacks such as that on Austria was received sympathetically by the French, and that cooperation in the Polish-Lithuanian conflict was discussed.	611
Mar. 25 399	<i>The German Chargé d'Affaires in Italy (Plessen) to the German Foreign Ministry</i> Mussolini's unreserved acceptance of the <i>Anschluss</i> is widely criticized in Italy; he is as unenthusiastic about the <i>Anschluss</i> as his critics, but he approved out of political realism; the Axis is stronger than ever.	612
Apr. 2 400	<i>Memorandum by the Foreign Minister</i> A conversation with the British Ambassador on technical problems growing out of the <i>Anschluss</i> , on the persecution of Austrians and the expulsion of a British correspondent, and on reviving the discussion of a colonial settlement.	613
Apr. 18 401	<i>The German Ambassador in the United States (Dieckhoff) to the German Foreign Ministry</i> Until March 13, American opinion followed events in Austria with understanding of the German position; the increasing hostility after March 13 is explained by the President's intervention, by Jewish and Catholic propaganda, and by British control over American opinion.	615

## CHAPTER II. GERMANY AND AUSTRIA, JULY 1936-JULY 1938—Continued

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1938 Apr. 28 402	<i>The German Foreign Ministry to Various German Diplomatic Missions</i> Reviews the German declarations of the inviolability of the German frontiers with Italy, Switzerland, Liechtenstein, Yugoslavia, and Hungary.	621
May 2 403	<i>The German Foreign Ministry to the Office of the Foreign Ministry in Vienna</i> Enclosing the circular letter of an Austrian Nazi who intended to write a history of the courier service of the Austrian N.S.D.A.P.; such a publication would not serve German interests.	623
May 16 404	<i>Memorandum</i> Suggesting the release of those imprisoned Austrians against whom court proceedings are not feasible; Ribbentrop defers action.	624
July 5 405	<i>Memorandum</i> Welzsäcker reviewed with Heydrich the question of imprisoned Austrians, and worked out a policy to be followed when inquiries were received from foreign governments.	625

## CHAPTER III. GERMANY AND THE UNITED STATES, AUGUST 1937-SEPTEMBER 1938

## A. THE IDEOLOGICAL CONFLICT, AUGUST-DECEMBER 1937

1937 Aug. 5 406	<i>The German Ambassador in the United States (Dieckhoff) to the German Foreign Ministry</i> Had complained of Dodd's speech, but advises that the incident be ignored.	627
Aug. 31 407	<i>The American Ambassador to Germany (Dodd) to the German Foreign Minister</i> Expressing surprise that his remarks had given offense.	628
Sept. 23 408	<i>Memorandum</i> Freytag advises that Dodd's speech and letter be ignored.	628
Sept. 27 409	<i>The German Ambassador in the United States (Dieckhoff) to the German Foreign Ministry</i> A discussion with Sumner Welles on the <i>Europa</i> of the Far East, Spain, armaments, colonies, Anglo-American trade negotiations, and Ambassador Dodd.	630
Oct. 1 410	<i>The German Ambassador in the United States (Dieckhoff) to the German Foreign Ministry</i> Welles tells in confidence of Dodd's impending recall.	632
Oct. 2 411	<i>Memorandum</i> Gilbert pointed out that the activities of Germans in the United States were disturbing German-American relations.	632
Oct. 7 412	<i>The German Ambassador in the United States (Dieckhoff) to the German Foreign Ministry</i> Roosevelt's "quarantine" speech was directed mainly against Japan; no military conflict is likely.	633

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1937		
Oct. 9 413	<i>The German Ambassador in the United States (Dieckhoff) to the German Foreign Ministry</i> Action is not likely to follow the "quarantine" speech; America will act only if there is a world conflict in which Britain is involved.	634
Oct. 11 414	<i>Memorandum</i> Freytag reviews the history of the Friends of the New Germany and the German-American Bund, and argues that Germany should have nothing to do with the Bund but should, like Italy, concentrate on cultural activities; suggests a reply to Gilbert's representation of October 2.	635
Oct. 15 415	<i>The German Ambassador in the United States (Dieckhoff) to the German Foreign Ministry</i> Reviews the origins and consequences of the "quarantine" speech; concludes that American policy is not becoming more active.	639
Oct. 15 416	<i>The State Secretary and Chief of the Reich Chancellery to the Foreign Minister and the Reich Propaganda Minister</i> Enclosing a treatise on the United States by Rechenberg which Hitler had read with great interest.	642
Oct. 28 417	<i>Memorandum</i> Davidsen gives personal data on Rechenberg and analyzes his treatise; concludes that neither the man nor his writing is reliable or useful.	642
Nov. 15 418	<i>Memorandum</i> Further arguments by Freytag against accepting Rechenberg's views as an accurate picture of American life.	645
Nov. 22 419	<i>The German Ambassador in the United States (Dieckhoff) to the German Foreign Ministry</i> Uses the resolution passed by the Catholic Bishops to develop the argument that religious strife in Germany is injuring German-American relations.	646
Nov. 24 420	<i>The German Ambassador in the United States (Dieckhoff) to the State Secretary in the German Foreign Ministry (Mackensen)</i> Former Ambassador Schurman had complained of German efforts to exert political influence over Americans of German origin. While Dieckhoff had denied that such efforts had been made, he warns that the activities of the Bund, in a situation already difficult because of the Jewish and Church questions, are a serious danger.	648
Nov. 27 421	<i>Minute</i> Weizsäcker told Attolico he doubted if the Anti-Comintern Pact had alarmed the United States.	652
Nov. 30 422	<i>The German Ambassador in the United States (Dieckhoff) to the German Foreign Ministry</i> The editorial in today's <i>New York Times</i> approved by the Department of State, which is trying to combat isolationist views; Dieckhoff believes American policy will follow British.	652

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1937 Dec. 7 423	<i>The German Ambassador in the United States (Dieckhoff) to the German Foreign Ministry</i> Warns that American isolationism will end if there is intolerable provocation, or if the existence of Britain and of values vital to America are threatened.	653
Dec. 11 424	<i>The German Foreign Ministry to the German Embassy in the United States</i> Tells of popular indignation over a speech by Ickes.	656
Dec. 13 425	<i>The German Ambassador in the United States (Dieckhoff) to the German Foreign Ministry</i> Had thought it best not to protest Ickes' speech.	656

R. THE EMBASSY AND THE BUND, DECEMBER 1937-JANUARY 1938

1937 Dec. 17 426	<i>Memorandum From the Office of the State Secretary</i> Announcing a conference on German-American activities.	657
Dec. 20 427	<i>The German Ambassador in the United States (Dieckhoff) to the Head of the Political Department in the German Foreign Ministry (Weizsäcker)</i> German-American relations remain unchanged because of fear of the "Aggressor States," the sharpening of ideological differences, and the fear of the spread of Nazism which the activities of the Bund encourages; warns that indifference to American opinion was disastrous once and may be again.	658
Dec. 22 428	<i>The State Secretary in the German Foreign Ministry (Mackensen) to the German Ambassador in the United States (Dieckhoff)</i> A recently discovered connection between the <i>Volksdeutsche Mittelstelle</i> and the Bund has been broken.	662
1938 Jan. 3 429	<i>The German Ambassador in the United States (Dieckhoff) to the German Foreign Ministry</i> The passages on foreign policy in the President's message are intended to undermine isolationism and to favor preparedness.	663
Jan. 7 430	<i>The German Ambassador in the United States (Dieckhoff) to the German Foreign Ministry</i> After dismissing the American fear of the Bund as without foundation, Dieckhoff examines exhaustively the possibility of mobilizing the German-Americans so that they could prevent a repetition of 1917, and concludes that any official efforts to this end would not only fail but would injure the German-Americans and German-American relations; the history of the Bund, and especially of its alleged Party connections, is used to fortify this conclusion.	664

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1938 Jan. 13 431	<i>The German Ambassador in the United States (Dieckhoff) to the State Secretary in the German Foreign Ministry (Mackensen)</i> Summarizes his report of January 7, and emphasizes the necessity for German authorities to remain aloof from the Bund.	678
Jan. 14 432	<i>The German Ambassador in the United States (Dieckhoff) to the German Foreign Ministry</i> Had protested vehemently against Dodd's speech of January 13.	679
Jan. 18 433	<i>The Head of the Political Department in the German Foreign Ministry (Weizsäcker) to the German Ambassador in the United States (Dieckhoff)</i> On efforts of the Foreign Ministry to improve German-American relations.	680
Jan. 19 434	<i>The German Ambassador in the United States (Dieckhoff) to the Head of the Political Department in the German Foreign Ministry (Weizsäcker)</i> Urging that no official notice be taken of the "March of Time" film on Germany; a protest would merely increase the popularity of the film.	681
Jan. 21 435	<i>The German Ambassador in the United States (Dieckhoff) to the German Foreign Ministry</i> Complains that a speech at Stuttgart by Glissibl of the Bund makes it harder to deny any connection between the Bund and Germany.	684

## C. THE BUND OFFICIALLY REPUDIATED, JANUARY-JUNE, 1938

1938 Jan. 21 436	<i>The Reich Minister and Chief of the Reich Chancellery (Lammers) to the Foreign Minister</i> Hitler is considering whether the new American Ambassador should be received before satisfaction is given for the Dodd speech.	685
Jan. 26 437	<i>Memorandum</i> At a meeting on January 24, public announcement that Reich-Germans may not be members of the Bund was recommended.	685
Feb. 4 438	<i>Memorandum</i> At a meeting of representatives of several offices, the Bund was discussed and the recommendations in the memorandum of January 26 accepted.	687
Feb. 5 439	<i>Reich Minister von Neurath to the Reich Minister and Chief of the Reich Chancellery (Lammers)</i> Urges that, despite justified indignation over Dodd's conduct, the new American Ambassador be given a chance to improve relations.	689

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1938		
Feb. 9 440	<i>The German Ambassador in the United States (Dieckhoff) to the German Foreign Ministry</i> Had told Welles that Germany bore no responsibility, while the anti-German campaign in America bore much responsibility, for the grave condition of international affairs. Dieckhoff believes the Government could bring the United States into a war perhaps more quickly than into the first World War.	689
Feb. 10 441	<i>The German Foreign Ministry to the German Embassy in the United States</i> Gives the text of a proposed press announcement calling attention to the fact that German nationals are not permitted to join the Bund; the American Government is to be informed.	691
Feb. 24 442	<i>Memorandum</i> In telling the American Ambassador of the renewed prohibition against membership in the Bund, it should be emphasized that this step is taken in the hope of improving relations.	692
Feb. 28 443	<i>The German Ambassador in the United States (Dieckhoff) to the German Foreign Ministry</i> Has heard of new promises of support to the Bund; urges that the German connections be broken.	693
Mar. 22 444	<i>The German Ambassador in the United States (Dieckhoff) to the German Foreign Ministry</i> Uses a speech of Ambassador Kennedy to argue that, while the isolationists are vocal and the Government is determined to keep its hands free, America will come into a world conflict if Britain is involved.	694
Mar. 22 445	<i>The German Ambassador in the United States (Dieckhoff) to the State Secretary in the German Foreign Ministry (Weizsäcker)</i> Uses the American reaction to the <i>Anschluss</i> to argue that American policy follows British policy; if Britain fights, America will fight; fears his reiteration of this thesis is boring but does not wish an American declaration of war to take Germany by surprise.	696
Mar. 29 446	<i>The German Foreign Minister to the German Ambassador in the United States (Dieckhoff)</i> Asks if a "goodwill tour" by Wiedemann and lectures by prominent Germans would help to counteract anti-German activities in America.	698
Mar. 30 447	<i>The German Ambassador in the United States (Dieckhoff) to the German Foreign Ministry</i> Argues that the failure of the American Government to press the campaign for repeal of the Neutrality Act does not in any way guarantee American neutrality; if Britain fights, America will fight.	699

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1938 Apr. 7 448	<i>The Aide to the Führer and Chancellor (Wiedemann) to the Head of Political Division IX in the German Foreign Ministry (Freitag)</i> Enclosing a summary of a conversation between Wiedemann and Fritz Kuhn in which the former had denounced the conduct of the Bund and refused to answer Kuhn's questions and complaints.	701
Apr. 14 449	<i>The German Ambassador in the United States (Dieckhoff) to the German Foreign Minister</i> Strongly advises against undertaking any publicity campaign until after the elections in November.	703
Apr. 29 450	<i>Memorandum by the Foreign Minister</i> Ribbentrop complains strongly that the American Government made no attempt to improve the attitude of the press; the American Ambassador says that the attitude of the press in both countries is not very gratifying.	704
Apr. 30 451	<i>The State Secretary in the German Foreign Ministry (Weizsäcker) to the German Ambassador in the United States (Dieckhoff)</i> Encourages Dieckhoff to reiterate his warning about the attitude of America in a world conflict; praises the new American Ambassador.	705
May 21 452	<i>The German Ambassador in the United States (Dieckhoff) to the German Foreign Ministry</i> Attributes the opposition of Ickes to the provision of helium to pressure from anti-German groups; the President privately disagrees with Ickes but can say nothing.	706
May 28 453	<i>The German Foreign Ministry to the German Embassy in the United States</i> Requests a report on the activities of the Bund and the execution of the order of February 10.	707
June 2 454	<i>The German Ambassador in the United States (Dieckhoff) to the German Foreign Ministry</i> The Bund continues to cause uneasiness; all governmental and Party authorities have not severed their connections with the Bund.	708
June 2 455	<i>The German Ambassador in the United States (Dieckhoff) to the German Foreign Ministry</i> Enclosing reports from the Consulates General at New York, Chicago, and San Francisco, all of which state that the Bund is injuring German-American relations and dividing Americans of German origin.	709

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## D. THE CONFLICT OF INTERESTS, JUNE-SEPTEMBER 1938

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1938		
June 10 456	<i>Memorandum by the Foreign Minister</i> The American Ambassador states that he will do all in his power to stem the press agitation in America.	713
June 13 457	<i>The German Ambassador in Great Britain (Dirksen) to the State Secretary in the German Foreign Ministry (Weizsäcker)</i> In an hour-long conversation, Ambassador Kennedy expressed eagerness to visit Germany, stressing his desire to promote friendly German-American relations and his confidence that, because of his strong position at home, he would succeed; the American foreign service, the visit of Colonel Lindbergh to Germany, the Jewish question, the American press, and the aims of German policy were among the subjects discussed.	713
June 25 458	<i>The German Ambassador in the United States (Dieckhoff) to the German Foreign Ministry</i> The steady rise of anti-German sentiment (the origins of which are summarized) makes unlikely any new commercial agreement between the United States and Germany.	718
July 20 459	<i>The German Ambassador in Great Britain (Dirksen) to the State Secretary in the German Foreign Ministry (Weizsäcker)</i> Ambassador Kennedy reported that American sentiment against Germany was much stronger, but the President continued to promote peace; Kennedy reiterated his desire to visit Germany. In a marginal note, Weizsäcker states why Dieckhoff opposes the visit.	721
July 28 460	<i>Memorandum</i> Secretary Hull, in conversation with Dieckhoff, listed the reasons for American resentment at German economic policy.	724
Aug. 16 461	<i>The Under State Secretary in the German Foreign Ministry (Woermann) to the German Chargé d'Affaires in Great Britain (Th. Kordt)</i> Kennedy is to be told that his visit would be welcome, but that it is uncertain whether the occasion which he had suggested for the visit would materialize.	725
Sept. 12 462	<i>The German Chargé d'Affaires in the United States (Thomsen) to the German Foreign Ministry</i> A detailed analysis of the forces shaping American foreign policy. Ideological aversion to totalitarianism is only a cover for the more important concern for the balance of power and international trade.	726

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## CHAPTER IV. GERMANY AND THE FAR EAST, JULY 1937-SEPTEMBER 1938

## A. NEUTRALITY, JULY-AUGUST, 1937

Date and Doc. No.	Subject	Page
1937 July 20 463	<i>The German Foreign Ministry to Various German Diplomatic Missions</i> In the Far East conflict Germany will observe strict neutrality, but earnestly desires a peaceful settlement for economic reasons and because the conflict serves Soviet interests. (Footnote: The text of the Secret Agreement attached to the Anti-Comintern Pact of November 25, 1936).	733
July 21 464	<i>The German Ambassador in Italy (Hassell) to the German Foreign Ministry</i> Ciano gave the Italian view, which is sympathetic to Japan.	735
July 21 465	<i>The German Ambassador in China (Trautmann) to the German Foreign Ministry</i> Falkenhausen gave in confidence Chiang's estimate of the probable course of events, and his own, both of which were most optimistic.	736
July 22 466	<i>Memorandum</i> The Japanese Counselor said that the intervention of third powers to promote a peaceful settlement would not be welcome.	737
July 22 467	<i>Memorandum</i> The Japanese Counselor protested that arms were still going to China, despite the promises of Neurath that these exports would be stopped; Weizsäcker said he would investigate.	737
July 24 468	<i>Memorandum</i> The British Chargé d'Affaires brought an <i>aide-mémoire</i> expressing anxiety about conditions in the Far East, summarizing the action taken by the British Government, and requesting the German view; Weizsäcker replied that Germany had taken no action, and intended to take none.	738
July 27 469	<i>The German Ambassador in Japan (Dirksen) to the German Foreign Ministry</i> A Japanese spokesman complained that German shipments of arms to China were stopped only after a protest and that the German Military Adviser still is active in China.	740
July 27 470	<i>The German Ambassador in China (Trautmann) to the German Foreign Ministry</i> Chiang urges German pressure on Japan, hinting that China might be forced to seek aid from the U.S.S.R.	741
July 28 471	<i>The German Foreign Ministry to the German Embassy in China</i> Germany has counseled moderation to Japan; can do no more.	742
July 28 472	<i>The German Foreign Ministry to the German Embassy in Japan</i> A strong repudiation of the Japanese contention that the Anti-Comintern Pact requires German assistance to Japan. German neutrality, not Japanese protests, stopped the delivery of arms to China; recall of the German military advisers would mean taking sides against China.	742

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1937		
July 28 473	<i>Memorandum</i> The Japanese Ambassador suggests that, by refusing to recognize the anti-Communist motivation of Japanese action in China, Germany was jeopardizing the Pact; Weizsäcker suggests that the Japanese are in fact facilitating the spread of Communism.	744
July 30 474	<i>Memorandum</i> Further Japanese efforts to demonstrate that Japan was fighting Communism in China and that Germany was therefore obligated to assist Japan.	745
July 31 475	<i>The German Foreign Ministry to the German Embassies in China and Japan</i> Is Soviet activity increasing in North China?	747
Aug. 1 476	<i>The German Ambassador in China (Trautmann) to the German Foreign Ministry</i> Reports of Communist activity have no truth, but Japan may drive China into alliance with the U.S.S.R.	748
Aug. 3 477	<i>The German Ambassador in Japan (Dirksen) to the German Foreign Ministry</i> Japanese politicians hope for a quick, local solution of the North China conflict; the military men, however, plan the overthrow of the Nanking Government. The Japanese claim to have evidence of Communist activity in China.	748
Aug. 17 478	<i>Memorandum by the Foreign Minister</i> Hitler stated that Germany must remain neutral in the Far East; some arms deliveries to China were to continue.	750
Aug. 17 479	<i>Memorandum for Ambassador von Ribbentrop</i> A discussion with Japanese representatives of the possibility of drawing Rumania and Poland into the Anti-Comintern Pact.	750
Aug. 19 480	<i>Memorandum</i> State Secretary Funk agreed that, in accordance with Hitler's decision, the Propaganda Ministry must alter its pro-Japanese attitude.	752
Aug. 19 481	<i>Memorandum</i> Keitel agreed that the German press must take a neutral position on the Far Eastern conflict.	753
Aug. 20 482	<i>Memorandum</i> Contrary to expectations, instructions had gone out for the press to take a more friendly position toward Japan; pending further steps by Neurath, these must stand.	753
Aug. 23 483	<i>The German Ambassador in Japan (Dirksen) to the German Foreign Ministry</i> Unexpected Chinese resistance has shifted the Japanese objective to complete overthrow of Chiang and the Nanking Government; in this new situation the recall of our military advisers in China, and pressure on China to make peace should be considered.	754

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1937 Aug. 30 484	<i>Memorandum</i> The Chinese Ambassador argued that the Nonaggression Pact with the U.S.S.R. meant no change in Chinese policy and that the German policy of neutrality should therefore continue; Gaus expressed misgivings.	756

## B. DIVIDED COUNSELS, SEPTEMBER-NOVEMBER 1937

1937 Sept. 8 485	<i>The German Ambassador in Japan (Dirksen) to the German Foreign Ministry</i> The Japanese are worried because the Italians persistently endeavor to give the negotiations for an anti-Comintern pact an edge against England; Italy is trying to exploit the Far Eastern conflict to obtain a freer hand in the Mediterranean.	757
Sept. 19 486	<i>Memorandum for the Führer</i> Forecasts an early victory for Japan, after which the Nanking Government will be forced to conclude an anti-Comintern pact; the Japanese hold out to Ribbentrop the prospect of a joint economic program with Germany in China.	758
Sept. 21 487	<i>The German Ambassador in Japan (Dirksen) to the German Foreign Ministry</i> Repeats Japanese objections to the presence of German advisers in China; the advisers are reported to be directing operations.	759
Sept. 22 488	<i>Memorandum by the Foreign Minister</i> Rebuffs Japanese hints that the German Ambassador be recalled from Nanking, that more information about conditions in China be passed on to Japan, and that a German-Japanese-Italian anti-Comintern pact be concluded; if they wished, Japan and Italy should make a bilateral agreement.	760
Sept. 23 489	<i>The German Foreign Ministry to the German Embassy in Japan</i> Renew representations against bombings near German buildings.	761
Sept. 23 490	<i>The German Ambassador in China (Trautmann) to the German Foreign Ministry</i> Argues against recall of advisers and denies that advisers are participating in fighting.	761
Sept. 24 491	<i>The German Foreign Ministry to the German Embassy in Japan</i> Repeats the substance of Trautmann's denial that the advisers are participating in operations.	762
Sept. 25 492	<i>The German Ambassador in China (Trautmann) to the German Foreign Ministry</i> On rumors of the establishment of a Soviet airline in China.	763

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1937 Oct. 11 493	<i>The German Ambassador in China (Trautmann) to the German Foreign Ministry</i> Chiang requests that German influence be used to secure a more neutral attitude from Italy, and hints at his desire for German participation in the Brussels Conference.	763
Oct. 13 494	<i>Memorandum</i> Suggests that Germany forestall an invitation to the Brussels Conference by saying that Germany will not participate in a hopeless undertaking.	764
Oct. 14 495	<i>The German Foreign Ministry to the German Embassy in China</i> A justification for the probable refusal of Germany to attend the Brussels Conference.	765
Oct. 14 496	<i>Memorandum by the Foreign Minister</i> Explains the German view of the Brussels Conference to the Italian Ambassador.	765
Oct. 15 497	<i>Memorandum by the Foreign Minister</i> In conversation with the Chinese Ambassador, Neurath explains why Germany will not attend the Brussels Conference and denies that the German advisers in China are to be withdrawn.	766
Oct. 16 498	<i>The German Ambassador in China (Trautmann) to the German Foreign Ministry</i> Advises that Germany attend the Brussels Conference.	767
Oct. 19 499	<i>Memorandum</i> The War Ministry asked if the Foreign Ministry knew anything of Göring's instructions to stop deliveries to China; Mackensen said the Foreign Ministry knew nothing.	767
Oct. 19 500	<i>Memorandum</i> Through Ribbentrop and Göring, Keitel had been told that Hitler had decided to support Japan and to stop deliveries to China; Japan had threatened to end the Anti-Comintern Pact unless Germany ceased to support China.	768
Oct. 21 501	<i>The German Ambassador in Japan (Dirksen) to the German Foreign Ministry</i> Japan probably will not go to Brussels and hopes Germany will not go; Italy will represent the Japanese position; Japan is prepared for direct negotiations with China, initiated by Germany.	769
Oct. 21 502	<i>The German Ambassador in the United States (Dieckhoff) to the German Foreign Ministry</i> Sumner Welles argues that Germany should attend the Brussels Conference.	770
Oct. 22 503	<i>The German Foreign Ministry to the German Embassy in China</i> Explain to the Chinese that Germany considers the Brussels Conference futile, but would be glad to serve as a channel for direct negotiations.	771

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1937		
Oct. 22 504	<i>Memorandum</i> Göring had stated that deliveries to China were secretly to be continued.	772
Oct. 27 505	<i>Memorandum by the Foreign Minister</i> Hitler says Germany will not go to Brussels.	772
Oct. 28 506	<i>The German Ambassador in Japan (Dirksen) to the German Foreign Ministry</i> A Japanese suggestion that Germany influence China to begin peace negotiations.	773
Oct. 29 507	<i>Memorandum</i> The Japanese Ambassador was pleased by the German refusal to go to Brussels.	773
Oct. 30 508	<i>The German Ambassador in China (Trautmann) to the German Foreign Ministry</i> Had suggested the desirability of peace negotiations to the Chinese, but it would be desirable to know something of the Japanese conditions before speaking to Chiang.	774
Oct. 30 509	<i>The German Foreign Ministry to the German Embassy in Japan</i> Is Japan ready for peace negotiations or merely seeking propaganda effects?	775
Oct. 30 510	<i>The German Foreign Ministry to the German Embassy in China</i> Warns not to go beyond urging China to seek a settlement; so far, Germany is only a letter carrier.	776
Oct. 30 511	<i>The German Ambassador in China (Trautmann) to the German Foreign Ministry</i> Warns of disadvantages in China if Germany and Italy appear to be following a common policy in the Far East.	776
Oct. 31 512	<i>The German Ambassador in China (Trautmann) to the German Foreign Ministry</i> Had intended to give Chiang the outline of Japanese terms obtained from Ott, but will withdraw to the role of letter carrier.	777
Nov. 3 513	<i>Memorandum</i> Mackensen had suggested pointing out to Hitler that it was better to have a German than a Soviet general at Chiang's side.	777
Nov. 3 514	<i>The German Ambassador in Japan (Dirksen) to the German Foreign Ministry</i> Hirota gives the Japanese peace terms: autonomous Inner Mongolia; a demilitarized zone and a pro-Japanese administration in North China; a larger demilitarized zone in Shanghai; cessation of anti-Japanese policy; a common fight against Bolshevism; reduced customs; respect for rights of aliens. Dirksen convinced of Japanese good faith.	778
Nov. 3 515	<i>The German Foreign Ministry to the German Embassy in China</i> Tell Chiang of Japanese terms, which seem acceptable.	779

CHAPTER IV. GERMANY AND THE FAR EAST, JULY 1937-SEPTEMBER 1938  
—Continued

Date and Doc. No.	Subject	Page
1937 Nov. 5 516	<i>The German Ambassador in China (Trautmann) to the German Foreign Ministry</i> On learning the Japanese terms, Chiang said there would be a revolution if they were accepted; peace was possible only on the basis of the <i>status quo ante</i> ; if Chiang fell, the Communists would take over and fight on.	780
Nov. 6 517	<i>The German Foreign Ministry to the German Embassy in Italy</i> If questioned about rumors of German mediation in China, say they are unfounded.	781
Nov. 7 518	<i>The German Ambassador in Italy (Hassell) to the German Foreign Ministry</i> Ciano said mediation impossible until Japan had won a clear victory.	782
Nov. 8 519	<i>Memorandum</i> Hitler had not mentioned the recall of advisers in China, but had said the War Ministry must avoid being pro-Chinese.	782
Nov. 8 520	<i>The German Ambassador in Japan (Dirksen) to the German Foreign Ministry</i> Advisers should not be recalled now because they will be useful in mediation; if mediation fails, Japan will press for their recall.	783
Nov. 9 521	<i>The German Ambassador in China (Trautmann) to the German Foreign Ministry</i> Falkenhausen pointed out to Chinese leaders the disastrous consequences of continued war.	784
Nov. 10 522	<i>Memorandum</i> In reply to an inquiry, Mackensen told the British Ambassador the reports of German mediation were fabrications.	784
Nov. 20 523	<i>Memorandum</i> The Italian Ambassador said Italy must recognize Manchukuo and asked that Germany do likewise on November 25, adding that Ribbentrop had said Hitler agreed to the recognition.	784
Nov. 22 524	<i>Memorandum by the Foreign Minister</i> Told the Italian Ambassador that Germany was not prepared to make Japan a free gift by recognizing Manchukuo and thereby forfeiting the position of mediator.	785
Nov. 24 525	<i>Memorandum for Minister Aschmann of the German Foreign Ministry</i> Germany is a natural mediator, but mediation is possible only if requested by both sides; the Brussels Conference prevents mediation at present. Welzsäcker presents this view for guidance.	786
Nov. 27 526	<i>The German Foreign Ministry to the German Embassy in Italy</i> Hitler said Germany was ready in principle to recognize Manchukuo, but only after receiving guarantees for trade.	786

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## C. MEDIATION, DECEMBER 1937-JANUARY 1938

Date and Doc. No.	Subject	Page
1937		
Dec. 1 527	<i>Memorandum by the Foreign Minister</i> Told the Chinese Ambassador that it was in the interests of China to conclude peace as soon as possible.	787
Dec. 3 528	<i>The German Ambassador in China (Trautmann) to the German Foreign Ministry</i> Chiang conditionally accepts the Japanese terms as a basis for discussion.	787
Dec. 3 529	<i>The German Ambassador in Japan (Dirksen) to the German Foreign Ministry</i> Japanese optimism is rising as Chinese resistance weakens; to counter the opposition to a negotiated peace, the General Staff hopes Hitler will open the door for negotiations.	788
Dec. 3 530	<i>The German Ambassador in Japan (Dirksen) to the German Foreign Ministry</i> Explains why mediation should be undertaken by Germany at once.	791
Dec. 3 531	<i>Memorandum</i> Keitel seeks information on the military situation in China.	792
Dec. 4 532	<i>The German Foreign Ministry to the German Embassy in Japan</i> Gives the text of a communication to the Japanese Government summarizing the peace discussions since November 3; Dirksen to make sure Japan is ready to open direct negotiations on these terms; then Germany will obtain a similar promise from China; after that, Hitler would appeal for a cessation of hostilities.	793
Dec. 5 533	<i>The German Ambassador in China (Trautmann) to the German Foreign Ministry</i> The Chinese Government summarizes the negotiations and requests that Hitler propose the cessation of hostilities as a preliminary step to the restoration of peace.	797
Dec. 6 534	<i>The German Representative at Hsinking (Knoll) to the German Foreign Ministry</i> Japanese mistrust of Germany has appeared strongly as a result of the nonrecognition of Manchukuo and rumors of German mediation.	798
Dec. 6 535	<i>The German Foreign Ministry to the German Embassy in Japan</i> Make appropriate use of the Chinese summary in speaking with Hirota.	798
Dec. 7 536	<i>The German Ambassador in Japan (Dirksen) to the German Foreign Ministry</i> Hirota intimates that recent Japanese successes would lead the Army to demand harsher peace terms.	799
Dec. 8 537	<i>Memorandum</i> Attolico intimates that Germany is not keeping Italy informed of steps to bring about peace.	800

CHAPTER IV. GERMANY AND THE FAR EAST, JULY 1937-SEPTEMBER 1938  
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Date and Doc. No.	Subject	Page
1937 Dec. 10 538	<i>The German Foreign Ministry to the German Embassy in Japan</i> Without exerting influence, make it clear that Germany will not convey unacceptable terms to China, or terms Japan intends later to broaden.	800
Dec. 13 539	<i>The German Ambassador in China (Trautmann) to the German Foreign Ministry</i> Although the Chinese deny rumors of an alliance with the U.S.S.R., they admit that pressure for such an alliance is growing.	801
Dec. 23 540	<i>The German Ambassador in Japan (Dirksen) to the German Foreign Ministry</i> Hirota gives the revised Japanese peace terms, which went far beyond those communicated on November 2, but fell short of those the Army and industry wished to impose; a reply was expected by about the end of the year, and if the terms were accepted hostilities would continue during the peace negotiations.	802
Dec. 23 541	<i>The German Ambassador in Japan (Dirksen) to the German Foreign Ministry</i> The Italians have requested information on the German-Japanese conversations; despite Dirksen's protests, apparently the Italians have been given some information.	804
Dec. 24 542	<i>The German Foreign Ministry to the German Embassy in China</i> The Japanese terms are to be given to the Chinese, with the statement that Germany took no stand with regard to them.	805
Dec. 24 543	<i>The German Foreign Ministry to the German Embassy in Japan</i> The Japanese terms have been reluctantly given to the Chinese; call attention to the difficulty of rapid communication; Germany will keep Italy informed in general terms.	808
Dec. 26 544	<i>The German Ambassador in China (Trautmann) to the German Foreign Ministry</i> The Japanese terms were received with consternation by Kung and Madame Chiang Kai-shek.	809
Dec. 27 545	<i>The German Ambassador in China (Trautmann) to the German Foreign Ministry</i> Details of the Chinese reaction to the Japanese terms.	810
Dec. 29 546	<i>The German Foreign Ministry to the German Embassy in Japan</i> Point out that it would be wiser to accept terms which fall short of Japanese aspirations rather than to drive China into the arms of the U.S.S.R.	810
Dec. 30 547	<i>The German Ambassador in Japan (Dirksen) to the German Foreign Ministry</i> Hirota gives the details of some of the Japanese terms.	811
Dec. 31 548	<i>The German Ambassador in China (Trautmann) to the German Foreign Ministry</i> Had endeavored to moderate Falkenhausen's optimism concerning the possibilities of continued Chinese resistance.	812

CHAPTER IV. GERMANY AND THE FAR EAST, JULY 1937-SEPTEMBER 1938  
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Date and Doc. No.	Subject	Page
1938 Jan. 10 549	<i>Memorandum by the Foreign Minister</i> Neurath told the Japanese Ambassador that a prolonged war involved dangers for Japan. The Ambassador said that if Chiang Kai-shek would not accept the Japanese terms, peace would be made with the provincial governors.	813
Jan. 12 550	<i>The German Ambassador in Japan (Dirksen) to the German Foreign Ministry</i> Had wired Hankow that the Japanese expected a clear statement of the Chinese position by the 15th.	814
Jan. 12 551	<i>The German Ambassador in China (Trautmann) to the German Foreign Ministry</i> Had told the Chinese Foreign Minister that the Japanese expect an answer by the 15th.	814
Jan. 13 552	<i>The German Ambassador in China (Trautmann) to the German Foreign Ministry</i> The Chinese Foreign Minister requests that Japan be told that China is prepared to take as the basis of discussion the terms proposed in November, but desires further information on the altered terms of December; Trautmann stated that this communication revealed no desire for an understanding.	815
Jan. 14 553	<i>The German Ambassador in Japan (Dirksen) to the German Foreign Ministry</i> Hirota considered the Chinese reply evasive; Dirksen suggested that specific Japanese terms be given.	816
Jan. 15 554	<i>The German Ambassador in China (Trautmann) to the German Foreign Ministry</i> Kung requested that Japan be told that China desires understanding and durable peace with Japan, and earnestly wishes to know the basic conditions proposed by Japan.	817
Jan. 15 555	<i>The German Ambassador in Japan (Dirksen) to the German Foreign Ministry</i> A Japanese naval spokesman has proposed that the former German islands in the Pacific be returned to Germany, and then purchased by Japan. Dirksen is sure both that Japan will not relinquish the islands and that an early clarification by direct discussions is desirable.	818
Jan. 16 556	<i>The German Ambassador in Japan (Dirksen) to the German Foreign Ministry</i> Hirota says the Chinese reply reveals no intention to sue for peace and that negotiations are therefore abandoned.	819
Jan. 17 557	<i>The German Foreign Ministry to the German Embassy in China</i> Tells of the breakdown of negotiations.	820
Jan. 17 558	<i>The German Ambassador in Japan (Dirksen) to the German Foreign Ministry</i> Details of Dirksen's efforts to secure continued negotiation.	821
Jan. 17 559	<i>The German Ambassador in China (Trautmann) to the German Foreign Ministry</i> Had not yet informed the Chinese of the Japanese note, in the hope that China would offer concessions.	822

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1938 Jan. 18 560	<i>The German Foreign Ministry to the German Embassy in Japan</i> An open sale of the Pacific islands to Japan would hurt Germany's colonial claims; a public announcement of Japanese willingness to discuss German colonial claims, and a secret agreement to resell to Japan would be most advantageous.	822
Jan. 24 561	<i>The German Ambassador in Japan (Dirksen) to the German Foreign Ministry</i> Doubts if the Japanese would accept a secret agreement to resell the islands after their return to Germany; return and resale must be parts of one agreement.	823
Jan. 25 562	<i>Memorandum by the Foreign Minister</i> The Japanese Ambassador told Neurath that Japan would set up a new government in China; the possibilities of expanding German-Japanese trade were discussed.	824
Jan. 25 563	<i>The German Foreign Ministry to the German Embassy in Japan</i> On colonies, wait for the Japanese to open the subject, and maintain a noncommittal attitude.	825

## D. CONCESSIONS TO JAPAN, JANUARY-MAY 1938

1938 Jan. 26 564	<i>The German Ambassador in Japan (Dirksen) to the German Foreign Ministry</i> Now that German efforts at mediation have failed, and the defeated Chinese Government is seeking Soviet support, German military advisers should be withdrawn from China, the delivery of war materials to China should stop, Manchukuo should be recognized, and North China should be the base for German trade.	826
Feb. 5 565	<i>The German Ambassador in Japan (Dirksen) to the German Foreign Ministry</i> Hirota requested that German shipments of war materials to China be stopped and suggested the recognition of Manchukuo, withdrawal of German military advisers from China, and the discussion of German colonial claims.	832
Feb. 14 566	<i>The German Ambassador in China (Trautmann) to the German Foreign Ministry</i> Shanghai reports recognition of Manchukuo would turn China against Germany.	833
Feb. 14 567	<i>The German Ambassador in China (Trautmann) to the German Foreign Ministry</i> Canton reports that recognition of Manchukuo would wreck the economic and cultural position of Germany in South China and give Soviet Russia her chance.	834
Feb. 16 568	<i>Memorandum</i> A review of discussions with Japan on the former German colonies, and of possible solutions of the problem.	835

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CHAPTER IV. GERMANY AND THE FAR EAST, JULY 1937-SEPTEMBER 1938  
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1938 Feb. 17 569	<i>The Reich Minister and Chief of the Reich Chancellery (Lammers) to the Foreign Minister</i> Hitler now wishes to recognize Manchukuo.	839
Feb. 21 570	<i>The German Foreign Ministry to the German Embassy in China</i> An explanation of the recognition of Manchukuo, to be given to the Chinese Government. The recognition does not mean an end to the friendly relations between Germany and China or to German neutrality in the Far Eastern conflict.	839
Feb. 23 571	<i>Memorandum Concerning the Visit of Japanese Ambassador Togo to Foreign Minister von Ribbentrop on February 22, 1938, at 5 p.m.</i> After expressing gratitude for the recognition of Manchukuo, Togo said Japan was anxious to further German colonial aspirations but could not relinquish the islands held by Japan. Ribbentrop suggested that on economic and financial questions Japan show the same generosity Germany had shown on Manchukuo.	841
Feb. 24 572	<i>Memorandum</i> The Chinese Ambassador charged that, by recognizing Manchukuo, Ribbentrop had abandoned Neurath's foreign policy; Mackensen replied that Hitler laid down German policy, and denied that the recognition was an act unfriendly to China.	843
Mar. 8 573	<i>The German Ambassador in China (Trautmann) to the German Foreign Ministry</i> Vigorously attacks the premises of Dirksen's report of January 26; argues that the recognition of Manchukuo was a mistake and that, if the other concessions recommended by Dirksen were made, China would be lost to Germany while Japan would give nothing in return.	844
Mar. 17 574	<i>The Chief of the Supreme Headquarters of the Wehrmacht (Keitel) to the Foreign Minister</i> Urges that General Ott, who cannot be given a high military post because he was Aide to Schleicher, be given a diplomatic post.	851
Apr. 8 575	<i>Memorandum of the Conversation Between the Foreign Minister and His Excellency Mr. Togo on April 8, 1938, at 5 p.m.</i> Togo argues that Germany cannot be conceded economic equality with Japan in China; Ribbentrop insisted that Germany was entitled to a certain measure of equality with Japan and a more privileged position than other countries.	851
Apr. 23 576	<i>Memorandum</i> Wiehl submits, for Ribbentrop, the figures on German contracts for, and deliveries of, war materials to China.	852
Apr. 26 577	<i>Advisory Staff Nanking (China)</i> A table of the number and names of German advisers to the Chinese Government.	854
Apr. 27 578	<i>Memorandum</i> Weizsäcker confirms to the Chinese Ambassador the reports that Germany definitely wished the German military advisers in China to leave.	855

CHAPTER IV. GERMANY AND THE FAR EAST, JULY 1937-SEPTEMBER 1938  
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1938 Apr. 28 579	<i>Memorandum</i> Göring had forbidden the export of war materials to China.	856
Apr. 30 580	<i>The German Ambassador in China (Trautmann) to the German Foreign Ministry</i> Falkenhausen says that departure of advisers would be a breach of contract and would mean financial ruin for the advisers.	856
May 5 581	<i>Memorandum by the German Ambassador in Japan (Ott)</i> Encloses a Japanese statement on matters under discussion between Germany and Japan, and tells of his conversation with the Japanese Foreign Minister on these matters.	858
May 9 582	<i>The German Ambassador in China (Trautmann) to the German Foreign Ministry</i> Chiang protested against the German intention to stop the deliveries of matériel; Trautmann is convinced that abrupt action on the advisers and matériel will jeopardize the position of Germany in China.	860
May 13 583	<i>The German Foreign Ministry to the German Embassy in China</i> Tell Falkenhausen that the early departure of advisers is expected, and cooperate with him to secure Chinese consent; Germany will compensate the advisers; strict measures are contemplated if officers refuse to comply.	861
May 17 584	<i>The German Foreign Ministry to the German Embassy in China</i> Emphasizes that withdrawal of advisers is expressly ordered by Hitler and that refusal to leave will have serious consequences; intimates that, if China makes difficulties, diplomatic relations will be broken off.	862
May 21 585	<i>The German Ambassador in China (Trautmann) to the German Foreign Ministry</i> The Chinese Foreign Minister said the withdrawal of advisers would be interpreted as indirect aid to Japan; he stressed the private status of the advisers.	863
May 30 586	<i>The State Secretary in the German Foreign Ministry (Weizsäcker) to the German Ambassador in China (Trautmann)</i> A private letter, touching on Trautmann's difficult position, on the close connection between the War and Foreign Ministries, on Czechoslovakia, colonies, and the U.S.S.R.	864

K. THE SEARCH FOR A PREFERENTIAL POSITION IN NORTH CHINA,  
MAY-SEPTEMBER, 1938

1938 June 2 587	<i>Memorandum of a Conversation Between the Foreign Minister and the Japanese Ambassador on May 20, 1938 (Based on Information Given by the Foreign Minister)</i> The Ambassador presented a <i>Pro Memoria</i> stressing Japanese desire to promote German economic interests in China, but emphasizing the need to safeguard the special position of Japan in China; while this was not a treaty it was backed by the word of honor of the Japanese Government; a treaty was not desirable.	865
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1938 June 2 588	<i>Memorandum of a Conversation Between the Foreign Minister and the Japanese Ambassador on May 20, 1938 (Based on Information Given by the Foreign Minister)</i> Ribbentrop pointed out the German services to Japan, the German losses in China, the inadequate Japanese cooperation, and the German expectation of greater Japanese cooperation in future. The Ambassador promised to consult his Government.	867
June 2 589	<i>Memorandum of a Conversation Between the Foreign Minister and the Japanese Ambassador on May 28, 1938</i> A sharp discussion on the German demand for the provision of more foreign exchange by Japan.	868
June 3 590	<i>Memorandum</i> The Japanese Ambassador opposed the suggestion of Raumer and Wiehl that the <i>Pro Memoria</i> of May 20 be so worded as to make certain both that the concessions applied to all parts of China under Japanese control, and that Germany would receive better treatment than third powers.	870
June 10 591	<i>The German Foreign Ministry to the German Embassy in China</i> A reply on the departure of advisers is expected by June 13.	872
June 13 592	<i>The German Foreign Ministry to the German Embassy in China</i> No further delay in departure of advisers is permitted; tell Chiang you will be recalled if he continues his opposition.	872
June 14 593	<i>The German Ambassador in China (Trautmann) to the German Foreign Ministry</i> Chiang said all German advisers would be relieved of military functions and the majority allowed to depart immediately.	873
June 16 594	<i>Memorandum Regarding Deliveries of War Matériel to China</i> On the confusion within the German Government regarding the status of deliveries of matériel to China, and on the disastrous effects of cancellation of contracts for the German armament industry.	874
June 18 595	<i>Memorandum for the Foreign Minister</i> In a conference with the Japanese Ambassador, Ribbentrop insisted that Germany must have a preferential economic position in China; there was discussion of a rumored Italo-Japanese pact, and of cooperation in the task of combatting lies about the authoritarian states.	876
June 19 596	<i>The German Ambassador in China (Trautmann) to the German Foreign Ministry</i> Chiang had been told that if his attitude persists the German Ambassador will immediately be recalled.	877
June 20 597	<i>The German Foreign Ministry to the German Embassy in China</i> Trautmann was to leave immediately if definite consent to the departure of all advisers was not secured by June 23; severance of relations might follow quickly.	878

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1938 June 23 598	<i>Memorandum for the Foreign Minister</i> Togo was told that Germany was dissatisfied with both the form and the content of the <i>Pro Memoria</i> of May 20; a more formal document was needed, and one which clearly recognized the German claim to preferential economic treatment in China.	879
June 23 599	<i>The German Ambassador in China (Trautmann) to the German Foreign Ministry</i> Despite all his efforts, Chiang insists that five or six advisers stay in China temporarily.	881
June 24 600	<i>The German Foreign Ministry to the German Embassy in China</i> Since the time limit has expired, Trautmann is to leave.	883
June 29 601	<i>The German Foreign Ministry to the German Consulate General at Hong Kong</i> If the advisers leave as planned on July 5 relations may be continued.	884
June 29 602	<i>Memorandum by the Foreign Minister</i> Togo gave Ribbentrop a revised <i>Pro Memoria</i> on German trade in China, intimated that, while Japan would grant Germany preferential treatment in practice, this could not be stated in treaty form. Ribbentrop said the draft did not appear to go beyond most-favored-nation treatment, which was not satisfactory.	884
July 5 603	<i>Memorandum by the Foreign Minister</i> Oshima reported the results of the interrogation of the G.P.U. chief who was now in Tokyo. Ribbentrop stated that he was not satisfied with the revised <i>Pro Memoria</i> submitted by Togo.	887
July 6 604	<i>Memorandum of a Conversation With the Japanese Ambassador on July 6, 1938</i> After a discussion with Wiehl of the German-Japanese economic negotiations, the revised <i>Pro Memoria</i> was considered. Some minor differences of wording were adjusted, but there was no agreement on the German demands for preferential treatment and for an exchange of notes.	888
July 28 605	<i>Memorandum</i> In conversation with Togo, Wiehl said German belief that the revised <i>Pro Memoria</i> was unsatisfactory was reinforced by evidence that Japan was determined to exclude all foreign trade in North China; a statement of specific German grievances was given Togo. A vigorous discussion followed, from which Wiehl concluded that Japan was ready to make concessions.	890
Aug. 9 606	<i>The German Foreign Ministry to the German Embassy in Japan</i> Reviews the negotiations with Japan regarding North China and concludes that Japan refuses formally to promise preferential treatment to Germany because the Japanese had promised Britain they would not grant such preference.	894

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1938 Sept. 16 607	<i>The German Ambassador in Japan (Ott) to the German Foreign Ministry</i> Hears that Japan is prepared to strengthen the Anti-Comintern Pact but, if possible, to direct it exclusively against the Comintern.	896
Sept. 22 608	<i>Memorandum</i> Magistrati told of a Soviet report that Japan had avoided war with the U.S.S.R. because Germany had refused the Japanese request for military assistance; Woermann denied that Japan had requested military assistance.	896

## CHAPTER V. GERMANY AND THE SOVIET UNION, NOVEMBER 1937-JULY 1938

1937 Nov. 25 609	<i>The German Ambassador to the Soviet Union (Schulenburg) to the German War Minister (Blomberg)</i> Encloses the text of a lecture given at the Wehrmacht Academy.	898
Undated 610	<i>Extracts From an Address by the German Ambassador to the Soviet Union (Schulenburg) Before the German Wehrmacht Academy, November 25, 1937</i> The Soviet Union is dominated by fear of Germany; this fear led to the Soviet pacts with France and Czechoslovakia, and to the increase in armament expenditures. The wave of terror has greatly weakened the Soviet Union. The U.S.S.R. is headed, economically and politically, for a depression.	898
1938 Jan. 5 611	<i>The Reichsführer-SS and Chief of the German Police in the Ministry of the Interior to the Foreign Ministry</i> An order for the immediate expulsion of all Soviet nationals who are Jews.	900
Jan. 10 612	<i>The Counselor of the German Embassy in the Soviet Union (Tippelskirch) to Counselor of Legation Schliep of Political Division V in the German Foreign Ministry</i> Enclosing the revised text of Schulenburg's address to the Wehrmacht Academy.	901
Jan. 10 613	<i>Memorandum on the Status of German-Russian Negotiations</i> On the difficulties encountered in securing an extension of the trade agreement.	902
Jan. 13 614	<i>The German Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Schulenburg) to the German Foreign Ministry</i> The request for the closing of consular agencies in the U.S.S.R. indicates a systematic endeavor to limit relations with foreign countries as much as possible.	903
Jan. 17 615	<i>The German Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Schulenburg) to the German Foreign Ministry</i> A detailed examination of Soviet measures to reduce the number of consular agencies in the U.S.S.R.; these measures have their origin in the increasing preponderance of forces hostile to foreigners.	904

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1938 Jan. 28 616	<i>The German Foreign Ministry to the German Embassy in the Soviet Union</i> Expelled Jewish Soviet citizens will be sent across the border illegally if Soviet entry permits cannot be procured.	909
Feb. 7 617	<i>The German Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Schulenburg) to the German Foreign Ministry</i> Soviet comments on personnel changes in the German Government.	909
Feb. 7 618	<i>The German Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Schulenburg) to the German Foreign Ministry</i> Figures on Reich-Germans arrested in the U.S.S.R. and on the deportation of German prisoners.	910
Feb. 21 619	<i>Memorandum on the German-Russian Economic Negotiations</i> Outlines the difficulties encountered, from Nazi Party officials as well as from the Soviet negotiators, in securing a continuance of deliveries of essential raw materials from the U.S.S.R.	912
Feb. 22 620	<i>Memorandum</i> The German Military Attaché in Moscow said the reports of the German couriers were the only remaining source of information outside of Moscow.	915
Feb. 24 621	<i>Memorandum</i> Describes the courier service to Tokyo via Siberia; despite doubts regarding security, the service will be continued.	915
Mar. 29 622	<i>The German Foreign Ministry to the German Embassy in France</i> Give publicity both to the statement under oath by the Germans implicated in the Moscow trial that the charges were pure inventions, and to the fact that Hitler's speech of February 20 shows the impossibility of cooperation between Germany and the Soviet Union.	916
May 16 623	<i>The German Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Schulenburg) to the German Foreign Ministry</i> Litvinov's vague speech on Abyssinia is further evidence of the weak position of the Soviet Union in international affairs resulting from the bloody domestic events.	917
June 18 624	<i>The German Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Schulenburg) to the German Foreign Ministry</i> The new Soviet Ambassador to Berlin, Merekalov, is young but gives the impression of self-assurance.	918
June 20 625	<i>The Press Adviser of the German Embassy in the Soviet Union (Stein) to the German Foreign Ministry</i> Soviet press reports on German preparations for war, and on popular resistance to these preparations.	919

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1938 June 23 626	<p><i>The German Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Schulenburg) to the State Secretary in the German Foreign Ministry (Weizsäcker)</i></p> <p>From a change in a news despatch suggested by the Soviet censor, and from the persistent curiosity shown by the American Embassy, Schulenburg concludes that the Soviet Government is trying to create the illusion that a Soviet-German understanding is possible, and that these efforts are meeting with success.</p>	920
June 27 627	<p><i>The German Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Schulenburg) to the German Foreign Ministry</i></p> <p>Analyzes Litvinov's speech of June 23 on the international situation and concludes that the speech shows little aggressiveness, a desire to leave open all possibilities, and a strikingly objective attitude toward German policy.</p>	921
July 4 628	<p><i>The German Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Schulenburg) to the German Foreign Ministry</i></p> <p>Personnel changes in the Commissariat for Domestic Affairs indicate the increasing influence of the G.P.U. in the Soviet Government.</p>	924
July 5 629	<p><i>Memorandum</i></p> <p>Enclosing an analysis of political and economic relations between Germany and the Soviet Union. Soviet foreign policy, increasingly influenced by fear of Germany and Japan, has been weakened by political and economic difficulties at home. German efforts to increase the flow of raw materials from the Soviet Union have not yet succeeded.</p>	926
July 5 630	<p><i>Memorandum by the German Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Schulenburg) Concerning Litvinov's Speech on Foreign Policy of June 23, 1938</i></p> <p>The speech shows disillusionment over the cooperation of the Soviet Union with the democratic countries and the League of Nations and marks the end of the Soviet policy of close collaboration with Britain and France.</p>	928
July 6 631	<p><i>The German Ambassador in France (Welczeck) to the German Foreign Ministry</i></p> <p>Analyzes a semi-official article on Soviet-German relations and concludes that the Soviet alliance is now valued by France chiefly as a means of keeping Germany away from the Soviet reservoir of raw materials and manpower.</p>	929

CHAPTER VI. GERMAN RELATIONS WITH THE HOLY SEE,  
MARCH 1937-SEPTEMBER 1938

A. THE ENCYCLICAL ON THE CONDITION OF THE CHURCH IN GERMANY,  
MARCH-MAY 1937

Date and Doc. No.	Subject	Page
1937 Mar. 22 632	<i>The German Ambassador to the Holy See (Bergen) to the German Foreign Ministry</i> The Vatican had prepared the encyclical "On the Condition of the Catholic Church in Germany" secretly to prevent a ban on its being read.	932
Mar. 23 633	<i>Memorandum</i> Dieckhoff refuses to conduct conversations with the Nuncio because of the very serious situation created by the encyclical.	933
Mar. 23 634	<i>The German Ambassador to the Holy See (Bergen) to the German Foreign Ministry</i> The Vatican provided for wide dissemination abroad of the contents of the encyclical, but asserts continued desire for good relations with Germany. Bergen advises that, outwardly, the encyclical be ignored.	934
Mar. 23 635	<i>The Reich and Prussian Minister for Ecclesiastical Affairs to the Bishops of German Dioceses</i> The encyclical represents a serious violation of the Concordat; its dissemination in any form is forbidden.	935
Mar. 24 636	<i>The German Ambassador to the Holy See (Bergen) to the German Foreign Ministry</i> Warns that if complications result from the encyclical, a Yellow Book will be issued, containing the notes addressed earlier to Germany.	936
Mar. 25 637	<i>The German Foreign Ministry to the Germany Embassy to the Holy See</i> Bergen is not to participate in ceremonies at Easter.	937
Mar. 26 638	<i>The German Foreign Ministry to Various German Diplomatic Missions in Europe and the Consulate General at Geneva</i> Nuncio has been told that the encyclical is regarded as a call to battle.	937
Mar. 27 639	<i>The Chairman of the Fulda Conference of Bishops (Bertram) to the Foreign Minister</i> Enclosing a copy of his reply to the prohibition against dissemination of the encyclical. The reply denies that the encyclical or its dissemination violated the Concordat. The struggle against Christianity waged in high places made the encyclical necessary.	938
Apr. 1 640	<i>The German Ambassador to the Holy See (Bergen) to the German Foreign Ministry</i> Tells what he has learned concerning the origin of the encyclical; points out that the international situation, and particularly Italo-German relations, make denunciation of the Concordat inadvisable; urges that the German reply affirm German willingness to protect religion.	941

CHAPTER VI. GERMAN RELATIONS WITH THE HOLY SEE,  
MARCH 1937-SEPTEMBER 1938-Continued

Date and Doc. No.	Subject	Page
1937 Apr. 5 641	<i>Memorandum</i> The Nuncio presented a <i>Pro Memoria</i> protesting against the measures taken against the publication of the encyclical, especially the suppression for 3 months of bishops' official publications; Dieckhoff said he would investigate.	943
Apr. 7 642	<i>The German Foreign Ministry to the German Embassy to the Holy See</i> Hitler has ordered the resumption of the foreign exchange and immorality trials against Catholic clergymen.	945
Apr. 7 643	<i>The Reich and Prussian Minister for Ecclesiastical Affairs (Kerrl) to the Chairman of the Fulda Conference of Bishops (Bertram)</i> Maintains that while the German Government has desired peace with the Church, the Pope and Catholic clerics in Germany have demonstrated their hostility to the new Germany, especially by their failure to condemn clerics who violated the revenue and morality laws of Germany; the encyclical is conclusive proof of a desire to rally the world against the new Germany.	945
Apr. 9 644	<i>The German Ambassador in Italy (Hassell) to the German Foreign Ministry</i> Ciano joins Hassell in denouncing the Vatican's harsh policy toward Germany and its weakness in Spain.	949
Apr. 9 645	<i>The Reich and Prussian Minister for Ecclesiastical Affairs (Kerrl) to the Foreign Ministry</i> Recommends that the Foreign Ministry refuse to discuss the Nuncio's <i>Pro Memoria</i> of April 5.	950
Apr. 15 646	<i>The German Foreign Ministry to Various German Diplomatic Missions and Consular Offices</i> Encloses a note concerning the encyclical; decision on publication of the note is reserved for a later date. The note denounces the encyclical as an attempt to arouse the world and German Catholics against the new Germany and as a violation of the Concordat; friendly relations can be established between Church and State, and the Concordat continued, only if the Holy See holds the clergy to the fulfillment of their political obligations of loyalty.	951
Apr. 15 647	<i>The German Ambassador to the Holy See (Bergen) to the German Foreign Ministry</i> Cardinal Pacelli explains that the Pope had issued the encyclical only when experience showed that Germany was unwilling to negotiate; the Holy See remained willing to negotiate.	954
Apr. 23 648	<i>The German Foreign Ministry to Various German Diplomatic Missions</i> For guidance of conversations, encloses the correspondence on the prohibition against dissemination of the encyclical.	956

CHAPTER VI. GERMAN RELATIONS WITH THE HOLY SEE,  
MARCH 1937-SEPTEMBER 1938—Continued

Date and Doc. No.	Subject	Page
1937 Apr. 30 649	<i>The Papal Secretary of State (Pacelli) to the German Ambassador to the Holy See (Bergen)</i> In reply to the German note of protest against the encyclical, denies any political intent and affirms that the Holy See in this case as in all others takes exception to governmental forms and practices only when they injure spiritual welfare; maintains that the German note had not refuted any of the statements in the encyclical and that before cooperation can be restored the German State and the Nazi Party must be released from the anti-Christian currents which draw their strength from the struggle against the Church.	956
May 4 650	<i>Memorandum by the Foreign Minister</i> Mussolini, in conversation with Neurath, points out the harmful effects of the Church struggle in Germany, and says that through small favors to the clergy he had won their support.	966
May 11 651	<i>The German Ambassador to the Holy See (Bergen) to the German Foreign Ministry</i> On reports that the Episcopates of other countries wish to organize demonstrations against the persecution of the Church in Germany.	967

B. THE SPEECH OF CARDINAL MUNDELEIN, MAY-OCTOBER 1937

1937 May 20 652	<i>The German Ambassador in the United States (Dieckhoff) to the German Foreign Ministry</i> Suggests that the German reaction to Cardinal Mundelein's speech not be allowed to go so far as to weaken the strong German position.	968
May 21 653	<i>The German Foreign Ministry to the German Embassy to the Holy See</i> Representations are to be made against the insulting language Mundelein used against Hitler and members of the Reich Government.	968
May 21 654	<i>The German Ambassador in the United States (Dieckhoff) to the German Foreign Ministry</i> Defends himself against the charge that he had not treated Mundelein's insults with sufficient seriousness.	969
May 25 655	<i>The German Ambassador to the Holy See (Bergen) to the German Foreign Ministry</i> In reply to the German protests against the Mundelein speech, Cardinal Pacelli asks what Germany intends to do about the insults to ecclesiastical institutions and personages which appear day after day in Germany.	970
Undated 656	<i>Memorandum</i> A longhand draft by Neurath asking what the Curia intends to do about the moral corruption of the clergy.	972

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CHAPTER VI. GERMAN RELATIONS WITH THE HOLY SEE,  
MARCH 1937-SEPTEMBER 1938—Continued

Date and Doc. No.	Subject	Page
1937		
May 26 657	<i>The German Ambassador to the Holy See (Bergen) to the German Foreign Ministry</i> As requested, will leave for Germany, ostensibly on official business.	973
May 27 658	<i>The German Foreign Ministry to the German Embassy to the Holy See</i> Gives the text of a note saying that the conduct of the Holy See in connection with the Mundelein speech has made a normal state of relations impossible.	973
June 9 659	<i>The Chargé d'Affaires of the German Embassy to the Holy See (Menshausen) to the German Foreign Ministry</i> Gives evidence that, since the arrival of the official text of the Mundelein speech, the Vatican is inclined to conciliation and feels the Cardinal went too far.	975
June 25 660	<i>The Chargé d'Affaires of the German Embassy to the Holy See (Menshausen) to the German Foreign Ministry</i> Encloses the reply of Cardinal Pacelli to the German protest. The reply denies that the Holy See had refused to discuss the Mundelein speech, explains the circumstances under which the speech was delivered, lists specific German insults to ecclesiastical institutions and personages, and suggests an examination of all the causes of the present situation of conflict.	976
June 30 661	<i>Memorandum</i> At a conference between representatives of the Foreign Ministry and the Ministry for Ecclesiastical Affairs the relative advantages of various ways of denouncing the Concordat, and of justifying this action, were discussed.	982
July 3 662	<i>Memorandum by the Foreign Minister</i> The Nuncio complained that certain searches and confiscations of files by the Gestapo violated the Concordat; Neurath said he would investigate.	983
July 6 663	<i>The German Ambassador to the Holy See (Bergen) to the German Foreign Ministry</i> Enclosing a note from the Papal Secretary of State answering charges of anti-German activity in the Saar made by Bürckel.	984
July 7 664	<i>The German Ambassador to the Holy See (Bergen) to Counselor of Legation Dumont of the German Foreign Ministry</i> The Vatican fears that Germany is organizing a "third" faith in opposition to the Evangelical and Catholic faiths.	988
July 20 665	<i>The German Ambassador to the Holy See (Bergen) to the German Foreign Ministry</i> In addressing pilgrims from Chicago the Pope praised the zeal of Cardinal Mundelein.	989
July 21 666	<i>The German Foreign Ministry to the German Embassy to the Holy See</i> The Pope's praise of Cardinal Mundelein will inevitably produce an equivalent reaction in Germany.	990

CHAPTER VI. GERMAN RELATIONS WITH THE HOLY SEE,  
MARCH 1937-SEPTEMBER 1938—Continued

Date and Doc. No.	Subject	Page
1937 July 23 667	<i>The German Ambassador to the Holy See (Bergen) to the German Foreign Ministry</i> The Pope often speaks without caution or reserve, to the unpleasant surprise of the Secretariat of State. Bergen had impressed on the Cardinal Secretary the damage which resulted.	990
July 23 668	<i>Memorandum</i> Minister Kerri had gone to Bayreuth to discuss with Hitler the Vatican policy of Germany.	993
July 24 669	<i>The Reich and Prussian Minister for Ecclesiastical Affairs to the Foreign Ministry</i> Complains that, although no satisfaction has been received for the Mundelein speech, relations have in effect become normal again.	993
July 24 670	<i>The German Foreign Ministry to the German Embassy to the Holy See</i> Hitler has ordered that the morality trials cease until further notice.	995
Aug. 5 671	<i>The Foreign Ministry to the Reich and Prussian Ministry for Ecclesiastical Affairs</i> Agrees that relations with the Curia are not normal, but denies that diplomatic business must be suspended; the contemplated note on the Concordat may create a new situation.	995
Aug. 6 672	<i>The Reich and Prussian Minister for Ecclesiastical Affairs to the Foreign Ministry</i> Examines recent correspondence on the Mundelein case and repeats the often expressed opinion that Germany is not represented at the Holy See with the requisite firmness and fervor.	997
Aug. 13 673	<i>The Foreign Minister to the Reich and Prussian Minister for Ecclesiastical Affairs (Kerri)</i> Defends Bergen, and points out that language which may be appropriate at home is not suitable for intercourse with the outside world, as Germany has repeatedly discovered to her cost.	998
Aug. 21 674	<i>The German Ambassador to the Holy See (Bergen) to the German Foreign Ministry</i> The Cardinal Secretary of State expressed uneasiness at reports that anti-Catholic demonstrations were planned for the Party Rally; these could only lead to counterdemonstrations.	999
Aug. 22 675	<i>The German Ambassador to the Holy See (Bergen) to the German Foreign Ministry</i> Warns that the critical tension in Vatican-German relations continues and that the Pope is prepared to battle stubbornly.	999
Aug. 26 676	<i>Memorandum</i> Mackensen discussed with representatives of other Ministries the proper order for the execution of contemplated measures relating to the Church.	1000

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CHAPTER VI. GERMAN RELATIONS WITH THE HOLY SEE,  
MARCH 1937-SEPTEMBER 1938—Continued

Date and Doc. No.	Subject	Page
1937 Aug. 27 677	<p><i>Memorandum</i></p> <p>At the conference on contemplated measures relating to the Church it was recommended that the declaration concerning the nullity of the Concordat be issued as soon as possible and that the new school law be promulgated immediately thereafter.</p>	1001
Aug. 30 678	<p><i>The German Ambassador to the Holy See (Bergen) to the German Foreign Ministry</i></p> <p>A further discussion with the Cardinal Secretary of State of alarming reports concerning German-Vatican relations. The Cardinal and Bergen exchanged assurances of desire to relieve the tension and to establish normal relations.</p>	1002
Sept. 19 679	<p><i>The German Ambassador to the Holy See (Bergen) to the German Foreign Ministry</i></p> <p>In greeting German pilgrims, the Pope lamented the honors given to a false prophet [Alfred Rosenberg], who opposed everything Catholic and Christian.</p>	1003
Sept. 21 680	<p><i>The German Ambassador to the Holy See (Bergen) to the State Secretary in the German Foreign Ministry (Mackensen)</i></p> <p>While noting that the Concordat had not been denounced at Nuremberg, as had been feared, the Vatican believes the honor accorded Rosenberg means an open fight and the end of hopes for a settlement. Warns that open condemnation of National Socialism will affect Catholics and advises that the Concordat note not be sent.</p>	1004
Sept. 29 681	<p><i>Memorandum</i></p> <p>Kerri told Mackensen that Hitler would settle the whole question of Church and State by a great speech which Hitler said would eclipse Luther's ninety-five theses and complete the work of the Reformation; on the day of the speech the Vatican will be told that the Concordat is outdated.</p>	1005
Oct. 1 682	<p><i>The State Secretary in the German Foreign Ministry (Mackensen) to the German Ambassador to the Holy See (Bergen)</i></p> <p>During his visit Mussolini has avoided mentioning our relations with the Vatican in any way. Warns that the whole religious situation will probably be reopened.</p>	1006
Oct. 7 683	<p><i>The Foreign Ministry to the Reich and Prussian Ministry for Ecclesiastical Affairs</i></p> <p>There is no reason to take up the Mundelein case; the present situation is best suited to a new departure in German relations with the Curia.</p>	1007

CHAPTER VI. GERMAN RELATIONS WITH THE HOLY SEE,  
MARCH 1937-SEPTEMBER 1938—Continued

C. RELATIONS KEPT IN A STATE OF INDECISION, OCTOBER 1937-MAY 1938

Date and Doc. No.	Subject	Page
1937 Oct. 16 684	<i>Memorandum by the Foreign Minister</i> A conversation, rather sharp in tone, between Neurath and the Nuncio concerning the German failure to answer complaints, the contents of the <i>Schwarze Korps</i> , and the attitude of the Vatican toward Spain.	1007
Nov. 10 685	<i>Memorandum</i> The Nuncio tells of religious objections to certain German laws; Gaus promises to look into the matter.	1008
Nov. 29 686	<i>The German Ambassador to the Holy See (Bergen) to the German Foreign Ministry</i> Encloses a note concerning the ban on religious instruction by Catholic priests, and requests instructions. The note points out that the ban is contrary to the Concordat and that the religious, or rather the anti-Christian, teaching now offered is subversive of the Catholic faith.	1010
Dec. 26 687	<i>The German Ambassador to the Holy See (Bergen) to the German Foreign Ministry</i> In his Christmas allocution the Pope said that the religious persecution in Germany had rarely been equaled; he vigorously repudiated the accusation that, in protesting against this persecution, he was interfering in politics.	1013
1938 Jan. 5 688	<i>Memorandum</i> A representative of the Nunciature was told that the Christmas allocution of the Pope would not be printed in Germany because it contained sharp attacks against the Reich.	1016
Jan. 20 689	<i>The German Ambassador to the Holy See (Bergen) to the German Foreign Ministry</i> Enclosing a memorandum by a well-informed local German priest; there is no doubt that France is exploiting Vatican-German tension. The memorandum argues that the Italian people reject the Third Reich as a power which fights the Church; mission posts throughout the world, including German missionaries, see Germany thwarting their work; everywhere France is stepping into the positions forfeited by Germany.	1017
Feb. 13 690	<i>Memorandum</i> A review of the Reich and State concordats which formed the legal basis for relations with the Holy See. All were still formally in force, and diplomatic relations continued. Neurath had rejected the contention of the Minister for Ecclesiastical Affairs, made on January 4, that action on Vatican notes should no longer even be considered.	1021
Feb. 14 691	<i>Memorandum</i> Ribbentrop and Mackensen agreed that Hitler could not visit the Pope while in Rome; Gaus was to suggest a justification for this position.	1022

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CHAPTER VI. GERMAN RELATIONS WITH THE HOLY SEE,  
MARCH 1937-SEPTEMBER 1938—Continued

Date and Doc. No.	Subject	Page
1938 Feb. 26 692	<i>The Head of the Political Department in the German Foreign Ministry (Weizsäcker) to the German Ambassador to the Holy See (Bergen)</i> If the question of a visit by Hitler to the Pope arises, place emphasis on the fact that this is a visit of the creator of National Socialist Germany to the creator of Fascist Italy, and therefore the visit has a special character.	1023
Mar. 3 693	<i>The German Ambassador to the Holy See (Bergen) to the Head of the Political Department in the German Foreign Ministry (Weizsäcker)</i> A visit by Hitler to the Pope is still hoped for here, except by opponents of Germany, and is evidently expected by the Italian Government; the omission of the visit will be regarded by the Vatican as a distressing precedent and will put a further strain on relations.	1023
Mar. 9 694	<i>Memorandum</i> A representative of the Nunciature was told that Germany was not yet prepared to discuss the claim of the Holy See, first made on February 1, that the restrictions on education by religious in Bavaria was a violation of the Concordat.	1025
Mar. 9 695	<i>Minute</i> The Italian Counselor of Embassy hinted to Weizsäcker that it was desirable that Hitler make a gesture to show he was not entering Rome in an anti-Catholic frame of mind.	1026
Mar. 15 696	<i>The German Ambassador to the Holy See (Bergen) to the German Foreign Ministry</i> On the Incorporation of the Austrian Legation into the German Embassy.	1026
Mar. 25 697	<i>Memorandum by the Foreign Minister</i> The Nuncio requested permission to establish a branch of the Nunciature in Vienna, complained of an attack on the Pope in a German periodical, and asked when a reply could be expected on the school question; Ribbentrop gave inconclusive replies.	1027
Apr. 1 698	<i>The German Ambassador to the Holy See (Bergen) to the German Foreign Ministry</i> The Holy See states that it was not consulted on the declaration of the Austrian Episcopate.	1028
Apr. 2 699	<i>The German Ambassador to the Holy See (Bergen) to the German Foreign Ministry</i> While the undoubtedly inspired attack of the Vatican radio on the Austrian bishops should be counteracted, it must not appear that we are trying to drive the Episcopate into conflict with Rome, possibly to establish a national church.	1029
Apr. 4 700	<i>The German Ambassador to the Holy See (Bergen) to the German Foreign Ministry</i> The Cardinal Secretary of State emphasized that the attacks of the autonomous Vatican radio were not inspired by the Vatican, and that he fervently wished for peace with Germany.	1029

CHAPTER VI. GERMAN RELATIONS WITH THE HOLY SEE,  
MARCH 1937-SEPTEMBER 1938—Continued

Date and Doc. No.	Subject	Page
1938 Apr. 6 701	<i>The German Ambassador to the Holy See (Bergen) to the German Foreign Ministry</i> Cardinal Inuitzer, who has made no secret of his Greater German attitude, appeared to have had a hard struggle in his conferences at the Vatican.	1030
Apr. 6 702	<i>The German Ambassador to the Holy See (Bergen) to the German Foreign Ministry</i> Cardinal Inuitzer's revised statement was extorted from him; the Pope was swayed by morbid irritation with Germany; suggests continued support of the Cardinal.	1031
Apr. 8 703	<i>Memorandum</i> Greiser reports that the Cardinal Secretary stated that he was prepared to come to Berlin to effect a settlement between the Vatican and the Reich.	1031
Apr. 19 704	<i>Memorandum</i> The Italian Chargé d'Affaires again mentioned the possibility of a visit by Hitler to the Pope; Weizsäcker protested against a report in the Italian press that the visit might take place.	1032
Undated 705	<i>Proposal for a Note to the Vatican on the Nullity of the Reich Concordat, Using the Arguments Suggested by the Foreign Ministry on June 11, 1937</i> An unsigned, undated draft justifying the abrogation of the Reich and State concordats on the ground that they are not suited to present conditions.	1032
May 5 706	<i>The German Ambassador to the Holy Sec (Bergen) to the German Foreign Ministry</i> Reports a speech by the Pope lamenting the display of the swastika flag in Rome on the occasion of Hitler's visit.	1035

## D. A CONSISTENTLY NEGATIVE POLICY, MAY-SEPTEMBER 1938

1938 May 5 707	<i>The Reich and Prussian Minister for Ecclesiastical Affairs to the German Foreign Ministry</i> As a result of popular anger at his failure to vote in the plebiscite of April 10, Bishop Sproll was forced to leave his diocese. If he returns unrest will recur; the Vatican should be asked to influence him to resign.	1035
May 18 708	<i>The German Ambassador to the Holy See (Bergen) to the State Secretary in the German Foreign Ministry (Weizsäcker)</i> Hears that Mussolini sounded out the Pope about a possible visit by Hitler, and that the Pope replied that he would receive Hitler if the latter would make an agreed statement on the Church in Germany.	1036
May 18 709	<i>Memorandum</i> Draft instructions to Bergen stating that Bishop Sproll should renounce his see.	1037

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CHAPTER VI. GERMAN RELATIONS WITH THE HOLY SEE,  
MARCH 1937-SEPTEMBER 1938—Continued

Date and Doc. No.	Subject	Page
1938 May 23 710	<i>The German Ambassador to the Holy See (Bergen) to the German Foreign Ministry</i> Reviews the tension resulting from events climaxed by the failure of Hitler to visit the Pope; suggests that considerations of foreign policy make an easing of the tension advisable; in any case a decision on policy appears indispensable.	1038
May 25 711	<i>The German Ambassador to the Holy See (Bergen) to the State Secretary in the German Foreign Ministry (Weizsäcker)</i> A detailed review of the ways in which German relations with foreign countries and German interests throughout the world are injured by the religious strife in Germany, and particularly by the lack of respect implied in the consistently negative attitude of the Ministry for Ecclesiastical Affairs toward the Holy See.	1039
June 9 712	<i>Memorandum on Matters Pending With the Vatican</i> Lists the subjects on which complaints have been received from the Holy See and which, in accordance with instructions, have been left pending.	1043
June 10 713	<i>The German Ambassador to the Holy See (Bergen) to the German Foreign Ministry</i> Had taken up the request for Bishop Sproll's recall with the Cardinal Secretary of State who, while not approving the Bishop's conduct, was very reserved.	1044
June 10 714	<i>Memorandum by the Foreign Minister</i> After the Nuncio had presented specific requests, which Ribbentrop promised to examine, the Nuncio asked whether conversations could be resumed for a general settlement of differences; Ribbentrop said the time for such a settlement had not yet come.	1044
June 21 715	<i>Memorandum</i> Weizsäcker had told the Nuncio that the request for a branch office of the Nunciature in Vienna could not be complied with.	1046
June 23 716	<i>The State Secretary in the German Foreign Ministry (Weizsäcker) to the German Ambassador to the Holy See (Bergen)</i> The assimilation of Austrian law to German may be the signal for a large-scale combat with the Curia; the lull in discussion of ecclesiastical matters will soon end.	1046
July 11 717	<i>The German Foreign Ministry to the German Embassy to the Holy See</i> Bishop Sproll's recall is to be requested once more.	1047
July 15 718	<i>The German Ambassador to the Holy See (Bergen) to the State Secretary in the German Foreign Ministry (Weizsäcker)</i> Tempers are rising because of the German habit of ignoring notes from the Secretariat of State; the new German marriage law will inevitably be protested.	1048

CHAPTER VI. GERMAN RELATIONS WITH THE HOLY SEE,  
MARCH 1937-SEPTEMBER 1938—Continued

Date and Doc. No.	Subject	Page
1938 July 20 719	<i>The Chief of the Security Police (Heydrich) to the Foreign Ministry</i> Bishop Sproll returned to Rottenburg on July 16, on express instructions from the Holy See. A demonstration took place that evening, in which there were regrettable excesses. The Bishop refused demands that he leave. The Party will continue the demonstrations, with orders against excesses.	1049
July 21 720	<i>Memorandum</i> Woermann renewed the demand for Bishop Sproll's recall; the Nuncio took an entirely negative position.	1051
July 23 721	<i>Memorandum for the State Secretary Regarding Bishop Sproll</i> A review of the case of Bishop Sproll.	1051
July 26 722	<i>The German Ambassador to the Holy See (Bergen) to the German Foreign Ministry</i> If Bishop Sproll's recall is demanded, the Curia will resist; advises that demonstrations be stopped and that the Bishop be boycotted; his position will then be untenable, and he will not get the halo of a martyr. Forcing the issue will disturb the secret peace negotiations between the Reich Commissioner and the Austrian Episcopate. The Vatican is unquestionably ready for peace.	1052
July 30 723	<i>The German Ambassador to the Holy See (Bergen) to the German Foreign Ministry</i> Hears confidentially that the refusal of the Pope to recall Bishop Sproll results from fear of establishing a dangerous precedent.	1054
Aug. 4 724	<i>Memorandum</i> Woermann suggests postponement of discussion of the Nuncio's request for the establishment of a bishopric at Innsbruck because of the uncertain state of relations.	1054
Aug. 15 725	<i>Memorandum</i> In the case of Bishop Sproll, a conference of the ministries concerned had decided that since a boycott must be accompanied by demonstrations, and since demonstrations could not be continued for years, the only solution was to prohibit his residence in Württemberg and, if necessary, have the Gestapo quietly remove him from that State.	1055
Aug. 17 726	<i>The Reich Minister for Ecclesiastical Affairs (Kerri) to the Reich Minister for Public Enlightenment and Propaganda (Goebbels)</i> Enclosing a note to be published in the Württemberg press justifying the banishment of Bishop Sproll.	1057
Sept. 26 727	<i>The Reich Minister for Ecclesiastical Affairs to the Reich Minister for Science, Education, and Public Instruction</i> Notes from the Vatican and complaints from the Nunciature are not being answered because of the anti-German attitude of the Vatican.	1058

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CHAPTER VII. GERMANY AND THE GREAT POWERS OF WESTERN EUROPE,  
MARCH-AUGUST 1938A. ITALY BETWEEN GERMANY AND THE WESTERN DEMOCRACIES,  
MARCH-APRIL, 1938

Date and Doc. No.	Subject	Page
1938 Mar. 17 728	<i>Memorandum for the Führer</i> Magistrati told Ribbentrop that the British had proposed negotiations on the following subjects: reduction of Italian troops in Libya; Italian adherence to the London Naval Treaty of 1936; Palestine; anti-British propaganda; Spain; recognition of the conquest of Abyssinia.	1059
Mar. 29 729	<i>Memorandum</i> Attolico pointed out that Mussolini's acquiescence in the annexation of Austria was not popular in Italy; to counteract a growing danger, propaganda for German annexation of South Tyrol must stop; he gave Mackensen a memorandum which showed Nazi Party support of this propaganda.	1060
Mar. 29 730	<i>Memorandum From the Office of the Foreign Minister to the Head of the Political Department, via the State Secretary</i> Ribbentrop wishes an investigation of Attolico's complaints concerning German propaganda in South Tyrol; the severest measures are to be taken against circles acting contrary to Reich policy.	1065
Mar. 31 731	<i>The German Foreign Ministry to Various German Diplomatic Missions</i> To counteract British suggestions on colonies, point out that Germany asks the return of her colonies as a right, and that Germany is not interested in a partial solution or in the acquisition of other colonies.	1065
Apr. 2 732	<i>The Deputy Head of the Political Department in the German Foreign Ministry to the German Ambassador in France (Welczeck)</i> The Moscow Embassy reports that relations between France and the U.S.S.R. are very bad, and that the alliance may be ended; the view of the Paris Embassy is requested.	1067
Apr. 4 733	<i>Memorandum by the Foreign Minister</i> The Italian Chargé told Ribbentrop that the negotiations with Britain would be concluded about April 15, that Italy was withdrawing troops from Libya, and that Italy had rebuffed, and would rebuff, British suggestions that negotiations be begun with France.	1067
Apr. 6 734	<i>The Foreign Ministry to the Deputy of the Führer (Hess)</i> Requests an investigation of Attolico's complaints and orders to all authorities that anti-Italian propaganda be stopped.	1068
Apr. 13 735	<i>The German Chargé d'Affaires in France (Bräuer) to the German Foreign Ministry</i> Revived discussion of the manner of accrediting a French Ambassador to Italy is typical of the trend in France toward a rapprochement with Italy.	1069

CHAPTER VII. GERMANY AND THE GREAT POWERS OF WESTERN EUROPE,  
MARCH-AUGUST 1938—Continued

Date and Doc. No.	Subject	Page
1938 Apr. 14 736	<i>The German Chargé d'Affaires in France (Bräuer) to the German Foreign Ministry</i> French opinion of the U.S.S.R. has gone down, and relations are now far from cordial; the alliance is valued, and will be retained, because it closes the Soviet reservoir of raw materials to Germany and, in the event of war, will tie down part of the German Army.	1070
Apr. 15 737	<i>The German Ambassador in Italy (Mackensen) to the German Foreign Ministry</i> Ciano said Italy would not negotiate with France until after France had appointed an Ambassador.	1074
Apr. 16 738	<i>Minute</i> Magistrati gave Welzsäcker a copy of the Anglo-Italian agreement, and gave assurances intended to forestall possible German sensitiveness.	1074
Apr. 17 739	<i>The German Ambassador in Italy (Mackensen) to the German Foreign Ministry</i> Ciano said that a French <i>aide-mémoire</i> had been received requesting negotiations; earlier, he had rejected the British suggestion that France be included in the Anglo-Italian negotiations; now, he would listen to the French proposals, but he saw no basis for agreement.	1075
Apr. 17 740	<i>The German Ambassador in Italy (Mackensen) to the German Foreign Ministry</i> Gives the text of the French <i>aide-mémoire</i> requesting early negotiations.	1077
Apr. 18 741	<i>The German Ambassador in Italy (Mackensen) to the German Foreign Ministry</i> Mussolini spoke of the French attempts at <i>rapprochement</i> exactly as Ciano had spoken. Mackensen explained Hitler's stand on South Tyrol. Mussolini expressed his thanks and told how, to settle Italo-Yugoslav relations, he had suppressed Italian propaganda in Dalmatia.	1078
Apr. 19 742	<i>The German Foreign Ministry to the German Legation in Czechoslovakia</i> The Anglo-Italian Agreement is the result of Chamberlain's realism and is welcomed by Germany. Do not give the impression that we are dissatisfied, or that we feel the need for similar Anglo-German negotiations.	1079
Apr. 19 743	<i>Memorandum</i> Magistrati said Mussolini was not pleased by the statement in a Sudeten publication that the Austrian <i>Anschluss</i> had raised Hitler's prestige and lowered Mussolini's.	1080
Apr. 20 744	<i>The German Ambassador in Italy (Mackensen) to the German Foreign Ministry</i> An informant reports new evidence of German interest in South Tyrol and resultant Italian uneasiness.	1081

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CHAPTER VII. GERMANY AND THE GREAT POWERS OF WESTERN EUROPE,  
MARCH–AUGUST 1938—Continued

Date and Doc. No.	Subject	Page
1938 Apr. 20 745	<i>The German Ambassador in Italy (Mackensen) to the State Secretary in the German Foreign Ministry (Weizsäcker)</i> Encloses a report from the trusty informant stating that Italy expects, and would support, a German thrust eastward; on the other hand, a revival of the old German push south-east would bring Germany into conflict with Italy. Mackensen concludes that assurances to Italy are needed concerning German policy, and particularly concerning the Brenner frontier.	1082
Apr. 21 746	<i>The German Ambassador in Italy (Mackensen) to the German Foreign Ministry</i> The French Chargé had been disappointed by Ciano's reserved reception of the French overture.	1083
Apr. 21 747	<i>The German Ambassador in Italy (Mackensen) to the German Foreign Ministry</i> Ciano requests that, in assimilating the Austrian economy to the German, Italian interests be safeguarded; otherwise the atmosphere for Hitler's visit would be impaired.	1084
Apr. 21 748	<i>The German Consul General at Milan (Bene) to the German Foreign Ministry</i> There is electric tension in South Tyrol and widespread belief that, when Hitler is in Rome, Mussolini will give him South Tyrol. The Consul describes episodes which show the tension, and he concludes that the fate of South Tyrol cannot at present be predicted.	1085
Apr. 22 749	<i>The German Ambassador in Italy (Mackensen) to the German Foreign Ministry</i> In conversation, first with Prince Philip of Hesse, and then with Mackensen, Ciano stressed the damage which the tension in South Tyrol was doing to Italo-German relations, and the consequent necessity for Hitler to enforce acceptance of his policy on all Germans.	1088
Apr. 22 750	<i>The German Chargé d'Affaires in Great Britain (Woermann) to the German Foreign Ministry</i> Under Secretary Butler stressed his own desire, and the desire of the British Government, for an understanding with Germany; referring to Czechoslovakia, he said that the manner in which Germany achieved her national aims would be decisive for the attitude in England.	1092
Apr. 23 751	<i>The German Ambassador in Italy (Mackensen) to the German Foreign Ministry</i> The French Chargé said that he, in response to Ciano's expression of willingness for discussions, had declared that the French were ready to hold such conversations; the Chargé outlined the possible content of the coming discussions.	1093
Apr. 23 752	<i>The German Foreign Ministry to the German Embassy in Italy</i> On the question of Italian economic interests in Austria, gives the evidences of German consideration for Italian wishes.	1094

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CHAPTER VII. GERMANY AND THE GREAT POWERS OF WESTERN EUROPE,  
MARCH-AUGUST 1938—Continued

Date and Doc. No.	Subject	Page
1938 Apr. 25 753	<i>The German Ambassador in Italy (Mackensen) to the German Foreign Ministry</i> Hore-Belisha said that he supported Chamberlain's policy, which saw existing realities clearly and drew the logical conclusions. The possibility of an Anglo-German understanding was discussed.	1095
Apr. 25 754	<i>The German Ambassador in Italy (Mackensen) to the German Foreign Ministry</i> Ciano appeared satisfied by the German assurances on Italian economic interests in Austria.	1097
Apr. 27 755	<i>Memorandum</i> Analyzes in detail the Anglo-Italian Agreement of April 16. If executed, the Agreement means an end of Italian expansion in the Mediterranean, at least expansion at British expense. Italy is no longer completely dependent on Germany and gains freedom of action in Central and Southeastern Europe. Germany gains by the lessened danger of being drawn into war by Italy, and by this new vindication of the value of bilateral, as opposed to general settlements.	1097

## B. THE AXIS STRENGTHENED, APRIL-JUNE 1938

1938 Apr. 30 756	<i>The State Secretary in the Office of the Commissioner for the Four Year Plan (Körner) to the Foreign Ministry</i> There is agreement that the Italians must suffer no losses on their Austrian holdings, but on his visit to Rome Hitler should not agree to a legal acknowledgment of Austria's debts as this would establish a bad precedent.	1101
Apr. 30 757	<i>The German Chargé d'Affaires in Great Britain (Th. Kordt) to the German Foreign Ministry</i> During the visit of Daladier and Bonnet to London agreement was reached on Czechoslovakia and Spain; Britain pressed for closer cooperation with the Axis, and apparently suggested that France become more aloof from the U.S.S.R.	1103
Undated 758	<i>Memorandum</i> A review of Italo-German relations, and of Italian foreign policy in general, since 1936.	1104
May 9 759	<i>The State Secretary in the German Foreign Ministry (Weizsäcker), Temporarily in Rome, to the German Foreign Ministry</i> During Hitler's visit to Rome, Italian and German draft political agreements were laid aside; the real result is reflected in the speeches, and particularly Hitler's words on the Alpine frontier.	1106

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CHAPTER VII. GERMANY AND THE GREAT POWERS OF WESTERN EUROPE,  
MARCH–AUGUST 1938—Continued

Date and Doc. No.	Subject	Page
1938 May 11 760	<p><i>Counselor of Legation Braun von Stumm to the Head of the Information and Press Department in the German Foreign Ministry (Aschmann)</i></p> <p>An informant said Hitler's speech in Rome had changed an incipient feeling of hostility into enthusiasm and confidence; the informant advised great caution regarding Czechoslovakia; he said the Italians blamed French shipments of arms for the continuance of the civil war, and for the heavy losses among the Italian volunteers, in Spain.</p>	1107
May — 761	<p><i>The German Foreign Ministry to All German Embassies (Except Rome, Tokyo, Hankow, Rio de Janeiro, Buenos Aires, and Santiago)</i></p> <p>Outlines what was to be said, and what was to be denied, concerning Hitler's visit to Italy.</p>	1108
May 12 762	<p><i>The State Secretary in the German Foreign Ministry (Weizsäcker) to the Under State Secretary (Woermann)</i></p> <p>As a result of Hitler's visit to Rome it is clear that in Czechoslovakia Italy will neither hinder nor actively support German aims; for the present, Italian policy in the Mediterranean aims at consolidation; long-run objectives seem not yet determined; no appetite for Spanish possessions was apparent.</p>	1110
May 16 763	<p><i>The German Ambassador in France (Welczeck) to the German Foreign Ministry</i></p> <p>After repeated assurances that the Franco-Italian negotiations would soon reach a successful conclusion, Mussolini's speech at Genoa created astonishment and disappointment.</p>	1111
May 17 764	<p><i>The German Ambassador in Italy (Mackensen) to the German Foreign Ministry</i></p> <p>Summarizes Mussolini's speech at Genoa on May 14 and concludes that Axis solidarity is now reestablished, if Germany shows consideration for Italian interests in Austria, and if all authorities in the Reich follow Hitler's declared policy regarding South Tyrol.</p>	1112
May 18 765	<p><i>The German Ambassador in Italy (Mackensen) to the German Foreign Ministry</i></p> <p>Unless Italian interests in Austria are recognized by Germany, Mussolini has ordered that a direct appeal be made to Hitler.</p>	1115
May 19 766	<p><i>The German Ambassador in France (Welczeck) to the German Foreign Ministry</i></p> <p>Describes French alarm at the interruption of the conversations with Italy, and the efforts of Bonnet to demonstrate French nonintervention in Spain.</p>	1116
May 20 767	<p><i>Memorandum of the Meeting of May 19, 1938, on the South Tyrol, Under the Chairmanship of the Foreign Minister</i></p> <p>Ribbentrop said that, for Germany, there no longer was a South Tyrol question; anyone who deviated from Hitler's policy would be punished. In imitation of the Italian procedure regarding the Italian minority in Yugoslavia, Hitler might explain his policy to a representative group of South Tyrolean leaders.</p>	1117

CHAPTER VII. GERMANY AND THE GREAT POWERS OF WESTERN EUROPE,  
MARCH-AUGUST 1938—Continued

Date and Doc. No.	Subject	Page
1938 May 20 768	<i>Memorandum by the Foreign Minister</i> Mussolini told Ribbentrop that, territorially, the South Tyrol question was closed. Ciano told how Mussolini silenced the Italian minority in Yugoslavia by a conference with their leaders; Ribbentrop said Germany would imitate the Italian example.	1119
May 20 769	<i>The German Ambassador in Italy (Mackensen) to the German Foreign Ministry</i> An informant describes the background and results of Mussolini's speech at Genoa: the Axis is strong again and dominates Europe, if Hitler's words on South Tyrol are followed by action; France has been warned that hopes of detaching Italy from Germany are futile and that, for an agreement with Italy, France must discontinue her aid to the Loyalists and accept a Franco victory.	1120
May 23 770	<i>The German Ambassador in Italy (Mackensen) to the German Foreign Ministry</i> Ciano said that so long as France sabotaged nonintervention in Spain there was no basis for agreement.	1125
May 24 771	<i>The German Foreign Ministry to the German Embassy in Italy</i> It is proposed to have Hitler explain German policy to a delegation of South Tyrolese leaders; Germans would tour the valleys and seek out the proper persons to be invited; Mackensen is to make the necessary arrangements with Ciano.	1126
May 25 772	<i>Memorandum</i> Ciano had informed the British, and would inform others, that although no agreement was signed during Hitler's visit, the visit had confirmed Axis policy in every respect.	1127
May 30 773	<i>The German Foreign Ministry to the German Embassy in Italy</i> Summarizes the Italo-German agreement on Austria; the negotiations are believed to have produced the desired political results.	1128
May 31 774	<i>Memorandum by the Foreign Minister</i> After remarking on the need for closer cooperation between Axis representatives at some capitals, Attolico asked about the project for an Italo-German written agreement. Ribbentrop said nothing was being done and he thought the matter was not of decisive importance.	1128
June 1 775	<i>The German Ambassador in Italy (Mackensen) to the German Foreign Ministry</i> Ciano was not enthusiastic about the idea of having German emissaries select South Tyrol representatives on the spot for the interview with Hitler.	1130
June 3 776	<i>The German Chargé d'Affaires in Italy (Plessen) to the German Foreign Ministry</i> A summary of a speech by Ciano stressing Axis solidarity.	1132

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CHAPTER VII. GERMANY AND THE GREAT POWERS OF WESTERN EUROPE,  
MARCH–AUGUST 1938—Continued

Date and Doc. No.	Subject	Page
1938 June 3 777	<i>The German Chargé d'Affaires in Italy (Plessen) to the German Foreign Ministry</i> Ciano said that if the British suggested mediation in Spain he would refuse; he said the negotiations with France could not be resumed until the Spanish question was settled.	1133
June 13 778	<i>The German Ambassador in Italy (Mackensen) to the German Foreign Ministry</i> An informant says Mussolini plans to annex Albania as soon as possible.	1134
June 13 779	<i>The German Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Schulenburg) to the German Foreign Ministry</i> It is true that Litvinov said that the U.S.S.R. would welcome a Franco-Italian settlement; he did not say that such a settlement would weaken the Axis although he certainly hoped this would be the result.	1134
June 18 780	<i>The German Foreign Ministry to the Head of the Volksdeutsche Mittelstelle</i> In response to Italian objections the plan has been dropped to have emissaries select representatives in the South Tyrol for an interview with Hitler; any Party offices with contacts in South Tyrol, or South Tyrolese who visit Germany, are to be informed of Hitler's policy.	1136
June 18 781	<i>Memorandum</i> Attolico again raised the question of an Italo-German written agreement on general policy; Weizsäcker said the project was still formless.	1137

## C. AXIS POLICY STRENGTHENS THE ENTENTE, JUNE–AUGUST 1938

1938 June 22 782	<i>The German Ambassador in Italy (Mackensen) to the German Foreign Ministry</i> Ciano described at length a conversation with the British Ambassador concerning Spain and the Italo-French negotiations as these related to the coming into force of the Anglo-Italian Agreement. From Ciano's remarks it was evident that the Italians were informed about the telegraphic reports of Perth.	1137
June 22 783	<i>The German Ambassador in Italy (Mackensen) to the German Foreign Ministry</i> Italian troop withdrawals from Libya (11,000 men so far) had been stopped now that the entry into force of the agreement with Britain was uncertain.	1141
June 23 784	<i>The State Secretary in the German Foreign Ministry (Weizsäcker) to the German Ambassador in Italy (Mackensen)</i> Italian eagerness to bring the agreement with England into force, apparently even by decreasing the Italian effort in Spain, is creating doubts about the solidarity of the Axis. Ribbentrop has hinted to Attolico that the idea of a written Italo-German agreement might be taken up again.	1142

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CHAPTER VII. GERMANY AND THE GREAT POWERS OF WESTERN EUROPE,  
MARCH-AUGUST 1938—Continued

Date and Doc. No.	Subject	Page
1938 June 27 785	<i>The Chief of Staff of the Head of the Volksdeutsche Mittelstelle to the Foreign Ministry</i> A leader from South Tyrol has been told of Hitler's policy.	1143
June 30 786	<i>Memorandum by the Foreign Minister</i> An inconclusive discussion between Ribbentrop and Attolico on the possibility of negotiations concerning cooperation between Germany and Italy.	1143
July 1 787	<i>Memorandum by the German Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Schulenburg)</i> On reports that in November and December 1937 Litvinov was angered by Delbos' refusal to visit Moscow.	1144
July 2 788	<i>The German Ambassador in Italy (Mackensen) to the German Foreign Ministry</i> Ciano informed the British that their insistence on an end to the Spanish question before putting the Anglo-Italian Agreement into force relieved Italy of the necessity of conforming to the agreement, and that a resumption of Italian negotiations with France was only possible after the coming into force of the Anglo-Italian Agreement.	1145
July 4 789	<i>The German Ambassador in Italy (Mackensen) to the German Foreign Ministry</i> Points out that the figures on Italian troop withdrawals from Libya given by Ciano on June 22 and July 2 were very different; apparently almost 20,000 men have been withdrawn.	1147
July 11 790	<i>The German Chargé d'Affaires in the Soviet Union (Tippelskirch) to the German Foreign Ministry</i> Soviet hopes that the annexation of Austria and Italian negotiations with Britain and France had weakened the Axis have been destroyed. Now Litvinov is encouraged by the Franco-Turkish agreement.	1148
July 13 791	<i>The German Ambassador in Italy (Mackensen) to the German Foreign Ministry</i> Ciano summarized the British reply on the coming into force of the Anglo-Italian Agreement, and commented that the matter had reached an impasse; Mussolini was using his regained freedom of movement to send reinforcements to Spain, where Italian troops would soon make a new and strong assault, with Valencia as its goal.	1150
July 18 792	<i>The German Ambassador in Italy (Mackensen) to the German Foreign Ministry</i> Mussolini was elated by Italian successes in Spain; there, as in Abyssinia, China, and Czechoslovakia, the British had bet on the wrong horse.	1152

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CHAPTER VII. GERMANY AND THE GREAT POWERS OF WESTERN EUROPE,  
MARCH-AUGUST 1938—Continued

Date and Doc. No.	Subject	Page
1938 July 18 793	<i>The German Ambassador in Great Britain (Dirksen) to the German Foreign Ministry</i> Since March, Anglo-German relations have deteriorated to the point where war is freely discussed. The deterioration is explained, not only by the activity of Jews, Communists, and nationalists, but by the effects of the <i>Anschluss</i> and the Czech crisis, by rearmament propaganda, and by the entrance of Anglo-German relations into domestic politics. Chamberlain is ready and able to make a settlement, unless Germany uses force in Czechoslovakia, in which case war is certain. An Anglo-German settlement is urgently necessary.	1153
July 21 794	<i>The German Ambassador in France (Welczeck) to the German Foreign Ministry</i> The Daladier-Chamberlain correspondence—on Spain, on the Anglo-Italian Agreement, on German rearmament, on Czechoslovakia, and on the need for a common Anglo-French policy—has created unusual optimism in France.	1159
July 26 795	<i>The German Chargé d'Affaires in Italy (Plessen) to the German Foreign Ministry</i> The visit of the Hungarian Ministers to Rome resulted in no new agreements; rather, the Hungarians found that Italy places both the Axis and friendship with Yugoslavia above friendship with Hungary.	1161
July 30 796	<i>The German Ambassador in France (Welczeck) to the German Foreign Ministry</i> The royal visit to Paris completed the strengthening of Anglo-French relations, which has gone on since the visit of Daladier and Bonnet to London in April, and marked the beginning of a new ideological front of the democracies, including the United States. The new <i>Entente Cordiale</i> is founded on the fears resulting from Germany's regained strength and from the Italian menace to France's Mediterranean communications, and the <i>Entente</i> will weaken only if these fears abate.	1163
Aug. 15 797	<i>The Italian Ambassador in Germany (Attolico) to the German Foreign Minister</i> Forwards a letter from Ciano declining an invitation to Nuremberg. Attolico urges the necessity for a meeting between Ribbentrop and Ciano to consider the European and world situation, and to demonstrate Axis solidarity.	1170
Aug. 16 798	<i>The German Chargé d'Affaires in Italy (Plessen) to the German Foreign Ministry</i> Mussolini, in view of German-Italian relations, had refused to approve the sale of airplanes to Czechoslovakia.	1171
Aug. 16 799	<i>The German Ambassador in France (Welczeck) to the German Foreign Ministry</i> The Franco-Italian passport war indicates that even pro-Italian circles in France, and the British as well, have abandoned hope of an agreement with Italy.	1172

CHAPTER I  
GERMANY AND THE GREAT POWERS  
OF WESTERN EUROPE,  
SEPTEMBER 30, 1937-MARCH 11, 1938

A. THE SETTING, SEPTEMBER 30-NOVEMBER 10, 1937

No. 1

1518/378030-31

*The German Foreign Ministry to All German Diplomatic Missions  
in Europe and to the Consulate General at Geneva*

Cipher Telegram

TODAY!

BERLIN, September 30, 1937.  
(Pol. IV 4936)

The visit of the Head of the Italian Government went off splendidly and in fullest harmony in every respect.<sup>1</sup> I refer you to the press for the external events. And all essential information as regards the political content can be correctly gathered from the two toasts and speeches exchanged at the Maifeld. The elements of the political relations between Germany and Italy, strengthened by the state visit, are still the following: No bloc aimed at third powers, but complete solidarity of interests against any attempt at disturbance by third powers; *defense* against the Third International as the common enemy; *constructive* cooperation with all European countries having European peace as much at heart as Germany and Italy.

For your information: The foregoing assures that if one of the partners should seek closer *rapprochement* with Britain than heretofore, the other partner would benefit to the same extent. An early end of the Spanish Civil War and the reconstruction of Spain is urgently desired by both parties; the interests and potentialities [*Möglichkeiten*] of Italy will have due preference here and, quite generally, Italy will not be impeded by Germany in the Mediterranean, whereas, on the other hand, the special German interests in Austria will not be impaired by Italy. However, it is entirely

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<sup>1</sup> The visit of Mussolini to Germany took place September 25-29, 1937. For documents concerning Austria, see pp. 278 ff. Documents of the German Foreign Ministry concerning the Spanish Civil War will be found in vol. III.

correct, that, as Mussolini publicly stated, the Rome-Berlin Axis is not directed against other countries, and that therefore nothing was discussed or agreed upon which Austria could consider dangerous or infringing upon her independence.

Relations between Germany and the Vatican were not discussed.

A communiqué concerning the visit will not be issued, since the visit far exceeds the scope of customary diplomatic and political meetings. Please communicate immediately in case of reports which might distort the eminently peaceful character of the state visit.

NEURATH

## No. 2

325/194486-75

### *Memorandum*

Enclosed is a memorandum of my conversations with Mussolini during his visit to Germany.

Respectfully submitted to the Foreign Minister via the State Secretary.

VON BÜLOW-SCHWANTE<sup>1a</sup>

BERLIN, October 2, 1937.

[Enclosure]

During Mussolini's stay in Berlin I had an opportunity for fairly long conversations on three different trips in a closed limousine—from Berlin to Potsdam, from Potsdam to Berlin, and from Berlin to the Schorfheide.

#### *First conversation:*

Mussolini inquired in detail about the development of the Jewish question prior to and after the seizure of power,<sup>2</sup> and about its present status. He said that with 70,000 Jews in Italy this question constituted no problem for him. But the racial question of white and black was now coming into the foreground for him. I gave him a detailed account of the Jewish question. Concluding this topic, he told me that after long surveillance of the mail he had fortunately discovered only three cases in Africa in which Italian women had forgotten themselves. He had had them beaten as a deterrent example and then sent them to a concentration camp for 5 years.

<sup>1a</sup> Head of the Protocol Department of the German Foreign Ministry.

<sup>2</sup> i.e., the coming to power of the Nazis on January 30, 1933.

After the Jewish question we turned to the question of exiles, and he told me that at first the exiles had given him much trouble. Luxembourg had been a special center, as Prague was for us. But exiles necessarily became boring as time went on.

Following the question of exiles he inquired about Brüning.<sup>3</sup> I told him the latter was living in England and occasionally in the United States, was doing research in Church history, and had completely retired from active politics. Regarding Wirth,<sup>4</sup> Mussolini related that according to his information Wirth had been traveling around a good deal in Italy, Switzerland, Austria, and France. At the present time he was working as representative of a gasoline firm at Trieste. Regarding Kaas<sup>5</sup> he stated that he was still at the Vatican. When it seemed as if he intended to pass from this name to the Catholic question in Germany, I changed the subject, as I was not informed of the present state of affairs.

Mussolini then spoke of population policies and their decisive importance for the future of Germany and Italy. In this connection he told me why he had doubted any intervention by England in the Abyssinian War. He had had statistical material brought to him and had noted that there was a surplus of 2 million women among the 46 million British. These women could without doubt be counted as pacifists. He had further seen that the age groups over 40, over 50, and over 60 were very strong in comparison with the younger age groups. No one over 40 years liked to go to war. The decisive factor, finally, had been that England, as a result of the revival of her trade in the last few years, had become extraordinarily satiated, and satiated people did not like to risk anything. On the basis of these considerations he had, as he said literally, become impudent and had ventured the blow against Abyssinia. The Englishman, moreover, would always fight to the last Frenchman. The Englishman did not like land warfare, and therefore he [Mussolini] would move two army corps to Tripoli in order to create a threat to Egypt by land.

*Second conversation:*

Mussolini spoke about his conversation with the Führer at Munich with extreme satisfaction. He had discussed the basic problem of German-Italian friendship there, and both of them had clearly recognized that collaboration between Germany and Italy was the prerequisite for the realization of the tasks of Fascism and National

<sup>3</sup> Heinrich Brüning, Reich Chancellor March 30, 1930-May 31, 1932.

<sup>4</sup> Josef Wirth, Reich Chancellor May 10, 1921-November 14, 1922.

<sup>5</sup> Ludwig Kaas, leader of the Catholic Center Party in Germany before its dissolution.

Socialism, namely, an all-out fight against Bolshevism. Since all necessary conditions had been settled in this basic conversation, he considered further political discussions in Berlin unnecessary, and was of the opinion that questions of detail should be dealt with by his and by the Führer's staff. The tone of his words indicated sincere conviction.

During the further course of the conversation he inquired about the members of the Diplomatic Corps here, particularly about François-Poncet and Henderson. He believed he should expressly warn against the latter and stated that he knew from British reports that Henderson had characterized the preparations for the festive reception in Berlin as a masquerade which Berlin had staged in honor of Mussolini. He commented very unfavorably on the attitude of the British Chargé, Forbes, at Madrid and toward Spaniards seeking asylum. He was also interested in the Russian Ambassador, but did not at first know who he was. When I told him that after all he had had Yureneff<sup>6</sup> in Rome, he remembered but did not make any particular comment. The conversation then turned to the diplomats formerly accredited to Berlin and now in Paris. In this connection he also spoke very unfavorably of Phipps. We then spoke of the Italian diplomats who had been stationed in Berlin during the past years. He had great esteem for the late Count Bosdari as an intellectually distinguished admirer of Dante. Regarding Countess Bosdari he said that after a long romance she had now contracted a morganatic marriage with the Count of Turin. He also described the successor, Aldrovandi, as a very intelligent man, whereas Orsini Baroni was described as a good man but a mediocre diplomat. He did not comment on Cerruti himself; but a remark regarding Mme. Cerruti, whom he called a Jewish actress from Hungary, showed that he was not very favorably inclined toward him. Regarding the present Ambassador and his wife, he mentioned that Mme. Attolico had great charm and was one of the cleverest wives of any of his diplomats. He did not comment directly about him, saying only, later on in the conversation, that he did consider it rather desirable for the chief of a mission to know the language of the country to which he was accredited.

*Third conversation:*

Mussolini discussed the Spanish question in detail. The war in Spain had to be won under any circumstances, and there was no doubt that he would persevere until it was successfully concluded.

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<sup>6</sup> Konstantin Yureneff, who had been named Soviet Ambassador to Germany, had been in residence only a few weeks when he was recalled to Moscow and did not return.

He had already sunk approximately 200,000 tons, and he would continue. Saying that there were "intelligent torpedoes," he told how one such torpedo had recently missed an English ship by 5 meters. He was now going to infest Red ports with mines laid by submarines, since this fact, when it became known, would induce the crews of merchant ships to go on strike if they were told to sail to Red ports. He expected much success from this blockade measure. In addition, he was now going to send 100 airplanes and 4,000 technical troops. General Franco had informed him that he intended to start the great and decisive offensive around October 25. The Spanish affair had now cost him more than 3 billion lire. I replied that this seemed to correspond to about 500 million marks and that Germany was involved in the affair to the same extent if not more. Mussolini by all means intends to get his money back and thought that this was quite possible because of the rich raw material resources. Recently he had taken the liberty of taking a small advance payment when he held on to the 4,000 ton grain ship which was on its way to a Red port under the Panamanian flag. In the last analysis he believed in the decency of the National Spaniards, whereas he did not place too great hopes in General Franco. The fight against Bolshevism in Spain must also be persevered in, because Bolshevism would be finished in Europe as a result of a defeat in Spain; for after Spain, Germany and Italy would have to get hold of one country after another [*ein Land nach dem anderen sich vornehmen*] in order to fight Bolshevism, if necessary.

In this conversation, too, his very strong aversion to England became evident. Comparing the fact that in England 24 men would play soccer while 100,000 watched, whereas in our countries we preferred the 100,000 to engage in sports themselves, he remarked that the British had their brains in their feet. He had built up his air force against England, and as regards the various fortifications in the Mediterranean, he had prevailed against the views of his generals. Following this remark he discussed at length and in detail how he had built up his air force. During the war, Italy had had 4,000 airplanes; at the end of the war an additional 6,000 had been on order. The pacifist-minded Prime Minister Nitti had destroyed the entire air force, and when he [Mussolini] assumed power, he had taken over only a few hundred planes in poor condition. Today he had no very large air force numerically, but had several thousand new, very modern, fast planes and first-class armament.

The conversations were conducted for the greater part in French, which Mussolini knows much better than German. Among the

individual subjects there were, of course, questions of everyday life, social questions, reminiscences of the war, the subject of the new Italy, road construction, Mussolini's trips abroad prior to his assumption of power, and the like. The conversations moved easily from subject to subject and were not interrupted for a moment on any of the trips. When he was talking about his night trip through Austria and the conversation threatened to turn to the Austrian question, I changed the subject as in the case of the Catholic question, since I was not informed in this matter, either.

On the last evening during dinner in the dining car, he had a long conversation with the Führer's Deputy, Reich Minister Hess, and myself on the subject of how, after the seizure of power, he had purged the Fascist Party of people who, although they were able to help in the struggle for power in the State, were not able to administer the country after the seizure of power. He mentioned a number of agencies such as the Forest Militia, the Port Militia, and the like, which he had created primarily to place people whom otherwise he would have been unable to use. The militiamen who had returned from Abyssinia were also giving him a great deal of trouble. They thought they had earned the gratitude of the Fatherland and no longer wanted to work at all. But he would bring them into line. He then developed the theme that a very careful distinction had to be made between satisfying, and exaggerating, the demands for a civilized life. The broad masses should not suffer want, but neither should they, as he expressed himself, be allowed to become lazy by being spoiled. The golden mean definitely had to be found.

At the end, he asked me again in private to express his sincerest gratitude and his most friendly feelings to the Führer and Chancellor. He had come to Germany with great expectations, but what he had experienced here had exceeded these. His admiration for the Führer, for the German people, and for their achievements was infinitely great. He further expressed his appreciation for the fact that all his wishes, even regarding the character of his visit, had been fulfilled through the arrangement of the program, as well as for the courteous reception accorded him. He likewise asked me to convey his most cordial regards and repeated thanks to the Foreign Minister and to Colonel General Göring.

## No. 3

2039/445984-86

*Memorandum*

BERLIN, October 2, 1937.

(Pol. IV 5032)

In connection with the visit of the Duce to Berlin, the French Ambassador called on me today. His evident purpose was more to air his own views about the event than to obtain information. He launched forth in long, sometimes quite vehement phrases about the Duce's behavior and especially his speeches. He stressed a few expressions in particular, and even ventured so far as to say that these speeches were full of *injures*, especially to France. I emphatically rejected that expression and asked him to tell me more specifically which of the utterances, in his opinion, justified his speaking in this manner. He cited the Duce's statements on the democracies in general and on the gods of Moscow and Geneva whom Mussolini had indiscriminately lumped together. Why, so his argument ran, if one really desired peace, did one have to accompany one's effusions on such a theme with blows with the fist. Mussolini's statement on the democracies had seemed to him almost like a blow to the stomach. The Ambassador clearly stressed the different impression that the speeches of the Führer, on the other hand, had made upon him, designating them as very *modéré* and *mesuré*. It was completely impossible to obtain any sort of clear picture as to what the situation really was after these speeches. One could not, on the one hand, express the desire to live in peace with all peoples while declaring, on the other, that it was only possible to speak with like-minded people, and expressing the hope that all of Europe would become Fascist. I reminded the Ambassador that once before, on the occasion of a discussion of a speech of the Führer's, I had warned him against dotting the *i*'s, harping on certain phrases, or ripping sentences out of their context. The speeches on the whole were, to our way of thinking at any rate, a strong demonstration for world peace. That Mussolini now and then used sharper expressions than the Führer was explained by the fact that his speeches were translated from the Italian, and the Italian temperament was always manifested in such speeches, particularly so, however, when the speaker was addressing a large crowd.

The Ambassador then asked some specific questions on the factual content of the Führer-Duce conversations. On the subject of Austria, whose independence he already saw endangered by the conversations, I replied that the Berlin-Rome Axis was not directed

against any third state, and therefore not against Austria, either, and that this principle had not been tampered with and particularly not with respect to Austria at the present moment, either by us or by the other side, although we had surely not concealed from the Duce the fact that we were dissatisfied with conditions inside Austria and the behavior of the present Government, precisely from the standpoint of healthy progress.

The statements of the Ambassador on the allegedly impending Three Power Conference revealed that he expected an Anglo-French note to be delivered in Rome within the next few days. The Italians had not acted logically in this matter, for if, as he heard, they were now making difficulties, it was contrary to what had been said at the time by Bova-Scoppa,<sup>7</sup> whom he designated as the real author of the idea of such a conference. It was wrong, too, if the Italians now were representing the idea of the conference as an attempt to shake the solidity of the Rome-Berlin Axis. I replied that personally, I could not quite reject this idea, either, but it was an attempt that was doomed to failure from the start. For the rest, we faced developments in this matter with utter composure, especially under the influence of the conversations just terminated, from which both sides had emerged with the complete confidence that neither side, when engaging in conversations with a third party, would forget the interests of the other.

François-Poncet concluded his long observations with the remark that it would be best to wait calmly and see what, out of the welter of wild rumors, would ultimately come forth as the result of Mussolini's visit. I confirmed him in this view. Everything, François-Poncet said in conclusion, would finally depend on what actions would follow the Berlin speeches.

MACKENSEN

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<sup>7</sup> Signor Bova-Scoppa, Italian permanent delegate to the League of Nations, had had a series of conversations with M. Delbos in Geneva on September 22. The British were informed of the tenor of the conversations, but these preliminaries did not result in a three-power conference.

## No. 4

1595/384426

*The German Chargé d'Affaires in Great Britain (Woermann) to the  
German Foreign Ministry*

A 4323

LONDON, October 5, 1937.  
(Pol. II 2647)

In continuation of the report of September 3,—A 3182.<sup>7a</sup>

Subject: Herbert Morrison's pamphlet.

Mr. Strang, the Chief of the Central European Division of the Foreign Office, today informed Herr Kordt<sup>8</sup> that investigations regarding Herbert Morrison's inflammatory letter had revealed that it had appeared in the well-known Leftist magazine *Forward*. It had not been possible to produce proof that Herbert Morrison had participated in the circulation of the letter outside England. The British Government deplored the fact that Mr. Morrison had published such a letter, just as it most emphatically disapproved of any interference in the domestic affairs of another state as a matter of principle. Mr. Morrison had been informed that the British Government deplored his action very much. The British Government, unfortunately, had no way to take stronger action against Mr. Morrison.

Mr. Strang was then informed that the anti-German statements of Mr. Morrison, who, as the chairman of the London County Council, occupied a responsible public position, were calculated to disturb German-British relations, which was surely not in the interest of the British Government.

WOERMANN

<sup>7a</sup> Not printed. There was much discussion of this subject; the position of the two Governments remained unchanged throughout.

<sup>8</sup> Erich Kordt, of the German Embassy in London.

## No. 5

1518/373074-75

*The German Ambassador in Italy (Hassell) to the German Foreign Ministry*

4280/37

ROME, October 8, 1937.  
(Pol. IV 5135)

Subject: Count Ciano on the course of Mussolini's visit to Germany.

## POLITICAL REPORT

In my first conversation with Count Ciano after having returned from Germany, he expressed most enthusiastically his satisfaction with the result of Mussolini's visit to Germany. In his opinion the Duce's trip to Germany could be called a complete success. This was also the opinion and feeling of Mussolini, who, by the way, was enjoying the very best of health, reports to the contrary notwithstanding. At a particularly important moment the meeting between the Führer and the Duce had strengthened anew the foundations of German-Italian collaboration, and he was convinced that the political effects would be considerable and gratifying. The Führer's return visit, the date of which was not yet fixed, but which it was hoped would take place next year at a propitious moment, perhaps in the spring, was being anticipated with great pleasure in Italy as an event of the greatest importance.

The Duce's favorable impressions of his trip to Germany, above all politically, are entirely confirmed to me by other sources. He was greatly impressed especially by the unity of the people behind the Führer and by the achievements of the *Wehrmacht*. He is said to have returned with the firm determination to continue German-Italian cooperation, convinced that the Führer, and, an informant specifically added, Colonel General Göring too, were animated by the same intention.

The excellent German work of organization, particularly of Protocol, was generally admired. Only during the return from the Maifeld and from the stadium were difficulties and delays noticed. On the other hand, the Duce seems not to have been entirely enthusiastic about the reception festivities in Rome. I understand that, in particular, he called the erection of a triumphal arch entirely out of place in this case.

HASSELL

## No. 6

119/118993-95

*The German Consul General at Milan (Bene) to the German Foreign Ministry*

MILAN, October 13, 1937.

On the basis of various conversations which I had during my stay at Bolzano and Merano I can summarize my impressions as follows:

Bolzano and Merano have had a tourist season such as they have not had since 1925. The hotels are so full that they have had to distribute the visitors among the surrounding villages. Approximately 90 percent of this influx of tourists came from Germany.

The fruit crop turned out much better in the end than was at first anticipated. These two factors had considerably improved the general feeling there, and people only wish that the influx from the Reich may continue and recur next year.

The Duce's trip to Germany at first had a crushing effect upon the population of the South Tyrol. However, people seem now to have reached the point where they say that the question of the South Tyrol has been discussed by the two leaders and that the Führer will no doubt have done the right thing for the South Tyrolese.

The South Tyrolese released from confinement had already arrived in their homeland. Their release had been regarded as brought about at the instance of the Führer and had raised spirits to a considerable degree. From various conversations, I had the impression that people are of the opinion that the Italian authorities should first be given a few weeks or months to change to a friendlier mode of treatment. The Italian authorities could not be expected to do this immediately, because otherwise every South Tyrolese would say: "Aha, this was ordered by the Führer."

The fact that the convicted South Tyrolese have returned has greatly strengthened the belief in better treatment soon.

It is the increase in the income tax by approximately 200 percent that at present causes great alarm among the population. This measure affects all businessmen and professional people living in South Tyrol. But in the enforcement of the Italian law concerning appeals the South Tyrolese, who are not very proficient in the language and are less versed in the law than the Italians, are at a disadvantage. It is also generally assumed that Italians appealing their tax assessments will obtain greater concessions than the South Tyrolese. I shall probably be able to learn more regarding this

matter at my next official visit [*Amtstag*] at the beginning of November.

I was able to make my official visits to Bolzano and Merano now, since the heads of the various offices were present this time. I paid visits to the prefect of Bolzano, the mayor of Bolzano, the provincial secretary of the Fascist Party of Bolzano, the mayor of Merano, and the police chief of Merano. I had met the police chief of Bolzano in July. The provincial secretary of the Fascist Party makes the best impression, both as regards outward appearance and personality. The prefect does not make a very favorable impression, but his *chef de cabinet* makes a terrible one. I quite understand why the South Tyrolese Germans intensely hate these two men.

The reception by the authorities was quite correct, and at times even cordial. The effect of the Duce's visit to Germany could be felt.

When passing through, the Duce did not stop either time, going right on through, but on his return trip he passed through very slowly so that some of the men who had appeared for the welcome could jump on the moving train, as ordered by the Duce. The Duce is said to have greeted the prefect in a very cool and impersonal manner. From this the people of South Tyrol draw the conclusion that they might get rid of their "beloved" prefect. At any rate, they have great hopes of this.

The two *Ortsgruppenleiter* of the National Socialist Party said that during the preparation for the Harvest Thanksgiving Day they had noticed a much friendlier attitude on the part of the Italian authorities than in former years.

BENE

## No. 7

621/250451-52

### *Memorandum*

BERLIN, October 15, 1937.

(Pol. II 2686/37)

German-French relations are correct. The French Government has gradually been forced to reconcile itself to the fact of German rearmament as well as to the occupation of the Rhineland, so that these controversies are now a thing of the past. There has not yet, however, been a discussion on the decisive questions of foreign policy that present themselves today, particularly because of the differences of opinion with regard to the Spanish question. On political questions of basic importance, therefore, there has of late been no discussion between the two countries.

The question of the conclusion of a new Western Pact as a substitute for the Locarno Treaty has been dragging on for months now; the new German-Belgian exchange of notes of October 13<sup>o</sup> will probably tend to relegate the question of the Western Pact still further into the background.

Aside from the conclusion of the new commercial treaty, our extensive participation in the Paris International Exposition, the large German attendance at this exposition, and the extensive representation we had in the numerous congresses held within the framework of the exposition, had a favorable effect on our mutual relations, particularly from the standpoint of creating favorable sentiment.

## No. 8

634/252866-68

### *Memorandum by the Foreign Minister*

RM 811

(Pol. II 2722)

The French Ambassador called on me today in order to report after his return from Paris. He described the mood prevailing there in leading circles, which of late had become extremely bitter, especially toward Mussolini. It was strongly suspected that Mussolini no longer intended to leave Majorca, now that it was known that the Italians were building large fortifications and airfields there. It was also believed in Paris that the dispatch of troops to Libya was directed not so much against England and Egypt as against Tunisia. It was further believed that Mussolini had received encouragement in Berlin for this action of his.

I told the Ambassador that this assumption was entirely erroneous and that I believed I knew that Mussolini had no aggressive intentions toward France. The Ambassador declared that France and England could not tolerate Mussolini's establishing himself on Majorca or elsewhere in Spain. This menaced France's life line, and if it was not possible to induce Mussolini to withdraw from Majorca after settlement of the Spanish question, the direst complications could ensue.

I told the Ambassador that all these new problems were the consequence of the attitude of the French Government at the beginning of and during the Spanish conflict. If France had not at that time

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\* In which Germany assured Belgium that she would respect the integrity of Belgium and support Belgium if attacked unless Belgium took part in military action directed against Germany. For these notes see *Documents on International Affairs, 1937* (London, 1939), pp. 192-193.

supported the Red Madrid Government and had she acceded to our proposal to stop the influx of volunteers from the very beginning, this situation would not have occurred. The Ambassador admitted this hesitantly but said that this was now the situation and that it was regarded very seriously in Paris. As far as the solution of the Spanish problem was concerned, Paris had quieted down again after initial nervousness, and it was hoped that through the negotiations in the Nonintervention Committee a step was being taken toward ending the Spanish conflict. It would be of great value to the French Government if, by a symbolic act, the withdrawal of volunteers were started. I told the Ambassador that I could inform him that we had instructed our delegate in London to vote for such a symbolic act and I believed that the Italians would do likewise. As for the rest, it had to be realized that considerable difficulties still stood in the way of the practical solution of the question of volunteers. Among other things, I did not know what was to be done with the volunteers from Red Valencia, whose native countries for the most part would hardly wish to receive them again. I proposed to the Ambassador that they be sent to the French Devil's Island, where there was evidently room for them.

M. Poncet then talked about domestic political developments in France, which were reflected in the results of the municipal elections. He predicted that there would shortly be a Radical-Socialist Cabinet, perhaps with the participation of the Moderates.

Finally, M. Poncet brought up the occurrences in Czechoslovakia. I told him that these occurrences, particularly the continual provocations by the Czech police against the Sudeten Germans, were not calculated to improve German-Czech relations. As long as a certain autonomy was not granted to the Sudeten Germans, I saw no possibility of normalizing German-Czech relations. It would be a very meritorious act if the French Government would try to prevail on its friend Beneš to meet the wishes of the Sudeten Germans. As long as he treated them badly, he could not expect to receive good treatment from us.

BARON VON NEURATH

BERLIN, October 19, 1937.

[A marginal notation in Weizsäcker's hand reads as follows:]

Please inform Rome, Paris, Prague, Salamanca, London, insofar as these missions are concerned. W.

## No. 9

1097/318249-50

*The German Foreign Ministry to the German Embassy in Italy*

CONFIDENTIAL

BERLIN, October 19, 1937.

(zu Pol. VIII 1494)

By courier on October 19.

With reference to the telegram of October 10 [16], No. 285.<sup>10</sup>

Referring to the last sentence in the above-mentioned telegram, I should like to remark that although we cannot very well formally reject Italy's accession to the German-Japanese Anti-Comintern Agreement in view of article 2 of this Agreement which leaves accession open to other states, we should prefer a separate agreement for various reasons.

Therefore, both the Japanese Ambassador here and the Government in Tokyo were informed a few weeks ago that we had no objections to a bilateral Italo-Japanese agreement analogous to but independent of ours. The Japanese Foreign Minister, in a conversation with Ambassador von Dirksen, also indicated that he preferred an independent agreement.

I suggest that you also inform the Government there of our views when the opportunity offers in the course of conversation.

By direction:

VON WEIZSÄCKER

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<sup>10</sup>Not printed. It dealt principally with the Nine Power Conference. In the final paragraph of the telegram Ambassador Hassell had reported that the Japanese Ambassador in Rome had told him that he was expecting soon an instruction concerning the conclusion of an Italian-Japanese anti-Comintern agreement. The Japanese Ambassador had said that the conclusion of such a pact would be desirable for both parties, but that it had not yet been decided whether a special agreement on the order of the Berlin Agreement should be concluded, or that Italy should adhere to the Berlin Agreement.

Concerning previous negotiations on this subject, see also documents Nos. 485 and 488, pp. 757 and 760.

## No. 10

2128/463659-68

*The German Ambassador in Italy (Hassell) to the German Foreign Ministry*

Cipher Telegram

VERY URGENT

ROME, October 20, 1937.

VERY SECRET

No. 294 of October 20

For the Foreign Minister.

Raumer<sup>11</sup> and I today explained to Ciano the purpose of Ribbentrop's coming visit. Ciano was handed the draft of the protocol. Ciano replied that the idea of Italy's accession to the German-Japanese Anti-Comintern Agreement had been presented to him today for the first time. Thus far the course of the Japanese-Italian conversations, regarding which he had always kept in touch with me, was as follows: After preliminary discussions with Sugimura,<sup>12</sup> Hirota<sup>13</sup> had written him a letter, which he read to us. The text expresses friendly sentiments and the desire to strengthen their friendship, without mentioning an agreement. Ciano's answer, also read to us, is similar in content; as previously reported, it arrived in Tokyo after a delay of several weeks. Subsequent conversations with Ambassador Hotta<sup>14</sup> had taken place on the basis of the idea of an Italo-Japanese anti-Comintern agreement. Only immediately prior to our conversation had Hotta reported that he had instructions to suspend these conversations temporarily, since a personage would arrive from Berlin with a proposal for a tripartite agreement in the form of Italy's accession. The Japanese Ambassador at Berlin would also come. Without wishing to anticipate Mussolini, Ciano stated that he could say he had no objections in principle to putting the Japanese-Italian anti-Comintern agreement in the form of tripartite agreement. However, from a hasty examination of the protocol he had the impression that it was somewhat scant and yet complicated. I pointed out that it was a mere draft, the primary aim of which was not to make Italy seem a country subsequently acceding but to give her the position of an original signatory; moreover, it seemed to me personally that a simpler and—from a legal point of view—less objectionable

<sup>11</sup> Of the *Dienststelle Ribbentrop*. The negotiations with Italy were conducted by Ribbentrop as Hitler's personal representative. The documentation in the archives of the Foreign Ministry is fragmentary.

<sup>12</sup> Yotaro Sugimura, Japanese Ambassador to France from July 1937; previously Japanese Ambassador to Italy, 1934-1937.

<sup>13</sup> Koki Hirota, Japanese Foreign Minister June 4, 1937-May 26, 1938.

<sup>14</sup> M. Hotta, Japanese Ambassador in Italy.

formulation was possible in *one* protocol without any additional protocol. Ciano then asked whether the idea of a tripartite agreement originated with the Japanese or with us, whereupon Raumer described how it came about. But Ciano said that according to the Japanese version the initiative lay more with the Germans. As he had stated, he did not have any objections to the idea in principle; nevertheless the question had to be raised whether the conclusion of a new agreement in place of the old one was not preferable to a mere protocol. Above all, however, the following should be considered: If Italy concluded an agreement with Japan alone, the content and scope of the German-Japanese Agreement were less important in making a decision. In the case of the present proposal, however, Italy had to know exactly what the situation was; above all, therefore, she had to know for certain whether the published agreement completely represented the agreements concluded or was supplemented by secret agreements, and, in such an event, what their content was. In regard to Italy the Japanese seemed to be aiming at a guarantee of extremely benevolent neutrality. The question was, what had actually been agreed upon between Germany and Japan. Raumer indicated that this was the complete agreement and that it was supplemented only by oral gentlemen's agreements. He met with complete disbelief on the part of Ciano, however, who declared repeatedly that he had learned from various sources, including even German sources, of the existence of secret agreements.<sup>14a</sup> Ciano emphasized that if the course now proposed should be taken, there had to be complete certainty on this point. I replied that the purpose of today's conversation had only been to inform Ciano, and to prepare for the visit of Ribbentrop, to whom the factual discussion of this point could also be left. Ciano repeated that he was ready for such discussion, adding that he considered my presence there a matter of course. Moreover, as soon as he learned of Ribbentrop's arrival, he would immediately communicate the time appointed for the conversations with him and the Duce.

I have the impression that, in spite of the objections expressed, the idea of a tripartite agreement is at the present time welcomed by Ciano in dealing with England, in that it is in line with the well-known Italian proposals which, in my opinion, we have been right in rejecting up to now. A mere protocol does not seem to find much favor. It will be difficult to avoid the question of the existence of secret agreements; a simple denial is in my opinion useless.

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<sup>14a</sup> For the Secret Additional Agreement to the Anti-Comintern Pact, see footnote 2a, p. 734.

Since Ribbentrop telephoned that he desired a private conversation, in view of another matter to be discussed by him at the order of the Führer, I suggest that a private conversation with Mussolini on this subject follow the main conference.

HASSELL

No. 11

313/190145-46

*The German Ambassador in Italy (Hassell) to the German  
Foreign Ministry*

4527/37

ROME, October 26, 1937.  
(Pol. II 2810)

Subject: Conversation with the British Ambassador regarding relations between Italy and England.

POLITICAL REPORT

Lord Perth, who called on me today, stated that for the time being it could not be foreseen when the Anglo-Italian conversations would be resumed. In any case, as long as the Spanish problem remained in the present stage, they were out of the question. That problem, however, was greatly complicated by the attitude of Soviet Russia. There were actually more psychological than concrete obstacles today between Italy and England. It could not be denied that the Italians were extremely unpopular in England at the present time; the great majority of the public considered the term Fascist on a level with the term Communist. I asked Lord Perth what subjects might actually be taken up in the conversations between Italy and England. He replied that with regard to the Mediterranean it was especially a question of discussing the military forces of each side, particularly the Italian forces in Libya, as well as Grandi's idea of an agreement concerning the exchange of reports on changes in military strength. Of course, it was probably not advisable to make the latter such that the transfer of every battalion would have to be reported; rather, in his opinion, merely an exchange of reports at regular intervals should be considered. The British, moreover, were not very much concerned about the strong Italian forces in Libya, for, in the opinion of experts, a campaign through the desert would be extremely difficult. Nor did the French seem to be particularly concerned. A few things had perhaps to be discussed as regards the Red Sea, though nothing very important. I asked Lord Perth whether the Italians would not first bring up the recognition of the Empire. The Ambassador

replied that England, now as before, did not consider herself competent in this question, but would have to leave the decision to the League of Nations. When I remarked that without this recognition Italy would hardly be willing to enter upon any worth-while discussions, he replied that she had, after all, concluded the Gentlemen's Agreement of January<sup>15</sup> without this recognition. I then pointed out that in view of this situation it would scarcely be possible to discuss frontier questions or the like between the Sudan and Ethiopia, which was not yet recognized as Italian. He agreed with this view.

HASSELL

No. 12

2128/4637118-14

*The German Ambassador in Italy (Hassell) to the German Foreign Ministry*

SECRET

ROME, October 27, 1937.

4525/37

Subject: Economic preparations for war. Financial situation.

POLITICAL REPORT

According to a reliable informant, the Government's two leading figures in economic problems, Finance Minister Thaon de Revel, and Guarneri, the Chief of the Undersecretariat for Trade and Payments, in the course of confidential conversations stated in a small circle that Italy would have to avoid war at all costs, since she did not possess sufficient reserves to wage war. First and foremost the gold reserve would have to be increased again. Thaon de Revel stated that it would take 10 years before the required reserves would again be available, whereas Guarneri believed that a minimum of 5 years would be necessary.

The same informant further stated that the Spanish undertaking had cost Italy 3 billion lire thus far. Since 1.6 billion lire had been spent on this up to April 1937 (cf. report of June 18—2513/37—), an average of about 300 million lire (40 million Reichsmarks) monthly has thus been spent recently for Spain. Economically, Italy obtains from this undertaking mainly the ores which are so important to the armament industry. According to my informant 100,000 tons of ore have been imported from Spain so far this year, whereas

<sup>15</sup> Regarding the situation in the Mediterranean. Printed in the British White Paper, Cmd. 5348, Italy No. 1 (1937): *Declaration of His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom Regarding the Mediterranean, Rome, January 2, 1937*; also in *Documents on International Affairs, 1937*, p. 87.

Italian statistics show imports in the amount of only 23,000 tons from January to August.

It is obvious that in view of these facts the Six Year Plan for Italian East Africa, announced with so much fanfare, cannot be carried out either. Finance Minister Thaon de Revel informed the French financial attaché here that he had succeeded, against the strongest opposition from the colonial authorities, in seeing that during the next three to four years there would be authorized large expenditures only for the construction of roads, and that on a smaller scale than originally intended.

HASSELL

### No. 13

860/285776

#### *The German Minister in Belgium (Richthofen) to the German Foreign Ministry*

Telegram

VERY URGENT

BRUSSELS, October 27, 1937—1:48 p.m.

VERY SECRET

Received October 27, 1937—3:30 p.m.

No. 67 of October 27

For the Foreign Minister personally.

The British Embassy, through its acting Counselor of Embassy, informed us that Eden was coming to Brussels on November 2<sup>18</sup> and would be very glad to meet the Reich Foreign Minister here for a conversation. If necessary, he could come a day earlier.

This announcement was confidential and known only to a very small circle even in London; strictly confidential treatment was therefore requested.

RICHTHOFEN

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<sup>18</sup> On the occasion of the Nine Power Conference, which opened at Brussels on November 3.

## No. 14

151/82424

*The German Ambassador in Italy (Hassell) to the German  
Foreign Ministry*

Telegram

VERY URGENT!

ROME, October 29, 1937—2:25 p.m.

VERY SECRET!

Received October 29, 1937—6:55 p.m.

No. 301 of October 29

Count Ciano informed me today that the British Ambassador had handed him a letter from Eden yesterday in which the latter informed him that he, Eden, would head the British delegation at the opening of the Nine Power Conference and would be very glad if the Italian Government should dispatch Count Ciano for the same purpose and thus make the Italian-British conversations possible. After discussing the matter with Mussolini he would reply to the British Ambassador today that he would not go to Brussels now. First, because he could not be spared at the moment. In this connection, he referred to the coming signing of the Anti-Comintern Treaty with Germany and Japan, which would probably take place on November 6 at Rome (Ciano had told me as early as the day before yesterday that Herr von Ribbentrop had informed him by telephone that the Führer wanted him to sign it at Rome instead of Munich). The second reason which he would give the British Ambassador was that such sudden discussions without sufficient preparation were not very useful. On the other hand, he would add that if, in the course of the Conference, the usefulness of holding such conversations after adequate preparation became evident, he would gladly go to Brussels. Ciano asked that the German Government proceed likewise in case it received a similar invitation from the British Government. He would appreciate receiving the German view of the matter.<sup>16a</sup>

HASSELL

<sup>16a</sup> As the German Government did not participate in the Brussels Conference (see document No. 505, p. 772), no position was taken on the points raised in this telegram.

On November 15, 1937, the Italian Ambassador called on State Secretary Mackensen and in the course of the interview (313/190140-41, not printed) stated that Mr. Eden had made a renewed attempt to arrange a meeting with Count Ciano at Brussels. The latter had replied that while he did not reject the idea of a meeting, the moment was not appropriate.

## No. 15

2554/523773-76

*The German Foreign Ministry to the German Minister in the  
Union of South Africa (Leitner)*

CONFIDENTIAL

BERLIN, October 31, 1937.

(Pol. X 3980/37)

The Union of South Africa, in contrast to other mandatory powers, has repeatedly attempted to enter into discussion with the German Government regarding Germany's colonial claims. It has taken the viewpoint that the German claim should be discussed not only for political reasons, but because it is also legally justified to the extent that Germany could bring a claim for compensation as a result of failure to recognize a part of its demands. A summary of the most important facts pertaining to this matter is enclosed.<sup>16b</sup>

Consequently the Government of the Union first was of the opinion that it could, in a separate discussion with the German Government, negotiate an advance renunciation of Southwest Africa in exchange for a promise of political support in the assertion of our other colonial demands. With the whole question still completely open, such an agreement would have prejudiced our legal standpoint over against the other mandataries—the aim of which is the reestablishment of the *status quo ante*. Furthermore, at the same time as it was seeking to draw us into a discussion concerning the future of the mandated territory of Southwest Africa, the Government of the Union was preparing special measures against the Germans in Southwest Africa—measures which, in their origin, could not be separated from the desire of the Union to administer the mandated territory as a fifth province of the Union. It was therefore impossible to give any practical effect to the proposals of General Hertzog<sup>17</sup> in 1936. But, quite apart from this, a discussion with the Union concerning such a *pactum de contrahendo* would not have had any practical result, since the Union would not be in a position to compensate us suitably from her own resources for the renunciation of Southwest Africa which they were seeking; since we refuse absolutely to let ourselves be fobbed off onto other colonial states which are not mandataries for our former colonies; and since the idea of a financial settlement for a German colonial territory with a considerable German population is a thing we cannot even discuss.

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<sup>16b</sup> Not printed.

<sup>17</sup> Gen. J. B. M. Hertzog, Premier of the Union of South Africa.

Recently there has been a change in the attitude of the Union which is obviously the result of the discussion of German colonial claims at the British Empire Conference. The Union is no longer thinking of separate negotiations with the German Government but has permitted itself to be persuaded by the Government of Great Britain that a discussion regarding the satisfaction of German claims should be conducted only in connection with other unsettled questions. Among these, according to information given by General Hertzog to Minister Wiehl,<sup>18</sup> are the question of a Western and an Eastern Pact, as well as the reentry of Germany into a reorganized League of Nations. The statesmen of the Union are evidently of the opinion that they could somehow play the part of the honest broker between us and the British Government, for General Hertzog brings up the influence he is able to exert in London. Whether such influence exists and how far it extends in practice the Union has not yet demonstrated to us. It is also to be feared that the attitude of the London Government would merely be rendered more obdurate, if it should get the impression that *we* were using the Union in the colonial question and attempting to play it off against London. Nevertheless, in view of the negative attitude of the other mandatory powers, it would be a mistake if we failed to derive some advantage from the fundamentally positive attitude of the Union and did not get the Union to commit itself as much as possible to the views which we consider favorable. If the idea of a separate discussion regarding Southwest Africa is put aside by the Union in favor of a solution of the colonial question within a larger framework, we should not avoid the issue.

I therefore request you to utilize as far as possible any opportunities for a general discussion of the colonial question with South African statesmen.

In so doing you should state the following:

1. The German Government has noted with satisfaction that the Government of the Union is in principle prepared for a general discussion of the colonial question and that the Union recognizes German claims as justified.

2. The German Government has noted with interest that the Union takes the view that, in case a claim of the German Government to one or the other of the mandated territories should not be granted, it shall be entitled to suitable territorial compensation elsewhere.

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<sup>18</sup> Emil Karl Josef Wiehl, German Minister in the Union of South Africa from December 4, 1934; assigned in 1937 to the Foreign Ministry as head of the Economic Policy Department.

3. The Government of the Union believes that the German Government should seize the initiative with the British Government for a general discussion of the colonial question. In this connection you should state that the German Government would welcome every opportunity for such a discussion. It has, however, regretfully been forced to observe that the attempts it has thus far made to enter into a discussion of the colonial question with the British Government have had negative results.

From the information given by General Hertzog to Minister Wiehl it is clear that the British Government would be prepared to take up the colonial question, if at all, only in connection with the settlement of other questions which have been the subject of diplomatic consideration for a long time. Here you may remark that the attitude of the British Government as well as that of the other mandatory powers is essentially different from that of the Union Government, in that the other mandatory powers have neither expressed nor demonstrated a fundamental recognition of the justification of the German claim. As long as this is not the case we can scarcely expect any practical results from any German initiative. If, therefore, the Union Government wants to do something for the initiation of a general colonial discussion, it should, on its own initiative and not as our spokesman, turn not to us but to the London Government and induce the latter to take a positive attitude toward the German colonial claim and demonstrate this to us.

4. From statements of Minister Pirow<sup>19</sup> we have noted that he is considering the return of the German colonies in Southwest Africa from a point of view which has not previously appeared in the discussion. Mr. Pirow hinted at the possibility of an *independent* Southwest Africa and on another occasion declared that the Union might abandon its objections to the return of German East Africa if we would give this territory extensive autonomy—something like the status of a German dominion. Although for the time being we feel that these exceedingly vague allusions represent nothing but Mr. Pirow's personal opinion, please consider even such remarks. They are unmistakably connected with the ideas espoused by Mr. Pirow for a hegemony of the South African Union over African territories south of the equator. It would be of interest to learn more about the intentions of the Union on this point.

The Embassies in London, Paris, and Rome as well as the Legations in Brussels and Lisbon are receiving copies.

MACKENSEN

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<sup>19</sup> Oswald Pirow, Minister for Defense of the Union of South Africa.

## No. 16

1387/359020

*The German Chargé d'Affaires in Great Britain (Woermann) to the  
German Foreign Ministry*

Telegram

No. 650 of November 2

LONDON, November 2, 1937—11:20 p.m.

Received November 3, 1937—2:40 a.m.

(Pol. II 2861)

Eden's speech in the House of Commons on November 1 contains in its latter part sharp statements against powers which do not observe their treaty obligations and which back up their policy by threats, as well as a statement that England will not submit to commands.<sup>20</sup> It is not clear from this part of the speech whether it is directed principally against Italy or against Italy and Germany. I am inclined to believe that the latter is the case, but with the emphasis on Italy.

It is noteworthy that Eden, in his struggle against the British Opposition, sharply emphasizes Soviet Russian intervention in Spain, and that his statements in essential parts are not unfriendly to Franco. The desire to be on good terms with Franco, in case he should be victorious, is plainly discernible.

The recognition of the weakness of the League of Nations is in line with the tendency which has been expressed in recent speeches by members of the Cabinet, and which simultaneously serves to give support to England's own rearmament.

On the colonial question the viewpoint of the British Government is unchanged; but the very passage attacking Mussolini may be another little step toward realizing that the problem must be discussed.

The reception in the larger British papers was favorable almost without exception.

The reaction of the Italian Embassy here was naturally very unfavorable, particularly because of the attack on Mussolini in connection with the colonial question.

WOERMANN

<sup>20</sup> Extracts from this speech may be found in *Documents on International Affairs, 1937*, pp. 60-70.

## No. 17

Serial 100

*Protocol*

The Government of the German Reich,  
The Italian Government, and  
The Imperial Japanese Government,

Considering that the Communist International continues constantly to endanger the civilized world in the West and the East, and disturbs and destroys its peace and order,

Convinced that close cooperation between all states interested in maintaining peace and order can alone diminish and remove this danger,

Considering that Italy, which since the beginning of the Fascist Government has combated this danger with inflexible determination and has eradicated the Communist International in its territory, has decided to take its place against the common enemy side by side with Germany and Japan who, for their part, are animated by the same desire to guard against the Communist International,

Have agreed as follows, in accordance with article II of the Agreement against the Communist International concluded on November 25, 1936, in Berlin between Germany and Japan.

## ARTICLE 1

Italy accedes to the Agreement against the Communist International together with the additional Protocol, concluded between Germany and Japan on November 25, 1936, a copy of which is annexed.<sup>21</sup>

## ARTICLE 2

The three Powers signing the present Protocol agree that Italy shall be considered as an original signatory of the Agreement and additional Protocol mentioned in the preceding article, the signature of the present Protocol being equivalent to the signature of the original text of the said Agreement and additional Protocol.

## ARTICLE 3

The present Protocol is considered as an integral part of the above-mentioned Agreement and additional Protocol.

## ARTICLE 4

The present Protocol is drawn up in the German, Italian, and Japanese languages, each text being regarded as an original. It comes into force on the date of signature.

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<sup>21</sup> Not printed here. See footnote 2a, p. 734.

In faith whereof the undersigned, being duly authorized by their respective Governments, have signed this Protocol and thereto attached their seals.

Done in triplicate at Rome, November 6, 1937—in the XVI year of the Fascist era, i.e., November 6 of the 12th year of the Showa period.

JOACHIM VON RIBBENTROP  
CIANO  
M. HOTTA

No. 18

418/216233-35

*The German Ambassador in Italy (Hassell) to the German  
Foreign Ministry*<sup>22</sup>

4776/37

ROME, November 10, 1937.  
(Pol. VIII/1757)

POLITICAL REPORT

Subject: Effects of the Anti-Comintern Agreement.

The Polish Ambassador, M. de Wysocki, called on me today and told me that during his last stay in Warsaw he had already discussed with Colonel Beck, if only academically, the question of Poland's possible adherence to the Anti-Comintern Agreement. On this occasion he had gained the impression that to take such a step would be extremely difficult and certainly not without grave risks for Poland, because as Soviet Russia's neighbor she intended to remain at peace with the latter under all circumstances, to the extent that it was in Poland's power to do so. Adherence to the Agreement, however, would undoubtedly be considered an unfriendly act by Moscow. During a conversation with Ciano day before yesterday, he had been very much surprised at the latter's optimism concerning the strength of the new coalition and the expected effect upon England. As to the first point, according to the report from a reliable informant, Ciano also expressed himself privately to the effect that it was the strongest coalition in the world, for the internal strengthening and external expansion of which, moreover, the Agreement represented only the first step. Regarding the effect upon England, Wysocki said that he was unable to share Ciano's opinion that the new Agreement would lead England to seek an understanding with the "Axis." Furthermore, especially after this statement

<sup>22</sup> This copy is taken from the files of the German Embassy in Moscow. The marginal notations are in the handwriting of Ambassador Schulenburg.

by Ciano, he was all the more perplexed by the arrogant tone which the semiofficial *Corrispondenza diplomatica* had used today in regard to Chamberlain, particularly since he assumed (correctly, in my opinion) that the author of this article was Mussolini himself. M. de Wysocki added that Soviet Ambassador Stein had just called on him and had expressed the idea that in addition to the signed Agreement there were undoubtedly secret military agreements between the three Powers; or that at least their conclusion was imminent between Italy and Japan, too.<sup>23</sup> The Russian Counselor of Legation had said as much to Herr von Plessen the day after the signing of the Agreement, adding that it was quite obvious that the Agreement was an aggressive alliance against Russia, primarily, however, against England. M. de Wysocki remarked that he had exerted every effort to talk Stein out of his opinion regarding alleged secret military agreements, an interpretation that I confirmed him in. As to Ambassador Stein's *démarche* with Ciano, Stein had stated to him, Wysocki, that there had been no real protest and that no consequences, for instance in the field of trade relations, were to be expected from Moscow. He had only carried out his instruction, as *Stefani* correctly reported, and Ciano had taken note. The entire conversation had lasted but one minute and had been the shortest he had ever had with a foreign statesman.<sup>24</sup>

Finally, M. de Wysocki remarked regarding Beck's visit to Rome that the visit was decided upon in principle but the time had not yet been set. Considering the growing influence which Beck exerted upon Poland's domestic policy and considering Poland's present domestic situation, which although not critical was much troubled, it was very difficult for Beck to leave Warsaw. Besides, M. Delbos' trip to the East, which was going to take him to Warsaw, too, would have to be awaited first.

In the meantime, while M. Beck did not arrive here, his wife did, and the Polish Ambassador gave a dinner for her, which Ciano also attended. At the end of this month General Roeder's visit to Rome is expected, and it may be assumed that a meeting of the Rome Protocol Powers<sup>25</sup> will also be held in the near future, with Budapest as the meeting place. As regards Hungary's attitude toward the Anti-Comintern Agreement, the Hungarian Minister told me that it was sympathetic but, as far as the question of adherence was concerned, that still was reserved for the time being.

VON HASSELL

<sup>23</sup> A marginal notation in handwriting reads as follows: "Litvinov made the same statement!"

<sup>24</sup> A marginal notation in handwriting reads as follows: "Here 'brevity' seems to have been the 'soul of wit'."

<sup>25</sup> Italy, Austria, and Hungary, who on March 17, 1934, had signed the Rome Protocols, an undertaking by the signatory states to pursue a concordant policy.

## No. 19

*Memorandum*<sup>25a</sup>

BERLIN, November 10, 1937.

MINUTES OF THE CONFERENCE IN THE REICH CHANCELLERY, BERLIN,  
NOVEMBER 5, 1937, FROM 4:15 TO 8:30 P.M.

Present: The Führer and Chancellor,  
Field Marshal von Blomberg, War Minister,  
Colonel General Baron von Fritsch, Commander in Chief,  
Army,  
Admiral Dr. h. c. Raeder, Commander in Chief, Navy,  
Colonel General Göring, Commander in Chief, *Luftwaffe*,  
Baron von Neurath, Foreign Minister,  
Colonel Hossbach.<sup>25b</sup>

The Führer began by stating that the subject of the present conference was of such importance that its discussion would, in other countries, certainly be a matter for a full Cabinet meeting, but he—the Führer—had rejected the idea of making it a subject of discussion before the wider circle of the Reich Cabinet just because of the importance of the matter. His exposition to follow was the fruit of thorough deliberation and the experiences of his 4½ years of power. He wished to explain to the gentlemen present his basic ideas concerning the opportunities for the development of our position in the field of foreign affairs and its requirements, and he asked, in the interests of a long-term German policy, that his exposition be regarded, in the event of his death, as his last will and testament.

The Führer then continued:

The aim of German policy was to make secure and to preserve the racial community [*Volksmasse*] and to enlarge it. It was therefore a question of space.

The German racial community comprised over 85 million people and, because of their number and the narrow limits of habitable space in Europe, constituted a tightly packed racial core such as was not to be met in any other country and such as implied the right to a greater living space than in the case of other peoples. If, territorially speaking, there existed no political result corresponding to this German racial core, that was a consequence of

<sup>25a</sup> The German text of this document is printed in *Der Prozess gegen die Hauptkriegsverbrecher vor dem Internationalen Militärgerichtshof Nürnberg 14. November 1945–1. Oktober 1946* (Nuremberg, 1947), vol. xxv, pp. 402–413. A translation appeared in *Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression* (Washington, Government Printing Office, 1946), vol. III, document 386-PS, pp. 295–305. The document is retranslated and printed here because it provides a summary of German foreign policy in 1937–38.

<sup>25b</sup> Adjutant to the Führer.

centuries of historical development, and in the continuance of these political conditions lay the greatest danger to the preservation of the German race at its present peak. To arrest the decline of Germanism [*Deutschtum*] in Austria and Czechoslovakia was as little possible as to maintain the present level in Germany itself. Instead of increase, sterility was setting in, and in its train disorders of a social character must arise in course of time, since political and ideological ideas remain effective only so long as they furnish the basis for the realization of the essential vital demands of a people. Germany's future was therefore wholly conditional upon the solving of the need for space, and such a solution could be sought, of course, only for a foreseeable period of about one to three generations.

Before turning to the question of solving the need for space, it had to be considered whether a solution holding promise for the future was to be reached by means of autarchy or by means of an increased participation in world economy.

*Autarchy:*

Achievement only possible under strict National Socialist leadership of the State, which is assumed; accepting its achievement as possible, the following could be stated as results:—

A. In the field of raw materials only limited, not total, autarchy.

1) In regard to coal, so far as it could be considered as a source of raw materials, autarchy was possible.

2) But even as regards ores, the position was much more difficult. Iron requirements can be met from home resources and similarly with light metals, but with other raw materials—copper, tin—this was not the case.

3) Synthetic textile requirements can be met from home resources to the limit of timber supplies. A permanent solution impossible.

4) Edible fats—possible.

B. In the field of food the question of autarchy was to be answered by a flat "No."

With the general rise in the standard of living compared with that of 30 to 40 years ago, there has gone hand in hand an increased demand and an increased home consumption even on the part of the producers, the farmers. The fruits of the increased agricultural production had all gone to meet the increased demand, and so did not represent an absolute production increase. A further increase in production by making greater demands on the soil, which already, in consequence of the use of artificial fertilizers, was showing signs of exhaustion, was hardly possible, and it was therefore certain that even with the maximum increase in production, participation

in world trade was unavoidable. The not inconsiderable expenditure of foreign exchange to insure food supplies by imports, even when harvests were good, grew to catastrophic proportions with bad harvests. The possibility of a disaster grew in proportion to the increase in population, in which, too, the excess of births of 560,000 annually produced, as a consequence, an even further increase in bread consumption, since a child was a greater bread consumer than an adult.

It was not possible over the long run, in a continent enjoying a practically common standard of living, to meet the food supply difficulties by lowering that standard and by rationalization. Since, with the solving of the unemployment problem, the maximum consumption level had been reached, some minor modifications in our home agricultural production might still, no doubt, be possible, but no fundamental alteration was possible in our basic food position. Thus autarchy was untenable in regard both to food and to the economy as a whole.

*Participation in world economy:*

To this there were limitations which we were unable to remove. The establishment of Germany's position on a secure and sound foundation was obstructed by market fluctuations, and commercial treaties afforded no guarantee for actual execution. In particular it had to be remembered that since the World War, those very countries which had formerly been food exporters had become industrialized. We were living in an age of economic empires in which the primitive urge to colonization was again manifesting itself; in the cases of Japan and Italy economic motives underlay the urge for expansion, and with Germany, too, economic need would supply the stimulus. For countries outside the great economic empires, opportunities for economic expansion were severely impeded.

The boom in world economy caused by the economic effects of rearmament could never form the basis of a sound economy over a long period, and the latter was obstructed above all also by the economic disturbances resulting from Bolshevism. There was a pronounced military weakness in those states which depended for their existence on foreign trade. As our foreign trade was carried on over the sea routes dominated by Britain, it was more a question of security of transport than one of foreign exchange, which revealed, in time of war, the full weakness of our food situation. The only remedy, and one which might appear to us as visionary, lay in the acquisition of greater living space—a quest which has at all times been the origin of the formation of states and

of the migration of peoples. That this quest met with no interest at Geneva or among the satiated nations was understandable. If, then, we accept the security of our food situation as the principal question, the space necessary to insure it can only be sought in Europe, not, as in the liberal-capitalist view, in the exploitation of colonies. It is not a matter of acquiring population but of gaining space for agricultural use. Moreover, areas producing raw materials can be more usefully sought in Europe in immediate proximity to the Reich, than overseas; the solution thus obtained must suffice for one or two generations. Whatever else might prove necessary later must be left to succeeding generations to deal with. The development of great world political constellations progressed but slowly after all, and the German people with its strong racial core would find the most favorable prerequisites for such achievement in the heart of the continent of Europe. The history of all ages—the Roman Empire and the British Empire—had proved that expansion could only be carried out by breaking down resistance and taking risks; setbacks were inevitable. There had never in former times been spaces without a master, and there were none today; the attacker always comes up against a possessor.

The question for Germany ran: where could she achieve the greatest gain at the lowest cost.

German policy had to reckon with two hate-inspired antagonists, Britain and France, to whom a German colossus in the center of Europe was a thorn in the flesh, and both countries were opposed to any further strengthening of Germany's position either in Europe or overseas; in support of this opposition they were able to count on the agreement of all their political parties. Both countries saw in the establishment of German military bases overseas a threat to their own communications, a safeguarding of German commerce, and, as a consequence, a strengthening of Germany's position in Europe.

Because of opposition of the Dominions, Britain could not cede any of her colonial possessions to us. After England's loss of prestige through the passing of Abyssinia into Italian possession, the return of East Africa was not to be expected. British concessions could at best be expressed in an offer to satisfy our colonial demands by the appropriation of colonies which were not British possessions—e.g., Angola. French concessions would probably take a similar line.

Serious discussion of the question of the return of colonies to us could only be considered at a moment when Britain was in difficulties and the German Reich armed and strong. The Führer did

not share the view that the Empire was unshakable. Opposition to the Empire was to be found less in the countries conquered than among her competitors. The British Empire and the Roman Empire could not be compared in respect of permanence; the latter was not confronted by any powerful political rival of a serious order after the Punic Wars. It was only the disintegrating effect of Christianity, and the symptoms of age which appear in every country, which caused ancient Rome to succumb to the onslaught of the Germans.

Beside the British Empire there existed today a number of states stronger than she. The British motherland was able to protect her colonial possessions not by her own power, but only in alliance with other states. How, for instance, could Britain alone defend Canada against attack by America, or her Far Eastern interests against attack by Japan!

The emphasis on the British Crown as the symbol of the unity of the Empire was already an admission that, in the long run, the Empire could not maintain its position by power politics. Significant indications of this were:

- (a) The struggle of Ireland for independence.
- (b) The constitutional struggles in India, where Britain's half measures had given to the Indians the opportunity of using later on as a weapon against Britain, the nonfulfillment of her promises regarding a constitution.
- (c) The weakening by Japan of Britain's position in the Far East.
- (d) The rivalry in the Mediterranean with Italy who—under the spell of her history, driven by necessity and led by a genius—was expanding her power position, and thus was inevitably coming more and more into conflict with British interests. The outcome of the Abyssinian War was a loss of prestige for Britain which Italy was striving to increase by stirring up trouble in the Mohammedan world.

To sum up, it could be stated that, with 45 million Britons, in spite of its theoretical soundness, the position of the Empire could not in the long run be maintained by power politics. The ratio of the population of the Empire to that of the motherland of 9:1, was a warning to us not, in our territorial expansion, to allow the foundation constituted by the numerical strength of our own people to become too weak.

France's position was more favorable than that of Britain. The French Empire was better placed territorially; the inhabitants of her colonial possessions represented a supplement to her military

strength. But France was going to be confronted with internal political difficulties. In a nation's life about 10 percent of its span is taken up by parliamentary forms of government and about 90 percent by authoritarian forms. Today, nonetheless, Britain, France, Russia, and the smaller states adjoining them, must be included as factors [*Machtfaktoren*] in our political calculations.

Germany's problem could only be solved by means of force and this was never without attendant risk. The campaigns of Frederick the Great for Silesia and Bismarck's wars against Austria and France had involved unheard-of risk, and the swiftness of the Prussian action in 1870 had kept Austria from entering the war. If one accepts as the basis of the following exposition the resort to force with its attendant risks, then there remain still to be answered the questions "when" and "how." In this matter there were three cases [*Fälle*] to be dealt with:

*Case 1: Period 1943-1945.*

After this date only a change for the worse, from our point of view, could be expected.

The equipment of the army, navy, and *Luftwaffe*, as well as the formation of the officer corps, was nearly completed. Equipment and armament were modern; in further delay there lay the danger of their obsolescence. In particular, the secrecy of "special weapons" could not be preserved forever. The recruiting of reserves was limited to current age groups; further drafts from older untrained age groups were no longer available.

Our relative strength would decrease in relation to the rearmament which would by then have been carried out by the rest of the world. If we did not act by 1943-45, any year could, in consequence of a lack of reserves, produce the food crisis, to cope with which the necessary foreign exchange was not available, and this must be regarded as a "waning point of the regime." Besides, the world was expecting our attack and was increasing its counter-measures from year to year. It was while the rest of the world was still preparing its defenses [*sich abriegeln*] that we were obliged to take the offensive.

Nobody knew today what the situation would be in the years 1943-45. One thing only was certain, that we could not wait longer.

On the one hand there was the great *Wehrmacht*, and the necessity of maintaining it at its present level, the aging of the movement and of its leaders; and on the other, the prospect of a lowering of the standard of living and of a limitation of the birth rate, which left no choice but to act. If the Führer was still living, it was his unalterable resolve to solve Germany's problem of space at the latest by

1943-45. The necessity for action before 1943-45 would arise in cases 2 and 3.

*Case 2:*

If internal strife in France should develop into such a domestic crisis as to absorb the French Army completely and render it incapable of use for war against Germany, then the time for action against the Czechs had come.

*Case 3:*

If France is so embroiled by a war with another state that she cannot "proceed" against Germany.

For the improvement of our politico-military position our first objective, in the event of our being embroiled in war, must be to overthrow Czechoslovakia and Austria simultaneously in order to remove the threat to our flank in any possible operation against the West. In a conflict with France it was hardly to be regarded as likely that the Czechs would declare war on us on the very same day as France. The desire to join in the war would, however, increase among the Czechs in proportion to any weakening on our part and then her participation could clearly take the form of an attack toward Silesia, toward the north or toward the west.

If the Czechs were overthrown and a common German-Hungarian frontier achieved, a neutral attitude on the part of Poland could be the more certainly counted on in the event of a Franco-German conflict. Our agreements with Poland only retained their force as long as Germany's strength remained unshaken. In the event of German setbacks a Polish action against East Prussia, and possibly against Pomerania and Silesia as well, had to be reckoned with.

On the assumption of a development of the situation leading to action on our part as planned, in the years 1943-45, the attitude of France, Britain, Italy, Poland, and Russia could probably be estimated as follows:

Actually, the Führer believed that almost certainly Britain, and probably France as well, had already tacitly written off the Czechs and were reconciled to the fact that this question would be cleared up in due course by Germany. Difficulties connected with the Empire, and the prospect of being once more entangled in a protracted European war, were decisive considerations for Britain against participation in a war against Germany. Britain's attitude would certainly not be without influence on that of France. An attack by France without British support, and with the prospect of the offensive being brought to a standstill on our western fortifications, was hardly probable. Nor was a French march through Belgium

and Holland without British support to be expected; this also was a course not to be contemplated by us in the event of a conflict with France, because it would certainly entail the hostility of Britain. It would of course be necessary to maintain a strong defense [*eine Abriegelung*] on our western frontier during the prosecution of our attack on the Czechs and Austria. And in this connection it had to be remembered that the defense measures of the Czechs were growing in strength from year to year, and that the actual worth of the Austrian Army also was increasing in the course of time. Even though the populations concerned, especially of Czechoslovakia, were not sparse, the annexation of Czechoslovakia and Austria would mean an acquisition of foodstuffs for 5 to 6 million people, on the assumption that the compulsory emigration of 2 million people from Czechoslovakia and 1 million people from Austria was practicable. The incorporation of these two States with Germany meant, from the politico-military point of view, a substantial advantage because it would mean shorter and better frontiers, the freeing of forces for other purposes, and the possibility of creating new units up to a level of about 12 divisions, that is, 1 new division per million inhabitants.

Italy was not expected to object to the elimination of the Czechs, but it was impossible at the moment to estimate what her attitude on the Austrian question would be; that depended essentially upon whether the Duce were still alive.

The degree of surprise and the swiftness of our action were decisive factors for Poland's attitude. Poland—with Russia at her rear—will have little inclination to engage in war against a victorious Germany.

Military intervention by Russia must be countered by the swiftness of our operations; however, whether such an intervention was a practical contingency at all was, in view of Japan's attitude, more than doubtful.

Should case 2 arise—the crippling of France by civil war—the situation thus created by the elimination of the most dangerous opponent must be seized upon *whenever it occurs* for the blow against the Czechs.

The Führer saw case 3 coming definitely nearer; it might emerge from the present tensions in the Mediterranean, and he was resolved to take advantage of it whenever it happened, even as early as 1938.

In the light of past experience, the Führer did not see any early end to the hostilities in Spain. If one considered the length of time which Franco's offensives had taken up till now, it was fully

possible that the war would continue another 3 years. On the other hand, a 100 percent victory for Franco was not desirable either, from the German point of view; rather were we interested in a continuance of the war and in the keeping up of the tension in the Mediterranean. Franco in undisputed possession of the Spanish Peninsula precluded the possibility of any further intervention on the part of the Italians or of their continued occupation of the Balearic Islands. As our interest lay more in the prolongation of the war in Spain, it must be the immediate aim of our policy to strengthen Italy's rear with a view to her remaining in the Balearics. But the permanent establishment of the Italians on the Balearics would be intolerable both to France and Britain, and might lead to a war of France and England against Italy—a war in which Spain, should she be entirely in the hands of the Whites, might make her appearance on the side of Italy's enemies. The probability of Italy's defeat in such a war was slight, for the road from Germany was open for the supplementing of her raw materials. The Führer pictured the military strategy for Italy thus: on her western frontier with France she would remain on the defensive, and carry on the war against France from Libya against the French North African colonial possessions.

As a landing by Franco-British troops on the coast of Italy could be discounted, and a French offensive over the Alps against northern Italy would be very difficult and would probably come to a halt before the strong Italian fortifications, the crucial point [*Schwerpunkt*] of the operations lay in North Africa. The threat to French lines of communication by the Italian Fleet would to a great extent cripple the transportation of forces from North Africa to France, so that France would have only home forces at her disposal on the frontiers with Italy and Germany.

If Germany made use of this war to settle the Czech and Austrian questions, it was to be assumed that Britain—herself at war with Italy—would decide not to act against Germany. Without British support, a warlike action by France against Germany was not to be expected.

The time for our attack on the Czechs and Austria must be made dependent on the course of the Anglo-French-Italian war and would not necessarily coincide with the commencement of military operations by these three States. Nor had the Führer in mind military agreements with Italy, but wanted, while retaining his own independence of action, to exploit this favorable situation, which would not occur again; to begin and carry through the campaign

against the Czechs. This descent upon the Czechs would have to be carried out with "lightning speed."

In appraising the situation Field Marshal von Blomberg and Colonel General von Fritsch repeatedly emphasized the necessity that Britain and France must not appear in the role of our enemies, and stated that the French Army would not be so committed by the war with Italy that France could not at the same time enter the field with forces superior to ours on our western frontier. General von Fritsch estimated the probable French forces available for use on the Alpine frontier at approximately twenty divisions, so that a strong French superiority would still remain on the western frontier, with the role, according to the German view, of invading the Rhineland. In this matter, moreover, the advanced state of French defense preparations [*Mobilmachung*] must be taken into particular account, and it must be remembered apart from the insignificant value of our present fortifications—on which Field Marshal von Blomberg laid special emphasis—that the four motorized divisions intended for the West were still more or less incapable of movement. In regard to our offensive toward the southeast, Field Marshal von Blomberg drew particular attention to the strength of the Czech fortifications, which had acquired by now a structure like a Maginot Line and which would gravely hamper our attack.

General von Fritsch mentioned that this was the very purpose of a study which he had ordered made this winter, namely, to examine the possibility of conducting operations against the Czechs with special reference to overcoming the Czech fortification system; the General further expressed his opinion that under existing circumstances he must give up his plan to go abroad on his leave, which was due to begin on November 10. The Führer dismissed this idea on the ground that the possibility of a conflict need not yet be regarded as so imminent. To the Foreign Minister's objection that an Anglo-French-Italian conflict was not yet within such a measurable distance as the Führer seemed to assume, the Führer put the summer of 1938 as the date which seemed to him possible for this. In reply to considerations offered by Field Marshal von Blomberg and General von Fritsch regarding the attitude of Britain and France, the Führer repeated his previous statements that he was convinced of Britain's nonparticipation, and therefore he did not believe in the probability of belligerent action by France against Germany. Should the Mediterranean conflict under discussion lead to a general mobilization in Europe, then we must immediately begin action against the Czechs. On the other hand, should the powers not engaged in the war declare themselves disinterested, then

Germany would have to adopt a similar attitude to this for the time being.

Colonel General Göring thought that, in view of the Führer's statement, we should consider liquidating our military undertakings in Spain. The Führer agrees to this with the limitation that he thinks he should reserve a decision for a proper moment.

The second part of the conference was concerned with concrete questions of armament.

HOSBACH

CERTIFIED CORRECT:

*Colonel (General Staff)*

## B. THE VISIT OF LORD HALIFAX, NOVEMBER 1937

### No. 20

1558/377879

*The German Chargé d'Affaires in Great Britain (Woermann) to the German Foreign Ministry*

Telegram

No. 669 of November 10

LONDON, November 10, 1937.

Received November 10, 1937—9 p.m.

(Pol. II 2926)

The *Evening Standard* publishes the following report:<sup>26</sup>

"The *Evening Standard* understands that plans are being made for Lord Halifax, the Lord President of the Council, to visit Germany in the near future.

"He will have an interview with Herr Hitler.

"It is proposed that Anglo-German relations should be discussed at the interview but no negotiations on specific issues such as the former German colonies now administered under League mandate by Britain are contemplated.

"If the present plan is carried out Lord Halifax will leave for Germany on Monday week."<sup>27</sup>

WOERMANN

<sup>26</sup> The passage quoted is in English in the original.

<sup>27</sup> No material has been found in the archives of the German Foreign Ministry on the origin of the visit of Lord Halifax to Germany, ostensibly to attend a hunting exhibition. The *Evening Standard* report printed above, and subsequent reports, were resented in Germany, and provoked a reply by the National Socialist Party Correspondence.

## No. 21

83/25369-71

*Memorandum*

In my opinion the following might be designated as a satisfactory first stage of a German-British discussion;

I. a) A declaration of mutual readiness, as long as the negotiations for a Western pact have not been concluded, to meet with the other Locarno powers when critical situations arise among these powers. If need be, the number of the conferring powers could be increased.

b) The initiation of German-British conversations with regard to the inviolability of the Dutch border.

c) A British pledge to exert influence by way of softening the aggressiveness of Czechoslovak policy.

II. A declaration of mutual readiness to reveal land and air armament programs, as soon as the other principal powers can be induced to do likewise.

III. The establishment of a German-British commission to examine German colonial claims. Inclusion of French delegates should be envisaged.

IV. I to III are to be without prejudice to Franco-British and German-Italian relations.

*Grounds:*

For a long time to come, we cannot consider engaging in a war with England as our opponent. What we want from England we cannot obtain by force, but must obtain by negotiation.

From England we want colonies and freedom of action in the East, from us England wants military quiescence, particularly in the West. These wishes are not completely irreconcilable. A point of departure for negotiations can be found, and concrete results are of less importance to begin with than the goal of preventing the anti-German front in London from solidifying.

German-British relations may in my opinion be improved by several degrees without damage to our other relations. The British need for tranquillity is great. It would be profitable to find out what England would be willing to pay for such tranquillity. However, time is in England's favor and not ours in the matter of armament. Therefore we do not have an unlimited period for negotiations.

Hereby submitted to the State Secretary.

WEIZSÄCKER

NOVEMBER 10, 1937.

## No. 22

625/251424-32

*The German Ambassador in Austria (Papen)<sup>28</sup> to the German Foreign Minister*

VIENNA, November 11, 1937.

Received November 15, 1937.

(Pol. II 2989a)

DEAR NEURATH: Since I had only a brief opportunity the day before yesterday in Munich to tell you about my report to the Führer, I should like, in order not to omit anything, to send you the enclosed short résumé of the impressions I received in conversations with various persons in Paris. I hope that by these statements I have rounded out the picture which, as I know, you too obtained of conditions there.

With best regards and Heil Hitler!

Yours,

PAPEN

[Enclosure]

*Memorandum on the Report to the Führer  
of November 8, 1937*

VIENNA, November 10, 1937.

After I had conveyed to the Führer and Chancellor a personal message from His Majesty the King of Sweden, I gave him a short account of the impressions that I received from conversations with personages of all political hues in Paris.

On the occasion of a luncheon tendered me by friends at Versailles, I met, among others, Finance Minister Georges Bonnet, whom I knew well from the time of the Lausanne Conference. He had just attended the final session of the Radical-Socialist Congress at Lille and seemed highly gratified at the adjustment of the interests of the present Coalition Government that had been effected there. He told me that the decisive thing about the present situation was that the Radical-Socialist Party, which had always been the great gathering place for the French middle class, was undergoing a significant evolution to the Right. To be sure, the party did not consider the moment opportune for terminating the present Coalition Government, but the large majority of its members were turning vigorously

<sup>28</sup> The German diplomatic mission in Austria was a Legation (*Gesandtschaft*), but von Papen's title was that of Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the German Reich on Special Mission (*Der ausserordentliche und bevollmächtigte Botschafter des Deutschen Reiches in besonderer Mission*).

against the bolshevistic and socialistic tendencies of the coalition partners. The party was determined under all circumstances to support his, the Finance Minister's, work toward the restoration of financial confidence in the country. Bonnet himself seemed firmly convinced that he would succeed in the work of financial recovery, and he emphasized again and again that in this he was assured of the moral and material support of the United States. In his capacity as French Ambassador at Washington he had discussed the political and economic future of Europe in detail with Roosevelt, and he could assure me that the United States intended to support Franco-British policy in Europe with the full weight of its moral convictions and its material resources.

We then spoke about the situation in Germany and the possibility of a German-French adjustment of interests, very much desired by Bonnet. The visit of Schacht and the intimate talk that he had had with the then head of the Government had unfortunately brought no results.<sup>29</sup> I told him that in order definitely to place German-French relations on a new basis, France had to recognize the actual needs of the German people and act accordingly. On the colonial question, satisfaction of German demands seemed entirely possible to him, and he also believed that this view was shared inside the British Government. There was much that indicated that the British Government was trying in this connection to exert some slight pressure upon public opinion. But, of course, one could not treat the colonial question as an individual problem. It was necessary to know the ultimate aims of German policy and to reach an over-all agreement in all spheres. I replied that the most difficult question for France would probably be the principle of the European balance of power that had been followed for centuries, and the continual renewal of alliances, in accordance with this principle, with powers of the most diverse kinds in the Central European area. In France they had not understood the Führer's great concept, which had been expressed in his historical decision to declare the German-French border question ended once and for all. If France had thus received full security for her eastern border, it was a natural corollary that she should renounce the balance-of-power policy and stop calling every extension of German influence in the Danube region a threat to French interests. The Finance Minister thought it was possible that France would be able to decide on such a policy if she knew the ultimate aims of Germany in the Danube region. I then explained to him our thesis in regard to Austria (further evolutionary

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<sup>29</sup> For additional documents on the Schacht-Blum conversations of May 25-29, 1937, see documents Nos. 72 and 83, pp. 119 and 135.

development of the Agreement of July 11, 1936;<sup>30</sup> closest community of economic and intellectual interests, with the preservation of Austrian independence). To my question whether there would be any objection in France to such a further development of the Agreement of July 11, 1936, he replied definitely in the negative. Only, progress in this direction should not be sought by means of surprise. With regard to Czechoslovakia I spoke of an extensive autonomy for the minorities. To this, too, he raised no objection.

We then spoke at length about the possibilities of reintegrating Germany economically into the world economy.

In conclusion, the Finance Minister said that he wished very much that I would see his Premier, M. Chautemps. I declined, on the ground that I was in Paris completely incognito and had no authority whatever to talk about political questions of any kind. Also, I did not desire that anything I had said should leak out to the public.

Not more than an hour after this luncheon I received a telephone call from the Premier, M. Chautemps, requesting that I call on him in complete privacy at his private apartments on Boulevard Raspail. After obtaining the concurrence of Count Welczeck, I accepted this invitation.

The French Premier talked with me for some two hours on all questions of common interest to us. As a matter of particular interest in this conversation, I wish to point out that he, too, spoke with particular pride of the restoration of healthy internal political conditions in France. The revolution, he said, had at least been driven from the streets. He would not deny that clashes might still occur, for there were an extraordinary number of Bolshevik Russians and Spaniards in France who made things hard, not only at home but also in Morocco, by poisoning the minds of the natives. Nevertheless, he believed he could say that, if it came to open clashes, one could depend fully and completely upon the police and the army. The army would shoot. At any rate, the picture of the imminent decay and the internal political dissolution of France, that people abroad had grown accustomed to forming, was false.

The Premier further stressed the fact that he urgently desired a settlement of the conflicting interests of Germany and France. The Spanish question was less of a headache to him than formerly because he hoped that after Franco was firmly established, the Italians would keep their promise with regard to the occupation of the Balearic Islands. England would play the chief role in the Spain of the future because she was the only moneylender on the Continent that was in a position to support Franco. The Far

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<sup>30</sup> Document No. 152, p. 278.

Eastern conflict was a much greater source of anxiety to him. He considered it the greatest threat to European recovery, that the last of the open markets in the world still remaining (China) would now probably be closed even to Germany and Italy. Moreover, in case of a Chinese defeat, he considered the danger of the bolshevization of China to be extremely great. Japan, weakened by a tremendous bloodletting, would in the future permit Russia to throw the main weight of her strength against the European border.

With regard to German needs, I made the same statements to him as I had to the Finance Minister and was amazed to note that, like M. Bonnet, the Premier considered a reorientation of French policy in Central Europe as entirely open to discussion—always under the condition, naturally, that Germany's ultimate aims in Central Europe were known. At any rate, he, too, had no objection to a marked extension of German influence in Austria obtained through evolutionary means. He answered emphatically in the negative when I asked whether France still considered the idea of a Hapsburg restoration open to discussion and worth supporting.

At the close of the long conversation, M. Chautemps embraced me, saying: "Tell the Führer it would be a milestone in world history if we two were to place European politics on a new and healthier basis."

In talks that I had with statesmen of the French Right, such as former Ministers Piétri, Champetier de Ribes, Reynaud, and with some senators of the Right, with Lucien Romier, the political director of *Figaro*, and with the foreign-policy director of the *Temps*, whom I met at Count Welczeck's, I received the impression that in these circles, too, the fact of a slow evolution to the Right is being fully recognized. At any rate, these circles do not believe in an internal decay of France and are convinced that in this respect the army is intact. It is worth while noting the answer given to a question that I put to some of these gentlemen, namely: whether and under what circumstances it was believed that a government of national union could be achieved in France. The answer was: "Only in case of a direct threat to the French border." This aspect of the situation seems to me essential to the appraisal of our situation in the Danube region.

The conclusion that I draw from the impressions gained in France is the question whether the apparently great willingness of the French to negotiate with us could not be used to advantage, either to obtain partial successes or at least to confirm confidence in the sincerity of our desire for peace.

There is no doubt that the wish to negotiate with us does not arise from any feeling of *material* weakness, and one gets the impression that the strength of its own armament machine, as well as the close friendship with England and the certainty of moral support from America, gives the present Government a feeling of extraordinary security—in spite of all internal difficulties.

In the opinion of Georges Bonnet, the Italian economic situation is extremely bad. He estimates the total remaining reserves of gold and foreign exchange at about 2.5 billion lire. There is no doubt that this opinion affects the appraisal of our Axis policy. My objection that the German example showed to what extent one could today make one's currency independent of gold and foreign exchange was apparently not very convincing to him.

If internal political developments in France are moving toward a slow recovery and do not give us the chance to approach our ultimate political objectives by waiting for a substantial weakening of the Western Powers; if the Spanish conflict is slowly moving toward a condition that restores to France the feeling of complete security for her western frontier and her Mediterranean communications; if finally the Far Eastern conflict results only in a marked shifting of the main weight of Russia to the European side—does not the question then arise whether it would not be expedient to employ to the best possible advantage for our own desires the tense situation still existing today?

I naturally informed Ambassador Count Welzeck of the substance of the conversations. My impressions, he told me, coincided with his.

## No. 23

1387/359028-29

### *The German Foreign Ministry to All German Embassies and Legations and to the Consulate General at Geneva*

BERLIN, November 13, 1937.  
(Pol. II 2914)

It could be observed that in the latest speeches of British Cabinet members, the failure of the League of Nations was repeatedly noted, in contrast to previous speeches, which frequently contained an almost extravagant and uncritical profession of adherence to the League. And, in contrast to the custom of previous years, the League of Nations was not mentioned in the speech from the throne at the opening of Parliament this year, a fact which was severely criticized by the Opposition during the debate over the speech in Parliament. In the speech of Foreign Secretary Eden during the

foreign policy debate in the House of Commons on October 21, the League of Nations was not mentioned either; for which the Minister was immediately reproached by the Opposition. This prompted the Prime Minister in the very same session to make some remarks regarding the League of Nations, in which he brought out mainly the failure of the League. In view of the general interest attaching to a change, even though not in the fundamental attitude of the British Government toward the League, at least in the tone of the speeches by British Ministers on this subject, the above-mentioned statements by British Ministers deserve to be noted. When the opportunity offers, foreign circles may also profitably be referred to these statements.

The pertinent excerpts from the latest speeches of British Ministers may be found in the enclosed summary.<sup>31</sup>

By direction :  
BISMARCK

## No. 24

1558/377893-94

### *The German Ambassador in Great Britain (Ribbentrop) to the German Foreign Ministry*

Telegram

URGENT

LONDON, November 15, 1937—10:52 p.m.

VERY SECRET

Received November 16, 1937—3 a.m.

No. 689 of November 15

(Pol. II 2995)

For the Führer and Chancellor and the Foreign Minister.

In today's conversation with Halifax I first mentioned that I had no instructions with regard to his visit to Berlin, but that I welcomed the opportunity of having an informal and friendly conversation with him before his departure. Halifax replied that he was pleased to be able now to make the Berlin visit, which we had planned once before. In addition he told me that he would leave for Germany a day earlier, on Tuesday, as he would like to stop in Berlin before his conference with the Führer and Chancellor at Berchtesgaden. According to a report from Halifax's circle of acquaintances, the reason for advancing the date of the meeting is the desire not to have the trip jeopardized by renewed press maneuvers.

Halifax expressed his pleasure at having the opportunity of becoming personally acquainted with the Führer and Chancellor, whose work he admires, and to carry on frank exploratory con-

<sup>31</sup> Not printed.

versations with him. He would explain to the Führer the British view of the political problem, and he hoped that the Führer would give him his impression of the European and the general situation. Specifically he mentioned briefly the Austrian and Czech questions. Halifax further assumed that the Führer would probably discuss the colonial question, which I had previously brought up. At that time the question had not yet been ripe for discussion. Today he could speak of it. Halifax then stated that he considered the Rome-Berlin Axis and the London-Paris Axis to be realities. His idea with regard to the development of German-British relations in this connection was that the coming discussion should be looked upon as a beginning, which could then perhaps be followed by further discussions. He hoped it would then be possible "to bring our friends along" (meaning France and Italy). If we succeeded in bringing about agreements between the four Powers we would have done good work in the interest of European peace.

At the end of the conversation, in the course of which I mostly limited myself to noting Halifax's statements without taking up any details, Halifax stressed that England and Germany ought not to oppose each other. A conflict between the two countries, whatever the outcome, would mean the end of civilization. I replied that I had taken that position here for years, as he knew, and that there was certainly not a single German who desired such a conflict.

RIBBENTROP

## No. 25

2134/466880-81

### *Memorandum*

BERLIN, November 15, 1937.

The British Chargé d'Affaires called on me at my home yesterday evening at 6:20 and asked me for advice regarding the attitude he should take toward the article of the National Socialist Party Correspondence, published in the *Deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung*, which had come to his attention in the course of the afternoon. His Ambassador, who was very much concerned that the visit should take place, was at present in Czechoslovakia and could, therefore, not be reached. The statements, however, especially in the subtitle of the *Deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung*, sounded as if there was danger that the visit would not materialize. He was therefore considering whether to notify the Ambassador by telegram or even to call him back.

I answered that the article had been written without the participation of the Foreign Minister or the Foreign Ministry and obviously originated directly with the highest authority, whose justifiable indignation at the treatment of the matter of Halifax's visit by the British press must surely be fully comprehensible to everyone. It was well-nigh irresponsible of the British press to discuss this delicate subject, the treatment of which required the utmost caution on both sides, in a manner which was obviously intended to prevent the visit from taking place at the last minute. Even if I did not, as he did, interpret the statements to mean that the visit was to be called off, nevertheless, a serious situation had undoubtedly arisen. Since I did not know what arrangements had been made in the present case in regard to the distribution of the National Socialist Party Correspondence, I could not answer his question today as to whether and how further distribution could be prevented; furthermore, tomorrow was Monday, when only a few papers appear in the morning. But above all, it seemed to me important that the British Government should act, taking vigorous measures not only in private but publicly against the English papers which were obviously attempting to thwart its policy. The British Chargé confirmed this view as correct also in his opinion. He condemned the attitude of the British press severely, saying that it amounted to a stab in the back for his Government. He would report to London in that sense immediately. I told him that, as far as further treatment of the matter by us was concerned, much surely depended on the success of his efforts. I did not, however, consider it necessary at the present moment to notify the Ambassador and surely not to summon him here. The root of all the evil lay in the fact that the British press had been permitted to discuss the subject at all beyond the publication of the statement agreed upon with us. Mr. Forbes admitted this, too, without reservation.

MACKENSEN

## No. 26

1558/377888

*The German Ambassador in Italy (Hassell) to the German Foreign Ministry*

Telegram

ROME (QUIRINAL), November 16, 1937—8:35 p.m.

Received November 16, 1937—9:51 p.m.

No. 321 of November 16

(Pol. II 2992)

Ciano expressed great satisfaction with the sharp warning given the British press by the National Socialist Correspondence. He added that he did not believe in the good will of the British, nor consequently in really positive concessions from the mouth of Halifax. To Lord Perth he had flatly declined the second invitation to a meeting with Eden at Brussels, not because he did not want to meet Eden, but because he did not consider Brussels suitable for the occasion or the matter sufficiently prepared. The report that Volpi<sup>35</sup> had some mission in England was completely erroneous; he was attending only to some private business.

HASSELL

## No. 27

1097/318307

*The German Ambassador in Italy (Hassell) to the German Foreign Ministry*

4880/37

ROME, November 17, 1937.

Received November 20, 1937.

(Pol. VIII 1815)

Subject: Ciano on the Anti-Comintern Agreement.

## POLITICAL REPORT

In a conversation yesterday Count Ciano also touched upon the Anti-Comintern Agreement. I asked him whether he had information regarding the possible adherence of other nations, for instance Poland or Brazil, to which he replied that presumably the pressure of the United States would be too strong for the Brazilians, and the Poles would be too uneasy over their unpleasant neighbor to venture upon such a decision. Nor did he consider the adherence of other nations as particularly desirable at present;<sup>36</sup> at any rate,

<sup>35</sup> Giuseppe Volpi, president of the Fascist Council of Industry.

<sup>36</sup> A marginal notation in Neurath's handwriting reads as follows: "Neither do I."

he did not think much of persuading little countries, such as Austria or Hungary, to adhere to it. The main thing now was the relations of the three Great Powers to each other, which the Führer had correctly characterized as a world-political triangle.

HASSELL

No. 28

1595/384440-44

*The German Minister in Ireland (Hempel) to the German Foreign Ministry*

CONFIDENTIAL

A 166

DUBLIN, November 17, 1937.

Received November 20, 1937.

(Pol. II 3026)

Subject: Irish views on the significance of the accession of Italy to the German-Japanese Anti-Comintern Pact and the Berlin visit of Lord Halifax.

The significance of the accession of Italy to the German-Japanese Anti-Comintern Pact and the resulting political fellowship of the three States participating is thought here to lie primarily in the fact that today, whether intentionally or not, the Pact strikes mainly at England. At the same time it is emphasized that the future definite content of this elastic political fellowship is not yet apparent and may well adjust itself as needed to the political necessities of the moment. The situation produced thereby is interpreted as decidedly favorable, especially to Germany and her political demands. Mr. Walshe, the highest permanent official (Secretary of State) of the Foreign Ministry here, today expressed himself to me as follows: Never before, not for decades, even centuries, had England, in his opinion, been in such a difficult situation. Simultaneously two of her most vulnerable positions, the Mediterranean life line and her Asiatic possessions and outposts, were gravely endangered. The Far Eastern situation was the critical point at the present time. England could make no greater mistake now than to bring things to a head there by allowing the Brussels Conference, for example, to succeed in its intention of initiating a boycott against Japan. This could lead in a short time to unforeseeable consequences. The best thing would be for England to decide to leave the Sino-Japanese conflict alone. Sooner or later, if the Japanese managed things wisely and in a statesmanlike manner, there would be the possibility of conciliation and of a subsequent cooperation between the two Far Eastern peoples. More-

over, the time had passed when the white race held the Far East in tutelage.

At the present moment, however, under the stress of this situation, an understanding with Germany was a prime necessity for England. How well this was recognized in England was shown by the fact that there was scarcely any reaction by the British Government and public opinion to the sharp refutation by the National Socialist Party Correspondence of the sensational news in the *Evening Standard* and other papers. An increasing retreat by the British Government from the demands of the liberalistic Left, including the Labor Party, as well as a growing recognition by the British public of the fundamental change in the world political situation and the necessity of drawing practical conclusions therefrom, was unmistakably evident. This process, however, could not come to full fruition overnight in a people that for centuries had been the almost unconditional master of its decisions; it would take years. Under such circumstances Germany's demand for the return of her colonies (German East Africa, Southwest Africa, and Samoa) definitely had prospects of success today. For that reason, incidentally, it had been proper to refute so sharply the tendentious reports in the British press, which were intended to push the German colonial demands into the background again. Mr. Walshe added that sooner or later the Sudeten German question must also move toward a fundamental solution.

Lord Halifax, according to Mr. Walshe, enjoys great confidence in Ireland, apparently also with respect to the possibility that the settlement of Irish-English relations may some day be placed in his hands. Mr. Walshe is obviously very well informed regarding the personality of Lord Halifax, with whom he is acquainted; he was of the opinion that the impressions Lord Halifax would get on his present mission regarding the religious and church questions in Germany would have at least an emotional reaction upon his attitude. Although I assume that this is known in Berlin, I considered it proper, in any event, to report on this point separately.

I am repeating this conversation as an indication of the mood here. As you know, Mr. Walshe has been the highest permanent official of the Foreign Ministry here since 1923. He is extremely interested in the great problems of European politics and is very well acquainted with them. I should also assume that he has all manner of sources of information at his disposal regarding sentiment in England. Even in view of the fact that it is customary here to say agreeable things without meaning everything that is said, these expressions may be accepted as an indication of his

conviction that the political situation is favorable for Germany. Mr. Walshe added, furthermore, that he hoped that an easing of the tension in German-British relations would also favorably affect the settlement of Anglo-Irish relations, which could be expected sooner or later.

The local press has also been thoroughly occupied with the question of the accession of Italy to the German-Japanese Anti-Comintern Pact and has likewise expressed itself, in varying degrees and with the careful reserve customary here, to the effect that the Pact as a whole would create favorable conditions principally for Germany, especially for her demands for the return of the colonies. Concerning the possible effects of Lord Halifax's visit to Berlin, the press here, too, has thus far engaged only in vague surmises.

HEMPEL

## No. 29

1595/384436-29

### *The German Embassy in Great Britain to the German Foreign Ministry*

CONFIDENTIAL

A 4980

LONDON, November 18, 1937.

Received November 19, 1937.

Subject: Conversation with the Prime Minister's press chief.

George S. Stewart, the Prime Minister's press chief, asked the head of the D.N.B., Dr. Hesse, who is a rather close friend of his, to call on him yesterday and gave him the following information with the request that it be transmitted to the proper authorities. He stated expressly that what he was telling him was private and that he could not express himself officially with regard to it.

#### 1) *Evening Standard* article of November 13.

Chamberlain had been exceedingly angry about the article. He had had exhaustive investigations made in regard to its origin. These had revealed that the author could only be Poliakoff. The article had not been inspired by the Foreign Office, by members of the Cabinet, or by parliamentary circles. An inquiry at the French Embassy had had the same negative result. It was a known fact that Poliakoff wrote in the interest of whatever power paid him the most. Stewart very clearly hinted that he suspected Italy, without, however, alluding in any way to the Embassy here.

(Poliakoff, according to information I have received from other sources, is indeed supposed to be maintaining direct connections with Rome.)

Moreover, Stewart could not understand why the article which had appeared in the *Evening Standard* should have created such a sensation in Germany. The *Evening Standard* was a paper to whose utterances no particular importance was to be attached.

2) *Criticism of Eden in the German press.*

Chamberlain deplored exceedingly the continued criticism of Eden in the German press, especially the fact that an attempt had been made in German newspapers, by responsible publications, in fact, to present Eden as in opposition to him (Chamberlain). This was factually incorrect and politically unwise. His policy was also Eden's policy. He had expressly made the remarks concerning Eden in his Scarborough speech as a reply to assertions made in a leading German newspaper some 6 weeks before. In this connection Stewart referred to a prewar episode, when—apparently at the instigation of the Ambassador, Prince Lichnowsky—a Guildhall address by Lloyd George had been used to indicate to the German public that it could infer the existence of opposition between Lloyd George and Prime Minister Asquith. At that time Asquith had felt called upon to state publicly that the Cabinet was in complete agreement with Lloyd George's statements. Stewart then added that if the German press continued to attempt to demonstrate opposition between Eden and Chamberlain, this would of necessity cause Eden to be supported by Chamberlain in the same manner as Lloyd George had been supported by Asquith. Such a statement by the Prime Minister, which, in the interest of German-British relations, was not desired by Chamberlain, might possibly have an unfavorable effect on those relations. He urgently requested us to influence the German press to refrain from claiming that there was any conflict between the policies of Eden and Chamberlain toward Germany.

3) *The Halifax visit.*

Halifax was, in the opinion of Chamberlain, the most important statesman and politician England had at the present time. He was completely independent and without any personal ambition whatever. Chamberlain had intentionally refrained from having the British Ambassador in Berlin participate, because he felt that a direct informal discussion between Lord Halifax and the Führer and Chancellor was the best procedure in view of the status of German-British relations at this time. Eden was of the same opinion. He had even, at the instigation of Halifax, suggested the Berlin visit to him (Chamberlain). Stewart warned against excessive expectations with respect to the results of the visit and re-

peated several times that a German-British *rapprochement* could only be brought about very slowly and gradually, but that when such a *rapprochement* was achieved it could also be counted on to last. Even if the practical results of the visit were apparently slight, Germany should not be disappointed. Things sometimes went rather slowly in England and often took years.

By direction:  
E. VON SELZAM

## No. 30

860/285777

*Memorandum*

BERLIN, November 19, 1937.

The Italian Ambassador telephoned me and called attention to the report appearing on the last page of the *Temps* received here today, according to which Lord Halifax is supposed to have transmitted an invitation from the British Government to the Reich Foreign Minister to pay now the visit to London which had been postponed. With reference to this communication the Ambassador asked whether the report was correct. I replied that I had not the slightest inkling of such an invitation; therefore I was inclined to consider the report unfounded. I replied in the affirmative to the Ambassador's question as to whether he might transmit my statement to Rome.

MACKENSEN

## No. 31

F10/339-59

*The German Foreign Minister to the British Ambassador in  
Germany (Henderson)*

PERSONAL!  
URGENT!

BERLIN, November 20, 1937.

DEAR SIR NEVILLE: I enclose the memorandum that was made here on yesterday's conversation between the Führer and Chancellor and Lord Halifax. The memorandum is *not official* and is intended only to facilitate Lord Halifax's reporting. I therefore request that you have it treated as strictly confidential.

With best regards,

Very truly yours,

BARON VON NEURATH

[Enclosure]

## MEMORANDUM

TOP SECRET

(Pol. I 6370 g.Rs.)

CONVERSATION WITH HERR HITLER—19TH NOVEMBER 1937<sup>87</sup>

*Lord Halifax* opened the conversation by saying that he welcomed the opportunity to bring about a better understanding between England and Germany, by means of a personal conversation with the Chancellor; this would be of the greatest importance, not only for the two countries concerned but also for the whole of European civilization. Before leaving England he had discussed the visit with the Prime Minister and the Foreign Secretary, and they had been absolutely in agreement regarding the object to be attained; it was to discover in what way an opportunity could be made for a comprehensive and open discussion of all questions of interest to both countries. The view was held in England that it was perfectly possible to clear out of the way the misunderstandings which existed at the present moment: the great services which the Chancellor had performed in the reconstruction of Germany were fully recognised, and, if the public opinion of England took up an attitude of criticism from time to time towards certain German problems, it might no doubt be in part because people in

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\* There are three versions of the memorandum on the Hitler-Halifax conversation in the archives of the German Foreign Ministry: the English version sent to the British Ambassador, which is printed here; the German version sent to Hitler (F 10/360-374); and a second German version in which the utterances of Hitler and Halifax are arranged in parallel columns, by topics (375/208675-92). The copy of the text as sent to Hitler is defective; page 11 is missing. This page can, however, be reconstructed from the analytical German version. The contents of the English version are substantially identical with the two German versions; the few minor discrepancies are indicated here in footnotes. The analytical German version is arranged as follows:

- A. General Political Questions
  - 1. Aim and Procedure of the Talks
  - 2. The Need for a General Settlement
  - 3. Four Power Co-operation
  - 4. The *Status Quo* and its Rectification
  - 5. The Question of Treaty Observance
  - 6. The Part Played by the Press
- B. Specific Political Questions
  - 1. The Colonial Question
  - 2. Austria and Czechoslovakia
  - 3. The Memel Question
  - 4. Bolshevism, Russia, and the Franco-Russian Mutual Assistance Pact
  - 5. The Far East
  - 6. The League of Nations
  - 7. The Armaments Question
  - 8. General Questions of Anglo-German Relations.

The document has been omitted since the account printed above covers the same ground, and in some instances is more comprehensive. No memoranda have been found summarizing Lord Halifax's other conversations in Germany.

England were not fully informed of the motives and attendant circumstances of certain measures taken in Germany. Thus the Church of England followed with anxiety and disquiet the development of the Church question in Germany; and Labour Party circles were critical of certain action taken in Germany. In spite of these difficulties he, Lord Halifax, recognised that the Chancellor had not only performed great services in Germany but also, as he would no doubt feel, had been able, by preventing the entry of Communism into his own country, to bar its passage further West. The Prime Minister held the view that it should be possible to find a solution (of our differences) by an open exchange of views. The solution of even difficult problems could be facilitated by mutual confidence. If Germany and England were to succeed in reaching an understanding or even in approaching nearer to such an understanding, it would be necessary, in the English view, that those countries which stood politically close to Germany and England should be at the appropriate time brought into our discussions. One should mention in this context Italy and France, to whom it must be made clear from the beginning that an Anglo-German *rapprochement* would not mean an attempt to divide France and England. The impression should not be given that the Berlin-Rome axis or the good relations between London and Paris would be prejudiced by an agreement between England and Germany. After the ground had been prepared by agreement between England and Germany, the four Great Powers of Western Europe must together create the basis upon which a lasting European peace would be built. In no case should one of the four Powers be left outside this collaboration for in that case the situation of insecurity which would arise would never find an end.

*The Chancellor* replied that an understanding between the four Powers of Western Europe appeared to him very easy if it were only a question of good will and of mutually polite relations. The question became more difficult when one proceeded to the solution of problems based upon material differences. If it was desired to make sure of co-operation with Germany the question must be asked how Germany would be regarded by the other partners—as a State in the sense of the Versailles Treaty (and in that case one could scarcely go further than a purely formal shaping of European relations) or whether Germany would be treated as a State which no longer bore the moral or material stigma of the Treaty of Versailles. But in that case the logical consequences would have to be drawn from this changed situation, for one could not seek a State to co-operate actively in European politics and refuse it the

recognition of a Great Power's right to take part as an active partner. The tragedy of the situation lay in the fact that in England and France people did not yet believe in the necessity of getting used to the idea that Germany, which after the Treaty of Westphalia had hardly been more than a theoretical concept for 250 years, had in the last 50 years become a reality. It was the task of a superior art of government to face this reality even if perhaps this had certain unpleasant sides. The same was true for Italy and in a certain sense for Japan as well. History often created realities which were not always pleasant. Germany had had to accept a reality of this kind for Poland had for 150 years, so to speak, not existed and had now been called back to life. He (the Chancellor) saw it as the principle [*sic*] task before him so to educate the German people that it could accept unpleasant political realities. The nucleus of the problem to be dealt with was therefore the question what active political co-operation could be accorded by a country which in other respects was not even accorded the most urgent necessities of life.

There were two possibilities in the shaping of relations between the peoples:

The interplay of free forces, which was often synonymous with great and grave encroachments upon the life of the peoples and which could bring in its train a serious convulsion which would shake the civilisation we had built up with so much trouble. The second possibility lay in setting up in the place of the play of free forces the rule of a "higher reason"; in this case, however, one must clearly realise that this higher reason must lead to approximately similar results to those which had followed from the working of free forces. He (the Chancellor) had often asked himself during recent years whether humanity today was intelligent enough to replace the play of free forces by the method of higher reason.

In the year 1919 a great chance to apply this new method had been missed. At that time a solution of unreasonableness had been preferred: as a consequence Germany had been forced back on the path of the free play of forces, because this was the only possible way to make sure of the simplest rights of mankind. It would be decisive for the future whether the one method were chosen, or the other. When considering the sacrifices which would certainly be demanded here and there by the method of reason one should realise what sacrifices would have to be made, were one to return to the old method of the free play of forces. One would then realise that the former alternative cost less.

*Lord Halifax* agreed with the Chancellor when he said that purely formal relations had little value and that an understanding which went further than this could only be reached if the parties on all sides stood upon the same ground and reached unity of thought. He was on his side convinced that permanent results could only be reached on a basis of realism, even if the realities to be dealt with were unpleasant for one party or the other. He said that every one in England respected Germany as a great and sovereign country and that it was only upon this basis that she would be treated. Englishmen were realists and were perhaps more convinced than others that mistakes had been made in the Treaty of Versailles which had to be put right. England had always in the past made her influence felt in this direction of realism. He referred to England's role in the earlier evacuation of the Rhineland, in the solution of the reparations question and at the time of the remilitarisation of the Rhineland. One should try to speak the same language and to avoid conversing with raised voices over great distances, because this after all only led to misunderstandings and made the solution of problems no easier.

On the English side it was not necessarily thought that the *status quo* must be maintained under all circumstances. It was recognised that one might have to contemplate an adjustment to new conditions, a correction of former mistakes and the recognition of changed circumstances when such need arose. In doing so England made her influence felt only in one way—to secure that these alterations should not take place in a manner corresponding to the unreasonable solution mentioned by the Chancellor, the play of free forces, which in the end meant war. He must emphasise once more in the name of H. M. Government that possibility of change of the existing situation was not excluded, but that changes should only take place upon the basis of reasonable agreements reasonably reached. If on both sides there was agreement that the world was not static, one should try to put the recognition of this fact into practice so that the energies at the disposal of mankind should be directed in mutual confidence to a common objective.

*The Chancellor* replied that he was sorry to say he had the impression that the will did exist indeed to take action in a reasonable direction but that, particularly in the democratic countries, reasonable solutions were faced with great difficulties because the political parties there were able to exert a decisive influence over the actions of the Government. He himself had in the years 1933–34 made a number of practical proposals for the limitation of armaments, the acceptance of which would have spared Europe and the world

a great deal of money. These proposals had been refused one after the other although many a statement<sup>38</sup> had had the reasonable insight to realise that Germany would not remain for ever in the situation resulting from the Treaty of Versailles. But since political parties and above all the irresponsible press had a decisive influence on the decision of the Government proposals such as those of the army of 200,000, of the army of 300,000, and of air limitation had all been refused. Only the Naval Agreement was left of all his attempts to clear up these questions.

We were in a similar position to-day. The necessary and reasonable solutions were obstructed by the demagogic frame of mind of political parties, and naturally enough this greatly increased the difficulties. On the other hand he referred to the good relations with Poland which he had brought about in spite of a very difficult past. But Germany on her side could not expect the smallest concession in the granting to her, by other countries, of the most natural of her needs of life, because those countries were ruled by the parties. Germany knows the attitude of the English parties in the colonial question, and in particular the absolutely negative bearing of the Conservatives. The same was the case in France. Germany could only take note of this attitude and realize the fact that under these circumstances no solution of the colonial problem could come about. One must then wait. There were also other cases in which the decisive influence had not been exercised by the art of government of individual statesmen, but by the demagogic attitude of political parties. The robbery of the Memel district by Lithuania in the year 1923 and the treatment since then of German protests in this question were a notorious example. This was why most of his proposals had been rejected. He was in a manner of speaking regarded by the parties in democratic countries as the black sheep, and the fact that a proposal emanated from him was sufficient to cause its rejection. Even today the influence of parties was making itself felt in a similar manner. It was a fact that certain nations did not have sufficient space on which to live. If England, with her 46 million inhabitants, was obliged to live on the motherland alone, she might perhaps more easily understand this. The bias with which the colonial question was regarded was illustrated by the fact that one regarded it as quite natural that America and Russia should have great territories at their disposal, that England should possess a quarter of the world, that France should have a colonial empire, and that Japan at least should not be prevented from

<sup>38</sup> This passage, in the German version as sent to Hitler, reads as follows: "many a statesman . . ."

expanding. It was also natural that smaller countries like Belgium, Spain, and Portugal should have colonies. It was only to Germany that one declared that she could in no circumstances be allowed to possess colonies. That characterised the attitude of the parties, which like the Conservative Party in England adopted absolutely negative resolutions regarding the colonial question. What was the object of inviting a country to active co-operation if in other matters one refused it the most primitive rights? One criticised the German attitude in the Far East; it was said to be treachery to the white race. Germany however had held fast longer than any other country to the solidarity of the whites against other races and had been criticised precisely by democratic countries for her racial policy. Now she had completely disinterested herself in the Far East. She could cultivate trade relations with this or that country. Since the German flag had disappeared in the Far East and since trade followed the flag, the possibilities of doing business were anyhow none too great.

Means of solving international problems would be very difficult to find until either the political parties became reasonable or methods of government were introduced which gave these parties no longer so much influence on the governments.

In this connection the Chancellor cited also the action of the press to disturb Lord Halifax's visit to Germany. He did not doubt that certain circles in England took a realistic view of things. The Naval Agreement was a proof of this. But the determining political factors appeared to him to adopt another attitude. That was in any case his impression after nearly five years of government. He believed that every proposal he made would be at once torpedoed and that any government would find itself faced with great difficulties from the opposition if it accepted them.

*Lord Halifax* replied that, if the Chancellor was really of that opinion, it was clear that he had wasted his time in coming to Berchtesgaden and the Chancellor had wasted his time in receiving him. For if the Chancellor's premises were correct, it followed that no advance could be made on the road to understanding, and that, so long as England was a democracy, further conversation could serve no useful purpose, since England would not quickly modify her present system of government. It was also not correct to say that opportunities had been missed and offers rejected on account of the influence of the political parties. This was definitely not the case as regards England. Offers had been rejected because, rightly or wrongly, certain countries had regarded the security proffered by these offers as insufficient. The rejection of such proposals was

evidence of the fundamental truth that disarmament must follow security and not vice versa. That England should have concluded the Naval Agreement with Germany, despite the fact that from the party point of view there was considerable opposition to it, showed precisely, that the English Government also acted independently of parties. It was not in the least the slave of what the Chancellor regarded as demagogic party manoeuvres. In the English view no government which was worthy of the name was under the domination of outside parties. Nor was it correct that proposals had been rejected because they had been made by the Chancellor "the black sheep." Certain countries had been obliged to note how Germany had acted in violation of treaty obligations on grounds which might appear convincing to Germany but appeared unconvincing to other countries. It was only natural that German offers should have been more critically examined in these quarters than would otherwise have been the case.

The British Government did not adopt the attitude that the colonial question was in no circumstances to be discussed with Germany. It knew that it was a difficult problem. It was however clear that no English Government could deal with the colonial question by direct negotiation with Germany alone. The problem could only be broached as a part of a general settlement by means of which quiet and security might be established in Europe.

In the course of the discussion regarding this general settlement, other countries who were concerned must naturally be drawn in. The Chancellor had spoken of circles in England who had been hostile to the visit of Lord Halifax. Was he sure that the hostile circles were confined to England? This was however no reason for those who wished to build [*sic*] up a better political system in the world to be deflected from their course.

*The Chancellor* answered that he had been misunderstood by Lord Halifax. Lord Halifax had represented as the goal of Anglo-German co-operation an understanding between the four Western Powers. Amongst these was France, and his observations in regard to the demagogy of political parties were above all directed to France, where they were completely applicable. He had excepted England with particular reference to the Naval Agreement.

As regards the non-observation of treaty obligations, he observed that other Powers before Germany had violated their treaty obligations and Germany had only assumed freedom of action after the rejection of all her proposals. Even in the opinion of internationally recognised English law professors Germany had been entitled in law to the disarmament of the other countries after she had herself

completely fulfilled her treaty obligations in this sphere. She had moreover accepted the proposal of the late Prime Minister MacDonald for a 200,000 man army. The proposal had been rejected by France.

In the colonial question other countries had broken the Congo Treaties which prohibited the extension of a war to African territory. Germany, confiding in the good faith of others to carry out the Treaty, had only maintained small contingents of troops in Africa.

Between England and Germany there was only one difference namely the colonial question. It was a difference of opinion. If agreement could be reached, it would be most satisfactory. In the contrary event he, the Chancellor, could only take note of the fact with regret. There were many spheres in which Germany and England had a different outlook. It was however a question of matters which in no case had a direct bearing on Anglo-German co-operation. In the colonial question one was faced with two expressions of opinion on the English side. The English Government declared that one could discuss. The parties, and in particular the Conservative Party, categorically rejected everything. There were no other difficulties between Germany and England.

*Lord Halifax* asked the Chancellor, if, subject to a satisfactory solution of pending questions, he saw any possibility of leading Germany back to a closer cooperation with other nations in the League of Nations or in what respect the Covenant of the League in his opinion must be altered before Germany could once more become a member of the League. There was no doubt that the virtues of the League might have been exaggerated by its too enthusiastic supporters. Nevertheless, one must admit that the League used its influence for a peaceful method of solving international difficulties. If it was possible to put these methods into force, one would have practically realised the second alternative which the Chancellor had previously described as the "reasonable method," in contra-distinction to the free play of forces. If one were to use the League, which was an international method, the details of which one might perhaps alter, in this manner, it would have considerable effect upon the re-establishment of confidence between the nations. He therefore inquired of the Chancellor his attitude toward the League and to disarmament. All other questions fell into the category of possible alterations in the European order which might be destined to come about with the passage of time. Amongst these questions were Danzig, Austria, and Czechoslovakia. England was interested to see that any alterations should come through the course

of peaceful evolution and that methods should be avoided which might cause far-reaching disturbances, which neither the Chancellor nor other countries desired.

The colonial question was doubtless difficult. The English Prime Minister adopted the attitude that it could only be solved as a part of a new start and of a general settlement. He would like to ask the Chancellor if he could give him an idea of the rough lines on which he considered that the colonial problem should be solved.

*The Chancellor* answered that in his opinion the fact that Germany was not a member of the League did not constitute an Anglo-German problem, since America also was not in the League and nevertheless no one could maintain that on this ground there were profound differences of opinion between England and America. In addition the League, as a result of the absence of Japan and of the inactivity of Italy, was no real League any more. Whether Germany would ever return to Geneva was a question which could not at the present moment be answered. She would definitely not return to a rudimentary League of Nations or to a League which regarded it as its task to oppose the natural development of political relations and to stand for an indefinite perpetuation of the *status quo*.

The solution of the disarmament question had been considerably easier before, since it had then only been a question of armaments limitation. Today England herself was arming to a degree which had no parallel in English history. Was England ready to abandon her rearmament? He (the Chancellor) knew that the English answer to this question was to describe English rearmament as making up lost ground. Germany found herself in the same situation. She must also make up the ground which she had lost in the past through her all too great loyalty in carrying out her treaty obligations. He had moreover already found out that the nations' influence was in proportion to their armaments and he saw today that his own weight in international relations had increased with the weight of his armaments. The disarmament problem had been extraordinarily complicated by the French alliance with Russia, which had been concluded as a reply to certain German measures. Thereby Russia had been brought into Europe not only as a moral but as a very weighty material factor, particularly in view of her alliance with Czechoslovakia. In these circumstances who could broach the disarmament question, and how should this happen? He had in fact no idea how the disarmament question should be brought within the realm of practical possibilities. In any case he was a fanatical enemy of conferences which were doomed to

failure from the start. He would in no case allow himself to be persuaded to take part in such proceedings by statesmen who considered that a conference was due every quarter. When one was dealing with disarmament one must first be quite clear what was to be disarmed. He pointed to his earlier proposals to prohibit bombing. Since the colonial Powers regarded the bombing aeroplane as a good method of breaking the resistance of rebellious natives, they had rejected this proposal as being against their interests. In the light of the most recent experiences of war in different parts of the world they were nevertheless again inclined to abolish bombing aeroplanes.<sup>39</sup>

Germany had to bear the burden of her armaments and did not complain. She would adhere to her treaty obligations under the Naval Agreement but with the reserve, which was already made at the time of the latter's signature, that Russia should not arm indefinitely at sea. In that event a revision of the Naval Agreement would be necessary. Nevertheless he had not so high an opinion of Russian capabilities as to believe that the case for revision would arise within measurable time.

As far as Czechoslovakia and Austria were concerned a settlement could equally be reached given a reasonable attitude. The Agreement of July 11th<sup>40</sup> had been made with Austria and it was to be hoped that it would lead to the removal of all difficulties. Czechoslovakia was herself in a position to clear away existing difficulties. She only needed to treat the Germans living within her borders well and they would be entirely happy. Germany herself set great store by good relations with all her neighbours.

On the colonial question it was not for Germany to state her wishes. There were two possibilities: first the free play of forces. What Germany would take in the way of colonies in that event he would not say.<sup>41</sup> The second possibility was a reasonable solution. Reasonable solutions must have a legal basis. Germany had a claim to her former property. It was proclaimed on many sides that international order should be built up not on force but on law and he, the Chancellor, entirely agreed. He would indeed be glad if the moment from which this new order should be taken as valid were fixed before 1914. Germany would then come particularly well out of the new settlement. He repeated that Germany had no wishes to express in the colonial question but took her stand

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<sup>39</sup> This passage, in the analytical German version, reads as follows: "... they now were again inclined to acquire bombing aeroplanes after all."

<sup>40</sup> Document No. 152, p. 278.

<sup>41</sup> This passage, in the analytical German version, reads as follows: "What Germany would take . . . could not be foretold."

simply and solely on grounds of equity. England and France on their side must make proposals if it seemed to them intolerable for one reason or another to return this or that German colony. In her demand for colonies Germany was pursuing no political or military ambition. She had no intention of establishing herself on any strategic line but wanted colonies only on economic grounds to provide herself with agricultural produce and raw materials. She had no interest in possessing colonies in a region where there was shooting and where the danger of international complications was great. If England felt that she could not on strategic grounds return certain territories to Germany she might propose a substitute elsewhere. All the same Germany would not take the Sahara as a colony and equally not anything in the mediterranean region because a position between two World Powers seemed to her rather too dangerous. Tsingtau and Kiauchau were also too exposed.

*Baron von Neurath*, referring to the League of Nations question, said that since her withdrawal from the League Germany had never withdrawn from international co-operation whenever it appeared that there was a chance not of talking but of doing something practical. An example of this was Germany's collaboration in the Spanish Non-Intervention question.

*The Chancellor* for his part pointed to the German-Polish and German-Austrian agreements and expressed the hope that a reasonable solution could be found with Czechoslovakia.

*Lord Halifax* said that he did not entirely agree with the Chancellor on one or two points, though he did not intend to pursue the matter since it was a question of points which were not essential to the conduct of the present conversation.

Mr. Chamberlain and His Majesty's Government would be glad if, following their wide and frank discussion that day, further conversations between representatives of the two Governments might take place as to questions of detail. It had been a pity that nothing further had been done after Sir John Simon's and Mr. Eden's visit, and if now further conversations were linked on to this discussion, this fact would make an exceptionally favorable impression on public opinion.

*The Chancellor* replied that for the present he had in mind the diplomatic channel as a means of carrying the Anglo-German contact further. For, if it was desired to hold conversation on concrete questions, they must be very well prepared. The principal cause of the failure of many such conversations had been the lack of preparation. A conference could really only represent the final conclusion of previous preparatory negotiations. He was sure that

the colonial problem was the most difficult question and upon this they were still very far apart. England and France must make up their minds whether they wanted to meet the German demand at all and if so in which direction. Germany could only announce her demand and resign herself to the hope that it would meet with a reasonable reception.

#### AFTER LUNCHEON

After luncheon *Lord Halifax* returned to the subject of the Anglo-German *prise de contact* and again proposed direct negotiations between government representatives. Such negotiations would not only be practically welcome but would make a good impression on public opinion. It would have a disappointing effect if these negotiations could only be contemplated at a very distant date. A very great deal had been expected in England from the visit of the Reichsminister for Foreign Affairs and there had been great disappointment when this visit could not take place in consequence of the "Deutschland" and "Leipzig" incidents. It would therefore be a good thing if further conversations were now held between English and German representatives. The colonial question could be discussed at them and he repeated in this connexion that the British Government was entirely ready for this question to be [discussed?<sup>42</sup>]. At the same time he must again add that any British Government could only handle the colonial problem as part of a general settlement. All the questions to be settled must be attacked simultaneously on a wide front.

*The Chancellor* replied that it was precisely this negotiation on a wide front which required careful preparation. In his opinion it would be better not to allow conversations to take place at all than to be placed in the position after a negotiation of having to admit that the result was unsatisfactory. One must also be able to wait. Two realistic peoples such as the German and English should not allow themselves to be influenced by the fear of a catastrophe. It was always being said that if this or that did not happen, Europe would be face to face with a catastrophe. The only catastrophe was Bolshevism. Everything else could be settled. The catastrophe mentality was the work of an excitable and malevolent press. It was wrong to maintain that they were in the same position internationally as in 1912-14. This might perhaps be true if the war and its lessons did not lie between. He was not the man to be nervous politically. In a few years today's problems might wear a quite different complexion. In a quieter atmosphere, when the situation in the Far East and in Spain had been cleared

<sup>42</sup> This word is partly illegible in the original.

up, a great deal would perhaps allow itself to be much more easily settled. If therefore for the moment this or that question appeared difficult, they should first wait for two or three years.

It was only the part played by the press which was sinister. Nine-tenths of all tension was produced simply and solely by it. The Spanish crisis, and the alleged occupation of Morocco by German troops were typical examples which clearly showed the dangers of irresponsible journalism. A first condition of the calming of international relations was therefore the co-operation of all peoples to make an end of journalistic free-booting.

*Lord Halifax* agreed with the Chancellor's remarks as to the dangerous influence of the press. He too considered that the Anglo-German negotiations must be well prepared. Mr. Chamberlain had said on his departure that he would willingly take the risk of a false interpretation of his, Lord Halifax's, visit to Germany in the press, if by means of this visit at least a step in the right direction could be taken. Both sides must have only the same aim in view, namely the establishment and consolidation of European peace.

Continuing, Lord Halifax thanked the Chancellor for the opportunity of this talk and said he would give an exact account of it all to the British Prime Minister.

*The Chancellor* also expressed his satisfaction at having had so wide and frank a discussion with Lord Halifax and declared that he could unreservedly accept on Germany's behalf the objective which Lord Halifax had just defined. Anyone who, like himself, had been a soldier in the World War, wanted no more war. The same tendencies existed in England and other countries. Only a country like Soviet Russia could gain by a general conflict.<sup>43</sup> All others were for the preservation of peace from the bottom of their hearts.

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<sup>43</sup> This passage, in the German version as sent to Hitler, reads as follows: "Only one country, Soviet Russia, could gain . . ."

## No. 32

1558/377903

*The German Ambassador in Great Britain (Ribbentrop) to the  
German Foreign Ministry*

Telegram

VERY URGENT

No. 704 of November 22

LONDON, November 22, 1937—3:09 p.m.

Received November 22, 1937—5:10 p.m.

(Pol. II 3049a)

For the Foreign Minister.

Since the Embassy has so far received no information from you regarding the Halifax visit, I should be grateful for a report on the conversations with Halifax for my official guidance.

RIBBENTROP

## No. 33

375/208693-702

*The German Foreign Ministry to the German Embassies in Italy,  
Great Britain, France, and the United States*

Cipher Telegram

URGENT

BERLIN, November 22, 1937.

SECRET

- 1) Diplogerma<sup>44</sup> Rome, No. 368
- 2) German Embassy London, No. 455
- 3) Diplogerma Paris, No. 502
- 4) Diplogerma Washington, No. 199

Only to 1):

On November 20 the Italian Ambassador was informed in rough outline regarding the course of the conversations of the Führer and the Foreign Minister with Lord Halifax, principally in order to counteract the tendency to misinterpret things which was becoming evident in the Italian press. I now give you the following detailed presentation, on the basis of which I ask you to inform Mussolini in my name.

For 1) to 4):

The talk between the Führer and Halifax, in which I participated, was held in a conversational tone, was purely informational, and produced nothing sensational. The Führer did not spare his visitor some bitter truths about British and French policy. Although one can speak of no concrete material results and although no es-

<sup>44</sup> The telegraphic address of the German Embassy.

sentially new viewpoints emerged, Halifax's visit must still be described as satisfactory.

Before going into details, it should be noted that the Rome-Berlin Axis, as well as the close relationship between London and Paris, was treated as established reality both by Halifax and, of course, by ourselves.

The following problems were discussed:

1. *The Colonial Question*: The Führer expressed the familiar view that Germany had a claim to her original colonies, was invoking that claim, and was leaving it to France and England to come forward with counterproposals, if for any reason the return of a particular German colony did not seem to them to be feasible. In her colonial claims Germany was not pursuing power politics or any military ambitions. She was anxious to have agricultural and other raw materials, but did not seek colonial possessions where international complications were to be feared.

Halifax replied that the colonial question could be taken up in the course of further German-British conversations. The British Government was quite prepared to discuss it, though only as part of a general settlement.

2. *Eastern Questions*: Halifax admitted of his own accord that certain changes in the European system could probably not be avoided in the long run. The British did not believe that the *status quo* had to be maintained under all circumstances. Among the questions in which changes would probably be made sooner or later were Danzig, Austria, and Czechoslovakia. England was only interested in seeing that such changes were brought about by peaceful development. Halifax did not go into any further detail.

The Führer likewise did not go any deeper into the problem, but remarked that a settlement was altogether possible with Czechoslovakia and Austria if the countries concerned maintained a sensible attitude. As regards Austria, the Führer called attention to the Agreement of July 11, 1936, which it was hoped would lead to the settlement of all difficulties. Czechoslovakia herself had it in her power to satisfy the Sudeten Germans by good treatment. With a reference to the German-Polish and German-Austrian settlements, the Führer expressed the hope that a sensible solution would also be found for Czechoslovakia. He did not go into further detail with regard to Danzig.

3. *The League of Nations*: Halifax inquired whether, assuming a satisfactory settlement of pending questions, the Führer envisaged the possibility of leading Germany back into the League of Nations in order to work more closely with other countries, and in what re-

spect, in his opinion, the Covenant of the League would have to be changed before Germany could reenter it.

The Führer objected, in the first place, that this question was not a German-British problem. He called attention to the absence of the United States, the nonparticipation of Japan, and Italy's inactivity. Germany would certainly not return to a rudimentary League of Nations any more than to a League which opposed the natural development of political relations.

4. *The Armament Question:* This question was likewise brought up by Halifax, but was treated rather loosely, on the whole. Essentially, the Führer called attention to its historical development and the neglected opportunities. The Führer pointed to the difficulties that had come in the way of an armaments agreement because of the Franco-Russian and the Franco-Czech alliances, and again called attention to his previous proposal for the outlawing of aerial bombing.

The Führer mentioned the Anglo-German Naval Agreement as the only result of the previous and otherwise fruitless discussions.

5. *The Far Eastern Conflict:* Regarding the Far Eastern conflict, the Führer told Halifax only that we were no longer politically interested in the Far East since the German flag had disappeared from there. We were free to cultivate the economic possibilities with both combatants.

6. *The Mediterranean and Spanish Questions:* The Spanish question was mentioned only in connection with journalistic intrigues. The Mediterranean question was not discussed.

7. *Locarno:* The negotiations for a Western Pact and the Belgian problem were not discussed. The word "Locarno" was not mentioned. On the other hand, in the course of the discussion Halifax several times conjured up the shadow of possible discussions among the four great Western Powers. He said, among other things, that after the ground had been sufficiently prepared between England and Germany, the four great Western Powers together would have to lay the foundation upon which a lasting European peace could be erected. In no case should any one of the four Great Powers be left out of this cooperation, since otherwise there would be no end to the present state of insecurity.

8. It is also worthy of note that Halifax even in his introductory remarks described Germany as the bulwark of the West against Bolshevism. Otherwise, the problem of Russia was not referred to in the conversation by either side.

9. Halifax touched upon the development of the church question with the remark that the English Church was following this question with concern and uneasiness.

If, according to the foregoing, it was thus a question of an informational discussion and it cannot be said that any concrete results were brought about, the fact remains that certain subjects of great importance are to be discussed further between the German and British Governments. Halifax designated direct negotiations between representatives of the two Governments as the proper channel. Here the Führer warned against headlong haste and in particular against official meetings without a carefully and thoroughly prepared concrete basis having been found in advance. The reference to an imminent trip to London by the German Foreign Minister, which has already appeared in the press several times, is therefore not an acute matter, as long as the prerequisite mentioned by the Führer has not been provided by the preliminary diplomatic spadework.

To summarize, the visit of the British Cabinet member to the Führer is to be regarded for German-British relations, and even beyond that, as a beneficial and gratifying event which, if one proceeds logically and at the same time cautiously, may constitute a beginning of progress in matters of European politics. It must, however, be kept in mind in this connection that in accordance with the repeated assertions of Halifax only a general settlement is contemplated by the British.

Because of the private nature of Halifax's trip, we have informed only the Italian Government of the essence of the discussions and assume that Paris will be likewise informed by London. For the rest, the subject must remain confidential. •Please mention this request in your capital, too.

NEURATH

#### C. THE TRAVELS OF M. DELBOS, NOVEMBER-DECEMBER 1937

##### No. 34

2128/463720-21

*The Head of the Political Department in the German Foreign Ministry (Weizsäcker) to the German Ambassador in Italy (Hassell)*

BERLIN, November 22, 1937.

Received November 24, 1937.

DEAR HASSELL: We have received the following telegraphic message from Consul General Borchers in New York:

"I have received from an entirely reliable source the following report, which, if it is not yet known to you, I should not like to withhold from you.

"In February 1937, Count Ciano had two letters written to Eden by an intermediary who occupies a prominent position in Anglo-Italian economic relations. These letters state that an over-all Anglo-Italian settlement covering Spain, the Mediterranean question, and Bari<sup>45</sup> would be possible, depending only on the recognition of Abyssinia. In particular, the letters stated that far-reaching commitments to Germany, which otherwise would be within the realm of possibility, would not be made, in case England agreed. At that time England did not take up the suggestion, since, according to the intermediary, sufficient confidence was not felt. The writer of the letters, who personally gave this information to my source, describes Mussolini even at the present stage as extremely interested in a settlement with England."

If the report should be correct, it is perhaps still of interest to you in connection with the Anglo-Italian Agreements concerning the Mediterranean that were concluded on January 2, 1937.

With best regards and Heil Hitler,

Yours,

WEIZSÄCKER

### No. 35

625/251433-35

*The Head of the Political Department in the German Foreign Ministry (Weizsäcker) to the German Ambassador in Austria (Papen)*

By courier November 29

BERLIN, November 23, 1937.

(zu Pol. II 2989a)

(Pol. II 3309)

DEAR HERR VON PAPEN: Herr von Neurath let me read your letter of November 11 as well as the enclosure on your Paris impressions.

Your observations coincide to a large extent with those we have received from France from other sources and which can be summed up in three sentences:

- 1) Germany is practically the fashion in Paris at present;
- 2) France declares herself ready to negotiate with us;
- 3) This favorable disposition will probably not last much longer.

Sentence 1 is pleasant news. Sentence 3 may be right and is worth noting. Sentence 2 always disturbs me.

If it is true that France is ready to negotiate and make concessions, one would have cause for self-reproach, besides justly incurring the censure of others, if one let the opportunity slip by.

As far as the past is concerned, the French reference to the abortive Schacht mission is unjustified. For in 1936 the British

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<sup>45</sup> The reference is to propaganda programs from the Bari radio station.

prevented M. Blum from acting. But today? What is France, with her reiterated assurances, prepared to do in our favor? Which of our wishes could and would she fulfill? Are they matters of only superficial importance or do they go deeper? We hear continually about an *arrangement général*. Would that be an offer of friendship without continuing to dig the spurs into our eastern flank? That is after all the decisive point, and on this the French do not seem to want to talk.

Could you, and this is why I take the liberty of writing, supplement your memorandum on this matter, or at least indicate what German wishes you were told could be discussed?

Taking your consent for granted, I am sending a copy of this request to Welczeck, with whom you were in close contact in Paris.<sup>46</sup>

Many thanks in advance.

Best regards and

Heil Hitler!

WEIZSÄCKER

No. 36

631/252275-76

*The German Chargé d'Affaires in Poland (Wühlisch) to the  
German Foreign Ministry*

P V 52/11. 1937

WARSAW, November 23, 1937.

Received November 24, 1937.

(Pol. II 3086)

In continuation of report of November 19—PV 52/11.37.<sup>47</sup>

Subject: Substance of the conversations that the American Ambassador at Paris, Mr. Bullitt, held with Polish statesmen at Warsaw.

As I have meanwhile learned from a reliable source, Mr. Bullitt, the American Ambassador at Paris, took it upon himself during his Warsaw visit to champion French policy. In the conversations that he held with Foreign Minister Beck and Vice Minister Count Szembek, he is supposed to have pointed out that next to England, Poland had the greatest interest in the maintenance of peace and of the *status quo*. It was therefore the duty of the Polish Government to support Anglo-French foreign policy. Mr. Bullitt is said

<sup>46</sup> The following message was sent by Weizsäcker to Count Welczeck by courier on November 30: "Dear Count Welczeck: Enclosed I send you a letter to Herr von Papen. Since it concerns France and a subject which we have discussed more than once, I did not want to conduct the correspondence without your knowledge. Best regards and Heil Hitler! Weizsäcker"

<sup>47</sup> Not printed.

to have emphasized in this connection that, on the one hand, the value of the French alliance had grown considerably for Poland since the danger of a sharp increase in Bolshevism in France could be regarded as averted; on the other hand, Poland today again had greater importance for France, because Paris no longer expected as much advantage from the alliance with the Soviet Union as it did formerly.

WÜHLISCH<sup>47a</sup>

### No. 37

375/208719-20

*Telephone Message From London, November 24, 1937, 1 p.m.*

LONDON, November 24, 1937—1 p.m.

This morning Selzam<sup>48</sup> inquired of Strang, the head of the Central European Department,<sup>49</sup> whether the Paris report that Chautemps and Delbos would come to London at the invitation of the British Government was a fact. Strang confirmed this but requested that it be treated as confidential, since nothing had yet been made public officially.

Immediately thereafter Sir Orme Sargent<sup>50</sup> asked Selzam to call on him and informed him, with a request to transmit it to Berlin as quickly as possible, that the British Government had invited Chautemps and Delbos, and that both had accepted the invitation. The two gentlemen were expected on Monday the 29th and would presumably remain one day. This afternoon an official statement would be made in the House of Commons. Orme regretted the premature press report from Paris. The British Government had attached great importance to informing the German Government before any reports appeared in the press.

In answer to Selzam's question as to the reason for the invitation, Orme replied that the invitation was a result of the Halifax visit, since the French had regarded that visit somewhat suspiciously, and the British wanted to reassure them. Then too, Chamberlain was not yet acquainted with Chautemps. Chamberlain was anxious to become personally acquainted.

<sup>47a</sup> A marginal notation in Neurath's handwriting reads as follows: "Mr. Bullitt made the same statement to me, only not with the comment that Poland had to support French foreign policy."

<sup>48</sup> Eduard von Selzam, First Secretary in the German Embassy in Great Britain.

<sup>49</sup> William Strang, head of the Central European Department in the British Foreign Office.

<sup>50</sup> Assistant Under Secretary of State in the British Foreign Office.

During yesterday's conversation with Ambassador von Ribbentrop, Eden had not mentioned the invitation to Chautemps and Delbos because it had not been known whether the French Ministers would accept.

BIELFELD

No. 38

2128/463758-59

*The German Foreign Ministry to the German Embassy in Italy*

Cipher Letter

URGENT

BERLIN, November 24, 1937.

For Chief of Mission or his representative in person. Confidential. To be decoded personally. Strictly Secret.

In continuation of telegram No. 369.<sup>51</sup> The text of the Foreign Minister's letter of November 22 to Ciano is herewith transmitted for your strictly confidential information. The text reads as follows:

"In accordance with the agreement we made in Berlin, I should like to inform Your Excellency of the content of the conversations conducted on the occasion of the visit by the British Lord President, Viscount Halifax.

"As intended by both parties from the very beginning, the conversations were only of a general and informative nature. In his remarks Lord Halifax indicated that the present situation in regard to Germany's eastern and southeastern neighbors was, in the opinion of the British too, by no means satisfactory to Germany and that an attempt should be made to settle this problem some day by peaceful means and with the cooperation of the parties concerned. Regarding the German colonial claims, the British Minister indicated that in the opinion of the British this question might be discussed.

"On the other hand, he again expressed the well-known British view that all these questions were interdependent, and that a solution could only be reached within the framework of a general settlement. In this connection he particularly stressed the British desire for Germany's return to the League of Nations. The Western Pact and the Mediterranean problem were not mentioned.

"From his statements in these conversations it became unmistakably evident that the British Government regarded the Berlin-Rome Axis as an established fact; nor did he leave any doubt that his Government was cooperating closely with the French Government on all these questions.

"On the basis of these views, the British Government is obviously thinking of quadripartite discussions as the final goal, and in order to reach the desired general settlement during those conversations.

<sup>51</sup> Not printed.

"No agreement was reached on the manner in which an exchange of views is to be continued. For the time being we relegated them to the usual diplomatic channel. Lord Halifax's renewed suggestion that I pay a visit to London was merely noted by us.

"I considered it well to describe to Your Excellency the course of the conversations in detail, partly in order to remove certain apprehensions which were to be noticed in the Italian press.

"Accept, [etc.]"

BISMARCK

### No. 39

375/208727

*The German Ambassador in Italy (Hassell) to the German Foreign Ministry*

Telegram

VERY SECRET

ROME, November 24, 1937—8:10 p.m.

No. 327 of November 24 Received November 24, 1937—11:15 p.m.

With reference to telegram No. 368 of November 22.

For the Foreign Minister personally.

My attempt today to carry out your telegraphic instructions proved to be completely superfluous, as Ciano had already received the Foreign Minister's letter regarding the Halifax visit (your telegram 369 of November 23<sup>52</sup>) and declared at every question I brought up that he was already informed. Verification of how far this was actually the case was impossible as I was unfamiliar with the contents of the letter. Ciano had already transmitted the letter to Mussolini.

Specifically Ciano thought that all in all the visit must be described as not very successful, even though the willingness to discuss the colonial problem, within the framework of the general settlement, and the admission that the *status quo* in the Near East is not unalterable, do represent a certain amount of progress. Negotiations had not yet been resumed between England and Italy. If Italy withdrew from the League of Nations within the next few days, as he had notified Berlin through Attolico, that would for the time being presumably not strengthen British inclination to negotiate with Italy. It was necessary, however, to make things quite clear at the outset, in order to leave no basis for illusions or maneuvers. For that reason he believed that the Führer would approve of Italy's withdrawal. How necessary it was to make things perfectly clear everywhere was shown by the attitude of

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<sup>52</sup> Not printed.

the French press toward the foolish article of the Italian correspondent of the *Tribuna* in Paris, who had not only been recalled but would presumably be further disciplined.

HASSELL

No. 40

905/293812-13

*Memorandum*

SECRET

The Reich Press Chief, Dr. Dietrich, yesterday held a conference with several editors in chief of the Berlin press at which, in view of the misleading reports in the foreign press, he was at pains to clarify the fundamentals of the German position. The starting point of German policy was her withdrawal from the League of Nations. Germany had freed herself from collectivism and had no idea whatever of becoming part of such a mechanism again. Perhaps the time would even come when she could announce this decision publicly. On the other hand, it was the intention of the others to lead Germany back into this system. This was in the final analysis the purpose of all visits made by statesmen to Germany, and presumably the aim of the Halifax visit. On that basis, therefore, no progress could be made if the other powers made this intention of theirs the prerequisite for launching discussions; for Germany was getting further and further away from Geneva and its theories.

As regards the conjectures appearing in the foreign press regarding the content of the conversations with Halifax, it could be stated, first of all, that, contrary to the substance of those press reports, no demands had been made by Germany. If these surmises continued, the moment might very well come when Germany would publish the protocol of the discussions of the Führer and Chancellor with Lord Halifax. Then these surmises would, of course, very quickly collapse. All this raises the question today whether it would not perhaps have been better if Lord Halifax had not come at all.

In regard to the subject of Danzig, the viewpoint taken was that these questions were being currently discussed between Germany and Poland or between Danzig and Poland and afforded no occasion for international discussion.

Regarding Czechoslovakia: the Sudeten-German problem, too, was not an international one, but was to be settled in a manner suited to that question. For Austria, the Treaty of St. Germain

was decisive, and for German-Austrian relations, the Agreement of July 11. None of these problems was a proper subject for international negotiations; consequently, an inquiry by Halifax had been answered with a definite "No."

We had only one desire and that was to be left alone; we wanted to arrange our affairs and to devote ourselves to the development of our strength.

To be submitted to the Foreign Minister together with an additional enclosure (from the Reich Propaganda Ministry).<sup>54</sup>

ASCHMANN

BERLIN, November 25, 1937.

### No. 41

375/208728

#### *The German Minister in Czechoslovakia (Eisenlohr) to the German Foreign Ministry*

Telegram

No. 187 of November 25

PRAGUE, November 25, 1937—2:45 p.m.

Received November 25, 1937—4 p.m.

The report on Chamberlain's statement in the House of Commons regarding Halifax's visit to Berlin and the invitation extended to the French,<sup>55</sup> as well as the detailed reporting of the statements and counterstatements by the *Manchester Guardian*, the National Socialist Correspondence, Reuter, and Havas, completely dominate the press here and enable the public to form a complete picture. A deep unrest is discernible from many symptoms, but the outward tone, even in the commentaries, is moderate and cautious. The *Prager Presse* prints very precisely the London Havas report containing the alleged viewpoint of Germany in five points; these are considered here to be the most nearly correct. According to a London despatch in the same newspaper, the British Government communicated to the central European governments through diplomatic channels the reassuring statement that British policy would not be altered.

EISENLOHR

<sup>54</sup> Not printed.

<sup>55</sup> The invitation for the French Prime Minister and Foreign Minister to come to London. The visit took place November 28-30, 1937.

## No. 42

1558/377927

*The German Embassy in Great Britain to the German Foreign Ministry*

A 5080

LONDON, November 25, 1937.

Received November 26, 1937.

(Pol. II 3094)

Subject: Alleged French wishes in connection with the visit of Lord Halifax to Germany.

An informant of the Embassy claims to have learned from a reliable source that the French Government had expressed the following wishes to the British Government before Halifax embarked on his visit:

1. The French colonial empire should not be included in the discussions.
2. No change in the present status of the Danube basin should enter into discussion.
3. The idea of collective security should not be sacrificed.

The above information is transmitted with reservations.

By direction:

VON SELZAM

## No. 43

1558/377929-30

*The German Embassy in Great Britain to the German Foreign Ministry*

Telegram

No. 719 of November 26

LONDON, November 26, 1937—3:17 p.m.

Received November 26, 1937—5:35 p.m.

With reference to report A 5066 of November 24.<sup>56</sup>

I. The diplomatic correspondent of the *Manchester Guardian* declares in his despatch today that his statements of the day before yesterday regarding the German demands made during the Halifax discussions are to be understood to mean that these German demands had formed the background for the Führer's arguments. He intimates that before the beginning of the Halifax visit cer-

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<sup>56</sup> Not printed.

tain persons in England had received information regarding German claims from persons close to the Führer.

A well-known group in England, whose influence was not to be underestimated, had been working, in close cooperation with leading National Socialists, toward an Anglo-German "understanding" on conditions which were incompatible with the avowed aims of British foreign policy.

I refer in this connection to my report of November 24, P.R. 1297 to the Propaganda Ministry.<sup>57</sup>

Another article took up in detail the alleged German demands regarding the League of Nations, Czechoslovakia, and Austria, reported the day before yesterday by the diplomatic correspondent.

It is to be expected that the statements in the *Manchester Guardian* will be widely circulated.

II. Particular reference is also made to the Berlin correspondent's report in today's *Times*, which was reported by D.N.B. in detail.

BIELFELD

#### No. 44

1558/377937

#### *Minute*

BERLIN, November 27, 1937.

(Pol. II 3149)

The Italian Ambassador, whose attention I had recently called to a foolish Italian news agency report by an Italian correspondent in Berlin regarding the Halifax visit, told me today, without any direct reference to the incident, that it had been rather unpleasantly noticeable during the Halifax visit that there was a dualism in our press. The official treatment and the Party treatment of the Halifax visit had shown quite perceptible differences.

WEIZSÄCKER

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<sup>57</sup> Not printed.

## No. 45

1558/377931

*The German Chargé d'Affaires in the Soviet Union (Tippelskirch)  
to the German Foreign Ministry*

Telegram

No. 261 of November 27      Moscow, November 27, 1937—8:30 p.m.  
Received November 27, 1937—11:15 p.m.  
(Pol. II 3116)

*Izvestia* and *Pravda* are only now beginning to comment on the Halifax visit. Referring to the publication in the *Manchester Guardian* of the probable results of the discussions, the commentaries point out that, on the one hand, the secrecy was suspicious and that, on the other hand, the information available confirms that the trend of the discussions was hostile to peace. *Izvestia* considers the most important fact to be that England is inclined to appease the demands of aggressors.<sup>58</sup> Insinuations such as the following are made: The withdrawal of England from the League of Nations and from collective security and the consequent sacrifice of the smaller nations; Germany was intentionally treating England badly, because she hoped for success by this method. Discussions of this kind were serving to release aggression<sup>58</sup> and lead to German hegemony on the European continent.

The comments reflect the alarm over the ignoring of the Soviet Union and are obviously made for the purpose of influencing France before Chautemps and Delbos leave for London.

TIPPELSKIRCH

## No. 46

625/251441-45

*The German Ambassador in France (Welczeck) to the German  
Foreign Minister*

Telegram

SECRET

A 4354

No. 656

By courier

PARIS, November 27, 1937.  
(Pol. II 3174)

I. Although there was no doubt in France that Halifax, in the conference with the Führer and Chancellor, would treat the Paris-London Axis as a reality and would say nothing directly aimed against French interests, nevertheless the Berlin visit from the very

<sup>58</sup> This word is in English in the original.

beginning was viewed by the public here with a certain uneasiness, even mistrust. Largely responsible for this was the general attitude of the French toward the British, whose "realistic" methods, always inclining toward negotiation, and instinctively shrinking alike from a decided stand on one side of a question and from definite and clear-cut decisions, have left some uncertainty here even after the intimate collaboration during the past year. The uneasiness was intensified by the pro-German utterances in the House of Lords and in the British press before the visit, which were not well received here. The subject of principal concern was whether in the expected discussion of Austria and Czechoslovakia Halifax would take French views sufficiently into account. Frequently the apprehension was expressed that on this subject the Führer and Chancellor might succeed in "taking in" his British interlocutor by clever declarations of peaceful intention.

During the visit, it is true, the French press was restrained, but it tried diligently to disturb the conversations by what it considered appropriate quotations from the British and German press.

After the visit there began a rather helpless guessing as to the results; this, supported by false information emanating particularly from the British press, soon gave way to stressing more and more emphatically that the discussions had shown little or no possibility of a *rapprochement*. The treatment in the press gives the impression that the liaison between the British and French Governments did not function so quickly and reliably this time as usual. Corbin's<sup>59</sup> report, I hear, was short and sketchy, although this is attributed here, not to any bad will on the part of the British Government, but to reasons necessarily inherent in the situation itself.

The news of the invitation to Chautemps and Delbos to London was heartily welcomed generally, except by the Communists, as a sign of British loyalty and as a continuation of intimate Anglo-French cooperation. But the satisfaction appears to be not entirely unalloyed. The desire of the British Government to discuss at once the results of the Berlin visit with leading French statesmen creates the impression here that from the standpoint of the British these results are not, at least initially, regarded as unsatisfactory, whereas special difficulties are expected to result from the visit for France. One can read between the lines the fear that Chautemps and Delbos face a contest with the British Government, particularly as far as Central Europe is concerned, for which the press is seeking to prepare the French case by more and more

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<sup>59</sup> André Charles Corbin, French Ambassador in Great Britain.

vigorous rejection of the demands allegedly made by the Führer and Chancellor.

II. Whether and to what extent Chautemps and Delbos share this anxiety is questionable. Delbos and Léger,<sup>60</sup> who, I state in strict confidence, yesterday had a detailed conversation with Sieburg,<sup>61</sup> were very sure of the close Franco-British accord. Delbos declared the willingness of the French to give favorable consideration, jointly with the British, to any possibilities of an understanding arising out of the Berlin visit. Naturally France would not renounce collective security and the League of Nations, which constituted the basis of French foreign policy. But perhaps it would be possible to find some assembly satisfactory to us which would be suitable for negotiations with Germany. Such a forum had, indeed, already been sought in conversations regarding the new Western Pact. The French Government was also prepared to seek a way by which discrimination against Germany in the colonial domain could be eliminated in principle; in this connection he alluded to the Congo Acts, which had envisaged equal international rights in the matter of colonies. In connection with the discussions concerning possibilities of *rapprochement*, Delbos pointed to the great significance of the French-British-American currency agreement, accession to which, as was known, was open to other states. Settlement of the questions of raw materials and of colonies was not possible without American cooperation. As far as Central Europe was concerned, France could naturally not declare her disinterestedness in territorial changes. On the other hand, she had no essential objection to a further assimilation of certain of Austria's domestic institutions with Germany's. The Czech question was more difficult and complicated, but discussion of minority protection for Sudeten Germans within the framework of the Czech State was quite feasible. From another unimpeachable source, I have learned that, in the opinion of the Quai d'Orsay, the treatment of the Czech question will play a large part in London and will determine the character and significance of Delbos' forthcoming central European trip. According to this source, the Quai d'Orsay and the Foreign Minister personally advocated fulfillment of treaty obligations, while the Premier was more undecided. Outside and even inside the Cabinet, objections had arisen to Chautemps' trip to London, because it was feared that precisely on the Czechoslovak question he was too soft. I refer in this connection to Chautemps' statement, made during the Chamber

<sup>60</sup> Alexis Léger, Secretary General of the French Ministry for Foreign Affairs.

<sup>61</sup> Friedrich Sieburg, Paris correspondent of the *Frankfurter Zeitung*.

debate on raising civil service pay, against "certain maneuvers," the actual purpose of which was to prevent the trip to London of the French Ministers; according to the foregoing information this statement therefore was not directed solely against Communists.

In concluding the conversation with Sieburg, Delbos stressed the fact that the present moment was a serious and important one for the international situation. If an understanding was not reached with Germany, France would have no alternative but to secure her strength further by maintaining her armaments and by a suitable foreign policy. Léger emphasized the latter idea particularly. France was strong. There was nothing farther from the truth than the view, widespread and publicly expressed in Germany, that France was facing internal disintegration. Léger, too, expressed the good will of the French Government to pave the way for an understanding, but complained bitterly of the fact that French suggestions to this effect in December and January as well as in the spring, on the occasion of Schacht's visit, were met by Germany with complete silence and in part even treated with public irony.

WELCZECK

### No. 47

740/267766-68

#### *The German Ambassador in Great Britain (Ribbentrop) to the German Foreign Ministry*

A 5125

LONDON, November 30, 1937.

Received December 1, 1937.

(zu Pol. II 3159)

Subject: The visit of the French Ministers to London.

For the Führer and the Foreign Minister.

I enclose two memoranda of conversations with informants of the Embassy, which are in essential agreement and in my opinion present a fairly accurate picture of the Anglo-French ministerial discussions.<sup>82</sup>

The total impression thus far is as follows:

Chamberlain apparently has an earnest desire to explore all possibilities of solution and to bring about a general European settlement. According to reliable reports, Chautemps is also supposed to have come to London with positive intentions. In con-

<sup>82</sup> The enclosures are omitted, since their content is sufficiently indicated in the report.

trast to this, certain circles at the Quai d'Orsay and in the Foreign Office have unquestionably been trying, during the last few days, to impede a positive development; for example, French circles here have attempted, through British politicians of the Left, etc., to get Chautemps to believe that England does not desire a real agreement with Germany. It cannot be clearly determined yet to what extent these attempts at disturbance have succeeded. It must be stated, however, that the Anglo-French communiqué regarding the discussions was very carefully drafted. Only the improved atmosphere brought about by the Halifax visit and the intention to examine the German colonial problem further may be mentioned as positive gains. These positive points are limited, however, by the fact that the colonial question will not be taken up by itself but can probably be solved only within the framework of a general settlement, and by the fact that other countries also are to be brought into this question. Viewed from England, where the Conservative Party quite recently was still taking a comparatively strong stand on the colonial question, today's announcement is nevertheless a step forward.

It is obvious, particularly with respect to the question of colonial compensation, that there are enormous possibilities for intrigue in the international press. It would therefore be advisable to counteract this in an appropriate manner, if the occasion should arise, in order that Germany's attitude during the Halifax visit should not be distorted and her position during subsequent negotiations prejudiced in advance.

A report emanating from Foreign Office circles should be mentioned, according to which in the future it is intended to carry on further discussions through diplomatic channels and to inform the public as little as possible.

Tomorrow afternoon I shall call on Eden to get the official version of the discussions, and I shall then report again.

One thing may already be said today: the ministerial discussions here have indicated that serious difficulties stand in the way of a solution of the problems. We shall probably have to expect a period of protracted diplomatic discussions.

RIBBENTROP

## No. 48

905/293792-94

*The German Ambassador in Great Britain (Ribbentrop) to the  
German Foreign Ministry*

Telegram

VERY URGENT

LONDON, December 1, 1937—12:25 a.m.

VERY SECRET

Received December 1, 1937—3:55 a.m.

No. 736 of November 30

For the Führer and the Foreign Minister.

This evening Eden made the following confidential statements to the British press, which are to serve as background for tomorrow's press comments:

1. The visit and the communiqué put an end to rumors that there was any difference of opinion between England and France. The harmony of views between the two countries, however, did not mean the formation of a common front directed against a third power.

2. It was the common viewpoint of the two Governments that the Halifax visit had contributed to a clarification of the political atmosphere and that it justified the hope that at the proper time a *rapprochement* with Germany would be facilitated. In this manner a *détente* had been brought about, presenting new possibilities.

3. The ultimate goal was a general settlement. Consequently, no question had been specifically excluded from Chautemps' discussions.

4. The remarks on the colonial question in the communiqué were to be interpreted as meaning that this question could be discussed neither separately from other questions nor without including other countries interested in it. The Dominions had already been informed of the outcome of the discussions, and Belgium would be informed. Any colonial settlement had to be part of a much more comprehensive general solution; if Germany desired colonies, then Great Britain and France wanted an agreement on armaments.

5. The Anglo-French conversations were only a first step. Further discussions would follow through diplomatic channels. But Germany would not be approached again until further progress had been made.

6. In the Far Eastern conflict Britain and France would cooperate with other powers with similar interests in the Far East. This was not exclusively a Franco-British question.

7. In addition, relations with Italy, the Balkan countries, North Africa, and Soviet Russia had been taken up. There had been agreement in regard to all these points.

8. On the occasion of his tour Delbos would inform the Governments to be visited regarding the general character of the London discussions and the Anglo-French hopes based on them. This would offer an opportunity to dispel misunderstandings which had arisen in these countries. Delbos would naturally also discuss all problems that France was particularly interested in.

9. The possibility of Germany's return to the League of Nations had been taken up.

10. The question of the recognition and the sovereignty of Abyssinia had not been a subject of discussion, although Eden's statements permit the assumption that there had been an opportunity to touch upon it.

11. The feeling that there was no immediate danger of war had been strengthened by the discussions. England and France had demonstrated that they desired peace and that they were prepared to make their contribution to that end. Their common policy was at the same time conciliatory and firm.

I request strictly confidential treatment of the above information.

RIBBENTROP

### No. 49

905/293786-87

#### *The German Ambassador in France (Welczeck) to the German Foreign Ministry*

Telegram

No. 665 of December 1

PARIS, December 2, 1937.

Received December 2, 1937—10:30 a.m.

Almost the entire press today seems satisfied with the results of the London conferences,<sup>63</sup> because:

1) Thorough discussion of all international problems reaffirmed Franco-British collaboration;

2) The frequently expected British pressure upon France did not materialize;

3) Agreement was reached to the effect that an understanding could be reached with Germany only through a general settlement and that no individual points could be settled in advance;

4) The participation of all countries concerned (thus including Austria, Czechoslovakia, Soviet Russia) and consideration for their interests were decided upon;

5) Continued adherence to the guiding principles previously followed was expressly announced in the communiqué;

6) The door to negotiations with Germany had not been closed, either.

On the other hand it is stated, and commented on in various ways according to the point of view, that:

1) The demands of the Führer and Chancellor upon Halifax were not rejected in principle;

<sup>63</sup> The text of the communiqué issued on November 30, 1937, following the visit of MM. Chautemps and Delbos in London may be found in *Documents on International Affairs, 1937*, pp. 142-143.

2) The German demands for colonies were now confirmed as officially made;

3) A German demand for definite concessions was not mentioned in the communiqué;

4) The expression "*tranquillité*" employed in the communiqué with respect to Central Europe was inadequate. The press finds consolation in the fact that more extensive commitments on the part of England could hardly be expected and stresses with especial satisfaction the fact that Delbos was now authorized on all trips through Central Europe to speak for England also.

In this connection I hear in confidence from persons connected with the Foreign Ministry that they are satisfied both with the result of the London conference as a whole, and, in particular, with that part of it relating to Central Europe. Léger had given an effective historical account of France's relations with the Little Entente and the British attitude toward it hitherto. The French delegation had thereupon said that it was the purpose of Delbos' trip again to win over the countries of the Little Entente to a general mutual assistance pact with France, and also to interest Poland in it. Because of the suggestion that this would further the cause of peace, the British had been induced to authorize Delbos to tell those countries that England approved the French idea.

WELCZECK

### No. 50

375/208774-76

#### *The German Ambassador in Great Britain (Ribbentrop) to the German Foreign Ministry*

Telegram

URGENT

No. 740 of December 2

LONDON, December 2, 1937—2:10 p.m.

Received December 2, 1937—5:30 p.m.

For the Führer and Chancellor and the Foreign Minister.

In continuation of my telegraphic report No. 736 of November 30.

Eden, on whom I called today, said he had intended to ask me to come to see him in order to inform me regarding the visit of the French Ministers. He made the following statements on individual points:

#### 1. *The colonial question.*

England as well as France had an earnest desire to make concessions to Germany in regard to colonies. He hoped that Germany would recognize the progress that had been made in the colonial question; while up to recently a negative attitude had still (group

garbled) in England and France, it was now being treated as a problem that was acute and that had to be solved, as had been explained in the communiqué concerning the Ministers' visit. It was now the task of England and France to approach Germany with proposals. For this purpose they and the French had agreed to study the problems separately at first. In England, for example, as he could inform me with the request that it be treated confidentially, they were thinking of establishing a Cabinet committee to study the colonial question. He had no desire to conceal from me the fact that it was an exceedingly difficult problem and that probably a month or more would pass before a certain clarification of the problem had been reached. It was the intention then to approach Germany again, and the British were thinking that it would be best if England could also speak for France. Regarding the method of negotiation, they were not thinking of conferences or any more ministerial visits, but of diplomatic channels. When I called his attention to the false report in the press, that Germany had requested part of the Belgian Congo and Portuguese Angola as compensation for the renunciation of Southwest Africa and Tanganyika, Eden assured me that he did not know where this report came from.

### 2. *German quid pro quo.*

Eden emphasized that the colonial problem could not be taken up in isolation, but that England and France wanted at the same time to obtain as a *quid pro quo* an agreement which would give both countries a greater feeling of security. In reply to this, I stressed the fact that for Germany the colonial question was a matter of justice, and that we must deplore linking it up with other problems which might be difficult to solve. Eden replied that England, as a nation of "shopkeepers,"<sup>64</sup> could not be blamed if she wished to obtain compensation in return for giving up colonies.

### 3. *Armament questions.*

As compensation Eden mentioned particularly an agreement regarding the limitation of armaments. To my objection that it would be very difficult to bring all the countries together on such an agreement, Eden said it must also be possible to obtain a qualitative limitation for the air forces such as had been achieved in the matter of the navies. The Führer had mentioned to Halifax the prohibition of aerial bombing. He did not know whether results could be obtained in this way, or in the field of qualitative limita-

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<sup>64</sup> The quoted word is in English in the original.

tion of the air forces. But Chamberlain attached great importance to this question, and at his request the technical aspects of the question, too, would be investigated in England and France. Eden did not mention any limitation of land armaments.

4. *The guarantee of peace [Friedenssicherung] in the West.*

Eden asserted that England and France were still seeking a guarantee of peace in the West. He did not enter into details.

5. *Austria.*

He had told the French that the question of Austria was of much greater interest to Italy than to England. Furthermore, people in England recognized that a closer connection between Germany and Austria would have to come about sometime. They wished, however, that a solution by force be avoided.

6. *Czechoslovakia.*

The British had argued for an improvement in the condition of the Sudeten Germans and found complete understanding among the French. Delbos had promised to work on Prague toward better treatment of the Sudeten Germans and toward direct understanding between Prague and Berlin.

7. *Italy.*

England and France were endeavoring to initiate early negotiations with Italy regarding Mediterranean questions. The French had at first expressed doubts about entering into early conversations, because of Italian polemics against France. They had, however, finally allowed themselves to be convinced by the British that it would be advantageous to get in touch with Italy as soon as possible.

8. Finally Eden requested me at Chamberlain's behest to urge restraint in the colonial campaign in Berlin during the time required for examination of the colonial question in England and France. The colonial question had now been taken up and press polemics would make the task of the British and French Governments more difficult. I promised to submit this request to my Government.

RIBBENTROP

## No. 51

905/293782

*The German Ambassador in Great Britain (Ribbentrop) to the  
German Foreign Ministry*

Telegram

URGENT

LONDON, December 2, 1937—3:20 p.m.

VERY SECRET

Received December 2, 1937—6:40 p.m.

No. 741 of December 2

For the Führer and Chancellor and the Foreign Minister.

References to two points:

1. The tendentious reports in the international press that Germany was prepared to renounce her claim to East Africa, Southwest Africa, and also other colonies in exchange for the acquisition of the Belgian Congo and Portuguese Angola, are calculated in their propagandistic effect to give public opinion a distorted impression of German colonial claims. Belgium has already refused to consider the Belgian Congo as compensation. This development might cause public opinion to take German renunciation of East Africa and Southwest Africa for granted, while the possibilities for compensation elsewhere gradually disappear and perhaps only Togo and the Cameroons are left. To counteract this I consider it well constantly to refer in the German press in a calm but clear manner to the German legal standpoint of the return of *all* the German colonies.

2. In reply to the demands of the British and French Governments that the colonial question be linked up with political questions, and in view of the propaganda in the world press to that effect, I should like to suggest that the German press be instructed that the German colonial claim is not a bargaining point, and that to burden the colonial question with other problems, which might be difficult to solve, would be very injurious to the favorable progress in the increasing pacification of Europe.

The denial by Reuter of the Führer's alleged demand on Halifax regarding the Belgian Congo and Angola is not being printed by the British press. If this tendency continues, official denial or an official statement would perhaps be advisable.<sup>65</sup>

RIBBENTROP

<sup>65</sup> A marginal notation reads as follows: "Can probably be delayed another couple of days."

## No. 52

375/208769

*The German Foreign Ministry to the German Legation in Portugal*

Cipher Telegram

URGENT

BERLIN, December 2, 1937.

No. 176

(zu Pol. X 4841/37 Ang II)

The reports in certain British and Belgian papers, that a proposal had been made to Lord Halifax here for the unification of the Belgian Congo and Angola and the administration of the territory by an international society having a German majority, represent a deliberate attempt to make trouble. In case you are questioned with regard to this, please deny these rumors and refer to the Führer's statement of January 30 that Germany was making no colonial demands on countries that have taken no colonies from her. I refer you to last night's edition of the *Berliner Börsenzeitung*, which sharply attacked the above-mentioned assertions in an inspired article.

WEIZSÄCKER

## No. 53

147/78523-24

*Minute*

BERLIN, December 2, 1937.

The Polish Chargé d'Affaires, in accordance with the instructions of his Minister, today communicated to me the following:

M. Beck, as was known, would receive the French Foreign Minister tomorrow. Minister Beck considered it very important not to be entirely dependent upon the communications of M. Delbos in regard to the main purport of the Halifax visit to Berlin, but, on the basis of his own knowledge, to face the French Foreign Minister with firmly established views. For this reason M. Beck had instructed Prince Lubomirski to call on the Reich Foreign Minister to learn from him the main subjects and viewpoints treated in the Halifax visit.

I gave the Polish Chargé no material information regarding the subjects discussed during the Halifax visit. I explained to him that I understood the wish of his Minister, but that I was bound by the fact that it had been agreed upon between the British and ourselves to treat the conversations during the purely private Halifax visit as confidential. Only Rome and Paris were to be informed for the time being by Berlin and London respectively. It would

therefore go beyond the agreement if M. Delbos gave out in Warsaw the information imparted to him. On the other hand, the Halifax conversations had been so very general and so unsensational that anyone who followed the policies of the countries could form a quite accurate picture of the proceedings, even without having been a participant.

As Prince Lubomirski insisted and brought into the argument the personal sensitiveness of the Minister if he were told nothing, I said that I was willing to inform the Chargé by 5 o'clock this afternoon whether he might obtain further information from the Foreign Minister, the State Secretary, or myself.

I believe that it would be expedient to communicate to the Polish Chargé at this time an approved version of certain questions treated in the Halifax conversations, namely, the colonial question, Eastern questions, and the League of Nations, if only to deprive the Polish Government of the alibi which it might otherwise use as a cover if it becomes too friendly with Delbos.

I request instructions as to what reply should be made to the Polish Chargé.

WEIZSÄCKER

## No. 54

147/78525

### *Memorandum*

BERLIN, December 2, 1937.

Pursuant to the instructions of the Foreign Minister, I today communicated to the Polish Chargé d'Affaires the main substance of telegraphic instruction No. 502 of November 22 to London.<sup>68</sup> In regard to the Eastern question I characterized the mention of Danzig by Lord Halifax as cursory and remarked that the Führer had not gone into it. With reference to German relations with the League of Nations I expressed myself rather more skeptically even than indicated by the telegraphic instructions. I did not mention as such the possible conversations of the four great Western European Powers but only suggested the idea that the two Axes, Rome-Berlin and London-Paris, had been discussed as constant factors, and their parallel *rapprochement* mentioned as something to be desired. I omitted Lord Halifax's reference to the church question. I impressed on Prince Lubomirski the importance of treating my communication as confidential.

WEIZSÄCKER

<sup>68</sup> Thus in the original. Reference may be intended to telegraphic instructions No. 455 to London and No. 502 to Paris of November 22, 1937, document No. 33, p. 68.

## No. 55

740/267792-93

*Memorandum by the Foreign Minister*

RM 935

(Pol. II 3213)

After the French Ambassador had told me officially a few days ago that the French Foreign Minister, M. Delbos, would pass through Berlin on his trip to Warsaw, I went to the Schlesischer Bahnhof this morning and greeted M. Delbos. During the short conversation of about 10 minutes which we held in his parlor car in the presence of the French Ambassador, M. Delbos came at once to the subject of the London meeting. He tried to explain to me that decided progress had been made in London toward normalizing relations between England, France, and Germany. There had, in particular, been no talk of any intention to block Germany's development again. His trip to Warsaw and to the capital cities of the Little Entente was not aimed at this in any way, either. [Recognition of] the necessity of reaching an understanding with Germany had in the past year made great progress in France and the entire nation was conscious of it. Nor was there any intention, as I seemed to assume, of attempting to settle all pending questions at once. Naturally they were striving for a general peace settlement at Paris, but they were convinced that this goal could only be attained if the pending questions were taken up one by one, and it would always be a great step forward if but one question was solved satisfactorily.

I told M. Delbos that the text of the London communiqué regarding the London discussions must create the impression that the old viewpoint was still being taken there, namely, of wanting to dictate to Germany how she might pursue her own interests. We rejected this tutelage once and for all. During the past years we had so often given proof of our good will and our readiness for peace, without evoking any response from the French or the British. To the suggestion of the Führer, for example, that a beginning be made with the question of armaments by the regulation of bombing and of the use of airplanes behind the front, there had been no reaction at all. At this point M. Delbos interrupted, saying he regretted this deeply and believed he could say that in France, too, they had come to believe that the armaments question could only be approached from this angle.

M. Delbos then began to speak of the press. I told him that all negotiations between states are made impossible by the lack of discipline prevailing in the press in the democratic countries.

That was again evident now, after the London discussions. All the conjectures and malicious lies that had been circulated in the French and the British press in the last few days regarding the discussions in London and the alleged German demands defied all description. The aim of these journalists is quite obviously to sow mistrust everywhere and thus prevent calm discussion of pending questions. M. Delbos admitted this and said that a law to check these abuses was now being drafted in France also.

Finally M. Delbos said he believed he could nevertheless state that, despite the sniping of the press, things had in general quieted down and nervousness had decreased. I replied that I had to assure him that there had never been any nervousness on our part, but that we shall energetically defend ourselves against any attempts to falsify our intentions.

BARON VON NEURATH

BERLIN, December 3, 1937.

### No. 56

1687/396425-26

*The German Foreign Ministry to the German Embassy in Poland and the German Legations in Czechoslovakia, Rumania, and Yugoslavia*

Telegram

BERLIN, December 4, 1937.

(Pol. II 3174)

As the Paris Embassy reports in strict confidence, the Secretary General of the French Foreign Ministry, Léger, recently complained bitterly to a German personage that the French suggestion for initiating a German-French understanding last December and January as well as in the spring, on the occasion of Schacht's visit, was received with complete silence by Germany and, in part, even publicly ridiculed. Since it is to be assumed that these assertions will also play a part in the present tour of the French Foreign Minister, the following comments are made for your information and for use when the occasion offers:

When the President of the Reichsbank, Schacht, visited Paris in the summer of 1936, a serious start was indeed made toward German-French conversations, primarily on the recovery of colonial raw materials areas for Germany. This start proved to be completely disappointing, however, when, in the middle of December, Premier Blum admitted rather diffidently to our Ambassador that Mr. Eden had dissuaded him from continuing the

course taken with Herr Schacht. Probably in order to weaken the effect of this failure, Delbos then, in the second half of December, again suggested to our Ambassador German-French conversations, the goal of which he said should be to obtain raw materials, colonies, and loans for Germany, in return for which he demanded peace. This suggestion, astonishing after Blum's earlier statement, was nevertheless answered by us positively to the effect that we were in principle prepared for a conversation, but considered it desirable to proceed in stages, as Delbos, for that matter, had himself proposed. This positive attitude was expressed both by the Foreign Minister at the end of December to the French Ambassador here, and again by our Ambassador at Paris to M. Delbos at the beginning of March, but without anything more concrete resulting from the French idea. In March Delbos spoke of possible financial help from the United States if Europe concluded an armaments truce and of the necessity of considering for this purpose discussions between the five Great Powers of Europe, including Russia; such conversations did not necessarily have to take place at Geneva. Another visit to Paris by Schacht this spring brought no new developments beyond this. The impression therefore existed here, as early as the beginning of the year, that the French were simply pursuing the intention of later being able to claim their allegedly unreciprocated readiness to enter into conversations.

You are therefore to maintain that the claim that Germany had evaded a discussion is completely misleading. Contacts with the French Government have, on the contrary, so far resulted in no suitable basis for German-French discussions.

MACKENSEN

## No. 57

740/267778-81

*The German Foreign Ministry to Various German Diplomatic Missions*

Cipher Telegram

BERLIN, December 4, 1937.  
(zu Pol. II 3179 Ang. II)

## Diplogerma:

1. Warsaw No. 130
2. Prague No. 123
3. Bucharest No. 164
4. Belgrade No. 105<sup>67</sup>
5. Budapest No. 107
6. Vienna No. 149

Drafting Officer: Counselor of Legation von Rintelen.

For strictly confidential information.

According to reports received here, questions concerning Central Europe played a considerable role in the London conferences between the British and French Governments. As our Ambassador at Paris learned confidentially, Léger first gave an effective historical account of France's relations with the Little Entente and the British attitude toward it. The French delegation thereupon said that it was the purpose of Delbos' trip again to win over the countries of the Little Entente to a general mutual-assistance pact with France. Because of the suggestion that this would further the cause of general peace, the British had been induced to authorize Delbos to tell those countries in question that England approved the French idea. In addition, the Ambassador at Paris reported the following statements of the French Foreign Minister, which he made to a German informant before starting his trip to London: As far as Central Europe was concerned, France could naturally not declare her disinterestedness in territorial changes. On the other hand, she had no essential objection to a further assimilation of certain of Austria's institutions with Germany's. The Czech question was more difficult and complicated, but discussion of minority protection for Sudeten Germans within the framework of the Czech State was quite feasible.

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"A marginal addition reads as follows: "For Belgrade. In connection with telegraphic report No. 101." The telegram referred to is not printed.

*Only to 2-6:*<sup>68</sup>

With regard to the British attitude, Eden told Ambassador von Ribbentrop that he had stated to the French that the question of Austria was of much greater interest to Italy than to England. Furthermore, people in England recognized that a closer connection between Germany and Austria would have to come about sometime. They wished, however, that a solution by force be avoided. The British, moreover, had argued for an improvement in the condition of the Sudeten Germans and found complete understanding among the French. Delbos had promised to work on Prague toward better treatment of the Sudeten Germans and a direct understanding between Prague and Berlin.

*To 1-6:*

As may be seen from this and other information available here, the French Foreign Minister on his present tour will above all seek safeguards against a deterioration of German-Czech relations: on the one hand, by urging in Prague direct settlement with Germany of the causes of friction, which the British Government has evidently already done; on the other hand, however, by seeking to form more treaty ties than exist today, in case of a conflict.

In the short conversation that I had with Delbos yesterday when he passed through, the French Foreign Minister, to be sure, stressed that there had been no talk in London of any intention to block Germany's development again; his trip to Warsaw and to the capital cities of the Little Entente was not aimed at this in any way either.

*Only to 1-4:*

Please send me a telegraphic report if anything further can be learned there about the efforts of Delbos in the direction indicated.

NEURATH

## No. 58

375/208790

### *Memorandum*

BERLIN, December 4, 1937.

The Italian Ambassador asked me today what information we had regarding the London conversations between the British and French Governments.

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\* A marginal note reads as follows: "Warsaw has already received this in another telegram."

I repeated to Attolico the substance of telegram No. 740 of December 2 from London. I expressly omitted the passage according to which Eden told the French and Ribbentrop that the Austrian question was of greater interest to Italy than to England.

Since Herr von Hassell received instructions yesterday to inform the Italian Government to the same effect, the information I gave Attolico this evening did not anticipate the action of our Embassy in Rome.

WEIZSÄCKER

No. 59

375/208787

*The German Ambassador in Great Britain (Ribbentrop) to the  
German Foreign Ministry*

Telegram

No. 747 of December 4

LONDON, December 4, 1937—4:21 p.m.

Received December 4, 1937—6:30 p.m.

According to a communication from the Italian Counselor of Embassy, Eden made statements to Grandi on December 1 which are in large part verbally identical with those he made to me. The following complementary information regarding Grandi's conversation should be reported:

Eden expressly recognized the Berlin-Rome Axis as an established fact.

2. He (one word missing) that a general settlement in Europe would have to be reached. Great Britain would prefer to make this general settlement through the League of Nations, but would also be prepared to follow a different procedure if Italy and Germany wished this.

3. England and France agreed that in Central Europe (Austria and Czechoslovakia) certain changes could be made, provided, however, that the *status quo* was not changed by force. The point of departure remained that England and France were interested in these questions and had a voice in them: On this condition, they had no objection if bilateral negotiations, too, were to be conducted on certain questions between Germany and the countries concerned.

4. Regarding the colonial question, Eden also spoke to Grandi of a time limit of one month, during which the Dominions were also to be consulted. After the conclusion of the conversations, England would approach Germany. Eden did not believe that proposals which would then be made could lead to a quick agree-

ment, but that this would be the beginning of protracted negotiations.

5. Anglo-Italian relations. Eden apparently conducted the conversation somewhat differently with Grandi than with me, emphasizing more strongly in the conversation with me the possibility of an early beginning of the negotiations, whereas he said to Grandi he had finally adopted the French view that useful discussions could only be held if Italy changed the anti-French attitude of her press and abandoned the anti-British propaganda in Arabia and Palestine. Grandi had opposed this view, since those very questions could form one of the subjects of the conversations.

RIBBENTROP

### No. 60

375/208788

*The German Embassy in Great Britain to the German Foreign Ministry*

Telegram

No. 748 of December 4

LONDON, December 4, 1937—5:03 p.m.

Received December 4, 1937—7:35 p.m.

With reference to No. 461 of December 1.<sup>68a</sup>

As already reported, Halifax is supposed to have told the British Cabinet that he discussed Belgium and Angola with some important person in Berlin. This was mentioned during the discussions on the occasion of the Chautemps visit. After the departure of Chautemps, the French Embassy communicated this to several journalists. Please do not use this in the press.

WOERMANN

### No. 61

375/208789

*The German Minister in Portugal (Huene) to the German Foreign Ministry*

Telegram

No. 154 of December 4

LISBON, December 4, 1937—6:43 p.m.

Received December 5, 1937—12:15 a.m.

With reference to No. 176 of December 2.

The Secretary General of the Foreign Ministry remarked spontaneously during my conversation with him yesterday that the Portuguese Government had, of its own accord, immediately pub-

<sup>68a</sup> Not printed.

lished a statement rejecting the latest reports concerning a change in ownership status of Angola as completely unworthy of credence. Accordingly, he had also requested the Portuguese Minister to call this to the attention of Minister President Göring when he called on him to thank him for the statement he had made. However, this morning's newspapers—some of them in sensational form—stress the rumors in the *Temps*, according to which Reich Minister Dr. Schacht is supposed to have discussed Angola with Halifax.

HUENE

## No. 62

875/208785-86

*The German Ambassador in Italy (Hassell) to the German Foreign Ministry*

Telegram

No. 335 of December 4

ROME, December 4, 1937.

Received December 6, 1937—9:15 a.m.

(Forwarded by plane to save expense)

With reference to No. 383 of December 3d.<sup>69</sup>

I briefly informed Ciano today of the Hungarian visit to Berlin (your telegram No. 376 of November 27<sup>69</sup>) and informed him in greater detail of the conversation between Eden and Ribbentrop.<sup>70</sup> On the individual points Ciano read to me Grandi's telegram concerning his conversation with Eden. Grandi's information agrees in the main with ours but is less detailed concerning the colonial problem. In the question of Czechoslovakia, Eden had particularly emphasized that England's situation was entirely different from that of France, for France had definite obligations there, whereas England had such obligations only in the West or in a general sense under the League of Nations Covenant.

Delbos had stated that the main purpose of his trip to Prague was to use his influence there in the sense previously reported. As regards Anglo-Italian relations Eden had stated that England was prepared to negotiate, as France was now also, and in this connection had referred to a British memorandum of October 2, to which the Italian Government had not yet replied. Ciano added that no reply had been made because the British Government, as was known, had declared in the memorandum that it was prepared

<sup>69</sup> Not printed.

<sup>70</sup> For Ribbentrop's report of this conversation, see telegram No. 740 of December 2, 1937, from the German Embassy in London, document No. 50, p. 88.

to discuss pending questions but not the recognition of the Empire. He, Ciano, would now inform the British Government in the near future that Italy was prepared for discussions at any time, but only if they embraced the entire problem, hence the question of recognition also. The discussions would therefore have to follow the line laid down by the correspondence between Chamberlain and Mussolini,<sup>71</sup> and not be based on the said memorandum. At present Italy had no reason to hold conversations with France.

HASSELL

No. 63

625/251485-87

*The German Ambassador in Austria (Papen) to the Head of the Political Department in the German Foreign Ministry (Weizsäcker)*

VIENNA, December 4, 1937.  
(Pol. II 3309)

DEAR HERR VON WEIZSÄCKER: Many thanks for your lines of November 23, which unfortunately, I received only yesterday, otherwise I should have been able to discuss them with you better orally in Berlin.

Your letter brings up a question of the very greatest importance. In my Paris conversations I received the definite impression that the present Government would do its utmost to effect a "general settlement" with Germany, because it was convinced that this was the only way to regain its economic equilibrium. In this, the rather weak M. Chautemps seems to be pushed forward by the aggressive Georges Bonnet. I confined myself in my Paris conversations essentially to the subject closest to me, trying to determine to what extent the French would be prepared to renounce their traditional policy of a balance of power in Central Europe. I consequently represented this question as the one absolutely decisive for us in effecting a German-French settlement, treating the colonial question as secondary. It was amazing to me to note that those with whom I spoke also described the colonial question as a problem that could probably be easily solved, whereas, of course, they made the decision regarding the continuation of their central European policy, or the possibility of a fundamental change in

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<sup>71</sup> This exchange of personal letters took place at the end of July and the beginning of August 1937. For the official communiqué on the exchange, see *Documents on International Affairs, 1937*, p. 93. For Count Ciano's statement on the subject on August 3 see *ibid.*, p. 287, and for Mr. Chamberlain's statement in the House of Commons on November 3, *ibid.*, p. 96.

this policy within the framework of their present alliances, dependent upon our desires in the Danube region. I found it very interesting to note that neither Bonnet nor Chautemps raised any objections to an evolutionary extension of German influence either in Austria, on the basis of the Agreement of July 11, or in Czechoslovakia, on the basis of a reorganization into a nation of nationalities. I have therefore come away with the view that it would perhaps be possible after all to make progress with the present Government through straightforward talks by taking advantage of the present difficult situation. So far as Austria is concerned, in my opinion it would be sufficient, when clearing away the Versailles Treaty, to demand that the famous article 88 of St. Germain be wiped out (if possible, of course, the demand should be made by Austria). We could, in return, promise that the extension of German influence will be effected by peaceful, evolutionary means. The Anglo-French attitude is always an excellent barometer for the willingness of the Ballhausplatz to meet German wishes for a sincere *rapprochement* in the spirit of the July 11 Agreement. We would probably be able to achieve remarkable results here very quickly if the Quai d'Orsay would decide to give the Austrians some good advice in this respect. That the Austro-German question is of only very slight interest to London is clear to everyone here. The conversations with France are, therefore, decisive for our progress.

If, therefore, after the London conversations, it should again be attempted—as it seems it will—to make the colonial question dependent on an *arrangement général* then, in my opinion, we ought to speak quite frankly with the French about this group of questions.

With best regards and Heil Hitler

Yours,

PAPEN

P.S. I shall send you next week a proposal for the further handling of the G[erman]-Austrian question during the next few weeks. A new decision is necessary.

## No. 64

740/267801-05

*The German Chargé d'Affaires in Poland (Wühlisch) to the German Foreign Ministry*

P V 21/12.37

WARSAW, December 7, 1937.

Received December 8, 1937.

(Pol. II 3241)

## POLITICAL REPORT

In continuation of the telegraphic report of December 6, No. 66.<sup>73</sup>

Subject: Visit of the French Foreign Minister to Warsaw.

The visit of the French Foreign Minister to Warsaw took place in an atmosphere of decided cordiality. Even before his arrival the press had been instructed to couch its articles of welcome in as friendly a tone as possible. From the outset, concrete results were not to be expected and, so far as is known, were not achieved. Only with respect to the development of cultural relations was the conclusion of an agreement contemplated—an agreement which had been planned for a long time.

The French Foreign Minister was sure of a cordial reception in Warsaw, since he is known here as the first director of French foreign policy who understands the special nature of Polish interests. It is being especially stressed that he did not use Warsaw—as did Laval—only as an intermediate stop on the way to Moscow. He is also probably the first French Foreign Minister who reconciled himself to the settlement of German-Polish relations by direct means without reproaching the Polish ally on this account.

It is of course clearly recognized that this more understanding attitude of French foreign policy toward Beck's course is not to be explained merely by the person of Foreign Minister Delbos, but that it is rather a sign of the changed foreign political situation in which France now finds herself. Whereas formerly, particularly after the conclusion of the German-Polish Agreement, it was Poland that had to seek understanding for her foreign policy in France, today it is France who, through her Foreign Minister, is propagandizing in Poland for her foreign political view. The cordiality that pervaded the atmosphere during the visit of the Minister found tangible expression in the conferring of the highest Polish order, the Order of the White Eagle, upon M. Delbos.

From the very start a special note was struck for the visit to Warsaw by the meeting of M. Delbos with the Reich Foreign

<sup>73</sup> Not printed.

Minister in Berlin. This brief meeting at the railroad station produced a sensational effect here. It is seen both as a sign of a German-French *détente*, and as proof of the fact that there is no alarm in Germany about Delbos' trip to Warsaw. M. Delbos himself stressed on every occasion here, and particularly to M. Beck, how much he appreciated the "great courtesy" that the Reich Foreign Minister had shown. M. Delbos also expressed himself to this effect to a member of the Embassy at the reception in the French Embassy, at the same time indicating his satisfaction over the fact that the Berlin meeting had found a favorable echo in the world.

The political discussions seem to have dealt essentially with the following subjects:

*Possibilities of European appeasement.*

M. Delbos informed the Poles of the course of the Halifax visit and of the Anglo-French conferences in London. The Berlin meeting also played a part in this connection. Delbos is said, moreover, to have pointed out particularly that France at present considered herself seriously threatened by Italy.

*Participation of Poland in a possible Western Pact.*

At the request of the Poles, Delbos is said to have promised M. Beck Polish participation in possible negotiations concerning a new Western Pact. The Poles are supposed to have pointed out on this occasion that London and Rome had made similar promises, so that Poland now had the agreement of all the great powers with the exception of Germany. Since they are still suffering from the nightmare of the Four Power Pact here, the promise of Delbos is of particular importance to the Poles.

*Poland's behavior toward Czechoslovakia.*

It is certain that, contrary to the original assumption of the Poles, M. Delbos did speak of Polish-Czechoslovak relations. He referred to the fact that, precisely in the minorities question, Czechoslovakia had made a generous gesture which should be duly appreciated in Warsaw.<sup>74</sup> The Poles, however, gave M. Delbos clearly to understand that no mediation by a third power, not even by their French ally, was desired for the settlement of Polish-Czech relations. M. Beck is also supposed to have said that Poland's attitude was being determined not only by the minori-

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<sup>74</sup>The reference is to conciliatory proposals regarding the treatment of the Polish minority in Czechoslovakia recently made by Premier Hodza before the budget committee of the Lower Chamber of the Czechoslovak Parliament. A somewhat unfriendly reply had been made on November 26, 1937, in the *Polska Informacja Polityczna*, organ of the Polish Ministry for Foreign Affairs.

ties question, but also by the close relations of Czechoslovakia with the Soviet Union. Polish reserve with respect to the Czechoslovak gesture was once again emphasized very clearly, during the French visit at that, by an article headed "*Timeo Danaos et dona ferentes*," which appeared a few days ago in the organ of the General Staff.

*Relations with the Soviet Union.*

M. Beck is supposed to have said that Poland did not intend to adhere to the Anti-Comintern Pact.

*Austria and Danzig.*

It is not yet known whether the question of Austrian independence and the Danzig problem played a part in the discussions.

*Colonial question and economic problems.*

It is not known whether the Polish demand for colonial possessions was mentioned to Delbos by the Poles. It is remarkable that, simultaneously with the Delbos visit, Polish colonial demands were discussed rather thoroughly in the French press. For the rest, the problem of Jewish emigration seems to have been discussed, probably in connection with the plans for an emigration of Polish Jews to Madagascar. Commercial and credit problems do not seem to have entered into the discussions.

There is as yet no more detailed, conclusive appraisal by the Polish press of the political significance of the French visit. Aside from their articles of welcome, newspapers have contented themselves principally with detailed day-by-day accounts. At any rate, gratification at the visit is general and it is expressed in the entire press without reserve. A certain criticism of the Polish attitude is to be found in the Opposition press, which is of the opinion that, with respect to the German danger, the French concept of collective security is more effective than mere bilateral commitments, which is Beck's method. The Socialist *Dziennik Ludowy* expresses this criticism in characteristic fashion by heading its article on the visit with the caption: "A warm plate, but cold soup."

A memorandum on the superficial details of the visit as well as the text of the official speeches and of the official communiqué are enclosed.<sup>75</sup>

WÜHLISCH

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<sup>75</sup> Enclosures not printed.

## No. 65

740/267817-20

*The German Minister in Rumania (Fabricius) to the German Foreign Ministry*

Tgb. Nr. 3458/37—I A 34

BUCHAREST, December 7, 1937.  
(Pol. II 3266)With reference to telegram No. 164 of December 4.<sup>76</sup>

Subject: Treaty of Alliance between France and the Little Entente.

Foreign Minister Antonescu assured me repeatedly that the question of a treaty of alliance between Rumania or the Little Entente, on the one hand, and France, on the other hand, was definitively disposed of. The French statesmen were well aware of this. On his last visit to Paris he was no longer even approached on the subject. He had finally brought the matter up of his own accord, stressing unequivocally that such a treaty was not envisaged by the Rumanian Government. If the French broached the matter again on the occasion of Stoyadinovich's visit to Paris, it was only because they had wanted to embarrass M. Stoyadinovich. They already knew that he was opposed to it.

To my question whether the impending visit of M. Delbos had any connection with the question of the alliance, M. Antonescu replied that such was not the case. Moreover, he remarked, it was incorrect to assume that France was of her own volition pressing for conclusion of this agreement; the driving force was the Czechoslovaks, who, since Beneš, Hodza, and Krofta were not able to accomplish it, were urging France to use her influence with Rumania.

If Antonescu's account, which I consider sincere, is correct, I am unable to fit into the over-all picture the story bandied about here by the Hungarians: that Blum had stated during his last visit to Prague that France would only grant another loan to Czechoslovakia for defense purposes if Czechoslovakia could induce Rumania and Yugoslavia to conclude a treaty of alliance of the Little Entente with France (cf. your cipher letter of September 30—Pol. IV 4910—item 1<sup>76</sup>).

I hardly believe that M. Delbos would meet with much sympathy if he should again bring up the alliance during his visit here. It appears, however, from the article in the *Temps* of December 3 and from telegram No. 164 of December 4 as if he had intended

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<sup>76</sup> Not printed.

to speak of it. Perhaps the greeting of M. Delbos by the Reich Foreign Minister upon the former's passage through Berlin, which was regarded here generally as a clever gesture of German foreign policy aimed at an understanding, played a part in dissuading M. Delbos from what was probably his original plan. But even if this were not the case, the liberal government and King Carol would not be able to consent to such an alliance today, since they could not afford such a change of policy, which would be a slap in the face to public opinion, prior to the elections.

The only factor that could cause some anxiety and claims our attention—and I have also discussed this with my Italian colleague—is the authorization granted M. Delbos in London by Mr. Eden to state that England approves the conclusion of a general mutual assistance pact between France and the states of the Little Entente. The King likes to listen to British advice and it is of great importance to him if England supports France's wishes. There is also the possibility that even if nothing is gained during Delbos' present visit, the threads will be spun further on the occasion of the King's visit to London, which is planned for the spring. I believe, however, that the King is too shrewd and cautious, simply on the basis of encouragement from England, to decide on a policy differing from that of Prince Paul of Yugoslavia; he would at least demand that England, too, enter the pact and England will not do that under present circumstances.

So whatever M. Delbos proposes now on the question of the mutual assistance pact will at present have no serious significance.

I may take the liberty of reporting further at a later date.

In its initial stage, the visit of M. Delbos does not seem to be without some small complications, concerning which I am making a special report.

FABRICIUS

## No. 66

625/251481

*The German Ambassador in France (Welczeck) to the German Foreign Ministry*

A 4580

PARIS, December 10, 1937.

(Pol. II 3302/37)

With reference to instruction Pol. II 3217 of December 6.<sup>78</sup>

Subject: The greeting of the French Foreign Minister by the Reich Foreign Minister.

On the occasion of a conversation I had a few days ago with Léger, the latter brought up the subject of the greeting of Delbos by Baron Neurath at the Schlesischer Bahnhof in Berlin. This unusual attention issuing from the initiative of the Reich Foreign Minister had created the most favorable impression possible in all circles here and was regarded as a good omen for the beginning of a general *détente* and tranquilization.

WELCZECK

## No. 67

2128/463763

*The German Chargé d'Affaires in Italy (Plessen) to the German Foreign Ministry*

Telegram

URGENT

ROME, December 11, 1937.

No. 349 of December 11

In continuation of No. 345 of December 10.<sup>78</sup>

Ciano received me today after his return from Milan and, referring to my visit of yesterday with the *Chef de Cabinet*, he informed me that the Fascist Grand Council would make the decision this evening to withdraw from the League of Nations. The Japanese Ambassador was being given the same information. Stoyadinovich had been informed before his departure and had indicated his full approval of the date; Ciano requested that this be treated as strictly confidential.

Ciano described rumors regarding other impending decisions as without foundation.

PLESSEN

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<sup>78</sup> Not printed.

## No. 68

740/267827-32

*The German Ambassador in Poland (Moltke) to the German Foreign Ministry*

P I 1 b/12.37

WARSAW, December 11, 1937.

Received December 13, 1937.

(Pol. II 3315)

## POLITICAL REPORT

M. Beck invited me today to have a talk with him and stated the following: He had gained the impression that as a result of Halifax's visit to Berlin, of the London conversations, and of the French Foreign Minister's trip to Warsaw, international discussions had again got under way after a rather long intermission. He thought that, under these circumstances, we, too, might be interested in some observations that he had made here with reference to questions of European politics on the occasion of Delbos' visit. He would begin with a negative statement: Delbos, whom he had long known as an intelligent and sensible diplomat with whom one could talk very frankly, had not, during his stay here, proposed any new groupings for Eastern Europe, in connection either with Russia or Czechoslovakia. Not a word had been said by Delbos on the subjects that had made the conferences with the French ally so difficult and unsatisfactory, beginning with the Eastern Pact and continuing until very recently. He saw in this a significant fact, which, he presumed, was not devoid of interest for us either. To my remark that various Polish press reports had represented the creation of a new security system for the benefit of Czechoslovakia as the chief aim of the journey of the French Minister, M. Beck replied that we should have to wait and see what M. Delbos would do with regard to this in the cities of the Little Entente. Here, at any rate, M. Delbos had said nothing about the matter. He was evidently the first French Foreign Minister finally to understand and grasp Polish policy—that Poland was anxious to have her special interests considered. In Rumania Delbos would certainly speak differently, but he would now not find it as easy there either as with Titulescu.<sup>80</sup> He had the impression, incidentally, that Titulescu had largely lost his former prestige in France and his most recent conduct would not contribute either toward reviving vanishing sympathies. To my question as to whether Poland's relations with Czechoslovakia had not been

<sup>80</sup> Nicholas Titulescu, former Rumanian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

improved by the more conciliatory attitude of Hodza on the problem of Polish minorities, M. Beck replied that fine words had often been heard before from Prague. One had to wait for deeds. After her earlier experiences, Poland was justified in the utmost distrust in this respect. In any case, he could affirm that up to the present time there had been nothing that could be considered an improvement in relations. M. Beck further remarked, with respect to the situation in the Danube area, that he had noted with satisfaction a better understanding for Hungary on the part of M. Delbos.

M. Beck then brought up the Berlin meeting of the Reich Foreign Minister and M. Delbos and stated that the latter had repeatedly expressed his pleasure at this gesture, which went far beyond the usual acts of courtesy. M. Delbos thought this meeting an important sign that the atmosphere had cleared for continuing the exchange of views. M. Beck added that he noted this fact with particular gratification, for Poland sincerely desired an improvement in the relations between France and Germany. Delbos had further pointed out with satisfaction that, in his conversation with Lord Halifax, the Führer and Chancellor had referred to his previous proposals on the armament question, which had, unfortunately, not been pursued at the time. M. Delbos regarded this repetition an important and particularly satisfactory fact. M. Beck added that it was his impression that the world was coming more and more to feel that to settle the armament question on the broadest basis, as had formerly been unsuccessfully attempted, was not feasible and that efforts must be limited to a narrower field. Incidentally this had, as was well known, long been the Polish view.

Reverting to Halifax's visit, and repeating his thanks for the report given him at the direction of the Reich Foreign Minister, M. Beck remarked that the information M. Delbos had given him quite agreed with this. Summarizing, he declared that from his conversations with Delbos he had the impression that the atmosphere was noticeably improved and that, after the impasse which one had got into, the door might be considered as half open. He presumed that these observations of his would interest the Reich Foreign Minister and requested that they be transmitted to him.

In the further course of the conversation, the situation in the Far East and the possibility of Russian intervention were touched upon briefly. M. Beck pointed out that two points had perhaps been generally underestimated: first, the absence of any intervention by a third party showed that the Chinese interests of other

countries, particularly of the United States, were not so great as had often been assumed; and, secondly, it had undoubtedly been very surprising that Japan had been in a position to obtain such far-reaching results in so short a time. If Russia had speculated upon Japan's bleeding to death in the conquest of so extensive an empire, she had perhaps been disappointed after all. On the other hand, in view of the mentality of the yellow race, which was not easily understood by a white person, the uncertainty as to whether China and Japan might not, perhaps, unexpectedly reach an understanding, was perhaps too great to encourage Russia still to intervene at this time. The weakening of the Russian Army as a result of recent events inside Russia also had to be taken into consideration. M. Beck said nothing very definite about further developments, but, in spite of reports to the contrary apparently received by him, he did not seem really to believe that Russia will intervene. At any rate, he emphasized that no observations had been made on the Polish border permitting the inference that preparations for war were under way.

As to the impending withdrawal of Italy from the League of Nations, M. Beck remarked that the League of Nations would, of course, thereby suffer further substantial weakening, but that at the same time, to his regret, those forces in Geneva that had always been trying to exert a nefarious influence on the development of affairs would be strengthened. Poland's standpoint and her aversion to any intervention in domestic affairs from any side whatever were well known and would not change.

I then led the conversation to the colonial question, referring to the Havas despatch. M. Beck referred to the statements made by him and the head of the Polish delegation in Geneva. The Polish Government maintained the view that if international economic problems were to be basically settled, a solution must also be found for the problems of the supply of raw materials and of the creation of emigration opportunities for surplus population. This was the form in which he had presented the problem. The way in which it would be settled was a question which opened up various possibilities and still had to be thoroughly studied. Germany's situation and that of Poland differed with respect to this. Germany had once possessed a colonial empire and had made considerable financial sacrifices to develop it. This was not the case with Poland. Nevertheless, as far as he could see, a certain similarity of interests was to be noted with regard to the end in view. Whether, in the practical settlement, they should consider the allocation of colonial territories or the creation of

trading companies to facilitate the acquisition of raw materials without foreign exchange or some other solution could not at present be foreseen.

Lastly, I took up the situation of the German minority, about which I am sending a separate report.

VON MOLTKE

No. 69

740/267833-40

*The German Minister in Rumania (Fabricius) to the German Foreign Ministry*

Tgb. Nr. 3518/37—I A 22

BUCHAREST, December 13, 1937.  
(Pol. II 3341)

Subject: Visit of Foreign Minister Delbos to Bucharest.

The public aspect of the visit of Foreign Minister Delbos is described in the enclosed memorandum.<sup>81</sup> The text of the speeches exchanged between M. Antonescu<sup>82</sup> and M. Delbos at the banquet in the Foreign Ministry and of the official final communiqué are likewise enclosed.<sup>81</sup> I also enclose a clipping from the *Moment* of December 11,<sup>83</sup> in which the editor-owner, Hefter, sets forth ideas that surely originated in the French Legation.

The subject matter of M. Delbos' conversation here is said to have been the following:

The chief subject of conversation was the survey of the European situation. M. Delbos reported in detail regarding his visit, with M. Chautemps, in London and what was said there. In this, the visit of Lord Halifax to Germany played an important role. M. Delbos told me himself, at the evening reception at the French Legation, that the atmosphere had been cleared there for an understanding with Germany. This atmosphere was made even more favorable by the meeting with the Reich Foreign Minister at the railroad station in Berlin. He had spoken only briefly to Herr von Neurath, but a short meeting was often more eloquent than days of negotiation. He must have expressed himself to this effect to the Rumanian Government and the King, for both Foreign Minister Antonescu, and particularly the King, whom I also met at the French Legation and who had me summoned for a conversation, told me what a strong impression the gesture of the German

<sup>81</sup> Not printed.

<sup>82</sup> Victor Antonescu, Rumanian Minister of Foreign Affairs.

<sup>83</sup> Not printed here.

Foreign Minister had made upon Delbos. Both stressed the fact that M. Delbos had held out the prospect of initiating an understanding with Germany, without telling me just how M. Delbos depicted this possibility to them. I remarked to M. Delbos that the atmosphere should not be disturbed by the press as had just occurred again, when the cession of Portuguese and Belgian colonial territory to Germany was brought up in the press only as a means of creating sentiment against German colonial demands. M. Delbos replied that he was of the same opinion and that Herr von Neurath had spoken to him of that very thing at the meeting in Berlin. (I did not reveal I was informed of this.) He indicated that he wanted to do something about this matter and was thinking of conversations between the press chiefs of the two countries.

M. Antonescu, whom I saw repeatedly during the last few days, the last time on the occasion of a visit with the *Reichsjugendführer*, Baldur von Schirach, assured me that the conversations with Delbos on the question of the mutual assistance pact between France on the one hand and Rumania and the Little Entente on the other have resulted in nothing new, and that no arrangements of any kind relating to it had been made or were contemplated. My Italian and Polish colleagues found out the same thing. The Polish envoy, M. Arciszewski, does not believe either that M. Delbos has posed here as the spokesman for England, since he denied this explicitly to M. Beck in Warsaw. The Italian envoy, M. Sola, and I, on the other hand, are of the opinion that M. Delbos *particularly* underscored the absolute agreement of opinion between Paris and London, as is evident also from Rumanian Foreign Minister Antonescu's speech, in which he says:

"There is distinguishable on the horizon the reassuring sign of complete accord between France and Great Britain. The vigorous efforts of these two great democracies to bring about a *détente* are gratifying to us because they may lead to an improvement in the situation."

In contrast with the discussions in Warsaw, at which, according to information received from Arciszewski, the League of Nations and collective security played minor roles and the system of bilateral treaties was emphasized by M. Beck, the belief in the Geneva institution and the principle of collective security was reaffirmed here. At the same time the Rumanians expressed the wish (see also passage in Antonescu's speech referring to this) that the collective security of Western Europe should not be separated from that of Eastern Europe.

This, in my opinion, constitutes the most important result for Rumania of the visit of M. Delbos to Bucharest. For nothing was done about the treaty of alliance, and the enclosed statements of M. Hefter in the *Moment* are only miserable attempts of the French envoy, M. Thierry, which are sufficiently characterized, moreover, by the fact that, to publish them, he makes use only of this Jewish organ.

Rumors were also current here to the effect that M. Delbos would offer the Rumanians a French and Soviet Russian guarantee in order to make them more compliant on the subject of a pact. Such a proposal could not be entertained by the Government at election time and was surely not made either. These rumors very quickly subsided.

Doubtless one of the chief topics of conversation concerned the relations between Germany and Czechoslovakia. M. Antonescu told me without my asking that M. Delbos would use his influence in Prague to the end that Czechoslovakia settle its relations with Germany by a change of its policy with respect to minorities.

It is said that M. Delbos had expressed the wish that Rumania should promote a *rapprochement* between Poland and Czechoslovakia. My Polish colleague does not believe that, since this question had already been discarded in the talks between Beck and Delbos at Warsaw. As far as Hungary is concerned, the rumor is current here that M. Delbos had tried to use his influence with the Rumanian Government to induce it to change its attitude toward Hungary and to display a more cooperative spirit on the question of the minorities. I have been unable thus far to learn any further details on this matter.

They also discussed Italy quite thoroughly. On this point I only heard from M. Antonescu that France considered it easier to pave the way for good relations with Germany than with Italy. He said that during the dinner at Court M. Delbos had stated that should a plebiscite be held in France today, 60-80 percent of the people would come out for an understanding with Germany, but scarcely 20-25 percent for one with Italy. This sentiment in favor of Germany emanated largely from the youth and the military organizations. It is said that Rumania had spoken here for a *rapprochement* with Italy, but I have not been able to learn anything positive on this score thus far. It is said that the Rumanian Government intends soon to appoint a minister to Rome in place of Lugoșanu, of the National Peasant Party, who has resigned, and wished to obtain the consent of France to the recognition of Abyssinia, which is necessary for the appointment. M. Comnen,

who arrived here day before yesterday from Berlin, is being considered as minister. I am convinced that if the first report is correct, the second, with respect to the person to be appointed minister, is pure guesswork, since the Government could surely have come to no decision on this matter before the elections.

Whether the question of [exchanging] ambassadors with Poland made any progress, as is rumored here, I have not yet been able to ascertain. They say the King spoke to M. Delbos personally in this matter and obtained his assent.

The question of armaments and the grant of credits also occupied a prominent place in the discussions. The Under Secretary in charge of armaments in the War Ministry, General Glatz, was in Paris and in Czechoslovakia only recently and told me that his recent trip had been very satisfying to him. In France they were finally showing a more active interest. He added immediately, however, that he wanted to close the deal with Rheinmetall as soon as possible, too. The tie with Germany was becoming more and more valuable to him as a result of the favorable developments in economic relations.

In the cultural field, Foreign Minister Delbos' speech at the dinner in the Foreign Ministry announced a marked increase in activity. Wherein this consists could not yet be learned. No agreement on the subject was signed here.

It has already become the rule that if nothing of political importance is negotiated, cultural agreements take their place. The same thing is happening here. Nevertheless, the visit of Foreign Minister Delbos has achieved what was expected here: the continuance of the firm friendship between the two countries has been reaffirmed. With respect to relations with Germany, M. Antonescu, in the presence of the *Reichsjugendführer*, expressed this to me as follows: "*Amitié avec la France et estime des relations avec l'Allemagne.*" He observed that at the moment the toasts were exchanged between him and Delbos in the Foreign Ministry, German-Rumanian governmental commissions were signing the Trade Agreement in the Ministry of Commerce.

Delbos' visit came at the time of the election campaign, and for the men in the Government therefore it meant a severe strain, which Prime Minister Tatarescu also mentioned to me. M. Antonescu said that if his speech of December 9 was extravagant in protestations of friendship for France, it was partly due to the fact that M. Titulescu had been sitting nearby in his villa and waiting expectantly for the moment to emphasize, in contrast to the attitude of the present Government, his friendship for France.

Incidentally, Titulescu, Maniu,<sup>84</sup> and Gafencu,<sup>85</sup> who were not present at any of the official receptions, were, in spite of their communiqué (see report of the 9th, Tgb. Nr. 3459/37<sup>86</sup>) received by M. Delbos individually. M. Titulescu had addressed a telegram to the Under Secretary of State, Léger, complaining that Minister Thierry had not invited him to the first reception; M. Delbos asked that M. Titulescu justify this grotesque procedure, since he could have applied directly to him, Delbos, who was in Bucharest or expected here. M. Delbos reported the incident to M. Antonescu and ridiculed this behavior of Titulescu's.

The comments of the press on M. Delbos' visit were almost all friendly.

FABRICIUS

#### D. THE BASES FOR A SETTLEMENT WITH FRANCE, DECEMBER 1937

##### No. 70

625/251466-67

##### *Memorandum*

(e.o. Pol. II 3299)

On the occasion of a social gathering at the French Embassy, M. François-Poncet approached me yesterday on the matter of Italy's withdrawal from the League of Nations, expressing the fear that many influences were at work to impede and sabotage the opening of discussions between us and the Western Powers, which the visit of Lord Halifax had envisaged. Surely Italy's withdrawal from Geneva at the present moment was primarily in pursuit of this aim. And the welcoming of the French Foreign Minister by the German Foreign Minister at the Schlesischer Bahnhof had certainly disturbed the Italians. I replied to the Ambassador that I knew nothing of this.

M. François-Poncet then asked me what statement of M. Léger's, reported by Count Welczeck, had given so much annoyance here. I told the Ambassador that I did not know what he meant. I might possibly imagine that any annoyance expressed here could have reference to the fact that of late the Quai d'Orsay apparently liked to make tendentious statements about the discussions which in this and the past year had occasionally taken place in Paris with Herr Schacht and Count Welczeck, implying that it had been only our fault if everything had not long ago been beauti-

<sup>84</sup> Julius Maniu, leader of the National Peasant Party and former Prime Minister.

<sup>85</sup> Grigore Gafencu, former Secretary General in the Rumanian Ministry for Foreign Affairs.

<sup>86</sup> Not printed.

fully settled. This observation obviously excited the Ambassador. He said with some animation that it had been *our* fault if such an impression had been created in Paris. After Herr Schacht's last visit, they had waited in vain for an echo from Berlin, and finally had to conclude from the silence that we here had simply repudiated Herr Schacht, which had then been proved, too, by the further course of events. The whole trouble with us was that, instead of talking with Paris and London, by doing which we could even obtain colonies, we had gone over completely to bloc politics, which could only lead to terrible consequences; to our disadvantage, by the way, since in case of conflict the United States, though perhaps with a week's delay, would range itself on the side of England and France.

The approach of a lady put an end to the Ambassador's emotional outburst.

VON RINTELEN

BERLIN, December 13, 1937.

### No. 71

625/251472-73

#### *Memorandum*

(zu Pol. II 3299)

With reference to the enclosed memorandum<sup>87</sup> I wish to remark that the statements of the French Ambassador are obviously based on the fact that, according to Herr Schacht's memorandum of his visit to Paris in May of this year,<sup>88</sup> the French Premier, Blum, had told him at the time that he was prepared to negotiate with Germany and would now wait and see whether the German Government would send him any communication on this matter. Since no reply from us was forthcoming to this statement of M. Blum's, the French now consider themselves justified in complaining about our "glacial silence," as M. Léger calls it.

I might comment on this point<sup>89</sup> that the memorandum<sup>89a</sup> of Herr Schacht's visit to Paris last May only came to my attention recently through Herr Forster.<sup>90</sup>

To be submitted to the State Secretary.

WEIZSÄCKER

BERLIN, December 13, 1937.

<sup>87</sup> *Supra*.

<sup>88</sup> *Infra*.

<sup>89</sup> A marginal comment in Mackensen's handwriting reads as follows: "This matter has been cleared up by me."

<sup>89a</sup> A marginal comment in Mackensen's handwriting reads as follows: "Please submit to me."

<sup>90</sup> Counselor of Embassy of the German Embassy in France.

## No. 72

625/251468-71

*Memorandum*

## REPORT ON MY VISIT TO PARIS, MAY 25-29, 1937

The impression that the German pavilion at the World's Fair in Paris is making upon the French is quite extraordinary. From the standpoint of its architecture, its artistic interior, and the excellence of the individual articles displayed, it towers far above the average of the Exposition. At the time of the dedication of the German pavilion, the Danish, the Belgian, the Italian, and the Russian pavilions were already completed. The appearance of the streets of the Exposition is still very much one of a project under construction, but the daily number of visitors is already very considerable. The greatest architectural achievement of the French is the really imposing reconstruction of the Trocadero.

The reception which the French prepared for me as the representative of the Führer and Chancellor was courteous in every way. Two Ministers at the airport upon my arrival (since my wife accompanied me, the wives of the Ministers were also present) and two Ministers upon my departure, about seven Ministers at the opening ceremonies in the German pavilion, the Premier and three Ministers at the Ambassador's dinner, two Ministers at the dinner of the German Chamber of Commerce, and six Ministers, including the Premier, with their ladies, at the state dinner given in my honor. The President of the Bank of France was also present at all the affairs. The French Ambassador at Berlin had prepared the trip and was in Paris again during my visit and attended all the affairs.

Since I stated in a conversation with François-Poncet before my departure that political progress could not be expected during the visit, I received the French press immediately upon my arrival and explained to them that my visit was solely of a representative nature. All other conjectures were idle. The press understood this statement correctly and reacted accordingly. Nonetheless Germany and France constituted the subject of all conversations and demanded expression of some kind at the luncheon of the *Comité France-Allemagne*. The high point of my impromptu speech at this luncheon was that one should not always disparage Germany as the one perpetually making demands, but should also remember all that Germany had offered through the mouth of its Führer. It was for France now to react to these things. I was

able to observe more than once that this concise statement gave rise to considerable discussion and serious reflection.

Between times I concerned myself with the conclusion of the German-French commercial treaty negotiations and held conversations on this score both with Auriol and with Bastid and Spinasse.<sup>91</sup> The demand I made for a reduction in the interest rate on the Dawes and Young loans was quite effective as a bargaining point for other items in the negotiations but could not be maintained, for the simple reason that an interest rate of 5½ percent is entirely normal in France today (see the yields of the French Government loans) and there is even nothing unusual about an interest rate of 7 percent on long-term loans. (Of the entire 7 percent Dawes loan, moreover, only some 25 million marks are still in French hands.) After consultation with the proper authorities in Berlin, I therefore gave my assent to the conclusion of the treaty negotiations, which resulted satisfactorily for Germany.

The only political conversation that I had took place on the last afternoon with Blum alone, at tea. Blum tried once more to explain why our conversation of last August could not be developed further in the fall, and put the blame for it principally upon the British. Moreover, he referred to the fact that it was quite impossible for him to make any headway in France for an understanding with Germany if the German press and German Ministers in their speeches constantly spoke so disparagingly about France. The French were gaining the impression that Germany was waiting for the internal decay of France. In such an atmosphere he could not prepare the ground for an understanding. I replied that before my present journey to Paris I had also read in the French press that, driven by necessity, I was coming to France imploring aid, and I asked him to balance these statements in the press against possible statements of ours. Blum made the distinction that the French utterances had issued from some irresponsible organs, whereas public opinion in Germany, as everyone knew, was directed entirely by the Government. He wished to say once more, however, and considered this as an official communication to the German Government, that the French Government was at all times ready to enter into negotiations with Germany; he could not, however, open these negotiations with the discussion of the colonial question. He would now, for his part, wait and see if the German Government would send him any communication on this matter.

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<sup>91</sup> Vincent Auriol, Minister of Finance, Paul Bastid, Minister of Commerce, and Charles Spinasse, Minister of National Economy in the Cabinet of Léon Blum.

The above attitude is confirmed by a communication from Senator Le Trocquer, who made a report on German foreign trade in the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Senate. The correspondent of the *Frankfurter Zeitung*, Sieburg (the only German journalist who has access to all French offices and enjoys complete confidence), reports that Senator Le Trocquer discussed the Paris visit of Dr. Schacht, stating that the French Government had shown its willingness to negotiate with respect to the proposals made by the German Minister, provided that these were introduced in the form of a general plan, and that one proposal alone (obviously meaning the one on colonies) was not selected and pushed into the foreground.

The substance of the conversation with Blum receives added importance from the fact that after I had spoken at the luncheon of the *Comité France-Allemagne*, François-Poncet drove at once to Blum in order to report to him, and that thereafter the State Secretary for Foreign Affairs, Léger, was summoned by Blum, and Blum talked with him for an hour about what was to be said to me at our forthcoming meeting.

As my personal impression of the whole visit, I should like to stress the following:

1) Occasional communistic disturbances, possibly even of a menacing nature, are certainly not [*sic*] to be expected. By no means, however, will this lead to a chaotic upheaval.

2) Offensive remarks about the French people or their Government make the settlement of our foreign relations more difficult.

3) The economic inadequacy of the German position, both with respect to food and procurement of raw materials, is known to the smallest detail in all French offices. Apprehensions of the military with respect to a possible inferiority to Germany are no longer present.

4) Political dependence upon England is extraordinarily great and is only increased by the miserable French financial policy. The President of the Bank of France is flirting strongly with plans for curtailment of foreign exchange in the field of capital transactions.

SCHACHT

## No. 73

631/252296-98

*The German Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Schulenburg) to the  
German Foreign Ministry*

Moscow, December 14, 1937.  
(Pol. II 3330)

Subject: Soviet attitude toward Delbos' trip to Warsaw.

As a result of the oversensitiveness characteristic of the Soviets, together with their never-resting suspicion, the visit of French Foreign Minister Delbos to Warsaw, in particular, but also the continuation of his trip to Bucharest and Belgrade without touching Moscow, created in authoritative circles here a feeling of uneasiness and of being ignored. Particularly at the present moment, after the visit of Lord Halifax to Germany and after the Anglo-French conversations, Moscow would certainly have attached especial importance to a visit from Delbos in order to be informed by him personally about the significance of the most recent diplomatic events in Western Europe.

In this connection it is worth mentioning that, according to a rumor current here sometime ago, the truth of which could not be corroborated, Litvinov, at the time of his last visit to Geneva, is supposed to have suggested a visit to Moscow to Delbos.

The greeting of the French Foreign Minister upon his passage through Berlin by Foreign Minister Baron von Neurath and the conversation held on that occasion tended to increase the displeasure and the feeling of being ignored. Every sign of a German-French *rapprochement* immediately occasions anxiety here concerning a Four Power Pact and in this case a Five Power Pact, with the inclusion of Poland.

Latent Soviet mistrust saw the main purpose of Delbos' trip to Warsaw as an effort to bring Franco-Polish relations closer again. But every indication that Poland is rising in the favor of France is felt here the more unpleasantly since the hopes pinned by the Soviets on the alliance with France have not been realized and the political atmosphere between the Soviet Union and Poland has long been tense and filled with the deepest mistrust. This Soviet jealousy of Poland may well be increased today by observation of the fact that the attitude of many important personages in France toward their Soviet ally has become much more sober as a result of domestic developments in the Soviet Union and the resulting weakness in its diplomatic position. It is also believed that there is cause to fear that these French elements are inclined to give Poland

priority in the French system of alliances over the Soviet Union, whose help in case of conflict is becoming more and more problematical.

The fact that authoritative circles here are anything but satisfied with Delbos' visit to Warsaw is also evident from the attitude of the Soviet press. While the visit of the French Foreign Minister to Bucharest is treated in a relatively friendly manner in the newspapers here, the Soviet press is using the Warsaw visit to create the impression by tendentious quotations, principally from French Leftist newspapers, that the alliance with Poland is of no value to France, since Polish foreign policy is pursuing aims opposed to those of France.

An article that appeared in the *Journal de Moscou* on December 4, "*Les succès de M. Beck*," was written in the same tone. The real author of this article, signed Alexandrov, was probably Gnedin, the chief of the press section of the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs. The article thereby gains special significance.

Obviously Gnedin considers it inexpedient for tactical reasons to express directly to France the Soviet displeasure at the Warsaw visit of Delbos. He therefore does not mention a word about Delbos' visit to Warsaw but confines himself to venting his wrath upon Poland and M. Beck. Poland's foreign policy is censured for having placed Poland in a dependent position with respect to Germany, for having trifled away the confidence and friendship of France, and for having conclusively spoiled her relations with the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia. These and other insinuations directed at Polish foreign policy are no doubt calculated to discredit Poland in the eyes of France and of the French reader. Even if it is not openly stated, the effort to recommend the Soviet Union, in contrast to unreliable Poland, as a faithful ally of France, may be plainly read between the lines of the article.

VON DER SCHULENBURG

## No. 74

1585/382621

*The German Ambassador in Great Britain (Ribbentrop) to the  
German Foreign Ministry*

Telegram

VERY SECRET

LONDON, December 14, 1937—9:28 p.m.  
No. 768 of December 14 Received December 15, 1937—12:40 a.m.  
(Pol. II 3334)

For the Führer and the Foreign Minister.

In the course of a conversation I had with Eden today I asked him his opinion regarding the time factor in the continuation of the questions brought up in connection with the Halifax conversations, referring to his remark to Grandi and me on December 1 that he would approach us again in about a month. Eden said that he would presumably not return to London till the latter part of January and that separate study of the problem by England and France would scarcely be concluded before the end of January. Since an Anglo-French consultation will take place only then, we probably have to expect that the tempo will be slowed up considerably. Eden declared that he himself did not yet have any ideas regarding the probable outcome of the current consultations. He repeated that in the event of further discussions England would at the same time presumably appear as spokesman for France.

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RIBBENTROP<sup>93</sup>

## No. 75

375/208798

*The German Ambassador in Great Britain (Ribbentrop) to the  
German Foreign Ministry*

Telegram

VERY SECRET

LONDON, December 14, 1937—9:28 p.m.  
No. 770 of December 14 Received December 15, 1937—12:40 a.m.

For the Führer and the Foreign Minister.

Several days ago I invited Halifax to have lunch with me alone. I emphasize the following points made in the course of a long conversation:

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<sup>93</sup> A marginal notation in Neurath's handwriting reads as follows: "Henderson told me at Chamberlain's request that a further initiative by England could hardly be expected before 4 months."

A marginal notation in Rintelen's handwriting reads as follows: "That coincides with Chamberlain's information to Herr von Ribbentrop (cf. the telegram of December 16 from London)." The telegram to which reference is made is printed as document No. 81, p. 131.

Halifax said that he was very glad to have been in immediate contact with the Führer. The British Government was earnestly trying to make concessions to us in the colonial question. But it was very difficult to find an acceptable solution. The British people expected something in return. Otherwise it would be very difficult for the Government to have the claim accepted by public opinion. The British Government was anxious that something be done particularly in the field of armaments, in which connection the idea of qualitative limitation of air weapons was being mentioned.

I objected that our colonial claim was based on legal rights and that negotiations could therefore not be coupled with other difficult questions. Halifax replied that he understood this, but that various problems would at least have to be taken up at the same time, whereupon I replied that this would surely amount to coupling. To a question of mine, Halifax replied that the French visit to London did, after all, represent progress. In reply to my question whether the initiative now undertaken was strong enough to prevail in the face of the numerous opposing forces prevalent everywhere, he said that Chamberlain was determined that something should be attempted.

My total impression was that Halifax does not suppose that negotiations will proceed rapidly, that he himself has only a rather vague idea of the course and the outcome of the negotiations and is, if not exactly pessimistic, at least skeptical about the prospects.

RIBBENTROP

## No. 76

2039/445988

*The German Foreign Ministry to the German Embassy in France*  
Telegram

No. 527 of December 14

BERLIN, December 14, 1937.

The Italian Government, which since 1936 had repeatedly indicated to us its intention to withdraw from the League of Nations, 3 weeks ago informed us of its decision to carry out the withdrawal now, and originally planned to issue the declaration on the anniversary of the Comintern Agreement. On November 26, we stated, in reply to Italy's inquiry, that we would heartily welcome the withdrawal, the date being left to the discretion of the Italians, and that after the Italian declaration the Führer intended on his part to proclaim that the question of Germany's return to the League of Nations was thereby definitely settled for us. On November 28, the Italian Ambassador informed us that the declara-

tion would be made after Stoyadinovich's visit to Rome. For the rest I refer to D.N.B. and Mussolini's speech.<sup>93a</sup>

WEIZSÄCKER

### No. 77

375/208794

#### *The German Foreign Ministry to the German Legation in the Union of South Africa*

Cipher Telegram

No. 93

BERLIN, December 14, 1937.

(Pol. X 5076 Ang. I)

With reference to your telegraphic report No. 67.<sup>94</sup>

Please hand to the Government to which you are accredited a note of approximately the following content:

Press reports of Smuts' statement at Bloemfontein have come to the attention of the German Government, to the effect that the German Government in the London Agreement of 1923 assented to the idea that the future of Southwest Africa lay with the Union.<sup>95</sup> The German Government cannot leave this view uncontradicted. Nothing is said in the text of the Agreement with regard to the future of Southwest Africa. The letter of the head of the German delegation annexed to the Agreement merely states as the opinion of the German Government that the future of Southwest Africa *now*, that is at the time of the conclusion of the Agreement, was bound up with that of the Union. That merely recognized the state of affairs brought about by the granting of the mandate to the Union. End of the note.

You are requested to send us by air mail the exact text of the note. We reserve a decision regarding possible publication.

WEIZSÄCKER

Transmitted December 14, at 10:50 p.m., by teleprinter.

<sup>93a</sup> For Mussolini's speech of December 11, 1937, announcing Italy's decision to withdraw from the League of Nations, see *Documents on International Affairs, 1937*, pp. 290-291.

<sup>94</sup> Not printed.

<sup>95</sup> For extracts from statements by General Smuts at Bloemfontein on December 2, 1937, see *Documents on International Affairs, 1937*, pp. 250-251. The London Agreement of October 23, 1923, is in the British White Paper, Cmd. 2220. The text of the letter sent by the head of the German delegation to General Smuts at the time of the London Agreement also appears in *Documents on International Affairs, loc. cit.*

## No. 78

875/208789

*Minute*

BERLIN, December 15, 1937.

The American Counselor of Embassy<sup>86</sup> was in London on private business recently and was, on this occasion, invited to confer with, among others, Vansittart.<sup>87</sup>

From his London impressions he gathered that there were still two different viewpoints in the Cabinet regarding the manner in which the Halifax conversations are to be continued. Eden's idea was to broaden the number of States participating in the conversations as soon as possible, above and beyond the four great Western Powers. The other group, the leader of which he stated was Sir Samuel Hoare, would like to proceed from bilateral German-British conversations merely to a four-power discussion. This difference as to procedure at the same time expressed the entire difference of political opinion between the two groups. Whether Chamberlain definitely sided with the Hoare group still appeared somewhat uncertain.

In the course of his rather lengthy description, Gilbert also called attention to the fact that we would have to observe and handle very carefully British public opinion, which had for years been nourished on the League of Nations ideology. In addition to our successful rejection, we should give it a constructive slogan. The elections, which will take place in about a year, required the Government to listen more than usual to public opinion.

In the course of the conversation I called Mr. Gilbert's attention to the planned pessimism disseminated in the Diplomatic Corps here (by the French Embassy), which is directed against Germany. He was quite familiar with it.

WEIZSÄCKER

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<sup>86</sup> Prentiss B. Gilbert.

<sup>87</sup> Sir Robert Vansittart, Permanent Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

## No. 79

2554/523765-66

*The German Minister in the Union of South Africa (Leitner) to  
the German Foreign Ministry*

Telegram

No. 69 of December 15      PRETORIA, December 16, 1937—10:55 a.m.  
Received December 16, 1937—4:55 p.m.

In continuation of my telegram No. 67.<sup>98</sup>

On the basis of my impressions thus far, I have the following conception of the attitude here toward the colonial question.

As far as the problem in general is concerned, the greater part of the public considers a settlement of the colonial question necessary. Only the liberalistic British elements maintain a negative attitude. Recently, however, the desire for a quick settlement has decreased appreciably. In view of the favorable developments in Europe, fears of warlike complications particularly have decreased and the primary motives for a colonial settlement, in order to prevent war, or to avoid participating in a British war, have faded into the background. At the same time, the nationalistic Boer elements, the very ones which are most strongly in favor of a settlement, are becoming more and more restrained in the course of the domestic political campaign.

As far as the specific aspects of the problem are concerned, on the other hand, the return of the mandated territory of Southwest Africa is rejected by the greater part of the public. Occasionally, the idea of a settlement by indemnification or compensation is entertained. Belief in the possibility of such a settlement has grown because there has recently been an increasing tendency to count on German readiness to compromise for a Central African colonial empire. There is a disposition on the part of some in the nationalist Boer camp to disinterest themselves regarding Southwest Africa. By leaning politically toward a German Southwest they believe they will obtain an unconditional guarantee of neutrality in the case of a British war, that they will facilitate a more independent position in relation to England for the Union and the incorporation of the protectorates, and that they will receive German support in the treatment of the race problem. But they do not like to admit this disinterestedness publicly and it might not be possible to put it into practice at the present time or in the near future, since, in view of the present prosperity of the territory, the conviction of the economic value of Southwest Africa is growing, since

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<sup>98</sup> Not printed.

there is widespread fear for military reasons of having Germany for a neighbor, and, last but not least, since the retention of Southwest Africa has now become a question of prestige for the Union. Relinquishment could probably be carried out . . . (group garbled) a strong Boer nationalistic government, which however, we can hardly expect for next year. Relinquishing Southwest Africa is being considered—in harmony with Pirow's<sup>99</sup> plans for the future—in connection with taking over the protectorates and England's retaining the Tanganyika territory. The opposition here to the return of the latter territory has stiffened very much since Italy established herself in Abyssinia.

It seems to me that a clarification of Germany's intentions regarding Southwest Africa would be very desirable, in order to dispel from the minds of the people here the idea of German readiness to compromise, to strengthen the undercurrents in the nationalistic camp and, above all, to reactivate support for settlement of the colonial question and to restore the pressure on London by the Union to this end. The most practical procedure would probably be, in case this fits into the whole framework of the treatment of the colonial question, an unequivocal statement of the demand for the return of the colonies in the form of a public declaration. Perhaps simultaneously a declaration to the effect that we are prepared to conclude a neutrality agreement or a nonaggression pact could be included.<sup>1</sup>

LEITNER

## No. 80

625/251534-37

*The German Ambassador in Austria (Papen) to the Head of the Political Department in the German Foreign Ministry (Weizsäcker)*

CONFIDENTIAL

VIENNA, December 16, 1937.  
(Pol. II 120)

DEAR HERR VON WEIZSÄCKER: I sent my Adjutant, Kageneck, to you in order to inform you briefly as to the result of my conversations, but I consider it important enough to revert to it once more by letter, particularly since Herr von Neurath is absent at the moment:

<sup>99</sup> Oswald Pirow, Minister for Defense of the Union of South Africa.

<sup>1</sup> The German has "*darin Aenderung werden*," obviously a mistake, possibly for "*darin abgegeben werden*." The whole text of this telegram suggests either very clumsy composition or faulty decoding.

1) My conversations with the Führer, which took place partly in the presence of Minister President Göring, produced in him the same reflections which we had talked over in the morning. It is to remain our aim to pursue a policy that will preclude a solution by force so long as such a solution is undesirable for European reasons. This then coincides completely with our wishes. For the rest, the Führer wishes to think over the situation thoroughly and asked me to see him at the Obersalzberg after New Year's in order to continue the conversation.

2) In the evening I called to see François-Poncet, in order to correct a report that had been circulated regarding my Paris visit and which was entirely contrary to fact. The Ambassador took the opportunity to tell me that he was very dejected because he had the feeling that our negotiations<sup>2</sup> with the Western Powers had again reached a standstill. I had the impression that the conversations which Flandin had in Berlin had left a very negative impression.<sup>3</sup> Flandin, as is well known, is very close to François-Poncet politically. He referred particularly to a statement that Reich Minister Dr. Goebbels had made to M. Flandin. To the latter's question as to whether Germany was not prepared to enter a completely modified League of Nations which had only something of the functions of a clearinghouse, Dr. Goebbels replied entirely in the negative. Germany had had enough of the collectivistic treatment of politics and considered such an instrument entirely superfluous.

François-Poncet said that while it was understandable that we should not wish to see the colonial question treated as a bargaining point, we had to realize that the countries ceding colonies wanted to place an equivalent of some kind on the other side of the scales. This equivalent could only be the strengthening of European peace. What remained of the Führer's promises, now that even a possible return to a modified League of Nations was out of the question? What troubled him, François-Poncet, was the observation that the German Foreign Minister seemed to be taking a much more pronounced stand during the past few weeks, to the detriment of the moderate position he had taken so far.<sup>4</sup>

I naturally tried to combat this pessimism in every way and said that the most urgent need was to continue the conversations. Within the framework of my personal task I then spoke of the cen-

<sup>2</sup> A marginal notation in Neurath's handwriting reads as follows: "Which?"

<sup>3</sup> A marginal notation in Neurath's handwriting reads as follows: "That is Flandin's fault."

<sup>4</sup> A marginal notation in Neurath's handwriting reads as follows: "I am only protesting against the attempt of the French to prevent any evolution at all."

tral European situation and presented the viewpoint which, as you know from my letter, I also supported in Paris. François-Poncet thereupon expressed the wish that we again call attention to this view, through conversations in Paris by our Ambassador, too, if possible<sup>5</sup> (maintenance of the July 11 Agreement and of evolutionary development), so that one would at least get the impression that in central European matters the German attitude was not as impossible to define as was now claimed on all sides.<sup>6</sup>

Personally, I also believe that it would be useful to explain this standpoint officially in Paris, if only to provide ourselves with the necessary alibi of which we spoke the day before yesterday.

I should appreciate hearing whether the views in Berlin coincide with mine and remain, with best regards and best wishes for a merry Christmas,

Yours,

FRANZ PAPEN

P.S. Please tell Herr von Mackensen that I regretted very much that it was physically impossible for me to look him up between the various conversations of the day before yesterday, since the Führer summoned me to luncheon instead of at 5 o'clock.

## No. 81

375/208800-03

*The German Ambassador in Great Britain (Ribbentrop) to the  
German Foreign Ministry*

Telegram

VERY SECRET

LONDON, December 17, 1937—12:15 a.m.

No. 775 of December 16

Received December 17, 1937—4:20 p.m.

For the Führer and the Foreign Minister.

Yesterday I had a long conversation with Chamberlain the content of which I sum up as follows:

1. To begin with I asked what impression Chamberlain had of the Halifax visit. He said that he was satisfied about the result of the visit since he and his colleagues in the Cabinet now had a better understanding of the Führer's attitude toward current problems because of Halifax's personal contact with him.

2. Sentiment in Parliament was favorable toward a settlement with Germany. He had noticed this recently when the communiqué regarding the Chautemps visit was read. At the passage in

<sup>5</sup> A marginal notation in Weizsäcker's handwriting reads as follows: "The Führer already told Halifax this, and the latter has surely transmitted it to the French."

<sup>6</sup> A marginal notation in Neurath's handwriting reads as follows: "We can do that, but it will be useless."

which Germany's colonial claim was mentioned favorably, not a word of protest had been raised; in view of the previous strong opposing tendencies in Parliament, this was a remarkable change. When I asked what sort of proposals would be made to us, Chamberlain answered that this question was being carefully studied at the moment and could not be definitely stated at the present time. The study of the colonial question took time, so that we would probably not be able to discuss it further before February or March.

3. Chamberlain firmly contradicted my allusion to Delbos' trip to the East and my remark to the effect that the visit of the French Minister had perhaps not exactly promoted London's efforts toward a settlement. The Delbos trip had been planned for a long time and the sensible attitude of the French had surprised him.

4. Chamberlain brought up the subject of England's desire for limitation of armaments. He had been happy to take up the Führer's idea regarding limitation of aerial warfare and believed that a qualitative limitation of bombing, for example, and also of the types of bombers themselves was perhaps a feasible method of initiating the limitation of armaments. This question was also being studied by the experts at the present time. Chamberlain mentioned further that the quantitative limitation of armaments would probably be very difficult.

5. Then the conversation turned to central European questions, in which connection I called attention to the fact that here Germany had settled her affairs by direct agreements. In the further course of the conversation I asked Chamberlain how he stood with regard to the Austrian problem and what he thought of the situation of the Sudeten German minority, for example. Chamberlain did not discuss this in detail, merely stating briefly that if we were to start conversations we would probably be able to find a solution for this question. Later he referred to Germany's repeated assurances of European peace and expressed the opinion that the question might perhaps be raised whether these might be formalized. I did not press the matter further, but confined myself to stating that I hoped that problems which were difficult or perhaps even insoluble at this time would not again in some way or other be coupled with the solution of the colonial problem. This would certainly lead us into another blind alley.

6. At the very beginning of our conversation I had called Chamberlain's attention to the Führer's favorable attitude toward England, recently proclaimed, and to the frequently neglected opportunities for a German-British understanding offered England by

the Führer in recent years. The Naval Agreement was the only positive result, but the more moderate attitude of the Führer which was expressed in it and which spoke for itself had apparently met with no understanding in England. All offers had been declined by the British Government, probably under the influence of circles which did not desire an understanding with Germany or for some reason unknown to us did not consider it possible. These and similar arguments appeared to make a certain impression on Chamberlain, for he eagerly assured me that it was a well-known fact that he was not one of those who considered an understanding with Germany to be impossible. He understood completely the symbolical significance of the Naval Agreement. The latter had been criticized severely in England, but he was not one of the critics. We would now have to consider the future and determine whether an understanding could be reached; he thought that it could. Here I agreed with him decidedly and stated that I was also thoroughly in agreement with his realistic opinion that there was no reason why the Berlin-Rome Axis could not reach an understanding with the London-Paris Axis. Chamberlain did not pursue this thought further.

7. Toward the end of the conversation I mentioned once again that here in this country as well as in France, whose Government was still dependent on Communists (whereupon Chamberlain interrupted by saying that the present French Government was better than any of the previous ones), there were many elements that did not desire an understanding and that therefore it would not be an easy matter to prevail against such opposition. To this Chamberlain replied with a spontaneous gesture that he was resolved to continue his initiative. In reply, I maintained that in my opinion only a very generous attitude toward German interests could finally lead to an understanding, whereupon Chamberlain again stated that sentiment in Parliament was favorable toward the return of the colonies, but that the British people expected from him some sort of international arrangement for the stabilization of peace; otherwise sentiment in regard to the colonial question could easily shift again. Chamberlain then said that, above all else, it was now necessary to have patience, for we had a long and difficult job ahead of us; he asked me to communicate this attitude of his to the Führer. He had noted with satisfaction that since the Halifax visit the German press had not been so persistent in regard to the colonial question; he requested calm treatment of it in the immediate future, too, in order that the possible reaction of British public opinion toward the attitude of the German press might not

make the solution of the problem more difficult for him.

Chamberlain, like Eden, expects to be absent from London till the latter half or the end of January. He requested me to call on him again after my return from Berlin; perhaps he could tell me more then.

The discussion, incidentally, was carried on in the most friendly manner, and Chamberlain was apparently at pains to demonstrate good will—by referring, for example, to our first conversation this summer at the Embassy, at which time he promised his full support for a German-British understanding. He claimed that this was still his stand today.

RIBBENTROP

## No. 82

621/250491-92

*Memorandum by the Chief of the Presidential Chancellery  
(Meissner)*

BERLIN, December 17, 1937.

The Führer and Chancellor today received the chairman of the *Comité Franco-Allemand*, Scapini, the representative of the blind veterans of the league of ex-servicemen, whom the Führer knew from a previous meeting at Godesberg.

The conversation, which lasted over three-quarters of an hour and which I attended as interpreter, covered Lord Halifax's visit to Germany and the discussions in the French press regarding this visit, German-French relations in general, and the League of Nations and its situation, which was rendered more difficult by the withdrawal of Italy.

With reference to Halifax's visit, the Führer came out sharply against the lies that the foreign, particularly the French press, published in connection with this visit. Such press campaigns destroyed the value of direct discussions. As to Germany's relations with France, the Führer emphasized that after the return of the Saar there was no longer anything that could come between Germany and France. On the question of the League of Nations, the Führer expressed himself very definitely to the effect that, since (aside from America) three great powers had withdrawn, the League of Nations had lost its significance; the smaller states continued to belong only because they had to, and Soviet Russia had no other aim than to make the League of Nations serve its own purposes.

To a question of Scapini's, the Führer replied that the League of Nations could not summon the strength from within for a reorganization because unanimity was necessary for that, and the dissenting vote of Russia alone would prevent any reform. The only possible course would be that the League of Nations dissolve, just as a commercial company that is collapsing enters into liquidation, and that the attempt then be made to put another organization in its place.

MEISSNER

No. 83

625/251519-26

*Memorandum*

BERLIN, December 17, 1937.

(Pol. II 3417)

The French Ambassador, who called on me today on another matter, at the beginning of the conversation handed me the enclosed memorandum on Léon Blum's conversation of May 28 with Reich Minister Schacht. He had received it recently from Léon Blum after "repeated urging," as he expressed it. Even if, the Ambassador said, this memorandum possessed only historical value now (since not only had we not followed up the conversation, but our attitude on the decisive questions had stiffened perceptibly),<sup>7</sup> it was perhaps of interest to the Foreign Minister to know what impression of that conversation had remained with Blum. To my question with respect to the origin of the memorandum, François-Poncet stated that, immediately after the conversation with Herr Schacht, M. Blum had made detailed notes which formed the basis of this memorandum. It had by no means been written only recently.

If he assumed that this memorandum would be of interest to us, it was partly because the communiqué on the London conference of November 30—which had been interpreted much too negatively by us, as he had already repeatedly stressed to me—contained several ideas which Blum had expressed at that time. The latter had at that time conducted the conversation with Schacht in the belief that he was speaking to a representative of the Reich Government authorized to conduct such a conversation. As things developed further, the French had, however, gained the impression

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<sup>7</sup> A marginal notation in Neurath's handwriting reads as follows: "I cannot understand how Blum or Poncelet could think that this vague conversation could serve as the basis for negotiations."

that the Reich Government had not acknowledged the ideas developed by Herr Schacht.

The Ambassador concluded this portion of his remarks with the rather doleful assertion that, so far as he could see, the days of the Halifax visit and the London conversations had left behind hardly anything but a certain possibility of making some small progress in the field of armaments.

The Ambassador requested that the enclosure be treated in strict confidence and expressed his personal opinion to the effect that he was anxious only to inform the Foreign Minister, but that he by no means cared to have the Blum memorandum also come to the attention of Minister Schacht.

MACKENSEN<sup>8</sup>

[Enclosure]

*Conversation of Dr. Schacht with M. Léon Blum on May 28, 1937<sup>9</sup>*

CONFIDENTIAL

Dr. Schacht arrived al' smiles; he began by congratulating himself on the conclusion of the commercial treaty, saying: "Well, that's that! That is something gained. It's a matter that has been dragging on for several years. I am glad it is settled, and settled while I am in Paris and coming from London."

I also congratulated myself upon this and alluded to the speech he had just made at the *Comité France-Allemagne* luncheon.

He said to me: "Do you think we can now take a few steps forward?"

I asked him to allow me to speak to him as freely, as straightforwardly, as sincerely, as I had done at the time of our conversations in August.

Not only did he authorize me to do so, but he replied that only conversations that were free, straightforward, and sincere could advance matters between our two countries.

The result was a rather long monologue.

I told him that there was a personal matter which I wished to settle with him. Repeatedly, especially in his conversations with Poncet, he had referred to the failure or miscarriage of the conversations at Paris last winter. He had repeated that he had brought to them great offers which had been rejected; that, on December 18,

<sup>8</sup> A marginal notation in Weizsäcker's handwriting reads as follows: "Via the Head of Political Department to Pol. II for the purpose of supplementing our last instructions to Paris. Blum's memorandum confirms our conception in every respect."

<sup>9</sup> The original of this document is in French.

I had cut everything short and closed the account. Now, I wished to point out to him that I had faithfully performed the mission which I had undertaken and which was nevertheless difficult and ticklish; that he himself had been somewhat mistaken when he assured me that I should find the British Government much better disposed, at least in private, than I might imagine as far as the colonial question was concerned. It was not true, moreover, that my conversation of December 18 with Count Welczeck had put an abrupt end to everything. And I remarked that this conversation had been followed, on the contrary, by Mr. Eden's speech at Leamington<sup>10</sup> and my speech at Lyon.<sup>11</sup> Now, the only answer that Mr. Eden received was criticisms in a slightly sardonic tone. And to me, I said, no answer at all had been given.

Yes, Schacht interrupted, the silence——

Complete silence.

But is it true, I retorted, that the August conversation produced no result? You met Leith-Ross,<sup>12</sup> with whom you had a long conference on the same subject. There you contemplated a three-sided conversation, to which we immediately consented. And quite recently you again assured me that you were ready to accept such contact.

Now, you know the British position and ours with respect to the basic question. I explained it clearly to Poncet and to Count Welczeck. It is impossible for any of us to begin the conversation with colonial claims put forward as a sort of preliminary question. In our opinion, on the contrary, the preliminary operation should be to find out whether a settlement on the political plane is possible. It is the principle which was laid down in my speech at Lyon and which nobody can find strange. How can a country be expected to contemplate economic conventions capable of increasing the strength of another country which it fears may be an aggressor?

I am delighted, moreover, to think that this fundamental difficulty has apparently disappeared, for, in view of the statements that Herr von Neurath made in Berlin, and Marshal von Blomberg<sup>13</sup> in London, and of what you yourself said in your speech this afternoon, there is no longer any question of presenting the colonial claim as a preliminary question. It is the political settlement that should be examined first of all. We shall go on to economic

<sup>10</sup> Mr. Eden's speech at Leamington was made on November 20, 1936. For extracts see *Documents on International Affairs, 1936* (London, 1937), pp. 260-263.

<sup>11</sup> M. Blum's speech at Lyon made on January 24, 1937. For extracts see *Documents on International Affairs, 1937*, pp. 192-196.

<sup>12</sup> Sir Frederick William Leith-Ross, chief economic adviser to the British Government.

<sup>13</sup> Field Marshal Werner von Blomberg, German War Minister.

facilities, to supplies of raw materials, to all such problems, when we feel that the political settlement is possible.

Schacht replied: "Those are questions of method, they are not essential."

I resumed: We have never hesitated to speak of the political settlement; nor do we hesitate to do so now. In your speech of this afternoon, as in the conversation of last August, you brought up three subjects:

A general European plan,  
Limitation of armaments,  
Return of Germany to the League of Nations.

Schacht: On the question of the limitation of armaments, the Führer has already made formal declarations.

Well, let us begin the conversation, let us try to find what specific conclusions we can arrive at and how they can be integrated into a whole.

As to a general settlement, there must be no ambiguity.

We have been engaged in diplomatic conversations with you since July. It is possible that we shall arrive at an agreement on the Belgian matter. And I think that the negotiations can be continued as far as the "new Locarno" is concerned. But do you wish us to ask ourselves what a "new Locarno" means for France, what it does for France, the British guarantee? No need of a new Locarno for that—

Here I made a rather emphatic digression. Since it is a question of our relations with England, there are two illusions that Berlin must give up: the first is that they will succeed in separating Great Britain and France; the second is that, through a latent revolutionary crisis, France is being destroyed as a factor in European affairs. It must not be imagined that France is disintegrating—she will not cease to be a political factor in Europe. Many a time this has been imagined to be the case in the past; the same illusion was entertained on the eve of the 1914 war. Not at all! I do not know what the future of our Government will be; I do not know how the political situation will evolve; but France will not disintegrate; whatever happens, she will remain what she is in Europe!

Schacht answered that he had never had any such idea.

Your press, however, expresses it every day.

We shall speak of the press presently.

I for one have a very strong feeling that France will remain one of the prime movers in European politics. It is necessary to get rid of any idea to the contrary. It is necessary to get rid also

of the idea that a division is possible between England and us. There is no need to speculate on that. Your press repeats daily that we are the slaves of England; no, we are not a servile government; but it is true that we, England and France, are trying insofar as possible to coordinate our actions. This union, I am quite convinced, is in the nature of things a necessity, and I am convinced that the situation will be greatly clarified on the day when Germany considers this an established fact. Consequently, so far as England's assistance is concerned in case of aggression against us, a new Locarno would be no gain for us. Or do you think that we expect from it the guarantee or the assistance of Italy?

Oh! we know that Italy is not always a very reliable ally!

Well then, I repeat, what is a Locarno for us? What will it do for us? What can we expect of it except a general settlement or at least the preparation for such a settlement? As I told you in August, we are no longer in the period when the peace of Europe depended solely on a *rapprochement* between Germany and France. There was a time when that condition was sufficient; that time has passed. In the period when that was the sole condition, I worked for a *rapprochement* with all my might. But if it is no longer a sufficient condition, it is still a necessary condition. Therefore, if it is a question of creating between France and Germany relations which make it possible to establish a European peace, we are always ready.

You know France. You have an Ambassador here who observes with impartiality, intelligence, and sympathy. You know that France never desired peace with as much unanimity as today; and she knows that *rapprochement* between France and Germany is a condition of peace. But it is impossible for us to conceive of commitments between Germany and us that disregard the rest of Europe, and that will paralyze us in any European conflicts in which our vital interests or our signature might be at stake. That is the sum and substance of the matter.<sup>14</sup>

France cannot make commitments with Germany which will forbid her to intervene whenever such action is dictated either by respect for the Covenant of the League of Nations or by her special obligations.

He interrupted me to tell me that all this could be arranged. We had thought, he told me, that a Locarno was the prelude to a general settlement. And then he asked me how I myself conceived of the compatibility between the obligations that link us to certain powers and the Franco-German obligations.

<sup>14</sup> This sentence has been underlined and a marginal notation in Weizsäcker's handwriting reads, "it is."

Perhaps, I replied, by means of other pacts of nonaggression.

Let us now speak, I resumed, of the League of Nations. You said a word about it to me in August and you did not then show aversion toward returning to a League of Nations which would be "divorced from the Treaty of Versailles." Now, on the contrary, your position seems to me entirely negative. You speak of a League of Nations which is not a court of justice, which does not pronounce judgment, which does not decree penalties, in short, which is divested of all that in the least resembles a system of collective security. That is quite a different story. Well, how do you conceive of it?

We [the Germans] conceive of a League of Nations which would be a place of reunion, of contact, of negotiation. I believe that if a League of Nations such as that had existed in 1914, the war would not have taken place, because the very rule of a League such as we conceive of it would be that all the Nations forbid each other to resort to war without prior contact and consultation.

In short, what you want is to reduce the capital of the League of Nations in order to save it. I can use this expression with a businessman as astute as you. But there is one thing on which there must be no misunderstanding; neither France nor Great Britain, I believe, will accept a League of Nations not only reduced to its lowest terms in the present but deprived of all capacity for development in the future. As for us, we are concerned with preserving not only the present existence but also the future existence of an international community. That is a powerful sentiment in England as it is in France, perhaps rather diluted in the rest of Europe, but one which was suddenly seen to crystallize at the beginning of the Ethiopian affair. You probably consider me a little sentimental on this subject; for us, this sentimental hope is an important reality.

Schacht asked me: How do you think the conversation can begin, in practice, on these points?

I replied: "On these three agreed subjects:

General settlement of European problems,  
General limitation of armament,  
Conditions for Germany's entry into the League of Nations.

We are ready to come to an understanding. I have indicated to you the points on which it is impossible for us to abandon our present attitude. On all others you will find complete good will on our part."<sup>15</sup>

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<sup>15</sup> The quotation is not closed in the original.

Tell me exactly, Schacht said to me. I am returning to Germany. May I report this conversation to my Führer?

Certainly.

If the Führer deems that on this basis a contact can be established, the conversation can develop on the diplomatic plane. It can start as soon as we have recognized that we are in agreement on the basic directions. From that moment the conversations could be conducted simultaneously in the political sphere and in the economic sphere.

Undoubtedly.

And if we begin this conversation, it will not mean that we Germans abandon our economic and colonial demands?

In this regard, you are free as we are; you commit yourself to nothing and we commit ourselves to nothing; it is not an implied renunciation on your part.

I believe, he concluded, that our conversation is important.

I believe you will realize that I have done everything that I could in order that we might reach an agreement.

At the end of the conversation we discussed the press. He spoke in a sardonic tone of their own and of ours. I interrupted him to say that they were not the same thing: ours was a free press, his notoriously and publicly took its cue from politics.

He then said: With us it is a means of government; with you it is an obstacle to government.

There is something in that. And since it is so, what comparison can be made between an article which, with us, from time to time appears in one newspaper or another, and your campaigns, methodical, systematic in attack and, sometimes, in defamation? Do not push me too hard to tell you what I think of it and what you, in your conscience, think of it yourself—

"If we enter into a conversation of this nature it will be necessary to close the discussion," he replied smiling.

The conversation developed in such a way that it was I who spoke nearly all the time.

I cannot remember now when I alluded to yesterday's speech by Delbos. He told me that he had not yet read it.

## No. 84

2127/463194-204

### *Second Secret Protocol*

In accordance with the instructions issued to them by their Governments, the Chairman of the German Governmental Committee and the Chairman of the Italian Governmental Committee

for the regulation of economic relations between Germany and Italy, advised by several members of the Committees and by several experts, continued the discussion, begun at Munich, of the question of how Germany and Italy may, to a greater extent than at present, provide special mutual assistance in the economic field during normal and abnormal times, and of what can be done in normal times to prepare for such assistance in special cases.

These discussions have led to the following result:

1. The Chairmen of the two Governmental Committees, as provided in paragraph 1 of the Secret Protocol of May 14, 1937, exchanged the lists of goods which each country desires to order from the other. After having examined these lists, they determined the extent to which the wishes of each can be fulfilled.

Thereupon it was agreed that deliveries provided for in the annexed lists A and B will be made in 1938 and partly in 1939. The additional deliveries provided for during abnormal times by each side appear in the other annexed lists, C and D.

In calculating, on the basis of the year 1937, the extent to which carrying out the deliveries provided for in lists A and B will cause a dislocation in the mutual exchange of goods, it has been determined that in 1938 Germany will make additional deliveries to Italy in the amount of 30 million Reichsmarks (228.9 million lire) and that Italy will make additional deliveries to Germany in the amount of 10.64 million Reichsmarks (81.2 million lire). Since, in accordance with other agreements, a special settlement is to be made for a part of these additional deliveries of Italian goods, valued at about 8.4 million Reichsmarks (64.1 million lire), the favorable balance of Germany will be 27.76 million Reichsmarks (211.8 million lire). The German Government has agreed to make available for the settlement of this balance:

Additional funds for German travel to Italy which will make up the difference between the amount obtained by setting aside 10 percent of the estimated German exports and the total sum of 47 million Reichsmarks (338 million lire), i.e., approximately 15.5 million Reichsmarks (118.3 million lire);

In addition, the amount of 6 million Reichsmarks (45.8 million lire) for the transfer to Italy of the savings of migratory Italian agricultural workers in Germany;

both in conformity with the other agreements concluded this day.

An additional sum of 6.26 million Reichsmarks (47.7 million lire), which represents the balance in favor of Germany remaining after the above arrangements, will be reserved for use in 1938 by joint agreement of the Chairmen of the two Governmental Committees.

The basis upon which the volume of additional deliveries was determined, in relation to the normal deliveries, appears from the calculation in annex 1. For the last quarter of 1937 only estimated figures were available for this computation. The Chairmen of the two Governmental Committees therefore reserve the right to review this computation as soon as the final figures for 1937 are available. If substantial deviations from the estimated figures should result, the two Chairmen will jointly determine whether and what changes in the agreements reached in this Protocol are required.

The discussion of the method by which the balance of payments for the deliveries provided for in lists C and D is to be effected is reserved.

2. The Chairman of the German Governmental Committee states that the examination of the transportation question had the following provisional result:

It must be assumed that in the given case shipments could be made only via Austria, and perhaps via Switzerland. In Austria, in addition to the Brenner, only the Tauern Railroad can be considered, and no other routes to Vienna via Czechoslovakia. Accordingly, the capacity of the routes through Switzerland and Austria is determined by the load-carrying capacity of the Gotthard, Brenner, and Tauern Passes. If some civilian traffic (passenger trains) is maintained, these Passes can carry the following maximum volume of commercial shipments to Italy:

Route	Million Tons Yearly
a. Basel-Gotthard-Milan, 10,000 tons daily.....or approx. 3	
b. Kufstein-Innsbruck-Brenner, 6,500 tons daily.....“ “ 1.95	
c. Salzburg-Tauern-Tarvisio, 4,500 tons daily (single track)....“ “ 1.35	

The total yearly capacity of these routes, therefore, is approximately 6-6½ million tons net, if Switzerland and Austria are open, and 3-3½ million tons net, if only Austria is open.

A necessary prerequisite is that the locomotives and operating personnel required for the transit traffic are available in Switzerland and Austria.

For the evaluation of the above figures it is pointed out that in 1935, for instance, 8 million tons of coal were shipped from Germany to Italy, of which 1.8 million tons were shipped by railroad and 6.2 million tons by sea.

Since in the given case the use of the direct sea route cannot be relied upon, the transportation of coal, except by railroad, would be possible only via Belgian and Dutch ports. However, it must be anticipated that this route will not be available either.

Examination of the question of the extent to which the load on the Tauern Railroad could be lessened by using the Danubian route as far as Vienna, showed that no appreciable relief can be expected, because in the given case the shipping facilities of the Danubian route between Regensburg and Vienna, with a present capacity of about 4-5,000 tons daily, would presumably be taxed to capacity by shipments from the Southeast vital to both countries.

Even if the highways in question were considerably expanded, only very small quantities and a few high-priority goods very urgently required could be shipped by the land route because of the shortage of transportation equipment.

The Chairman of the Italian Governmental Committee states that the competent Italian authorities have begun a very careful investigation of the transportation problem, with particular attention to the necessity of maintaining shipments from other countries also. The Italians have arrived at a result which is even more unfavorable than that indicated by the above-mentioned provisional German figures. However, it will be necessary to reexamine the estimates and to determine whether and to what extent the transportation facilities indicated by the German findings can be utilized.

3. As regards the question of granting patents or licenses it is noted that general decisions on this point cannot be made at the present time and that the Chairmen of the two Governmental Committees will consult each other regularly in each individual case that comes up.

4. The Chairman of the German Governmental Committee states that in Germany a large number of agricultural workers would be needed in the given case and that, if Italy were able to supply them, up to 200,000 workers could be employed in Germany.

The Chairman of the Italian Governmental Committee states that for the given case Italy, in the present state of her industrial development, wishes to obtain several hundred highly qualified specialists in certain industrial fields, to be designated more specifically at the proper time.

Signed at Rome in two originals each, in the German and Italian languages, on December 18, 1937.

[Signature illegible in copy  
from the files of the Rome  
Embassy, the only copy which  
has been found.]

GIANNINI

## LIST A

## ITALIAN DELIVERIES TO GERMANY IN NORMAL TIMES

## 1) Deliveries in 1938 including stockpiling:

	For use Tons	For stockpiling Tons	Total Tons
Rice	62,500	0	62,500
Hemp & hemp oakum	25,300	2,500	27,800
Cheese	425	0	425
Skins and hides	4,200	0	4,200
Bauxite	100,000	50,000	150,000
Pyrites	85,000	0	85,000
Zinc ore	10,000	10,000	20,000
Mercury	500	150	650
Sulphur	40,000	20,000	60,000
Tartar	1,500	2,500	4,000
Raw silk	780	0	780
Floss silk not dyed; plain or thrown silk	200	0	200
Hackled hemp	3,000	500	3,500

## 2) Extraordinary deliveries in 1939 (for stockpiling):

	Tons
Bauxite	50,000
Mercury	150
Sulphur	20,000

## LIST B

## GERMAN DELIVERIES TO ITALY IN NORMAL TIMES

## 1) Deliveries in 1938 including stockpiling:

	For use Tons	For stockpiling Tons	Total Tons
Coal	7,000,000	2,000,000	9,000,000
Magnesium	0	1,500	1,500
Toluol	0	3,000	3,000
Acetone	0	900	900

## 2) Extraordinary deliveries in 1939 (for stockpiling):

	Tons
Coal	2,000,000
Magnesium	1,500
Toluol	3,000
Acetone	900

## LIST C

## ITALIAN DELIVERIES TO GERMANY IN ABNORMAL TIMES (ANNUALLY)

	Tons
Hemp & hemp oakum	25,000
Cheese	2,000
Skins and hides	4,200
Bauxite	150,000
Pyrite	100,000
Zinc ore	20,000
Mercury	600
Sulphur	50,000
Tartar	1,500
Raw silk	500
Floss silk not dyed; plain or thrown	200
Hackled hemp	2,500

## LIST D

## GERMAN DELIVERIES TO ITALY IN ABNORMAL TIMES (ANNUALLY)

	Tons
Coal	8,000,000
Thomas steel in the form of rolling-mill products	1,000,000

Thomas steel may, if necessary, be delivered half in rolling-mill products and half in pig iron.

## LIST 1

COMPUTATION OF THE VALUE OF THE ADDITIONAL IMPORTS BY EACH SIDE  
IN 1938 AS COMPARED WITH 1937:

	Quantity of additional imports	Value in millions of Reichsmarks
A) ITALIAN IMPORTS FROM GERMANY:		
Coal	1,779,000 tons	24.90
Magnesium	1,500 "	3.75
Toluol	3,000 "	0.90
Acetone	900 "	0.45
		<hr/> 30.00
B) GERMAN IMPORTS FROM ITALY:		
Hemp and hemp oakum	1,370 tons	0.98
Skins	2,330 "	3.80
Bauxite	35,600 "	0.62
Zinc ore	14,800 "	0.90
Sulphur	27,200 "	1.52
Tartar	2,800 "	1.09
Raw silk	85 "	1.00
Hackled hemp	730 "	0.73
		<hr/> 10.64

## No. 85

740/267848

*The German Minister in Yugoslavia (Heeren) to the German Foreign Ministry*

Telegram

BELGRADE, December 19, 1937.  
(Pol. II 3375)

The Minister President expressed himself to me as on the whole satisfied with the course and the results of Delbos' visit. He believed that Delbos had left Belgrade with greater understanding for Yugoslav policy; this was also revealed by the friendly attitude of the French press. The question of the mutual assistance pact had been touched upon by Delbos only in that he mentioned as his impression of the Rumanian position that they were fundamentally prepared to conclude a pact but felt that they were prevented by the Yugoslav refusal; independent action on the part of Rumania would mean the dissolution of the Little Entente. Stoyadinovich, smiling, replied that that was typically Antonescu. Aside from this exchange, in talking with Delbos, Stoyadinovich had treated the question of the pact as if it had been settled by the Paris conversations. To the comment that Stoyadinovich seemed to have encouraged Mussolini to withdraw from the League of Nations, the Minister President replied that this opinion of his influence upon the policy of a great power was very flattering to him, but was unfortunately not in accordance with the facts.

From the total course of the conversation with Delbos, the Minister President received the impression that France is more ready for an understanding with Germany than has heretofore been the case, but believes as ever that she must stand firmly behind Czechoslovakia.

HEEREN

## No. 86

905/293731-38

*Memorandum*

SECRET

BERLIN, December 20, 1937.

The procedure recommended by Herr von Rintelen at the end of the enclosed memorandum presupposes a certain amount of time to spare. And we can probably count on that for the time being.

We ourselves are not yet strong enough to engage in European conflicts and shall therefore not seek any. Italy can and must be

restrained by Berlin from engaging in any adventures<sup>16</sup> if she should be so inclined. The group of powers confronting us has for the time being no inclination toward armed conflict, provided we do not overstep our boundaries. That all speaks for continued peace in Europe.

But the time granted us is perhaps not unlimited. Opinions differ as to whether time is in our favor or not. The military and economic power of Germany is hardly growing faster than that of our presumable opponents; for the latter have the greater staying power.

In order a few years hence to enjoy a stronger international position than today, we therefore need to improve our *political* position. This will not come to us automatically. We shall not come to an agreement and peaceful relations with France so long as she is not prepared to give up her attempts to threaten Germany from the East by alliances. England is today still undecided<sup>17</sup> as to whether or not she should buy peace in Europe by making concessions to Germany. It must be doubted whether a suitable price can be agreed on. But our attitude will have to be decided independently of these doubts. Keeping England in a state of vacillation as long as possible<sup>18</sup> is certainly to be preferred to a condition of definite British hostility toward us.

Herewith submitted to the State Secretary.

WEIZSÄCKER

[Enclosure]

#### MEMORANDUM

SECRET

If the information which Lord Halifax gave us during his visit and the reports of the results of the London conversations between England and France are examined from the point of view of the extent to which they indicate a change in the attitude of the two great Western European Powers toward Germany which could be interpreted as progress compared with the previous state of affairs, the following becomes apparent:

1. Obvious progress in the British attitude is to be noted above all in the fact that, according to the statements of Lord Halifax,

<sup>16</sup> A typed marginal notation reads as follows: "Comment by the Foreign Minister: 'After the assurances Mussolini has given, I have no fear of that.'"

<sup>17</sup> A typed marginal notation reads as follows: "Comment by the Foreign Minister: 'The decision will depend on developments in the Far East.'"

<sup>18</sup> A typed marginal notation reads as follows: "Comment by the Foreign Minister: 'and not eliminating the present areas of friction in the Mediterranean and the Far East too quickly.'"

the territorial *status quo* in Europe and in the world is no longer to be excluded from discussions between the Governments. To be sure, the condition is made that the changes must be brought about in a peaceful manner, but nothing is said, any more, regarding article 19 of the League of Nations Covenant.

That the British Government also took this attitude in the conversations with Chautemps and Delbos is shown by Eden's statements to Herr von Ribbentrop and M. Grandi. If M. Delbos, too, then emphasized to the Reich Foreign Minister that France had no intention of obstructing Germany's foreign policy, this can only mean that Germany is to be allowed freedom of action within certain limits. Article 19 of the Geneva Covenant, which is thus being sacrificed for all practical purposes, was intended to bring about precisely this obstruction.

2. Although, now as before, it is stated that concessions to Germany are possible only within the framework of a general settlement, the list of desiderata to be expected from England and France in order to effect such a general settlement has obviously shrunk a great deal. No longer is a complicated system of pacts being spoken of, as it still was in 1935; even the idea of a Western pact is no longer mentioned. Reentry into the League of Nations likewise no longer appears to be a necessary prerequisite for an understanding. The talk of our abandoning our economic policy, as was demanded by England and France early this year, has likewise ceased. What has remained is the desire for an armaments agreement between Germany, England, and France, for one thing, and then the demand that any change of the present situation take place only by peaceful means. This latter demand may, of course, easily find concrete expression in a request for nonaggression pacts to be concluded by Germany with those of her neighbors with whom she does not already have such. Once before, at the end of 1935, Laval, the French Premier at the time, designated a German promise of nonaggression as the minimum which France would have to demand as a condition for an understanding.

In regard to the demand for a general settlement, the statement made to the German Foreign Minister by M. Delbos when passing through Berlin is of fundamental importance. According to this statement France does not demand the simultaneous settlement of all issues, but is prepared to bring about this settlement by stages. That is something which M. Delbos, by the way, already proposed a year ago—at that time, in a completely unsubstantiated form. It will be advisable to commit our opponents, if possible, to this definition by M. Delbos of the term "general settlement."

3. Remarkable among Lord Halifax's statements, in comparison with previous suggestions, was the proposal to seek an understanding among the four Powers, Germany, England, France, and Italy, while respecting the Berlin-Rome and London-Paris Axes. In practice, this would mean a return to the principle of Mussolini's Four Power Pact of 1933. At that time the basic idea was diluted and adulterated by France. What France's attitude is now with regard to her allies remains to be seen. The danger of isolation which this principle implies for Soviet Russia can only be welcomed by us. As a matter of principle, we are, of course, advocating the view today that central European questions do not concern the two Western Powers, while in other questions it is we who must insist on the inclusion of other powers, in connection with armament questions, for example, which cannot be settled within the four-power framework alone. But whatever these details may be, a significant loosening up is to be noted in comparison with the rigid "Geneva framework" of former years.

By way of summary it may be stated that the present attitude of England and France is much more accommodating than the attitude that these powers thought they could maintain as recently as the beginning of this year. The principal reason for this is, no doubt, the recognition that the methods used so far will not in the long run prevent a serious conflict, but must, on the contrary, actually bring it about. In addition, in the case of France, there is the consciousness that her military position in Europe has today become weaker, particularly since the occupation of the Rhineland in March of last year. This does not hold true of France's own defenses, but it does hold true of the possibilities of employing them and of the certainty with which Paris can count on the help of third powers.

What France is afraid of today is a conflict in which she might become involved solely because of her treaties of alliance, without being herself attacked. She cannot, of course, free herself from these alliances, because she herself attaches too much importance to them and in case of need definitely wants to be able to count on them, something which she can only do, however, if she herself proves a faithful ally. But the prospect of a war in support of Czechoslovakia against Germany, for example, in which only Soviet Russia, obviously much weakened by Stalin's policy of executions, would be obligated to assist, is not very tempting to France. Even so, if things became serious, Paris would of course not simply be resigned to its fate, but on the contrary would go to any lengths to promote what has been the ultimate goal of all French foreign

policy in case of failure of the attempts to come to an understanding with Germany: collective action. While this has failed twice in recent years—against Italy and Japan—it has in both cases failed mainly because there was no willingness really to apply it. In the Abyssinian conflict, England was quite prepared to utilize the League of Nations machinery to bring Italy to her knees; it was Paris, as a matter of fact, that prevented this from happening. But Paris, together with England, believes that it is today still in a position to checkmate any possible aggressor, particularly in Europe, by the employment of this machinery. The need felt in Paris today for the closest association with England and the willingness to subordinate other aims to this collaboration with England no doubt rests in large part on such considerations. It is apparent from this that in case of serious conflict, just as in the Rhineland conflict last year, the attitude of France will again ultimately depend on the decision of the London Cabinet.

British policy today proceeds on the thesis that it is possible to do complete justice to German grievances by peaceful means. Whether this is possible is to be determined by means of negotiation. If Germany rejects a test of the correctness of this thesis, it is to be expected that England will then draw all the closer to France and will one day be more yielding to French pressure than in March of last year. That the British at that time, and the whole world in the end, did accept German rearmament and the abolition of the demilitarized zone without more than a paper protest, is to a considerable degree to be attributed to the fact that they were preceded by conclusive proof of our attitude in the Disarmament Conference and in the German offers of armament limitation early in 1934; this clearly gave the German measures an intrinsic justification beyond any formal legal objections. In the thesis of the possibility of peaceful revision of the *status quo*, the circumstances may be similar and make a similar tactical procedure advisable. Failure of negotiations on this subject would not be detrimental to German policy but, like the failure of the Disarmament Conference, would mean increased freedom of action for Germany, and less risk in the use of this freedom of action.

## No. 87

625/251504-10

*The Head of the Political Department in the German Foreign Ministry (Weizsäcker) to the German Ambassador in France (Welczeck)*<sup>19</sup>

CONFIDENTIAL

BERLIN, December 21, 1937.

(e.o. Pol. II 3395)

Today via courier.

Drafting Officer: Counselor of Legation von Rintelen.

DEAR COUNT WELCZECK: I hear that Counselor of Legation Schmidt, during his stay in Paris recently, already told you something of the course of the conversations that M. Flandin during his short visit to Berlin had here with the Foreign Minister as well as with Herren Goebbels, Göring, and Schacht. To supplement these reports I should also like to communicate for your confidential information the following from the sources available to us here:

Flandin's visit to Herr von Neurath was not very fruitful, for M. Flandin obviously had come with the intention of interrogating the Foreign Minister without wishing to communicate anything of interest himself. The Foreign Minister therefore felt compelled to ask M. Flandin whether he had been authorized by anyone to put questions to him, which M. Flandin denied, emphasizing that his trip was of a purely private nature. Under these circumstances Herr von Neurath did not feel obliged to explain in detail to the former French Premier the German viewpoint on the various questions. At a question of Flandin's as to German intentions with regard to Czechoslovakia and Austria, the Foreign Minister indicated to him that these questions would be settled among those concerned, but that we could not concede to France the right to make these questions the subject of a German-French discussion.

The 2-hour conversation that M. Flandin had with Reich Minister Goebbels seems to have been more fruitful. Herr Goebbels made roughly the following statement to M. Flandin: Germany was definitively rejecting Geneva and the Geneva methods but was, of course, nevertheless prepared to continue to cooperate with the European powers, particularly England, France, Italy, and also Poland. Russia could not be said to be a part of Europe; at any rate, as long as the Comintern was active, there was for Germany no question of negotiations with Russia. But the controversial issues

<sup>19</sup> This draft was prepared, evidently, for signature by Weizsäcker. It is initialed by Bismarck as well as Weizsäcker.

had to be settled directly between the parties concerned; the Danzig question, for instance, between Germany and Poland. The interference of third powers, as for example that of England and France in Austria and in the question of the Sudeten Germans, had only served thus far to prevent a satisfactory settlement. As far as German-French relations were concerned, peace and good-neighborliness could easily exist between the two Powers. Willingness to take into account Germany's vital needs was all that was required. It was clear that present conditions could not continue for Germany, since the German population could not obtain its normal means of subsistence under the present circumstances. M. Flandin also spoke to Herr Goebbels about German-French press relations, and among other things Herr Goebbels demanded cessation of the harmful activity of the *émigré* press in Paris and of the attacks of the French press on the person of the Führer. Furthermore, the French Government would have to dissociate itself from the continuous attacks on Germany in newspapers like *L'Humanité*, *Le Populaire*, and *L'Oeuvre*, if not publicly, then through diplomatic channels. He would then also be prepared, on his part, to see to it that the German press assisted in creating a favorable atmosphere for German-French relations, which would in turn constitute a useful preliminary to a political settlement between the two Powers.

In the conversation with Herr Schacht, the latter told M. Flandin that they would be making a mistake in Paris if they were speculating on the German economic or financial difficulties; the course of German policy would quite definitely not be altered thereby.

From Flandin's conversation with Herr Göring it is worth mentioning that Flandin replied to the statement that we had to reject the system of collective security by saying that even he, as leader of the Opposition in France, could not make clear to the French voters overnight that they should cease to believe in the League of Nations and collective security after the opposite had been preached to them for 16 years. To Flandin's question whether Germany would not return to a League of Nations which had undergone thorough reforms, General Göring replied that you could not make a good horse out of an old nag even by putting a new saddle on it. France should come to an understanding directly with Germany; then she would find more security than the League of Nations and collective treaties could offer her. Italy and England, too, would then somehow have to be included in this agreement. With regard to the Sudeten German question, Herr Göring said that whether it could be settled satisfactorily depended on the Czechoslovak Government. As far as Austria was concerned, a basis for the

future had already been created by the Agreement of July 11, 1936. When M. Flandin remarked on the question of colonies that if Germany was primarily asserting an economic need for them it probably would be enough to bring the problem of raw materials closer to a solution, Herr Göring unequivocally rejected this notion. German prestige required that we actually be given colonies and not merely the possibilities of obtaining raw materials. Finally M. Flandin also went into the question of armaments, whereupon Herr Göring stated that it was not we who were to blame for the armaments race.

The general impression that M. Flandin carried away from today's conversations was evidently the conviction that the views of the German and French Governments had very little in common. It is to be assumed that the French Ambassador here did his best to confirm M. Flandin in his impression, for quite generally he is inclined at present to take a most gloomy view of the future development of German-French relations.

With best regards and Heil Hitler!

Yours,

[File copy not signed]

No. 88

625/251474-80

*The German Foreign Ministry to the German Embassy in France*

BERLIN, December 21, 1937.

(zu Pol. II 3299)

By courier on December 21.

I respectfully enclose a copy of a memorandum on statements of the French Ambassador here for your information. These statements are along the same lines as those of M. Léger to Herr Sieburg, which prompted the circular instructions of which you have been advised by copy contained in instructions of December 6, Pol. II 3174.<sup>20</sup> As for the claim that plays the principal part in these statements, that, after the last visit to Paris of the President of the Reichsbank, Herr Schacht, we had maintained an "icy silence," as M. Léger expressed it, we can say to begin with that we have after all concluded a commercial agreement with France this year and have more than once demonstrated our readiness for positive collaboration in practical matters of international cooperation, such as those which came up in the London Nonintervention Committee. Furthermore, the conversations of Reichsbank President Schacht

<sup>20</sup> Not printed. Pol. II 3174 was a circular instruction to missions repeating telegram No. 656 of November 27, 1937, from Paris (document No. 46, p. 81).

could not bring forth a profitable discussion in a broader framework, for the reason alone that M. Blum's proposals at that time were as incapable of furnishing a concrete basis for discussions as the similar proposals of M. Delbos in December of last year. This has also been indicated to the French Ambassador here by the Foreign Minister.

The impression exists here that the Quai d'Orsay is at present exhibiting deliberate pessimism, and the French Ambassador here is apparently cooperating zealously in his reports and in other ways. They are not only retrospectively referring to the absence of readiness on our part to enter into conversations last year, but claim that today, too, we lack any desire for an understanding; that we wish to keep our hands free for new *faits accomplis*, possibly of a military nature, and for that reason are turning down the other powers even now that they are offering us colonies.

Since a further dissemination of these claims, which seem almost like efforts to anticipate the decision in a new "[War] Guilt Question," is necessarily detrimental to our interests, I would ask you, when opportunity offers, to counteract these false reports in any manner you deem fit, making use of the following viewpoints. Actually, besides the motives already indicated, these rumors may reflect primarily the well-known nervousness in French political circles, which originated under the impact of Germany's recuperation coinciding with the increasing infirmity of the Geneva system and of the French policy of alliances. Paris is obviously alarmed at the growing danger of becoming embroiled in Central Europe through its own alliance obligations, without being able to expect much help from Geneva or its own allies, including Moscow. They therefore apparently want to bargain with Germany for some binding obligations which would restrict the latter's freedom of action in Central and Eastern Europe and thus reduce the risks that they have incurred in these areas due to their own alliance policy. Yet they fail to understand that these real or imagined dangers have been conjured up not at all by Germany, but rather by French policy itself, and that an attempt to exorcize them by means of nonaggression pacts or the like would be futile. It has been shown in the long postwar years that precisely the consciousness of being able to rely on pacts and alliances has in many places suppressed any willingness to make concessions to German desires and needs. We can therefore not be expected to contribute in any way to resurrecting this system. If there are certain indications today of a dawning understanding in England and France that the path toward the realization of every political aim of ours in Central

and Eastern Europe can no longer simply be blocked, this is attributable essentially to our regained freedom of political action. The more effective this is, so much the more can a peaceful settlement of pending problems be hoped for. Should we, on the other hand, again forego this freedom of action, a renewed stiffening in the attitude toward us and the disappearance of the readiness to make concessions in the places in question would undoubtedly be the inevitable result. The final consequence, some day, would be the danger of violent explosions.

To infer from this essentially antagonistic attitude of ours toward all attempts to encircle Germany any lack of willingness to reach an understanding or even to enter into conversations would be quite absurd and all the less fitting today when the other powers, after the visit of Lord Halifax and the London conversations between England and France, have undertaken to examine what proposals they can make us in order to do justice to Germany's vital needs. We intend to allow the two Western Powers the time and the quiet necessary for this examination and we hear from London that a few months will probably elapse before the continuation of the conversation with us; this we can await patiently and without nervousness. It must, however, lead to serious doubts as to the sincerity of the French desire for an understanding if we are obliged to listen to reproaches from the French of the kind described above, in which we can see nothing but a disturbance to and vitiation of the atmosphere, and signs of agitation against Germany. In this connection we must even ask whether this is really contrary to the real intentions of the French Cabinet members responsible for foreign policy.

I am reserving the possibility of supplementing this instruction, since the French Ambassador here has just handed me a memorandum from M. Léon Blum of his conversation with Herr Schacht of May 28.<sup>21</sup> The memorandum requires further study.

M[ACKENSEN]

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<sup>21</sup> Enclosure to document No. 83, p. 135.

## No. 89

1585/382637

*The German Embassy in Great Britain to the German Foreign Ministry*

A 5577

LONDON, December 22, 1937.

(Pol. II 3436)

Subject: Annual dinner of the Anglo-German Fellowship.

On December 2, the second annual dinner of the Anglo-German Fellowship took place. The Duke of Saxe-Coburg-Gotha was invited as the guest of honor. Lord Mount Temple, the president of the Anglo-German Fellowship, presided. There were about 500 persons present, among them some influential and distinguished persons from British public life and society. I might mention Lord Halifax, Lord Glasgow, Sir Robert Vansittart, the Under Secretary of State in the Foreign Office, Mr. Jordan, the High Commissioner of New Zealand, as well as Lady Jellicoe.

The fundamental theme of the speeches was that a German-British understanding must be promoted. Otherwise, concrete political subjects were avoided. The gathering may be described as a success and the press, too, covered it in a satisfactory way.

It would be desirable that other influential circles gradually became interested in the association.

A list of those who attended the dinner is enclosed.<sup>22</sup>

By direction :

SELZAM

## No. 90

625/251517-18

*The Head of the Political Department in the German Foreign Ministry (Weizsäcker) to the German Ambassador in France (Welczeck)*

BERLIN, December 23, 1937.

DEAR COUNT WELCZECK: Many thanks for your lines of the 17th, in which you say that you will make a few more corrections in our instruction Pol. II 3174.<sup>23</sup> Herr Forster discussed this matter with

<sup>22</sup> Not printed here. It was published at the time.

<sup>23</sup> Not printed. Pol. II 3174 was a circular instruction to missions repeating telegram No. 656 of November 27, 1937, from Paris (document No. 46, p. 81). Welczeck's note of December 17, which is not printed, stated that Forster would convey Welczeck's suggestions for modifications of the information contained in the Paris telegram which was repeated in the circular instruction.

me here for our information. Moreover, as you will have seen from our instruction Pol. II 3299 of the 21st, it has also become timely here for other reasons. It may be quite useful that these matters are being clarified *ex post facto*, even if, unfortunately, somewhat belatedly, although the interval of time that has elapsed may have been for the good, too. For more important than the internal clarification in our own camp, is, I suppose, the fact that the opposite side sees how and why they have taken the wrong path. I have the definite impression that they are beginning to understand this today; some months ago they had hardly reached that stage.

Cordially reciprocating your season's greetings, and with best regards, I am,

With a Heil Hitler!

Yours,

WEIZSÄCKER

No. 91

625/251527-33

*The German Foreign Ministry to the German Embassy in France*

BERLIN, December 24, 1937.

(zu Pol. II 3417)

In continuation of the instructions of December 21, Pol II 3299.

As mentioned at the close of the preceding instruction, a few days ago the French Ambassador here handed me Léon Blum's memorandum of his conversation with Reichsbank President Schacht on May 28th.<sup>26</sup> M. François-Poncet stated in this connection that he had received this memorandum from Paris only after repeated urging. Even if it possessed only historical value now, since not only had we not followed up the conversation but, on the contrary, a perceptible stiffening had occurred in the German attitude on the decisive questions, it was perhaps of interest to the Foreign Minister to know what impression of that conversation had remained with M. Blum. To my question with respect to the origin of the memorandum, M. François-Poncet stated that immediately after the conversation with Herr Schacht, M. Blum had made detailed notes which formed the basis of this memorandum. It had by no means been written only recently.

If he assumed that this memorandum would be of interest to us, the Ambassador continued, it was partly because the communiqué on the London conference of November 30—which had been inter-

<sup>26</sup> Enclosure to document No. 83, p. 135.

preted much too negatively by us, as he had already repeatedly stressed to me—contained several ideas which M. Blum had expressed at the time. The latter had conducted the conversation with Herr Schacht in the belief that he was speaking to a representative of the Reich Government authorized to conduct such a conversation. As things developed further, the French had, however, gained the impression that the Reich Government had not acknowledged the ideas developed by Herr Schacht.

The Ambassador concluded his remarks with the rather doleful assertion that, so far as he could see, the days of the Halifax visit and the London conversations had left behind hardly anything but a certain possibility of making some small progress in the field of armaments.

I enclose herewith a copy of the memorandum handed to me by François-Poncet,<sup>27</sup> for your information. M. François-Poncet requested that the enclosure be treated *in strict confidence*; he was concerned only with the personal orientation of the Reich Foreign Minister. Accordingly we refrained here from transmitting the memorandum to other offices. I would ask you also to comply with the request of the French Ambassador for strictly confidential treatment and to make no further use of it.

Generally, perusal of the memorandum of M. Léon Blum only confirmed the impression already existing here as a result of Herr Schacht's memorandum. This impression was that the communications that M. Léon Blum made to Herr Schacht in May could not offer a suitable basis for initiating a more exhaustive German-French conversation. In fact, M. Blum's own memorandum shows that in May he was really not ready to offer us anything tangible at all but did, of course, reiterate the familiar demands for a general settlement of European problems, general limitation of armaments, and Germany's return to the League of Nations. The compensation that he was still ready to offer us in August 1936, concessions to our colonial demands, he expressly termed inappropriate last May as a starting point for a conversation. The other old and familiar French arguments, too, that a German-French settlement could only be made if all the allies of France were included and that the conclusion of new nonaggression pacts was required in order to effect the necessary general European settlement, are again contained very plainly in M. Blum's statements. A conversation on this basis would consequently have had to move in a direction that would in the final analysis have meant a stabilization of the French system of alliances

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<sup>27</sup> Enclosure to document No. 83, p. 135.

in Europe and renewed paralyzation of Germany's freedom of action in the field of foreign policy.

It does not seem quite clear to us how M. Léon Blum or the French Ambassador here could believe that we would be prepared to regard this repetition of time-worn French demands, accompanied only by quite vague promises to make concessions to us, as a serious offer to negotiate. Moreover, M. Léon Blum's statements entirely disregarded the viewpoint on which agreement had already been reached in the previous conversations between the Embassy and M. Delbos, namely, that it was inexpedient to attempt to tackle all the essential questions at once, but that it would be more profitable to proceed by stages and particularly that the Spanish conflict had to be settled first, before conversations regarding the establishment of closer political collaboration could be entered into with any prospect of success.

It is to be assumed, and this is also confirmed by the accompanying statements of M. François-Poncet when he delivered Léon Blum's memorandum, that responsible French circles have meanwhile come to realize the necessity of bringing about a German-French *détente* by quite other means than M. Léon Blum still had in mind in May. We do not now intend to convey to the French definite suggestions in this regard; rather do we wish, as was already mentioned in the previous instruction, first to give the two Western Powers the necessary time and peace to consider what proposals they can make us in order to meet Germany's vital needs. It seems necessary, however, to combat the view that a year ago and again in the spring we had passed up, through lack of readiness for discussion, a favorable opportunity offered us for successful settlement of all European controversial issues, whereas, on the contrary, the truth is that a basis for negotiation was simply not provided in the discussions on that subject with the leading French statesmen.<sup>28</sup>

<sup>28</sup> This draft instruction bears the initials of Weizsäcker, Bismarck, and Rintelen.

## No. 92

1519/373081-82

*The German Ambassador in Italy (Hassell) to the German Foreign Ministry*

5799/37

ROME, December 31, 1937.

Received January 3, 1938.

(Pol. IV 20)

Subject: Effects upon Italy of our policy toward France and England.

I have the honor to enclose a copy of a memorandum by a usually well-informed source, in which the alleged psychological effects upon Italy of our policy toward France and England are discussed. Although the report contains deliberately exaggerated and overdrawn statements and has to be read with a critical eye, it is nevertheless interesting as a symptom.<sup>29</sup>

HASSELL

[Enclosure]

ROME, December 30, 1937.

In the circles of the Palazzo Chigi a certain displeasure and a certain "*preoccupazione*" continue because of the attempted *rapprochement* between Berlin and Paris. Delbos' welcome by Neurath at the railroad station in Berlin is called a "*fatto grave*" by Mussolini himself. The attempts at a *rapprochement* between France and Germany, according to opinion here, are in contradiction to the Rome-Berlin Axis and nullify its policy as well as that of the Berlin-Rome-Tokyo triangle. That the meeting between Neurath and Delbos took place at a time of strong tension between Rome and Paris cannot be forgotten here and is even considered an aggravating circumstance. It had provided the French press with an opportunity to make capital out of the divergent attitudes of Germany and Italy toward France and to engage in all kinds of speculations.

During the last few days this unfavorable impression has been further reinforced by an article published in the *Völkischer Beobachter*, in which Delbos is even praised. Because of its general trend this article caused considerable surprise<sup>30</sup> and created a "*viva sensazione*" both in the Foreign Ministry and in the Ministry of Popular Enlightenment. It was presented to Mussolini and Ciano

<sup>29</sup> A marginal notation in Neurath's handwriting reads as follows: "I know this tune. The informant exaggerates."

<sup>30</sup> A marginal notation, apparently in Mackensen's handwriting, reads as follows: "In this connection compare Magistrati's visit with me."

as a symptomatic and rather alarming event. In this connection much is being said in the Palazzo Chigi about two simultaneous directions of German policy: one revolutionary, dynamic, imperial, in line with the Rome-Berlin-Tokyo Axis; the other rooted in tradition, not very favorably disposed toward the grandiose schemes of the Rome-Berlin Axis, and greatly preferring to confine itself to the small gains of the diplomatic game.

If the matters are perhaps viewed and judged with exaggerated sensitivity in Rome, the following should be borne in mind in order to understand it: The German-British conversations are suspended at present; however, London is negotiating with Paris regarding a plan to be proposed to Germany in the near future. On pretexts which are always changing, England does not wish to negotiate with Italy. And now, Germany is seeking a *rapprochement* with England and France. In parliamentary circles, too, incidentally, increasing anxiety is noticeable because of Germany's attitude. Even if these facts indicate only a *state di preoccupazione* thus far, this feeling nevertheless is beginning to spread and to become more persistent. In addition, the French and Russian diplomats are trying to strengthen the suspicion of the Italians that Italy made a mistake by allying herself with Germany and that Germany is ready to abandon Italy.

#### E. THE POSSIBILITIES OF AGREEMENT WITH GREAT BRITAIN, JANUARY 1938

##### No. 93

FI/0039-48

#### *Memorandum for the Führer*

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL  
PERSONAL

BERLIN, January 2, 1938.

#### CONCLUSIONS REGARDING REPORT ENTITLED "GERMAN EMBASSY LONDON A 5522"<sup>31</sup> CONCERNING THE FUTURE DEVELOPMENT OF GERMAN-BRITISH RELATIONS

With the realization that Germany does not want to be bound by the *status quo* in Central Europe, and that war in Europe is possible sooner or later, the hope for an understanding among the British politicians favorable to Germany—if they do not for that matter at present simply play a role that has been assigned to them—will gradually come to an end. The fateful question is thus raised whether in the long run Germany and England will of necessity be

<sup>31</sup> Not found.

driven into separate camps and march against each other again some day. To answer this question the following must be realized:

A change in the eastern *status quo* to Germany's advantage [*im deutschen Sinne*] can only be accomplished by force. As long as France knows that England—who has, so to speak, underwritten France in relation to Germany—will assist her, French intervention on behalf of her eastern allies is likely or at any rate is always *possible*, and so, as a consequence, is war between Germany and England. This analysis of the situation is correct even if England does not want war; believing that she has to defend her frontier on the Rhine, England would simply be automatically involved by France; in other words, France, for all practical purposes, has the power to bring about a German-British war as a result of a German-French conflict. From this, in turn, the conclusion must be drawn that a war between Germany and England on account of France can only be prevented if France *knows from the very beginning* that England's forces would not suffice to guarantee the common victory. Such a situation could force England and thereby France to accept many things which a *strong* Anglo-French combination would never tolerate. Such a situation would, for instance, arise if England—because of insufficient armament or because of the threat to her Empire by a superior coalition of powers (e.g., between Germany, Italy, and Japan), tying down her military forces elsewhere—could not give France sufficient support in Europe. The question of a coalition of powers depends on future developments, on our alliance policy, and on the further development of British relations with the United States. It would be unfavorable for England if she were to be confronted by the above-mentioned coalition by herself and still inadequately armed. To be sure, this coalition would have to be very closely united, and England and France must have no reason to doubt that Italy and Japan are supporting us firmly, and that, if necessary, the joint forces of the coalition would be employed in a lightning blow. Italy and Japan are just as much interested in a strong Germany as we are in a strong Italy and Japan. During recent years the existence of the New Germany has been of great advantage to both in their efforts at expansion. Considering this fact and the common goals to be achieved later, we should succeed in inducing both of these Powers to declare their solidarity with us at the proper time. In such a situation England would possibly deter France from intervening in case of conflict between Germany and one of France's eastern allies, in order to localize it, so that England would not be forced by the intervention of France to fight under unfavorable conditions for her Empire in perhaps three dif-

ferent places, i.e., in eastern Asia, in the Mediterranean, and in Europe. Over a local problem in Central Europe, even if it were to add considerably to Germany's strength, England would in my opinion not risk a struggle for the survival of her Empire. In such a case France would hardly have the nerve to storm the German fortifications in the West alone without England. In this connection it appears to me that the speed with which such a conflict in Central Europe would be victoriously ended would be decisive. In case of a quick success, I am firmly convinced that the West would not intervene. A longer duration, however, might cause the enemy countries to believe that Germany's forces had really been overestimated and thus bring intervention by the Western Powers closer.

For these reasons I believe we should continue to be interested in strengthening the Berlin-Rome Axis and the Berlin-Rome-Tokyo Triangle and in the adherence of other states to this coalition. The stronger our coalition of friends, the more likely it would be that England, and thereby also France, would stay out of any conflict in Central Europe involving Germany; and the conflict would remain localized to our advantage. I even believe that we should strengthen these friendships more and more and that we ought to make new ones. Recently, former French Prime Minister Flandin in an article spoke of a coalition of the authoritarian countries—Germany, Italy, and Japan—and of the two democracies—England and France plus Russia—all of whom were striving to win over to their views as many countries as possible. If one considers the successful efforts of England in several countries in this regard—I mention, for instance, Portugal, which again is quickly drawing closer to England, and where a short time ago the former private secretary to Austen Chamberlain (Selby) arrived; and Turkey, where Sir Percy Lorraine, one of the best British diplomats, has influenced the Turks strongly in favor of England—this information of Flandin seems to originate with his British friends. Above all, however, England will, in future, too, direct her efforts toward weakening the Berlin-Rome Axis and toward breaking up the Berlin-Rome-Tokyo Triangle. Influential circles in England are constantly working for an understanding between England and Italy as well as Japan. The Foreign Office in the summer sent its most able official, Sir Robert Craigie, to Japan. In order to be able to protect the heart of the British Empire, England will in my opinion at the proper time do everything she can to reestablish good relations with Italy and Japan, possibly even at a great sacrifice; in other words, outbidding Germany. In my opinion, Germany, Italy, and Japan must be firmly united against this attempt, for this unity is the whole strength of

their position in the world; and it appears advisable for all three countries to strive to win the friendship of even the smallest country within their reach. I believe that also in regard to intelligence and propaganda, one cannot have enough such friends in case of conflict. It would be dangerous to renounce secure friendships and not to choose others, because of an uncertain British friendship. In this way we might fall between two stools. Whether some friendships might better be concluded or maintained rather informally at first, or whether others should better be given more specific shape, such as inclusion in the anti-Comintern movement, must in my opinion be decided in each individual case.

As to England, our policy ought in my opinion to continue to be aimed at compromise while fully safeguarding the interests of our friends. We must also continue to foster England's belief that a settlement and an understanding between Germany and England are still possible eventually. Such a prospect might, for example, have a restraining effect on any possible intention to intervene on the part of the British Government, should Germany become involved in a local conflict in Central Europe which does not vitally concern England.

It is probably better if our developing coalition is maintained outwardly as a somewhat loose aggregation for the time being. However, in the long run this cannot alter the fact that eventually the formation of two opposing fronts will of necessity become more and more obvious. I believe that the question whether a German-British settlement can then still be achieved at all, may be answered as follows:

If England with her alliances is stronger than Germany and her friends; she will in my opinion fight sooner or later. Should Germany, however, be so successful in her alliance policy that a German coalition would be stronger than its British counterpart, or perhaps as strong, it is quite possible that England would prefer to try for a settlement after all. Once the fronts have become rigid, however, a sudden compromise of their manifold interests appears to me inconceivable under normal circumstances. Then, it could only be attempted by two opposing countries at the expense of their partners in the coalition. In such a case, one could for instance theoretically imagine that England, realizing that she is confronted by a superior coalition, would suddenly offer Germany a far-reaching settlement. Such a 180 degree shift of policy occurred quite frequently in history, in bygone days when wars were still personal affairs of monarchs and when people frequently did not even know what they were fighting for. In our modern, politically minded world it is scarcely

imaginable any longer and is certainly not feasible for a democracy. The German *quid pro quo* could, however, be given only at the expense of her friends. In my opinion such a policy is impossible for Germany. Apart from all other reasons, such a vacillating policy would entail an enormous risk, namely, that of isolation; for what guarantee could Germany obtain from England that such an offer of a settlement, made under stress, would be kept? It appears to me that there can really be no such guarantee.

Therefore, concerning the question whether a German-British understanding is still possible, it must be said that as long as the fronts are not rigid, such an agreement would really still be conceivable. However, as may be seen from the enclosed report<sup>32</sup> and this memorandum, it is very difficult, because Germany wants to shape her future in a way which is different from what England is apparently prepared to grant in case of agreement with Germany (see also enclosed letter by Lord Londonderry<sup>33</sup>). Only energetic action by the British Prime Minister, in accordance with our views and against the strong resistance mentioned above, could perhaps still turn the tide. It is conceivable that a British Prime Minister—if he is not afflicted with the psychosis regarding German strength and lust for power, but in principle believes in the possibility of German-British friendship—would still prefer to seek a generous and sober settlement which would satisfy German aspirations without endangering vital and purely British interests. During recent months this thesis has been very emphatically stressed by Garvin in the *Observer*. When I asked Chamberlain recently for his opinion of these articles of Garvin's, he merely replied that "they were too long for him, and therefore he did not read them"!

An unequivocal British concession regarding the Austrian-Czech question in accordance with our views could clear the political atmosphere in Europe. Judging from my previous experience, however, I consider such a turn unlikely and believe that at best only the force of circumstances could compel England some day to tolerate such a solution. My opinion that this problem cannot be solved by official negotiations with England is strengthened by the fact that Chamberlain is enmeshed in a system of domestic as well as foreign policy (together with France) that makes important decisions exceedingly difficult.

Once the fronts have become rigid, only distinctly abnormal changes in the balance of power or events in Europe or the world (France going Bolshevik, collapse of Russia, serious changes af-

<sup>32</sup> Not found.

<sup>33</sup> Printed as an enclosure to document No. 104, p. 183.

fecting our friends) could force political developments to take a different turn. However, a policy cannot be based on such possibilities. Therefore, in my opinion it is proper to continue the course we have taken in our foreign policy.

In conclusion I should like to sum up my views in the following sentences:

1. England is behind in her armaments—therefore, what she is playing for is to gain time.

2. England believes that in a race with Germany time is on England's side—exploitation of her greater economic resources for armament—time for extending her alliances (e.g., the United States).

3. The visit of Halifax, therefore, is to be considered as a maneuver to obtain information and as a camouflage—even Germanophiles in England frequently play only a role that has been assigned to them.

4. England and her Prime Minister, after the Halifax visit, in my opinion see no possible basis for an agreement with Germany (they consider National Socialist Germany capable of anything, just as we consider the British capable of anything); therefore, they fear that some day they might be forced by a strong Germany to accept solutions that are not agreeable to them. In order to meet this contingency England is at all events preparing by military and political measures for a conflict with Germany.

5. Therefore, we must draw the following conclusions:

1. Outwardly, continued understanding with England while simultaneously protecting the interests of our friends.

2. Quiet but determined establishment of alliances against England, i.e., in practice, strengthening our friendship with Italy and Japan and in addition winning over all countries whose interests conform directly or indirectly with ours. For this purpose the diplomats of the three great powers are to cooperate closely and intimately.

Only in this manner can we meet England, whether it be for a settlement someday or in conflict. England will be a tough and keen foe in this diplomatic game.

6. The special problem as to whether France and thereby England would intervene if Germany should become involved in a conflict in Central Europe depends upon circumstances and the time when such a conflict were to break out and end and upon military considerations which cannot be evaluated here. I should like to present personally some views on that subject to the Führer.

This is my evaluation of the situation after having carefully weighed all the circumstances. I have worked for friendship with England for years, and nothing would make me happier than the possibility of its achievement. When I asked the Führer to send me to London I was skeptical about the likelihood of success, but, because of Edward VIII, it seemed that a final attempt should be

made. Today I no longer have faith in any understanding. England does not desire in close proximity a paramount Germany, which would be a constant menace to the British Isles. On this she will fight. National Socialism, however, is thought capable of anything. Baldwin already apprehended this and Edward VIII had to abdicate, since it was not certain whether, because of his views, he would cooperate in an anti-German policy. Chamberlain has now appointed Vansittart, our most important and toughest foe, to a position where he can play a leading role in the diplomatic game against Germany. Henceforth—regardless of what tactical interludes of conciliation may be attempted with regard to us—every day that our political calculations are not actuated by the fundamental idea that England is our most dangerous enemy *would be a gain for our enemies.*

R[IBBENTROP]

No. 94

1486/308622

*The German Ambassador in Italy (Hassell) to the German Foreign Ministry*<sup>34</sup>

Telegram

No. 3 of January 5

ROME, January 5, 1938—8:10 p.m.

Received January 5, 1938—11:45 p.m.

(Pol. IV 80)

In my first meeting of the year with Mussolini yesterday, I had a long conversation with him, in which he seemed remarkably worried. The new year was starting badly and he did not anticipate much good in it; tension, as well as lack of understanding in important places, was steadily increasing. Roosevelt's message was characteristic;<sup>35</sup> it had the arrogant tone of a schoolmaster and showed complete lack of understanding for developments in Europe. I replied, on the one hand, that the events in Rumania should perhaps be evaluated as a favorable element;<sup>36</sup> that, on the other hand, the democratic British and French were also, it was interesting to note, dissatisfied with Roosevelt's message. Mussolini said that for the time being a reserved skepticism in regard to Rumania was advisable; Goga was sending a remarkable number of telegrams to

<sup>34</sup> A marginal notation reads as follows: "In accordance with instructions from the State Secretary this telegram is not to be transmitted further."

<sup>35</sup> President Roosevelt's message to Congress on January 3, 1938. Extracts may be found in Department of State, *Press Releases*, vol. XVIII (1938), pp. 31-32.

<sup>36</sup> The reference is to the resignation of the Tatarescu Cabinet on December 28, 1937, and the appointment of Octavian Goga as Premier.

leading figures of all camps. As to the attitude of the British and French toward Roosevelt's message, it was correct that they wanted the United States committed completely to them—to which the Americans, however, were not at all inclined. Mussolini then referred to the speech of the Japanese Minister of the Interior, which, if possible, was even more arrogant than Roosevelt's message;<sup>37</sup> the statements of the Japanese made brutally clear the real Japanese aims, which were directed against all white peoples.

HASSELL

No. 95

1249/338013-15

*The German Embassy in Great Britain to the German Foreign Ministry*

A 52

LONDON, January 5, 1938.

Received January 6, 1938.

(Pol. II 51)

Subject: The appointment of the former Under Secretary of State as Chief Diplomatic Adviser in the Foreign Office.

The appointment of Sir Robert Vansittart as Chief Diplomatic Adviser, which I already reported on January 1, A 5683,<sup>38</sup> has caused a sensation and sundry conjectures among the British public. The prevailing opinion in the press is that the reasons given in the Foreign Office announcement for the creation of the position were in general decisive. In part, however, concern is expressed whether the solution arrived at was the correct one under the circumstances. In leftist newspapers the fear can be discerned that the creation of the new post and the appointment of Vansittart to fill it were the result of the machinations of certain circles which sought to force a German-British *rapprochement* and believed that in his new post Vansittart would be less able to oppose the policy desired by them. Persons in political life who, by virtue of their position and their connections, should have knowledge of the facts, also expressed the opinion that the new arrangement was intended in a way to sidetrack Vansittart. On the other hand, an obvious effort may be noted on the part of persons close to him to characterize his appointment as Chief Diplomatic Adviser as a special distinction and as a promotion.

<sup>37</sup> For extracts from Admiral Suetsugu's statement of January 4, 1938, see *Documents on International Affairs, 1938* (London, 1942), vol. 1, pp. 340-341.

<sup>38</sup> Not printed.

Vansittart, as is well-known, is one of the most outstanding members of the British foreign service, a man of quite extraordinary ability and extensive experience, praised for a magnificent memory for details. It is scarcely imaginable that Chamberlain would wish to forego the cooperation of such a man, even if the two had different opinions regarding various questions of foreign policy. Nor does the change by any means indicate that this is of necessity the case. Although it appears as if, in his new position, Vansittart has lost the authority based on a position in the administrative apparatus of his Ministry, his principal duty is, after all, described as advising the Foreign Secretary and the Cabinet on important questions of foreign policy.

There is no certainty yet among the division chiefs in the Foreign Office regarding the new Chief Diplomatic Adviser's position among the top group in the Foreign Office. Departmental instructions have not yet been issued. The new position is considered an experiment and it is believed that at first one will have to wait and see how the change will work out. For the rest, having a Chief Diplomatic Adviser will mean that not only the Permanent Under Secretary but also the Secretary himself will be relieved of some of his burdens. It is described as particularly important that there is now a person of high rank at the center of things, who, as the representative of the Foreign Secretary, like him and with his prestige, can conduct negotiations abroad without being forced to render an account to Parliament, as must the Foreign Secretary, who is a political appointee.

In the final analysis it will depend on how Chamberlain and Eden use Vansittart, and what the latter makes of his new position. It may very well be that by the force of his personality he will exert more influence on the formation of British foreign policy, either by personal influence on the Secretary and the Cabinet or through possible missions abroad, than he could previously because of the heavy pressure of other duties. Furthermore, it is almost inconceivable that his many years of working with the personnel of the foreign service should not have the same result. Sir Horace Wilson, the Chief Industrial Adviser, for example, is also known to have considerable influence on officials of Ministries in which he is particularly interested. A further report may follow.

By direction:  
SELZAM

## No. 96

625/251543 47

*The Head of the Political Department in the German Foreign Ministry (Weizsäcker) to the German Ambassador in Austria (Papen)*

FINAL DRAFT

BERLIN, January 10, 1938.

(zu Pol. II 120 38)

DEAR HERR VON PAPEN: I still owe you special thanks for your lines of December 16. The information you conveyed naturally was of great interest to us, i.e., both what you wrote about your conversations with the Führer and Chancellor and the account of your conversation with M. François-Poncet. In the latter, the French Ambassador again stated to you also that our negotiations with the Western Powers had reached a deadlock because of the attitude of the German Government. He has made this assertion more than once in the past few weeks although actually it is not true. For, in reality, at no time during 1936 and 1937 did we have any French offers; all we had were vague hints and references to a readiness for a settlement. Today, too, there are no negotiations pending with the Western Powers. It is even questionable whether a workable basis for conversations between us, on the one hand, and England and France, on the other, could be found. Whether such conversations materialize or not depends less on our readiness for an understanding or a conversation than on that of the powers on the other side, which, after the visit of Lord Halifax to Germany and the London conversations between England and France, have undertaken to study what proposals they can make us in order to get the negotiations under way. As you know, we intend to give the two Western Powers the time and peace necessary for this study and have also heard from London that a few months will probably elapse before they enter into a conversation with us, and we shall wait without urging greater speed. But the interval is, unfortunately, evidently being used by the French to make assertions such as M. François-Poncet made to you, which impress one as if the French were already attempting to anticipate the decision in a kind of new "[War] Guilt Question."

According to your letter, François-Poncet, for corroboration of his views, referred to the conversations that Flandin had had here with several members of the Reich Cabinet. It is Flandin's own fault if these conversations left a negative impression with him, for he pursued the method of appearing here as a sort of inquisitor and, without having even a semiofficial mandate, of demanding in his interrogations in Berlin more or less of an accounting as to what

we proposed to do or contemplated doing in all matters of interest to him. This caused Herr von Neurath to say to Flandin, among other things, that we would settle these subjects in which he was interested, but without first asking the French for permission every time. This had reference particularly to the central European questions broached by Flandin.

What M. François-Poncet and also the Quai d'Orsay have in mind is obviously that they could use the German colonial demands in order to obtain from Germany commitments that would restrict her freedom of action in Central Europe and thus reduce the risks that they have incurred in these areas due to their own alliance policy. They ignore the fact that these real or imagined dangers have been conjured up not by Germany, but rather by French policy itself, and that an attempt to exorcise them by means of nonaggression pacts or the like would be futile. It has been shown in the postwar years that precisely the consciousness of being able to rely on pacts and alliances has in many places suppressed any willingness to make concessions to German desires and needs. We can, therefore, not be expected to contribute toward resurrecting this system. If there are certain indications today of a dawning understanding in France and England that the path toward the realization of every political aim of ours in Central and Eastern Europe can no longer simply be blocked, this is attributable essentially to our regained freedom of political action. The more effective this is, so much the more can a peaceful settlement of pending problems be hoped for. Should we, on the other hand, again forego this freedom of action, there would probably be a renewed stiffening in the attitude toward us and the disappearance of the readiness to make concessions in the places in question, which would finally result in the danger of a violent explosion.

Only recently we sent Count Welczeck in Paris an instruction in the sense of the foregoing statements. Perhaps he will succeed slowly in making these views comprehensible also to the leading figures at the Quai d'Orsay. Please excuse the length of this reply to the question at the end of your letter and also the delay. I was absent from here for a few days.

Heil Hitler!

WEIZSÄCKER

## No. 97

1097/318372

*The German Minister in Hungary (Erdmannsdorff) to the German Foreign Ministry*

A Nr. 11 P 2 Anti-Comintern Pact

BUDAPEST, January 12, 1938.

Received January 17, 1938.

(Pol. VIII 104)

Subject: Anti-Comintern Pact.

## POLITICAL REPORT

In reply to my inquiry, the Italian Foreign Minister, Count Ciano, told me that during the conversations just ended he had not suggested to the other representatives of the powers in the Rome Pact that they join the Anti-Comintern Pact, but had been satisfied with the Austrian and Hungarian declarations of sympathy with the aims of the Pact which were contained in the press communiqué. In his opinion only great powers should be signatories to the Pact.

Efforts should be made to obtain Poland's and Spain's accession to the Pact. He would also heartily welcome Brazil's accession, if only in order to make a breach in the ideological bloc of the so-called democratic powers on the American continent. However, Count Ciano doubted whether the Brazilian President was able or even willing to oppose the United States in this manner.

ERDMANNSDORFF

## No. 98

375/208804

*Memorandum by the Foreign Minister*

RM 28

The British Ambassador, who called on me today, mentioned among other things the colonial question. His request was to have patience. Neville Chamberlain was firmly resolved to make a positive proposal; but, naturally, this required considerable time for negotiations not only in England itself but also with the Dominions. Would we, during that time, not press too much in public and in particular, as he expressed it, would we be reasonable. I answered the Ambassador that we understood fully the difficulties involved in the solution of this question and that we were patient. Of course, I could not promise him that the discussion of the colonial question in our newspapers and in public would disappear. Nor, after the experiences I had had, would I even permit such a pause to occur,

for the impression would then very easily form in England that we were no longer interested in this question. Consequently, I could only advise Neville Chamberlain to hurry.

BARON VON NEURATH

BERLIN, January 13, 1938.

No. 99

375/208805-06

*Memorandum by the Foreign Minister*

RM 30

The British Ambassador today handed me the enclosed *aide-mémoire*, in which statements of the Chancellor on the occasion of the Halifax visit are referred to and inquiry is made as to whether the statement quoted therein is to be understood to mean that the Führer is not entirely averse to the abolition by international agreements of bombing planes. I told the Ambassador that in his previous speeches the Chancellor had proposed, to begin with, that bombing be prohibited outside a certain combat zone. This appeared to me to be the first stage. If bombing as such were completely prohibited on the basis of international agreements, then the manufacture of bombing planes would also become useless.

BARON VON NEURATH

BERLIN, January 13, 1938.

[Enclosure]

AIDE-MÉMOIRE<sup>39</sup>

In the unofficial notes which Herr Schmidt was good enough to make of the conversation between the Chancellor and Lord Halifax on November 19th, the Chancellor is quoted (page 18) as having made the following remarks in regard to the problem of disarmament with special reference to the abolition of aerial bombing:

"When one was dealing with disarmament, one must first be quite clear what was to be disarmed. He pointed to his earlier proposals to prohibit bombing. Since the colonial powers regarded the bombing aeroplane as a good method of breaking the resistance of rebellious natives, they had rejected this proposal as being against their interests. In the light of the most recent experiences of war in different parts of the world, they now were again inclined to outlaw bombing planes after all."

<sup>39</sup> Original text in English, with the exception of the paragraph quoted.

It would appear from this passage that the Chancellor would not be averse from the abolition of bombing aeroplanes by international agreements. His Majesty's Government have this particular question now under consideration and in view of its great interest from the point of view of humanising air warfare, I should be grateful for any information which Your Excellency can give me as to the exact scope of the Chancellor's suggestion.

BRITISH EMBASSY, BERLIN, January 11, 1938.

No. 100

2258/478689-90

*Memorandum*

CONFIDENTIAL

Requesting that the document be returned, the enclosed letter from Herr von Ribbentrop to the Foreign Minister<sup>40</sup> is to be submitted to:

- 1) Prince Bismarck
- 2) Herr Rintelen

for their information, with the concurrence of the Office of the Foreign Minister. The Foreign Minister requests, however, that no marginal notations be made.

As nothing can be said against the conclusions contained in the report [*Da gegen die Schlussfolgerung des Berichtes nichts zu bemerken ist*], a detailed consideration of the rest of it can probably be dispensed with, too. Only one thing seems necessary to me, namely, not to treat the question of limitation of armaments altogether negatively even in conversations (page 21). Since this is the only cheap coin in which we can pay, we ought rather to consider what might, after all, perhaps be done in this field.

WEIZSÄCKER

JANUARY 13 [, 1938.]

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\* The reference is apparently to Ribbentrop's report of January 2, 1938, which has not been found in the archives of the Foreign Ministry. Ribbentrop's memorandum of the same date for Hitler, embodying the conclusions he drew from that report, is printed as document No. 93, p. 162.

## No. 101

1249/338018-21

*The German Chargé d'Affaires in Great Britain (Woermann) to the  
German Foreign Ministry*

A 173

LONDON, January 14, 1938.

Received January 15, 1938.

(Pol. II 125)

In continuation of the report of January 4 [5], 1938, A 52.

Subject: The appointment of Sir Robert Vansittart as Chief Diplomatic Adviser and of Sir Alexander Cadogan as Permanent Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs in the Foreign Office.

Opinions here still vary as to whether the appointment of Sir Robert Vansittart as Chief Diplomatic Adviser means the beginning of an attempt to sidetrack him, or whether it is a promotion. Merely as an illustration of this fact, I wish to mention that several days ago, at a meeting with eighteen German journalists, I asked them for their opinion; six of them believed that it meant a sidetracking, six others thought it was a promotion, and the rest held opinions in between. Opinions in the Diplomatic Corps and in British circles are similarly divided. So far no reliable account of the exact origin of the changes has leaked out.

One thing is certain and that is that the changes in the Foreign Office have a Cadogan angle and a Vansittart angle, and these two aspects of the question are of course connected to a certain extent.

Sir Alexander Cadogan, as is known, was for many years, up to 1933, a member of the British League of Nations delegation, together with Eden. It is generally known that the two understood each other well and that Cadogan was considered an Eden man. When in the late fall of 1935 Hoare and Laval agreed in Paris on the well-known plan for dealing with the Abyssinian conflict, Sir Robert Vansittart was present there. When this plan led to a crisis in England, a large part of the responsibility was attributed to Sir Robert, and it was precisely Eden who is supposed to have advocated that view at the time. Thus, according to reports here, the appointment of Cadogan—who early in 1934, as is known, had been named Minister and later Ambassador to China—to the position of Deputy Under Secretary of State was brought about by Eden in order to counterbalance Vansittart. Probably Cadogan had from the beginning been given hopes of succeeding Vansittart. As is known, there was talk at that time that Vansittart was to get an ambassadorial post, Washington being chiefly mentioned and occasionally

Paris. Later, relations between Eden and Vansittart must have improved, and it appears that the present initiative did not come from the Foreign Secretary, but from the Prime Minister.

I have not received any really reliable information regarding the Prime Minister's motive for this decision. However, a determining factor seems to have been that Vansittart was quite generally, and rightfully, regarded as an exponent of a one-sidedly French orientation of British foreign policy and that this did not fit in with Chamberlain's attempts to promote better relations with other countries. I hear, for example, that a person close to the Prime Minister expressed himself to the effect that one could not possibly say that Vansittart had improved his position.

The immediate result in the organization of the Foreign Office is that Vansittart is no longer able to give direct instructions to British Missions abroad and to officials in the Foreign Office. I hear that the Foreign Office will not even provide him with a private secretary, and that his former private secretary, Jebb—who recently succeeded Norton—is going to work for Cadogan.

In view of Vansittart's personality, as I stated in my previous report, everything will of course depend entirely on what he makes of his position and what they let him make of it. A definite change of course in British foreign policy as a result of the changes in the Foreign Office is surely not to be expected at the present time, since Cadogan's views seem to coincide to a considerable extent with Eden's.

We shall continue to follow developments here. I shall report further as soon as there are any new bases for judging the matter.

WOERMANN

## No. 102

2258/478682-88

### *Memorandum*

BERLIN, January 15, 1938.

(e. o. Pol. I 21)

#### WHAT POSSIBILITIES OF DISARMAMENT STILL EXIST?<sup>41</sup>

(With reference to an oral inquiry by the Director of Political Affairs, transmitted through Counselor of Legation Baron von der Heyden-Rynsch. No specific question was put to me nor any heading indicated.)

#### *Sections:*

##### I. Limitation of Armaments

(personnel and matériel of the armed forces)

<sup>41</sup> None of the enclosures mentioned in this document is printed here.

## II. Limitations Under Laws of War

## III. Military Assistance Pacts

## IV. Nonaggression Pacts

*Purpose: Guaranteeing Peace*

## I. LIMITATION OF ARMAMENTS

(personnel and matériel of the armed forces)

A) *General Disarmament.*

The Geneva disarmament negotiations—the Preparatory Disarmament Commission, 1926–30, and the Disarmament Conference since February 2, 1932—are generally considered, not only by us, to have failed, even though the attempt is made to keep the Conference artificially alive.

1) No one is any longer thinking of disarmament in the sense that Germany was disarmed by the dictate of Versailles.

2) Nor is any state prepared to reduce its armaments.

3) The most that could be achieved is *limitation* of armaments:

- a) qualitative
- b) quantitative

*Re 2).* We are constantly stating, as Mussolini did, that we are prepared in principle for any reduction, even to the last man and the last gun, "*si omnes*."

But these "*omnes*" are not willing.

There is general rearmament, and on a scale previously unknown.

*Re 3).* It will be necessary to agree on limitations,

- a) because manpower is limited (e.g., in England),
- b) because the nations cannot or will not in the long run bear the financial burdens of the armaments.

B) *Naval Armaments: Naval Agreements.*

Thus far limitation has been achieved only in the field of naval armaments:

1) The Washington Treaty for the Limitation of Naval Armament, of February 6, 1922.

2) The London Treaty for the Limitation and Reduction of Naval Armament, of April 22, 1930.

*Re 1) and 2).* Both qualitative,

both expired on December 31, 1936.

3) They were replaced by the general (multilateral) London Naval Treaty, of March 25, 1936, between England, France, and the United States of America, which became effective on July 29, 1937. *Qualitative* limitation of naval armament. Is open to other powers.

Japan withdrew from the negotiations because her quantitative equality with England and America was not recognized by them. Italy stayed away because of the sanctions. Neither of them has subsequently adhered to this agreement, nor concluded any bilateral agreements; consequently they are not at present bound in any way.

4) Germany adhered to the London Treaty of 1936 through the bilateral Anglo-German Naval Agreement of July 17, 1937, which became effective on November 4, 1937. (*Reichsgesetzblatt*, 1937, part II, page 701).

5) With Soviet Russia, England concluded a treaty similar to the one with Germany, signed on the same day and entered into force on the same day.

6) England has, in addition, concluded a *quantitative* naval agreement with Germany, the Anglo-German Naval Agreement of June 18, 1935, and exchange of notes (D.N.B. No. 926, of June 18, 1935): strength of the German Navy—35 percent of the British. Supplementary agreements on the occasion of the Agreement of July 17, 1937 (see above).

*Re 4) and 6).* By these two Anglo-German Naval Agreements Germany has bound herself completely with respect to England. Further commitments by us in the field of naval armaments are out of the question.

#### *C) Land Armaments.*

1) There are no treaty restrictions either as to personnel or matériel—neither numerical nor organizational restrictions regarding personnel, and neither quantitative nor qualitative restrictions regarding matériel.

Everything that has been worked out in the disarmament negotiations has remained in the stage of proposals and draft agreements, including the MacDonald Plan of March 16, 1933.

(The text accepted at the first reading: Disarmament Conference document 163 (1) of September 22, 1933, in *Documents de la Conférence*, volume II, page 600.)

2) As regards the personnel of the ground forces, Germany agreed as early as May 1933 at the Disarmament Conference to accept the MacDonald Plan as the basis for an agreement (Ambassador Nadolny in the Principal Committee of the Conference, on May 19, 1933). The Plan provided for an army of 200,000 for Germany. During the diplomatic negotiations in the winter of 1933-34, after Germany's withdrawal from the Disarmament Conference because of the Simon Plan of October 14, 1933, Germany declared that she was prepared to limit her army to 300,000 men. England and Italy agreed. France broke off the negotiations by the Barthou note of

April 17, 1934. Thereupon general rearmament began, and Germany reestablished her military sovereignty: the law creating the *Wehrmacht*, of March 16, 1935; universal military service, a peacetime army of 36 divisions. On March 7, 1936, sovereignty over the demilitarized Rhineland zone was reestablished.

3) As regards personnel, no country at the present time is prepared:

- a) to limit the numerical strength of its army.
- b) to have anyone dictate its system of defense.

4) At most, qualitative limitations such as have been put into effect with regard to naval armaments might be attained with respect to some of the principal weapons of attack; for example:

- a) maximum caliber of heavy field artillery,
- b) maximum weight of tanks.

But even here there is no willingness in evidence.

D) *Air Forces*. (Here the notes are cut short and condensed because of the rush at noon on Saturday.)

1) There are no limitations whatever by international agreement; in this connection see what was said above under Land Armaments, 1).

2) Germany is prepared, as before, to conclude an *air pact* with the *Western Powers*.

- a) for the limitation of air forces
- b) for mutual assistance; in this connection see part III; see the German reply of February 14, 1935, to the London communiqué of February 3, 1935. A copy in No. 122 of the magazine, *Völkerbund*, Geneva, is enclosed; No. 121 is likewise enclosed.

Further material will follow.

## II. LIMITATIONS UNDER LAWS OF WAR

A) *Existing Laws of War* (cf., for example, E. Lodemann: *Kodifiziertes internationales Deutsches Kriegsrecht* [Codified International German Laws of War], Berlin, 1937, Stilke).

B) *Proposals*, especially the latest proposals by the Führer in his Reichstag speeches and in the German Peace Plan of March 31, 1936.

For instance:

1) Gradual outlawing and abolition of *bombing*, point 9 of the Reichstag speech of May 21, 1935, the text of which is in the enclosed book, *Der zivile Luftschutz* [Civilian Air Protection], at the bottom of page 97.

2) Limitation of the *combat zone* to 20 kilometers, point 3 of the German Peace Plan of March 31, 1936, among the practical tasks mentioned there for conferences.

3) Etc., etc. (further particulars will follow).

### III. MILITARY ASSISTANCE PACTS

A) There are, for example, the Franco-Soviet Russian Treaty of Assistance, of May 2, 1935, and the Czech-Soviet Russian Mutual Assistance Treaty of May 16, 1935.

B) Germany rejects such military assistance pacts, but is prepared to conclude an air agreement with the Western Powers. See the preceding page, under I D 2). Text enclosed.

C) ...<sup>43</sup>

### IV. NONAGGRESSION PACTS

In pursuance of his proposals for guaranteeing peace, the Führer has repeatedly offered to conclude bilateral nonaggression pacts with all the neighbors of Germany—with France and Belgium even up to 25 years.

...<sup>43</sup> Further details and documents will follow. See also the enclosed book, middle of page 96.

Herewith respectfully submitted to the Acting Chief of Political Division I, Counselor of Legation Baron von der Heyden-Rynsch.

These notes were drafted in a hurry on Saturday morning. I shall be glad to furnish further particulars as soon as I know what is wanted: which of the above points are considered particularly important and what else may be desired. I can also submit further documents, in the English language as well.

See also my compilation of material intended for the American journalist, Simms, on June 11, 1937, for the Director of Political Affairs, in League of Nations and Armaments file 515, for the rejected German offers of limitation of armaments.

See further my article, "Prohibition of Gas and Aerial Warfare," containing a survey of the disarmament negotiations, in the Air Ministry's compilation: Knipfer and Hampe, *Civilian Air Protection*, 2d edition, 1937, p. 92, which is here enclosed with the request that it be returned. In appendix 2, p. 97, the text of the Führer's proposal for prohibiting bombing is also given.

ECKHARDT

BERLIN, January 15, 1938.

<sup>43</sup> Marks of omission appear in the original.

## No. 103

905/293728

*Minute*

BERLIN, January 17, 1938.

The British Ambassador's suggestion (RM 30 of January 13, 1938) seizes upon one of the few points in the field of armament agreements which can perhaps be realized. In my opinion it can be examined, but it should not be disposed of in advance.<sup>44</sup>

Of all the complex of subjects brought up by Halifax, the only thing actually under discussion with the British is colonies in return for a promise to stand still politically. The net result of such accounting will in all probability be zero. However, there remains the field of armaments, in which we can pay in cheap coin, or perhaps even make a virtue of necessity.

As far as armaments agreements are concerned, there is nothing more to be done in regard to the navy. In the case of the army, certain qualitative limitations (the caliber of artillery or the weight of tanks) as well as publication of armament programs, that is, the framework, without the details (not the budget), might perhaps be discussed. In the matter of air armaments, our offer of an air agreement should once again be examined. The humanizing of warfare also furnishes more material for negotiation (bombing, for example, among other things).

It would probably be well to discuss armament matters with the War Ministry in the above sense and set up a plan, if there appears to be sufficient material.

A written reply<sup>45</sup> to the British *démarche* ought in my opinion to be only in general terms, with a simultaneous reference to the fact that more material for discussion might be found on the subject of armaments, which might be connected with the British initiative we have been given reason to expect.

To be submitted herewith to the State Secretary.

WEIZSÄCKER

<sup>44</sup> This sentence, like the minute as a whole, is ambiguously phrased.

<sup>45</sup> A marginal notation in Neurath's handwriting reads as follows: "Out of the question. We can wait and see what the British do next."

## No. 104

1585/382682, 382684-86

*Memorandum*

BERLIN, January 19, 1938.

(zu Pol. II 333)

The Lord Mayor of Frankfurt am Main, State Counselor Krebs, came to see me today and handed me the enclosed letter from Lord Londonderry to the Englishman, Mr. Gall,<sup>46</sup> saying that he thought the Foreign Ministry might be interested in this letter from one Englishman to another. The letter had been put at his disposal by a friendly source.

There is no need to return the letter to Herr Krebs.

MACKENSEN

[Enclosure]

*Copy of a Letter From Lord Londonderry to Mr. Gall<sup>47</sup>*

WYNYARD PARK, BILLINGHAM-ON-TEES, CO. DURHAM.

6th December 1937.

DEAR MAJOR GALL: I have received your letter of the 4th December and, whilst I appreciate the object you have in view, I am sorry to say that at this moment I am not altogether willing to approach the Prime Minister. I have been writing to him on other matters recently, which creates somewhat of a difficulty for me.

As a matter of fact, I am beginning to think that our endeavours to establish friendly relations with the Germans must be considered from all possible angles. My own view is not nearly so hopeful as it was, and my recent visits to Germany have given rise to certain misgivings in my mind. You will have seen that there is a very strong anti-German campaign in this country, and in my judgment there is very good reason for it. My efforts for some years, before the Germans had rearmed, were directed to arrive at an international policy of disarmament. This should have been the forerunner to subsequent appeasement, a term I do not care about, but which to a large extent expresses the object we have in view.

<sup>46</sup> This letter appears to be the same as that referred to in Ribbentrop's memorandum of January 2, 1938 (document No. 93, p. 162). A letter of January 22, 1938, from Neurath to Lammers (1585/382688, not printed) forwarded the Londonderry letter for submission to the Führer. It was returned in a letter of February 5, 1938, from Lammers to Neurath (1585/382681, not printed) which stated that the Führer had read a translation of the letter.

<sup>47</sup> The copy found in the files is in English and appears to be a typed copy of the original. It is accompanied by a German translation.

This limitation has gone by the board, and we are all now engaged in a desperate race of armaments. The German demands, which are increasing, have now behind them a very formidable armed force, and I am very anxious lest by our conciliatory attitude and our desire to see justice done to Germany all the German desires will take the form of grievances which, when the Germans are strong enough, they will seek to enforce by force of arms. The German people are being trained actually on military lines and the great national machine, such as it is, can be switched over very easily from so-called peaceful intentions to a very formidable weapon for enforcing their claims.

I do not wish to take a gloomy or a pessimistic view, but it appears to me that by the shilly shallying policy of the Government we are slowly but surely drifting toward this position. I should like to see our Government undertaking a bold policy based on the limitation of armaments and the according to Germany of the position in the world which we, with the French and Italians, can agree is the position she should occupy in international affairs. Japan has set an example which, when the Germans feel themselves strong enough, they are certain to follow. As signatories to the Kellogg Pact, they will not declare war, but will try and establish their claims in Central Europe by advances and occupations which, so long as every one agrees, will not require the action of their Army or Air Force. If, on the other hand, we seek to check them in advances which we do not consider legitimate, then we shall find ourselves faced with overwhelming military forces.

The danger point in my judgment is about 1939, and if by then we cannot have established some understanding of the limitation of German ambitions, I see nothing for it but a repetition of 1914. I feel that all our friendly approaches should be tempered in such a way as to shew that whilst we are very anxious for friendly relations we want to know where Germany's aspirations are leading, and what arrangements of a specific character can be reached. The alternative is that we shall go on shewing our friendliness to Germans, giving way on all their demands, without at the same time knowing when these demands will come to an end.

I am dining with the German Ambassador next week, and am going to put this point of view before him, and I shall explain that, although my influence is not very great, I shall press for a categorical statement from Germany as to the limit of their desires, and that, unless something like this [is] forthcoming, I shall have to come to the reluctant conclusion that the only thing we can do, and I cer-

tainly think it would be a powerful safeguard, is to go on arming ourselves so as to counter the German bid for hegemony, for that is what it really amounts to.

Yours sincerely,

LONDONDERRY

No. 105

905/293727

*Minute*

BERLIN, January 20, 1938.

In answer to my minute of January 17 concerning the inquiry made by the British Ambassador regarding bombing (RM 30 of January 13) the Foreign Minister has ordered that no reply to the British *démarche* be given. We could wait and see what the British do next.

Meanwhile, we should establish contact with the War Ministry, perhaps orally to begin with, with later supplementation in writing. Please present proposals for this purpose by the first half of next week.

WEIZSÄCKER

No. 106

109/114980

*The German Chargé d'Affaires in Great Britain (Woermann) to the German Foreign Ministry*

Telegram

No. 32 of January 25

LONDON, January 25, 1938—9:57 p.m.

Received January 26, 1938—3:45 a.m.

In continuation of telegram No. 24 of the 21st.<sup>48</sup>

Grandi, who has gone on (group missing) for a few days and whom I was unable to see before his departure, gave me the following additional information through his Secretary of Embassy regarding his conversation with Eden on January 19, in continuation of the short report from the Italian Counselor of Embassy:

The question of beginning Anglo-Italian conversations was actually discussed, but no more progress was made than before Christmas. As was known, Eden had stated during the conversation with Grandi at the beginning of December that useful conversations could take place only if and when Italy abandoned anti-British propaganda. Grandi had replied that the question of propaganda could

\* Not printed.

itself form one of the subjects of the conversations (cf. telegraphic report No. 747 of December 4).

This view was again confirmed to the [Foreign] Office by the Italian Chargé d'Affaires shortly before Christmas, in the form of an *aide-mémoire*. In the conversation of January 19, Grandi resumed the discussion at the same point at which it was broken off, without changing his position. He again declared that the Italian Government was prepared to begin discussions on all pending issues. Eden answered evasively. A conversation between Lord Perth and the Italian Government, held at the beginning of January in Rome, had the same result.

WOERMANN

### No. 107

1687/396553-63

#### *The German Foreign Ministry to Various German Diplomatic Missions*<sup>49</sup>

BERLIN, January 26, 1938.

(Pol. IV 364)

The Three Power Conference between Italy, Hungary, and Austria, which was held at Budapest from January 10 to January 12, was one of the regular meetings of the permanent consultative organ established under the Supplementary Protocol of March 23, 1936, to the Rome Protocols of March 17, 1934, for the purpose of mutual consultation.

The result of the discussions, which occasionally became difficult, with Austria and Hungary on one side and Italy on the other, was recorded in the official communiqué, a copy of which is enclosed.<sup>50</sup> Regarding the individual points of the final communiqué the following may be said:

#### *The Three Power Protocols and the Berlin-Rome Axis.*

In point 2 of the final communiqué, the representatives of the three Governments again confirm their joint determination to intensify their political and economic activity and their cordial co-operation in the spirit of the Rome Protocols. The representatives of Austria and Hungary express their sympathy with the close co-operation of the two great Powers with whom they are on friendly terms, Italy and Germany, a cooperation which is rooted in the Rome-Berlin Axis and represents a new and important pledge of peace and reconstruction.

<sup>49</sup> List of addressees not printed.

<sup>50</sup> Not printed. A translation appears in *Documents on International Affairs*, 1938, vol. II, pp. 43-44.

The Hungarian Foreign Minister told our Minister at Budapest in this connection that this declaration of sympathy with the Berlin-Rome Axis was a matter of course for the Hungarian Government, since for years it had expressed its desire for close German-Italian cooperation.

After his return from Budapest, State Secretary Schmidt<sup>51</sup> informed Herr von Papen that in the conversations Chancellor Schuschnigg stressed that he was particularly anxious to win support for the policy based on the German-Italian Axis. State Secretary Schmidt also emphasized that the solidarity of the 17 million Austrians and Hungarians expressed in the communiqué would further strengthen the policy of the two great Powers.

*Three Power Protocols and German-Austrian Agreement of July 11, 1936.*

In point 2, the representatives of Italy and Hungary express their complete satisfaction with Austrian policy, which is based on the harmony between the principles of the Rome Protocols and of the Austro-German Agreement of July 11, 1936.<sup>52</sup>

With reference to this, Count Ciano remarked to Herr von Erdmannsdorff that the Austrians had wished to insert a passage here regarding the independence of their country. However, he had refused to consent to this, since, on the one hand, Austria's independence was not being violated by anyone and, on the other hand, he had wanted to avoid anything that might have had unfavorable repercussions in Berlin.

State Secretary Schmidt stated to Herr von Papen that although German-Austrian relations had not been officially discussed, he had expressed to Count Ciano his special desire for closer relations and for relations of greater mutual trust with the Reich.

*Fight Against Communism.*

In point 3, the representatives of Austria and Hungary repeat their unequivocally hostile attitude toward Communism and greet with sympathy the Italian-German-Japanese Anti-Comintern Pact.

Count Ciano, after his return from Budapest, stated to Herr von Hassell that Austria's and Hungary's accession to the Anti-Comintern Pact had not been demanded by Italy. According to our information, however, Count Ciano originally had more extensive hopes. But later Italy, whose position in relation to Austria and Hungary has become weaker because of the abolition of secret preferences and foreign exchange payments, apparently refrained from

<sup>51</sup> Guido Schmidt, Austrian State Secretary for Foreign Affairs.

<sup>52</sup> Document No. 152, p. 278.

making any far-reaching proposals, realizing that Austria and Hungary would not have complied with such a request anyway.

*Recognition of Franco's Government.*

In point 4, Austria and Hungary declare their decision to grant formal recognition to the government of General Franco as the legitimate Government of Spain and all her possessions and colonies.

Count Ciano stated to Herr von Erdmannsdorff that he had had very great difficulty in persuading the Hungarians to accept this decision. M. de Kanya mentioned that while the Hungarian public had been siding with Franco for a long time, the Austrian and Hungarian Governments thus far had hesitated to recognize the Spanish Nationalist Government *de jure*, since they feared unfavorable effects on their citizens still living in Red Spain. They had intended first to wait for further military successes by Franco, which unfortunately had not materialized so far. Ciano, however, had "all but implored" them to fulfill Mussolini's wish to this effect and had apparently been greatly worried about returning to Rome without this success.

*Italy's Withdrawal from the League of Nations.*

In point 5, the representatives of Austria and Hungary take note of the "sound and weighty reasons" which had led the Italian Government to withdraw from the League of Nations. They recognize the far-reaching consequences of this decision for the composition, aims, and potentialities of the League of Nations, and they declare that the latter cannot and should not assume the character of an ideological group. If it were to do so, Austria and Hungary reserved the right to reconsider their relations with the League.

Foreign Minister de Kanya and Austrian State Secretary Schmidt told our Minister at Budapest that Count Ciano made no attempt to force the withdrawal of Austria and Hungary from the League of Nations. The Austrian Government would have been unable to make such a decision in view of the contemplated conversion of the League of Nations 7 percent loan, and so would the Hungarian Government, for similar reasons and because of the pending negotiations on an early end of the League of Nations control over the finances of Hungary.

M. de Kanya also added that he could not give up the League of Nations as a platform and an instrument for making complaints on behalf of the Hungarian minorities in the ceded territories, as long as no equivalent was offered by the other side.

According to the information available here, the Italian wishes in this matter also seem originally to have gone further. Count

Ciano, however, for the reasons mentioned in point 3, apparently refrained from demanding the withdrawal of Austria and Hungary from the League of Nations.

*Hungary's Claim to Equality in Armaments.*

In point 6, the representatives of Austria and Italy reaffirm their recognition of Hungary's complete equality of rights with regard to rearmament. They add, addressing the Little Entente, that they regard the speedy realization of this principle as necessary.

*Relations Between Hungary and Rumania.*

In point 7, the representatives of Austria and Italy declare that their Governments follow with great interest the development of relations between Hungary and Rumania. They consider that a satisfactory outcome of the Hungarian-Rumanian negotiations would contribute greatly to the consolidation of peace in the Danubian region.

M. de Kanya, as he explained to our Minister at Budapest, had desired a stronger statement, but in the end was satisfied with Count Ciano's solemn declaration that Italy would not come to an arrangement with Rumania until the Rumanian Government had first taken positive steps toward better treatment of the Hungarian minority in Transylvania, a declaration which the Hungarian Government had to value highly, after the storm of applause in the Italian press for the Goga Cabinet, to which the reserve of the German press provided a laudable contrast.

*Commercial Relations Between the Three Powers of the Rome Protocols.*

In point 8, the representatives of the three Governments have agreed to intensify commerce between the three States by every means on the newly created basis.

*International Cooperation.*

Finally, in point 9, the Governments confirm their common desire to cooperate with all States striving for peace and reconstruction.

*Hapsburg Question.*

According to available information the Hapsburg question was not discussed at the Budapest Conference.

The outcome of the conference means a further coordination of the Rome Protocols with the Berlin-Rome Axis since the last conference of the consultative organ in Vienna on November 11 and 12, 1936—an outcome that we can only welcome.

By direction:  
BISMARCK

## No. 108

375/208815-17

*Memorandum by the Foreign Minister*

RM 66

The British Ambassador called on me today and informed me that his Government had summoned him to London for a consultation regarding the steps to be taken by England on the basis of the Halifax conversations. Henderson repeated the remark, frequently made before, that the British Government, particularly the Prime Minister, was firmly resolved to meet Germany halfway on the colonial question. He was, of course, encountering great difficulties, for there were many people in England who did not wish to give up anything. It would make the Prime Minister's task very much easier if during the negotiations he could already point to the prospect of some *quid pro quo* on the part of Germany.

I told the Ambassador that he had heard repeatedly, and from the mouth of the Führer too, that our claim to the return of the colonies could not be the subject of bargaining. The Ambassador went on to ask if we were at least prepared to engage in some discussion of armaments, bombing, etc. I told him that the question of bombing could possibly be discussed independently some time, but in any case not in connection with the colonial question. When Henderson then mentioned Germany's return to the League of Nations again and wanted some assurance that we would eventually discuss the question of reentry into a reformed League, I declared that I did not wish to discuss this question at all. I had expressed myself clearly enough in regard to our attitude toward the League. Besides, I gathered from the present negotiations in Geneva that England did not even have the courage to continue the discussion of the reform of the League of Nations.

Henderson then inquired regarding our plans for Czechoslovakia and Austria. I told him that from various conversations with me he knew what complaints we had against Czechoslovakia. If these complaints were disposed of by the Czechs, then our relations with Czechoslovakia would automatically get back to normal, too. As far as Austria was concerned, I could only tell him—and with the request that it be repeated in London—that we would not permit England, either, to interfere in the settlement of our relations with Austria. This settlement was an exclusively German-Austrian question, and we would reject any interference.

When the Ambassador then asked whether I did not believe that the Führer could give him some assurance in regard to the attitude

Germany would take in case an accommodating spirit were shown in the colonial question, I told him that I was convinced that the Führer would not tell him more than I had. Thus far we had not achieved anything by means of assurances on the part of Germany. We would wait until we received concrete offers from the other side. Then one could discuss whether some contribution could be made from our side and, if so, what contribution.

Henderson is leaving for London tomorrow evening and believes that he may be back in Berlin by about the latter part of next week.

BARON VON NEURATH

BERLIN, January 26, 1938.

No. 109

1585/382673

*The German Chargé d'Affaires in Great Britain (Woermann) to the Head of the Political Department in the German Foreign Ministry (Weizsäcker)*

LONDON, January 26, 1938.

(Pol. II 278)

DEAR HERR VON WEIZSÄCKER: Sir Alexander Cadogan recently said to me that at the present moment there was nothing particular to be discussed in the way of German-British questions. I remarked that unfriendly sentiment against Germany was still widespread in England. Sir Alexander replied that the British press had certainly taken a better attitude toward Germany in recent months. He was glad to note that the same was also true regarding the attitude of the German press toward England. In order to get the conversation going, I remarked that this improvement in press relations appeared to me to coincide in time with the Halifax visit. Sir Alexander had obviously been waiting for this cue; he stated that we would, of course, get a reply from England, but that it could not be expected immediately. When I remarked that Eden, in his last conversation with the Ambassador, had also mentioned a delay of a few months, Cadogan answered that he would not exactly say that it would still be a few months from this date before the reply would be sent, but, at any rate, it would still take a while.

February 15 was mentioned once in the press as the date. This report also appeared in the *Essener Nationalzeitung*. I believe that this date is purely conjectural.

I am writing you a personal letter because I consider the matter a little too vague for an official report.

With the best regards and Heil Hitler!

Yours,

WOERMANN

## No. 110

296/184852-55

*The German Ambassador in France (Welezeck) to the German Foreign Ministry*

A 308

PARIS, January 29, 1938.  
Received January 31, 1938.  
(Pol. V 873)

With reference to the circular instructions of May 11 and August 31, 1937, Pol. V 2321 and Pol. V 4900, and in continuation of the report of October 29, 1937, A 3967.<sup>53</sup>

Subject: Activity of the Comintern in France.

## I

The French section of the Comintern, organized in the Communist Party of France, has, in the months that have elapsed since the last report, continued to adhere in France to the policy of the Popular Front, but with diminishing success.

At the Party's convention at Arles at the end of December 1937 (see also the report of January 7—A 10<sup>53</sup>), the following data were given with regard to the present strength of the Communist Party:

Since 1935, membership has increased from 86,900 to 341,000; the number of Communist cells increased from 4,321 to 12,992 in the same period (this includes the factory cells, which increased from 766 to 4,041)—from 203 to 890 in the city of Paris alone.

The Party's political line was again approved at the convention at Arles. The readiness of the Communists to participate in a Popular Front government was reiterated, the need was stressed for strong propaganda among the Catholic workers, and the efforts to create a Proletarian Unity Party were approved.

The practical success of this policy was not particularly great. In November, because of an article by Dimitrov, which was published in *L'Humanité* and in which the Socialists were strongly assailed, the Socialists for the time being broke off the negotiations for union with the Communists, which have been dragging on for years. The Catholics, the Catholic Episcopate especially, emphatically stated that there was no question of a tie-up with the Communists. Finally, the Communist Party also came to grief with its parliamentary tactics. The Party considered itself so indispensable as a component part of the Popular Front majority that in the Chamber, too, it leveled strong criticism at the Government's measures, on the assump-

<sup>53</sup> Not printed.

tion that the Government would avoid a break. When Premier Chautemps, in order to relieve the morale crisis, demanded a vote of confidence from the Chamber in the middle of January, the Communists declared they were abstaining and not voting against the Government only out of consideration for the preservation of the Popular Front. To their surprise, the Premier then gave the Communists freedom of action. This declaration resulted in the resignation of the Cabinet, but it was a clear warning to the Communists that in broad circles there is an inclination to get along without them.

As in June, by the sudden resignation of the Blum Cabinet, so they were now, by the surprising resignation of the Chautemps Cabinet, faced with the unpleasant alternative of either splitting the Popular Front which had been founded by them and abandoning a position which in the course of the last year and a half had brought them many advantages, or of disavowing the stand they had just taken.

This time, too, they decided on the latter course. The Communist Party issued the watchword: "The Popular Front must be maintained." Whereas they had refused a vote of confidence in the first Chautemps government, in which the Socialists sat, too, a few days later they voted for the second Chautemps government in which the Socialists are no longer even represented. This shows plainly that the Comintern wishes for the present to adhere to the idea of the Popular Front.

Present conditions, however, are no longer particularly favorable to the Popular Front. Social conflicts continue to break out. The new labor bill that has been introduced in the Chamber proposes to exclude demagogic agitation as much as possible in the settlement of labor disputes. The financial and social conditions demand a strong governmental authority. For these internal political questions, the Government is seeking solutions other than those proposed by the Communists.

In addition, there is the fact that French foreign policy is pursuing less and less the line desired by the Comintern. Relations with the Soviet Union have become cooler. For the time being a change in the nonintervention policy in Spain is out of the question. Occasionally, the possibility of a *rapprochement* with Germany is also being weighed even in official circles. All these circumstances provoke the Communists to violent attacks on foreign policy and on Foreign Minister Delbos, who belongs to the Radical Socialist Party.

Despite these differences of opinion on important questions of domestic and foreign policy, it is nevertheless conceivable that the

Communist Party will try as usual to avoid an open break in the Popular Front, since it can not expect much good from a government with a more Rightist orientation.

## II

The French public has again occupied itself somewhat more in detail recently with the underground work of the Comintern in France.

### *a) Communist Military Preparations.*

Deputy Gapiand questioned the Minister of the Interior in the Chamber at the end of December with regard to Communist military preparations. The Minister of the Interior requested him to submit his material to the police. The *Action Française* published an article on such military preparations (Enclosure 1).<sup>55</sup>

A similar inquiry was made in the Paris City Council.

At the beginning of November, the *Action Française* published a report that another Communist revolutionary attempt was planned for the night of November 15 (Enclosures 2a and 2b).<sup>55</sup>

The same assertion was made by Deloncle during his interrogation after he was arrested in connection with the so-called Cagoulard affair. He alleged that he had also advised the General Staff and the President of the Republic of the plot. (Enclosure 3.<sup>56</sup>)

Reliable material on the alleged revolutionary plans did not reach the public this time either.

### *b) Supervision of Russian Emigrés.*

In November 1937 it was revealed that the telephone conversations of Zenzinov, the secretary of Kerensky, the former President of the Provisional Government in Russia, were being listened to with the aid of a device which was attached to his line at the instigation of a certain Isidor Steinberg. Isidor Steinberg had fled. He is supposed to be an agent of the Comintern.

### *c) Vengeance of the G.P.U.*

Ignaz Reiss, a former G.P.U. agent who had broken with the G.P.U. in July, was murdered at Chamblandes, in the Canton of Vaud, on the night of September 4-5. According to statements in the Swiss newspaper *Suisse*, quoted in the *Echo de Paris* of January 23rd (Enclosure 4)<sup>55</sup> the murder is an act of vengeance of the G.P.U. Accomplices in the crime were: the Frenchman Ducommet, and a certain Smirensky, both employees of the Soviet Trade Mission

<sup>55</sup> Not printed here.

<sup>56</sup> Not printed.

at Paris. They allegedly escaped. The other accomplices by the names of Beletzki, Sergei Efron, Grosovsky, Lydia Grosovsky, Renate Steiner, Martha Schildbach, are said to have fled from Switzerland to France and from there to have escaped to safety. Beletzki and Smirensky are supposed to have fled to the Soviet Union, Sergei Efron to Red Spain. Lydia Grosovsky was arrested in France but released on bail.

*d) Support for Spain.*

Assistance to Red Spain in the form of food, transports of volunteers, and munitions is being continued. All the Communist organizations in Paris charged with providing assistance are now united at Number 1, Cité du Paradis.

WELCZEK

F. ANGLO-ITALIAN CONVERSATIONS BEGUN, FEBRUARY 1938<sup>a</sup>

No. 111

109/114997-99

*Memorandum by the Foreign Minister*

Upon instructions from Ciano, Ambassador Attolico called on me today and informed me of the following in regard to the Italo-British conversations:

A few days ago Eden had expressed to Grandi the wish for a resumption of Italo-British conversations. Grandi, on instructions from Rome, had replied that such conversations could be useful only if they were comprehensive and included the recognition of the Roman Empire. Whereas previously Eden had always expressed himself very vaguely on this point, he had indicated to Grandi on February 5 that a definite arrangement could include the recognition of the Roman Empire. Although Eden's statement was still somewhat general, Grandi had reported to Rome that in his opinion Eden was serious this time.

In the course of another conversation Eden had then called Grandi's attention to the fact that the British Government had inspired that article in the *Sunday Times* of February 5, which advocated a resumption of the Italo-British conversations and [stated] that the atmosphere was favorable for this as a result of Italy's

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<sup>a</sup> No material of significance has been found in the archives of the German Foreign Ministry on the drastic changes in the German Government announced on February 4, 1938; among these changes was the replacement of Neurath by Ribbentrop. Documents on the Berchtesgaden meeting of Hitler and Schuschnigg on February 12, 1938, will be found in chap. II. No material has been found to substantiate the suspicion, prevalent at the time, that the resignation of Eden on February 20 was the result of Axis pressure.

prompt consent to the strengthening of the Nyon Agreement on the basis of recent events in the Mediterranean. The similar article of February 8 in the *Daily Telegraph* was also inspired by the Foreign Office.

Later Grandi had also questioned Vansittart on this point, but the latter had confined himself to stating that he wanted to discuss this entire problem with him at greater length, whereas the new State Secretary, Cadogan, had stated in a precise manner that it was quite possible to come to an arrangement. Attolico tells me that Grandi added that according to reports from a private but reliable source the British Cabinet, in the session of February 6, had also discussed the question of a possible resumption of Italo-British conversations and had decided to pursue the exchange of views.

As a result of these various reports from Ambassador Grandi, Mussolini had issued the following instructions to him:

The Italian Government continued to be prepared in principle to discuss the questions existing between England and Italy. It must be understood that the conversations would have to be of a comprehensive nature and that no controversial points could be excluded. Furthermore, it should be clear from the very beginning that a lasting arrangement would have to include full recognition of the Italian Empire. Mussolini had further instructed Grandi to conduct the negotiations in such a manner as not to create the impression that Italy had any special interest in such an arrangement. After Eden's unsuccessful efforts in Germany to weaken the Rome-Berlin Axis, Mussolini did not wish to have the same attempt now made in Rome. In a later telegram Grandi had been instructed to tell Eden that if Great Britain had any wishes, she might address herself directly to Rome and that Mussolini preferred to conduct such conversations with the British Ambassador in Rome.

Attolico further stated that Ciano had instructed him to tell us that Italy still maintained the same position that Mussolini had explained to me in the Palazzo Venezia in November, and that nothing would be done in Rome without the full prior concurrence of Berlin.

In reply to my question as to why England had taken a different attitude from previously on the subject of recognition and what he thought future developments would be, Attolico stated that Eden had probably felt at the last League of Nations session in Geneva, particularly because of the attitude of Sweden (which was going to send a new minister to Rome next month), that he was becoming more and more isolated in his position on the nonrecognition of the Italian Empire. The prospects for an understanding were, of course, poor, for, whereas the battle of the air waves could be settled with-

out much difficulty, it appeared to him that the questions of Spain and Libya were, just as before, big obstacles to such an understanding.

Attolico intends to keep us informed regarding developments in London.

RIBBENTROP

BERLIN, February 10, 1938.

No. 112

2554/523770-71

*Memorandum*

VERY SECRET

I have learned privately and confidentially from the most reliable source that the purpose of the visit of the British Ambassador, Sir Neville Henderson, to London last week was to receive instructions from the Prime Minister, Neville Chamberlain, regarding a British offer of colonies to Germany.

According to this information, the Ambassador is directed to make the Führer and Chancellor a "generous" colonial offer in the name of the Prime Minister. Apparently this offer will basically comprise the return of the former German colonies which are under British mandate. German Southwest Africa would accordingly not be included. Portuguese colonial territory would be offered in place of German East Africa. The Portuguese would be compensated by means of other British colonial possessions or by parts of German East Africa. Chamberlain did not intend to utilize this offer of colonies as the basis for a political horse trade with Germany. The British Government could justify this "generous" offer before the British public only if Germany for her part made a contribution toward safeguarding the peace of Europe. Suitable possibilities for this would be, for example, an agreement regarding bombing, and the participation of Germany in an international organization which might result from a completely reformed League of Nations.

Apparently Ambassador Henderson has not yet quite made up his mind whether he should carry out the above-mentioned instruction before the Führer's political declaration, which has been announced for February 20.

BERLIN, February 11, 1938.

Herewith respectfully submitted to Ministerial Director Baron von Weizsäcker.

VON STREMPER

The above memorandum is to be submitted to the State Secretary.

On the same subject the British Ambassador told Attolico that the offer which was to be the basis of negotiations was in fact generous and would, besides the offer of colonies, be concerned principally with questions of armaments and the humanizing of warfare, while according to Attolico's description it is not concerned with any British request that Germany remain politically inactive on her eastern border.

WEIZSÄCKER

BERLIN, February 11, 1938.

No. 113

1585/382690-91

*The German Chargé d'Affaires in Great Britain (Woermann) to the German Foreign Ministry*

A 707

LONDON, February 11, 1938.

Received February 12, 1938.

(Pol. II 367)

Subject: Count Grandi on the tendencies within the British Cabinet.

In the course of a lengthy conversation, Count Grandi gave me the following picture of the various tendencies within the British Cabinet.

He said there were three factions. The first faction was represented by Eden. The latter was mainly influenced by domestic considerations, particularly in view of the next election campaign. Eden hoped to become the leader of the left wing of the Conservative Party, perhaps even of a new party in which the left-wing Conservatives could join with all the elements in between the Labor and the Conservative Parties. Consequently he was using more or less leftist slogans. Eden's prestige increased among his followers whenever he did anything against Fascism and National Socialism, and decreased when he appeared compliant toward Germany and Italy.

The second faction was represented by Chamberlain and his friends. He, Grandi, believed that we needed to ascribe no ulterior motives to Chamberlain. He honestly desired an understanding with Germany and Italy, insofar as this was possible under the circumstances, and, of course, not at the expense of France.

I was now curious to find out what Grandi would describe as the third faction. He said the third faction was the Vansittart school, which arrived at the same results as Eden, but purely from considerations of foreign policy. This faction considered every means

of political intrigue justifiable. I told Grandi that I agreed with him in many respects, but that he had omitted a fourth faction, which I might call the Duff Cooper faction. They were the people who favored an understanding with Italy but not with Germany. Grandi said it was true that there was such a tendency. He considered it a subdivision of the Chamberlain faction. Among this group he named Hore-Belisha along with Duff Cooper and thought that both these politicians, particularly Duff Cooper, saw their whole political career as a sort of competition with Eden. The latter stood in the way of Duff Cooper's political ambition and he was, therefore, inclined to consider bad everything that Eden did. Thus, if Eden advocated an anti-Italian policy, it was natural that Duff Cooper should be pro-Italian.

With these last statements Grandi probably wanted mainly to protect those politicians who are actually very much in favor of a close friendship with Italy and thus more or less want to reestablish the Stresa Front. What Grandi said about the motives of these politicians may contain a grain of truth, but is surely exaggerated, since Duff Cooper certainly has not become a friend of Germany as a result of his opposition to Eden.

WOERMANN

# No. 114

2129/464106

## *The German Ambassador in France (Welczeck) to the German Foreign Ministry*

SECRET

PARIS, February 11, 1938.

A 355

(Pol. IM 490/38)

With reference to instructions of January 29, Pol. IM 209 g.<sup>56</sup>

Subject: Collaboration of the French and British Navies.

Some collaboration between the French and British Navies can be safely assumed on the basis of our observations here. Such collaboration would be entirely consistent with the political aim of the two countries, which tends more and more to an alliance with a decidedly military background. No indications that this collaboration is based on a hard and fast agreement can be noted. However, the history of prewar relations between France and England and their collaboration in recent years show that such an agreement is not necessary, either, to make the collaboration effective. After all, as far as the air force is concerned, too, informed circles, including the German *Luftwaffe*, assume, no doubt correctly, that close collabora-

<sup>56</sup> Not printed.

tion is taking place, even though the French and British do not admit to any hard and fast agreement and no proof of such an agreement exists.

The Naval Attaché expresses a similar view in the enclosed memorandum, which also goes into the statement regarding Corsica.<sup>59</sup>

WELCZECK

## No. 115

625/251575-78

### *Memorandum*

(Pol. II 369)

It may be expected that in the first conversation between the Foreign Minister and the French Ambassador, M. François-Poncet will bring up the following questions:

I. *Ban on the "Temps" in Germany.* This ban was the result of a completely mendacious report by the *Temps*, allegedly emanating from Basel, on the most recent events in Germany. The French contend that this report was published rather inadvertently and without the knowledge of the editor in chief of the *Temps*, who was traveling in Morocco at the time. The Ambassador is asking for a speedy removal of the ban and claims that he, too, has numerous grievances regarding German newspaper articles about France.

II. *The exhibition, "Five Years of Hitler," staged by émigré groups in Paris.* Upon German protests, the French Government has had the insulting caricatures of German statesmen removed from the exhibition but stated that for constitutional reasons it is unable to close the exhibit, although it regretted and disapproved of the affair. In our objections, we pointed out especially that it was not a question of French sponsors but of machinations of *émigrés*, suppression of which we were constrained to demand of France. After it was at first said that the exhibition would close the middle of February, it is now reported that it is to remain open until the middle of March.

III. At the beginning of this month, the French Embassy in a note *protested alleged German machinations in Alsace-Lorraine*, referring particularly to the activity of the "*Bund Deutscher Westen*," of Herr Trump, the Paris representative of the *N[ational] S[ozialistische] Rhein-Front*, and to some other insignificant occurrences. Against these attempts to inflate unimportant matters, it might be desirable to refer to the fundamental declarations of the Führer and Chancellor on the subject of Alsace-Lorraine, the importance of

<sup>59</sup> Not printed.

which cannot be lessened if a few groups such as former citizens of Alsace-Lorraine living in Germany occasionally made speeches or wrote articles which did not seem entirely in harmony with these declarations.

IV. Should the interview also lead to a *more thorough discussion of the whole problem of German-French relations*, it is to be expected that François-Poncet will again drag out his familiar complaints, which he has often voiced in the last few months. They are to the effect that for a year and a half France had declared her readiness for German-French conversations, but that the German Government had remained deaf to all these proposals. The French had been particularly disappointed by the fact that after the last conversation between Léon Blum and Herr Schacht in Paris last May the thread had been completely cut. Evidently Germany was not at all interested in a settlement of her relations with France, probably seeing therein a restriction of her chances of one day proceeding to surprise actions in Central Europe. This apparent German attitude would conjure up the danger of the gravest complications, if not even the danger of a new world conflagration.

In the recent instructions to the Paris Embassy, it was stated in answer to these French insinuations that the French declarations of readiness to settle German-French relations so far had never gone beyond certain general expressions and, above all, had revealed the intention of curtailing our regained freedom of movement as much as possible by a return to the so-called collective framework; but it was precisely this that we had to reject, for it was only under the impression of our regained freedom of movement that the realization seemed to be slowly dawning in Paris and elsewhere that they had to heed our grievances to a greater extent than in the past. If we should forego this freedom of movement again, it was to be feared that then the readiness to make concessions would immediately disappear again with it, and this in turn would lead to the danger of so strong an aggravation of differences that these differences would finally lead to an explosion.

M[ACKENSEN]

BERLIN, February 12, 1938.

## No. 116

313/190120-24

*The German Embassy in Italy to the German Foreign Ministry*  
Enclosure to report 843/38 of February 16, 1938 (Rome Embassy)<sup>60</sup>

## MEMORANDUM

Through Ciano, Mussolini has sent Italian Ambassador Grandi instructions concerning the conversations with the British Government, stating in substance that England is again trying to neutralize the Rome-Berlin Axis or reduce its power of resistance and paralyze its action by an encirclement maneuver. (Grandi had explained the change in the British attitude from a one-sided point of view, namely on the assumption that, in view of events in the Far East and Japan's alarming expansion toward South China, England wished to speed up settlement of the Mediterranean questions.) Referring to this one-sided viewpoint of Grandi's, Mussolini gave instructions to the Italian Ambassador not to do anything on his own initiative but to confine himself to thoroughly sounding out and clarifying Great Britain's true intentions.

Specifically and as a point of departure Mussolini's instructions to Grandi signify that Italy will not refuse to negotiate but has no intention of working actively toward bringing about such negotiations or of conducting such negotiations in haste. For the time being, the most important thing is still to clarify England's true intentions. Italy, moreover, still persists in the view that a clarification of the Mediterranean questions is impossible unless a complete and final liquidation of the Abyssinian question is included. Furthermore, possible negotiations between England and Italy may not compromise the policy of the Rome-Berlin Axis or disturb the good relations and complete harmony with Berlin.

Grandi took notice of these instructions in his reply and at the same time maintained that he had never taken the initiative. All his conversations had been held at the instance of the British political leaders. He also assumed that as a result of the dismissal of the old leaders of the *Wehrmacht* and the Wilhelmstrasse, whom London considered pro-British and lukewarm toward Italy, and also as a result of the necessity of settling or reducing the difficulties in Europe, Great Britain had decided to seek a *rapprochement* with Rome in order, on the one hand, to neutralize Rome by rather pro-

<sup>60</sup> The report 843/38 of February 16, 1938, from the German Embassy in Italy to the German Foreign Ministry has not been found in the Foreign Ministry archives. The enclosure, consisting of the memorandum printed here, is unsigned and it has not been possible to determine its origin.

tracted negotiations, and, on the other hand, to be able to adopt a firmer policy in the Far East. Grandi added that in this situation he would consider it advisable for the Italians to use the same method that Germany employed in the question of relations with London, namely, to show no impatience whatever in regard to negotiations and not to refuse these negotiations.

From Grandi's other reports the following picture emerges:

The British Government, and particularly Chamberlain, urged that the conversations take place in London. In accordance with instructions, Grandi on his part insisted on Rome as the place for the negotiations. (Regarding this instruction to Grandi two points must be considered: first, Ciano has the understandable desire for a prominent role in these negotiations and their success; secondly, Mussolini is rather distrustful, both because of Eden's intransigent attitude and because of Grandi's conciliatory and accommodating attitude.)

Chamberlain on his part has again pointed out to the Italian Ambassador through an intermediary the advantages of negotiations in London, since in this event he would have the opportunity to exert his influence more easily and more directly, and since for practical purposes their direction would really be in his hands. However, if the negotiations took place in Rome, they would have to be conducted through normal channels by the Foreign Office. (Chamberlain meant to allude to Eden's activity and the fact that Eden is less friendly toward Italy than he, Chamberlain.) Grandi naturally had to reassert the opposition of Rome, but added that he would, of course, continue to exert every effort toward a possible clarification and if necessary would also address himself directly to Chamberlain. (Grandi has an intermediary whom he never names in his telegrams and with whom he cannot negotiate officially, but through whom Chamberlain occasionally sends him confidential information.)

In the last conversations between Eden and Grandi the Italo-British question was thoroughly discussed. The great difficulties which still exist between the two countries, primarily concerning the fate of Spain, were brought into sharp focus. Eden demands that the Italian volunteers be shipped home quickly and in large numbers, and that Italy simultaneously assume the obligation of withdrawing all her volunteers within a definite period which should, moreover, be a relatively short one. Grandi has already been able to learn from a conversation with Lord Plymouth<sup>61</sup> that England demands first of all that 75 percent of the volunteers be evacuated, including air force personnel and naval volunteers. Franco would

<sup>61</sup> British Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

thus lose one of the important elements of his superiority at the very beginning, a circumstance which would be further aggravated by the fact that in the last few months France and Soviet Russia have again increased their deliveries of arms and ammunition to Barcelona. The British maneuver thus aims at depriving Franco of the chance for final victory and at paving the way for a solution which can be dictated by London with the concurrence of Paris. Italy, however, cannot accept such a solution. A sharp argument arose on this point between Eden and Grandi. Grandi declared that before Italy could completely disinterest herself in the Spanish conflict, it was absolutely necessary that the supervision of deliveries to Red Spain be fully effective, not only on land but also on the sea and in the air. But actually the Franco-Russian deliveries to Red Spain were continuing at an increased rate, particularly recently. The withdrawal of the Italian volunteers could therefore be only on a moderate scale.

As regards the Abyssinian question, the conversations with Eden have shown clearly that the British Government intends to use recognition of Italy's sovereignty over Ethiopia as a weapon with which the complete disinterest of Italy in Spain and thereby the surrender of Spain to Great Britain are to be achieved. Furthermore, it is by no means clear yet whether or not Eden intends after all to leave the final decision in the Abyssinian question to Geneva. Eden confirmed to Grandi that the British Government had already made its decision with regard to the settlement of the Abyssinian question. It was now only a question of ascertaining the attitude of the other interested states. France would probably follow England. But other governments would also have to be consulted, those of the smaller nations, too. Soviet Russia was not mentioned by Eden in this connection. Eden's statements are considered rather ambiguous in Rome, partly because they do not make clear whether Great Britain's decision is intended to be final or subject to some declaration within the framework or in the spirit of the League of Nations.

Finally, Eden also told Grandi in the course of his conversations that the Anglo-Italian negotiations should be kept within the framework of the Anglo-Italian Gentlemen's Agreement of January 2, 1937. This proves that Great Britain intends to commit Italy to a disinterested policy in Spain, including her positions on the Balearic Islands, from which Italian air force and naval volunteers would also have to be withdrawn.

## No. 117

875/208818

*The German Chargé d'Affaires in Great Britain (Woermann) to the  
German Foreign Ministry*

Telegram

No. 84 of February 17

LONDON, February 17, 1938—4:24 p.m.

Received February 17, 1938—6:25 p.m.

Under Secretary of State Sargent told me today that the British Government was glad that Ambassador Henderson would have an opportunity to see the Führer before February 20. It was a question of the continuance of the Halifax conversations. He assumed, however, that it was not a question of the actual beginning of negotiations, but of a clarification of the date.

WOERMANN

## No. 118

119/118865-66

*Minute*

BERLIN, February 17, 1938.

Supplementing earlier complaints regarding our work in behalf of Germanism in South Tyrol, the Italian Counselor of Embassy brought up the following:

German tourists came to South Tyrol with travel literature which outwardly gave a harmless impression but which in the text on the inside contained inflammatory statements against the Italian regime in South Tyrol. Count Magistrati showed me a copy of these scurrilous sheets [*Pamphlete*], as he called them, which had been submitted to Rome at the end of January by the administration in Bolzano. Count Magistrati left me a copy of the text of the propaganda leaflet (see enclosure).<sup>62</sup> According to the statement of the Counselor of Embassy, this text is identical with that of the leaflets recently suppressed in Munich. Count Magistrati concluded from this that both leaflets (the tourist pamphlet and the Munich leaflets) came from the same source. He identified it as the *Verein für das Deutschtum im Ausland*. He stated that evidently one was dealing with a decalogue which was to become the gospel of the Germans in South Tyrol. Magistrati refrained from characterizing the decalogue at length, since I replied that I would see to it that the necessary steps were taken in this matter.

<sup>62</sup> The enclosures are not printed here

The Counselor of Embassy then, however, made further remarks concerning the same general problem. Among other things, he mentioned a series of books which had recently been published in Germany or which had appeared in new editions. The enclosed copy, which Count Magistrati left with me, gives more detailed information about this. He did not take this literature seriously and said himself that in view of the large mass of new publications a very strict and thorough political censorship in Germany could really not be expected. On the other hand, a sharp warning to the V.D.A. [*Verein für das Deutschtum im Ausland*], as the propaganda center for South Tyrol, would certainly have a good and sufficient effect. He then mentioned a remark which Mussolini had made to him, to the effect that these critics could be silenced by showing them how frivolous German foreign policy appeared if it was undermined by such an oppositionist private policy.

Count Magistrati further objected to remarks regarding South Tyrol which occasionally appeared in the so-called *Roland-Blätter* and in *Jung-Roland*.

Finally he also criticized the chronicles on South Tyrol appearing in the monthly publications of the *Auslandsinstitut* in Stuttgart, which, in view of the close relations between State Secretary Bohle and the *Auslandsinstitut*, had to be considered as semiofficial.

In contrast with this, Count Magistrati mentioned as an example of how promptly and correctly the Italian Government acted, the fact that Mussolini had had the December issue of the *Archivi del Alto Adige* confiscated because an article on Alsace had contained remarks which were not in keeping with the friendly relations between Germany and Italy.

The Italian Counselor of Embassy brought this up on instructions from the Ambassador without making any request except that the V.D.A. be reprimanded. The other points, he said, he had mentioned more by way of illustration. However, he probably expects that the other authorities concerned will also receive reminders.

WEIZSÄCKER

## No. 119

109/115001-03

*The German Chargé d'Affaires in Great Britain (Woermann) to the  
German Foreign Ministry*

Telegram

No. 91 of February 18

LONDON, February 18, 1938—11:35 p.m.

Received February 19, 1938—3:50 a.m.

In the course of the past week, Eden has twice had Grandi asked whether he had not yet received advices from his Government in the matter of the withdrawal of volunteers. Grandi replied in the negative both times.

Yesterday Chamberlain asked Grandi for an interview, ("which" apparently missing) took place in the presence of Eden.

Grandi informed me as follows regarding the course of the conversation:

1) Chamberlain opened the conversation with the Austrian problem and asked Grandi about the Italian view. Grandi confined himself to a reference to the familiar announcement in the *Informazione Diplomatica*<sup>63</sup> and emphasized that this was the opinion of his Government. Grandi likewise did not receive the impression from the conversation that special steps were to be expected from the British Government. But he confirmed the information I had received from other quarters to the effect that the French had today exerted heavy pressure upon the British Labor Party.

2) Chamberlain then came to the subject of the Anglo-Italian conversations. Grandi said that Chamberlain had spoken almost as if the known exchange of correspondence between Chamberlain and Mussolini of last July<sup>64</sup> had taken place yesterday, and as if it were really only up to Italy now to make possible the opening of the conversation.

Although a number of details were touched upon in the course of the conversation, nothing new of any kind resulted from it this time. It is Grandi's impression that the Eden faction in the Cabinet is now in favor of deferring the negotiations until progress has been made in the Spanish question, but that this faction is opposed by another, which favors the earliest possible commencement of the conversations. Grandi expressed his unchanged readiness to begin the talks, but let it be known that Italy was in no hurry.

<sup>63</sup> The announcement in the *Informazione Diplomatica* on February 17 stated that "In responsible quarters in Italy the meeting at Berchtesgaden and the decisions taken by Chancellor Schuschnigg are looked upon as the natural development of the relations between Germany and Austria as these were established by the Agreement of July 11, 1936."

<sup>64</sup> See footnote 71, p. 102.

3) Chamberlain then came to . . . (groups missing) in connection with the question of the general discussions, the present status of the Spanish question in the Committee. According to Grandi, it was not until this part of the conversation that Eden took a somewhat more active part. Chamberlain and Eden complained that Italy had kept them waiting 10 days for an answer and insisted that an answer be forthcoming as soon as possible. Grandi again declared that he had no instruction yet but was expecting it soon.

I asked Grandi what exactly was the result of the conversation, which had started in the morning and been continued in the afternoon and had lasted several hours. Grandi said that the result was no more than he had described to me above. He considered it possible that by this step, which had been announced by the press with much fanfare, Chamberlain had intended, in view of the tension created by the Austrian question, to show that British-Italian relations were improving. Beyond this, however, he considers it possible that Chamberlain really desires an understanding. All kinds of questions had, of course, been taken up in the course of the discussion, but in so vague a form that he did not even consider it necessary to inform his Government of them. The British were forever attempting to discuss all those very matters which later would comprise the subject matter of the negotiations.

On the basis of this statement by Grandi I have no final opinion as to the importance of Chamberlain's new initiative.

Further report follows.

WOERMANN

## No. 120

1387/359037-38

*The German Chargé d'Affaires in Great Britain (Woermann) to the  
German Foreign Ministry*

Telegram

URGENT

No. 105 of February 21

LONDON, February 21, 1938—2 p.m.

Received February 21, 1938—4:35 p.m.

(Pol. II 492)

1. The correspondence between Eden and Chamberlain, which was published today, confirms that the immediate cause of the resignation was differences of opinion regarding the beginning of Anglo-Italian conversations, but that in addition there was a disagreement regarding the foreign policy problem and the methods of solving it.

These more profound differences of opinion also refer, as is generally known, to the question of relations with Germany.

Eden's pro-French attitude and his lack of understanding for Germany and Italy are based to a considerable degree on considerations of domestic policy (cf. report A 707 of February 11). Eden is working more and more toward a future role as leader either of the Conservative Party or perhaps of a new party, which would comprise left-wing Conservatives, the National Labor Party, and remnants of liberal parties, and could perhaps even win over the right wing of the Labor Party. Among all these groups Eden has a definite following; besides, as regards foreign policy, he is supported by part of the right-wing Conservatives. Eden has, therefore, no doubt used actual differences of opinion to secure himself a good start at some later date, as is the custom in parliamentary countries. In his recent speeches, too, Eden has talked a great deal about domestic problems, showing that he does not want to be thought of as a politician whose only field is foreign policy. At any rate, one must continue to reckon with Eden.

2. The expectation frequently entertained that at least some members of the Cabinet would follow Eden did not materialize. Only the parliamentary Under Secretary, Lord Cranborne, also resigned. The immediate reason for the resignation created a favorable situation for Chamberlain, insofar as he was assured of the loyalty of the Ministers who desired a quick settlement with Italy but not with Germany (Duff Cooper, Hore-Belisha).

3. Lord Halifax is generally mentioned as the next Foreign Secretary; if no immediate decision is made, he is to be charged with the conduct of affairs at least for the time being (I refer particularly to the judicious statements of February 17 by Halifax in the House of Lords, which were transmitted in telegraphic reports 94 and 95<sup>65</sup>). The fact that Halifax, being a peer, cannot speak in the House of Commons means that the defense of foreign policy there is to a very large extent placed in the hands of the Prime Minister.

WOERMANN

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\* Neither printed.

## No. 121

109/115004

*The German Chargé d'Affaires in Great Britain (Woermann) to the German Foreign Ministry*

Air Mail Telegram

No. 108 of February 21

LONDON, February 21, 1938.

Received February 22, 1938—9:15 a.m.

In continuation of telegraphic report No. 107 of February 21.<sup>68</sup>

On the occasion of today's session of the House of Commons, Chamberlain gave a detailed review of developments in Anglo-Italian relations since Eden's speech in the House of Commons on July 19. According to this review the Italians recently expressed a very definite desire to begin conversations soon. Chamberlain announced that after he had been informed today by Grandi of Italian acceptance of the British proposals, he had told the latter that the British Government was prepared to begin conversations. The Italian Government would be notified immediately. But as the conversations would be conducted in Rome, it was necessary that the British Ambassador come to London for the purpose of obtaining instructions.

He had then called Grandi's attention to the following additional points:

1. A settlement of the Spanish question was considered by the British Government an essential part of any agreement that might be made.

2. The British Government, as a loyal member of the League of Nations, would desire to obtain the approval of the League of Nations.

3. It was, moreover, essential that during the negotiations with the League of Nations the situation in Spain should not be materially altered as a result of new Italian troop shipments to Spain or as a result of failure by the Italians to implement the arrangements contemplated by the British formula.

WOERMANN

## No. 122

109/115007-08

*Memorandum*

BERLIN, February 22, 1938.

The Italian Counselor of Embassy, acting on behalf of the Ambassador, who is confined to bed, today spoke to me at length about

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<sup>68</sup> Not printed.

the Anglo-Italian conversations. He emphasized that he did this upon instructions from Rome since they wanted to keep us informed from there. Grandi had sent word to Rome that he was and had been informing Herr Woermann only cursorily and was leaving to Rome the matter of keeping the German Government fully informed.

Magistrati first discussed the Italian acceptance of the British plan regarding the withdrawal of the volunteers. However, he knew even less about this matter than we did. Then he mentioned that Grandi had refused to discuss the Austrian problem with Chamberlain. Magistrati further explained that the initiative in the resumption of Italo-British conversations had come from the British.<sup>67</sup>

Magistrati then read me an instruction of February 8 to Grandi, the main points of which had already been brought to the notice of the Foreign Minister by Ambassador Attolico personally.

Grandi's telegrams, which Magistrati read to me, were very largely devoted to the question of the press and the radio station at Bari. It is not worth while to say anything more about this, since the conversations, especially in the matter of the press feud between the two countries, were devoted mainly to arguments and not to a solution of this problem. The most important progress which Grandi could report on February 12 was the communication that the British Government was prepared in principle to recognize the Italian Empire without the previous blessing of the League of Nations. Magistrati considered the main difficulty in the conversations heretofore, and the one which he assumed had also caused Eden's fall, to be the combining of the solution of the Spanish question and the recognition of the Empire, which Italy had refused to accept because the concept "solution of the Spanish question" was after all very flexible.

After Magistrati's statements, which in spite of their length did not disclose very much, I reminded the Counselor of Embassy that Italy after all aimed at a total settlement with England and that the points mentioned here would not represent a complete settlement of Anglo-Italian relations, whereupon Magistrati stated that there would perhaps be something to negotiate with respect to the frontiers of Abyssinia, which were not yet fixed, and that of course the Paris-London-Rome-Berlin quadrangle was in the background of the discussions, i.e., an attempt completely to supplant the League of Nations for all practical purposes.

WEIZSÄCKER

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<sup>67</sup> A marginal notation, apparently in Mackensen's handwriting, reads as follows: "On February 21 Chamberlain said the exact opposite in the House of Commons."

## No. 123

109/115005-06

*Memorandum by the Foreign Minister*

RM 18

The Italian Counselor of Embassy, Count Magistrati, called on me today to inform me of the following:

By order of the Italian Foreign Minister, Count Ciano, and acting on behalf of the ill Italian Ambassador, Attolico, he was to inform the German Government of the status of the Anglo-Italian negotiations. The Anglo-Italian negotiations would take place in Rome. During these negotiations all problems pending between England and Italy, including the unconditional recognition of the conquest of Abyssinia, would be discussed. The negotiations would begin as soon as the British Ambassador at Rome, the Earl of Perth, had returned to his post. The Italian Government was anxious to inform Germany that it would not tolerate any tendency to impair German-Italian relations that might appear during these conversations. If such a tendency should become evident, the negotiations could not be brought to a successful conclusion and would be broken off. Italy would make no agreement with England unless it was concluded in fullest harmony with Germany and in accordance with the principles on which the German-Italian Axis was based.

The discussion between the British Prime Minister and the Italian Ambassador at London, Count Grandi, had thus far dealt only with the withdrawal of the volunteers and the granting of belligerent rights to the Spanish parties. As was already known to the German Government, Grandi had given the consent of the Italians to a minimum figure on the basis of which belligerent rights would have to be granted. Together with the former British Foreign Secretary, Eden, the figure had been set at 9-10,000 men.

RIBBENTROP

BERLIN, February 23, 1938.

## No. 124

1798/409316-18.

*Memorandum*

(Pol. II 527)

The French Ambassador called on me this morning.

M. Poncet was noticeably depressed and mentioned that he was seriously thinking of resigning his post here. After the events of the last few weeks in Germany he felt there was no hope of bringing

about an understanding between France and Germany. I told him that I saw no reason for such a pessimistic mood. As he had noticed, the Führer had observed a great deal of restraint toward France in his speech and had again emphasized that there were no longer any territorial questions to be settled between ourselves and France. M. Poncet retorted that the tone of the Führer's speech and the atmosphere in Germany were becoming more and more aggressive. The Führer himself was now endorsing the claims with regard to Germans abroad, hitherto voiced only by Herr Rosenberg and Herr Bohle. I interrupted Poncet and told him that obviously here was another mistake. The Führer had merely declared that we could not remain unaffected by the fate of the Racial-Germans living in the neighboring countries. Poncet would recall that I had been telling him for the last few years that the improvement desired by France in our relations with Czechoslovakia could only take place if our fellow Germans living there were accorded better treatment in cultural and economic matters. So long as that was not the case, it was quite natural that their complaints would always find an echo here.

M. Poncet then brought up the subject of Austria. He asserted that France could not acquiesce in our brushing aside Austria's independence, which was guaranteed by international treaties. I repeated to the Ambassador what I had often said before, that the controversies [*Auseinandersetzungen*] between ourselves and Austria were a matter for those two countries alone. The statement that Austria's independence was settled by international treaties was incorrect. I knew only of a three-power agreement made at Stresa between England, France, and Italy, an agreement which since then was no longer considered as binding by one of the parties, namely Italy, and, in any case, had no binding force whatever for third countries. I urgently warned France not to interfere in this affair, which we considered a domestic matter. The example of Napoleon III prior to 1866 and 1870 ought surely to serve as a lesson that the German people's striving for unity could not be thwarted. It would be a much wiser and more farsighted policy to reconcile oneself to this right of self-determination, which France had in other cases always supported, instead of trying to find allies for protests against the possible affiliation of Austria with Germany. In any event, nothing more than protests would result, for I could not believe that any country, including France, would start a war over the *Anschluss* of Austria with Germany.

M. Poncet finally withdrew to the position that having a compact Reich of 80 millions in the center of Europe would put a great

strain on France and on the balance of power in Europe. I told him that by the same token we could protest against France's attempt to obtain military preponderance in Europe by mobilizing the blacks in her colonies.

Concerning events in England, M. Poncet's comments were far from happy, as he is afraid that Chamberlain will try to bring about an understanding with Italy and Germany without regard for French interests. To restore the balance, M. Poncet declared, France would again have to lean more on Russia, an undertaking in which I wished him the best of luck.

BARON VON NEURATH<sup>68</sup>

BERLIN, February 23, 1938.

### No. 125

605/247873-76

#### *The German Ambassador in France (Welczeck) to the German Foreign Ministry*

Telegram

No. 104 of February 24

PARIS, February 24, 1938.

Received February 25, 1938—12:30 a.m.

(Pol. II 537)

The political situation in France, which was determined principally by domestic and financial policy during the past month, has been brought very much under the spell of foreign policy by the Berchtesgaden Agreements,<sup>69</sup> the Führer's speech, and the change in the British Cabinet. Foreign policy decisions that might affect the course of France's foreign policy and her domestic policy, too, are up for discussion; France's League of Nations policy, the Russian Pact, her policy of alliances in Central Europe, and particularly the alliance with England, which has recently been the pivotal point of French foreign policy, are affected by the new events.

The Berchtesgaden Agreement had taken France completely by surprise and dealt her a hard blow, because it has again shaken her prestige in the Danube basin and, according to opinion here, points the way to an irresistible extension of German influence not only to Austria but also to Central Europe. As a result of the form in which the Agreement was concluded, France sees herself unable to employ effective means against it. She therefore tried, as is now known, to induce England to take collective action against Germany,

<sup>68</sup> On February 25, 1938, copies of this memorandum were transmitted to the German Embassies at London, Paris, Rome, and Moscow, and to the German Legations at Prague and Vienna for their information.

<sup>69</sup> Chap. II, pp. 497-531.

which was to indicate to us that any use of force to effect territorial changes in Central Europe would meet with decided resistance on the part of both Powers. Chamberlain refused, as authoritative French quarters admit, and this was the first great disappointment for France. (This refusal is said to have been a factor in the resignation of Eden, who was not quite so intransigent with respect to the French suggestion.)

The conciliatory passages of the Führer's speech are recognized and appreciated here. France, however, senses a threat, particularly in the remark concerning the 10 million Germans living outside the border of the Reich; this, it is thought, points in the same direction as the Berchtesgaden Agreement. A threat is seen also in the comments on Spain, from which is deduced the possibility of German intervention in the internal affairs of European countries on the basis of anti-Communism. On these two questions, too, England refused to take any step against Germany in the Anglo-French diplomatic conversations, causing France further disappointment.

France feels herself hardest hit, however, by the departure of Eden and by Chamberlain's initiative toward Italy, which is generally interpreted as a change in foreign policy. The press of the Left reacted rather violently to the dropping of Eden, the best friend of France, the defender of the League of Nations and of the London-Paris Axis, and has become so disagreeable toward Chamberlain and his new course that the Government, in the *Temps* and elsewhere, had to point out that the Anglo-French friendship still existed; that it was necessary to wait and see how British policy would develop, and that the French press had to beware of interference in England's domestic affairs. Despite the moderation of tone that followed, Chamberlain's initiative is nevertheless seen as a weakening of the League of Nations, as a declaration of a certain British disinterestedness in continental European events, especially central European events, and as a hardly restrained effort at *rapprochement* not only with Italy but also with the Berlin-Rome Axis.

It is therefore felt that the question must be faced whether France should go along with England's course and thereby sacrifice at least a portion of her present foreign policy or, while not giving up British friendship, should pursue a foreign policy more independent of the British. This "either or" is being brought into sharp relief by Flandin and by the Left, and the internal political consequences that might result are also presented. Adjustment of French foreign policy to England by abandoning or limiting the Russian Pact, with a simultaneous retrenchment in the Popular Front policy at home, marks the one extreme of opinion; expanding the Russian Pact and

the central European alliances, and strengthening and enlarging the Popular Front into a national front mark the other extreme.

The Government, on the other hand, seems to be steering a course toward reconciliation of the two theses and maintenance of the policy pursued so far. It seems to be of the opinion that the effects of Chamberlain's initiative must first be awaited and that then a way must be sought that would adjust French foreign policy to that of the British without any fundamental change. Above all, the Government does not seem to consider the moment right to come out for or against a *rapprochement* with the Rome-Berlin Axis and probably also believes that it can avoid this decision as long as there are no tangible results from the British initiative. A factor in this is perhaps the hope expressed particularly by the Left, that Chamberlain will fail in his initiative and will have to leave the field to Eden again, a development that is allegedly desired by the United States, too, whose support the French Government seems to value more highly again in view of international developments. Domestic considerations also play a large part in the attitude of the French Government. For any attitude other than one of waiting would lead to domestic controversies that could directly endanger the existence of the Cabinet, which is uncertain anyway. This applies particularly to the attitude toward the Russian Pact; while strong opposition to the Pact has arisen in the country, it is, however, not only supported by the Communists and by the Socialists—who in this and many other questions are dependent on the Communists—but also has bourgeois defenders acting for military reasons and out of considerations of national security (Paul Reynaud, Sarraut) in the sense of its inventor, Barthou.

Under these circumstances, the greatest significance attaches to the debate on foreign policy which is to begin on the morning of February 25 and last until the evening of the 26th. Whether this will bring final clarification as to the long-term course of French foreign policy seems doubtful. It is generally assumed that in view of the situation, which is regarded as serious, the Government's attitude of waiting and of adhering to the foreign policy pursued so far will prevail. Nevertheless a reaction to the three great diplomatic events has already set in to the extent that, at the session of the Council of Ministers on February 22, extraordinary credits were approved for armaments and it was decided to set up an independent fund for the requirements of national defense. Furthermore, comprehensive measures in all spheres of national defense have been taken or initiated and are the subject of a secret session of the defense committee of the Senate; they are of far-reaching signifi-

cance in the field of air armaments, especially. Reorganization of the High Command of the Air Force is also of significance in this connection. Although these measures had to a certain extent already been contemplated, international events at least served to expedite them and to consolidate public interest and the approval of the country.

WELCZECK

### No. 126

109/115011-12

*The German Foreign Ministry to the German Embassies in France,  
Poland, and Italy*

Telegram

BERLIN, February 25, 1938.  
(zu Pol. II 529)

1. Germadiplo Paris No. 68
2. Diplogerma Warsaw No. 21
3. Diplogerma Rome No. 48

The Embassy at London wires:<sup>70</sup>

"As was generally expected, Chamberlain scored a decisive victory in the House of Commons yesterday (330 votes against 168, with approximately 15 abstentions). In the debate as well as the vote Eden was supported almost exclusively by the Opposition.

"From the detailed report which Grandi gave me on the crisis, little can be added to the picture gained from the House of Commons session and the press. I shall submit a written report regarding the entire matter. There has from the beginning been a certain discrepancy in Grandi's account on the question of who took the initiative in the protracted stages of the preliminary Anglo-Italian discussions. Grandi told me today that although Chamberlain's account was not correct in all points, he intended to leave it uncontradicted under the present circumstances.

"The decision implies no change in the Prime Minister's attitude. It does, however, indicate a certain tendency toward a shift in British policy as a result of the elimination of the Eden opposition. Close friendship between England and France continues to be the basis of this policy. I consider Chamberlain's declaration significant evidence of a new trend, which, while upholding the special relationship between England and France and that between Germany and Italy, stresses the necessity of cooperation among these four Powers. Grandi told me that in Monday's conversation Chamberlain had also particularly stressed this point; he expressed the belief that Chamberlain was sincere in this, stressing the absence of any reference to the Soviet Union.

<sup>70</sup> Telegram No. 111 of February 24, 1938, from the German Chargé d'Affaires in Great Britain, not printed separately.

"Grandi said he considered it necessary that both Italy and Germany should now make Chamberlain's position easier. Otherwise Eden would make a triumphant comeback after a few months. I consider Grandi's opinion correct. The possibility of a government headed by Eden and including men like Churchill, who abstained from voting, would indeed arise if the policy now initiated by Chamberlain should lead to a decisive failure."

End of the telegram from London.

*Addendum for Rome:*

The Anglo-Italian conversations, which will begin at Rome in the next few days, are of great interest to us. The Italian Government informed us through its Ambassador here that it would keep us posted. Judging from the content of the information received, however, this has been done so far only on a comparatively small scale. I therefore request that you on your part keep us posted as far as possible, but without making an official *démarche* in the Palazzo Chigi. We are particularly interested in obtaining details on what individual questions are being proposed for discussion by the two sides.

WEIZSÄCKER

No. 127

1585/382696-702

*The German Chargé d'Affaires in Great Britain (Woermann) to the German Foreign Ministry*

A 966

LONDON, February 25, 1938.

Received February 26, 1938.

(Pol. II 548)

Subject: Eden's resignation and its effects on British policy.

When Neville Chamberlain succeeded Baldwin in May 1937, it was generally said that he would exert a decisive influence on foreign policy. It was well known that his predecessor, Mr. Baldwin, had given his various Foreign Secretaries almost complete freedom of action.

The opposition between Eden and Chamberlain was apparent from the very beginning. The possibility of conflict did not arise from material differences of opinion alone, but also from the very fact that Eden was forced more or less to give up his usual independence.

There was, however, no acute crisis last May at the time of the change of Cabinet. The prestige of the Foreign Secretary had grown during the Coronation and as a result of the many friendly

conversations which he had at that time with heads of foreign states and foreign statesmen. When Chamberlain as well as Churchill praised Eden very highly at the Conservative Party Conference in Scarborough in October 1937, his position was considered secure. But it was precisely from this moment that the opposition became more and more apparent. It is true that Eden constantly found formulas in his speeches even after this which also took the Chamberlain course into account and which contained certain friendly gestures toward Italy and Germany. However, the initiative in making an immediate attempt to come to an agreement with the two countries did not come from Eden, but from the Prime Minister. To be sure, Eden went along with this course, but wherever possible he placed obstacles in the way of its implementation. I should like to call attention here particularly to the hostile attitude which his press section in the Foreign Office constantly took, especially toward Germany.

That the crisis came to a head over the attitude on the Italian question, really is an accident which was caused by the chronology of events.

During the conversation which Chamberlain had with Grandi on the morning of February 18, Grandi had, as it were, gone over the Foreign Secretary's head, and in Eden's presence pushed aside all the objections raised so far by the Foreign Secretary. During the luncheon recess, which preceded the resumption of the negotiations in the afternoon, Eden already reported that a crisis existed; I happened to hear this at the time from his closest entourage.

The crisis then developed with great speed. The second talk between Chamberlain, Eden, and Grandi on the afternoon of February 18 was followed by a conversation between Chamberlain and Eden. The Prime Minister immediately drew the consequences and called a Cabinet meeting for the following day. This Cabinet meeting was followed by another, held on Sunday, February 20, and during this meeting Eden submitted his resignation.

The way in which the crisis arose surprised both the Prime Minister and Count Grandi. In the many conversations which Eden had held with the Italian Ambassador about starting Anglo-Italian negotiations, Eden had always made stipulations which were unacceptable to Italy (radio, Spanish question). Yet during the very last conversations which he had had with Eden, Count Grandi had got the impression that the distance separating them was not so great as before. Chamberlain expressed himself to the same effect in the House of Commons. It is, therefore, natural to conclude that Eden also felt particularly hurt because of the way Chamberlain

had by-passed him and that he thought this was a favorable moment for taking a leap which would aid his subsequent political career.

Of course, the matter can be explained and has been explained, as if only relatively minor differences of opinion regarding a question of procedure had brought about the break. In reality, Eden could no longer withdraw from his position after Saturday, when the entire press had already expatiated on the differences of opinion in regard to an important question of foreign policy; and so attempts to reach a compromise had to fail.

The debates in the House of Commons on February 21 and 22, and likewise the debate in the House of Lords on February 24, then resulted in a big victory for Chamberlain in both Houses. It cannot be said that Eden made a particularly brilliant defense of his position during the House of Commons session on February 21. Naturally he had to fit the differences of opinion into a larger pattern and give his policy a certain fundamental and ideological note. He did this in a manner calculated to imply that England had been confronted by Italy with a "now or never." He had very little success with this in the House of Commons, since the Prime Minister described this version as not "quite fair" and completely unfounded in fact. It is still not quite clear what Eden meant by this version. According to what I have heard, it is probable that, in the conversations Grandi occasionally used expressions which made it plain that Italy would not be put off indefinitely. But that appears to me to be all that Eden could have had reference to. The Parliamentary Under Secretary of State in the Foreign Office, Lord Cranborne, who resigned together with Eden and who spoke immediately after him in the House of Commons, then strengthened this note by stating that it was not a question of an isolated detail but of a matter of fundamental importance. The principle which had been involved was the principle of good faith in international negotiations. If the British Government had entered into official negotiations with Italy, this would not have been a contribution to peace but a capitulation to blackmail.

This attempt to strengthen their own position by big words did win for Eden as well as for Cranborne the lively approval of the opposition parties but it did not do their cause any good within the parties supporting the Government. When the vote was taken in the House of Commons itself, none of the members of the Government parties supported Eden and Cranborne; about fifteen members of the Government party joined them in abstaining. Except for Churchill and perhaps Spears, however, most of them are more or less unknown names.

Chamberlain's defense in the House of Commons was perhaps not sparkling, but it was highly effective. Neville Chamberlain is by no means a brilliant personality. His manner of speaking is slow, almost hesitant, and without feeling. But from time to time he hits upon the exact note that compels the attention of his listeners. So it was also at the two House of Commons sessions, during which he spoke three times. The defense of the Government by Lord Halifax in the Upper House was more brilliant and vigorous.

Wherein, now, do the differences of opinion between Eden and Chamberlain consist?

1. The characteristic trait of Eden's policy is perhaps his enthusiasm for the League of Nations. Eden's friends assert that he is very serious in this, and his opponents are also of the opinion that on this point he has preserved a sort of childlike faith. Perhaps he believed that in this policy he was supported by earlier resolutions of the Conservative Party and declarations of the National Government. Chamberlain, on the other hand, takes an absolutely realistic view of the League of Nations and the question of collective security associated with it. Naturally, he cannot say farewell to the League of Nations now, right after these earlier resolutions and declarations. He would thereby also be too far ahead of the sentiment in the country. But he has made it unmistakably clear that it is useless to believe that the League of Nations affords security to its members. This is not a changed attitude, by the way; for Chamberlain himself, either on this point or generally; he is perhaps only becoming more and more outspoken in order to accustom the country gradually to the idea. It is well known that Chamberlain had already based the British rearmament policy in part on the idea that faith in the League of Nations was not adequate protection for any country.

2. The second essential difference between the two statesmen is in their attitude toward Italy and Germany. In the last year Eden had more and more gained the approval of the parties on the Left, precisely because his policy was considered anti-Italian and anti-German, or, in other words, anti-Fascist and anti-National Socialist. It would be going too far to say that he would have rejected a settlement with these two countries under any circumstances. But his policy toward Germany is best symbolized by the notorious questionnaire which he sent out after the occupation of the Rhineland. His present policy toward Italy was similar to this. Eden's friends in the House of Commons have stated more bluntly than he that they considered the withdrawal of the volunteers from Spain to be one of the preliminary conditions for an agreement with Italy.

Chamberlain could not express his disagreement more plainly than by the ironical question whether the withdrawal of the Italian troops from Abyssinia should not likewise be made a prerequisite.

The policy toward Italy and Germany also exemplifies the difference in method. Eden could not get away from the school-master's manner characteristic of many Englishmen toward all foreigners and stemming from a belief in their own infallibility and superiority. Chamberlain, on the other hand, looks upon the European problems with a sober eye and is convinced that a settlement is possible only if England also appreciates and understands the viewpoint of others and is prepared to take it into account to a certain extent at least. Chamberlain acknowledged in the House of Commons that the special relations between Italy and Germany, just as Anglo-French relations, form the basis of European policy, and expressed the hope for cooperation between these four Powers. Nor is this recognition of the Rome-Berlin Axis as one of the bases of European policy new, but, on the contrary, it had already been stressed repeatedly by Lord Halifax. But for the Eden policy it was more important to try to weaken the Axis at one end or the other than really to strive for agreement among the four Powers.

3. There were further considerable differences in the views on relations with Soviet Russia. Eden is known to have returned from his visit to Moscow some time ago with a sort of enthusiasm for the Soviet Union. Though perhaps he has vacillated and weakened recently, he has always had in mind a European policy in which the Soviet Union was to play a leading role. Chamberlain's views are different. In the debates in the House of Commons he expressed himself only cautiously on the matter, but still unmistakably. Later, on the evening of February 21, when he intervened again in the debate in the House of Commons and spoke of his views on cooperation between England, France, Germany, and Italy, he described these four Powers as the four most powerful in Europe, limiting himself with regard to the Soviet Union to the remark that after all it was a half European but also a half Asiatic power. Then, in addition, he referred to the Soviet Union again with the somewhat disparaging remark that these four Powers certainly did not wish to establish a sort of Soviet dictatorship over the smaller European powers.

I have already mentioned in my reports—and this must, of course, not be forgotten—that Chamberlain, too, still considers friendship with France the most important basis of British foreign policy. But he differs from Eden in that he does not look at the world through French spectacles. The above-mentioned principal differ-

ences of opinion between Eden on the one hand and Chamberlain on the other indicate at the same time the trend in the development of British policy, a trend which—as already stated—does not signify any change in the previous attitude of the British Prime Minister.

Eden, of course, has not eliminated himself from British political life because of his more or less voluntary exit. On the contrary, he has a brilliant career before him, in the course of which he will undoubtedly also prove himself capable of change. But for the immediate future, he is committed to the theses now so vigorously championed by him, and he is naturally waiting for the time when the Chamberlain policy may perhaps suffer a serious failure. We ought not to assist him in this.

WOERMANN

No. 128

1249/338038-41

*Memorandum*<sup>71</sup>

SECRET

(Pol. II 549/38)

I. On Thursday, February 24, I had a conversation with Mr. Butler, the Parliamentary Secretary of State in the Ministry of Labor. Shortly before the conversation Permanent Secretary Legget of the Ministry of Labor had told me that Butler would resign today as Parliamentary Secretary of State in the Ministry of Labor and assume his post as Parliamentary Under Secretary of State in the Foreign Office on the 25th. So I took occasion to congratulate him and wish him well in his new and responsible position. The following points from the conversation are perhaps worthy of note:

1. During the conversation Butler twice stressed the fact that he had learned to know and appreciate Germany from his travels, and in order to emphasize this he spoke a part of the time in rather good German.

2. He was furthermore at pains to state repeatedly that he hoped for a close and trusting cooperation with Germany. He would certainly do all he could to promote this goal.

3. In the course of the conversation there was occasion to speak of the political events connected with Eden's resignation from the Cabinet. His statement may be summarized approximately as follows:

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<sup>71</sup> This memorandum was written on letterhead of the German Embassy in London, but it has not been possible to determine its origin further.

The generation of officials occupying the key positions in the Foreign Office today had grown up during a time when French was *the* language of diplomacy. For this reason it necessarily followed that the officials of the foreign service, both before and after they entered this service, attached, and were forced to attach, importance to spending several years in France to study the language. The result was that these officials very frequently had acquired a biased attitude in favor of France, which they always retained, even after they had gradually been promoted to the higher positions during the postwar years. In addition, they had obtained in Eden a young Foreign Secretary who obviously shared this attitude. On the other hand, Baldwin as Prime Minister had concerned himself with foreign policy only to the degree that was absolutely necessary, and consequently the predominant, pro-French element in the Foreign Office had been able to exert its influence to the fullest extent. During the postwar years, however, the French influence in diplomacy, particularly insofar as it found expression in the use of the French language, had decreased in favor of English. He showed this by a practical example which was very closely connected with his position in the Ministry of Labor, namely, in the Administrative Council of the International Labor Office in Geneva. He reminded me that previously at least 50 percent of the negotiations had been conducted in French, but he could tell me that today approximately 90 percent of the negotiations were conducted in English. The generation which had come up in the foreign service in recent years, on the other hand, was free from any pro-French leaning. But this group in the Foreign Office had never really made much headway, and the first real break in the French line had come with Sir Nevile Henderson. It had been perfectly plain, however, to all intelligent observers that there would have to be a showdown between these two groups after Baldwin left, and the first indication of this had been the sidetracking of Sir Robert Vansittart. The Anglo-Italian question and the events of last week had merely been the occasion which started the stone rolling; but sooner or later the same development could just as well have come about through some other occasion. It was significant that all the members of the Cabinet had arrayed themselves on Chamberlain's side, and that not a voice had been raised in favor of Eden.

4. During the conversation it further became apparent—I am unable to say now whether it was from the words of Butler or Legget—what a predominant influence Sir Horace Wilson still obviously has as the Prime Minister's closest adviser. It is well known that

Sir Horace Wilson is decidedly pro-German, but he keeps himself completely in the background.

I should like to summarize my impression of the conversation by stating that Butler is quite sympathetic toward Germany and has no prejudices against us, and that his attitude toward the French orientation is understanding but critical.

LONDON, February 25, 1938.

No. 129

1798/409305-08

*The German Chargé d'Affaires in Italy (Plessen) to the German Foreign Ministry*

986/38

ROME, February 25, 1938.  
(Pol. IV 1259)

Subject: Reaction in Italy to the Führer's Reichstag speech.

Regarding the reaction here to the Führer's Reichstag speech of February 20, I have the honor to transmit a copy of a memorandum by the informant repeatedly mentioned in the Embassy's reports. He maintains close relations with the Palazzo Venezia and the Palazzo Chigi and is therefore in a good position to know the frame of mind prevailing there.

In my opinion there is no doubt that Italy is not entirely pleased with recent developments in the Austrian question. In the press and in the Foreign Ministry, to be sure, it is emphasized that they are entirely satisfied with the result of the meeting at Berchtesgaden. However, this cannot conceal the true frame of mind. Whether she likes it or not, Italy will perhaps finally become reconciled to something which, as she has been aware for a long time, she cannot change. But she certainly does not like the course of events. This fact appears to me particularly worth noting at a time when Anglo-Italian relations are entering a new stage.

PLESSEN

[Enclosure]

MEMORANDUM

ROME, February 24, 1938.

Although the Führer's Reichstag speech as a whole was received with sympathy and understanding in official Italian circles and although particularly the statements regarding the collaboration of the two revolutions and the appreciation of Mussolini caused

great satisfaction, the impression prevails here that German-Italian cooperation should, in the opinion of Germany, be confined to the stand against Moscow and Geneva. Announcement of a considerably more far-reaching cooperation would have been desirable.

Thus, according to Italian opinion, the Führer's statements regarding the Spanish question do not go far enough and contain no outright commitments which can be considered as support of the Italian view concerning the solution of the Spanish question.

Above all, however, a confirmation of Austria's independence is missed. Hitler had spoken only of supplementing the Agreements of July 11, 1936. The impression prevails here that the Berchtesgaden Agreement is the result of sudden pressure which may substantially change the character of the Agreement of July 11. Germany, moreover, had not previously consulted Italy, as had been agreed upon. If Berlin should continue to use this method, it would no longer be possible to speak of cooperation, and the danger would arise that the respective political lines would diverge.

They also claim to know in the Palazzo Chigi that the British Government, and particularly Chamberlain personally, are very much concerned about the Berchtesgaden Agreement and the procedure that was used in regard to Austria. According to the opinion here there is the danger that just when the prospects for an understanding between England, Italy, and Germany have considerably improved, German policy in regard to Austria is furnishing very effective and disturbing arguments to the counterpropaganda of Eden and the Quai d'Orsay. This danger was all the greater, since the struggle between Eden and Chamberlain had by no means been decided and Eden would seize every opportunity to cause difficulties for Chamberlain. He would not fail to exploit any opportunity or any pretext which German or Italian policy might offer as proof that it was not possible to negotiate with authoritarian states and that he was right in his policy. All the more care must be exercised to prevent the possibility of such arguments, since it was by no means inconceivable that new elections would be held in England because of the Chamberlain-Eden conflict.

As to German-Italian relations, Mussolini and Ciano, as well as the most important top officials of the Palazzo Chigi, still consider the solidarity of the two regimes and agreement on general policies more important than anything else. They feel that these are revolutionary times, when the requirements of the revolution determine diplomatic action and not vice versa. Italy, however, fears that German policy in regard to Austria tends to precipitate and accelerate matters too much. In Italian opinion, this would necessarily

result in disturbing the existing balance, also upsetting the state of the rest of Europe in a manner which cannot as yet be foreseen.

It is further stressed that since Hitler in his Reichstag speech spoke only of German-Italian cooperation against Moscow and Geneva, it was quite obvious that he did not believe it possible to enter into a regular alliance with Italy. Germany wished, therefore, to retain her freedom of action and did not feel sufficiently strong as yet to decide matters in Europe by force of arms in the immediate future. If, however, an alliance and war were to be ruled out, no other solution remains but cooperation, or at least another attempt at cooperation with Western Powers, excluding Soviet Russia. But if this attempt is to be made, then, in order to avoid violent clashes and conflicts in the near future, the Austrian question must not be precipitated. Anxiety is felt here, in this respect, however, because further German surprises are not considered impossible but, on the contrary, are feared.

### No. 130

313/190107

#### *Memorandum*

BERLIN, February 28, 1938.

The Italian Counselor of Embassy acting on behalf of his Ambassador, who is still confined to bed, called on me today in order to inform the Foreign Ministry of a telegram regarding the latest conversation between Grandi and Chamberlain. According to this telegram Chamberlain expressed himself as follows: In the summer of last year, as well as in November 1937, he had declared in a speech that the Rome-Berlin Axis was a reality. Nothing was further from his thoughts than an intention to weaken this Axis. It was a pillar of European peace. He was more than ever convinced of this today. The new Foreign Secretary, Lord Halifax, also shared this opinion. He was therefore anxious to negotiate not only with Rome but at the same time with Berlin also and to reach an agreement with the Rome-Berlin Axis after a possible agreement with Rome.

WEIZSÄCKER

G. CONVERSATIONS WITH GREAT BRITAIN BEGUN, AND  
INTERRUPTED, MARCH 1938

## No. 131

F8/0015

*Memorandum by the Foreign Minister*

RM 131

The British Ambassador called on me at 11 o'clock this morning and stated that he had now received new instructions from his Government. He would appreciate an early audience with the Chancellor, since he was instructed to present Neville Chamberlain's message personally to the Chancellor. He could inform me that Neville Chamberlain wished to make a positive proposal concerning the colonial question (Africa). However, the British Government would have to obtain some *quid pro quo*, since, in return for its concessions, it must offer the British people something in the way of security for European peace.

I told him that our colonial demands were a legal claim and could not be made a bargaining point. Henderson replied that this was not intended either. However, he had received instructions to find out from the Chancellor whether the latter, for his part, desired to make a positive contribution to European peace.

RIBBENTROP<sup>72</sup>

BERLIN, March 1, 1938.

## No. 132

621/250514-16

*The German Ambassador in France (Welczeck) to the German  
Foreign Ministry*

SECRET

A 745

PARIS, March 1, 1938.

Received March 3, 1938.

Subject: Conversation with Flandin.

I recently had an opportunity for an extensive conversation at a neutral place with Flandin, who was Foreign Minister at the time I presented my credentials in April 1936. Since for some time now, Flandin has been trying to make himself the spokesman, as it were, of a policy of understanding with Germany—although his rather unprepossessing personality and his unpopularity in Parliament hardly seem to make him suited for the task—I considered it not

<sup>72</sup> The information contained in this memorandum was conveyed to the German Embassy in Great Britain in an instruction of March 3, 1938 (1585/382707), not printed.

uninteresting to hear his views on a number of questions, and the former Foreign Minister replied with remarkable frankness, without putting any counterquestions. Even if Flandin's statements are to be taken only as his personal opinion, as words of a former Premier who is obviously aspiring to the Foreign Ministry and, given other circumstances, will perhaps return to it some day, they seem quite concrete and interesting.

After some general statements regarding the preparation of the atmosphere or, as the French put it, the "climate," without which the tender plant of understanding could not thrive, Flandin turned immediately to the questions that crop up at once whenever the conversation turns to Germany, namely, the Sudeten German and Austrian questions. Just as Germany seemed, in his opinion, to be the natural mediator in an effort to reach an understanding with Italy, so France was the natural mediator between us and Czechoslovakia. And he would go even further: France would never permit her ally, Czechoslovakia, to be crushed, for this would bring about a change in the power relationship and the geography of Central Europe, which the Western Powers could not tolerate. On the other hand, in the course of a general settlement of all pending questions, he would even go so far as to advocate to the Prague Government administrative and cultural autonomy for the Sudeten Germans.

Our relations with Austria were, of course, judged differently here from those with Czechoslovakia. If we proceeded gradually with respect to the Austrians and without offending against form, we could achieve very much in the way of "coordination" [*"Angleichung"*] without any objections; what mattered was the procedure. But a formal "*Anschluss*" had to be avoided, under any circumstances. He did not believe that the view of the French Government on the Austrian question was very different from that of Mussolini.

Flandin then spoke of events in the Far East, the effects of which, in the event of a Japanese victory, would be catastrophic for the whole of Europe—and not only through the loss of the Chinese market. He hoped that we, too, would recognize this danger in time and draw the proper consequences. The Japanese were not ideologists, but realistic politicians.

Flandin then turned to the subject of Communism, the worst foe of all culture, which was latent in all countries, even in those where its existence was not apparent. The increasing impoverishment of all countries, caused by an armament race of many years' duration, was the most fertile soil for Communism and would in the long run discredit even the best governmental system in its own country.

If Germany and Italy forced an armament race on the other Great Powers, they unconsciously became the trail blazers for the foe they abhorred the most and fought the hardest. In this connection Flandin spoke of the need for an armament truce and a limitation of armaments, and, in his opinion, it did not matter at all whether Germany's peacetime strength was superior to that of France by half a dozen divisions or more. But the words limitation of armaments simply had to be spoken. The conversion of a portion of the armament industry to peacetime industry would cause difficulties for us, too, but these would not be insurmountable and, with cooperation in the economic field, could gradually be eliminated, especially with the help of America. From the French standpoint, the solution of the colonial question was no serious problem; many Frenchmen had inwardly already written off the Cameroons.

He viewed with anxiety developments in the internal situation of his country, particularly the financial and economic situation, but he did not doubt a recovery after the growing crisis had brought about a parting of the ways by splitting the Marxists, whose impotence would be recognized.

Relations between England and France were closer than ever. Rivalries of any kind did not exist. Both countries, however, still regarded Germany as enemy No. 1, but Italy, on the other hand, as danger No. 1. If conversations of any kind were held it seemed to him natural that England should begin to negotiate with Italy, and France simultaneously with Germany, for public opinion in France, which was 80 percent in favor of an understanding with Germany, would less readily accept the results of negotiations that England offered her than results obtained by direct negotiations with us. We had to understand and take into account this psychological factor, should we some day think of negotiating, which, to be sure, did not seem to be the case at present.

Flandin expressed himself only briefly on the Spanish question, without saying anything noteworthy.

I need not add that, in all cases in which this appeared necessary, I energetically and resolutely defended our standpoint.

WELCZECK

## No. 133

664/257223-28

*The German Ambassador in France (Welczeck) to the German Foreign Ministry*

A 746

PARIS, March 1, 1938.

Received March 3, 1938.

(Pol. II 602)

In continuation of previous reports of February 24 and 27.<sup>73</sup>

Subject: Debate on foreign policy in the French Chamber.

A certain atmosphere of resignation pervaded the debate on foreign policy in the French Chamber on February 25 and 26, which was not dissipated but rather made even more pronounced by the declaration of the Foreign Minister and various deputies that France must not become resigned. The failures and disappointments of French policy in recent years, the decline of the League of Nations, the rise of Germany, the alienation of Italy, the weakening of the alliances, the dangers of the policy toward Spain, all this was repeatedly mentioned in the discussion. But no new ideas were presented as to how to improve this serious situation from the bottom up. On the contrary, the Government finally received a strong vote of confidence for the continuation of a policy whose failures had just been thoroughly gone into. The vote, which is supposed to demonstrate the unity of the French parties on questions of foreign policy, is more an expression of helplessness than of strength this time.

This time, too, the old paraphernalia of all debates of this kind were dragged out. France's absolute desire for peace, her military strength, her cultural mission in Europe, her historical responsibility, her loyalty to the League of Nations and international law, the faithful observance of her obligations, and what not, were extolled with much eloquence. But it all lacked its former brilliance. The colors were more subdued, the tones muted, and the mood more oppressed.

Much less was said of German-French relations than usually. While only a short time ago Italy was regarded as especially dangerous, the language with respect to that country has again become conciliatory, while Germany is handled with calculated coolness. It was perhaps the first time in postwar history that a French Foreign Minister in a debate on foreign policy did not once mention the word Germany. M. Delbos in his speech circled around the

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<sup>73</sup> Latter not printed.

subject of Germany. But in so doing, he really made it plain how much French policy centers around Germany and is determined by the relations of France with Germany.

The Government had to take a stand on the situation created by the Berchtesgaden Agreements and the Führer's speech, as well as by the British crisis. An answer was expected to the question of whether France will retreat behind the Maginot Line from the dangers that beset her, and devote herself solely to the development of the French Empire, or whether she will adhere to her system of alliances and the League of Nations policy, with or without close association with England.

The Government declared with an emphasis that was worth noting that France was not giving up her position in Europe but was remaining faithful to her alliances and the League of Nations. If France withdrew from Central Europe, sooner or later a superior opponent would turn against France with redoubled strength. The Government further decided on continuation of the close collaboration with England.

In particular the following is to be said regarding the course of the debate and the statements of the Foreign Minister and the Premier:

1) *Franco-British relations* remain the basis of French policy. M. Chautemps called British friendship the very cornerstone of French policy. This is also in keeping with the demand of most of the speakers. To be sure, the essential independence of French policy is being stressed more than heretofore. But the practical consequences of opting for England will be that on many questions the British attitude will have a decisive influence.

2) This influence is already apparent in the handling of *Franco-Italian* relations, which were discussed by the speakers and the Government in close connection with Franco-British relations. The Government was reproached for having, by its policy of sanctions, alienated Italy and destroyed the Stresa Front and, by not recognizing the Italian Empire, for having poisoned relations even more and having encouraged the formation of the Berlin-Rome Axis. Early *rapprochement* with Italy was demanded by all the speakers of the Opposition.

The Government expressed itself with great restraint. The Premier, it is true, expressed sincere sympathy for the Italian people and the wish for an early establishment of cordial relations, but the Foreign Minister proposed, as conditions for a liquidation of the past, agreement on the Mediterranean question, the cessation of Italian intervention in Spain, cessation of the press campaign,

and the assurance of loyal collaboration for the preservation of the European balance of power. The debate and the Government's declaration showed that France is still mourning the Stresa Front. The initiative with regard to Italy, however, at present lies exclusively with England.

3) On the *Austrian question*, which was treated very thoroughly by the Deputies, the Government made the statement that Austrian independence was an essential element in the European balance of power. This is at bottom only a repetition of an oft-proclaimed principle. M. Delbos mentioned, to be sure, that conversations are in progress at the moment that impose restraint upon him; it is not to be inferred from his statements, however, that an energetic step is to be expected of France in the Austrian question.

4) Much more definite are the statements on *Czechoslovakia*. Delbos as well as Chautemps has declared unequivocally that France felt obligated to guarantee the independence of Czechoslovakia and that she would fulfill her obligations as an ally. This, to be sure, does not settle the question touched upon by one of the speakers, whether France, if the occasion arose, would also consider domestic disturbances in Czechoslovakia, should they be connected in any way with a foreign country, as a *casus foederis*.

5) The usual reference to the faithful *allies* was accompanied this time, in the statements of the Government, by the warning that the meaning of the alliances must not be changed by narrow, bilateral conceptions or egotistic particularism. There is no longer talk of a Little Entente mutual assistance pact. On the other hand, as revealed at one point in Delbos' statements, France seems desirous of pitting her influence against the economic penetration of the Balkans by Germany.

6) *The Franco-Soviet Pact*, of which there has been little talk recently, was again mentioned this time by M. Delbos when he recounted the factors making for peace. M. Chautemps emphasizes its defensive nature and warns against altering the purpose of the Pact, because such action might alarm other nations. This statement can be construed as a rebuff to those circles that are in favor of extending the Pact into a military alliance.

7) The *Spanish question* occupied a relatively small place in the debate. The Government stressed more than formerly the fact that it was determined to safeguard immediate French interests in Spain. When M. Delbos refers to the right of self-determination of the Spanish people he obviously means thereby to counteract the summons to give battle to the threat of Bolshevism in Spain.

8) The *League of Nations*, both in the debate and in the statements of the Government, has retained little of its former ideological glamor. The only convincing argument is the statement that the French system of alliances is most closely involved with the Covenant of the League of Nations and that France is therefore directly interested in the continuance of this Covenant.

9) Significant of the value that France has recently attached to relations with *the United States* are the unusually friendly words that both Delbos and Chautemps aimed in the direction of President Roosevelt.

10) The tone of resignation that permeated the discussions was particularly noticeable in the discussion of *German-French relations*. From the Socialist Grumbach to the opposition of the Right, the speakers emphasized the importance of the problem, but almost all of them asked: Does Germany really wish to negotiate? Grumbach recalled the Blum-Schacht conversations at length; Chautemps referred to the Government's efforts toward an understanding with Germany and regretted that the atmosphere had again been disturbed. The Foreign Minister, without expressly mentioning Germany, spoke against the alleged plans for economic supremacy in Central Europe and against the claim of wishing to protect the German minorities in the adjacent countries. He was unable to rise to a constructive idea for a courageous reorientation of the relations between the two countries.

Flandin, who came out openly for conversations with Germany in a long, clear, and interesting speech, was derided and isolated both by the Government and by the majority. Thus, the discussion on this important question was unfruitful and therefore at bottom unsatisfactory for French policy also.

The last debate in the Chamber will not be a landmark in French foreign policy. It came at a time when mists obscured the French political landscape, and the Government was not able to create clarity. The resoluteness of French foreign policy is crippled by the domestic situation.

The debates, it is true, gave the appearance of complete unity with regard to the aims of foreign policy and it was again stressed on all sides that in the hour of danger France was always unified and capable of a wonderful revival. But behind this oratory was the harrowing uncertainty whether the country had at the moment sufficient will and strength to achieve its aims by concentrating all its forces. Even the measures now adopted in the military field, which are certainly not to be underestimated, are hardly capable of relieving this uncertainty.

WELCZECK

## No. 134

635/253187

*The German Chargé d'Affaires in the Soviet Union (Tippelskirch)  
to the German Foreign Ministry*

CONFIDENTIAL

Tgb. Nr. A/348

Moscow, March 2, 1938.

Received March 5, 1938.

(Pol. V 1797/38)

In continuation of our report of February 21, A/301.<sup>74</sup>

Subject: Exchange of correspondence between Stalin and Ivanov.

I have learned from a reliable source that Coulondre, the French Ambassador here, made a *démarche* with Commissar of Foreign Affairs Litvinov as well as with his deputy Potemkin, as a result of Stalin's letter to Ivanov. Coulondre called Stalin's letter a violation of the pact with France. Stalin's statements aimed at interference in the internal affairs of France and conflicted with the assurances Stalin had given Laval during the latter's visit to Moscow.

Litvinov and Potemkin had tried, as is their wont, to minimize the import of Stalin's letter, and declared that it was wrong to place a far-reaching construction on the letter.

VON TIPPELSKIRCH

## No. 135

F1/0337-38

*The British Ambassador in Germany (Henderson) to the German  
Foreign Minister<sup>75</sup>*

BERLIN, March 3, 1938.

MY DEAR REICHMINISTER: His Majesty's Government, while agreeing that it would be most undesirable to publish the subject matter of my interview with the *Reichskanzler*, consider that the fact of the interview cannot be concealed. They consider in consequence that it will be better not to make a secret of it and suggest that the Press be informed that the Chancellor has granted me an interview and that conversation has taken place on current questions affecting the two countries.

<sup>74</sup> Not printed. It had reported the appearance in *Pravda* on February 11 of an exchange of letters between Stalin and a young Communist, Ivanov, on the question of "The Victory of Socialism in a Single Country." In this pronouncement Stalin had declared that the Soviet Union was still not safe from armed intervention from outside states and that the working classes of other countries should organize so as to be able to help the workers of the Soviet Union in case of war.

<sup>75</sup> The original of this document is in English in Henderson's handwriting.

If you agree, Lord Halifax asks me to arrange a formula with you and to let him know it as soon as possible.

Enclosed is translation of text of notification made to French Government.<sup>76</sup> I shall make same communication to M. François-Poncet this evening.

Yours sincerely,

NEVILLE HENDERSON

If you would like to discuss this before the interview I can come round and see you before it, say at 4:30 p.m.

My knowledge of German is, I fear, not sufficiently complete to ensure my understanding as fully as I should like what the Chancellor may say to me. I am sure my Government would like to be informed as fully as possible of his observations and suggestions. I mention this now in case the Chancellor would wish Herr Schmidt to be present. N. H.

### No. 136

375/208828-81

#### *Memorandum by the Foreign Minister*

RM 134

The Italian Counselor of Embassy, Count Magistrati, called on me at 8 o'clock this evening. Acting for the Italian Foreign Minister, Count Ciano, he first handed me the statement—a copy of which is enclosed—that the British Prime Minister, Neville Chamberlain, had given to the Italian Ambassador at London, Count Grandi, apropos of the Anglo-Italian conversations.

I informed the Italian Counselor of Embassy that the British Ambassador at Berlin, Sir Neville Henderson, had just been received by the Führer in my presence and that the communiqué concerning the interview, intended for the D.N.B., would be published. I further told him that the British had informed the French only very cursorily of the German-British conversations, and I read to him the enclosed communication from the British Government to the French Government, which Sir Neville Henderson had handed to me.

I stated to the Italian Counselor of Embassy that I wished to inform the Italian Government fully regarding the contents of the conversation between the Führer and Sir Neville Henderson. However, I wanted to request that the matter be treated as strictly confidential, particularly in view of the fact that the French had not been so fully informed.

The conversation with the Führer had dealt with three problems:

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<sup>76</sup> See enclosure 2 to document No. 136, *infra*.

*1. Disarmament.*

Sir Neville Henderson had stated that the British Government wanted to determine whether there was any prospect of a limitation of armaments. The British Government was especially anxious to obtain a limitation of heavy bombers. The Führer replied that he himself had at one time proposed a ban on aerial bombing, in line with the Geneva conventions, which would have made bombers completely useless. The Führer had further stated that in making efforts at disarmament, Soviet Russia would chiefly have to be considered. Without the participation of the Soviets, disarmament was entirely impossible. However, even if the Soviet Union gave its consent in principle, the question would have to be raised whether a promise of the Soviets could be trusted. Our armament was intended only as a defense against the East. Summarizing, the Führer had declared that disarmament at the present time appeared to him extremely difficult.

*2. Insuring peace in the Southeast.*

Sir Neville Henderson had declared that the British Government was occupied with the Czech and Austrian questions. An easing of tension there would be extremely important for the preservation of peace. The Führer had replied that he regretted the manner in which the British press had attacked Germany's attempts to ease the tension in Austria. The Berchtesgaden Agreement was an instrument of peace. Nevertheless, Germany was being assailed for it. There were 10 million Germans living at Germany's borders, whose continuous oppression Germany could not tolerate. He had also made this clear to Federal Chancellor Schuschnigg. The best contribution England could make to pacification in the Southeast would be to recommend to Vienna a reasonable solution and not stir up sentiment in certain circles there against the Berchtesgaden Protocol. If England would use her influence in this positive sense to bring about a settlement of the questions within the German nation, that would be a big step toward peace.

I further stated to the Italian Counselor of Embassy that the Führer had thus made it clear to the British Ambassador that German-Austrian relations were a German family matter. The Duce also saw the question in this light, and I had been particularly happy to hear from his lips so much understanding of our clear position during my last stay in Rome.

*3. Colonies.*

The British Ambassador had made no positive proposals regarding the colonial question, but had only wished to obtain the Führer's

views on this question. Henderson had stated that Chamberlain might be prepared to transfer some colonial territory in Africa to Germany and had inquired whether in such an event Germany would be prepared to adhere to the provisions of the Congo Acts. The Führer had again expounded the German view that all German colonies must be returned. To the specific question whether England was prepared for this, Henderson had replied that Chamberlain could speak only with regard to the British mandates, not with regard to the mandates of the Dominions. But even concerning the British mandates Henderson had given no definite answer.

The Italian Counselor of Embassy, whom I again asked to treat my report as confidential, thanked me for the information. He then inquired about details of the Führer's impending visit to Rome.

RIBBENTROP

BERLIN, March 3, 1938.

[Enclosure 1]

FS/0020

*Chamberlain to Grandi*<sup>77</sup>

"We fully realize how strong the bond of solidarity between Italy and Germany is. As I told you last July and later confirmed publicly in my speech in the Guildhall,<sup>78</sup> I never had the slightest intention or plan to do anything that might weaken Italian-German solidarity. *On the contrary, I consider the Rome-Berlin Axis a reality which might represent the most valuable pillar of European peace.* I want the Duce to know definitely that I am more than ever convinced of this today. This conviction of mine, I am happy to confirm, is shared by my friend Lord Halifax. On the other hand, I want the Duce himself to know today that while my immediate aim is a strong and permanent treaty with the Duce and Fascist Italy, my long range and no less important aim is a permanent and as strong as possible a treaty with the Führer and National Socialist Germany. I consider the treaty with Italy an indispensable step toward the subsequent conclusion of a treaty with the second power of the Rome-Berlin Axis, namely Germany."

<sup>77</sup> The copy of this document in the files is in German.

<sup>78</sup> For extracts from the text of this speech delivered on November 9, 1937, see *Documents on International Affairs, 1937*, pp. 70-71.

[Enclosure 2]

F8/0019

*Communication to French Government*<sup>79</sup>

BRITISH EMBASSY, BERLIN.

[1.] As a result of the conversations on the occasion of Lord Halifax's visit, His Majesty's Government has considered the steps which might be taken to reach a European settlement.

2. As the French Government knows, the British Government has examined the various difficulties involved in a solution of the colonial problem. The latter considers it desirable first to obtain more detailed information regarding the attitude of the German Government on this question, in particular to what extent the German Government is prepared to make a concrete contribution regarding Southeastern Europe and disarmament.

3. His Majesty's Government wishes to establish contact with Berlin concerning the colonial problem in order to learn on what basis a settlement would be possible. The Ambassador in Berlin has been informed to that effect. At the present stage of the negotiations no concrete plan is being suggested, and the Government is not being bound by any promises or assurances whatsoever.

No. 137

F1/0332-33

*Memorandum*<sup>80</sup>

The German Government has repeatedly made public its basic position on the colonial question. It can be briefly summarized as follows:

Germany had built up for herself in a peaceful manner a colonial empire and developed it at great sacrifice. This colonial empire was taken away from her by force at Versailles. The reasons put forward for the seizure are not tenable.

Therefore Germany demands that her former colonial possessions be returned. She does not make this demand for military reasons but because the former colonial possessions are an indispensable basis for the economic existence of the German people.

<sup>79</sup> The headings "Communication to French Government" and "British Embassy Berlin" are in English in the copy in the files while the remainder of the document is in German.

<sup>80</sup> At the head of this draft the word "Memorandum" [*Notiz*] appears in Ribbentrop's handwriting and several corrections are also in his handwriting. The date of this draft cannot be precisely determined. It is mentioned in a minute written by Weizsäcker on March 5, 1938 (905/293694), so it was drafted before that date. It would appear to have been drafted as the reply which Hitler had said might be made to the British colonial proposals.

The German Government directs its demand only to those powers which took possession of the German colonies and does not lay claim to any other regions.

From the British Ambassador's latest statements the German Government understands that the British Government on its part is now considering satisfying the colonial claim of Germany by a readjustment of the present state of possessions in Central Africa in which Germany is to participate. The British Government has not yet expressed itself concerning the concrete form of such a plan, and the other powers involved have not yet indicated how they stand.

In view of this situation the German Government must at present limit itself to the declaration that now, as before, it insists on its basic position as explained briefly above. If the powers now in possession of the former German colonies should for some reason regard it as advisable in the adjustment of the colonial question to exchange parts of the German colonial possessions for other regions, the German Government can naturally take a standpoint on such plans only when the powers involved have made concrete proposals to it in this matter.

No. 138

F1/0325, 0306-23

*The German Foreign Minister to the British Ambassador in  
Germany (Henderson)*

BERLIN, March 4, 1938.

DEAR SIR NEVILLE: I am enclosing a confidential report by Counselor of Legation Schmidt regarding the contents of the conversations you had with the Führer yesterday.

With best regards I remain, as ever

Yours,

RİBBENTROP

[Enclosure]

*Memorandum of the Conversation Between the Führer and Chancellor and the Royal British Ambassador in the Presence of Foreign Minister von Ribbentrop on March 3, 1938, in Berlin*

By way of introduction, the British Ambassador stressed the confidential nature of the conversation. No information would be given the French, much less the Belgians, Portuguese, or Italians, concerning the subject of the discussion. They would merely be informed that, continuing the discussions between Lord Halifax and

the Führer, this conversation had dealt with questions concerning Germany and England.

He (Henderson) wanted to present in rough outline a plan of the British Government for a solution, and if possible to get the German opinion regarding it from the Führer. He wished to point out that he spoke only on behalf of the British Government, which, before getting in touch with other powers concerning the execution of its proposals, first wanted to clarify the situation for itself. Therefore, the conversation must also be kept confidential as regards third powers.

Besides, it must be emphasized that this did not mean a commercial transaction, but an attempt to establish the basis for a genuine and cordial friendship with Germany, beginning with an improvement of the atmosphere and ending with the creation of a new spirit of friendly understanding. Without underestimating the difficulties to be overcome, the British Government did, however, believe that the present moment was propitious for such an attempt to improve mutual relations. Such an attempt, however, would surely fail if both sides did not contribute to the agreement, i.e., if an agreement were reached, it could only be on the basis of reciprocity. Positive cooperation by Germany was necessary to reestablish peace and security in Europe. As had been stated during the Halifax conversation, instead of the free play of forces, a settlement by higher reason must be found. Lord Halifax had already admitted that changes in Europe could be considered quite possible, provided they were made in accordance with the above-mentioned higher reason. The aim of the British proposal was to collaborate in such a settlement based on reason.

After having made these personal remarks, the British Ambassador detailed his instructions. He mentioned that while in London he had, upon orders of his Government, examined all questions resulting from the Halifax visit to Germany in conversations with Prime Minister Chamberlain and other interested Cabinet members. In this connection he stressed the importance of German collaboration in the pacification of Europe, to which he had already referred in previous conversations with Herr von Neurath and Herr von Ribbentrop. This pacification could be furthered by limitation of armaments and by appeasement in Czechoslovakia and Austria. In this connection the British Ambassador read the following instructions, which he later presented in writing:

"In our view appeasement would be dependent, amongst other things, on the measures taken to inspire confidence in Austria and Czechoslovakia. His Majesty's Government at present cannot esti-

mate the effect of the recent arrangement between Germany and Austria which must depend upon the manner in which the several undertakings of arrangements made are implemented by the two parties to them. They are therefore at present doubtful as to the effects which these arrangements are likely to have on the situation in Central Europe and cannot conceal from themselves that recent events have aroused apprehension in many quarters which must inevitably render more difficult the negotiation of a general settlement."<sup>81</sup>

Concerning the limitation of armaments, Henderson stated that the British Government was, of course, aware of the difficulties, and he recalled the Führer's suggestion of prohibiting aerial bombing. The British Government would very much welcome any such proposal. However, it considered a limitation on bombing planes in general even more important. Taking into consideration the German suggestions made 2 years ago, the British Government was reexamining this group of questions, and hoping to arrive at acceptable proposals. It would be interesting to hear the German attitude toward this question.

Concerning the colonies, the British Ambassador expressed the sincere willingness of the British Government not only to examine the colonial question, but to make progress toward its solution. Prime Minister Chamberlain had given his full personal attention to this problem. Here, too, the difficulties were of course great, after 20 years had passed since the last redistribution of colonial possessions. Besides, public opinion in England was particularly sensitive precisely on this subject. Then the British Ambassador read the following suggestion concerning the colonial question, which he presented in writing at the end of the conversation:

"A solution which seemed to them to have many attractions might be found in a scheme based upon the idea of a new regime of colonial administration in a given area of Africa, roughly corresponding to the conventional zone of the Congo Basin Treaties, acceptable and applicable to all the Powers concerned on exactly equal terms.

"Each Power, while solely concerned for the administration of its own territories, would be invited to subscribe to certain principles designed to promote the well-being of all.

"For instance, there would be the question of demilitarisation as well as stipulations for the welfare of the natives, and for freedom of trade and communications. Also perhaps a commission might be formed consisting of representatives of all the Powers having territory in the area covered by the new arrangements."<sup>82</sup>

<sup>81</sup> The quoted passage is not a translation from the German but follows the original English version as presented by the British Ambassador (F1/0326-27).

<sup>82</sup> The three quoted paragraphs are not a translation from the German but follow the original English version as presented by the Ambassador (F1/0328).

During the reading he mentioned that the territory in question was bounded on the north by the fifth degree of latitude and on the south by the Zambezi River approximately, and added that a commission might possibly be established to represent those powers whose colonial territory was within this area. In conclusion he asked the Führer

first, whether Germany was prepared in principle to participate in a new colonial regime as provided for by the British proposal, and

second, what contribution she would be prepared to make to the general peace and security of Europe.

The Führer replied that the most important contribution to the reestablishment of peace and security in Europe would be the suppression of the inflammatory international press, because nothing else was as great a threat to security as the intrigues of this press, which unfortunately was also represented in large numbers in England. He pointed out that he personally was known as one of the warmest friends of England, but he had been ill rewarded for this friendship. Perhaps nobody had been oftener and more grievously offended by England than he. It was, therefore, understandable that he had now withdrawn into a certain isolation, which still seemed to him more respectable than to make advances toward someone who did not want him and persistently snubbed him.

To an objection by the British Ambassador that this rebuff had occurred only in certain quarters in England, the Führer replied that the British Government should by now have been in a position to influence the press differently. Information was available in Germany from friends in England which made it apparent that the press had been influenced in the direction mentioned by the most authoritative British circles. The first and foremost prerequisite for clearing the atmosphere would therefore be a stop to the inflammatory campaign.

Concerning Central Europe, it should be noted that Germany would not tolerate any interference by third powers in the settlement of her relations with kindred countries or with countries having large German elements in their population, just as Germany would never think of interfering in the settlement of relations between England and Ireland. It was a question of preventing the continuance or the renewal of an injustice to millions of Germans. In this attempt at a settlement Germany would have to declare most seriously that she was not willing to be influenced in any way by other parties in this settlement. It was impossible that freedom of nations and democratic rights should always be described as elements of the European order, but the very opposite be main-

tained when it came to improving the lot of the Germans in Austria. There, a government which (unlike the German Government) had not been formed in a legal manner, and which was supported by only 15 percent of the population, had suppressed the rest of the Germans. This was an intolerable situation in the long run, and if England continued to resist German attempts to achieve a just and reasonable settlement, then the time would come when one would have to fight. If he, the Führer, endeavored—as he had done in Berchtesgaden—to get some relief for the oppressed Germans peacefully, and Paris and London not only watched his efforts with skepticism but even instructed their diplomats to obstruct this peaceful attempt (here the British Ambassador interrupted to say that England had never done that), they were rendering very poor service to the cause of peace. Ultimately the people themselves in Austria must be consulted, and the Germans in Czechoslovakia must be granted their rightful autonomy in cultural and other matters in order to obtain a satisfactory solution there. This was the simplest application of that right of self-determination of nations which had played such an important part in Wilson's Fourteen Points. The present state of affairs at any rate was impossible in the long run; it would lead to an explosion, and in order to avoid this, the Agreements of Berchtesgaden had been concluded. It might be added that the difficulties could be considered eliminated, if the Austrian Government fulfilled its obligations. But, as he had stated in his Reichstag speech, whoever proceeded by force against reason and justice would invite violence.

To a question by the British Ambassador whether Germany demanded a plebiscite in Austria, the Führer replied that she would demand that by evolutionary means the legitimate interests of the Germans in Austria be secured and that there be an end to oppression.

The British Ambassador pointed out that the present British Government had considerable understanding of realities. Chamberlain had himself assumed the leadership of the people, instead of being led by them. He had shown great courage by ruthlessly [*rücksichtslos*] exposing international slogans, such as collective security and the like. In history it was often most difficult to find two men who not only wanted the same thing, but also intended to carry it out at the same time. Therefore, England was declaring her willingness to eliminate the difficulties and inquired of Germany whether she on her part was also prepared to do so.

The Führer referred to the proposals he had made years ago. The answer had been the Franco-Russian Pact, which then became

particularly dangerous to Germany by the adherence of Czechoslovakia, since the industrial regions, situated near the frontiers of the Reich—in the Ruhr region and in Saxony—were thereby seriously threatened, and since the enemy would be able at any time to penetrate into the heart of Germany. Germany therefore finally had to protect herself against this encirclement. The limitation of armaments, therefore, depended essentially upon Soviet Russia. What was to be expected from her had again become quite clear from a speech by Voroshilov, in which the ruthless use of poison gas by Soviet armed forces was announced. Here, Germany must be armed. The problem became particularly difficult because of the fact that one could place about as much reliance upon the faithful observance of treaties by a barbarous creation like the Soviet Union as upon the comprehension of mathematical formulas by a savage. Agreements with that country, therefore, were as good as worthless. Soviet Russia should simply not have been allowed to enter Europe. The Führer's proposals at the time had envisaged a unification of Europe without Russia.

To a question by the British Ambassador whether Germany would be prepared to agree to a ban on aerial bombing, the Führer replied that he had made known his position on this question already a long time ago, and could now only add that Germany was not to be deceived any longer by empty promises, as she once was by Wilson's Fourteen Points. Even if the Soviet Union were today to declare its intention not to drop any more poison gas bombs, one could have no faith in such a declaration.

To an objection by the British Ambassador that at present only the relations between England and Germany were involved, the Führer replied that England need not fear any interference from the Germans. Germany did not meddle in Empire affairs. She was, however, obliged to accept a negative reaction by England when Germany tried to solve her own difficulties. Any attempted settlement toward the East was met by a British "No," and so was the colonial problem, and the British press in particular opposed Germany everywhere and conducted a campaign of slander against this country.

The British Ambassador replied it was not only the British who were responsible for the publication of false reports in the press. The German press censorship caused many false reports and, moreover, there had, in the German press, too, been violent attacks against England, particularly at the time he took over his post.

In reply, the Führer pointed out that Germany had remained absolutely silent in the face of all British attacks for 3 years,

from 1933 until 1936. However, while Germany never had meddled in England's domestic affairs (Ireland, etc.), the British attempts at interference by the bishops, by some members of Parliament, and by other authorities had continued constantly.

In this connection the British Ambassador mentioned confidentially that Lord Halifax today had called a press conference of responsible newspaper publishers, and had arranged a discussion with the president of the Newspaper Publishers' Association and with leading members of the British Broadcasting Corporation, during which he had again stressed the responsibility of these authorities for peace. Nothing more could be done under England's freedom of the press. However, it was remarkable that the new British Foreign Secretary who, on the basis of his conversations in Germany, knew exactly the German views regarding this matter, here as well as in other matters had already exerted considerable personal influence, which was the most appropriate way in England. As an example of the fact that the Germans, too, had made mistakes regarding British affairs, the British Ambassador referred to the erroneous German opinion that the Vansittart Committee was behind the anti-German propaganda campaign. He could state on his word of honor that this Committee had nothing whatever to do with the false reports. It was certainly not an instrument of propaganda against any country, but on the contrary only served to state the case for England and the British Empire.

In this connection Foreign Minister von Ribbentrop pointed to the campaign of lies by the Reuter Bureau which had lasted for 2 weeks. None of the men responsible for the false reports had been dismissed or even reprimanded. There must be a system behind it.

Regarding the Vansittart Committee, the Führer took notice of the renewed assurance by the British Ambassador (he declared that the Committee had not even started its actual work), and in summing up declared that the most decisive factor in relieving the tension would be better instructions to the press, discontinuance of inflammatory reports, and a more objective approach.

When questioned by the Führer regarding the new colonial regime, the British Ambassador explained on a map that the British Government had in mind a system similar to the Berlin Agreement of 1885 (apparently the Congo Acts). In the above-mentioned African territory the colonies would be redistributed. In this distribution Germany would be given consideration, and would in this case have colonial territory under her sovereignty. All powers with colonies in this central African territory must, however, accept

certain obligations concerning demilitarization, freedom of trade, and the treatment of natives.

The Führer replied that Germany was, of course, primarily interested in the question regarding the disposition of her former colonies. Instead of establishing a new and complicated system, why not solve the colonial problem in the simplest and most natural way, namely, by returning the former German colonies? He, the Führer, must openly admit, however, that he did not consider the colonial problem ripe for settlement as yet, since Paris and London had declared themselves much too firmly opposed to the return. Therefore, he did not want to press the issue either. One could wait quietly for 4, 6, 8, or 10 years. Perhaps by that time a change of mind would have occurred in Paris and London, and they would understand that the best solution was to return to Germany her rightful property acquired by purchase and treaty. The prerequisite for Germany's collaboration in a new colonial regime was, therefore, the return of the former colonies which were legitimately acquired and taken away by treaty. Germany did not want to burden other countries not involved in the colonial settlement. Perhaps Belgium and Portugal would not agree, either, and would believe that Germany was demanding something from them to which she was not entitled.

The British colonial plan was again explained by the British Ambassador, using the globe, and in answer to a question by the Führer, Sir Nevile Henderson declared that he believed that Portugal and Belgium, and presumably France and Italy too, would in the end cooperate in the settlement.

The conversation then turned to central European problems again. In reply to the remark by the British Ambassador that for Chamberlain to achieve anything, Germany would also have to make some contribution in this matter, the Führer replied that his contribution to these problems consisted of the Berchtesgaden Agreement with Austria; but he must emphasize very strongly that once Germans were fired upon in Austria or Czechoslovakia, the German Reich would intervene. He, the Führer, had had to talk a good deal in his political career, and therefore some circles perhaps believed that his words need not always be taken too seriously. But whoever considered his utterances concerning central European questions mere rhetoric would be very cruelly disappointed. If internal explosions occurred in Austria or in Czechoslovakia, Germany would not remain neutral, but would act with lightning speed. Therefore, it was false if certain diplomats or members of the Vienna Government stated that they need have no fear and need not be very careful about the fulfillment of their obligations.

In this connection Foreign Minister von Ribbentrop referred to the dramatic conversation between the British Minister in Vienna and Herr von Papen, during which the Minister had complained with great animation about the pressure which Germany had allegedly exerted on Austria. The only Berchtesgaden pressure had consisted in calling Austria's attention to certain dangers and suggesting a solution for them. If the British Minister had protested in such a dramatic manner to Herr von Papen, one can imagine how he must have spoken to Austrian Foreign Minister Schmidt.

The British Ambassador pointed out that these statements by the Minister did not necessarily represent the opinion of the British Government and declared that he, Sir Nevile Henderson, had himself often advocated the *Anschluss*.

The Führer replied that certain things were really intolerable for a great power. England declared that she could not tolerate an attack on Belgium or Holland. He, the Führer, wished to state just as emphatically that Germany must and would intervene if Germans in Central Europe continued to be oppressed in the same manner as hitherto, or in any other way.

The British Ambassador recapitulated the German views concerning Austria and Czechoslovakia by stating that, if the Germans in these countries were further oppressed, an explosion would occur, while if full equality was granted, no conflict was to be expected.

Concerning the question of limiting air armaments, the Führer mentioned that here, of course, disarmament for particular regions in the world could not take place, since air forces were extremely mobile. An air force in the Far East, for example, could easily be employed in Europe. Therefore, no territorial limitations could be considered in this question. He, the Führer, had made his proposals at the time on the assumption that war against noncombatants had been outlawed by the Geneva Convention. Unfortunately, his proposals had not been accepted. The British Ambassador replied that, while the British Government previously had not wanted to discuss the ban on aerial bombing, it was now taking a different view; and he concluded by stating that for various reasons the moment was propitious for the discussion of armaments. Germany was strong, but England was also strong again. Germany had awakened England from her slumber, so that neither of the two parties to the negotiations could assume that the negotiations took place because of fear or weakness. He, the Ambassador,

agreed with Field Marshal Göring's opinion that only negotiations between the strong were promising. On the other hand, much money was being spent on armaments, so that for this reason also the limitation of armaments was of interest.

The Führer replied that German armaments were conditioned by Russia. For Germany, it was a question of survival to defend her position in Central Europe, and she must arm for an attack by Soviet Russia, which could in the nature of things never be contained by the border states and Poland. In a discussion of armaments, the British, therefore, must first begin with Russia.

To a renewed question by the British Ambassador about the German attitude toward the British proposal concerning the colonies, the Führer suggested that a written answer might be given because of the importance of the question.

To the question by Foreign Minister von Ribbentrop whether the return of *all* the former colonies, including those in the possession of the British dominions, could be considered by the British Government, the British Ambassador replied that he could speak only for Great Britain, and that his statement did not apply to the Dominions.

Submitted herewith to Foreign Minister von Ribbentrop in accordance with instructions.

DR. SCHMIDT  
*Counselor of Legation*

BERLIN, March 3, 1938.

No. 139

F1/0329

*The British Ambassador in Germany (Henderson) to the German Foreign Minister*<sup>83</sup>

BERLIN, March 4, 1938.

MY DEAR REICHSMINISTER: Many thanks for Herr Schmidt's notes which I shall have translated and send to London.

There is one quite incorrect statement at the bottom of page 15.<sup>84</sup> I never said that I had spoken here in favor of the *Anschluss*. What I did say was that I had sometimes expressed personal views which may not have been entirely in accordance with those of my Government.

<sup>83</sup> The original of this document is in English.

<sup>84</sup> See p. 248, paragraph beginning "The British Ambassador pointed out . . ."

In the circumstances I must ask you to be so good as to omit that paragraph beginning "*der britische Botschafter*" down to "*eingetreten sei.*"

Yours sincerely,

NEVILLE HENDERSON

No. 140

F1/0299-0800

*The British Ambassador in Germany (Henderson) to the German Foreign Minister*<sup>85</sup>

PERSONAL

BERLIN, March 4, 1938.

MY DEAR REICHSMINISTER: There appears to be such a complete misunderstanding here as to the nature and future activities of the new Committee for co-ordination of British publicity abroad, of which Sir Robert Vansittart is the Chairman, that I feel obliged to ask you to accept the following facts in regard to it.

The composition of the Committee is as follows: representatives of the Foreign Office, Treasury, Colonial Office, General Post Office and Department of Overseas Trade and of the British Broadcasting Corporation, British Council and Travel Association.

The aim of the Committee is to ensure that the fullest and most effective use is made of the various efforts to spread a better understanding of England and its people abroad. Its function will be to prevent overlapping by organisations concerned in this work and by advice and exchange of information to co-ordinate their activities. It is not a new Government Department and it exercises no control or censorship over the British Broadcasting Corporation or press nor will it issue material to them or concern itself with details of their day to day work.

At the present stage the Committee will devote itself to a survey of the work now being done through the various means of publicity—newspapers, telegram agencies, broadcasting, films, British Council and analogous bodies—and to considering how this work can be co-ordinated, stimulated and made more complete.

It is in no sense an instrument of propaganda against other countries.

There are quite enough misunderstandings between us without adding to them, and I should be grateful therefore if you could see your way to rectify the misapprehension which the Chancellor appeared to have on this subject.

The above facts are as furnished to me officially by Lord Halifax.

Yours sincerely,

NEVILLE HENDERSON

<sup>85</sup> The original of this document is in English.

## No. 141

F1/0304-05

*Draft Letter from the German Foreign Minister to the British Ambassador in Germany (Henderson)*<sup>86</sup>

BERLIN, March 5, 1938.

DEAR SIR NEVILLE: At your request we have eliminated the words to which you objected in the memorandum which Counselor of Legation Schmidt prepared concerning your conversation with the Führer on Thursday.

In going over the memorandum, I noticed an omission on page 14, paragraph 2; and I should like to request that you insert the following paragraph in the memorandum:

"To a question by the Foreign Minister whether the British Government intended to satisfy the German demand for colonies only in the territory to which the Congo Acts referred, the British Ambassador replied that the suggestion concerning the Congo Acts ['Acts' changed to 'Basin'] should naturally not exclude . . . [two or three illegible words changed to 'return of former German colonies'] outside this territory."

With best regards I remain,

Yours sincerely,

R[IBBENTROP]

## No. 142

F7/0424

*The British Ambassador in Germany (Henderson) to the German Foreign Minister*<sup>87</sup>

BERLIN, March 5, 1938.

DEAR REICHSMINISTER: Your letter of today.

I accept the addendum which you wish inserted in Herr Schmidt's notes of Thursday's conversation with the omission of one word, namely "*selbstverständlich*" and it will be with that modification included in the translation of the notes which I have sent to London.

I hope to see you on Monday.

Yours sincerely,

NEVILLE HENDERSON

<sup>86</sup> This draft has corrections in Ribbentrop's handwriting, and it is initialed by him. A marginal note indicates that the letter was sent on March 5.

<sup>87</sup> The original of this document is in English and in Henderson's handwriting.

## No. 143

F1/0301,0298

*The German Foreign Minister to the British Ambassador in Germany (Henderson)*

PERSONAL

BERLIN, March 6, 1938.

MY DEAR AMBASSADOR: By your letter of March 4, 1938, you were good enough to inform me of the Committee headed by Sir Robert Vansittart, which has been charged with certain British information activities in foreign countries.

I have taken note of the information you conveyed and express my most sincere thanks. Nor shall I fail to transmit to the Führer and Chancellor the contents of your letter.<sup>88</sup>

With best regards, I am,

Yours,

R[IBBENTROP]

## No. 144

F8/0033-0032

*Memorandum by the Foreign Minister*

RM 145

Today I asked the Italian Counselor of Embassy, Magistrati, to see me, and informed him of the following:

As I had already advised him the other day, the British Ambassador had made vague proposals concerning disarmament, the appeasement of Europe, and colonial appeasement in Africa. The British Ambassador expressed the wish of his Government that the matter be treated confidentially and discreetly.

The Führer had decided to reply in writing to the British proposals, since it appeared advisable to him to put this down in writing. Germany would point out that there had to be complete agreement between Italy and us regarding all these questions. At the beginning of next week, as soon as the answer had been drafted, I would inform the Italian Embassy precisely of its contents.

In general our impression of these colonial plans was very vague. London seems to want to negotiate in all directions at once.

By direction of the Foreign Minister:

SPITZY

BERLIN, March 8, 1938.

<sup>88</sup> A marginal notation in Ribbentrop's handwriting reads as follows: "Translation transmitted to the Führer for his information."

## No. 145

F7/0475-0464

*Memorandum*<sup>89</sup>RECORD OF A CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE SECRETARY OF STATE AND  
HERR VON RIBBENTROP AT THE FOREIGN OFFICE ON MARCH 10, 1938  
(AGREED TEXT)<sup>90</sup>

I had a long interview this morning with Herr von Ribbentrop. During the first part of our conversation we were alone, and he began by saying how pleased he was to have the opportunity of visiting this country to take leave, using the occasion for some talks upon matters of which he was now officially in charge. He said that the German Chancellor would shortly be sending a note to the Ambassador on the colonial question and might include in that note some reference to other points raised in the Ambassador's interview. Herr von Ribbentrop himself had not come with any idea of negotiation, but was nevertheless glad to be able to make a *tour d'horizon* of the general situation as it presented itself to him and to the German Chancellor. I said that I should be very glad indeed to hear what he had to say. I had some observations that I wished to make at the appropriate moment, but, with reference to what he had just said about the Chancellor furnishing the Ambassador with a note, we should, of course, be ready to see this subject treated by way of a note, if the Chancellor thought that desirable, or, in the alternative, Herr Hitler would, no doubt ask the Ambassador to call upon him again and say what he might have to say by way of a conversation.

2. Herr von Ribbentrop then made a short reference to the difficulties created by the Press. His Excellency stated that he appreciated our difficulties and welcomed what I was able to tell him of my interview with the Press two days ago. I explained that it was essential to recognise the British attitude in this matter and that, as I had said to the Chancellor at Berchtesgaden, if he really thought that no agreement was possible in the presence of a free Press, that was tantamount to saying that no progress could be made, insofar as one of the fixed points in the compass was that we should never be prepared to consider measures of Press

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<sup>89</sup> This document is in English on stationery of the Foreign Office.

<sup>90</sup> In addition to this agreed text there is a long German memorandum in two parts addressed to Hitler. The first part differs so markedly from the agreed text that it is printed below (document No. 147, p. 264). The second part (F7/0441-0430) is a rough translation of the agreed text, with additional material inserted at places indicated on the agreed text. These additional remarks, translated from the German, are printed here within double parentheses.

control similar to those adopted in Germany. I further mentioned the initiative taken by the B.B.C. in the cancellation of their discussion on colonies, and added that I thought only harm resulted from the tendency to exaggerate the Press difficulty, because, after all, what mattered was the disposition of the [two]<sup>90a</sup> Governments vis-à-vis one another. We were not [disposed to] pay exaggerated attention to our own Press and, if [it was ever] possible to reach an understanding, the Press difficulty would settle itself. In this connexion I told His Excellency that it had been, as he knew, a matter of debate [whether] the cessation of Italian propaganda should be a [condition of] conversations, but that on the whole the view had been taken that, if those conversations led to better relations, the question of propaganda would settle itself. It was the same with the Press. Herr von Ribbentrop appeared not greatly to disagree with this diagnosis.

3. Herr von Ribbentrop then proceeded to say how he welcomed the evidence recently given in England of willingness to adopt a realist policy towards the facts of the present situation. The Prime Minister had set a notable example in this respect by his courage in acknowledging the facts as they affected the League of Nations. His attitude towards the Rome-Berlin Axis appeared to be a further proof of this realistic view. Many difficulties would be avoided if this treatment of the several elements in the problem could be extended. There were three great facts of which British opinion ought in this realist spirit to take account. The first was the fact that Germany had rearmed, meant to be strong, was obliged to be strong, and was strong. The refortification of the Rhineland was proceeding apace and German defence there would soon be as powerful as the French Maginot line. The second was that in Austria and Czechoslovakia she had racial and minority problems that had to be solved. They would have to be solved whatever Herr Hitler might or might not do and we should only delude ourselves if we failed to recognise this fact. Lastly, the colonial issue was one that we must also be prepared to face in a realist spirit. His Excellency did not wish to repeat what had been said on many occasions on this subject, but they were convinced that their claim was just and that we ought to be prepared to meet it reasonably.

4. The Chancellor was as anxious for an understanding with us as he had ever been. He had given evidence of this in the Anglo-German Naval Treaty; he had more than once assured France that Germany had no territorial ambitions at her expense, and he had made a settlement with Belgium. The German Government wel-

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<sup>90a</sup> The words in brackets are conjectural readings; the text is defective.

comed the prospect of our establishing closer relations with Italy because they saw in that, if it could be accomplished, a real advance towards a more peaceful state in Europe. If, therefore, this country could reconcile itself to looking these facts in the face, he felt able to look forward to a time when Germany would be strong, satisfied, and with no outstanding problems either at home or abroad, and with whom our relations would be permanently secured on a basis of mutual respect and confidence.

5. In the course of a reference to questions connected with air bombing, Herr von Ribbentrop repeated what the Chancellor had said to Sir N. Henderson about the difficulty of trusting Russian good faith, but said that, if it was ever possible for us to secure agreement among other Powers and the necessary guarantees and if Germany could accept such an agreement as might be proposed, they would welcome it.

6. His Excellency then spoke of the proposed plebiscite in Austria. This he stigmatised in strong terms quoting several items of the proposed procedure to justify his condemnation. The question was badly phrased; there would be no check on the vote; the whole affair was being engineered by a government that represented only a small minority and that had established itself in power by unlawful means against the interests of 80% of the Austrian population.

7. Sir Alexander Cadogan and Dr. Woermann joined us at this point. I then said that there were certain observations that I wished to make, which might in part be by way of reply to much of what he had said. I would begin by saying to him that I had naturally brought the report of Sir N. Henderson's interview with the Chancellor to the notice of His Majesty's Government and that I was speaking for them as well as for myself when I said that we found that report very disappointing. The Ambassador's approach was couched in most conciliatory and constructive terms. He had opened the colonial question, and, in regard to this, I had a correction that I desired to make on what appeared to have passed, in order to avoid possible misunderstanding later. I read to him, and subsequently handed to him, a copy of the note attached to this record as Annex.

((After reading the enclosure, Herr von Ribbentrop stated that he did not get the impression that a misunderstanding on the part of the Germans had arisen. He posed a counterquestion, whether the new declaration by Lord Halifax meant a step backward. Lord Halifax answered that this was not the case. It was only that no official decision had yet been made by the British Government con-

cerning particular areas. The obligations to be assumed in Tropical Africa at the proper time by Germany as well as by the other powers concerned were contained in the note which Sir Nevile Henderson had presented in Berlin. They were approximately identical with the obligations under the Congo Act of 1885. The treatment of natives and economic as well as military questions were involved. The Foreign Minister again pointed out that Germany had not made any demands on powers which had not taken any colonies away from her. As was known, Germany demanded only the return of her former colonies. When the Foreign Minister repeated the question whether England had in mind returning colonial territory to German sovereignty Lord Halifax replied in the affirmative.

Lord Halifax then stated that the erroneous belief that the colonial question could be settled in isolation from other problems must not be permitted to arise. Neither the present nor any other British Government could solve the colonial problem without simultaneously discussing other questions.

The Foreign Minister replied that the German attitude, namely, that the return of the colonies should not be made the subject of any bargaining deal, was certainly well known. Lord Halifax agreed, but repeated that there were also other questions to be settled.))

The German Chancellor, I said, had laid great stress when I had seen him on the importance of our being willing to consider the colonial question, and it was disappointing for us, after having given some thought to it, to be told that this was an issue that might be settled in four, six or eight years' time. Herr Hitler justified this, if I understood his attitude correctly, upon the behaviour of the Press and the British Broadcasting Corporation.

((Herr von Ribbentrop replied that the Führer had apparently not been correctly understood. The Führer was not making the continuation of discussions of the colonial problem flatly dependent upon the attitude of the press, but feared, rather, that during an oral exchange of ideas, the attitude of the press would dangerously influence the treatment of the colonial question—and German-British relations in general—and would under certain circumstances make it altogether impossible to continue the colonial questions. The Führer was considering a written answer to the British suggestion regarding the colonial problem. Lord Halifax then referred to the other possibility, that the British Ambassador in Berlin again obtain an oral reply from the Führer. However, this would of course have to be left entirely to the Führer.))

In regard to the general position of the Press, I repeated what I had just said, namely that I had explained to Herr Hitler at Berchtesgaden that, if some form of prohibition of the Press was an essential condition of agreement, it was clearly impossible to make progress. We had, however, taken steps to emphasise to the Press the real responsibility that lay upon them, and more than this we could not do.

((The Foreign Minister took note of this, but again pointed out the decisive importance of stopping the campaign of lies in the British press.))

8. I then turned to Central Europe. Here we were, of course, interested because of the reactions that action in those countries had elsewhere, if for no other reason. But we were bound to challenge the suggestion made by the Chancellor that we and the French were trying to block measures to promote just treatment for German minorities. Such was not our attitude. On the contrary, we recognised how important the question was to Germany and we had used and were using and would continue to use our influence to assist the peaceful solution of these difficulties.

((But in view particularly of the plebiscite scheduled for next Sunday, it was of decisive importance how Germany would act now. The British Government recognized that Germany was primarily interested in the question of her minorities in Austria and in Czechoslovakia. However, the question might have serious consequences for all of Europe, and for this reason the British Government was interested in it. Here was an inflammable issue that could easily lead to an explosion. If war should break out because of the Austrian or Czechoslovakian question, other powers might become involved, and he could not tell which powers would then remain unaffected.

In this connection Herr von Ribbentrop again replied that the plebiscite arranged by Schuschnigg—if the press reports thus far regarding the details were confirmed—was a fraud. He gave detailed reasons why the plebiscite could not be expected to reveal true public opinion. In the relations between Germany and Austria no formalistic legal question was involved, but only the great historic problem of the German people, which could not be settled by an inherently fraudulent plebiscite. The real will of the Austrian people was shown as early as 1921 in the plebiscites in Tyrol, Salzburg, etc., which were almost unanimously in favor of the *Anschluss*. Lord Halifax then asked whether the German Government could not some time make a specific statement of its wishes and complaints regarding the Germans in Czechoslovakia. He did not wish to have

a reply to that, but merely to make a suggestion. In this connection the Foreign Minister referred to the right of self-determination of peoples.))

9. I mentioned lastly as a ground for our disappointment the fact that we had taken up Herr Hitler's point made in conversation with me about bombing and bombing aeroplanes. He seemed now to have dropped it. We attached great importance to this point and were convinced that it was no good trying to prohibit bombing, a prohibition that would never stand the strain of war, but that it was more profitable to try to limit the threat of bombing by some restriction on the size or weight of bombing aeroplanes. At this point Herr von Ribbentrop asked exactly what we should have in mind. Had we some Disarmament Conference in mind? I said that, so far as I could speak for His Majesty's Government, I thought their view would be this—that we should not be prepared to make any effort to secure international agreement, however this might be approached, upon such a suggestion as I had made as to the restriction of the size or power of bombing aeroplanes, if at the end of it, when we went back to Germany, we were to be told that it was all wasted labour because of the congenital bad faith of Russia. If, on the other hand, he was able to say to me that, provided that other Powers would agree to some such line, the German Government also would look favourably upon it, there was no trouble that the British Government would not take to endeavour to secure what seemed to them so valuable an advance.

((To this Herr von Ribbentrop replied that in regard to this problem one must always keep in mind the practical possibilities of success and not discuss plans which under present circumstances were impossible of realization.))

10. Having explained the grounds of our disappointment, I said that I wished to speak to His Excellency very frankly on more general lines. His Majesty's Government sincerely desired peace and good relations between all the nations. Good relations between Great Britain and Germany would be an immense contribution to this end. It was for that reason that His Majesty's Government had been prepared to run great risks and make sacrifices. I had not concealed from him our disappointment at the Chancellor's response, though this made no difference to our firmly rooted desire for better understanding and we should at all times be ready to join the Chancellor in the attempt to realise this end.

11. But, if we were to succeed, we could not do it alone and all must help. We had from the beginning made it plain that the colonial issue would never be treated by this country in isolation.

I would repeat that we had no desire to place obstacles in the way of peaceful agreement reached by peaceful means. We recognised the reality of the problems from the German point of view, connected with Austria and Czechoslovakia. We had not tried to block Austria but had rather tried to steady European opinion, shaken by the Berchtesgaden interview. We had, moreover, consistently used our influence, and were ready to go on doing so, at Prague to promote a peaceful settlement there. But we should be less than frank if we did not make it clear to the German Government the danger we saw in the expression that responsible leaders in Germany were giving in public to German policy and to the spirit in which that policy was being pursued. The suggestion was being created that something more than fair treatment of minorities was involved. This seemed to us to put back the chance of reaching peaceful settlements: and to hold very dangerous possibilities for Europe. The last thing we wanted to see was a war in Europe. But the experience of all history went to show that the pressure of facts was sometimes more powerful than the wills of men: and if once war should start in Central Europe, it was quite impossible to say where it might not end, or who might not become involved. This then was the danger of the situation as we saw it, laying a very heavy responsibility upon us all, and not least upon the German Government. The course of events and the language used in Germany of late, both in public and in private, could not fail both to make peaceful solutions more difficult, and to excite apprehension lest all this might one day lead to some act, which in its turn might, contrary to the intention of the German Government, precipitate a general conflict.<sup>11</sup> I then took up what he had said about the Austrian plebiscite. This was, I observed, to be held on Sunday and I attached the utmost importance to everything being done to ensure that the plebiscite was carried out without interference or intimidation; we assumed the German Government would share our views and would, therefore, take all measures in their power to restrain Nazi followers from any action which might interfere with the smooth and free holding of the plebiscite. It really was of the first importance in our view that every care should be taken to avoid anything that might lead to or encourage violent action, for, if any explosions should occur at any time, it was quite impossible for any man to tell what might be the limit or the end.

12. Herr von Ribbentrop said he did not know what action his Government might be taking about the plebiscite. If I would allow

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<sup>11</sup> On March 11, 1938, the British Ambassador handed Neurath as a separate document the text of paragraph 10 and of paragraph 11 to this point, and the remainder of paragraph 11, also as a separate document (document No. 353, p. 576).

him to say so, he thought the most useful contribution we could make would be to use our influence with the Austrian Chancellor to cancel the plebiscite. I told him in reply to this that, whatever might be his view or mine about the plebiscite, it seemed impossible to say that the head of an independent state could not have a plebiscite if he wanted to. I did not happen to believe in plebiscites much, but that was merely a matter of opinion, and, as long as any conventions of ordinary behaviour between independent nations prevailed, I thought it scarcely possible to deny the right to the head of a state to resort to a plebiscite if he so desired. To this Herr von Ribbentrop responded by saying that this really was an attempt by a minority government, representing 20%, to force an unwelcome solution on the majority of 80%. In reply to this, I finally said that, if the facts were really as he stated, it was quite evident that the pressure of events would bring their own solution and that only harm could result from any action by the German Government to try to impose short cuts in a situation that was highly charged with ugly possibilities.

((In the course of further statements in this connection, Herr von Ribbentrop repeated that the Führer had been seeking an understanding with England for 18 years and that he (Herr von Ribbentrop) had himself again and again taken steps to reach this objective. It was now up to England to understand the true intentions and needs of Germany. If the colonial question was solved, and if a solution were found for the Austrian problem and that of the Germans in Czechoslovakia—which regardless of the will of the statesmen would take its inevitable course—Herr von Ribbentrop believed that Germany and England could really achieve a lasting understanding. Germany fully recognized the realistic attitude which Chamberlain had taken in recent weeks and hoped that he would retain this realism during the discussion of the German questions. England had her axis with Paris, we had our axis with Rome. However, there would be no reason why these two axes should not cooperate.))

13. Finally, I asked His Excellency to allow me to end on a note of something more like personal appeal. I remembered very well the first interview that we had had together when I was Lord Privy Seal, in which he had expressed his own desire, which I also believed to be the Chancellor's, for better understanding with this country. He would believe me when I said that nothing was nearer the heart of the Prime Minister and every member of His Majesty's Government, including myself, than a precisely similar hope. Our approach through the Ambassador had been designed to help this

forward. The Chancellor had it in his power more than any other man to go down to history as the great architect of peace and a great benefactor of countless men, women and children in Europe who were yet unborn. Conditions in this country to-day were favourable for the effort that so great a purpose deserved. The Prime Minister had set himself with energy to the task. For what it might be worth, I had the advantage of having some personal acquaintance with the Chancellor and those who directed the policy of the German Government. He had permitted me to speak with great frankness to himself. His Majesty's Government was also in a strong position to implement any agreement that we might be able to reach. From all these points of view it would be a tragic misfortune to let the opportunity pass.

14. If, therefore, they, with us, sincerely wished progress to be made, I hoped that he would be good enough to bear in mind what I had sought to say upon the general question and that, in due course, the German Government might see their way to make some constructive contribution to what was bound to be a general effort.

15. In taking leave, His Excellency told me that he anticipated that the Chancellor would, as he had said earlier, send some written note dealing with the colonial question, and perhaps with other matters, and we could then see what the next step might be. I concurred in this, expressing only the anxiety that the response of the Chancellor might not be such as would bring a shutter down upon the efforts that had been made and the hopes that we had, I thought, both shared during recent months.

((Herr von Ribbentrop expressed the hope that the negotiations would be continued. For further conversations the British Ambassador in Berlin would be a very acceptable and suitable person.))

HALIFAX

[Annex]

*References to the Colonial Question in the Conversation Between  
Herr Hitler and Sir N. Henderson on March 3*

The record of this conversation prepared by Herr Schmidt shows that, as regards the colonial question, there may be a misunderstanding which should at once be corrected.

The communication which Sir N. Henderson was instructed to make with regard to the colonial question was limited to the inquiry how the German Government would in principle be prepared to view the suggestion of some new regime of colonial administration in Tropical Africa which would include certain stipulations regard-

ing freedom of trade, treatment of natives, etc., applicable to all the Powers concerned on exactly equal terms. The character of this regime was outlined in the written statement left by His Majesty's Ambassador with the Chancellor after the interview. Sir N. Henderson's subsequent remarks in reply to questions from Herr Hitler or Herr von Ribbentrop were of a purely hypothetical nature. It must not, for example, be assumed that His Majesty's Government have taken a decision on the question of the transfer of colonial territory to Germany; on the contrary, they have not yet considered in full whether the very serious difficulties involved can be surmounted, and if so in what manner. It is evident, however, that the attitude of the German Government towards accepting the proposed new regime for Tropical Africa would be an important factor in shaping any decisions which His Majesty's Government might later be in a position to take in regard to territorial transfer, in view of the difficulties that any such transfer would involve.

FOREIGN OFFICE, March 9, 1938.

### No. 146

F17/318-320

#### *The German Foreign Minister to the Führer and Chancellor*

SECRET

LONDON, March 10, 1938.

Enclosed I am submitting several memoranda regarding conversations with the British Foreign Secretary, Lord Halifax, and a memorandum regarding statements by Sir Horace Wilson, the closest associate of the British Prime Minister.<sup>2</sup> I shall not see Chamberlain until tomorrow.

On the question which was posed for me, whether Chamberlain desires a genuine understanding or whether this suggestion is a tactical move, I should like to state the following:

1. Chamberlain's policy shows a certain continuity. From the conversations which Lord Halifax had in November 1937, in Berchtesgaden, continuing through the discussions which the British Ambassador in Berlin, Sir Nevile Henderson, conducted, to the statements which Lord Halifax made to me in our conversation of today, a certain tendency is unmistakably apparent. Up to now, however, there have been no positive proposals. It looks as if Chamberlain and Halifax want to try to reach a peaceful understanding among the four Great Powers of Europe without the Soviet Union. It does not seem impossible that Chamberlain has in mind a peaceful solution by settling the colonial problem in a manner acceptable to

<sup>2</sup> The Kordt memorandum of March 10, document No. 148, p. 269.

England as well as by a peaceful development of the minorities problem. To what extent he does, in the last analysis, believe in the success of such a final settlement is something I would rather not say for sure. To judge from the impression I have obtained so far, I do not consider it likely that he wants to negotiate with Germany merely in order to disrupt the Berlin-Rome Axis. If that were possible, everything would, to be sure, be done here for that purpose. *Therefore, our firm adherence to the Berlin-Rome Axis appears to me absolutely vital.* I have always emphasized this view in my conversations, too. In my opinion Chamberlain, above all, wishes to explore the ground first in order to find out to what extent he can succeed in obtaining an understanding with Germany and Italy. In any event this policy can only be advantageous to him, because England's primary aim continues to be to gain time in order to complete her armament.

2. For this reason and because of the fundamental British dislike of conflicts which can still possibly be avoided somehow, the present British Government undoubtedly wants no war, and in my opinion it has not caused the present situation in Austria. Public opinion in England, therefore, favors peace, and Chamberlain must show success in this direction, or he will fall. In my opinion, as things stand, it is to our interest that Chamberlain remain in power now; and therefore, like Italy, we ought to continue the conversations with England.

3. What now will England do if the Austrian question cannot be settled peacefully? Basically, I am convinced that England of her own accord will do nothing in regard to it at present, but that she would exert a moderating influence upon the other powers. However, it would be a different matter if a larger international conflict should arise over Austria, i.e., conflict with France. Therefore the question must be raised: How will France together with her allies react, and how will Italy react? I believe that the French would not go to war now over a German solution of the Austrian question, and neither would the allies of France nor Italy. The prerequisite, however, would be a very quick settlement of the Austrian question. If a solution by force should be prolonged for any length of time, there would be danger of complications.

4. It is also important in what form German intervention in the Austrian situation could be justified at the proper time. The problem is to find a slogan that is attractive both from the legal and factual point of view. Schuschnigg himself has furnished us ample material for this. Such a plausible justification is particularly important, especially for British public opinion. In the

same direction would also be the idea that we state the German aims in regard to the Sudeten Germans more clearly and in a form which is plausible to the British public, perhaps limiting the demand to a sort of autonomy.

This afternoon during the reception at the Embassy, Halifax asked me for another short discussion, which presumably will take place tomorrow afternoon after the luncheon with the Prime Minister.

### No. 147

F7/0451-0442

#### *Memorandum*

#### CONVERSATION WITH HALIFAX IN LONDON<sup>88</sup>

LONDON, March 10, 1938.

[For] Führer.

This morning, a lengthy conversation took place between the British Foreign Secretary, Lord Halifax, and the German Foreign Minister, Herr von Ribbentrop. During the first part of the conversation, Lord Halifax and Herr von Ribbentrop were alone.

At the beginning of the conversation Herr von Ribbentrop remarked that he was glad to be able, after all, to bid farewell personally, and that he would like to avail himself of this opportunity—if it was agreeable to Lord Halifax—for a general political conversation. The realistic policy pursued by British Prime Minister Chamberlain and Lord Halifax was welcomed by Germany. German-British relations had been impaired by various factors, such as the ideology of the League of Nations, etc. However, it was wrong to neglect the real interests of the two countries because of ideologies. We welcomed, therefore, a more realistic approach to foreign policy by England. Thus, for instance, British Prime Minister Chamberlain had stated on various occasions that he considered the Berlin-Rome Axis a reality, and that during the present negotiations with Italy he had no intention of disturbing in any way the close relations between Germany and Italy. Germany on her part would welcome a compromise between England and Italy, and he, Herr von Ribbentrop, hoped that an increasingly better understanding and lasting appeasement would also be attained between England and Germany. For instance, he welcomed the constructive feature of Chamberlain's recent speech concerning the Austrian problem and was gratified that the British Government

<sup>88</sup> This heading and the notation "[For] Führer" are in Ribbentrop's handwriting.

fully understood the necessity for the closest ties between Germany and Austria. The German attitude toward this problem would have been made clear to Lord Halifax by Sir Nevile Henderson's reports regarding his conversation with the Führer and the German Foreign Minister.

The conversation then very soon turned to the coming plebiscite in Austria. Herr von Ribbentrop told Lord Halifax that from the details which had thus far become known—if they should be confirmed—the plebiscite planned by Schuschnigg must be called a fraudulent maneuver in violation of the letter and spirit of the Berchtesgaden Agreement. First, the formulation of the question, which left no alternative whatsoever, was meaningless and a confidence game. The main issue, namely, whether Austria should be more closely attached to the German Reich in some manner, was evaded by the way the question was formulated. For Schuschnigg knew very well that in previous plebiscites the overwhelming majority of the Austrian people had voted in favor of a closer union with Germany. In this connection Herr von Ribbentrop mentioned the resolution of the Austrian National Assembly in 1918, which unanimously proclaimed Austria a part of the German Reich, and to the plebiscite in Styria and other parts of Austria some years later, when 90 to 100 percent had voted in favor of union with Germany, until the powers by the use of threats had prohibited further plebiscites in Austria. Furthermore, Herr von Ribbentrop pointed out that the announced voting methods were really quite impossible: raising the voting age to 24 years, the short time, no secrecy, a ballot which contained only a "yes" for Schuschnigg, and, in the absence of a free choice, no safeguards for fair balloting and fair election results, since both would take place under the terror of the Schuschnigg police. Schuschnigg, moreover, had very likely not informed some of his colleagues at all about his intentions. This was likewise in violation of the Agreements; the whole maneuver represented a final and unsuccessful attempt to stop the natural development by force and fraud. He hoped that Schuschnigg would still come to his senses.

Lord Halifax replied that he was not informed about the details of this Austrian plebiscite. He emphasized the fact that England had no intention of "blocking up Austria." England admitted that this was a problem which primarily concerned Germany. However, England continued to be interested in the repercussions which this problem might have upon other countries in Europe, and he still hoped that this problem could be solved peacefully.

Herr von Ribbentrop then touched upon German-British relations in general and again pointed out the importance of a press truce.

Lord Halifax replied that he wished to inform Herr von Ribbentrop confidentially that a few days ago he had met with about eighty representatives of the press and newspaper publishers, to whom he had earnestly emphasized the importance to be attached to the influence of the press in questions of foreign policy. Lord Halifax believed that his efforts had already shown certain results. He explained how essential it was that we recognize clearly the British attitude in this matter. He had already told the Chancellor in Berchtesgaden that no progress would ever be made if Germany insisted that an agreement was impossible as long as there was freedom of the press in England. England was not prepared ever to consider control measures for the press similar to the ones employed by Germany. In this connection Lord Halifax mentioned the measure taken by the British Broadcasting Corporation, which eliminated discussions regarding colonies from the program. He added that he considered it only harmful if excessive importance should be attached to press polemics, for what really mattered was the *attitude of the two Governments toward each other*. The English Government did not pay any exaggerated attention to its own press. If Germany and England would really come to an agreement, there simply would be no material for press polemics. For example, as Herr von Ribbentrop knew, making the discontinuance of Italian propaganda a prerequisite for beginning conversations had been discussed. However, it was recognized that the propaganda issue would be settled automatically if the conversations led to improved relations. As far as the press was concerned, the situation was similar. Chamberlain and he, Lord Halifax, were determined to reach an understanding with Germany, and in advocating this policy of an understanding with Germany and Italy, Chamberlain had assumed a great responsibility in the eyes of the British people and a great risk as well.

Then, Herr von Ribbentrop said roughly the following:

The question about the real aims of German policy had been asked so often. To this question he could give the following plain answer:

1. Germany wished to be and had to be strong. This aim had now been achieved by the reestablishment of the German Army. Germany, moreover, had secured her borders, so that millions would bleed to death, without one single foreign soldier succeeding in reaching German soil. However, the Führer did not intend to exploit the regained German power in any wars of conquest.

Germany must be armed for defense against Soviet Russian attacks. M. Stalin and his War Minister, Voroshilov, in their latest speeches, had again proclaimed in unmistakable terms the war aims of Russia. Germany could only hope that such an attack by Soviet Russia would not occur; however, in the course of time she had become more cautious. The Führer did not wish to request aid at the outset from the great Western Powers, if some day the steam roller of world revolution should be set in motion against Germany.

At this point Lord Halifax interjected that England was well aware of Germany's strength and that she had no objection to it whatever.

2. Germany wished to obtain the right of self-determination for the 10 million Germans living on her eastern border, i.e., in Austria and Czechoslovakia. No power on earth could stop this inevitable development toward the German view.

In this connection Herr von Ribbentrop mentioned that the Führer had been pleased when Lord Halifax had shown understanding for that, too, at Berchtesgaden and when he had declared that the *status quo* in Eastern Europe could not be maintained unconditionally forever.

Germany had always tried to solve these problems peacefully and would continue to do so in the future. The best proof of this was the Agreements of Berchtesgaden with Herr Schuschnigg. Here there had been talk of pressure exerted upon the Austrian Chancellor. He, Herr von Ribbentrop, who had been present at this conversation, could assure Lord Halifax that this "pressure" had consisted only of the Führer's explanation to Herr Schuschnigg that the development of a close union of Germany and Austria was inevitable. The result of this frank conversation in Berchtesgaden had been that Herr Schuschnigg *himself* in the presence of Herr von Ribbentrop had declared that he, too, considered the close union of Germany and Austria the only possible solution. Therefore, between Germany and Austria there was really no problem at all. If, therefore, the Austrian problem and the question of the Sudeten German minority in Czechoslovakia were settled satisfactorily in accordance with the right of self-determination, the German nationality problem in the east would be solved. As to the German minorities in Poland, the latter had a large number of Germans in her territory; on the other hand, however, a considerable number of Poles were scattered throughout Germany. The problem, therefore, was completely different from that in Austria and in Czechoslovakia, and Germany had found a settlement with Poland regarding this question.

3. Germany desired the return of her former colonial possessions and hoped that some day this problem would be settled in a generous manner. Germany was gratified to note that apparently the British Government wished to take the initiative on a large scale in this matter. In fact, it could only be in the interest of Great Britain, if this problem were settled by giving a people of 68 millions its rightful opportunity for colonization.

Summing up, Herr von Ribbentrop stated that he had only outlined his ideas concerning these problems to Lord Halifax today. The Führer intended to give a written answer on the colonial problem, and it was possible that he would at that time also deal with other problems. He did not want to anticipate the final answer of the Führer. However, it seemed appropriate to him that Lord Halifax be informed of these ideas.

When questions concerning aerial bombing were raised, Herr von Ribbentrop repeated what the Führer had already told Sir N. Henderson regarding the lack of good will on the part of Soviet Russia. However, if England succeeded in bringing about an understanding between the powers, with the necessary guarantees, Germany would not refuse to consent to such an agreement, but would readily cooperate.

Then, the conversation turned to direct German-British relations. Herr von Ribbentrop referred Lord Halifax to the steady policy of accommodation which the Führer had carried out not only by word but also by deed. For almost 19 years the Führer had constantly advocated an Anglo-German understanding, and Lord Halifax knew that likewise he, Herr von Ribbentrop, had been incessantly striving for this understanding for 8 years. Proof of this was the German-English Naval Treaty, the German attitude in the question of the guarantee of the western boundary, i.e., the Führer's declaration that there were no more territorial problems between Germany and France, and finally the agreement between Germany and Belgium.

Another example of the constructive German peace policy was the complete disappearance of the Danzig question from international discussion. The question of Danzig as well as the Austrian question had been artificially magnified by the other powers, thereby endangering peace. The policy of the present High Commissioner in Danzig, as contrasted with that of Mr. Lester, proved that the difficulties in Danzig had been artificial and brought in from the outside.

In brief, after the settlement of the colonial problem, there was really no longer any problem between Germany and England which

caused any difficulties whatever. He, Herr von Ribbentrop, believed that if a reasonable attitude was assumed by both parties, a final and lasting understanding between the two countries would be entirely possible. After having settled her nationality problem in the east and after having satisfied her colonial needs, Germany would be a satiated nation and would thereby become the best guarantor of peace in Europe. It was true that the Führer possessed a tremendous instrument of power, but he would never use it for the oppression of foreign peoples, as the Bolshevist world press so often claimed. This would be contrary to the principles of the National Socialist ideology. However, it would be a different matter if Germany's defense or the fight against the oppression of the German nationality in the east were at stake. In this case the Führer would, if necessary, employ the entire German nation, and Lord Halifax knew that it had never before been so solidly united in support of a leader.

Herr von Ribbentrop summarized this basic conception of the Führer in the following manner:

For the oppression of a foreign people, not a single German soldier would be sacrificed, but for the preservation of the German nationality in Europe, the entire German nation would be employed.

### No. 148

905/293688-92

#### *Memorandum*

RM 149

Today I had a conversation of about an hour with Sir Horace Wilson. To begin with Sir Horace asked me if I had received any definite impression as yet of the German Foreign Minister's conversation with Lord Halifax, which had lasted over 2 hours. He knew that Lord Halifax had reserved the forenoon for this discussion. He [Sir Horace Wilson] hoped, moreover, that the Foreign Minister would also have an opportunity to see the Prime Minister.

I said I had heard nothing as yet regarding the conversation between the Foreign Minister and Lord Halifax.

Sir Horace then asked me whether a conversation between the Foreign Minister and the Prime Minister had been arranged as yet, and whether I could tell him how long the Foreign Minister would remain in London. I told him that the date of his departure had not yet been fixed. For the rest, the Prime Minister had invited the Foreign Minister to have lunch with him on Friday. Sir

Horace regretted that there would perhaps not be time enough for a detailed discussion at the luncheon, to which a number of other persons had also been invited. I received the impression that he would have welcomed a further discussion between the Prime Minister and the Foreign Minister.

In connection with the question of how long I had been in England, he inquired whether it had struck me that in this country the individual enjoys a considerable amount of freedom and prosperity. Industrialists often came to him and complained about excessive taxes and so forth. When he countered by asking them whether they would rather work in America, France, Italy, or Germany, he always elicited the same reply: that they preferred to remain in England. Of course, British freedom was counterbalanced by a certain self-imposed discipline. He had thought a good deal about this and had come to the conclusion that the basis of this discipline was the fact that every Englishman was a member of some organization or other. The leaders of the big organizations often assumed for the individual the task of making decisions, and they thought twice before they resorted to extreme measures such as strikes and lockouts. In one field, however, British freedom was not counterbalanced by a corresponding self-imposed discipline. That was in regard to the *press*. The Prime Minister had again and again pondered over the question of how influence could be exerted on the press; after Eden's resignation, he had asked most of the influential journalists to come to see him one at a time and had explained the purpose of his policy to them, namely to achieve general appeasement. He was gratified to note that this attempt had not been entirely unsuccessful. Of course, beyond personal influence, very little could be done in England. The British Government could not give orders to either the *Daily Herald* or the big combines such as the *News Chronicle*, or to Beaverbrook or Rothermere. As a matter of fact, part of the British press was directing the most violent attacks against British statesmen, and frequent attempts were also made to disparage them by caricature. The best way to meet such tactics was to ignore them, for they were not very important—"it's just pouring water on a duck's tail."<sup>94</sup> Lord Halifax had no doubt informed the German Foreign Minister this morning that he had taken special pains to talk things over with the British press in the last few days. He hoped he had been successful, but one could not, of course, guarantee that there would be no *faux pas*. On the other hand, however, the British press

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<sup>94</sup> The quoted passages in this document are in English in the original.

also had its good points, and he hoped that we would also take note of those.

The Prime Minister was being accused by circles associated with Eden and with leftist organizations as well as by the League of Nations Union of betraying democracy and of seeking an understanding with Fascism. He was even accused of seeking to introduce a dictatorial system into England. The Prime Minister would prevail over such attacks and persist in his policy of bringing about an understanding with Germany and Italy. Last Monday, he had again explained that in pursuing this policy the question of the internal regimes was a matter of indifference to him. Some time ago the Führer—in a conversation with Lord Lothian, he believed—had compared England and Germany to two pillars upon which the European social order could rest. This comparison had particularly pleased the Prime Minister. If this ideal was constantly kept in mind and one went at things in a generous spirit, it should be possible to overcome the lesser difficulties. After all, it was really only a question of erecting an arch of cooperation upon these two pillars. Naturally, one would have to proceed carefully; and so long as the goal was kept firmly in mind, it need not always be mentioned. The Prime Minister had courageously taken a personal initiative. He had sent Halifax to Berchtesgaden. Unfortunately, the Prime Minister himself could not so easily set out on a trip, and the same after all was true with regard to the Führer. But he hoped that the discussion had made further progress today, or that the method of procedure at least had been clarified. Chamberlain was also prepared, if need be, to send Halifax to Berlin again to clear up any misunderstandings, but perhaps it was better for the time being to continue the conduct of negotiations through a third person, that is, the British Ambassador. The Prime Minister attached great importance to negotiating with Italy at the same time as with us. The aim of this policy was to obtain "appeasement." He expressly wished to avoid the use of the word "settlement," since in many circles this would be understood to mean abandonment by Germany of her national aspirations. We were expressly not being asked to give up our concern for Germans outside our borders. When we proceeded to the solution of questions of this kind, however, it would be well not "to upset other peoples" too much in the process. In his conversation with the Führer, Lord Halifax had learned the Führer's ideas of the possibilities of solution. He hoped very much that we would succeed as much as possible vis-à-vis Czechoslovakia and Austria without the use of force. The prerequisite for this was, of course, that

the other side also played "fair." When I interrupted to say that the plebiscite plan of the Austrian Government did not seem to me to be "fair," Sir Horace replied that in his opinion, too, this plan created difficulties.

Sir Horace was especially interested, aside from the political aspects, in the economic consequences of appeasement. Personally, he did not believe that war was imminent. But it was a fact that there was general unrest, and, consequently, business people were restricting themselves to as few undertakings as possible. That was wrong, for we ought to be intent on doing everything possible in the field of production. The impression that would be created in the economic field by an understanding between Germany, England, and Italy (he did not mention France—probably unintentionally) could scarcely be overestimated. Russia ought to be left out entirely at the present time. In his opinion the system there was bound "to melt away" some day.

Finally, Sir Horace declared that Germany must, pray God, not drop the negotiations and not lose sight of the important goal of which he had just spoken and which the Führer had mentioned to Lord Lothian, even if there were disappointments from time to time. He could only say that the Prime Minister and he himself, who was not a politician but only a civil servant, would make every effort in his limited sphere of activity to bring about appeasement. He hoped that Germany would also contribute to that end.

DR. ERICH KORDT

LONDON, March 10, 1938.

No. 149

F17/321-322

*Memorandum by the Foreign Minister*

LONDON, March 11, 1938.

Today I had a lengthy discussion with Sir Thomas Inskip, the Minister for the Coordination of Defense. Inskip has always been one of those members of the British Cabinet who have shown understanding for German views.

Regarding the subject of the conversation I should like to stress only the following attitude toward the Austrian question: Inskip stated that if Germany would be patient, the Austrian question could certainly be solved sooner or later in the German sense. In the history of nations it was not important whether such and such an aim was achieved within two or three months, or two or three years. He could definitely state that the British Cabinet

would not decide in favor of military intervention by England, if the Austrian question was solved in the German sense. However, it would be a different matter if Germany settled this question by force, or—to put it more clearly—if she solved it by military means. A large-scale conflict might result, and in such a conflict England could then also become involved.

Thus, Inskip expressed essentially the same opinion as Lord Halifax in the conversation of March 10.

To the report of the conversation I had yesterday with Lord Halifax I make the following addition: Halifax, quoting Napoleon III, stated regarding the Austrian question that Germany should not "*brusquer l'affaire*," but on the contrary use her influence in favor of pacification. I answered him that it was out of the question that the German Government would *brusquer l'affaire*. In Austria a small minority was attempting to impose its will on the great majority of the people. Therefore, the terror exercised by this small group was a *brusquerie*. I could not predict what the reaction of the majority would be to such a *brusquerie*.

RIBBENTROP

### No. 150

F14/005-001, F17/323-326

#### *Memorandum by the Foreign Minister*

#### FINAL DRAFT

RM 164

LONDON, March 11, 1938.

After today's luncheon with Prime Minister Chamberlain, he at first spoke to me in private, and very emphatically requested that I inform the Führer of his most sincere wish for an understanding with Germany.

When I was about to leave, several telegrams were transmitted to Chamberlain through Lord Halifax. He thereupon asked me to come with him to his study. Lord Halifax, Sir Alexander Cadogan, and Minister Woermann also participated in the conversation.

Chamberlain read two telegrams which had just arrived from the British Embassy in Vienna. The first one stated that Glaise-Horstenau had demanded that the Federal Chancellor postpone the plebiscite and hold it under different conditions at a later date. The second telegram stated that Schuschnigg had called off the plebiscite, provided "that there was a guarantee that the Nazis would remain quiet." Thereupon Seyss-Inquart, by order of the Führer, had called on Schuschnigg and presented an ultimatum with a one-hour time limit demanding that Schuschnigg resign and that the Min-

ister of the Interior succeed him. Later, a telephone message was brought in by Sir Alexander Cadogan to the effect that the time limit of this ultimatum would expire at 4:30 p.m.

Mr. Chamberlain stated that an exceedingly serious situation had arisen because of the threat mentioned in the telegram. I replied that I did not have any such news, and, therefore, could make no definite statement regarding the matter. If the plebiscite was postponed, that would appear to me to be very good news. As to the alleged threat, I would assume that, if it was made at all, Herr Seyss-Inquart had spoken on behalf of the Austrian National Socialists. After Federal Chancellor Schuschnigg had broken his word, given in Berchtesgaden, and after he had scheduled the plebiscite under the well-known fraudulent conditions, it did, however, appear to me to be a quite natural result that he would have to resign.

Lord Halifax, who was somewhat excited, stated that thus far he had not had a chance to discuss the situation created by the telegrams just received with the Prime Minister. It seemed to him—if the reports should be confirmed—that this threat of force was an “intolerable” method. He would like to discuss informally whether a plebiscite could not be held in Austria at a later date, along the pattern of the Saar plebiscite, which had, after all, produced such a favorable result for Germany. This meant mainly that an international police force would be sent to Austria to insure an impartial plebiscite.

At this point Chamberlain interrupted to say that this did not seem to him to be required by the situation, since the second telegram mentioned only a cancellation of the plebiscite and not a postponement to a later date. Personally he thought it would be better if the plebiscite were not held now. In answer to an interjected question, Lord Halifax later declared that he did not insist on the suggestion.

In this connection I again mentioned that I could not comment in detail regarding Chamberlain's reports, because I had no confirmation. However, it was quite obvious that Schuschnigg, under the circumstances, no longer deserved confidence. I mentioned my own conversation with the Austrian Chancellor in Berchtesgaden and stated that Schuschnigg had agreed with the Führer on a final settlement of the Austrian question in the German sense. Thereupon, without consulting the other members of his Cabinet and without getting in touch with Germany, he had arranged the plebiscite. I had just received reports from Germany to the effect that in some Austrian cities something akin to chaos was already pre-

vailing. The purpose of the Berchtesgaden conversations had, after all, been to solve the Austrian question peacefully and on the basis of mutual agreement. Schuschnigg had committed not only a breach of faith, but also a very foolish act in abandoning this course. There had been talk in the press of pressure exerted on Schuschnigg. This pressure had only consisted of the Führer's very frank explanations of the matter. It had been intolerable that the Austrian National Socialists had been forced to languish in prison and had been robbed of their pension claims, etc.

Lord Halifax said he considered it exceedingly serious that Schuschnigg had been threatened with invasion. I replied that the telegrams which were read here did not say that at all. Chamberlain immediately admitted this. However, Lord Halifax expressed the opinion that the exertion of pressure implied such a threat. Chamberlain again stated that personally he understood the situation. British public opinion, however, would hardly accept a settlement of the question under pressure or in effect by force.

The discussion took place in a tense atmosphere, and the usually very calm Lord Halifax was more excited than Chamberlain, who outwardly at least appeared calm and coolheaded. When, at [the end, Under Secretary Cadogan brought another telegram stating that]<sup>97</sup> the ultimatum expired at 4:30, Chamberlain stated that "no time was to be lost." Thereupon, I again expressed doubt regarding the truth of the reports, given out by the dishonest Schuschnigg government, and I concluded the conversation with the remark that I could make no official comment regarding them. However, I would communicate with Berlin and try to get an authentic report regarding the situation in Austria. Since Lord Halifax was to have tea with me later, we could then discuss the matter again. The form of our leave-taking was entirely amiable, and even Halifax was calm again.

RIBBENTROP<sup>98</sup>

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<sup>97</sup> The words enclosed in brackets are a translation from another draft (F17/323-326), as the typescript of the final draft is illegible.

<sup>98</sup> At 5:05 p.m. on March 11, 1938, Woermann telephoned the substance of this conversation to Mackensen. The latter's memorandum of the conversation (2185/472202) concluded: "Chamberlain had pointed out that a German ultimatum would create a very serious situation for England."

## No. 151

F8/0036-0034

*Memorandum by the Foreign Minister*<sup>99</sup>CONVERSATION WITH PRIME MINISTER CHAMBERLAIN AFTER THE  
LUNCHEON OF MARCH 11, 1938

At the beginning of our conversation, Prime Minister Chamberlain stated that he would like to send a message to the Führer. When I replied that the Führer would certainly be very pleased to receive a message, Chamberlain asked me to tell the Führer the following:

It had always been his desire to clear up German-British relations. He had now made up his mind to realize this aim. He requested me to tell the Führer that this was his sincere wish and firm determination.

I thanked Chamberlain and replied that the Führer had desired this Anglo-German friendship for 19 years and had not only affirmed this attitude by words but proved it by deeds.

When Chamberlain made the above-mentioned opening statement he appeared to be entirely honest, firm, and—one might say—determined.

After having congratulated Chamberlain on his courage in Parliament and his realistic policy, I outlined in the further course of the conversation the Führer's views regarding the future of German-British relations (following the lines used in my conversation with Lord Halifax). I again endeavored to draw Chamberlain the picture of a satisfied Germany after the minority problem in the east and the colonial problem had been settled, of a Germany which had no fundamental differences whatsoever with England, but which, as a strong and equal nation, could only complement Great Britain in every respect. It seemed to me that this made an impression upon Chamberlain. When I repeated the question whether Chamberlain really desired a sincere understanding with Germany, he replied quite spontaneously that this was his objective. This was done in such a manner that, with all skepticism, it was impossible for me to doubt his sincerity.

Chamberlain then added that he was very anxious to enter into conversations with Italy and Germany simultaneously, and replied to my remark in this connection that he had always considered the Rome-Berlin Axis a reality and had no intention of interfering with it in any way.

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<sup>99</sup> This memorandum is unsigned.

Chamberlain did not touch any further on the details of the problems pending between Germany and England in the course of the conversation. I somehow had the impression (which was also confirmed by a dinner conversation which Chamberlain had with my wife, during which he spoke of the great confidence he had in his Foreign Secretary) that he preferred to leave these details to Halifax.

Thereupon the Austrian problem was mentioned briefly. When I referred to the regrettable turn which the Austrian situation had taken because of the breach of faith and the behavior of Schuschnigg regarding the question of the plebiscite scheduled for Sunday, Chamberlain confined himself to the reply that once we had all got past this unpleasant affair and a reasonable solution had been found, it was to be hoped that we could begin working in earnest toward a German-British understanding. (It should be noted that at this moment Chamberlain had not yet received the telegrams concerning the latest developments in Austria, mentioned in Minister Woermann's memorandum,<sup>99a</sup> but that they were brought in only shortly before I left Downing Street.)

LONDON, March 13, 1938.

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<sup>99a</sup> Apparently a reference to Woermann's telephoned summary of the memorandum (see footnote 98, p. 275).

## CHAPTER II

### GERMANY AND AUSTRIA, JULY 1936-JULY 1938

#### A. THE AGREEMENT OF JULY 11, 1936, AND ITS EXECUTION, JULY-OCTOBER 1936

No. 152

2871/563833-38

#### *The German-Austrian Agreement of July 11, 1936*

##### GENTLEMEN'S AGREEMENT

CONFIDENTIAL!

Convinced that the mutually expressed desire for the reestablishment of normal and friendly relations between the German Reich and the Federal State of Austria requires a series of preliminary stipulations on the part of the two Governments, both Governments approve the following confidential Gentlemen's Agreement:

#### I. REGULATION OF THE TREATMENT OF REICH-GERMANS IN AUSTRIA AND OF AUSTRIAN NATIONALS IN THE REICH

Associations of their nationals in either country shall not be hindered in their activities so long as they comply with the policies established in their bylaws in conformity with the laws in force and do not interfere in the internal political affairs of the other country, nor, in particular, endeavor to influence citizens of the other State by means of propaganda.

#### II. MUTUAL CULTURAL RELATIONS

All factors decisive for the formation of public opinion of both countries shall serve the purpose of reestablishing normal and friendly relations. With the thought that both countries belong within the German cultural orbit, both parties pledge themselves immediately to renounce any aggressive utilization of radio, motion picture, newspaper, and theatrical facilities against the other party. A gradual elimination of presently existing restrictions on [cultural] exchange is envisaged on the basis of absolute reciprocity. As far as the sale of works of authors of either country in the territory of the other country is concerned, all restrictions are to be removed, insofar as these works are in conformity with the laws of the country of entry.

## III. THE PRESS

Both parties shall influence their respective press to the end that it refrain from exerting any political influence on conditions in the other country and limit its objective criticism of conditions in the other country to an extent not offensive to public opinion in the other country. This obligation also applies to the *émigré* press in both countries.

The gradual elimination of prohibitions on the importation of newspapers and printed matter of the other party is envisaged by both parties, in relation to the gradual *détente* in mutual relations aimed at in this Agreement. Newspapers admitted shall, in any criticism of the internal political situation in the other country, adhere particularly strictly to the principle enunciated in paragraph 1.

The Austrian Government declares itself ready to permit, effective immediately, the importation and distribution in Austria of the following newspapers published in Germany:

*Berliner Börsen-Zeitung*  
*Berliner Tageblatt*  
*Deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung*  
*Leipziger Neueste Nachrichten*  
*Essener National-Zeitung.*

The German Government declares itself ready to permit, effective immediately, the importation and distribution in Germany of the following newspapers published in Austria:

the official *Wiener Zeitung*  
*Neues Wiener Journal*  
*Volkszeitung*  
*Grazer Tagespost*  
*Linzer Tagespost.*

## IV. EMIGRÉ PROBLEMS

Both parties agree in their desire to contribute by reciprocal concessions to the speediest possible satisfactory solution of the problem of the Austrian National Socialist exiles in the Reich.

The Austrian Government will proceed to the examination of this problem as soon as possible and will announce the result to a joint commission to be composed of representatives of the competent Ministries so that an agreement may be put into effect.

## V. NATIONAL INSIGNIA AND NATIONAL ANTHEMS

Each of the two Governments declares that within the scope of existing laws, it will place the nationals of the other party on an

equal footing with nationals of third states in regard to the display of the national insignia of their country.

The singing of national anthems shall—in addition to official occasions—be permitted to nationals of the other party at closed meetings attended by these nationals exclusively.

#### VI. ECONOMIC RELATIONS

The Government of the German Reich, putting aside considerations of Party policy, is prepared to open the way for normal economic relations between the German Reich and Austria, and this readiness extends to the reestablishment of routine border crossing [*der Kleine Grenzverkehr*]. Discrimination against persons and areas, if not based upon purely economic considerations, will not be undertaken.

#### VII. TOURIST TRAFFIC

The restrictions on tourist traffic imposed by both sides because of the tension which had arisen between the two States shall be lifted. This understanding shall not affect restrictions based on the legislation of both countries for the protection of foreign exchange.

In order to avoid undesirable consequences, the two countries shall reach a provisional understanding concerning the maximum quotas, which shall be increased from time to time; relatives, persons traveling on business, sick persons, and athletes (especially members of the German-Austrian Alpine Association [*Deutschösterreichischer Alpenverein*]) shall receive preferential treatment as hitherto.

#### VIII. FOREIGN POLICY

The Austrian Government declares that it is prepared to conduct its foreign policy in the light of the peaceful endeavors of the German Government's foreign policy. It is agreed that the two Governments will from time to time enter into an exchange of views on the problems of foreign policy affecting both of them. The Rome Protocols of 1934 and the Supplementary Protocols of 1936, as well as the position of Austria with regard to Italy and Hungary as parties to these Protocols, are not affected thereby.<sup>1</sup>

#### IX. AUSTRIAN DECLARATION ON DOMESTIC POLICY IN RELATION TO THIS MODUS VIVENDI

The Federal Chancellor declares that he is prepared:

a) to grant a far-reaching political amnesty, from which persons who have committed serious public crimes shall be excluded.

<sup>1</sup> The Rome Protocols signed by Italy, Austria, and Hungary on March 17, 1934, were an undertaking by the signatory states to pursue a concordant policy.

The Supplementary Protocols signed March 23, 1936, declared it to be in the interest of the three countries to harmonize their action to a still greater extent.

Also covered by this amnesty shall be persons who have not yet been sentenced by judicial decree or penalized by administrative process.

These provisions shall also be duly applied to *émigrés*.

b) for the purpose of promoting a real pacification, to appoint at the appropriate moment, contemplated for the near future, representatives of the so-called "National Opposition in Austria" to participate in political responsibility; they shall be men who enjoy the personal confidence of the Federal Chancellor and whose selection he reserves to himself. It is agreed, in this connection, that persons trusted by the Federal Chancellor shall be charged with the task of arranging, in accordance with a plan worked out with the Federal Chancellor, for the internal pacification of the National Opposition and for its participation in the shaping of the political will in Austria.

#### X. PROCEDURE FOR OBJECTIONS AND COMPLAINTS

For the handling of objections and complaints which may arise in connection with the above Gentlemen's Agreement, as well as in order to guarantee a progressive *détente* within the framework of the preceding agreements, there shall be established a joint commission composed of three representatives of the Foreign Ministry of each country. Its task shall be to discuss at regular meetings the operation of the Agreement as well as any supplements thereto which may be required.

SCHUSCHNIGG  
*Federal Chancellor*

VIENNA, July 11, 1936.

No. 153

2871/563831-32

*Text of the German-Austrian Communiqué*

JULY 11, 1936.

Convinced of contributing to the general progress in Europe toward the maintenance of peace, and

Believing that the manifold reciprocal interests of the two German States might thereby best be served, the Governments of the German Reich and of the Federal State of Austria have decided to restore their relations to normality and friendship.

Therefore the following declaration is made:

1. In accordance with the statements made by the Führer and Chancellor on May 21, 1935, the Government of the German Reich recognizes the full sovereignty of the Federal State of Austria.

2. Each of the two Governments regards the internal political structure of the other country, including the question of Austrian National Socialism, as an internal affair of the other country, which it will influence neither directly nor indirectly.

3. The Austrian Government will, in general, and particularly with regard to the German Reich, maintain a policy based always on the principle that Austria acknowledges herself to be a German State. This shall not affect the Rome Protocols of 1934 and the Supplementary Protocols of 1936, nor the relation of Austria to Italy and Hungary as parties to the Protocols.

In consideration of the fact that the *détente* desired by both sides can only be achieved if certain preliminary conditions are provided by the Governments of both countries, the Government of the Reich and the Austrian Government will, in a series of individual measures, create the basic conditions necessary.

SCH[USCHNIGG]

### No. 154

1744/402846-47

#### *The German Foreign Ministry to Various German Diplomatic Missions<sup>2</sup>*

Telegram

IMMEDIATE

BERLIN, July 11, 1936.  
(e. o. Pol. IV 1431)

For guidance in conversation.

The communiqué<sup>1</sup> issued at 9 o'clock this evening by Minister Goebbels regarding regularization of relations between the Reich and Austria was predicated upon certain negotiations for a settlement conducted by the Federal Chancellor during the last few weeks with representatives of the National Opposition in Austria. The results thus far achieved in these discussions have brought about the present gratifying *détente* between the Reich and Austria.

The resumption of normal and friendly relations between the Reich and Austria is not sensational in nature. It merely brings about in one important point a *détente* in the European situation

<sup>1</sup> As indicated on an accompanying list; list not printed.

<sup>2</sup> Document No. 153, *supra*.

which is desired also by other powers. The clarification of the German-Austrian relationship, moreover, like the German-Polish Agreement of 1934, represents a further milestone in the Führer's work of peace and is moreover a proof of the correctness of the policy pursued by the Reich—that of the regulation of international relations primarily on the basis of bilateral accords.

For the text of the communiqué I refer you to the D.N.B. release.

DIECKHOFF

No. 155

1744/402867-89

*The German Ambassador in Italy (Hassell) to the German Foreign  
Ministry  
Telegram*

No. 111 of July 11

ROME, July 11, 1936—11 p.m.

Received July 12, 1936—3:55 a.m.

(Pol. IV 1434)

With reference to telegram of the 9th, No. 144.<sup>4</sup>

At today's conversation with Mussolini, at which Foreign Minister Ciano was also present, I first repeated the statement previously made to Ciano concerning Germany's favorable attitude toward recognition [of the Abyssinian conquest] as soon as the question became acute. Mussolini thanked me and confirmed that the problem was not acute at the moment; recognition might be expressed indirectly at an appropriate occasion, just as Japan, for example, was now assigning to the Embassy in Rome the Chargé d'Affaires who had been sent to Addis Ababa but not yet arrived there. Naturally, the time would come when the situation would have to be finally clarified, perhaps before the session of the League of Nations in September. I replied that we could, of course, discuss this point at the appropriate time. Then I mentioned the conclusion of the Austro-German Agreement expected this evening. Even though he had probably been kept currently informed of it from Vienna (which he confirmed), I nevertheless wanted to inform him, too. Mussolini expressed lively satisfaction over the event, which would bring to an end the unhappy situation of Austria as a football of foreign interests and, above all, would finally remove the last and only mortgage on German-Italian relations. He had energetically pressed Schuschnigg last time along these lines, starting from the viewpoint that Austria was a German State which must move parallel to the great German Reich. I agreed with those statements, but remarked that we were still concerned

<sup>4</sup> Not printed in this volume. See footnote 5, p. 284, and footnote 8, p. 285.

about the Hapsburg agitation, since a restoration would, of course, ruin everything. Mussolini replied that he had urgently exhorted Schuschnigg, who had declared himself a Monarchist, just as he was himself, to let this question rest at present. And that is why Schuschnigg had adopted the formula that the problem was not of present importance. But when such a problem was not of present importance for some time, it usually resolved itself in the course of events.

As regards the Locarno question, I spoke in accordance with the telegraphic instruction.<sup>5</sup> Mussolini replied that he fully agreed and read me the note to be handed today to the Belgian Chargé d'Affaires in which the invitation is rejected so long as the Mediterranean Agreement<sup>6</sup> is not declared invalid and so long as Germany is not invited at the same time. In conformity with his statements, he stressed the point that the immediate cooperation of Germany was necessary, particularly in the preparatory stages. He instructed Ciano in my presence to direct the attention of the Chargé verbally to this part of the note in particular. I expressed satisfaction at this attitude and emphasized the fact that we were not at all eager for this conference, in view of the present disturbed situation and the lack of adequate preparation. I then inquired of Mussolini whether I had understood him correctly that, if we were invited now but the condition regarding the Mediterranean Agreement were not fulfilled, Italy would abide by its rejection of the invitation. Mussolini confirmed this and expressed his conviction that we, taking a parallel attitude, would then also not attend. Quite generally speaking, the

<sup>5</sup> The Foreign Minister's telegraphic instruction to Rome, No. 144 of July 9, 1936 (1744/402841-44), not printed in this volume, read in part as follows:

"2. In the Locarno matter, Germany has not as yet received an invitation to the Brussels Conference. According to newspaper reports, the Italian Government received an invitation yesterday and is deliberating its reply. I replied to the Italian Ambassador, who called on me on July 8 in this matter, that German participation would only be considered if we had advance knowledge of the program. So far, however, we had only received the ominous questionnaire. To the further question of the Ambassador on this score, I replied that we would prefer that Italy stay away if Germany were not invited; that we would, on the other hand, welcome it, in case of German participation, if Italy were also present. According to Attolico, the Italian Government further agrees with us that precipitate scheduling of the Conference in the present disturbed situation and without sufficient diplomatic preparation would be a mistake. It is still possible that we shall answer the British questionnaire in some form before the Brussels Conference. A decision on this point may be expected soon . . ."

In the quoted passage the reference to a Brussels Conference relates to a proposed conference of the five Locarno Powers originally planned to be held at Brussels.

<sup>6</sup> By this term is meant the Anglo-French, Anglo-Greek, Anglo-Turkish, and Anglo-Yugoslav mutual assistance agreements which had been concluded as a result of the political and naval situation in the Mediterranean during the Italo-Abyssinian crisis. Diplomatic correspondence concerning these agreements appears in Great Britain, Cmd. 5072 (1936).

situation today was such that he was pessimistic about the conference and believed that the parallel German and Italian interests required their not being too hasty in the matter: in the first place, one no longer really knew who was determining British policy and along what lines; secondly, social conditions in France showed dangerous developments, and thirdly, the Soviet Russian factor was arising more and more threateningly in connection with Czechoslovakia. I replied that he knew that we had from the very beginning considered the Franco-Russian alliance the worst mistake of recent years. It now seemed almost as though England's eyes were gradually being opened in this respect, particularly under the impact of the Dardanelles Conference<sup>7</sup> which, as the Turkish Ambassador had expressed it, had, like a good purgative, brought all the hidden conflicts and problems to the surface; it was also doubtful whether Russo-Turkish friendship would emerge entirely unscathed from the Dardanelles Conference. Mussolini again made some remarks about Russo-Czechoslovak cooperation, obviously based on well-known German articles on that subject, and then stated that he had done everything possible for years, and also comparatively recently, to persuade Turkey that Italy had no aggressive designs against her, but Turkey would not be diverted from her misguided course.

Finally, I presented the German viewpoint on the Danzig question in accordance with the telegraphic instruction and acknowledged the attitude of the Italian press.<sup>8</sup> Mussolini replied that he considered the German viewpoint on this matter as correct. In the general situation just discussed, it was indeed desirable that German-Polish relations should remain undisturbed at the present time. Sometimes it was necessary to choose between two evils, and at the present time the Russian danger was the greater.

HASSELL<sup>9</sup>

<sup>7</sup> The Montreux Conference on the regime of the Straits, then in session.

<sup>8</sup> Telegraphic instruction No. 144 had stated that Germany was of the opinion that the Danzig question (several aspects of which were then under discussion before the League of Nations) was being unduly stressed there as a diversion from other problems, but that the Danzig matter was being handled by Germany in such a way that a clouding of German-Polish relations would not result.

<sup>9</sup> On July 14, 1936, according to a memorandum by Ministerial Director Dieckhoff of the Foreign Ministry (1744/402892), the Italian Ambassador called to state that the Head of the Italian Government had received the news of the German-Austrian Agreement with great satisfaction and that he was determined to pursue a policy parallel to that of the German Reich.

## No. 156

115/118174

*Memorandum*

BERLIN, July 13, 1936.

The Austrian Minister called on me today and first of all expressed his satisfaction over the conclusion of the German-Austrian Agreement. He then, however, asked whether there was any guarantee that the Agreement would really be carried out on the part of the responsible authorities of the Party.

I told Herr Tauschitz that everything would undoubtedly be done on our part faithfully to carry out the Agreement, and we naturally expected the same of the Austrians. We hoped that mutual pacification would now come about quickly. However, even should this be delayed for a while here and there, we should not immediately become impatient. Some time would surely have to elapse before complete normalization.

DIECKHOFF

## No. 157

115/118170

*Memorandum*

In view of the alleged assertion of Schuschnigg in his interview with Ward Price<sup>10</sup>—

"The question of the restoration of the Hapsburgs stands just where it was previously. It is an internal Austrian question which Germany has promised to leave untouched. At the same time, it is not a matter for an immediate settlement"—

the Foreign Minister asks you to instruct Herr von Papen as follows:

He should point out to Herr Schuschnigg that for the functioning of the German-Austrian Agreement it would be desirable if he (Schuschnigg) would avoid questions concerning the restoration such as were posed by Ward Price.

Respectfully submitted to

Ministerial Director Dieckhoff.

VON EITZDORF

BERLIN, July 14, 1936.

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<sup>10</sup> Correspondent of the *Daily Mail* (London).

## No. 158

1744/403241-44

*The German Ambassador in Austria (Papen)<sup>11</sup> to the German  
Foreign Ministry*

Nr. A 3931

VIENNA, July 21, 1936.

Received July 22, 1936.

(Pol. IV 1802)

Subject: Concerning the Gentlemen's Agreement of July 11, 1936.

Immediately upon my return today I had a rather long consultation with the Federal Chancellor, in which I informed him of the intentions of the German Government with regard to individual points in the Gentlemen's Agreement.

Re I) I informed the Federal Chancellor that the formation of Party groups of Reich-Germans in Austria was not envisaged until three to four months from now, at which time permission would be granted as a matter of course for groups of the Fatherland Front<sup>12</sup> in Germany. He took cognizance of our intention to limit the "Austrian Relief Association" [*Oesterreichischer Hilfsbund*] to purely charitable functions and to alter its publicity organ accordingly.

Re II) Referring to the consultations I had had with the Führer and Minister Goebbels on this subject, I informed him that there were no objections to the appearance of German artists from the Reich if the performances or concerts were not managed by *émigrés* or Jews. The Führer's decision that no obstacles be placed in the way of the fulfillment by Orchestra Conductor Knappertsbusch of his engagements here was received with particular satisfaction by the Federal Chancellor. Radio program exchanges are to be inaugurated immediately by the competent authorities. The Federal Chancellor suggested an exchange between Bayreuth and Salzburg. I approved this with the restriction that no performances conducted by Bruno Walter be exchanged. Similar arrangements will be made in the exchange of weekly newsreels (Olympic games).

Re III) The admission of the five newspapers on both sides, proposed provisionally, shall go into effect immediately. It is recommended that no press notices be published about this on either side, but rather that the newspapers affected be notified directly, so that

<sup>11</sup> The German diplomatic mission in Austria was a Legation (*Gesandtschaft*), but von Papen's title from this time was that of Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the German Reich on Special Mission (*Der ausserordentliche und bevollmächtigte Botschafter des Deutschen Reiches in besonderer Mission*).

<sup>12</sup> The political organization supported by the Austrian Government.

they may take the necessary steps. The Reich Press Chamber would therefore have to order the immediate admission of the Austrian newspapers referred to.

The Federal Chancellor expressed his particular satisfaction with the attitude of the German press since July 11.

As far as street sales are concerned, German newspapers shall have the same rights as other newspapers.

Re IV) In reference to the question of *émigrés*, I shall hand to the Austrian Government an *aide-mémoire* pertaining to the questions raised on the part of the Reich, which will serve as a basis for their decisions.

Re V) The Federal Chancellor promised to settle the question of national insignia immediately by decree. We shall thereby enjoy the rights of third parties. The basic requirement for the display of any foreign flag is the simultaneous display of the national colors. In reference to automobile pennants and party insignia worn in the buttonhole as well as the giving of the German greeting, no difficulties will be placed in the way of Reich-Germans in the future. The Austrian security authorities are to be so instructed. In connection with this arrangement the Federal Chancellor stipulates that they should not be utilized for purposes of demonstrations in a propagandistic sense. He would therefore consider it proper that this question should not be discussed in the press, in order not to give an impetus at the frontier to demonstrations of this sort. He believes that, if an arrangement is made secretly, in a short while no further difficulties would exist.

Re VI) He will immediately inform me by telephone of the departure of the commission which has been invited to Berlin. In this connection the Federal Chancellor asked me confidentially whether Berlin had any objections to the sending of Minister Schüller.<sup>12</sup> I request immediate telegraphic instruction.<sup>13</sup>

Re VII) The Federal Chancellor seems to be in agreement with the proposals outlined in the Reich Ministry of the Interior for the regulation of tourist traffic. He told me that, generally speaking, Austria would make similar arrangements to those made by Germany. I told him that the Economic Commission could contribute substantially to the solution of this problem by appropriating more schillings as foreign exchange.

<sup>12</sup> Richard Schüller, Minister for special assignments in the Austrian diplomatic service.

<sup>13</sup> Notation in Neurath's handwriting: "Schüller is non-Aryan." Notation in different hand: "Schüller is not coming; Wildner is coming instead. The commission arrives in Berlin Sunday evening to discuss the emergency program."

Yesterday I made the proposal to the Führer that passports validated for a single visit be issued during a period of transition and that out of the Austrian foreign exchange proceeds a foreign exchange pool, limited in size for the time being, be created. On the other hand, regular border crossing would be permitted at first only for border residents. The Führer agreed to these arrangements.

Re X) As regards the commission, I hereby request that I be informed as to its composition.

PAPEN

P.S. The amnesty is to be made public the day after tomorrow, including Rintelen, Steinhäusel, Flaschke, and those who were sentenced because of *possession* of explosives.

### No. 159

1744/402929

*The Foreign Minister to Ministerial Director Dieckhoff*

Temporarily at LEINFELDEN, July 22, 1936.

DEAR DIECKHOFF: Yesterday afternoon I flew back here again from Bayreuth after having had three long conferences with the Führer, during which I was able to discuss all current questions.

*Austria:*

The Chancellor stated that he agreed with von Papen's report concerning future procedure in the Austrian question. Details thereof will be communicated by Papen, who returned to Vienna yesterday morning, following consultation with official circles there. . . .<sup>14</sup>

NEURATH

### No. 160

1744/402932

*The German Ambassador in Austria (Papen) to the German Foreign Ministry*

Telegram

No. 97 of July 23

VIENNA, July 23, 1936—no hour.  
Received July 23, 1936—2:45 p.m.  
(Pol. IV 1756/36)

For the Führer and Chancellor.

The amnesty proclaimed today covers a total of 17,045 persons. The number of quashed proceedings against lesser participants is 12,618. Of a total of 46 persons condemned to life imprisonment, 12

<sup>14</sup> Omission indicated in the original.

have been amnestied; there remains a total of 213 persons who have not been pardoned, with prospects for the lightening of their punishment in the near future. The far-reaching nature of the amnesty is generally acknowledged here.

PAPEN

### No. 161

2070/449771-76

*The German Ambassador in Austria (Papen) to the Führer  
and Chancellor<sup>15</sup>*

Nr. A 4025

VIENNA, July 28, 1936.  
(Pol. IV 1963)

Subject: Austria after July 11, 1936.

The picture that the press of our two countries, as well as the foreign press, has given of developments since the German-Austrian settlement can perhaps be supplemented by a few brief statements.

The Austrian circles that hailed the Agreement from the very beginning, because they saw in it an extraordinary psychological relief for both sides, have grown even warmer in their appreciation through the events of the past 2 weeks. But the old guard, too, who thought only of continuing the struggle and could not at first understand why it was necessary to put an end to this enervating warfare of position, are coming to understand more and more what advantages they, too, may derive from the new situation. The execution of the amnesty has shown them that the Austrian Government honestly desires peace, and the fighters whose freedom has been restored and who were welcomed everywhere with unprecedented jubilation will now see to it that the common goal can be served in other ways also. There are a great number of reports to this effect. The victor of Tolmein, General Alfred Krauss, known as a champion of the German idea, wrote me that the return of these fighters and their reception had given him one of the most unforgettable days of his life.

For lack of a strict Party leadership, many National Socialists do not yet know what course to adopt in the future. Instructions from the so-called *Landesleitung* or other persons who would like to head the "National groups" at present give a somewhat confused picture.

<sup>15</sup> Copies of this report were transmitted by the Foreign Ministry to the following offices and authorities: The Staff of the Führer's Deputy, the Reich and Prussian Ministry of the Interior, the Reich Ministry for Public Enlightenment and Propaganda, the Reich and Prussian Ministry for Ecclesiastical Affairs, the Büro von Kursell, and the N.S.D.A.P. *Hilfswerk*, for their information.

Insofar as we can influence them from Germany, it would be advantageous to tell our friends that the best advice for the present is to "keep still and wait."

Of the elements that perceived in the Agreement of July 11 a fatal blow to their policy, the Monarchists are in the greatest quandary. They are spreading the view that the Reich will not keep the Agreement anyway and that in a short time, therefore, the question of restoration must again come to the fore.

In the Clerical camp there is considerable difference of opinion. On July 23 an article by an "Austrian prelate" appeared in the *Reichspost*: "The 11th of July from the Catholic Point of View." This article was reproduced in detail by the German press, particularly by the *Völkischer Beobachter*, and sympathetically discussed. The surmise that Cardinal Innitzer was the author is not correct. As a matter of fact, this view was publicly refuted yesterday when Prince Bishop Waitz of Salzburg, who is very hostile to us, sharply criticized the article at a meeting and said that no Austrian bishop had written it.

The article was, in fact, written by Bishop Dr. Hudal, the well-known rector of the German National Foundation in Rome.

Hudal very caustically assails pseudo-Austrianism. He writes: "Particularly the playing off of Austrianism against Germanism, strongly encouraged by the Jewish press, could not but infuriate all those who from their own study and observation were familiar with the history of Austria, which for centuries was linked with all Germandom. He who is indifferent to the German fate in Europe proves that he was never a true Austrian."

Hudal admits with the greatest candor the severity of the wounds the conflict has dealt the Catholic Church by defections and conversions to Protestantism. On the basis of the evolution of Fascism, despite the anti-Christian influence of Gentile, he brings up the question of whether a similar development would not be possible in the Reich—from considerations of foreign policy alone—which would bring about peace with the Church, in order to ease the situation with regard to foreign policy.

In the light of the new developments set in motion by the 11th of July, whereby new and different ways to solve the German question are to be sought after, this problem, in fact, acquires supreme importance. It is necessary, therefore, to determine today the means and the goal: Austria, as a Catholic country, will find internal *Anschluss* with the Reich easier by far, will, indeed, only achieve it at all, if the conflict with political Catholicism is brought to an end

in the Reich. In coping with this problem, Bishop Dr. Hudal, a native Carinthian, will become a person of extraordinary importance. His role in the conflict is already becoming clear in Austria (see the anathema of Prince Bishop Waitz). His forthcoming work, on which I recently reported, and of which the author says that he wrote it with his heart's blood for the peace of the German people, has aroused great hostility in Rome. It is, as I have already explained to Reich Minister Dr. Goebbels, a political necessity of the first order to keep this man in a position to fight for us and not, through a police ban on his forthcoming work, hand him over to the cardinals' clique which is fighting him, and thus silence him forever. For this reason I again repeat my opinion as expressed to the Minister of Propaganda: If a discussion of this book is not desired in Germany at the present time, it can, by an order to the press, be kept within the narrow confines that seem beneficial. The one thing we have to avoid is making it possible to say in Rome that we silence all discussion with a police club. I shall take the liberty of submitting to you shortly the proofs of Hudal's book.

One success that we owe solely to the intervention of Bishop Hudal in Rome is that Federal Chancellor Schuschnigg was prevailed upon in the last few days to appoint the well-known Professor, Dr. Eibl, to the chair of philosophy in Vienna.\* The fact that we were able to fill this post with one of our men can be counted a great success for us.

The battle that is being waged by the Clericals against a settlement with Germany must by no means be underestimated. Mayor Schmitz of Vienna is already on the point of making an all-out effort.

Sunday I had the pleasure of attending the general assembly of the German-Austrian Alpine Club at Garmisch. The rejoicing of the Alpinists over the settlement was indescribable. After Reich Minister Dr. Frick had given his permission for the 500 Reich-German participants who were present to pay a visit to Innsbruck in the afternoon, an unforgettable reception took place on that Sunday afternoon in the Tyrolese capital. I enclose a picture postcard of this memorable moment. The swastikas fluttering over the heads of a jubilant throng in the market place of Innsbruck seem to me to demonstrate more effectively than many reports how wise and foresighted it was to open up a new approach to the German-Austrian question.

PAPEN

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\* Which became vacant through the shooting of the Jewish professor, Winkler. [Footnote in the original.]

## No. 162

1744/402998-97

*Memorandum*

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL!

(Pol. IV 2352)

Some time ago the Foreign Minister asked me whether I knew that former *Landesinspekteur* Habicht<sup>16</sup> had recently been participating in Austrian affairs. Dr. Riegele, the brother-in-law of the Prussian Minister President, had given him information to that effect. I replied to the Foreign Minister that I knew nothing about recent activity of Habicht along those lines; rather, Herr Habicht, in contrast to other members of the former *Landesleitung* of Austria, had always conducted himself with particular reserve.

A few days later I learned from a reliable source that State Secretary Stuckart of the Reich and Prussian Ministry of the Interior, who is charged specifically in his Department with matters pertaining to the German-Austrian Agreement of July 11, had turned to Habicht to learn what demands, in his opinion, should be made of the Austrian Government for the further implementation of the Agreement. Herr Habicht had complied with this request.

On the occasion of the visit of Herr von Papen to Berlin, I informed him of the circumstances. Herr von Papen intended to speak to State Secretary Pfundtner of the Ministry of the Interior in order to exert a moderating influence on Herr Stuckart and warn him against one-sided and radical influences.

Following consultation with Minister Woermann, to whom I also made a report on the matter, I requested Herr von Papen through his administrative officer, Count Kageneck, since I was not able to reach him personally, to be extremely cautious in this discussion in order to avoid personal ill feelings on the part of Herr Stuckart.

According to a telephone communication from Herr von Papen, his conversation with State Secretary Pfundtner has meanwhile taken place in the moderate tone which I had requested. Herr Pfundtner was already informed as to the relations between Stuckart and Habicht and promised to use his influence on Herr Stuckart in accordance with the desires of Herr von Papen.

ALTENBURG

BERLIN, August 17, 1936.

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<sup>16</sup>Theo. Habicht, former leader of the Austrian N.S.D.A.P.

## No. 163

1744/403044-46

*Dr. Karl Megerle<sup>16a</sup> to the Foreign Minister*

BERLIN-LANKWITZ, August 29, 1936.

Received August 31, 1936.

MY DEAR FOREIGN MINISTER: I have just returned from a 10-day intelligence trip through Austria, during which I gained interesting and significant impressions.

In Government circles one still encounters the old hostility which even the good will of Schuschnigg and of State Secretary Schmidt has not yet been able to lessen. Those circles which are striving for the destruction of the Agreement of July 11 are strong and numerous. In Party circles there is still uncertainty, and some dejection and confusion. They are, however, beginning to find their way again. But what is decisive is the impression which one receives of the frame of mind of the Austrian people. For 5 days I drove by car through all the provinces except Burgenland and the Tyrol. Since ours was one of the first automobiles to display the Reich flag, we were able, from the reception accorded its appearance by the population, to read as though on a barometer the feelings of the people toward the Reich. In this respect, I return with a feeling of great confidence and the unshakable conviction that the 3 years of isolation from the Reich and the attempts of the Austrian Government to convert the people to Austrianism and alienate them from the Reich have been a failure. In a thousand forms and gestures, their love of and joyous adherence to the Reich were manifested to us, by persons of all social ranks and of all ages. This impression was intensified in conversations. Moreover, the type of person professing friendship toward us constitutes the more enlightened and more valuable portion of the population in both human and racial terms. This was particularly marked among the youth. The intelligent, fresh, open, and vigorous young people are on our side. But the police regime continues, arrests are the order of the day, and the spirit in which these things are done can hardly be reconciled with the conditions which are to be brought about in connection with our agreement.

One of the decisive points gathered from a 3-hour conversation with Minister von Glaise-Horstenau is the fact that State Secretary Schmidt is practically the only man who holds the key to

<sup>16a</sup> Dr. Megerle, who previously had been an official in the Reich Propaganda Ministry, was head of the so-called *Büro Megerle*, which was especially concerned with National Socialist propaganda in Austria.

Schuschnigg's confidence. Minister Glaise therefore requested me repeatedly to use my influence in Berlin, and particularly with you, to have Schmidt treated, both personally and politically, in such a manner that he is strengthened in the desire to work *with* the Reich. He is said to be very ambitious and clever and to be working faithfully for the constructive application of the Agreement of July 11 [*Friedensabkommen*]. Above all, however, he is striving to make personal contact with Reich personalities very soon—that is, to receive an invitation to Berlin. If I may take the liberty of offering a suggestion in this connection, it would be to invite Schmidt to Berlin in an appropriate manner shortly before the beginning of the so-called Western Pact negotiations and at that time, in accordance with our consultative agreement, acquaint him, if only along general lines, with the German attitude.

We could derive three advantages from this: in the first place, he would become interested personally in German policy; secondly, this manner of applying the consultative clause would be one way of circumventing Hornbostel<sup>17</sup> and discrediting him gradually. Because so long as Hornbostel remains at the Ballhausplatz, we shall never be able to have confidence in the Austrian Foreign Ministry. But if we interest Schmidt personally in these matters, then not only is intimacy assured, but also the opportunity of playing off Schmidt against Hornbostel. The third advantage would be secured if we succeeded in incorporating Austria visibly into the anti-Soviet front. If it were possible to prevail upon Austria by some means or other to make a public statement to the effect that she also feels herself threatened by the indirect presence of Soviet Russia in central Europe (Czechoslovakia), we would gain the advantage that our enemies would also become the enemies of the Austrian Government and that the latter would thus become dependent upon us. I have fully discussed these tactics regarding Schmidt with Ambassador von Papen. He agrees with them and also strongly urges that Schmidt be invited to Berlin very soon.<sup>18</sup>

With a "Heil Hitler," I remain, your devoted.

KARL MEGERLE

<sup>17</sup> Theodor Hornbostel, head of Political Division in the Austrian Foreign Ministry.

<sup>18</sup> Marginal comment in Neurath's handwriting: "I agree that Schmidt should be invited (preferably by Papen). Megerle always held that view."

## No. 164

2227/475675-78

*Professor Franz Wehofsich<sup>18a</sup> to Dr. Altenburg of the German  
Foreign Ministry*

BERLIN, September 10, 1936.

(Pol. IV 3454)

I am enclosing a copy of Bulletin No. 9 of the *Landesleitung* of the N.S.D.A.P. in Austria.

Permit me to draw your attention in particular to paragraph 3 in the bulletin, under which all Party members in Austria are prohibited from communicating with Party offices in the Reich under penalty of expulsion. In the interest of the movement in Austria it is absolutely necessary that all Party offices in the Reich should also observe the noninterference stipulated in the Agreement of July 11, 1936, between the two countries and immediately reject any attempts of Party members in Austria to communicate with them.

Heil Hitler

By direction:  
[signature illegible]

[Enclosure]

## BULLETIN No. 9

*1. Tourist Traffic.*

Each *Gau* is directed to draw up and to forward to us lists of inns, hotels, and convalescent homes which are National Socialist or have National sympathies in general. These lists should include indications of the quality of the restaurants and accommodations, and data regarding the rooms, hot and cold water, etc. The individual addresses are to be forwarded to the *Landesleitung* as soon as they are obtained and not held until all have been collected.

*2. Newspapers from the Reich.*

With respect to German newspapers which are circulated legally, the following shall apply:

The districts are to see to it that the *Essener Nationalzeitung* is circulated wherever possible. It must be available without exception in the inns which are patronized by our people. Party members of means shall subscribe to it; for those without means, we are trying

<sup>18a</sup> Whose name appears on the letterhead of the original. He was attached to the *Büro von Kursell*.

to obtain free delivery for a limited period by way of trial subscriptions. This has been promised to us. It is therefore necessary to send us a list of addresses to which trial subscriptions shall be sent.

### 3. *Trips to Germany.*

The Olympic Games naturally drew thousands of our Party members to Germany in spite of the prohibition. There could be no objection to this, if, as we now know well, most of these comrades had not used this occasion to attempt and frequently succeed in all sorts of possible and impossible, official and semiofficial, visits to German and *émigré* authorities, engaging in political conversations of great import with them. They then returned with all sorts of commissions, completely forgetting that Adolf Hitler has ordered strict non-interference, that such noninterference is a *vital necessity* for us and, after all, also a matter of honor, and that we absolutely do not need to go to the Reich for counsel and aid. We will achieve our goal unaided!

In view of the experiences at the Olympic Games, the *Landesleitung* decrees:

Any member of the N.S.D.A.P. Hitler Movement in Austria, whatever his unit, must report to the *Gauleitung* any journey to the Reich. *Under penalty of expulsion from the Party, it is prohibited to communicate with Party agencies in the Reich. Gauleiter and Hauptabteilungsleiter may undertake any necessary business trips to the Reich only with the permission of the Landesleitung.*

Notice is hereby given that the *Landesleitung* is compelled and prepared to proceed with the utmost severity in this matter. This order also applies to the Nuremberg Party Rally, to which for various reasons *no one* can be officially sent by the Party.

### 4. *Complaints against the Hilfswerk.*

The Austrian *Hilfswerk* in Berlin warns that letters complaining about the administration of relief are simply thrown into the waste basket, and, since they serve no purpose, should never be written.

### 5. *Order from Police Headquarters.*

We wish to draw your attention to the following secret order from Security headquarters:

During National Socialist demonstrations, such as took place in Vienna on the occasion of the Olympic torch race, plain-clothes policemen are to circulate among the demonstrators and participate as if they were staunch supporters of the Party; they are then to be arrested together with those around them and put in a cell with some genuine National Socialists, where they are to continue their role and

thus track down the leaders and organizers of the demonstrations and of the Movement in general.

6. *Decree.*

The Government has issued the following decree, which is exceptionally important for us:

Any person found to be in the possession of illegal publications shall immediately be subjected to an administrative fine, as in the past. A court sentence is only admissible if it can be proven beyond reasonable doubt that the accused has actually read the illegal publication or is in some other way acquainted with its contents.

Therefore, anyone apprehended who *stubbornly denies* being acquainted with the contents or ever having read it, *cannot be punished* by any court for being in possession of illegal pamphlets or printed matter.

7. *Farmers' elections.*

Under present conditions it is altogether impossible for us to participate successfully in the farmers' elections. It can neither be expected that they will permit us to make the necessary propaganda, nor that elected farmers who are known as National Socialists will be recognized by the authorities. We do not wish to be trifled with and therefore will not even try for the membership in the Farm Federation [*Bauernbund*] which is necessary for participating in the election.

Those who already are members shall remain so.

In the newspapers and through contacts with the Government we shall emphasize our willingness to cooperate in this corporative election under the necessary conditions and we will attempt to create these conditions. Until these conditions clearly exist, we shall abstain from this election.

The only exception is Carinthia, for which, as a border territory of mixed language, the farmers' election has an altogether different significance. Instructions have already been sent there.

8. *Abuses.*

You are again reminded that any abuse on the part of the authorities, any action or deed of the police which obviously goes beyond the framework of pacification, such as further arrests for no reason, detention of prisoners eligible for amnesty, etc., are to be reported to the *Landesleitung* with *all the data* without delay.

*9. Information Service.*

A bulletin of the Information Service with material for *Gauleiter* and *Brigadeführer* concerning the political situation will be issued this week.

The *Landesleitung* of the  
N.S.D.A.P. Hitler Movement of Austria.

No. 165

2227/475684-65

*Memorandum*

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

(Pol. IV 3179)

According to information received, the situation within the Party in Austria has not developed in a very gratifying fashion. The difficulties (which, incidentally, could have been foreseen) originate principally in the conflict between the old National Socialist leaders freed by the amnesty, who claim the unrestricted leadership of the Party for themselves, and the younger forces in the Movement, who have been administering the Party during the last 2 years of conflict and now do not wish to be excluded from a share in the leadership. At that, the younger forces are quite prepared to respect the authority and seniority of the older leaders. Hence the resumption of Captain Leopold's leadership of the Party was approved without dissent. After his release he himself considered cooperation with the younger forces advisable, since, of course, during his 26 months of imprisonment he had lost touch with the Movement's development during the last 2 years. At first he therefore confirmed younger Party members such as Stein and Globotschnik in their offices and reserved for himself, as he expressed it, more or less the position of "Federal President" in the Party, thus having the final say on the most important questions. But a few days ago Leopold dismissed all of the younger men from their positions and installed Captain Schattenfroh (retired) as his deputy. This particular choice has met with vigorous opposition in the ranks of the Party, for it is known that Herr Schattenfroh married a Jewess 2 years ago. Leopold apparently hopes to obtain dispensation for this selection from the supreme authority in the Reich. Under these circumstances resentment is not confined to the younger group of leaders demoted by Leopold but, because of the obvious violation of the basic principles of the Party's program through the choice of Schattenfroh, extends also to the rank and file of the Movement. It is clear that the Austrian police will not fail to use the opportunity to fan the discord

within the Party as much as possible and to work toward a split. At present Captain Leopold is in the Reich, in Munich. There an attempt will be made by German Party officials to influence him in the direction of a compromise, in order to preserve the unity of the Movement in Austria.

ALTENBURG

BERLIN, September 22, 1936.

No. 166

1744/403047-49

*Memorandum*

(zu Pol. IV 3351)

General Muff, our Military Attaché in Vienna, yesterday spent a day in Berlin. He had been ordered to report by Field Marshal von Blomberg, who wished to be informed about the state of affairs in Austria before starting out on his trip to the north.

The information that Herr Muff gave me confirmed the impression produced by the last reports from the Legation in Vienna, as well as by others that had come to the Foreign Ministry. The picture is not very pleasant. At the present time the opponents of the Agreement of July 11 are uniting in Austria. The opposition of the Christian Socialists, who, in the opinion of the General, desire to bring about the failure of the Agreement, is particularly strong. Minister von Glaise-Horstenau, with whom Herr Muff spoke as recently as the day before yesterday, expressed himself very pessimistically concerning future developments in Austria. There was no longer any question whatever of a Cabinet shake-up in a National sense. His assignment to a position (the Ministry of the Interior was promised him by the Federal Chancellor) was put off from day to day. To be sure, a few days ago he had induced the Federal Chancellor to issue an order to the effect that all Government departments in Austria are directed to inform the Minister before decision in all matters pertaining to the Reich and National questions. But the enforcement of this order depended in practice on the good will of the departments concerned; these, however, with the exception of the Ministry of Justice, were attempting to sabotage any domestic political reconciliation in Austria. They desired, of course, to obtain as much as possible for Austria from the Agreement of July 11, especially in the economic field, but were not inclined to make concessions in the field of domestic policy. There were, therefore, objections to negotiating with the Reich on the points established in

the Gentlemen's Agreement, such as the press, cultural questions, exiles, and amnesty. Under such circumstances Minister von Glaise-Horstenau wondered whether there was any further use for him to remain in office; he would, however, not give up his position until he was expressly authorized or directed to do so by the Reich. Herr von Glaise-Horstenau was of the opinion that in the execution of his task he would have to be supported by the Reich with every admissible pressure, especially in the economic field.<sup>19</sup>

General Muff remarked further that in the Austrian Army, too, there had as yet been no change of sentiment since July 11. It was becoming more and more apparent that General Zehner was an opponent of the Third Reich. Herr Muff warmly seconds the suggestion that State Secretary Guido Schmidt be invited to come to Berlin for a conference, since he had as much influence as ever over the Austrian Chancellor. Moreover, Minister Hornbostel had allegedly again been clever enough to consolidate his position in the Austrian Chancellery.

ALTENBURG

BERLIN, October 1, 1936.

## No. 167

1744/403055-66

### *Memorandum*

The *Auslandsorganisation* of the N.S.D.A.P. wishes to build up the Party organization in Austria again. *Gauleiter* Bohle intends to announce the reopening of the Party in Austria in a lecture in Vienna on October 24. Examination has shown that it is not definitely established whether or not the provisions of the German-Austrian Gentlemen's Agreement offer a firm legal basis for this project. But since it would be most undesirable to have the activities of the Party hampered by the Austrians, Ambassador von Papen is to be instructed to take this question up with the Austrian Government and to arrive at a settlement. It is expected that Austria will consent to an agreement in which, for reasons of reciprocity, the Fatherland Front would have to be permitted to operate in Germany. We are interested in having this agreement regulate the activities of the N.S.D.A.P. in Austria in all details, to prevent occasions for doubt in the future. Among these details are the questions of the wearing of uniforms and Party insignia, the activities of the local branches in the way of collections, the arrangement of lectures,

<sup>19</sup> Marginal comment, possibly in Neurath's hand: "Yes."

parades, etc. It has been arranged with Ambassador von Papen, who will arrive in Vienna on the 17th, that he is to be accompanied by a jurist experienced in public law for his negotiations with the Austrian Government.

Besides, a number of details incident to the return of Austrian *émigrés* to their homeland are to be settled with Austria. Since a meeting of the commission provided for in article X of the Gentlemen's Agreement is to be avoided, if possible, it is important to find a way in which a solution of these questions of detail can be found in agreement with the Austrian Government. For that, too, the cooperation of the Legal Department seems necessary.

Herewith respectfully submitted  
to the Legal Department.

WEIZSÄCKER

BERLIN, October 7, 1936.

### No. 168

1649/391612-18

*The Reich and Prussian Minister of the Interior (Frick) to the State Secretary and Chief of the Reich Chancellery (Lammers)*<sup>20</sup>

IMMEDIATE

BERLIN, October 12, 1936.

Nr. I A 363/3579 a.g.

Subject: Austrian refugees.

We have put in the budget of my Ministry for the fiscal year 1936 the sum of RM 20 million for the care of refugees from Austria. The financial estimates of the *Flüchtlingshilfswerk* of the N.S.D.A.P. (under the administration of SS-*Gruppenführer* Rodenbücher) and the SA-*Hilfswerk Nordwest* (under the administration of SA-*Obergruppenführer* Reschny), which amount to approximately RM 9,700,000 and RM 12 million respectively, are at the present time still being checked. The Reich Finance Minister has now in several letters expressed the expectation that after the conclusion of the German-Austrian Agreement we could count on Austrian refugees returning home in considerable numbers, so that the relief arrangements supported by Reich funds could now be restricted and the burden on the Reich economy reduced. In regard to the Austrian refugees, several fundamental questions need an early clarification.

In the Gentlemen's Agreement forming part of the German-Austrian Agreement of July 11, 1936, item IV reads as follows:

<sup>20</sup> Copy to the Foreign Ministry.

*"Emigré Problems."*

Both parties agree in their desire to contribute by reciprocal concessions to the speediest possible satisfactory solution of the problem of the Austrian National Socialist exiles in the Reich.

The Austrian Government will proceed to the examination of this problem as soon as possible and will announce the result to a joint commission to be composed of representatives of the competent Ministries so that an agreement may be put into effect . . .

## ITEM IX:

. . . The Federal Chancellor declares that he is prepared: (a) to grant a far-reaching political amnesty, from which persons who have committed serious public crimes shall be excluded.

Also covered by this amnesty shall be persons who have not yet been sentenced by judicial decree or penalized by administrative process.

These provisions shall also be duly applied to *émigrés*. (b) . . .

## ITEM X:

*Procedure for Objections and Complaints.*

For the handling of objections and complaints which may arise in connection with the above Gentlemen's Agreement, as well as in order to guarantee a progressive *détente* within the framework of the preceding agreements, there shall be established a joint commission composed of three representatives of the Foreign Ministry of each country. Its task shall be to discuss at regular meetings the operation of the agreement as well as any supplements thereto which may be required."

The Austrian Government has apparently not yet established the commission provided for in item IV; at any rate it has not been announced. The joint commission contemplated in item X has likewise not yet been established by the Foreign Ministry. An amnesty in the approximate sense of the German law of April 23, 1936 (*Reichsgesetzblatt* I, page 378), guaranteeing freedom from punishment has actually not been granted. Rather did the Austrian Government in some 20,000 instances grant only a conditional suspension on probation, apart from the cancellation of current proceedings and the suspension of those pending. The refugees from Austria have not yet been affected by these measures at all. According to the statement of the Foreign Ministry, political amnesty extends legally, apart from the so-called "purely political" offenses, only to such cases of violations of the explosives law "in which it is a question of the mere possession of rather small quantities or of carrying same for pay or of assault with explosives in which a comparatively small amount of the explosive was involved and which was carried out in such a way as neither to endanger human lives

nor to cause any considerable amount of property damage; but only in individual instances in the case of other offenses, in particular serious ones committed for political reasons and involving bloodshed, or those deliberately endangering human life."

The Austrian refugees who wish to return home therefore run the risk of being prosecuted by the Austrian authorities. It must be attempted by means of negotiation to obtain exemption from punishment for the refugees.

The cautiousness of the Austrian Government in regard to the refugee question would seem to be principally attributable to political reasons; an additional factor would seem to be the labor market in Austria, especially since the more than 20,000 who have thus far been pardoned have to be given employment.

In order to initiate the negotiations with the Austrian Government concerning the return of the Austrian refugees, it is necessary to make the necessary data available to Ambassador von Papen. The regular return of refugees will be possible only if it has been determined in each individual case that the refugee need not fear any criminal proceedings, that any expatriation proceedings have been cancelled, and that his reentry into his profession will be permitted and made possible.

For my sphere of activity, from the standpoint of domestic policy as well as in regard to the support of the welfare arrangements out of Reich funds, there now arise grave problems, in which the decision can only come from the Führer.

No doubt the return of all Austrian refugees who are still Austrian citizens or who have been expatriated but have not yet been made citizens of the Reich can be facilitated, insofar as they themselves attach any importance to their return. In my opinion this applies also to those refugees who have already become German citizens, insofar as it is possible to arrange with the Austrian Government for renaturalization. The following have been naturalized: Of the 8,600 Austrian SA-men assembled in the camps of the *SA-Hilfswerk Nordwest*, approximately 7,000; about 2,000 SS-men in the *Flüchtlingshilfswerk* of the N.S.D.A.P., and about 1,200 of the people otherwise cared for. The naturalization has largely been carried out in a summary fashion, mainly for the purpose of facilitating the refugees' progress in the Reich. The consideration of pending applications for naturalization has been suspended for the time being.

The question now is whether the return of the refugees to Austria shall be carried out to the extent that all refugees whose return could under present circumstances be demanded should be expected to return. Consideration of the naturalization applications pending

or still to be made, as well as the extent of the relief measures, is dependent upon the decision on this question. In my opinion the return of those refugees who have found or are finding secure employment in a profession or industry in Germany should not be required. On the other hand, however, it must be noted that for many refugees there is little incentive to return to Austria. Undoubtedly domestic political conditions in Austria act as a restraint. But others, especially the numerous farmers and sons of artisans, business people, etc., who would very soon be able to make a living there again, passionately desire to return home as soon as possible. This may also explain the recently increasing attempts to escape from the camps. Finally, the rate of speed of the return also plays a part. Aside from the fact that the negotiations of the Foreign Ministry and the German Legation in Vienna with the Austrian Government have not yet got under way, we must consider the following: In assigning a date of return for those refugees who cannot count on an assured means of livelihood there, we must bear in mind the fact that an estimated 80 percent of the National Socialists who have been pardoned and released from detention are unemployed and largely have to be supported by employed Party members as well as out of German funds. I respectfully request that the Führer's basic decision be obtained on these questions.

In this connection, the question of the composition and strength of the *SA-Hilfswerk Nordwest* (under *SA-Obergruppenführer* Reschny) likewise needs to be clarified. During the conversation in my Ministry on July 16, 1936, as well as on other occasions, Ambassador von Papen stated that the continued existence of the "Austrian Legion" of the present *SA-Hilfswerk Nordwest* was a hindrance to the *détente* with Austria, being, after all, a semi-military formation supported by the Reich and assembled in camps. At the present time the *SA-Hilfswerk Nordwest* consists of the staff, 4 regiments, and 4 independent battalions of approximately 8,600 men who are housed in barracks in the camps. The SA-men, in accordance with the Führer's order of this spring, have been segregated up to the present time. There is a possibility of obtaining work for some of them. Due to the fact that the Austrian SA is compulsorily segregated in the camps, considerable dissension has at various times arisen; it has given rise to repeated disturbances, even against the police. Therefore, I respectfully request that a decision also be obtained from the Führer as to whether the *SA-Hilfswerk Nordwest* shall be maintained in its present form even after the conclusion of the Agreement of July 11, or if it is to be liquidated by transferring

the Austrian SA-men who cannot return to their homes to the regular SA. Assistance in obtaining work and earning a livelihood would then have to be given, and the individual Austrian SA-men would have to be given the opportunity to leave the camps, insofar as they are able to find work and earn a living elsewhere. Among the refugees kept in the camps of the *Hilfswerk Nordwest*, that is, those who have not found a place in our economy, there is obviously a more widespread desire to return to Austria.

I therefore consider the following measures to be most urgent:

1) blocking of funds for the completion and expansion of the camp installations;

2) granting permission to leave to those camp inmates who wish to leave and who are able to find work and earn a living:

(a) either in Austria—without the danger of criminal prosecution—or

(b) in Germany.

In view of the increasing scarcity of suitable labor in Germany, obtaining employment for a large part of the inmates of the camps should not be difficult.

In order to be able to supply the Foreign Ministry and Ambassador von Papen with the necessary data for their negotiations with the Austrian Government, and in view of the discussions soon to be held in regard to the budget, I should be particularly grateful to be informed soon as to the decisions of the Führer.

FRICK

## No. 169

115/118179-83

*Memorandum Concerning the Meeting Between the Prussian Minister President, Colonel General Göring, and Austrian Federal Chancellor Schuschnigg*<sup>21</sup>

Federal Chancellor Schuschnigg, after the stormy meeting of the Council of Ministers, which kept him in Vienna till early in the morning, arrived in Budapest by plane just before the funeral service<sup>22</sup> on October 10. The Federal Chancellor was visibly tired. The distribution of seats among the representatives of Heads of State had been so arranged that General Göring occupied the first seat,

<sup>21</sup> This unsigned memorandum is written on stationery with the letterhead of the German Legation at Budapest and bears the following marginal note in Neurath's hand: "General Göring informed me of the conversation with Schuschnigg and of his impression of him in almost literally the same terms."

<sup>22</sup> For General Gömbös, Hungarian Minister President, who had died October 6, 1936.

slightly to the right and behind the Regent; the Italian Foreign Minister, Count Ciano, the second seat, to the left of the Regent; Federal Chancellor Schuschnigg had the place next to the Italian, and Minister Stoiloff, as the representative of the Bulgarian King, sat next to the Prussian Minister President. This arrangement was also maintained in the funeral procession, so that during the almost 2-hour-long march to the cemetery there was no opportunity for any conversation between General Göring and the Federal Chancellor.

On the same day the acting Minister President, His Excellency von Darányi, had invited the four representatives of the Chiefs of State together with the more important members of their retinues, the representative of the Polish Government, and the Ministers of the participating States to a dinner, at which the *Chef de Cabinet* of the Regent's Chancellery, the Ministers of Foreign Affairs, Interior, Religious Affairs, and Finance, several State Secretaries, and the Hungarian Minister in Berlin, Sztojay, were present as representatives of Hungary. After lengthy discussions, the problem of seating had been so settled that the representatives of the Chiefs of State of both Great Powers were to alternate in position on all occasions when both appeared together, beginning with "Allemagne" in the morning, using the French alphabet, while in the evening the first place went to "Italie"; at a third gathering—which was not held—first place would again have been occupied by General Göring. General Göring accordingly had at his right Hungarian Minister President Darányi and at his left the representative of the Regent, the *Chef de Cabinet* of the Chancellery. Federal Chancellor Schuschnigg sat opposite him. Thus there was an opportunity now and then, even during the meal, for General Göring to exchange a few words with the Federal Chancellor.

When the dinner was over, the two immediately engaged in a lengthy conversation, in which State Secretary Schmidt also participated, though almost exclusively as a listener.

Next morning, before his departure, General Göring gave me approximately the following information regarding the subject matter of the conversation: It was the first time he had ever met Schuschnigg. The impression of him which he had received was different from the picture he had hitherto had in his mind and was at any rate more favorable. Schuschnigg was certainly a pronounced ideologist, but he had developed lines of thought which would nevertheless justify a certain confidence in his capabilities and his aims.

The Federal Chancellor had again spoken of his worries regarding the *Anschluss*; the General had replied that if Germany desired an

*Anschluss*, it would have occurred long ago. That was a question which ultimately concerned only the nearest German divisional commander. Schuschnigg himself would surely not assume that Italy, in such an event, would hasten to the aid of Austria, if he stopped to think that, after all, there were the British, too, for whom nothing could be more opportune than that Mussolini should become involved in Austria in this manner. At any rate, he personally was convinced that in case of an *Anschluss* the Italians would not intervene with troops in favor of Austria. Besides, it was useless to talk of an annexation [*Anschluss*]; it would be preferable to choose the word partnership [*Zusammenschluss*], which was surely possible in many fields. In this regard he was thinking in particular of currency unification and a common tariff policy.

Talking about the subject of closer personal relations, the General had suggested to the Federal Chancellor that he visit Berlin, if only to see with his own eyes what things were really like in Germany. Such a visit would also strengthen his position in Austria, for once he had made an official visit to the Führer and Chancellor, saying "Heil Hitler" in Austria could hardly be regarded as a treasonable activity any more. As to the matter of the person who might make the return visit, the Federal Chancellor hinted that certain German statesmen were quite out of the question, considering speeches they had delivered against the Austrian Government and against him personally. In this connection he particularly mentioned the Minister of Propaganda. On the other hand, General Göring, for example, to whom this objection did not apply, would be very welcome. The General was under the impression that the Federal Chancellor had been, and as a matter of fact still was following in detail the speeches of all German statesmen, being particularly concerned about personal attacks against himself and the Austrian Government.

During the further course of the conversation, problems of German aid to Austria were discussed. On that matter General Göring expressed his readiness to aid the Austrians not only in the economic but also in the military field, always making the reservation that the prerequisite of such aid was the unification of certain basic currency and customs policies. Among other things he had told the Federal Chancellor that he was prepared to build up the entire Austrian air force—gratis, in fact—if the above-mentioned conditions were fulfilled. In addition, Federal Chancellor Schuschnigg, for his part, touched upon the idea of an exchange of officers, to which the General did not indicate any opposition.

All in all I received the impression that the General was much more favorably impressed by Schuschnigg's personality than he had expected, and that he apparently considers progress in the relations between Germany and Austria as entirely possible even with Federal Chancellor Schuschnigg.

On the other hand, his opinion of the abilities of State Secretary Schmidt was unfavorable.

BUDAPEST, October 13, 1936.

No. 170

1649/391660-68

*Memorandum of the Discussions Concerning the 1936 Budget for the Austrian Hilfswerk, Held on October 13 and 14, 1936, in the Reich and Prussian Ministry of the Interior*

SECRET

Nr. I A 399/3579 b(g) II

Ministerial Counselor Erbe opened the conference at 10 o'clock and stated by way of introduction: The discussion of the 1936 budget for the Austrian *Hilfswerk* had unfortunately been delayed until now, chiefly because the transfer of the *Hilfswerk Nordwest* to the northwestern area was only now being completed. The Führer and Chancellor in March 1936 had ordered that the *Hilfswerk Nordwest* be held together in camps. Because of the necessary moving, rebuilding, and expansion, an extrabudgetary sum of RM 558,000 had had to be allotted for the *Hilfswerk Nordwest*, which was not included in the present budget. Shortly thereafter, the German-Austrian Agreement of July 11, 1936, had created a new situation. The hope of the Minister of Finance that in the execution of this Agreement a reduction in the funds needed for the Austrian *Hilfswerk* would necessarily follow immediately, would hardly be realized within the next few weeks or months. Negotiations with the Austrian Government for the return of the refugees had been prepared, to be sure, but hardly conducted as yet in a serious manner. Nevertheless, such negotiations were planned for November, although it was still quite uncertain whether, in the face of the procrastinating and stiff attitude of the Austrian Government, any very favorable outcome could be expected. At any rate, one could hardly count on the return of any considerable number of refugees in the immediate future. This was also the view of the Austrian *Gauleiter*, Leopold, in whose

opinion only those refugees would at present be considered for return to Austria, who

1. Were still Austrian citizens,
2. Had independent businesses in Austria or could be placed in such businesses or enterprises as family members, or
3. Could be employed by German business concerns.

In the long run, however, a retrenchment would naturally have to be made in the Austrian *Hilfswerk*. Basic directives from the Führer and Chancellor concerning the further handling of the *Hilfswerk* had been requested.

*Oberregierungsrat* Schmidt-Schwarzenberg (Reich Ministry of Finance) expressed his thanks for the clarifying statements and requested prompt current reports on the state of affairs so that the Ministry of Finance might be able to take the steps necessary for a careful administration of funds in time, as in the case of the liquidation of the office of the Chief of A.W. and in the case of the reorganization of the Provincial Police.

*SS-Gruppenführer* Rodenbücher (*Flüchtlingshilfswerk*) remarked that from his experience the effects of the Agreement of July 11, 1936, were generally overestimated. For the time being there would be no change in the financial needs of the *Flüchtlingshilfswerk*. Five persons who had returned to Austria without permission had immediately been arrested there. The *Flüchtlingshilfswerk*, however, had already closed two camps and had informed the *Reichsführer-SS* that the *SS-Grenzüberwachung* would have to be discontinued because of the possible shortage of funds. In reply to 6,000 questionnaires distributed among the refugees the answer had been that

- 2600 had no desire whatsoever to return to Austria,
- 2800 wished to return conditionally only (if they could get work),
- 546 wished to return unconditionally. (relatives, owners of businesses).

On the other hand, the influx still amounted to 100 to 120 persons a month, involving amnestied persons who were completely penniless. The number of Austrian refugees now in the Reich was about 35,000.

In connection with the statements of *Gauleiter* Leopold, repeated by Ministerial Counselor Erbe, *SS-Gruppenführer* Rodenbücher remarked that in his opinion Leopold appraised the situation in Austria much too optimistically and that he did not consider him the appropriate person for collecting the funds flowing into Austria.

*Reichshauptamtsleiter* Damson (*Reichsschatzmeister*) mentioned that the *Reichsschatzmeister* would have a talk with the Führer con-

cerning the transfer to Austria, after which new guiding principles were to be expected.

Ministerial Counselor Erbe, with the concurrence of the representatives of the Reich Minister of Finance and the Accounting Office, remarked that upon inquiry by the Reich and Prussian Minister of the Interior the provision of RM 2,000,000 yearly for transfer to Austria from the budgetary fund of RM 20,000,000 had been expressly ordered in writing by the Führer and Chancellor. Accordingly, the Reich and Prussian Minister of the Interior was transferring this sum in equal monthly installments to the *Reichsschatzmeister* of the N.S.D.A.P. How this sum would then be transferred to Austria, to whom it would be paid there, and how it was to be used, was the exclusive concern of the *Reichsschatzmeister* and the other offices of the N.S.D.A.P. which alone were responsible for it.

*Oberregierungsrat* Schmidt-Schwarzenberg requested immediate consideration of the *SS-Grenzüberwachung*.

*SS-Gruppenführer* Rodenbücher stated in this connection that now, in view of the changed situation, he, too, no longer considered it possible to pay this *SS-Grenzüberwachung* on the Bavarian-Austrian border from the funds of the *Flüchtlingshilfswerk* and that he had already reported to the *Reichsführer-SS* that he could no longer oppose the cancellation of these funds in the 1937 budget. Nevertheless the Führer and Chancellor had ordered that his planes and the planes of his guests at the Hammerau airfield near Reichenhall be guarded by the *SS-Grenzüberwachung*. Ministerial Counselor Erbe remarked that obvious as the need for this guard service was, it nevertheless could not be provided through funds of the Austrian *Hilfswerk*. The discussion that followed led to the conclusion that for 1936 no further changes should be made in the present state of affairs, but that for 1937 no further funds for the *SS-Grenzüberwachung* should be included in the budget of the *Flüchtlingshilfswerk* (1936: RM 583,200, a detailed discussion of which was waived). The *Reichsführer-SS* and Chief of the German Police is to be informed (copy to the Reich Minister of Finance) so that he may have the necessary posts transferred to the budget of the Political Police in sufficient time.

In the further general discussion, *SS-Gruppenführer* Rodenbücher gave some data concerning the welfare work done. RM 50 in aid is paid monthly to single persons, RM 100 to married persons, and RM 20 for each child. The relatively costly care in the camp involves about 2,500 refugees. Of the other refugees, 1,200 must constantly be taken care of; 5,000 make demands only occasionally.

Ministerial Counselor Erbe pointed out that the proposed budgets called for:

<i>Flüchtlingshilfswerk</i> .....	RM 9,763,992
<i>Hilfswerk Nordwest</i> .....	RM 12,000,000
Total	RM 21,763,992

Hence, since only RM 20,000,000 was available, the estimates would have to be revised downward by a total of RM 1,763,992—and, in addition, by the RM 2,000,000 to be transferred to Austria, which was not included in the budget of the *Flüchtlingshilfswerk*.

Upon inquiry by Ministerial Counselor Haaser (Accounting Office) concerning the amount of the expenditures for 1935, these were given as RM 9,632,700 for the *Flüchtlingshilfswerk*.

*Oberregierungsrat* Schmidt-Schwarzenberg pointed out that in regard to personnel the estimates in the Central Office had doubled and that the estimate for the Economic Section (Agricultural Subsidies Program in Austria) did not belong in this budget since the Ossa<sup>22a</sup> was already available for this purpose.

For the rest, in the discussion of details, the questions asked by the chairman were answered as follows:

*Munich Camp, Giselastrasse*: The camp in question is one for temporary shelter. After the closing of the Grassling Camp, contemplated for a later date, this camp is to become the real reception center.

*The Diessen am Ammersee Farmers and Settlers School*: Is to be closed because one may count on the return to Austria of the farmers and farmers' sons sheltered there.

*Bischofsried Educational Establishment for Girls*: Is likewise to be closed.

*Bad Schandau Reorientation Camp*: Is already in the process of being closed.

#### CONTINUATION OF THE CONFERENCE ON OCTOBER 14, 1936

Ministerial Counselor Erbe opened the deliberation, reiterating in part the statements he had made at the session of October 13, 1936.

SA-*Obergruppenführer* Reschny (*Hilfswerk Nordwest*) stressed the point that a successful implementation of the agreement could be expected only if there was strong pressure on the Austrian Government. Since Austria herself had many unemployed, she would not be ready to receive the repatriates. So far, very sad experiences had

<sup>22a</sup> *Ossa Vermittlungs-und Handelsgesellschaft m. b. H.* This was an organization with numerous subsidiaries engaged in financing enterprises of German nationalist interest among the German minorities in the German borderlands. It was also active in Austria.

been encountered with the refugees who had returned. Thus, for instance, persons with their papers in order had been permitted to cross the border, but had then immediately been locked up and again brought back across the border. Others had been given heavy prison sentences. The mere discovery of membership in the *Hilfswerk Nordwest* was sufficient ground for punishment. Under these circumstances it was not to be expected that any considerable number of refugees could return to Austria. On the contrary, people were still constantly crossing the border from Austria so that there was a monthly influx of 100 to 120 persons. For the current fiscal year, therefore, the same budget would be needed as heretofore. Furthermore, on the occasion of the Nuremberg Party Rally, the Führer had expressly informed him that the dissolution of the *Hilfswerk Nordwest* was out of the question, and that on the contrary its continuation was more necessary than ever.

*Obersturmbannführer* Schmidt (*Hilfswerk Nordwest*) gave the following figures concerning the refugees cared for by the *Hilfswerk Nordwest*:

In the camps there are .....	6,300 men
(Of whom 90% are naturalized)	
Further.....	1,190 women
	1,591 children
	46 parents
<hr/>	
Total number: .....	9,127 persons

To these should be added as temporarily separated:

700 men in the *Wehrmacht*  
400 men in the Labor Service

At this point a detailed discussion of the budget proposal was begun, during which the following explanations were given in connection with the individual chapters and titles:

*Preface:* Camp troops [*Lagerscharen*] are squads organized in the individual camps for the clothing, feeding, and heating services.

The reception battalion [*Zugangssturmbann*] consists of men who are admitted to the *Hilfswerk Nordwest*.

The civilian battalion [*Zivilsturmbann*] consists of the so-called demobilized men, that is, men who are leaving the *Hilfswerk Nordwest*.

The facilities of the Home for Convalescents in Medem are heavily taxed (quarantining 120 men). The *Hilfswerk Nordwest* intends to establish still another home for convalescents in order to shelter persons granted amnesty who come to Germany upon completion of their prison terms and are badly in need of recuperation.

*Chap. 1, Title 4:* The so-called "companions" [*"Lebensgefährtinnen"*] have been largely reduced in number; some of them have been kept on as domestic help.

*Chap. 2, Title 1a:* New acquisitions of field kitchens are unavoidable because of the wear and tear that has taken place.

*Chap. 2, Title 3:* Ministerial Counselor Erbe requested a statement on the camps, showing the owners, the rentals, and the present legal situation (contracts). *Reichshauptamtsleiter* Damson promised to send such a statement.

*Chap. 2, Title 6:* The rather high estimate for traveling expenses seems to offer possibilities for effecting savings.

*Chap. 2, Title 9:* The retention of the motor-vehicle insurance was agreed upon. The insurance companies have thus far paid out for damages 80 to 90 thousand Reichsmarks more than has been paid in premiums.

*Chap. 2, Title 9a:* For the acquisition of new motor vehicles RM 120,000 is set aside. New motor cars, however, are to be purchased only to the extent that they are absolutely necessary (for instance, as replacements for indispensable delivery trucks that have become unserviceable), and, accordingly, the plan of purchasing 5 D.K.W. radio cars is to be abandoned.

*Chap. 2, Title 12:* Nonrecurrent expenditures: Under this head RM 762,340 is set aside for the purchase of clothing, etc. It was agreed that in view of the uncertain future of the *Hilfswerk Nord-west* such new acquisitions should be made from time to time only to the extent that they were absolutely necessary.

*Chap. 3, Title 4:* Nonrecurrent expenditures: to these must be added the RM 558,000 appropriated outside the budget.

## B. GUIDO SCHMIDT IN GERMANY, NOVEMBER 1936

### No. 171

1744/403085-88

*The German Ambassador in Austria (Papen) to the Führer and Chancellor*

Tgb. Nr. A 6191

VIENNA, November 4, 1936.

Received November 5, 1936.

(Pol. IV 4181)

Contents: The reorganization of the Government in Vienna.

Supplementing my telegram of yesterday<sup>23</sup> concerning the reorganization of the Government, the following should be added:

Although the local press is at pains to represent the complete reorganization of the Cabinet as an act without effect on the well-known objectives of the Schuschnigg government, the dismissal of persons who always reacted sharply against the Reich during the

<sup>23</sup> Not printed.

period of conflict and the appointment of National-minded men is considered by all informed circles as a distinct success for the July 11 policy. At any rate, all friendly diplomats implied that when they congratulated me today.

As explained in my report No. 6134 of November 2,<sup>24</sup> I have recently, in repeated, urgent representations to the State Secretary for Foreign Affairs and the Federal Chancellor, developed the viewpoint of the Government of the Reich to the effect that a maintenance and development of the policy of July 11 must now be characterized by a definite abandonment by the Austrian Government of the methods of procedure previously practiced. In this connection it is noteworthy that I had an appointment with the Federal Chancellor for another conversation yesterday, the day of the Cabinet shake-up, but that he preferred to postpone the conversation until today, in order not to have the reorganization appear outwardly as under the pressure of my representations. The most essential point in the future development will be whether the new Director of Security reorganizes the whole police system in the direction of an understanding with the National elements. Today the Federal Chancellor replied, when I put this question to him, that Herr von Neustädter-Stürmer had assumed his post with this in mind. But he asked me repeatedly to stress in Berlin that only slow progress could be made in this field, because the circles supporting the Fatherland Front were making things very difficult for him. For the rest, Herr von Schuschnigg emphasized that he wished to maintain firmly the July 11 policy, which, after the conversations in Berlin and the Mussolini speech, had become an axiom of European politics. The inclusion of men of the National persuasion in his Cabinet proclaimed this resolve publicly.

The new Minister of Security, as is well known, was elected to the National Council as early as 1930 as a representative of the *Heimatblock* and was made leader of the *Heimatblock* Deputies' Club. As a State Secretary in the Dollfuss government, he originated the voluntary labor service; and although he came forward as a representative of the Dollfuss government in July 1934, at the relief of the Chancellery,<sup>25</sup> he may nevertheless be considered a person of fundamentally National convictions.

Minister von Glaise-Horstenau, who has now received the portfolio of the Interior, will be able to work for the National interests, particularly in matters pertaining to clubs and other organizations.

<sup>24</sup> Not printed.

<sup>25</sup> Herr Neustädter-Stürmer from outside the Chancellery had conducted the negotiations with the Nazis inside the Chancellery on the occasion of the Nazi *Putsch* in Vienna on July 25, 1934.

He intends to keep in very close touch with the new Minister of Security in regard to the future course of action.

For our commercial negotiations, it is gratifying that the very wealthy Herr Stockinger, who has sabotaged every attempt at a *rapprochement*, has finally been disposed of. With the new Minister of Commerce,<sup>26</sup> who has a reputation as an expert, as well as with the new Minister of Finance,<sup>27</sup> we shall be able to get results very much more quickly. The Federal Chancellor told me in particular in the course of today's discussion that he, too, urgently wished to increase the volume of trade and had already discussed with the president of the issuing bank the grant of a rather large loan to be issued soon.

The retiring of Baron von Hammerstein as Minister of Justice is regrettable. Through my close relation with him, I have in many cases secured satisfactory arrangements for our National Socialists through unofficial channels. Herr von Hammerstein, as chief of the Fine Arts Section, will be working with the Minister for Religious Affairs, who is remaining. In this connection I have arranged today with that Minister for Herr von Hammerstein shortly to be placed at the head of the Cultural League [*Kulturbund*] to eliminate for the future the Jewish influences still prevalent here.

The essential thing for us is that the development of the Austrian domestic situation has begun again. The mandate of the new Minister of Security will not last long, according to what I hear, since the budget of the Provincial Directors of Security comes to an end at the close of this year, and this position will then be abolished. The next step will then have to be the return of the police authority to the Ministry of Herr von Glaise.

In regard to the meeting of the representatives of the Protocol Powers in Vienna, I hear that in line with my previous report the efforts of Italy to include Czechoslovakia in the three-power economic system are continuing. The Polish Minister tells me that his Government had been requested to recommend this policy to the Hungarians, who are raising objections. In answer to my question as to how this attempt by Rome could be reconciled with Mussolini's blunt statement regarding Hungarian revisionism, he thought that this fanfare was intended to get Hungary to agree without bringing up the revision question.

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<sup>26</sup> Dr. Wilhelm Taucher, Minister of Commerce and Communications.

<sup>27</sup> Rudolf Neumayer.

As far as the press is concerned, further progress can likewise be noted. The following are now admitted: the *Illustrierter Beobachter*, *Simplicissimus*, *Münchener Illustrierte Presse* (original edition), and the *Deutsche Illustrierte*.

PAPEN

No. 172

223/150898-401

*The German Foreign Ministry to the German Legation in Austria*

BERLIN, November 5, 1936.

With reference to instruction Pol. IV 4169 of this date.<sup>28</sup>

Subject: Economic policy discussions with Austria and preparation for the visit of State Secretary Guido Schmidt.

I. I request that State Secretary Schmidt be informed of the following in connection with the conversations which Clodius<sup>29</sup> had with him last week:

The Austrian Government is acquainted with the German Government's viewpoint that it is advisable to enter upon the contemplated second stage of the economic negotiations with Austria only after it is clearly apparent in broad outline that these negotiations represent a real step toward the further development of German-Austrian economic relations. According to the information which Clodius obtained from authoritative sources in Vienna, the Austrians apparently still had considerable misgivings about the feasibility of achieving this goal in any possible negotiations. If, despite the Austrian reserve hitherto displayed in regard to the program of negotiations, we are willing to resume discussions, it is only because of Herr Schmidt's definite promise to intervene in the negotiations himself if necessary and to concern himself with bringing about a satisfactory result. Only for this reason can we give our basic consent to accept the Austrian invitation and resume negotiations at about the end of this month in Vienna. We wish, however, to delay a final understanding on the matter until we have had an opportunity to discuss the pertinent questions with Herr Schmidt on the occasion of his visit to Berlin. In addition, this would have the advantage that the announcement of the beginning of the negotiations could then come about as the conclusion of the State Secretary's Berlin visit.

<sup>28</sup> Document No. 173, *infra*. The instruction is dated November 6.

<sup>29</sup> Karl Clodius of the Economic Policy Department of the German Foreign Ministry.

Please inform Herr Schmidt also that we agree in principle to make available the schilling amounts necessary to finance the tourist trade during the early winter months by means of a supplementary armaments transaction to be completed forthwith. We would enter upon closer consideration of this question as soon as the more detailed proposals promised by Herr Schmidt in regard to armament orders, which were to be transmitted via the Legation here, are at hand.

II. Please inform Herr Wildner<sup>30</sup> to the same effect. I ask, however, that the State Secretary's confidential promise to Herr Clodius personally, that in case of need he would exert political pressure on the course of the negotiations, not be mentioned to Herr Wildner. I likewise request that the armament transaction, concerning which Herr Wildner has hitherto apparently not been informed, be discussed with him only if Herr Schmidt has given his approval in advance.

III. For your confidential information I respectfully inform you that, for our attitude, the following considerations are decisive:

We are primarily concerned with conducting the economic and political discussions in such a manner as to contribute indirectly toward furthering the stalemated conversations regarding the political execution of the July 11 Agreement. We do not, however, consider it expedient to express this purpose to the Austrian Government or even to let it be too clearly recognized through the manner of our tactical procedure. Therefore we would consider it unwise to refuse, in principle, a resumption of negotiations. In this connection we are taking the following two considerations into account: 1) the very positive assurances which Herr Schmidt gave Herr Clodius in confidence, and 2) the latest Cabinet shake-up, which, particularly by the removal of Ministers Stockinger and Draxler, has resulted in a certain easing of the domestic situation in Austria and probably of the commercial relations with the Reich as well. Of course these negotiations might show that Herr Schmidt's influence and that of the new Minister of Commerce, Taucher, who from all indications is somewhat favorably disposed toward the Reich, will not suffice to obtain a satisfactory result. Or during the negotiations a renewed aggravation of the domestic situation in Austria and, in consequence, of her relations with the Reich might occur. In either of these two cases it will be possible for us to handle matters in a dilatory fashion and thus indirectly let the Austrian Government know that we are not disposed to render performance in advance in the field of commercial policy unless the Austrian Govern-

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<sup>30</sup> Dr. Heinrich Wildner, head of the Economic Policy Department of the Austrian Foreign Ministry.

ment proceeds in earnest toward a reorientation of its commercial policy toward Germany. Such dilatory tactics could also be applied if political developments do not assume the shape we may rightfully expect from the Agreement of July 11.

By direction:  
RITTER<sup>31</sup>

### No. 173

223/150402-03

#### *The German Foreign Ministry to the German Legation in Austria*

BERLIN, November 6, 1936.  
(Pol. IV 4169)

It is intended to conduct a general political discussion with State Secretary Schmidt during his visit. The German-Austrian Agreement of July 11 and its execution are, however, to be mentioned in particular. It would be desirable if at that time the following points could be brought to final clarification:

1. Permission for the Hitler salute and the wearing of Party insignia by German nationals in Austria.
2. Revocation of the press ban, or, in case this cannot be achieved generally, the admission of additional German newspapers, especially the *B.Z.* [*Berliner Zeitung*] and *Münchener-Neueste-Nachrichten*.
3. Limitation of the book ban and admission, in particular, of the Führer's book, *Mein Kampf*, into Austria.
4. An arrangement with regard to the exchange of university professors.

I request that State Secretary Schmidt be informed of these points and that his approval of their discussion be obtained in principle. Please inform me by telegram concerning the outcome. Detailed plans for points 2, 3, and 4 will then be made, of which the Legation will immediately be informed for transmittal to State Secretary Schmidt.

Special instructions will be issued by Department W<sup>32</sup> in regard to the economic questions to be discussed during the State Secretary's visit.

I trust that I may receive an early report on the subjects that will be brought up for discussion on the part of Austria in connection with the visit.

By direction:  
WEIZSÄCKER

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<sup>31</sup> Dr. Karl Ritter, Ambassador for special assignments in the German Foreign Ministry.

<sup>32</sup> The Economic Policy Department of the German Foreign Ministry.

## No. 174

2179/471643-44

*Memorandum*

During the conversation with Dr. Keppler, which is scheduled for Minister von Weizsäcker's office on Wednesday, November 11, at 4:30 p.m., it might be brought out that the visit of Austrian State Secretary Schmidt is to be utilized, aside from general political conversations, for particular discussions of German-Austrian relations after the conclusion of the German-Austrian Agreement of July 11. In this connection it should be stated that we are not satisfied with the hesitant manner hitherto observed by the Austrian Government in carrying out the Agreement. In the last 3 months the Austrian Government's action for the domestic pacification of Austria, promised in item IX of the Gentlemen's Agreement, has shown no progress whatever. The fight against the National circles in Austria is continuing. The amnesty has been carried out in a dilatory manner and thus far to an insufficient extent; it has not yet been extended to refugees in the Reich, and the same is true with regard to the possibility of the return of the refugees to their homes. The attitude of the Austrian press—in contrast to the exemplary reserved attitude of the press in the Reich, which has been acknowledged by the Austrian Government—still leaves much to be desired. Newspapers and books from the Reich are still banned. Reich-Germans permanently or temporarily in Austria are subjected by the police to a variety of difficulties in their association with fellow countrymen. The Hitler salute, and the wearing of Party insignia, although granted to the Italians in similar instances, are still not permitted the Reich-Germans. The treatment of the Reich flag represents an obvious case of discrimination in comparison with treatment accorded the flags of third states. In cultural matters the Austrian Government is, to be sure, prepared to conclude cultural agreements with various other countries (e.g., Italy, Hungary, France), but resists all efforts on the part of the German Reich to emphasize abroad and to strengthen further the German cultural fellowship which it has itself underscored.

Besides this general discussion, the visit of State Secretary Schmidt is to be used to bring to a solution the four points noted in the enclosed instruction to the German Legation in Vienna.<sup>33</sup>

Regarding the economic questions which are to be taken up during Schmidt's visit, Dr. Keppler is probably well informed through Dr.

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<sup>33</sup> See document No. 173, *supra*.

Veesenmeyer, who is in constant touch with Herr Clodius of Department W.

ALTENBURG

BERLIN, November 9, 1936.

No. 175

1049/891658-55

*The Finance Minister (Schwerin-Krosigk) to the Foreign Ministry*

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL  
F 6626-118 I

BERLIN, November 10, 1936.  
Received November 12, 1936.  
(Pol. I 2810g)

In view of the discussions held concerning the purpose of the *Hilfswerk*, I cannot share the view expressed by the *Hilfswerk* in its request of September 10, 1936, that the Austrian credit assistance is an exclusively economic measure. That the decisions on specific cases are today still influenced primarily by political considerations is evident from the Protocol of September 3, 1936. Consequently, in view of the German-Austrian Agreement of July 11, 1936, I am exceedingly reluctant to continue the credit assistance or, as suggested by the *Hilfswerk*, to expand it still further. On the contrary, I believe that the time has come for letting the credit assistance expire. Therefore, before I act upon the application of the *Hilfswerk* for the appropriation of additional funds, I ask you to state your views regarding my basic objections to the continuation of credit assistance.

If you should consider it politically unobjectionable to continue these measures, please ascertain whether the Reich Foreign Exchange Control is prepared to make available the foreign exchange required to carry out the proposal or to allow additional clearing facilities for the transfer. I refer here to the express request of the *Hilfswerk* that, departing from previous procedure, foreign exchange in cash and additional clearing facilities are required for the continuation of credit assistance. I must have this foreign exchange question clarified in advance; in view of the difficulties of balancing the budget, it would not be proper to include funds in the budget for 1937 which later could not be utilized because of exchange difficulties.

Moreover, I must call attention to the fact that an appropriation of funds for credit assistance in the 1937 budget to the extent requested by the *Hilfswerk* is out of the question. I therefore request you to abandon the project of further extending the credit assistance to the tourist trade, etc.

Finally, I cannot agree that the status of the funds available for credit assistance demands a speedy decision. Of the one million Reichsmarks which I made available in February 1935, 850,000 Reichsmarks have been used so far. Payments or commitments, as reported by the *Hilfswerk*, amounted to 747,570 Reichsmarks to the beginning of September; Ossa therefore still had 102,430 Reichsmarks on hand. I shall remit the 150,000 Reichsmarks which have not yet been demanded to the Ossa through the Central Disbursing Office [*Reichshauptkasse*] when required. The funds of approximately a quarter of a million Reichsmarks which will then be at the disposal of the Ossa for credit assistance should, on the basis of previous experience, be sufficient for continuing the credit assistance in its present extent for several months.

The *Flüchtlingshilfswerk* also applied to me directly on October 9, 1936, to ask for the approval of the request of September 10, 1936. I refrained from replying to the *Hilfswerk* but leave it to you to inform them as you see fit.

VON KROSIGK

### No. 176

2232/475964-71

*The German Foreign Ministry to the Reich and Prussian Ministry of the Interior, etc.*<sup>84</sup>

VERY URGENT

BERLIN, November 11, 1936.

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

(Pol. IV 4207)

As promised in the interdepartmental conference of October 16, conversations were held in Vienna at the end of last month between a delegate of the Foreign Ministry and a delegate of the Austrian Government for the purpose of facilitating the execution of points I, IV, and V of the Gentlemen's Agreement of July 11.

The following results were obtained in these conversations:

Regarding point I, Regulation of the Treatment of Reich-Germans in Austria and of Austrian Nationals in the Reich, and point V, National Insignia and National Anthems, it was possible in the conversation of the two delegates to arrive at an agreement that the N.S.D.A.P. may re-establish its organization for German citizens in Austria, without having to constitute itself as an association within

<sup>84</sup> Other addressees of this letter were: the Ministry of Justice, the Ministry for Public Enlightenment and Propaganda, the Führer's Deputy, the Reich and Prussian Ministry for Education, the Economic Commissioner of the Führer, Dr. Keppler, the *Auslandsorganisation* of the N.S.D.A.P., the *Flüchtlingshilfswerk* of the N.S.D.A.P., the *Hilfswerk Nordwest* at Bad Godesberg, the Gestapo, and the *Büro von Kursell*.

the meaning of Austrian laws. The organization may be established on the basis of directives issued by the *Landesgruppenleiter* for Austria, who is to have that title.

This result was greatly aided by a conversation which *Gauleiter* Böhle, the head of the *Auslandsorganisation*, had with Schmidt, the Austrian State Secretary for Foreign Affairs. After consultation with Herr Böhle it was decided to postpone for the time being the question of the display of the German flag and the wearing of the party insignia. These two points are to be further clarified on the occasion of the visit of State Secretary Schmidt to Berlin, which is contemplated for the latter part of November.

IV. *Emigré* Problem. The discussion between the two delegates brought out that in the matter of the refugee question, after a general directive had been obtained from Federal Chancellor Schuschnigg, a conference between the representatives of the Austrian Ministries concerned took place in September in which the following rules were laid down:

Austrian refugees in Germany are to be divided into three groups, for purposes of obtaining permission to return to Austria:

a) Persons who, besides crossing the border without permission and belonging to the Austrian Legion, are charged merely with infractions of a political nature, such as possession of an SA uniform, distribution of pamphlets, incitement to strikes and boycotts, etc.

b) Persons who, in addition to infractions listed under a), are charged with other infractions which, however, would be covered by the Austrian amnesty proclaimed in July.

c) Persons chargeable with crimes not yet covered by an amnesty in Austria, such as use of explosives and acts causing death or grave injury to persons.

For the cases listed under a), an amnesty is contemplated at an early date. But since the amnesty requires extensive legislative preparation, especially with regard to the restoration of Austrian citizenship to expatriated persons, the Austrians explained it as unlikely that these preparations can be concluded before the end of the year. For the cases classified under b) an amnesty would have to be granted at a later date; for the cases classified under c) the Austrian Government does not intend to issue a pardon for the time being.

The Austrian negotiator gives as the reason for the proposed procedure the fact that for many reasons the Austrian Government was by no means eager for an early return of the main body of the Austrian refugees. From intercepted letters it was evident that these refugees were taking an altogether negative attitude toward

the Austrian State and threatening further acts of violence after their return. Besides, the return of a large number of refugees would have the undesirable effect of depressing the Austrian labor market.

The German representative pointed out that a major cause of the resentment expressed in the refugees' intercepted letters was the very fact that despite the Agreement of July 11, concluded for the purpose of mutual pacification, the Austrian Government was resisting the return of even those persons whose means of support were rooted in Austria and who could merely be charged with offending against police regulations. The German Government was most anxious that refugees who wished to return because of their economic situation should be permitted to do so soon and that, as far as possible, all other refugees be permitted to enter Austria for the purpose of visiting relatives, etc. This required an amnesty which should be as comprehensive as possible, decreed at an early date. The German negotiator also mentioned that the persons covered by the amnesty must also be exempt from fiscal proceedings and from costs imposed by court order, and that no restrictions should keep them from obtaining licenses or civil service positions, or from continuing their studies, etc. He said that a list of approximately 500 refugees had been prepared, whose return for economic reasons was proposed.

After considerable discussion the delegate of the Austrian Government declared himself prepared to enable a number of Austrian refugees to return to Austria by means of safe-conduct, even before the amnesty had been proclaimed. This could, however, be granted only to refugees falling into class *a*) mentioned above. The persons in question would have to make an application to the Austrian Government for permission to return. These applications would then be promptly examined in Austria, in order to ascertain what charges there were against the persons in question (the police authorities would be instructed to report within 48 hours) and whether, upon their return, the applicants would promptly find housing and employment. Those granted safe-conduct could return to Austria without restrictions and the proceedings pending against them would be suspended, in anticipation of the definitive termination of these proceedings by the approaching amnesty. The Austrian Legation at Berlin was designated by the Austrian negotiator as the agency with which any further negotiations are to be conducted.

I request that the *Hilfswerk* of the N.S.D.A.P. reexamine in the light of the foregoing categories the list already submitted of the 538 refugees who applied for return to Austria, and thereafter make it available to the Foreign Ministry again for transmission to the

Austrian Government. Steps will be taken to assure that the list is reviewed with the utmost rapidity, as promised by the Austrian Government.

Finally, the officers in charge of the *Flüchtlingshilfswerk* and the *Hilfswerk Nordwest* should be asked to suggest to the refugees in their charge that they observe the greatest possible restraint in the letters they write home, so that the project of repatriation of the *émigrés* is not compromised by indiscretions.

WEIZSÄCKER<sup>35</sup>

### No. 177

2020/443792-97

*The German Foreign Ministry to the German Legation in Austria*

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

BERLIN, November 12, 1936.  
(Pol. IV 4379)

I have the honor to enclose the draft of a confidential protocol which is to be signed on the occasion of State Secretary Schmidt's visit to Berlin. You are requested to obtain the consent of the Austrian Government to the text as soon as possible and to report by wire possible proposals for amendment. Likewise, you are requested to transmit at your earliest convenience a report concerning the subjects which the Austrians intend to bring up during the visit.

Likewise enclosed is the draft of a press communiqué regarding the course of the State Secretary's visit.<sup>35a</sup> With respect to this, too, you are requested to report by wire on the attitude and any desire for amendment on the part of the Austrian Government.

*Note.* The individual points of the protocol were drafted in accordance with the proposals of the competent divisions, which in turn first communicated with the departments concerned. The text was revised from the legal point of view by Counselor of Legation Albrecht.<sup>36</sup> The provision concerning the position of Reich-Germans in Austria was approved by telephone by *Gauleiter* Bohle, the head of the *Auslandsorganisation*.

<sup>35</sup> A copy of this letter was transmitted to the German Legation at Vienna for information, with the instruction: "After reexamination, the *Hilfswerk* list will be sent to the Legation as promptly as possible for transmission to the Austrian Government. At the same time please inquire and report whether, as Minister Hornbostel indicated, Counselor of Legation Seemann of the Austrian Legation at Berlin has meanwhile been entrusted with carrying on the further negotiations with the Foreign Ministry in the *émigré* question. By direction: Weizsäcker."

<sup>35a</sup> Not printed.

<sup>36</sup> Of the Legal Department of the German Foreign Ministry.

[Enclosure]

*Protocol*

CONFIDENTIAL

Not to be published

The German Minister for Foreign Affairs, Baron von Neurath, and the Austrian State Secretary for Foreign Affairs, Schmidt, on November . ., 1936, discussed in Berlin, in the name of their Governments, the more important political, economic, and cultural questions pending, particularly as they arise from the execution of the German-Austrian Agreement of July 11, 1936. In this connection the two Governments have agreed on the following points:

## I. ATTITUDE TOWARD COMMUNISM

The two Governments recognize that Communism is the greatest danger menacing the peace and security of Europe and affirm their intention to combat Communist propaganda with all their power and to direct their own activity in this direction.

## II. COLLABORATION IN THE DANUBE REGION

The two Governments agree that the formation of new economic blocs in the Danube region in which the German Reich and Austria do not jointly participate is to be rejected. Accordingly, neither the German nor the Austrian Government will participate in such coalitions without having previously secured the approval of the Government of the other country.

III. EXECUTION OF THE GERMAN-AUSTRIAN AGREEMENT OF  
JULY 11, 19361. *Position of Reich-Germans in Austria.*

German citizens who can identify themselves as such shall be allowed to give the German salute among themselves and to wear the Party badge.

Owners of Austrian inns shall not be prohibited from showing the German flag when they have German citizens as their guests.

2. *Mutual cultural relations.*

(a) In all questions concerning the common German culture, and particularly at international scholarly congresses, close collaboration between the Reich-German and Austrian participants shall be sought for the purpose of joint action and conduct.

(b) Citizens of both countries shall have the opportunity to obtain membership in scholarly societies of the other country and to participate in study groups of these societies.

The scholarly academies of the two countries shall enter into closer scholarly collaboration.

The German-Austrian Scientific Aid [*Die deutsch-österreichische wissenschaftliche Hilfe*] within the framework of German research associations should be expanded into a general organization for scientific exchange between the two countries.

(c) In the appointment of university professors, lecturers, and research assistants, each party shall, by mutual agreement, consider citizens of the other party as much as possible. Citizenship shall have no bearing on the sequence in the lists of candidates.

In addition to the mutual appointments, the Governments will make a point of promoting guest lectures and the exchange of professors, lecturers, and research assistants in all faculties.

(d) The mutual ban on books will be lifted within a reasonable period. The Governments reserve the right, however, to continue the ban on books containing malicious attacks against the State, its institutions and its leaders.

### 3. *Press.*

The mutual ban on newspapers and periodicals shall be lifted in principle. However, both Governments reserve the right to ban the importation of newspapers and periodicals which flagrantly violate the spirit of the Agreement of July 11, 1936.

The distribution of readmitted newspapers and periodicals shall not be hampered in either country; they shall not be discriminated against by special measures in comparison with the domestic newspapers and periodicals, either by the procedure at customs clearance, or censorship before publication, or prohibition of street sales, or exclusion from the mails, or other regulations.

### 4. *Exiles.*

In order to establish peaceful German-Austrian relations, the return of those Austrians who have crossed into German territory but intend to return to Austria and can find employment there without difficulty shall be facilitated by means of a comprehensive amnesty. This amnesty will be proclaimed by the end of this year. It will comprise all punishable acts of a political nature, particularly unlawful departure, membership in the former Austrian Legion, and offenses against the regulations issued in connection with the ban on Austrian parties. It will, moreover, be made to include crimes which come under the internal amnesty of June 1936. Those granted amnesty will not be subject to any prosecution under administrative law, particularly fiscal orders or those concerning costs. Regarding the granting of trade licenses, securing employment, continuation of studies, and the like, they shall henceforth not be

discriminated against in any way. If they have been deprived of Austrian citizenship, they shall be enabled to regain it on easier conditions.

Austrians who crossed into German territory and desire to remain in Germany shall be enabled by the amnesty to enter Austria for temporary stays (visits, vacation trips).

*5. Economic relations.*

(a) The two Governments have agreed that the expansion of commercial relations between the German Reich and Austria shall be started in earnest at once. The German Government is prepared even now to increase substantially the importation into the Reich of agricultural products from Austria, particularly cattle, timber, and dairy products, and as far as possible to purchase all of the surplus agricultural products of Austria. The Austrian Government is prepared to create the conditions necessary for such action through a corresponding increase in the exports from the Reich to Austria.

It has further been agreed that the former barter trade—iron ore against coke—shall be resumed as soon as possible.

(b) The German Government agrees to make available an adequate portion of the schilling fund accruing from German exports to Austria for financing travel from the Reich to Austria.

(c) Negotiations regarding the questions discussed under 5 (a) and (b) will be begun immediately.

(d) The two Governments will appoint Government commissions for the settlement of economic relations between the German Reich and Austria, whose task it shall be to ensure that economic relations between the Reich and Austria develop in the direction contemplated in this Protocol.

No. 178

223/150411

*Memorandum*

Ambassador von Papen telephoned this afternoon. He reported that he had transmitted the draft protocol to State Secretary Schmidt this afternoon. The latter will obtain the opinion of Federal Chancellor Schuschnigg some time tomorrow and then send the definitive reply together with the Austrian wishes. The Legation will then immediately transmit it to the Foreign Ministry by wire.

During the first discussion of the protocol, according to information from Herr von Papen, the State Secretary made the following statements:

Re I. Attitude toward Communism: agreement in principle.

Re II. Collaboration in the Danube region: agreement in principle.

Re III. 1) The position of Reich-Germans in Austria:

Paragraph 1 presumably to be accepted. Re paragraph 2 (flag question), a proposal for amendment will be submitted.

2) Mutual cultural relations: Re sections (a)-(c): agreement in principle. The Austrian Government will submit additional proposals. Concerning 2 (d) (ban on books) as well as

3) (lifting of press ban) there are difficulties as to the time of the lifting of the ban. Regarding the press, presumably an increase will be proposed in the number of periodicals admitted, and the general lifting of the ban contemplated at a later date.

4. Exiles: In this matter the Austrian Government intends first to settle the case of the 538 refugees who wish to return to Austria. A general amnesty is to be proclaimed for illegal border crossings and membership in outlawed political organizations. All offenses beyond that are to be dealt with individually.

5. Economic relations: agreement in principle.

ALTENBURG

BERLIN, November 13, 1936.

## No. 179

2311/484344-55

### *Protocol*<sup>37</sup>

CONFIDENTIAL!

Not to be published

#### *German text*

#### *Austrian counterproposal*

The German Minister for Foreign Affairs, Baron von Neurath, and the Austrian State Secretary for Foreign Affairs, Schmidt, on November . ., 1936, discussed in Berlin, in the name of their Governments, the more important political, economic, and cultural questions pending, particularly as they arise from the execution of the German-Austrian Agreement

Preamble accepted without change.

<sup>37</sup> Various marginal notations and changes in Neurath's hand on the text of this draft protocol appear to have been made on the occasion of his interview with Schmidt on November 21, 1936 (see document No. 182, p. 342). Additions have been indicated by underlining and deletions have been enclosed in brackets.

of July 11, 1936. In this connection, the two Governments have agreed on the following points:

#### I. ATTITUDE TOWARD COMMUNISM

The two Governments recognize that Communism is endangering the peace and security of Europe and affirm their intention to combat Communist propaganda in their countries with all their power.

Number I accepted without change.

#### II. COLLABORATION IN THE DANUBE REGION

The two Governments agree that they will not participate in economic coalitions in the Danube region — bilateral economic treaties excepted — without previous consultation. This statement, insofar as Austria is concerned, does not, of course, refer to the pertinent provisions which are contained in the Rome Protocols and their supplements.

#### II. COLLABORATION IN THE DANUBE REGION

It is desired that "economic coalitions" be replaced by "new, more extensive coalitions." Otherwise, they agree.

Agreed.

#### III. EXECUTION OF THE GERMAN-AUSTRIAN AGREEMENT OF JULY 11, 1936

##### [1. *Position of Reich-Germans in Austria.*

The Federal Government will instruct its authorities not to intervene against German citizens who, with no demonstrative intent, use the German salute among themselves or wear the party badge.]

#### III. EXECUTION OF THE GERMAN-AUSTRIAN AGREEMENT OF JULY 11, 1936

##### [1. *Position of Reich-Germans in Austria.*

The general attitude of the Austrian Government as regards the use of the German salute and the wearing of the party badge in public is maintained at present, for reasons of preserving law and order and of avoiding disturbances which might endanger the Agreement of July 11, 1916, but the Federal Government will instruct its authorities, in cases where German citizens violate this ban with no demonstrative intent, to give

the greatest possible consideration to the fact of their German citizenship.]

Number III 1, par. 2,<sup>38</sup> accepted without change.

III. 1. Decorating inns, etc., in Austria by raising the flag of the German Reich together with Austrian flags is permitted when such inns are frequented by German citizens who are staying in the country on special occasions, for example, conventions, meetings of societies, conducted tours, etc.

2. *Mutual cultural relations.*

a) In all questions concerning the common German culture, and particularly at international scholarly conventions, close collaboration between the Reich-German and Austrian participants shall be sought for the purpose of joint action and conduct.

b) Citizens of both countries shall, in principle, have the opportunity to obtain membership in nonpolitical scholarly societies of the other country and to participate in study groups of these societies. Doubts as to the scholarly character of individual societies shall be discussed and settled by mutual agreement.

The scholarly academies shall enter into closer scholarly collaboration, but political factors must be excluded.

The German-Austrian Scientific Aid within the framework of German research associations should be expanded into a general organization for scientific exchange between the two countries.

2. *Mutual cultural relations.*

Number III 2 accepted without change; it is only desired that the Committee mentioned in paragraph e) should not bear the name "[German-Austrian] Committee for Cultural Affairs," but "[Austro-German] Committee for Cultural Affairs Between Germany and Austria."

<sup>38</sup> i.e., the paragraph in the opposite column, which Neurath numbered III. 1.

c) In the appointment of university professors, lecturers, and research assistants, each party shall, by mutual agreement, consider citizens of the other party as much as possible. Citizenship shall have no bearing on the sequence in the lists of candidates.

In addition to the mutual appointments, the Governments will make a point of promoting guest lectures and the exchange of professors, lecturers, and research assistants in all faculties.

d) The mutual ban on books will be lifted within a reasonable period. The Governments reserve the right, however, to continue the ban on books containing malicious attacks against the State, its institutions, its history, and its leaders.

e) In order to organize cultural collaboration between the two countries, a joint committee is contemplated, which shall consist of representatives from the two countries. This committee will be named "[German-Austrian] Committee for Cultural Affairs Between Germany and Austria."

3. Press.

It is agreed that the guiding principles laid down in point III of the Agreement of July 11, 1936, shall continue to apply in their entirety, and particularly that the removal of the ban on the mutual importation of newspapers and periodicals contemplated therein shall be continued.

In order to attain this objective it has been agreed to ex-

3. Press.

Number III 3, par. 1, accepted without change.

Distribution?

Wiener Zeitung

Accordingly, the Austrian Government is prepared to re-

change by December 15 a list of those newspapers and periodicals on which the ban shall be maintained even beyond this date. But the ban shall be confined, as far as possible, only to newspapers and periodicals the distribution of which appears undesirable from the point of view of preserving law and order. It is understood that in case of flagrant violations of the Agreement of July 11 newspapers and periodicals may again be banned.

admit for importation or distribution in Austria the following newspapers published in Germany.

*B. Z. am Mittag*  
*Köln[ische] Zeitung*

The Government of the German Reich on its part is prepared to readmit for importation or distribution in Germany the following newspapers published in Austria.

*Neues Wiener Tagblatt*  
*Neuigkeits Weltblatt*

In the case of periodicals there shall henceforth in principle be no ban. But the admission of periodicals the distribution of which appears undesirable from the point of view of preserving law and order shall continue to be prohibited. [Similarly, predominantly political periodicals shall not be admitted.] In order to attain this objective, lists of those periodicals on which the ban shall continue in force shall be exchanged between the competent authorities of the two sides by January 31, 1937. All other periodicals shall be admitted, beginning January 31, 1937, under the general regulations applicable to the foreign press. It is understood that in case of flagrant violations of the Agreement of July 11 periodicals may again be banned.

The two parties have, moreover, agreed to consult each other from time to time regarding a further increase in the number of newspapers to be ad-

#### 4. *Exiles.*

The Austrian Government is prepared:

a) To examine as soon as possible, the list which will be furnished by the German Government of about 500 of the Austrian refugees who[, for economic reasons,] request to return to Austria; the offenses, if any, and the opportunities for employment will be examined in each case, and the results will be communicated immediately to the German Government.

b) Similarly, to examine future applications with their supporting documents supplied by the German Government as soon as possible with the above considerations in mind, and to communicate the results to the German Government.

c) To put no new obstacles in the way of employment of refugees permitted to return under points a) and b) above, and to release them from any administrative penal proceedings, particularly fiscal orders or those concerning costs, as well as not to discriminate against them in any way in the future as regards the granting of trade licenses, securing employment, continuation of studies, and the like.

d) In the case of refugees whose repatriation is not approved, to consider sympathetically applications for short stays

mitted by both sides, so that a gradual lifting of the press ban may be achieved.

#### 4. *Exiles.*

III 4 a) accepted with the following changes:

1) After "list" there shall be inserted "of about 500." Accepted.

2) "for economic reasons" to be deleted.

III 4 b) accepted without change.

c) To put no [new] obstacles in the way of employment of refugees permitted to return under point a) above; these repatriates shall not be subject to prosecution either by the courts or by the police.

d) "Settlement of economic and legal affairs" to be replaced by "settlement of demonstrably urgent affairs"; furthermore, "to

in Austria under safe-conduct in particularly deserving and urgent cases (such as death or serious illness of close relatives living in Austria, [settlement of economic and legal affairs]).

e) To render possible, by enacting the necessary legal provisions, the re-enfranchisement of Austrian refugees whose Austrian citizenship was revoked.

f) To proclaim a general amnesty for illegal border crossings or membership in National Socialist organizations in Austria or in the former "Austrian Legion" or the former "Fighting League of German-Austrians" in Germany.]

#### 5. *Economic relations.*

a) The two Governments have agreed that the expansion of commercial relations between the German Reich and Austria shall be started at once in order to increase substantially the volume of trade on both sides. The German Government is prepared even now to increase substantially the importation into the Reich of agricultural products from Austria, particularly cattle, timber, and dairy products, and to absorb the surplus agricultural products of Austria insofar as the required schilling amounts can be provided for this purpose by increasing exports from the Reich to Austria. After the conversation just held regarding ways and means to this end the two Governments have

consider sympathetically" to be replaced by "to recommend sympathetic consideration by the competent authorities."

Agreed.

III 4 d) Otherwise accepted.

e) To provide the possibility, by enacting legal provisions, for the re-enfranchisement of Austrian refugees whose Austrian citizenship was revoked and who are stateless.

f) This paragraph to be omitted. State Secretary Schmidt wishes to make an oral statement in the matter.

Difficult problem.<sup>39</sup>

#### 5. *Economic relations.*

"Ways and means to this end" to be replaced by "ways and means leading to a general increase in mutual exports."

Accepted.

<sup>39</sup> A further notation in Neurath's hand reading: "Told him might discuss at some future date," was stricken out.

agreed that the negotiations shall be started on December 7 in Vienna.

b) In order to sustain the travel account of the German Clearing Office with the Austrian National Bank, an additional amount of 4.3 million schillings shall be provided. This amount will be available for traveling purposes through daily withdrawals from the clearing account, with the concurrence of the Austrian National Bank and the German Reichsbank, beginning December 15, 1936.<sup>89a</sup> The same amount shall be paid into the clearing account after the conclusion of the delivery contract which is being negotiated by the Austrian Ministry for National Defense.

The German Government agrees that henceforth an adequate portion of the schilling fund accruing from German exports to Austria shall be made available for financing travel from the Reich to Austria.

[c) The two Governments will appoint Government commissions for the settlement of economic relations between the German Reich and Austria, whose task it shall be to insure that economic relations between the Reich and Austria develop in the direction contemplated in this Protocol.]

b) Accepted, but "the same amount" is to be replaced by "this amount."

III 5 b) paragraph 2 accepted.

c) Is to be omitted at the request of the Austrians.

<sup>89a</sup> At this point a footnote in the original reads as follows: "Here we ask the insertion of a provision insuring that funds in this amount are advanced by the Austrian Government. Currency receipts particularly good."

## No. 180

2020/443808-09

*The German Ambassador in Austria (Papen) to the Foreign Minister*

URGENT

VIENNA, November 15, 1936.

CONFIDENTIAL

DEAR NEURATH: In yesterday's conversation with State Secretary Schmidt, on which I have just reported separately,<sup>40</sup> he expressed the desire that the atmosphere between our two countries be improved by an exchange of suitable friendly statements. In the interview he would give the Austrian press at his departure, he, the State Secretary, was prepared to stress the extraordinary accomplishments of the National Socialist Government, and especially of the Führer, for the New Germany, if he were certain that the Führer, when greeting him, would make an equally amiable remark about the Federal Chancellor.

I wholeheartedly support this idea; to date, nothing complimentary has ever been said by any Austrian official regarding the accomplishments of National Socialist Germany, and I know that the Federal Chancellor is only waiting for an opportunity to make such a statement on some official occasion. Perhaps it could be arranged that State Secretary Schmidt, in an interview which he would give to the Austrian press after his reception by the Führer, would be authorized to make approximately the following statement: "In the course of the political conversation, which touched on all problems of importance at this time, the Führer and Chancellor paid tribute to the efforts of the Federal Chancellor to improve the external and the internal situation of Austria, and recalled the years when His Excellency Chancellor von Schuschnigg had fought in the ranks of the old Austro-Hungarian Army as a brave soldier for the common German destiny."

I assume that the Führer would be willing to make such a statement, and I would be grateful if you would ask him about it so that I can inform the State Secretary in time.

Although not everything has been conceded, the Austrian counter-proposal with respect to the protocol nevertheless strikes me as considerable progress, so that I am convinced of the usefulness of the journey for our political work. With regard to a new Austrian Minister [to Berlin], Baron von Hammerstein, the present Minister of Justice, appears to me to be a suitable National personage. Perhaps you could touch on this informally.

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<sup>40</sup> Not printed.

Many thanks for the invitation to dinner on November 19. My wife is still in the mountains and regrets not being able to join me.

With best regards and Heil Hitler,

Yours,

PAPEN

P.S. I am enclosing a few ideas for your conversation with the State Secretary.<sup>41</sup>

### No. 181

115/118205-13

*The Chief of the Presidential Chancellery (Meissner)  
to the Foreign Minister*

PERSONAL!

NOVEMBER 20, 1936.

CONFIDENTIAL!

Received November 21, 1936.

MY DEAR REICH MINISTER: I have the honor to transmit herewith for your confidential information a memorandum of the conversation of yesterday between the Führer and Chancellor and the Austrian State Secretary for Foreign Affairs, Dr. Schmidt.

Since the Führer has not yet approved the text of this memorandum, may I reserve the right to communicate to you later any possible changes and additions ordered by the Führer.

Heil Hitler.

DR. MEISSNER

[Enclosure]

*Memorandum of the Reception of Austrian State Secretary Dr. Schmidt by the Führer and Chancellor on Thursday, November 19, 1936, at 11:30 a.m.*

In addition to State Secretary Schmidt there were present at the conversation:

Foreign Minister Baron von Neurath

The Austrian Minister in Berlin, Dr. Tauschitz

Ambassador von Papen

State Secretary Dr. Meissner.

The Führer stated that he wished to explain his general conception of the European situation, from which the German attitude in individual issues could then be deduced:

The historical element of the present and the near future is the fact that in Bolshevism a philosophy with aggressive military ten-

<sup>41</sup> "A marginal notation in Neurath's hand reads as follows: "The Führer agrees with this proposal. I have informed Papen."

dencies has been created. The Bolshevik experiment, ignoring in Asiatic fashion individual human life and human destiny, has been carried out brutally and has partially succeeded, under the spiritual leadership of the Jewish ruling group, which, detached from historical and national traditions, has destroyed the existing elements of culture and custom. This phenomenon will influence the present and future history of Europe and the world just as much as did the advent of Christianity, Mohammedanism, and the Reformation in past centuries. The Bolshevik idea is attempting to dominate the world. [*Die bolschewistische Idee versucht, die Welt in ihren Zwang zu ziehen.*] I consider this problem to be more serious than do other statesmen of Europe, particularly the British, who believe that such ideas could not take hold of the British people in their insular position. The German middle classes did not at first recognize this danger either. The most menacing situation at present is in France. There are people who tell me: Why do you not let France go on her way toward catastrophe? To those I reply: I am afraid that such a catastrophe would not stop at the borders. It would likewise engulf Belgium and Holland. Nor do I know whether, from a political and military point of view, we ourselves are yet sufficiently consolidated to withstand such an everspreading catastrophe. Besides, however, I am not interested in adding to our territory, densely populated as it is, more land where people are living who perhaps will not be good Germans at all; and, thirdly, we ourselves can exist only with difficulty if we are surrounded by groups of Bolshevik states exclusively, for economically we depend upon trade and barter. Even the completion of the Four-Year Plan, which, incidentally, will have been concluded in no more than 2 years and 8 months, does not relieve us of the necessity of living in economic association with other European countries. As regards volume and goods, our export trade has constantly increased in recent years and will continue to grow. Even though we intend to become economically more independent through the Four-Year Plan, our economic relations with other countries will not thereby be severed, but only shifted. We shall not and cannot detach ourselves from our European community; for that reason I cannot face with indifference the danger of catastrophes in our neighboring countries. This is also the reason why I have taken such an unequivocal position in the Spanish affair; a defeat of the nationalist forces in Spain would immediately have repercussions on the nationalist circles in France. The Blum government is gradually accustoming the French to live together with Bolshevism. He is what Kurt Eisner was for Bavaria and Kerenski for Russia. The

French middle classes are no factor; nor are the veterans' organizations and the members of the *Croix de Feu* sufficiently organized to defeat Bolshevism. There remains, therefore, only the army; the French Navy is already entirely Red; the picture which the army presents, however, is not quite uniform, so that in the over-all view the chances for Communism are 60 or 70 percent and against, 30 or 40 percent. When I consider this critical over-all situation, I conclude that the part of Europe which is still capable of resistance is under the obligation to hold together. Central Europe is seriously menaced by Bolshevism, and I have been trying to convince the countries of Central Europe again and again that we have no aggressive intentions, but only that of warding off Bolshevism. In this connection two problems arise: Czechoslovakia and Hungary. As to Czechoslovakia, I have tried repeatedly to establish satisfactory relations with her. In vain, unfortunately. However, it is plain that such relations are only possible if the 3.7 million Germans there do not remain second-class citizens; not only must they be permitted their national and cultural activities, but they must also be given opportunities for employment.

I proposed reaching a Western Europe settlement providing for a limitation of armaments; such a limitation of armaments would have been acceptable because of the extent to which it would have calmed the political situation in Europe. My proposals were rejected; since then each country is seeking to protect itself on its own. France—just as she made a compact with the Turks against European countries in past centuries—has concluded a pact with Soviet Russia; Czechoslovakia acceded to this pact. I cannot possibly allow Germany to become exposed to such a danger as arises from Russian air bases on the German-Czech frontier. I have therefore opposed it with a strong German Air Force. I do not want war, but neither do I want Germany to be in a position like that in 1914. However, this also entails the obligation not to get lost in matters of minor political importance. I understand Hungary's mentality completely. However, Germany also had to make a serious renunciation with a view to loftier political reason; this is something like a collective responsibility for Europe. I do not consider it opportune if Budapest now raises claims for revision in every direction. This cannot be achieved; one might, perhaps, from military and political viewpoints, succeed with one such claim for revision in one direction but not with the whole list of these wishes. Rumania and Yugoslavia are more important to me as outposts against Bolshevism than if they were weakened by war or threats of war. Hungary cannot count on Germany's aid in such ventures. We will be happy if we succeed in

keeping the Balkan countries away from the Bolshevik front. I am also prepared to establish better relations with Czechoslovakia, but Czechoslovakia must then sever her connection with Russia.

This idea of European consolidation has contributed toward creating the understanding between Germany and Italy, and it must also help to remove any obstacles to an understanding in Central Europe. There is a European federation of expediency, the members of which are primarily Germany, Italy, Austria, and Hungary; this federation does not need to establish any program; a *rapprochement* of these countries among themselves takes place automatically, particularly in times of crisis. Later on Spain will join, perhaps Poland also, and perhaps some time later even France. I should welcome it if Yugoslavia and Rumania soon joined it. I should consider it a great advantage if the Austrian Government would also make representations to the Hungarian Government against such unlimited revisionism.

STATE SECRETARY SCHMIDT: I have already exerted influence upon the Hungarian Government to this effect, and also upon Czechoslovakia in line with your statements.

THE FÜHRER: We have organized the German peacetime army [*Friedensarmee*], and the wartime army [*Kriegsarmee*] is being organized. The greatest danger for Germany would arise if this rearming were to result in clouding sober political thinking, as was the case in both countries in 1914. That is also the danger in any Hungarian rearmament, which might be burdened with this mentality. I intentionally excluded Alsace-Lorraine, as well as other German claims for revision. Hungary would have to do this too. The League of Nations is the battleground against an understanding among the European nations; I am surprised that Italy has still remained in it. Through her withdrawal from the League of Nations, Germany has derived nothing but advantage and has regained her freedom of action. I should consider it fortunate if all authoritarian states withdrew.

STATE SECRETARY SCHMIDT: We are likewise of the opinion that the League of Nations has lost its political importance, but for us smaller nations the situation is somewhat different. We have economic ties through loans, etc. It is perhaps well also that some of the authoritarian countries are still in the League of Nations in order to defend their point of view against Bolshevism there. As far as our military and financial policy is concerned, we have already left the League of Nations, but certain other things, such as the conversion of the League loan, are still holding us back. I have the impression, moreover, that Italy will soon withdraw.

THE FÜHRER: But then, in your place and that of Hungary, I would also withdraw.

THE FÜHRER, continuing: I have always been the greatest friend of an Anglo-German understanding. The British mentality is a sober one and can be influenced by force only. I experienced this myself when I conferred with Sir Simon [*sic*] here in Berlin. Only when I assured him that the German Air Force had reached the strength of that of the English were we able to express ourselves with mutual respect; thus our naval agreement came into being. I advise the Italians as well as the English to resume mutual good relations as soon as possible. I also believe that if England is confronted with a considerable European coalition of countries outside the League of Nations, she will also change her policy with regard to the League of Nations.

Following this conversation, State Secretary Schmidt introduced to the Führer the members of his staff who had accompanied him to Berlin.

Duration of the conversation: one hour and fifty minutes.

(The conversation recorded here was preceded by a private conversation between the Führer and Chancellor and State Secretary Schmidt which lasted approximately 30 minutes.)

DR. MEISSNER

## No. 182

2871/563839-47

### *Protocol*

CONFIDENTIAL

Not to be published

The German Minister for Foreign Affairs, Baron von Neurath, and the Austrian State Secretary for Foreign Affairs, Schmidt, on November 21, 1936, discussed in Berlin, in the name of their Governments, the more important political, economic, and cultural questions pending, particularly as they arise from the execution of the German-Austrian Agreement of July 11, 1936. In this connection, the two Governments have agreed on the following points:

#### I. ATTITUDE TOWARD COMMUNISM

The two Governments recognize that Communism is endangering the peace and security of Europe, and affirm their intention to combat communist propaganda in their countries with all their power.

## II. COLLABORATION IN THE DANUBE REGION

The two Governments agree that they will not participate in new, more extensive economic coalitions in the Danube region—bilateral economic treaties excepted—without previous consultation. This statement, insofar as Austria is concerned, does not, of course, refer to the pertinent provisions which are contained in the Rome Protocols and their supplements.

III. EXECUTION OF THE GERMAN-AUSTRIAN AGREEMENT OF  
JULY 11, 19361. *Position of Reich-Germans in Austria.*

Decorating inns, etc., in Austria by raising the flag of the German Reich together with Austrian flags is permitted when such inns are frequented by German citizens who are staying in the country on special occasions, for example, congresses, meetings of societies, conducted tours, etc.

2. *Mutual cultural relations.*

a) In all questions concerning the common German culture, and particularly at international scholarly congresses, close collaboration between the Reich-German and Austrian participants shall be sought for the purpose of joint action and conduct.

b) Citizens of both countries shall, in principle, have the opportunity to obtain membership in nonpolitical scholarly societies of the other country and to participate in study groups of these societies. Doubts as to the scholarly character of individual societies shall be discussed and settled by mutual agreement.

The scholarly academies shall enter into closer scholarly collaboration, but political factors must be excluded.

The German-Austrian Scientific Aid within the framework of German research associations should be expanded into a general organization for scientific exchange between the two countries.

c) In the appointment of university professors, lecturers, and research assistants, each party shall, by mutual agreement, consider citizens of the other party as much as possible. Citizenship shall have no bearing on the sequence in the lists of candidates.

In addition to the mutual appointments, the Governments will make a point of promoting guest lectures and the exchange of professors, lecturers, and research assistants in all faculties.

d) The mutual ban on books will be lifted within a reasonable period. The Governments reserve the right, however, to continue the

ban on books containing malicious attacks against the State, its institutions, its history, and its leaders.

e) In order to organize cultural collaboration between the two countries, a joint committee is contemplated which shall consist of representatives from the two countries. This committee will be named "Committee for Cultural Affairs Between Germany and Austria."

### 3. *Press.*

It is agreed that the guiding principles laid down in point III of the Agreement of July 11, 1936, shall continue to apply in their entirety and particularly that the removal of the ban on the mutual importation of newspapers and periodicals contemplated therein shall be continued.

Accordingly, the Austrian Government is prepared to readmit for importation or distribution in Austria the following newspapers published in Germany.

*B. Z. am Mittag*  
*Kölnische Zeitung.*

The Government of the Reich on its part is prepared to readmit for importation or distribution in Germany the following newspapers published in Austria.

*Neues Wiener Tagblatt*  
*Neuigkeits Weltblatt.*

In the case of periodicals there shall henceforth in principle be no ban. But the admission of periodicals the distribution of which appears undesirable from the point of view of preserving law and order shall continue to be prohibited. In order to attain this objective, lists of those periodicals on which the ban shall continue in force shall be exchanged between the competent authorities of the two sides by January 31, 1937. All other periodicals shall be admitted, beginning January 31, 1937, under the general regulations applicable to the foreign press. It is understood that in case of flagrant violations of the Agreement of July 11, periodicals may again be banned.

The two parties have, moreover, agreed to consult each other from time to time regarding a further increase in the number of newspapers to be admitted at the time, so that a gradual lifting of the press ban may be achieved.

### 4. *Exiles.*

The Austrian Government is prepared:

a) To examine, as soon as possible, the list which will be furnished by the German Government of about 500 Austrian refugees who, for

economic reasons, request to return to Austria; the offenses, if any, and the opportunities for employment will be examined in each case, and the results will be communicated immediately to the German Government.

b) Similarly, to examine future applications with their supporting documents supplied by the German Government as soon as possible with the above-mentioned considerations in mind, and to communicate the results to the German Government.

c) To put no obstacles in the way of employment of refugees permitted to return under point a) above. These repatriates shall not be subject to prosecution either by the courts or by the police.

d) To consider sympathetically, in the case of refugees whose repatriation is not approved, applications for short stays in Austria under safe-conduct in particularly deserving and urgent cases (such as death or serious illness of close relatives living in Austria, settlement of demonstrably urgent affairs).

e) To provide the possibility, by enacting legal provisions, for the re-enfranchisement of Austrian refugees whose Austrian citizenship was revoked and who are stateless.

##### *5. Economic relations.*

a) The two Governments have agreed that the expansion of commercial relations between the German Reich and Austria shall be started at once in order to increase substantially the volume of trade on both sides. The German Government is prepared even now to increase substantially the importation into the Reich of agricultural products from Austria, particularly cattle, timber, and dairy products, and to absorb the surplus agricultural products of Austria insofar as the required schilling amounts can be provided for this purpose by increasing exports from the Reich to Austria. After the conversation just held regarding ways and means leading to a general increase in mutual exports, the two Governments have agreed that the negotiations shall be started on December 7 in Vienna.

b) From the schilling account of the German Clearing Office with the Austrian National Bank, 50,000 schillings will be withdrawn daily from November 25, 1936 to January 31, 1937—in addition to such funds formerly provided for travel purposes as might still be on hand—and, beginning December 15, will be made available for travel from the Reich to Austria. As soon as a final settlement regarding the financing of travel from the Reich to Austria is reached in the impending negotiations, the funds advanced in this manner will be debited to the quota later reserved for travel, insofar as they

have not already been previously covered by payments from additional transactions being negotiated between the competent German and Austrian authorities.

The German Government agrees that henceforth an adequate portion of the schilling fund accruing from German exports to Austria shall be made available for financing travel from the Reich to Austria.

Done in duplicate and signed at Berlin, November 21, 1936.

BARON VON NEURATH

GUIDO SCHMIDT

No. 183

2020/443832-33

*The German Foreign Ministry to Various German Diplomatic Missions*<sup>42</sup>

Cipher Telegram

BERLIN, November 21, 1936.

(e. o. Pol. IV 4612)

For the orientation of your conversation on Austrian State Secretary Schmidt's visit to Berlin, I refer to the final communiqué circulated by D.N.B. on November 20.<sup>43</sup> The visit, which was satisfactory in every respect, signifies a further step along the path entered upon with the Agreement of July 11. A number of concrete problems important to both countries were discussed in detail in frank and cordial conversations, and were brought to a point which must be regarded as a gratifying advance:

Besides defining the common attitude toward Communism and economic cooperation in the Danube region, questions concerning the execution of the Agreement of July 11 were settled, particularly in the cultural and economic fields; likewise, a certain amount of progress was made in the question of the repatriation of Austrian refugees, the admission of German books and periodicals in Austria, and the position of Reich-Germans in Austria.

The subjects discussed were set down in a confidential protocol.

DIECKHOFF

<sup>42</sup> As indicated on an accompanying list: list not printed.

<sup>43</sup> Not printed.

## No. 184

115/118214-15

*Memorandum by the Foreign Minister*

RM 838

Today, before the signing of the Protocol, I once more pointed out to State Secretary Schmidt the fact that we were definitely counting on a National-Socialist Party newspaper being admitted to Austria, the *Völkischer Beobachter* if possible. Herr Schmidt promised this with certainty, but declared that he considered permission for the *Völkischer Beobachter* impossible. If this promise by State Secretary Schmidt should not be fulfilled, admission of Federal Chancellor Schuschnigg's paper into Germany would have to be withdrawn by us. Incidentally, Herr Schmidt denied that the Federal Chancellor had anything at all to do with this paper now. For more than a year he had had no connection with it.

Further negotiations regarding the police agreement are to be conducted between the Legation and Herr Schmidt in Vienna.

Finally, I once more pointed out emphatically to State Secretary Schmidt the necessity of arranging for the inclusion of the National forces in Austria in the Government to a larger extent and at a greater speed than hitherto and, furthermore, of discontinuing the repressive measures against members of the National Socialist movement in Austria. I called Herr Schmidt's attention to the fact that we, honestly executing the Agreement of July 11, had exerted our influence in every way possible on the Party authorities both here and in Austria. If, nevertheless, these authorities saw that the Agreement was not carried out by Austria in a similar spirit, there was danger that incidents and unrest would again arise, for which we would, however, have to disclaim all responsibility. Herr Schmidt tried to assure us that the Austrian Government would do everything to bring about the gradual decrease of measures for combatting National and National Socialist forces in Austria. In this connection, he referred to the latest reshuffling of the Cabinet and asked for patience. In this conversation, again, fear of the dynamism of the National Socialist movement and of the huge German State was obvious throughout.

Finally Herr Schmidt asked me to repay his visit soon in Vienna. To this I answered that I would first see what effect our discussions had in Vienna. Herr Schmidt asked me not to postpone the visit

too long and, if possible, to come in the second half of January or in the beginning of February. I reserved my decision in this matter.

V. N[EURATH]

BERLIN, November 21, 1936.

### No. 185

2020/443838-41

#### *The German Ambassador in Austria (Papen) to the Führer and Chancellor*

Tgb. Nr. A. 6639

VIENNA, November 24, 1936.

Received November 26, 1936.

(Pol. IV 4737)

Subject: The Berlin visit of State Secretary Schmidt.

I have today reported<sup>44</sup> in detail on the reaction of the domestic and foreign press to State Secretary Schmidt's Berlin visit.

It might be added that from the many remarks made by the State Secretary and his escort during the visit and the return trip, a deep inner satisfaction with the success of this first visit was visible. Herr Schmidt seemed especially touched by the human and amiable manner in which the Führer had discussed the Austrian question with him. He had been deeply impressed by the detailed picture of the present European situation which the Führer drew during the conversation—always in the light of the terrible Bolshevik danger—and especially the reference to the fact that German rearmament had absolutely no aggressive character and that Germany wanted nothing but a secure [*gesicherten*] peace. He had evidently expected to receive rather "sabre-rattling" impressions in Berlin, and the remark therefore escaped him, with great relief, that "in Rome they play with fire much more than in Berlin!"

The conversation with Field Marshal von Blomberg regarding our willingness to help Austria rearm—including long-term credits—and especially the extremely cordial reception and greetings by Minister President Göring, had aroused in the Austrian State Secretary the feeling of an honest friendship sincerely sought by us.

It had likewise interested the State Secretary to be able thoroughly to discuss European problems and the further development of German-Austrian relations with the Reich Foreign Minister. He told me that the conversation with this "intelligent and prudent diplomat" had been of great value to him.

<sup>44</sup> Marginal comment in Neurath's hand: "To whom."

It was regrettable that Berlin showed itself in one monotonous gray of rain and snow and that there was only little time to give the State Secretary personal impressions of the "New Germany." In this connection I am very much in favor of the Führer's intention to honor the State Secretary soon with a personal invitation, which would give him an opportunity to get an impression of the relationship between the German people and their Führer.

Nevertheless, the short sightseeing trip to Gatow to the Air War Academy and to the Richthofen Squadron, and the inspection of the Air Ministry, which took place under the guidance of the Minister President, impressed the Austrian guests very much. They seemed especially enthusiastic about the architectural beauty and, at the same time, the simplicity of the great new buildings.

The manifold personal impressions, as well as the sympathetic accompanying music of the press in both countries, have undoubtedly made the trip a great success in easing the psychological tension.

The practical result remains to be seen. The gratifying, though modest, progress which was embodied in the Protocol was in the main negotiated in Vienna and could not be expanded in Berlin, since the State Secretary had departed with strict instructions from the Federal Chancellor. It seemed, however, that the friendly reception of the State Secretary by the Party officials has left an impression with regard to the further development of our relations that is not quite correct. Minister Glaise-Horstenau told me today that the Federal Chancellor, well satisfied with the course of the visit, had remarked that "Berlin's domestic demands were not after all so great as he had feared" and that "Papen was much more National Socialistic than Hitler and Göring." The result of this impression is an already noticeable stiffening in regard to the fulfillment of our demands respecting amnesty and appointment of National elements.

I therefore intend to disturb these rosy dreams somewhat and to make clear again to the Federal Chancellor that the friendliness shown in Berlin was based entirely on the assumption that the persecution of Austrian National elements would be conclusively terminated, and that he would be deceiving himself further regarding the process of recuperation [*Gesundungsprozess*] if he believed that he was to draw such conclusions from the Berlin visit.

State Secretary Schmidt in a parting interview quoted as the outcome of his journey Florian Geyer's beautiful phrase: "A death blow to German disunity." During the trip back he said to me: "Germany without Hitler is inconceivable today." Therefore I hope that he has personally understood the deep meaning of this phrase.

PAPEN

C. GERMAN DISILLUSIONMENT WITH SCHUSCHNIGG AND  
PRESSURE ON ITALY, NOVEMBER 1936–JANUARY 1937

No. 186

1744/403120-21

*The German Legation in Austria to the German Foreign Ministry*

A 6753

VIENNA, November 27, 1936.

Subject: Speech by the Federal Chancellor at Klagenfurt on November 26.

At a convocation of Party officials of the Fatherland Front at Klagenfurt on November 26, Federal Chancellor Schuschnigg made a speech in which he set forth his basic attitude toward the Agreement of July 11 and toward National Socialism in Austria. As in previous speeches, though in a sharper manner, the Federal Chancellor denied any effect on domestic policy in Austria. This sharpness is to be attributed chiefly to the attacks to which he was recently exposed at Klosterneuburg because of the Agreement of July 11 by officials belonging to the Fatherland Front, who were worried about their positions.

The Fatherland movement, he stated, has three opponents: Communism, from which, as he had found it proper to state the day after the signing of the German-Japanese Agreement, no acute danger was threatening; National Socialism, which he called "Nazism"; and defeatism within its own ranks. The Government's attitude toward National Socialism was, sometimes out of short-sightedness, and often undoubtedly intentionally, connected with the Agreements of July 11. In regard to these Agreements it was a matter of "Agreements between States, which could have nothing to do with questions relating to domestic policy." National Socialism in Austria—and Austria should be concerned only with National Socialism within her own borders, because German National Socialism must remain outside the Fatherland Front's range of political theory or action—confronted the Government and the Fatherland Front as an enemy and opponent. This struggle was therefore an exclusively domestic matter and should not prevent every success of the German Reich from being received with pleasure and satisfaction.

In his further remarks the Federal Chancellor turned against the "eternal defeatism" within their own ranks and demanded popular confidence in the Government. How Schuschnigg pictures the relationship between his authoritarian government and the people appears from a remark which he made to some officials of the Fatherland Front in the Tyrol. He declared: "The people are nothing!"

If I have 300 devoted officials, men like you, in every province of Austria, Austria will belong to the Fatherland Front."

The text of the speech as reproduced by the *Wiener Zeitung* of the 27th is enclosed.<sup>45</sup>

By direction:  
BARON VON STEIN

No. 187

1744/403111

*The German Foreign Ministry to the German Legation in Austria*  
Telegram

No. 158

BERLIN, November 28, 1936.  
(Pol. IV 4800)

For the Ambassador personally.

Please call on the Federal Chancellor and speak to him in my name regarding his speech at the convocation of Party officials of the Fatherland Front at Klagenfurt. Please express my astonishment at his remarks and in that connection ask whether the speech is to be considered as a return for the visit of State Secretary Schmidt to Berlin and for the friendly way in which he was received by State and Party officials. Does the Federal Chancellor really believe that he can continue ruthlessly to take measures against National Socialism in Austria and at the same time follow with the Reich "a common course in questions of race [*Volkstum*]?"

In view of the Federal Chancellor's speech, a return visit by me to Vienna is out of the question for the time being.

NEURATH

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<sup>45</sup> Not printed here.

## No. 188

1687/396547-50

*The German Foreign Ministry to Various German Diplomatic Missions and to the Consulate General at Geneva*<sup>46</sup>

SECRET

BERLIN, November 28, 1936.

(Pol. I 2736 g II)

For information only!

In continuation of our previous instruction of November 21, 1936.

The discussions with the Austrian State Secretary for Foreign Affairs, Dr. Guido Schmidt, on the occasion of his visit to Berlin, were in the main conducted by the Foreign Minister in person.

## I. GERMAN-AUSTRIAN RELATIONS

The conversations first provided the opportunity to discuss German-Austrian relations in general. Certain false ideas that exist in Vienna regarding conditions in Germany and the attitude of the German Government toward Austria had to be corrected. In this connection, it was also possible to point out to State Secretary Schmidt the necessity of seeing to the inclusion of Austrian National forces in the Government to a greater extent and at a more rapid tempo than heretofore, as well as of stopping the persecution of members of the National Socialist movement in Austria. Herr Schmidt's attention was called to the fact that the Reich was striving faithfully with all the means at its command to carry out the Agreement of July 11; but if the Reich should see that Austria was not carrying out the Agreement in the same spirit, then there was danger that incidents and disturbances would again arise, for which we would have to disclaim all responsibility. In response to this, State Secretary Schmidt gave his assurance that the Austrian Government would do everything in order to effect the gradual repeal of the belligerent measures against the National and National Socialist forces in Austria. He referred in this connection to the latest reorganization of the Austrian Cabinet and asked us to have patience. His statements plainly revealed his anxiety at the dynamism of the National Socialist movement and of the Reich with respect to Austria.

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<sup>46</sup> Addressees of this instruction were the German Embassies in Rome, Paris, London, Warsaw, Moscow, Ankara, Tokyo, Nanking; the Legations in Belgrade, Bucharest, Prague, Sofia, Athens, Brussels, Bern, Copenhagen, Budapest; and the Consulate General at Geneva.

## II. THE HAPSBURG QUESTION

The Hapsburg question was brought up by State Secretary Schmidt himself, who asked what position the Reich would take on a possible restoration. The Reich Foreign Minister replied that we were absolutely opposed to a restoration and were in agreement with Austria's other neighbors in this respect. The Reich Foreign Minister explained that a restoration of the Hapsburgs could only have dire consequences for Austria, too, in her present situation. The State Secretary tried to refute this, but could not deny the reference to the anti-Reich attitude of the Austrian Legitimists. He stated in conclusion that the question was by no means acute. From the whole nature of the conversation it was unmistakably evident, however, that the Austrian Government is at least toying with the idea of a restoration.

## III. AUSTRIA'S RELATIONS WITH ITALY

The further course of the conversation revealed that the Austrian Government intends to rely heavily on Italy for support, as heretofore. When it was pointed out that this policy would probably meet with little sympathy from the Austrian people, the State Secretary remarked that the dislike for the Italians had definitely abated in Austria. He also asserted in this connection that the Austrian Government, through its good relations with Rome, had succeeded in obtaining a number of concessions for the South Tyrolese; for example, it had frequently obtained the release of persons who had been imprisoned because of their German views. To the query as to whether the Austrian Government had also succeeded in putting a stop to the Italianization efforts in South Tyrol, Herr Schmidt had to answer in the negative. To the statement of the State Secretary that the improvement in German-Italian relations had come about as a result of the Agreement of July 11, hence through Austria, the Reich Foreign Minister replied that this must surely be an error, for the improvement antedated this Agreement and was attributable primarily to the attitude of Germany during the Abyssinian conflict.

## IV. AUSTRIA'S RELATIONS WITH CZECHOSLOVAKIA

The State Secretary informed the Reich Foreign Minister that before his departure he had been asked by the Czechoslovaks to sound out Berlin and see if they were prepared to inaugurate an improvement in German-Czech relations. The reply given to Herr Schmidt was that this could be done on two conditions: (1) that the Czechs relinquish their close ties with Soviet Russia; (2) that

they accord better treatment to the Sudeten Germans. We had incontrovertible proof that the construction of new airports in Czechoslovakia, which bore no relation to the requirements of the Czechoslovak Army, had been demanded by the Russians and carried out with Russian assistance. We also knew that Russian officers—disguised, to be sure—had been or still were active there. The State Secretary replied that the Czechs disputed these contentions. The Reich Foreign Minister rejoined that they had said the same to us; but the information we had was indisputable. It was evident from the further statements of the State Secretary that the ties between Prague and Vienna are rather close and that Vienna does not seem averse to entering into closer political and economic relations with Czechoslovakia.

#### V. GERMANY'S RELATIONS WITH ITALY

The State Secretary also inquired as to Germany's relations with Italy and whether they were permanent. The answer given him was that wherever the interests of two nations coincided, relations were naturally good.

#### VI. GERMANY'S RELATIONS WITH YUGOSLAVIA

The State Secretary asked whether it was true that Germany had concluded a military alliance with Yugoslavia. This was denied and the reply made that our political and economic relations with Yugoslavia were, however, good and it was hoped that they would continue to improve.

#### VII. PROTOCOL

In the presence of State Secretary Schmidt, the Protocol, a copy of which is enclosed and which you are especially asked to treat as confidential, was signed.<sup>47</sup> Besides establishing a common stand against Communism, as well as economic collaboration in the Danube region, it settles matters concerning the execution of the Agreement of July 11, 1936.

We have informed the Italian Embassy and the Hungarian Legation regarding the conversations with State Secretary Schmidt and the contents of the Protocol.

By direction:  
WEIZSÄCKER

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<sup>47</sup> Document No. 182, p. 342.

## No. 189

1687/396551-52

*The Foreign Ministry to the Deputy of the Führer (Hess), etc.*<sup>48</sup>

BERLIN, November 28, 1936.

(Pol. I 2736 g I)

On the occasion of the visit to Berlin of the Austrian State Secretary for Foreign Affairs, Dr. Guido Schmidt, the Protocol, a copy of which is attached, was signed. It is specifically pointed out that the Protocol is to be treated as strictly confidential.

As far as the results of the conversations are concerned, the agreements arrived at in the cultural field can be designated as satisfactory.

Press matters have been the subject of thorough discussions in the sense of the Agreement of July 11. In this connection it was pointed out to State Secretary Schmidt that we would have to demand that the removal of the newspaper ban be carried out energetically and that even now at least one additional National Socialist Party paper be permitted in Austria, first of all the *Völkischer Beobachter*. State Secretary Schmidt agreed to this in principle, but declared that he considered admission of that paper impossible at present and that he would still have to consider the question of the immediate removal of the ban on another Party organ.

Should the Austrian Government not find itself prepared to do so, we for our part would not consider the removal of the ban on the *Neuigkeits Weltblatt* (see Protocol). In addition, it was agreed to conduct direct negotiations on further elimination of the newspaper ban.

The results obtained in respect to the position of Reich-Germans in Austria and in respect to the exiles question represent only slight progress. It was nevertheless advisable to bind the Austrian Government even to this slight concession.

<sup>48</sup> Other addressees of this letter were: the Reich and Prussian Ministry of the Interior, the Ministry for Public Enlightenment and Propaganda, the Ministry of Justice, the Reich and Prussian Ministry for Education, the Reich and Prussian Ministry for Food and Agriculture, the Foreign Division of the War Ministry, the *Reichsführer-SS* and Chief of the German Police in the Ministry of the Interior, the *Auslandsorganisation* of the N.S.D.A.P., the *Flüchtlingshilfswerk*, the *Hilfswerk Nordsee* (attention SA-Brigadeführer Löwe), the *Büro von Kursell*, the office of Dr. Megerle, and the Commissioner of the Führer for Economic Affairs, Dr. Keppler.

The list of refugees mentioned under number III, 4a, was handed to State Secretary Schmidt at the signing.

The economic negotiations with Austria are to be opened on December 7 in Vienna.

By direction:  
WEIZSÄCKER

### No. 190

1744/408124-29

*Memorandum by the Counselor of the German Legation  
in Austria (Stein)*

*General.* At the great reception which the Austrian President gave at Schönbrunn on November 29 in honor of Regent Horthy, the Federal Chancellor drew me into a long conversation. After some very friendly words concerning mutual personal relations, he turned to the political sphere with the general remark that he was glad to have been able since July 11 to follow a common course with the German Reich in the field of foreign policy; as long as he was responsible for Austria, that would continue.

*The Klagenfurt address.* I had the immediate impression that Schuschnigg, in view of the address he had delivered shortly before in Klagenfurt, felt the need of saying a few friendly words for Germany. I told him that I was glad to hear these words, at least privately; that from his most recent statements in Carinthia I had not, however, gained the impression that he was in such agreement with the policy of the German Reich; I also feared that in authoritative German circles the address would cause considerable astonishment; it would have quite a disillusioning effect, especially after Herr Schmidt's visit, which had gone off well in every respect. It would not be understood why he had characterized National Socialism as the real enemy, at the very time that the National Opposition, consisting mostly of National Socialists, was to be called on to participate in the Government. The Federal Chancellor replied that he, too, was glad that Schmidt's visit had even exceeded his expectations. As for his utterances in Carinthia, they had been intended only for a small circle of officials of the Fatherland Front; the press had given the matter great prominence, which was very much against his wishes. It was necessary to understand him; he was between two camps. On the one hand was the Fatherland Front, whose officials had been in the struggle for years and who now feared that they might have to relinquish positions to the

National Opposition, which was gradually to be called on to participate in the Government. He had to reassure these officials.

*National Opposition.* As far as the enlistment of collaboration from the National Opposition was concerned, he would continue to work on it; some progress, after all, had been made since July 11. At this point I interposed that I did not wish to interfere with Austrian domestic affairs, but that, nevertheless, the tempo in this matter seemed very slow to me. Schuschnigg replied that the main cause of this was the fact that the National Opposition consisted of so many groups at variance with each other that he really did not know which group to deal with. I interrupted him here. To my knowledge there was only one really large National Opposition movement in the country: the National Socialists behind Leopold. The rest of the National Opposition actually consisted only of generals—quite numerous, to be sure—without soldiers. Schuschnigg agreed. Being the typical former Austrian noncommissioned officer, however, Leopold was not well suited to be a Minister. I replied that I had only a slight acquaintance with Leopold but knew that he himself did not demand any ministerial post; to my knowledge he would, at first, hardly propose avowed members of the movement for ministerial posts. Leopold was a patriotic, upright, and in my opinion also a capable leader, who correctly appraised the requirements of the situation; he would certainly present for participation in the Government men acceptable to both camps. When it was a question of pacifying the country, it seemed to me pretty much a matter of indifference from what former social stratum the man bringing peace came. The Federal Chancellor then said that in the long run the National Socialists demanded complete control of the Government; this was simply not possible in Catholic Austria. I replied that in the last analysis every party aimed to extend its power as far as possible. In the Reich, to be sure, the movement demanded absolute power for itself and, as its performances had thus far shown, rightly so; in contrast to this, as far as I knew, the leader of the movement in Austria was in principle ready for negotiation and for the formation of a coalition government. Here Herr Schuschnigg interposed: "Are you advising me, then, to receive Leopold?" I replied that I could not give him any advice in matters of domestic policy but merely wished to tell him that in his place I would have made the personal acquaintance of the leader of the National Opposition long ago, less perhaps for political reasons than for getting a personal impression of the man. Even though at the outset not very much of a positive nature should be expected from

a conversation, yet mere acquaintance did as a rule purify the atmosphere, at least from the personal aspect.

*Communism.* I went on to say that the National Socialists represented the only true allies against Communism, which was dangerous for Austria as well. I was under the impression that the Federal Chancellor underestimated the Communist danger to Austria. Even though the mountain regions were perhaps less inclined toward Communism, yet Vienna, as the capital, was a special center of danger, and, according to reliable reports, other areas of Austria as well had already been infected by Bolshevism, especially the border areas, which were being infected from Czechoslovakia. Austria was no independent planet which could combat Communism alone and independently. The Communist pestilence was no respecter of borders, particularly arbitrary and artificial ones. After all was said and done, only the stand of the Führer and Chancellor was a real guarantee against the spread of Communism to Austria; for this reason the Federal Chancellor's statements concerning Communism would surely not be understood in the Reich; the timing of these statements also seemed to me to have been unfortunate, striking me as almost a disavowal of the German-Japanese Agreement,<sup>49</sup> concluded, as was well known, just the day before. Herr Schuschnigg replied that he knew very well that Communism represented a grave danger to the entire world; but he did not consider it the proper procedure constantly to portray Communism as a great danger; one should not talk so much about the devil. To make light of it without, and combat it vigorously within, was his principle in this matter; besides, just recently Communist propaganda material came to Austria from Berlin; he would send it to us soon.

*Legitimism.* In his opinion, incorrect conclusions were frequently drawn in the Reich because of the fact that while he followed authoritarian methods, they were often of a different nature. His attitude to the Legitimists also was often wrongly interpreted in Germany. The Legitimists were a dying class who, in their loyalty to the old Imperial House, were perhaps impractical men but fundamentally very valuable to the State. He did not concede them any decisive influence whatsoever in the conduct of the Government. I replied that I, too, highly valued loyalty and the great common history, but that other motives of the Legitimists struck me as dangerous. Aside from the fact that it was impossible, as shown by experience, to turn back the wheels of history, personal advantage as well played a decisive part with many Legitimists; nor could

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\* i.e., the Anti-Comintern Pact, signed by Germany and Japan on November 25, 1936, for cooperative measures against the Communist International.

the aim of the Legitimists be reconciled with the pacification of Europe; I merely wished, by way of example, to point to the disturbances which were constantly fostered by Legitimist political agitation in the other Succession States. Thereupon Schuschnigg reiterated that he could not call the question of a restoration in Austria one of present concern.

*The Catholic Church.* The Federal Chancellor then went on to say that concerning his attitude toward the Catholic Church, also, false reports were often spread in Germany. He was successfully resisting excessive demands on the part of the Church, but he had to take account of the fact that in Austria a large part of the population was of a positive Catholic orientation. As much as he desired, in the interest of close harmony with the Reich, that there might be a *rapprochement* between State and Church in Germany, he could nevertheless well understand that in view of the large proportion of the population opposing the Church this would be just as difficult for the Reich Government as it would be for him to draw away from the Church.

*Czechoslovakia.* Finally the Federal Chancellor brought up the subject of Czechoslovakia; he asked me whether common cause could not be made with Hodza. He knew him as a tractable man whose attitude was not fundamentally hostile to Germany. I replied that at present Hodza had relatively little authority in his country; Beneš had been the sole decisive factor in Czechoslovakia up to the present time; he had repeatedly let Hodza speak, especially in the economic field; and, as I had learned from a reliable source, he had subsequently been quite gratified by the ineffectiveness of these addresses. Schuschnigg concluded by saying that, for the future at least, he nevertheless considered Hodza a valuable factor in Czechoslovakia.

STEIN

VIENNA, November 30, 1936.

## No. 191

1744/403130-33

*The German Ambassador in Austria (Papen) to the  
Führer and Chancellor*<sup>50</sup>

A 6850

VIENNA, December 2, 1936.

Received December 3, 1936.

(Pol. IV 4959)

Reference telegraphic instruction 158 of November 28, 1936: "Address of the Federal Chancellor at Klagenfurt."

On account of the Hungarian state visit, as reported by telegram, I was able to make the *démarche* only yesterday. The Federal Chancellor was already informed of the substance of the Foreign Minister's telegram, which, according to the statement of State Secretary Schmidt, had been shown to the Austrian Minister by Herr von Weizsäcker.

In making the *démarche* I used as my basis the publication of the address, which appeared in the *Neuigkeits Weltblatt* of November 28, and at the same time took advantage of the occasion for an exhaustive discussion with the Federal Chancellor of the entire complex of problems involved in the further development of German-Austrian relations.

In Germany, I explained, a most disagreeable impression had been created by the fact that, shortly after the State Secretary's highly satisfactory visit to Berlin, the Federal Chancellor in a public address treated "Nazism" on the same level with Communism, making it, so to speak, Public Enemy No. 2. Even though I had to admit that the Federal Chancellor had spoken of two segments of the National groups, one of which, he was quite willing to concede, had idealistic aspirations serving the interests of the people, this impression had nevertheless been blotted out again by the culminating statement that "National Socialism in Austria confronts us as an enemy and opponent."

The Federal Chancellor replied that the address he had delivered was extemporaneous, not prepared, and was intended only for a small group of people. Nothing had been further from his mind than any desire to complicate relations with the Reich or put further obstacles in the way of the program to effect a reconciliation with Austrian National Socialism. On the contrary, the entire tenor of his address had been a repudiation of the elements within the

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\* A copy was directed to the Foreign Ministry.

Fatherland Front which constantly protested against the result of July 11 and tried in every way to prevent reconciliation with the Reich. His remark concerning "Nazism" was aimed only at the personalities in the National Opposition who did not seem able to reconcile themselves to the maintenance of an independent Austria and who still looked upon National Socialism's claim to complete control as the sole objective for Austria too.

From the further conversation, as well as from the statements of State Secretary Schmidt, I gained the impression that the Federal Chancellor regretted having expressed himself in such a way as to be misunderstood. I also explained to him with great earnestness how much a satisfactory development in German-Austrian relations would depend on the ultimate reconciliation of the Austrian Government and its political organ, the Fatherland Front, with the National Opposition. This remark constituted no interference in Austrian domestic affairs, because on the fulfillment of this condition depended the further success of the Agreements of July 11. For this reason I again had to direct his most serious attention to the entirely unsatisfactory course that political developments were taking in the Fatherland Front. This political body, formed during the years of the struggle against the Reich, was showing no inclination to adjust itself to the new situation. On the contrary, it seemed to me that it was waging a bitter struggle, in alliance with black Clericalism, against the integration of the National elements into Austria's political life.

I should keenly regret it, I told the Federal Chancellor, if the Berlin trip and also the recent Goslar address of the Prussian Minister President, with its strong conciliatory accent, were to give Vienna the false impression that Berlin was no longer interested in the internal political development of Austria. The regrouping of Europe at a time of most serious tensions demanded, quite imperatively, collaboration on the part of all racial-German elements, and it would be a sin against German destiny if the leading Austrian statesman considered the Agreement of July 11 only as a façade, behind which he would continue a particularistic Austrian policy.

To these arguments the Federal Chancellor replied in all earnestness that he fully recognized Austria's historical mission within the framework of the new German Reich. He was well aware that the historical position of Vienna had come to an end and that the focal point of the German mission now lay in Berlin. He was quite prepared to accept the consequences of this development.

In this connection Herr von Schuschnigg made other statements which I should like to reserve for an oral report.

On the subject of German-Austrian relations I am further able to report that Herr Langoth's<sup>51</sup> conversations with the Minister of Security, Neustädter-Stürmer, have proceeded satisfactorily. The approval of the relief program of the *Flüchtlingshilfswerk* was promised by the Minister within the next few days.

The effect of the Klagenfurt address on the Austrian Party sympathizers was, naturally, still more bitter. They were especially unable to reconcile it with the statements of the Prussian Minister President in Goslar. On the whole I am worried about the development of the illegal party in Austria. The leadership of Captain Leopold is meeting with the sharpest criticism in the provinces. It is said that, because of a certain inferiority complex, he is removing all clever and intelligent people from his entourage and from influential posts. It is probable that within the next few weeks there will be heated discussions concerning the question of leadership.

PAPEN

### No. 192

1649/391669-70

#### *The German Ambassador in Austria (Papen) to the German Foreign Ministry*

SECRET!

VIENNA, December 18, 1936.

A 6742

(Pol. I 3166 g)

With reference to your instruction of November 21, Pol. IV 4390.<sup>52</sup>

1. The credit-aid program for the benefit of Reich-Germans living in Austria is in my opinion politically unobjectionable and, since much good was done with its help, it should be continued within the limits imposed by foreign exchange difficulties.

2. The credit-aid program for the benefit of Austrians is, to be sure, an economic measure; but it serves political ends. For it is intended to strengthen materially and morally certain National or National Socialist circles of the Austrian population and thus place them in a position of being able to hold out until the moment when "the political efforts in Austria show concrete political as well as economic success." There can be no doubt that at least indirect influence is thus exerted on the shaping of Austrian domestic policy. Since in the Agreement of July 11 the Reich Government expressly bound itself to desist from such influence, I regard the

<sup>51</sup> Dr. Franz Langoth, head of the *Hilfswerk* of the N.S.D.A.P.

<sup>52</sup> Not printed.

continuation of the credit-aid program for Austrians as incompatible with this Agreement and share the misgivings expressed in this matter by the Reich Minister of Finance.

3. For the reason cited under 2, it would in my opinion be urgently desirable that the program for Reich-Germans be separated organizationally also from that for Austrians.

PAPEN

No. 193

2234/476052-53

*The Austrian Section of the Auslandsorganisation of the N.S.D.A.P.  
to the German Foreign Ministry*

BERLIN, December 18, 1936.

(Pol. IV 5493)

Subject: Confidential report from the illegal Party in Austria.

From a reliable source in the illegal Austrian Party I am informed that a few weeks ago copies of strictly confidential instructions from the Federal Chancellery in Vienna to its provincial authorities were turned over to the [German] Consulate at Graz. The most important of these instructions provide that:

1. The Communist Party in Austria is to be kept under surveillance but not treated too harshly, whereas Austrian National Socialists are to be punished most severely on the slightest occasion;

2. Directives given by Austrian Minister Glaise-Horstenau are to be completely disregarded and not acted upon.

I should appreciate it if you would let me look over this material or send me a copy of it.

Heil Hitler!

STEMPEL  
*Amtsleiter*

## No. 194

1549/376325-27

*The German Ambassador in Austria (Papen) to the Führer and Chancellor*

Tgb. Nr. A 188

VIENNA, January 9, 1937.

Received January 11, 1937.

Subject: A new proposal for the pacification of the National Opposition.

In an interview which Minister Neustädter-Stürmer gave to the chief editorial writer of the newspaper *Die neue Zeit*, which appears in Linz and which is closely connected with the *Heimatschutz*, he comes out definitely in favor of internal pacification and voices the hope that it may be possible in 1937 to bridge the gap which former years had torn open.

The Minister, in this connection, takes his cue from the watchword given by the Federal Chancellor, that the year 1937 was to mark the fight against unemployment primarily, since internal peace was best assured by "work and bread." The domestic problem was a matter of winning over the so-called National Opposition to positive collaboration, since he was convinced that it would not be possible to pacify the active elements of the "National extremists" without letting them participate in the work of reconstruction. Through the Agreement of July 11, the position of the "National extremists" had changed with relation to the State, since the general aims of the foreign policy of the Reich and of Austria coincided.

This necessity, expressed for the first time by a Minister in office, for enlisting National Socialist cooperation with the State, has found an echo commensurate with its importance in political life, though not in the press. Of the Viennese newspapers, the *Wiener Neueste Nachrichten* published the statements of Neustädter-Stürmer. On the 3d, the *Wiener Neueste Nachrichten* published two private letters as well as an extract from an editorial of the *Klagenfurt Freie Stimmen*, which express their approval of the statements of Minister Neustädter-Stürmer.

In a conversation I had today with Minister von Glaise-Horstenau it was agreed that, pursuant to the suggestion of the Minister of Security, an application is to be made for permission to form an organization whose aim would be to foster the German National idea. The organization's statutes, which are being prepared now, are to be submitted to the Austrian Government by an organizing committee not later than the end of this month. The group of proponents is

to include all elements of the National Opposition—hence not only representatives of the illegal Party, but all who wish to see such a definitely German policy pursued in Austria on the basis of the Agreement concluded on July 11.

The organization would have the aim of giving the German National movement freedom of speech and of the press, cultivating it by propaganda, and thus combating the "Austrian ideology" and Monarchism more effectively than heretofore.

Under law, the Government has to approve or reject an application for the founding of any organization within a definite short period. Thus the Federal Chancellor would not be able to avoid making a decision, particularly since the Minister of Security and the Minister of the Interior are determined to use this issue as a test case for the sincerity of the Government in effecting internal pacification.

Since the decisions of the Ministerial Committee created in December for the amendment and repeal of emergency legislation must also be submitted by the end of February, it will become clear by the end of that month, on two specific questions, what course the Schuschnigg government intends to take. I shall report further on the progress of the matter. The newspaper articles referred to are enclosed.<sup>53</sup>

PAPEN

## No. 195

1549/876823-24

*The German Ambassador in Austria (Papen) to the Führer and Chancellor*<sup>54</sup>

Tgb. Nr. A 189

VIENNA, January 9, 1937.  
Received January 11, 1937.

Subject: Recent Legitimist developments.

Archduke Otto sent to the 1,456 municipalities of which he is an honorary citizen a New Year's message, a copy of which is enclosed.<sup>54a</sup> The language of this document is extremely urgent: "The times are past when we could content ourselves with wishes and expectations. What we neglect to do in these fleeting hours remains forever undone." An appeal is made to the municipalities to form a bloc and try to obtain more honorary citizenships.

<sup>53</sup> Not printed here.

<sup>54</sup> Copy to the Foreign Ministry.

<sup>54a</sup> Not printed.

The distribution of the so-called "imperial towns" among the different provinces is interesting: Styria and Lower Austria are in the lead with some 65 percent; Salzburg, Upper Austria, and Carinthia, however, have only a very slight representation. The penetration of the Legitimist movement into the Fatherland Front is making further progress. Quite obviously, the propaganda is being aided by the Government to a high degree. For example, at a ball that was recently given at the Hofburg for the benefit of Legitimist students, the Federal Chancellor and the entire Cabinet, with the exception of Ministers Glaise-Horstenau and Neustädter-Stürmer, were the patrons.

I found out something very interesting today: Minister Glaise-Horstenau told me that the Italian Minister had told him that the conversation which had taken place in November between Mussolini and Minister von Wiesner<sup>55</sup> had been arranged by him, the Italian Minister, at the request of the Federal Chancellor. To a question of Wiesner's to Mussolini as to how he felt about Legitimism, the latter had replied: "In Italy I am a Legitimist, in Austria I am for whatever Schuschnigg wants."

There is no question but that, with internal conditions here remaining unsettled, the Legitimist idea is gaining ground and that, even if no surprises need be expected at present, this iron is being kept in readiness for any eventualities.

The internal political reaction to Legitimism will depend essentially on the success of the plan outlined in my report of today, No. A 188.

PAPEN

## No. 196

1744/403173-86

*The German Ambassador in Austria (Papen) to the Führer and Chancellor*

Tgb. Nr. A 247

VIENNA, January 12, 1937.

Received January 13, 1937.

(Pol. IV 229)

Subject: The balance sheet for 1936 and the future outlook.

The German-Austrian question set its stamp on all European developments in 1936, far beyond its immediate importance to the Reich. The effects of the decision of July 11 upon the new orientation in Europe are at their peak. Over and above the tactical

<sup>55</sup> Friedrich von Wiesner, leader of the Austrian Legitimist movement.

treatment of the question, which governs the present moment, the goal for the future must be clearly seen.

It therefore appears to be necessary to get a coherent picture of central European developments during the past eventful year in order to obtain a clear conception for a future course.

The Austrian domestic situation at the beginning of 1936 was characterized by the dualism of the Christian workers on the one hand and the *Heimwehr* on the other; they saw in Schuschnigg and Starhemberg their coequal representatives at the head of the Austrian Government.

The Phoenix affair,<sup>56</sup> which occurred in the spring, brought about a great increase in the anti-Semitism among the Christian workers, whose anxiety about the antisocial State leadership and the inadequate consideration given to their interests in the establishment of the corporate State, increased steadily. In this connection we made it a point to support to the best of our ability the reorganization of the Freedom League as the representative of the Christian workers. At the great propaganda parade staged by the Freedom League in Vienna in May, the conflict came to a head. The provoked *Heimatschutz* permitted itself to be led into acts of violence, and the Federal Chancellor, when he took his place at the head of the Freedom League parade, unequivocally sided with the workers.

The subsequent showdown brought about the resignation of the Vice Chancellor and the theoretical dissolution of the semimilitary organizations.

Thus far all differences of opinion between the Clericals and the *Heimwehr* camp had always been bridged over by the formation of a common front against the National Opposition. I had repeatedly urged Prince Starhemberg to make his peace with the Reich, and predicted to him that the first Austrian statesman who decided to take this step would control subsequent developments. The Prince was unable to make a decision. When this man, who is very talented but lacking in character, had fallen from power, the way for negotiation with the other side was open. The Federal Chancellor seized the opportunity and came back to the proposals which, on the Führer's instructions, I had submitted to the then Foreign Minister as early as July 1935. Even after the dismissal of Starhemberg, the position of the Federal Chancellor was not easy, since some of the Clericals, and the Legitimists, were opposed to his government because of the dismissal of the Vice Chancellor.

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<sup>56</sup> "Revelations concerning financial irregularities in the affairs of the Phoenix Insurance Company of Vienna involving prominent figures in the Government and Austrian public life.

The Agreement of July 11 clarified the situation with regard to the Reich. It was perhaps not easy psychologically for our Party friends and the entire pro-German National Opposition, after 3 years of hard self-sacrificing struggle and endurance of persecution of all kinds, to see the Reich make its peace with the Schuschnigg government; nevertheless, the overwhelming majority of all pro-German elements realized the urgent necessity of finally putting an end to the course which on July 25, 1934, turned to the disadvantage of the Reich. They understood that the solution of the "German question" could not be brought about by the Austrian N.S.D.A.P.—for example, by decisively influencing Austrian domestic affairs. It was clear that this question, decisive for Europe, would only be solved within the framework of the New Order in Europe sought by the Führer.

In spite of an extensive amnesty and the indemnification for victims of the past struggles provided for in the Agreements, and in spite of the promise to permit the National Opposition to participate in the formation of Austrian policy, it was clear from the very beginning that this process would be lengthy and subject to many reverses. For one of the most striking results of the July Agreement was that the authority of the Austrian Government within its own country would of necessity be enhanced and that the reinvigorated Clerical elements within the Government would attempt to bring to bear extensive passive resistance against reconciliation with the Reich. Conscious of his own strengthened position, the Federal Chancellor, in October, brought about the final dissolution of the semimilitary organizations. This step became inevitable after Prince Starhemberg, who had been dismissed, had attempted at various times, using the semimilitary organizations, to obstruct the new policy of the Government. On the one hand, the Federal Army and the police now became the sole custodians of the executive authority of the State; on the other hand, it was now possible for the National Opposition to attract to the Nationalist camp at least a part of the leaderless and homeless semimilitary organizations. At the same time—and this was the best indication of the Federal Chancellor's increased authority—he reshuffled his Cabinet. Starhemberg's closest collaborator, Finance Minister Draxler, and the rather unsavory Minister of Commerce, Stockinger, were dismissed. Their places were taken by men who, although committed to the Austrian course, could in general be considered as belonging more to the pro-German National movement. The repeated efforts of the Federal Chancellor to develop and strengthen the Fatherland Front as the expression of the Austrian conception of the State may, at

the end of the year, he said to have had but meager results. This idea is completely lacking in appeal and in the power of conviction. Thus it was not surprising that in the last few days of December the Federal Chancellor explained to me how thoroughly convinced he was that the historic role had definitively passed from the south to the north of the Reich. He was also determined—so he continued at that time—to act in the light of this historical realization and to place the political and moral forces of Austria at the disposal of the German nation in the struggle to regain its world position. This was subject to two conditions. Since the Führer himself had declared that the historic differences with France had been settled, the future of the Reich could lie only in southeastern Europe. Austria was predestined for this mission by history and by natural capacity. She should therefore be permitted to retain the character she had formed in the course of a millennium and not be yoked to any sort of centralized system directed from Berlin. Furthermore, Austria was a Catholic, a Christian country. He did not wish her to be drawn into the ideological controversies which, under different circumstances, were a daily occurrence in the Reich. If both conditions could be met it would not be impossible to find a constitutional formula that would enable Austria to cooperate closely with the Reich.

If the past year thus brought home a very valuable realization to the mind of the leading Austrian statesman, this was doubtless a result of the dynamic foreign policy of the Reich, which placed its stamp on European politics.

Under the pressure of the difficult situation brought about by the war in Abyssinia, Mussolini had decided as early as February definitely to repudiate the front formed against Germany at Stresa. Although the repeated attempts of the Little Entente (Hodza Plan) to induce Italy to participate in a Danubian conference were rejected by the Palazzo Chigi, the attempts to alienate Austria from the Reich as much as possible continued to be the order of the day. At the same time Mussolini sought, at the Rome Conference held in March, further to strengthen his alliance with Hungary and Austria by supplementary protocols. All the various attempts by the Czechs to exert influence on the domestic policies of Vienna through the Austrian trade-unions also failed. Titulescu's trip to Belgrade and Beneš' feeler in the direction of Bucharest in order to win support for the Hodza Plan failed; and the various efforts to exploit the German-Austrian dispute in order to draw Vienna closer to the Little Entente were ultimately checkmated by the activities of the Legitimists here, against whom a strong, united stand was taken

at the meeting of the Chiefs of State of the Little Entente in Bucharest. Nevertheless, the Federal Chancellor's trip to Prague and the continually increasing discussion of a Hapsburg restoration had aggravated the situation to such an extent that after Starhemberg's departure it appeared necessary for the Government to strengthen its position in some quarter. The alternative was obviously either reconciliation with the Reich or the restoration of Otto von Hapsburg.

The Führer's historic step reestablishing German sovereignty in the Rhineland aroused an unheard-of jubilation in all German hearts in Austria, and increased respect for the reestablished independence and resoluteness of the Reich. In the face of these impressions, the Anglo-French plan of committing Austria more actively in favor of the Western Powers' anti-German policy also failed when Schuschnigg, having been urgently invited to Geneva by Eden, Delbos, and Blum in July, declined.

Then the conclusion of the Agreement of July 11—which came as a surprise—immediately altered the entire international situation. The Western Powers, followed by Russia and the Little Entente, had hitherto feverishly sought to exploit German-Austrian tension in order to put a definite stop to the expansion and the influence of the Reich in the Danube area; the numerous attempts, which had thus far failed, now had to be given up for good. The basic struggle of the Reich against the situation created by the dictated Treaty of Versailles could now be continued with greater freedom of action than previously through the *ad hoc* creation of the Berlin-Vienna-Rome Axis. Austria had ceased to be an object of commercial bargaining in Europe, and Italy was pleased to have found a benevolent, neutral partner in her difficult situation.

While the greatest consternation prevailed in France because of the German-Austrian settlement [*Friedensschluss*] and the attendant loss of additional strategic positions in Central Europe, England immediately proceeded to take account of the new situation. If she had previously sought to consolidate her position in Greece and Yugoslavia because of the Abyssinian conflict, she now turned her particular attention to Czechoslovakia. According to the general opinion of the statesmen in the other camp, the effect of the restoration of good relations between Germany and Austria would necessarily be felt in Czechoslovakia first of all. The British therefore advised Prague (the consequence of repeated negotiations between Henlein and Sir Robert Vansittart) to go to considerable lengths in accommodating the wishes of the German minorities in order to

avoid anything that might give the Reich any pretext whatever for bringing up the Czech question.

As I have already stated repeatedly, everything points to the fact that the influence of Italy is also being exerted to that end. Rome has always understood how to play both ends against the middle and it is obvious that she is already trying to hinder as much as possible the expected further strengthening of Germany in Central Europe. I understand that powerful pressure is also being exerted on Hungary to improve her relations with Czechoslovakia.

In this game, in addition to the natural disinclination of Hungary to take this path, we are receiving valuable support from Poland. The granting of the big French loan to Poland has, as we know quite definitely, been exploited from many different quarters as pressure to bring about a fundamental improvement in Czech-Polish relations. In the conversations which Marshal Rydz-Smigly had in Paris, General Gamelin, as I know from a completely reliable source, gave him a letter of President Beneš, which the Marshal returned to the General without comment, remarking that this phase of policy was no concern of his. Considerable efforts have also been made recently to settle the Polish-Czech difficulties by arbitration. Warsaw has refused this, stating that the case is not suitable for arbitration. Since Polish policy considers it the greatest success of the past year that the pro-Russian policy of Rumania has finally been buried—as is assumed in Warsaw—the eyes of Warsaw are now fixed on the Czech question. It is understandable that the book published 2 months ago by the Czech Minister in Bucharest, entitled *The Little Entente and Peace*—which advocates the idea that there must be a common Czech-Russian frontier and which, in addition, contains a foreword by the Czech Foreign Minister, Krofta—should have aroused the most determined opposition on the part of the Warsaw Government. I was able to ascertain from many conversations with my colleagues here that in Warsaw the Czech question is considered only from the viewpoint of how this postwar creation may be reduced to a condition compatible with central European developments without provoking an European war. It is believed that for the present, i.e., as long as Beneš' strong personal ties with Paris are maintained, it is only possible to make preparations within the country for a solution, by ceaselessly strengthening the minorities against the dominant Czech element.

In this situation, which appears to make it advisable to handle the Czech question in cooperation with Poland, the extent to which the position of the Reich can be strengthened in Austria in the near future will of course be of decisive importance.

After July 11 the possibility of a Hapsburg restoration became for the time being more remote. A restoration had always been intended only as a guarantee against a German *Anschluss* or against the spread of German influence. For that reason, however, it was obvious that precisely because of the expected increase in German influence in Vienna after July 11 a Hapsburg restoration would very soon become of greater immediate concern in certain quarters.

At the end of the year, almost 6 months after July 11, it may be stated that the supporters of Legitimism are using all possible means to continue the struggle against the Reich. With the help of the pro-Legitimist Federal Chancellor, they have integrated their organization with the Fatherland Front and are now attempting, by utilizing its resources and its name, to win new friends for Otto's return. As far as the Government is concerned, it may be said that it is certainly determined not to take this step so long as it will involve Austria in a difficult international situation. But the intrigues are being continued and the cards are held in readiness to be played if the Reich, contrary to the Agreement of July 11, should attempt to bring about *Anschluss* by force. In this connection it is significant and not without danger that Legitimist circles, in close cooperation with the Clericals, make use of the ideological struggles current in the Reich, in order to make clear to the decidedly Christian part of Austria that there can be no cooperation whatever with National Socialism without endangering the Christian basis of Austria and, consequently, of Central Europe.

If one attempts to evaluate the results of the July 11 Agreement from the viewpoint of foreign policy, it may be stated that both parties have profited from it. The stability of the Austrian State has undoubtedly increased—always, however, with the tacit assumption that the promised reconciliation with the National Opposition will facilitate further consolidation. In its struggle to free itself from the bonds of the Versailles Treaty, the Reich has acquired an additional and very welcome freedom of action; and, by obviating any possible forcible countermeasures, the "German question" has been reserved for subsequent solution by us.

The continuation of this policy, however, necessitates a *clear statement of the broad objectives of German foreign policy*; these have, to be sure, been relegated to the background for the present because of our differences with the Western Powers in regard to the reopened colonial question and the crucial struggle for Spain's future; but they are all the more in need of *clarification*.

After the settlement of the questions being debated at the present time, in accordance with the Führer's repeatedly expressed desire,

the aim of Reich policy can only be the vindication of its historically based rights in the Danube Basin in Central Europe. All forces which have been released by the new developments must be directed toward this goal.

Negatively, it should first be made absolutely certain that German-Austrian developments do not suffer any reverses whatever. The leadership of the illegal Party must be permeated with this idea. The leaders must recognize that bringing about a new political relationship between Austria and the Reich is not their responsibility; consequently it is not their mission to undertake any action toward that goal. They should rather concern themselves with winning for a pro-German policy as large sections of the people as possible to form the nucleus for the domestic Austrian National movement; they will thus be creating the medium within Austria which the Reich will utilize when its dynamic power is sufficiently developed to take up the problem.

But, in addition to the forces at the disposal of our policy in this country, everything possible must also be done in theory and in practice to prepare the striking power of the Reich in southeastern Europe. Here I repeat the proposal I made last year of establishing a Central European Institute in Vienna, which, under Reich-German intellectual leadership, would appropriately concentrate all economic and political forces on this goal. The financing of such an organization will more than pay for itself. With all due consideration for German-Italian relations, it will be necessary to explain very clearly even now the lines of our policy in this respect, for it is to be expected that when the Spanish question has been settled and Rome no longer needs our support in that matter she will be much less inclined to accept this development than is the case today. Furthermore, as a counterweight against Legitimist endeavors and in reply to the proposals made by the Federal Chancellor, the most extensive preparations should be made for the possibility of a new and close political relationship between Austria and the Reich. This is subject to two conditions: willingness to give the greatest possible consideration, in such a political relationship, to decentralization, in keeping with Austrian individuality—which is also in accordance with the Führer's wish. And secondly, the even more decisive question, in my opinion: the termination of the ideological controversies in the Reich. Doubtless the struggle against political Catholicism in Austria will be at least as necessary as it was in the Reich. But this necessity has nothing to do with setting up an *antithesis between National Socialism and Christianity*. If today this antithesis is already causing the rest of the friendly world to regard the Reich

—the leader in the fight against Bolshevism—with the greatest suspicion, the solution of the “German question” seems to me to be actually dependent on an unequivocal statement on this matter by the Führer. If that is done, I am convinced that the great historic mission of National Socialism, the solution of the “German question,” and with it the penetration into southeastern Europe, will be brought within the realm of the possible in the near future.

PAPEN

No. 197

2234/478061-62

*The State Secretary and Chief of the Presidential Chancellery  
(Meissner) to the Foreign Minister*

JANUARY 13, 1937.

Received January 14, 1937.

(Pol. IV 216)

YOUR EXCELLENCY: On the occasion of the New Year, the Führer and Chancellor received the enclosed New Year's greeting from twenty-nine members of an Austrian SS *Standarte* who are being detained for the third year in the concentration camp at Wöllersdorf.<sup>57</sup>

This communication prompts the Führer and Chancellor to request you to instruct Ambassador von Papen in Vienna, in whatever manner he may deem appropriate, to call the attention of the Austrian Chancellor to the fact that Austrians, simply because they belong to a National Socialist organization,<sup>58</sup> are for the third year being detained in a concentration camp and that many of them, probably as a result of the long confinement, are constantly ill. On this occasion the Ambassador is to make no mention of the enclosed message of greeting but is to say that the German people fail to understand why the release of political prisoners contemplated in the Agreement of July 11, 1936, has been carried out to such a slight extent.

The Führer and Chancellor looks forward to receiving a written report on the outcome of this step.

With the expression of my especial esteem and Heil Hitler,

I am Your Excellency's

Most devoted,

MEISSNER

<sup>57</sup> Not printed.

<sup>58</sup> A marginal notation, apparently in Weizsäcker's hand, reads as follows: “The members of SS *Standarte* 89 are in Wöllersdorf not merely because they belong to a National Socialist organization, but because on July 25, 1934, they seized the Federal Chancellor's office.”

## No. 198

2234/476084-65

*The German Ambassador in Austria (Papen) to the German Foreign Ministry*

Tgb. Nr. A 279

VIENNA, January 14, 1937.  
(Pol. IV 226/37)

Subject: Amnesty questions.

On the occasion of my detailed discussion with the Federal Chancellor today regarding pending questions, he replied at great length to the complaints we had brought up in regard to the amnesty. He gave me the following interesting figures:

As of January 1, 1937, a total of 15,583 National Socialists had been granted amnesty, among them 12 who had been sentenced to life imprisonment, 84 who had been sentenced to prison terms of from 10 to 20 years, and all those who had been sentenced to prison terms of not more than 10 years—exclusive of those guilty of common crimes, bomb outrages, homicide, etc. This latter category still comprised a total of 154 prisoners, some of whom had been given life imprisonment or both long and short terms. A reexamination would very soon be made and those who had served approximately half of the shorter sentences imposed would be granted amnesty.

After the amnesty granted in accordance with the July Agreement, there had been in Austria a total of only 40 National Socialists held without trial. On January 1, 1937, 435 persons who were arrested for violation of the law against organizing the illegal Party were being held without trial, but almost all of these would be released after a brief detention. The amendment to the emergency laws shortly to be proposed by the Committee of Ministers would remedy the situation which still permitted security officials to order detention up to 6 months without trial. This would automatically bring about an improvement.

In view of the available figures he felt obliged to state that the numerous complaints concerning the inadequate functioning of the July 11 Agreement were really exaggerated and that, on the contrary, a considerable pacification had taken place.

By way of comparison, the Federal Chancellor also gave me the figures as of January 1, 1937, for the number of Socialists and Communists arrested; according to these figures there were as of this date 367 persons in custody without trial and 69 serving sentences. The disparity in the number of those serving sentences was explained by the granting of amnesty to the Reds, which had already

occurred before the July Agreement, and by the fact that the number of Reds arrested and sentenced had always been very much lower than that of the National Socialists, corresponding to the strength of the National Socialist movement as compared with the Socialist movement.

PAPEN

No. 199

2127/462800-03

*Memorandum by the German Ambassador in Italy (Hassell)*

Botsch/Htm

ROME, January 16, 1937.

In the course of my conversation with Colonel General Göring yesterday, he declared that he would take up the Austrian question with Mussolini that afternoon. He was convinced of the necessity of continued close German-Italian cooperation; but if this was to be firmly established and not be shaken by every gust of wind, there would have to be complete clarity in regard to the Austrian problem. This clarity could only mean that Italy should keep hands off Austria and recognize her as a German sphere of interest so that even an *Anschluss* could be carried out if we so desired. Moreover, he could not understand at all why Italy should wish to oppose this natural development. I replied that Mussolini in his conversation with me as early as January 1936 recognized the German character of Austria in principle and the necessity of her remaining a satellite of her big brother; the Duce was really quite convinced of the inevitability of a gradual union of the two German States. If he had at times, in anger, under the influence of the events of 1934, perhaps actually toyed with the idea of making Austria an Italian sphere of influence and generally changing the direction of Italian policy toward the north, this stage had passed. That he was nevertheless opposed to the *Anschluss* even today was based on two motives:

(1) Concern for the Italian Brenner boundary naturally played a leading role;

(2) The thought of German expansion in the spirit of the old Berlin-Bagdad idea, for example, and especially an advance by Germany toward Trieste and the Adriatic, still haunted the minds of the Italians.

Although I had always characterized the latter apprehension as completely nonsensical, and in regard to the first motive called attention to the well-known National Socialist attitude, the anxiety

still continued. General Göring replied that he would be prepared to give the Italians every possible guarantee in regard to the boundary, if German-Italian friendship was firmly established, and even go so far as to sacrifice the Germans in South Tyrol; they could not be supported permanently in any case; no change in the policy of Italianization was possible, and if the Germans in South Tyrol wished to retain their national individuality, there would ultimately be nothing left for them to do but settle in the Reich. At any rate, the important over-all relations between Germany and Italy could not permanently be made dependent on the question of the small German minority in South Tyrol. I remarked that at the present stage he would probably not be willing simply to give the Italians a boundary guarantee, which I felt would be premature and only to be considered in connection with a basic and comprehensive understanding. As far as the German element in South Tyrol was concerned, it was not only a question of this minority itself, but also of a very important moral factor in our policy, for the complete abandonment of any German elements abroad would have a crushing effect on all other Germans in foreign countries. I would, therefore, in case of such an understanding, deem it necessary at least to express the definite expectation that the Germans in South Tyrol would now receive better treatment in economic and cultural matters. General Göring agreed. He then returned to the question of Trieste and remarked that the folly of a German advance there was clear from the very fact that it would at one stroke create a unified Anglo-Italian front against us. On the other hand, it was evident that if we had sided with England in the Abyssinian question, the latter would gladly have abandoned Austria to us. Even today the situation was such that, if Anglo-Italian differences flared up again, as he believed they would, England would not hesitate to give us a free hand in Austria, provided we displayed the proper attitude. I agreed and expressed the opinion that hinting at such thoughts might have quite a useful effect here. As far as the Austrian problem itself was concerned, however, it would, if he wished to bring it up, be absolutely necessary, in my opinion, to stress two things: (1) that it was really only a matter of principle, while the question of the *Anschluss* itself was by no means acute, and (2) that within the framework of a firm friendship between Germany and Italy, we would never initiate any change in the political status of Austria without consulting Rome. General Göring declared that he was of the same opinion; but the problem would have to be brought up, because he feared that in view of the domestic policy of the Austrian Government another crisis would soon occur

there, and provision would have to be made to prevent such events from again affecting German-Italian relations.

Shortly before General Göring's conversation with Mussolini, I again urged him at the Capitol to stress the fact that he was discussing the question, which was in no way acute, purely from the standpoint of principle, which he promised to do.

After the conversation General Göring told me in the evening that he had discussed the question only in rather general terms, but had expressed the thought that Austria would fall to us sometime; Mussolini had not taken any stand, but reserved the right to state his position on this question later. I got the impression that General Göring's statement regarding Austria had met with a cool reception and that he himself, realizing this fact, had by no means said all that he had planned to say.

H[ASSELL]

No. 200

2234/476067

*The German Chargé d'Affaires in Austria (Stein) to the German Foreign Ministry*

A 358

VIENNA, January 16, 1937.

Received January 18, 1937.

(Pol. IV 258)

In continuation of our report of July 23, 1936 (A 3959).<sup>59</sup>

Subject: The amnesty following the Agreement of July 11, 1936.

The official figures on the number of National Socialists in Austria amnestied under the Agreement of July 11, 1936, have now been published for the first time. According to the official news release, 18,684 persons have been covered by the amnesty.

I enclose a clipping from the *Wiener Zeitung* containing the official release.<sup>60</sup>

It must not be overlooked, however, that according to reliable figures of the Austrian N.S.D.A.P., at least 4,000 National Socialists have been arrested since July 11, and punished by court or administrative action.

STEIN

<sup>59</sup> Not printed.

<sup>60</sup> Not printed here.

## No. 201

2234/476069

*The German Ambassador in Austria (Papen) to the German Foreign Ministry*

Telegram

No. 5 of January 18

VIENNA, January 18, 1937—5:40 p.m.

Received January 18, 1937—8 p.m.

(Pol. IV 269)

In reply to No. 4 of January 16.<sup>61</sup>

I want to point out that the press release does not mean that another amnesty has been granted. The release merely states precisely how many persons have been amnestied since last July.

According to a confidential remark made by the Minister of Security to a reliable agent last week, forty-three men who participated in the *Putsch* of July 1934 are still being held in Wöllersdorf. The Minister hoped that by the end of this month all National Socialists would have left the camp.

PAPEN

## No. 202

1649/391671

*Memorandum*

SECRET!

(zu Pol. I 3166g)

I availed myself of the presence of Ambassador von Papen on Saturday, January 16, 1937, to explain to him that a conference with local Party circles had brought out the fact that the suspension of the credit-aid program for Austrian National Socialists would not be understood, as the political and economic persecution of the Party in Austria was continuing, and as long as this was so, our comrades in the Party still needed protection. Herr von Papen thereupon told me that he fully understood this viewpoint and that it was also apparent from item 3 of his attached report<sup>62</sup> that he had not meant his negative stand on item 2 too seriously; if he was asked officially, he had to reply officially; in cases such as the credit-aid program in Austria, it was better in his opinion that action in regard to the matter came from Berlin without previously involving the Mission, in order that the latter might not be put at a disadvantage in its relations with the Austrian Government. Furthermore, he

<sup>61</sup> Not printed.<sup>62</sup> Of December 18, 1936, document No. 192, p. 362.

was of the opinion that the credit-aid program should be continued as proposed; he had also informed the Reich Foreign Minister orally to this effect.

ALTENBURG

BERLIN, January 19, 1937.

No. 203

115/118236-37

*Memorandum by the Counselor of the German Embassy in Italy  
(Plessen)*

ROME, January 21, 1937.

The Austrian Minister called on me today and reported the following:

Colonel General Göring during his recent visit had said to him very seriously that he had information according to which

1. a new wave of persecution against National Socialist elements had recently begun in Austria, and
2. Russian officers and troop shipments had passed through Austria on their way to Spain.

He (His Excellency von Berger-Waldenegg) had thereupon made inquiries in Vienna and had been most reliably informed from there that both reports were absolutely inaccurate. There was no question of any persecution of National Socialist elements in Austria; as proof of this, one could point to the thousands of cases of amnesty. The report regarding Russian troop movements through Austria was also completely false. Neither officers, enlisted personnel, nor weapons had passed through Austria on the way to Spain. He presumed that General Göring's information could perhaps be attributed to a report in the *Angriff* of December 5, which at the time had been formally denied and corrected by Austria.

His Excellency von Berger-Waldenegg requested me to call this to the attention of General Göring. He had reason to assume that, while in Italy, General Göring had expressed himself in the same vein to others, and he would appreciate it if they could be given a correct version.<sup>63</sup>

PLESSEN

<sup>63</sup> A marginal notation in Neurath's hand reads as follows: "Has been done."

## No. 204

2127/462810-11

*Memorandum by the Counselor of the German Embassy in Italy  
(Plessen)*

v.Pl./Ge.

ROME, January 23, 1937.

I asked Colonel General Göring today whether I could give any reply to the Austrian Minister's statements of January 21. General Göring thereupon instructed me to make the following reply to His Excellency von Berger-Waldenegg:

The reports of Russian officers and troops passing through Austria on the way to Spain were indeed taken from the press. General Göring had noted with interest the Austrian Minister's statements on this point; he would discuss the matter with the Austrian Minister in Berlin in order to determine how the reports had originated and got into the newspapers.

As far as the treatment of National Socialist elements in Austria was concerned, he could in no wise share the Minister's "optimism." It was quite obvious that there was persecution. The amnesty measures did not in any way alter this fact. The German-Austrian Agreement of July 11, 1936, was always represented in Austria as signifying an Austrian victory and a retreat on the part of Germany. When General Göring had made a speech at Goslar that was very friendly toward Austria, the Federal Chancellor had simultaneously made a speech in Klagenfurt which was not very pleasing to Germany. He was forced to take a very serious view of the entire development in Austria.

General Göring then added that I might also tell the Minister that Germany took an exceedingly serious view of the fact that the restoration was being continually discussed in Austria. If there was to be a restoration in Austria, it would force Germany to take appropriate measures. In reply to a question I interposed, General Göring said that we would then march in, and that would mean the end of Austria. When I remarked that surely I was not supposed to tell this to the Minister, General Göring replied that I might do so very definitely—the more plainly it was said, the better.

In the course of the conversation General Göring mentioned further that we could not permit a Hapsburg restoration, if only because in the agreement he had concluded with Yugoslavia he had promised Yugoslavia that he would not do so.

PLESSEN

## No. 205

2127/462812-13

*Memorandum by the Counselor of the German Embassy in Italy  
(Plessen)*

v.Pl./Ge

ROME, January 27, 1937.

Today I called on the Austrian Minister, who had been unable to see me earlier, and I made approximately the following statement to him:

Colonel General Göring asked me to thank him for his statements, which had been noted with interest. The reports that had come to him in regard to Russian officers and troops passing through Austria on the way to Spain were indeed taken from the press; he would discuss the matter with the Austrian Minister in Berlin in order to determine how the reports had originated and got into the newspapers. As far as the treatment of National Socialists in Austria was concerned, he was unable to share the Minister's "optimism;" what was happening in Austria was proof that unfortunately he was right in his appraisal of the situation there, which was causing him grave concern. For example, at the same time that he had made a speech at Goslar that was very friendly toward Austria, the Federal Chancellor made a speech which was not very pleasing to Germany. Furthermore, the German-Austrian Agreement of July 11 was frequently represented in Austria as signifying an Austrian victory and a retreat on the part of Germany. Finally, I mentioned that I had been instructed to inform him that we were gravely concerned about the fact that the restoration was being continually discussed in Austria. I added that the view of the German Government in regard to the restoration was, after all, known to the Austrian Minister.

His Excellency von Berger-Waldenegg thanked me for the information and expressed his gratification at the fact that General Göring had conveyed to him such a frank reply. Such a discussion could only contribute toward clarifying the position on each side. In regard to the question concerning the aid given the Russians in reaching Spain, he mentioned that he had read a report in the *Essener National-Zeitung* of January 21, if he was not mistaken, in which it was stated that the Russians were attempting to transport their nationals, who previously had gone to Spain by way of Czechoslovakia and Austria, through Germany; this showed that no country was completely able to prevent an illegal crossing of its boundaries. How the attitude toward National Socialist circles in Austria should be appraised was, the Minister said, a matter of opinion. He could assure me that the Hapsburg question was by no means acute; but the Austrian Government would have to insist

that this was a domestic matter, in regard to which Austria could not tolerate interference by other countries.

Finally, His Excellency von Berger-Waldenegg again emphasized strongly that it had been exceedingly useful to him to get General Göring's views, especially on questions in regard to which they differed from his own.

PLESSEN

No. 206

2234/476070-72

*The German Foreign Ministry to the German Ambassador  
in Austria (Papen)*

URGENT

BERLIN, January 27, 1937.  
(Pol. IV 602)

Drafting Officer: Counselor of Legation Altenburg.

On January 13, by order of the Führer and Chancellor, the State Secretary and Chief of the Presidential Chancellery sent me the enclosed<sup>64</sup> and a letter, a copy of which is attached,<sup>65</sup> regarding the persecution of members of National Socialist organizations in Austria.

According to your telegram of January 18, we can expect that all the National Socialists quartered at Wöllersdorf, including the members of SS *Standarte* 89, will be released by the end of the month. I request you, nevertheless, in a *démarche* with the Austrian Chancellor in accordance with the Führer's instructions, to give your vigorous support to the efforts of the Austrian Minister of Security in this direction. Please add at the same time that, despite the oral and written assurances given by the Austrian Government upon conclusion of the German-Austrian Agreement of July 11, particularly as contained in article IX of the Gentlemen's Agreement of the same day, the extensive political amnesty promised for introducing domestic peace in Austria has not yet been completely carried out. Even after the Agreement, Austrians, simply because of their National Socialist convictions and because they belong to National Socialist organizations, are still persecuted, penalized, and, as in the present case, kept in prison for years.

We perceive in this procedure on the part of the Austrian Government, as well as in its dilatory behavior in the matter of the amnesty and the repatriation of Austrian refugees, a gross offense

<sup>64</sup> Enclosure not printed.

<sup>65</sup> Document No. 197, p. 374.

against the letter and spirit of the Agreement of July 11, 1936, and hope that the Austrian Government will at long last tackle energetically the solution of these two questions, which are basic to the final reconciliation with the Reich.

Please report by letter on the reception accorded your *démarche*.  
v[ON] N[EURATH]

### No. 207

2127/462818-21

#### *Memorandum by the German Ambassador in Italy (Hassell)*

Botsch/Htm.

ROME, January 30, 1937.

On Sunday, January 17, I had quite a long conversation in the Villa Madama with Colonel General Göring, in which he gave me a detailed account of the course of his conversation with Mussolini on the Austrian problem. He had broached the question from the broad viewpoint of German-Italian cooperation and international political developments in general, emphasizing the necessity for clarifying this matter if German-Italian friendship was really to be firmly established and if Italy wished to count on German support for Italy at critical moments, such as might arise from Italy's Mediterranean policy. Moreover, he assured me, he specifically affirmed my suggestion that the question of *Anschluss*, or of similar developments, was not acute; he also stated that, on the basis of the firm friendship of the two countries, Germany would open the question only in consultation with Rome. Mussolini had apparently expressed himself with unusual reserve regarding all this, requested him to put his point of view in writing, and held out to him the prospect of a reply on the day when he returned from Naples. Herr Göring then informed me of his proposed written statement of his point of view, but added that he had decided, after all, to omit the promise it originally contained to tackle the problem only in consultation with Rome; it was true, he repeated, that he had made such a promise, but he hesitated to commit it to writing, as we should thus be assuming a unilateral and, as it were, advance obligation.

Then, on Tuesday, January 26, I had another conversation with Herr Göring in Berlin, in which he continued his account. He said that, in their talk on Saturday, January 23, Mussolini had at first spoken only of the magnificent reception at Naples, of Göring's impressions of Capri, etc., and had not even mentioned the crucial point. Not until he himself had taken a firm stand was Mussolini induced to come to the point. Then, without putting anything in writ-

ing, the Duce had presented his point of view, rather hesitantly and reluctantly, as follows: He had begun by stating that, legally, he could not really discuss the possibility of a change in Austria's political status, because he was bound by his signing of the Rome Protocols. For the rest, he had been particularly interested in learning the German conditions for really close cooperation between Italy and Germany. Such close cooperation he, Mussolini, considered absolutely necessary. It logically followed from this, Herr Göring said, that Mussolini would have to accept the conditions, since he proclaimed cooperation as absolutely necessary. Mussolini had added that he would bring pressure on the Austrian Government faithfully to carry out the Agreement of July 11; and, lastly, he had assured him that, in the event of a conflict in Austria, Italy would not resume, in conjunction with other states, the "Watch on the Brenner" against Germany.

Herr Göring seemed to me not exactly enthusiastic about this result, nor yet entirely dissatisfied with it. I told him of the reports of our informant concerning the unfavorable impression produced by his sally; this, he said, caused him no surprise, inasmuch as he had had similar reports from the Prince of Hesse. I then stated that I would play the devil's advocate and point out two dangers:

- 1) The possibility existed that Italy, in the present political situation, in which she is dependent upon cooperation with Germany, would, so to speak, ignore the proposal and let it pass but perhaps privately take cognizance of it and at the proper moment act accordingly.

- 2) One would have to reckon with the fact that the Italians might inform the Austrian Government of the proposal.

Herr Göring replied that he was not taking the first-mentioned danger very seriously, because Italy could not help binding herself further in her Mediterranean policy, thus remaining, to a certain extent, in opposition to England and France, which made German friendship indispensable to her. As for a possible leak at Vienna, it left him cold, because he had quite plainly told State Secretary Schmidt anyway that *Anschluss* was bound to come. Schmidt had replied that other and looser bonds between the two German States were possible; whereupon Herr Göring had said that, if the Austrians did not like the word annexation, they could call it partnership.

Herr Göring then asked me not to take up the Austrian question with Ciano but merely to say that he, Göring, had returned home strengthened in his conviction as to the necessity of German-Italian cooperation and well satisfied with the political conversations on all the points brought up.

H[ASSELL]

## No. 208

2127/462827-28, 462832-34

*The German Ambassador in Italy (Hassell) to the Foreign Minister*

DEAR NEURATH: My telegram No. 25 of January 30<sup>66</sup> contains the gist of my conversation with Ciano, in which, on Colonel General Göring's instructions, I conveyed to him Herr Göring's thanks and satisfaction. Herr Göring had asked me not to bring up the Austrian question, and I did not do so. However, Ciano immediately seized upon my remark that General Göring had been fully satisfied with the political conversations, to introduce the Austrian problem himself. In view of Herr Göring's request not to discuss the question, I made only very brief mention in my telegram of the tenor of Ciano's statements and of my reply. I should like, however, to send you privately a copy of my letter of today to General Göring, which I considered it necessary to send him. Please do not put this letter and its enclosure in the files.<sup>67</sup>

HASSELL

## [Enclosure]

*The German Ambassador in Italy (Hassell) to Colonel General Göring*

ROME, January 30, 1937.

DEAR HERR GÖRING: In accordance with your instructions, I called on Count Ciano immediately after my return and conveyed to him your thanks and your satisfaction with your stay in Rome. I shall deliver the same message to the Duce. Information concerning my conversation with Count Ciano is contained in an official telegram sent out today, which you have probably received in the meantime. But I should like to add a few remarks in private which I have not reported officially. In accordance with your wishes, I did not bring up the Austrian question but merely stressed the fact that you were satisfied with the political conversations on all the points discussed. To this Ciano replied that the Duce and he himself were in every respect satisfied with the talks. He was particularly pleased with my mention of your satisfaction in regard to *all* the matters discussed and, consequently, in regard to the Austrian question also. As a matter of fact, he said, this was a

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<sup>66</sup> Not printed.

<sup>67</sup> This document and its enclosure represent file copies from the papers of the German Embassy in Italy. Following the text of the letter, provision was made for the Ambassador to write the complimentary conclusion in his own hand.

delicate point, and in your first conversation with him the Duce had not shown any great pleasure at your unexpected sally, for we were dealing here with a problem that could not be solved all at once. I replied that as far as I knew you had discussed the question in principle only, not with the idea that we were on the point of carrying out *Anschluss* or of undertaking something similar. Ciano said with a smile that the first impression had been rather different: at first the Duce had had the feeling that you were treating the matter as definitely acute; but the second conversation led the Duce to see the matter in a somewhat different light. After all, one must always keep in mind that the Berlin-Vienna Agreement of July 11, 1936, was an important pillar of German-Italian understanding and cooperation. To this I replied that it would perhaps be more correct to say that the Agreement of July 11 was an essential *prerequisite* for bringing about a *détente* and an understanding between Berlin and Rome; in other words, if Berlin and Vienna had not buried the hatchet, the road from Berlin to Rome would not have been opened. Ciano admitted that, but added that German-Italian friendship, like all such relationships, rested on a row of pillars and would not simply collapse if one of the pillars was removed; he said that what he meant was that, after all, permanent value could not be claimed even for the Agreement of July 11. Nevertheless, one had to insist that it be maintained in force and be valid and binding for both parties; that a different settlement might sometime be in order could be contemplated only with great caution. Nevertheless, the alarm caused at first by your proposal had again abated, as already mentioned. Your sincerity, particularly, had made an impression. Thus it became evident that the Austrian question did not necessarily prejudice German-Italian friendship. There was full agreement on the Hapsburg question; the Agreement of July 11 was recognized by the Germans as being in force, and the Italians would exert their influence in Vienna for an absolutely faithful and scrupulous observance of the Agreement by the Austrian Government. Of especial importance, however, was the fact that you had clearly stated that, within the framework of German-Italian friendship, any German action on the Austrian question aiming at a change in the present situation would take place only in consultation with Rome. I added that we, for our part, assumed we were safe from a repetition of Italy's previous partnership with other powers ("Watch on the Brenner"). Ciano agreed to that as a matter of course, whereupon we passed to other questions.

HASSELL

D. SCHUSCHNIGG EVADES GERMAN DEMANDS,  
FEBRUARY-MAY 1937

No. 209

1549/370336-38

*The German Ambassador in Austria (Papen) to the Führer and  
Chancellor*

Tgb. Nr. A 1053

VIENNA, February 13, 1937.

Received February 15, 1937.

Subject: The restoration question.

In continuation of my telegrams Nos. 13 and 15,<sup>68</sup> I should like to make the following additional observations on the further course of the latest restoration campaign:

Actually, it seems to be true that neither the Federal Chancellor nor any member of the Government is responsible for the article in the *Wiener Zeitung*. But the effect of the statement in this semi-official newspaper is nonetheless significant, for it for the first time confirms as the official view that the new Austrian Constitution must be crowned with a monarch.

The press dependent upon or inspired by the Austrian Government naturally hailed this statement with great joy. From the reception accorded the article abroad, one can draw almost certain conclusions as to the growing approval of the idea of a restoration.

It is therefore urgently necessary to study and consider anew how this danger may be obviated by the Reich. I was always and am today still of the opinion that frontal attacks from the Reich upon the restoration, particularly when accompanied by disparaging criticism of the Hapsburg tradition, only strengthen the determination of the Legitimists within and without Austria. We shall therefore have to concentrate our efforts increasingly on those countries where the political party set-up has resulted in a conscious opposition to a restoration—calling attention to the inconsistencies of the Legitimist movement and to the dangers it holds for European peace. This seems to be possible especially in France. By a deftly managed campaign in Socialist and Radical Socialist circles, Premier Blum should be compelled publicly, in Parliament, to present the view of the French Government on the problem of restoration. Out of regard for his Leftist allies and for the Successor States, he could only reject it absolutely. This would then also serve as a cue for its treatment in the Successor States.

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<sup>68</sup> Neither printed.

It would further have to be pointed out that it is a complete deception of public opinion to speak of a red-white-red restoration, that is, of a restoration that consciously relinquishes all territorial revision. Hungarian Legitimism could not live a day if it wished to promote a restoration within the limits of present-day Hungary. Thus the inherent falsity of the whole campaign stands revealed from the close connection between Austrian and Hungarian Legitimism alone. Yugoslavia knows that the Croats long only for the moment of a restoration.

Another danger inherent in the present situation lies in the fact that the claim of Austrian Legitimism that it already controls a majority in the country remains unchallenged. Since the Austrian Government will tolerate no contradiction in its press, it should at least be pointed out abroad that the question of restoration is being pushed exclusively by a small clique of large landed proprietors, the old Government officials, and the clergy. The figures on Otto's honorary citizenships, the majority of them in Lower Austria and Burgenland, show very plainly that the small peasantry of the Alpine provinces has nothing to do with this question. It is therefore high time to assault the myth of the "majority."

The Hungarian Minister, who called on me yesterday, proposes a joint German-Hungarian *démarche* with Mussolini, to induce him to take a clear-cut stand in Vienna.

Even though the State Secretary promised me that the campaign is now to be called off and that the Federal Chancellor will only revert to it once more in his speech to the Fatherland Front on Sunday, I still believe that it would be desirable to define the attitude of the Reich Government again on the occasion of the visit of the Reich Foreign Minister.

PAPEN

## No. 210

1549/376328-35

*The German Ambassador in Austria (Papen) to the Führer and Chancellor*

A 1073

VIENNA, February 13, [1937].

Received February 15, 1937.

In continuation of my report of January 9 of this year—A 188.

Subject: Discussions between the Federal Chancellor and the National Opposition regarding continuance of pacification.

The attempts of the Austrian N.S.D.A.P. to legalize their activity seem to have reached a decisive stage. The preparatory work for

forming an organization intended to give the National Opposition an opportunity, even though slight, of exercising a legal influence on political events in Austria was concluded at the beginning of this week after numerous discussions between leading National Socialists and Ministers von Glaise-Horstenau and Neustädter-Stürmer. On February 8, a Committee of Seven handed Minister Neustädter-Stürmer the statutes of the "German-Social People's League in Austria" [*Deutsch-sozialen Volksbundes in Oesterreich*]. This Committee of Seven, which is to gather together all Nationals in Austria, consists of: three National Socialists (Dr. Jury, In der Maur, Dr. Tavs), two contact men of Minister Neustädter-Stürmer (Ministerial Counselor Wolfsegger and Vice President Berghammer), the contact man of Minister von Glaise-Horstenau (President Mannlicher),<sup>88a</sup> and the Catholic-National university professor, Dr. Menghin. The same Committee handed the Minister of the Interior the attached memorandum with the request that it be forwarded to the Federal Chancellor. The statutes and the memorandum were signed by 275 persons active in public life and business. Many of the names are outstanding. Captain Leopold did not sign, since his name appears in the memorandum.

The Federal Chancellor, whom Minister von Glaise-Horstenau informed of the memorandum and who was not unimpressed by the names, declared himself ready to start conversations with a small committee, mentioning Dr. Jury, President Mannlicher, and Professor Menghin. He promised to come to a decision by February 13. The Federal Chancellor was perhaps impelled to act so expeditiously because of various proclamations issued by groups of the Fatherland Front against the formation of political organizations, which, as was revealed by later statements of the Federal Chancellor, hardly pleased him. Another reason for disposing of the matter by Saturday was the fact that a meeting of *Landesführer* of the Fatherland Front is scheduled for that day, and their attitude toward the founding of new organizations is on the agenda.

The following case shows how little unanimity exists in the Government camp with regard to the views on pacification. Some members of the National Opposition had met on the 10th, under the leadership of Captain Leopold, for a discussion of the future course of action, when suddenly police officers arrived to arrest all those present. The latter protested vigorously and telephoned Minister Neustädter-Stürmer, who ordered the police president to cancel his order; after a little argument, that is what happened.

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<sup>88a</sup> Former president of the Austrian Senate.

whereupon the discussion was resumed. It is more than characteristic that, from the police president on down, responsibility for the order for arrest was placed on subordinates.

#### FIRST CONVERSATION WITH THE FEDERAL CHANCELLOR

On the 11th the Federal Chancellor's conversation with the Committee of Three took place. It speaks for the Federal Chancellor's appreciation of political realities that, after an introductory talk, he dismissed Dr. Mannlicher and Dr. Menghin in order to continue the conversation alone with the National Socialist representative. This first conference of a National Socialist with the Federal Chancellor had the following result.

##### *Its result.*

(1) The Federal Chancellor asked him not to insist on discussing the statutes of the organization, but to take the attitude that for formal reasons they would be withdrawn. It would be desirable to wait before reintroducing them, and in return he would meanwhile recognize the Executive Committee *de facto*. He was prepared to remain in further contact with the Committee and to see to it that its activity was not impeded. Furthermore, approval would be granted for the formation of committees in the Austrian provinces.

(2) The Federal Chancellor would see to it that in the administrative machinery in Vienna and in the provinces, chiefs and contact men would be appointed by the Fatherland Front, whose task it would be, as in the *Soziale Arbeitsgemeinschaft* (an association for appeasing Socialist Labor), to establish liaison in national matters, to make possible the collaboration of the Nationals within the framework of the Fatherland Front, and to intervene in cases of grievance.

(3) The extensive reform of emergency legislation was promised.

(4) The Federal Chancellor is prepared to proceed with the amnesty in administrative and court cases, and the release of the 145 National Socialists still in prison is to take place gradually. Pending proceedings are to be dropped, releases from detention effected, and sentencing handled leniently. Defamation and discrimination because of membership in the N.S.D.A.P. are to cease.

(5) The question of civil servants is to be handled sympathetically.

(6) Expulsions are to be investigated sympathetically.

(7) Those persons in the administration who are particularly objectionable to the National Opposition are to be gradually removed.

*Statement of the National Opposition.*

After these statements of the Federal Chancellor, Dr. Jury made the following counterstatements:

"I declare that, for reasons of *Realpolitik*, we take cognizance of the independence of Austria, and shall act in accord with it. This statement also applies to the Constitution of 1934 and to the law concerning the Fatherland Front, beyond which we wish to form no additional political party."

This statement was repeated and confirmed by Captain Leopold in the conversation with the Federal Chancellor on the 12th.

At a meeting of the Pacification Committee that took place on the 12th under the chairmanship of Captain Leopold, it was decided to continue the talk with the Federal Chancellor on the basis of his proposals, and to relinquish the idea of the immediate establishment of the organization. For mainly tactical reasons, however, it was decided to continue insisting on the establishment of the organization by the beginning of May; approval of the organization and commencement of its activities need not take place at the same time.

**SECOND CONVERSATION WITH THE FEDERAL CHANCELLOR**

At the proposal of Dr. Jury, Captain Leopold was called in to the conference that took place with the Federal Chancellor on the same evening, while Dr. Mannlicher withdrew at the desire of the Federal Chancellor. Thus those now negotiating on pacification as representatives of the National Opposition are the two National Socialists and the representative of the Catholic-National group, Dr. Menghin.

The result of the conference was the speedy release of the 145 National Socialists, in which connection the Federal Chancellor voiced the surprising wish that major offenders should emigrate to the Reich.

The Federal Chancellor again asked that they desist from the establishment of the organization and he promised to protect from police action any offices in Vienna and the provinces that might be established in furtherance of the pacification movement. Committees of arbitration and intervention would also be established in the Fatherland Front and would be charged with making binding decisions on all matters under dispute between the National Opposition and the Fatherland Front. Cases that cannot be settled in this way shall be submitted to the Minister of the Interior for a decision. A National was to have the chairmanship of these committees; otherwise they were to be set up on a parity basis.

On point 6 of the proposals as given above, it was agreed that in case of the positive outcome of these negotiations, Professor Menghin would be charged with investigating the expulsions.

In the discussion of point 7, the Federal Chancellor seemed prepared to recall Bechinie, the Director of Security of Salzburg, but not the Directors of Security of Vienna (Skubl) and Lower Austria (Baron Gautsch).

The question of whether the organization could be founded remained unclarified.

The discussions, which are to be continued at the beginning of next week, undoubtedly reveal not inconsiderable progress in the plans for pacification. First, to be sure, we must wait and see to what extent the promise of the Federal Chancellor will be kept and can be carried out after the visit of the Reich Foreign Minister to Vienna. Even in his own ranks Dr. von Schuschnigg will still have great difficulties to overcome.

PAPEN

[Enclosure]

*The Committee of Seven to the Austrian Federal Chancellor*

THE FEDERAL CHANCELLOR,

DR. KURT VON SCHUSCHNIGG,

*Vienna.*

In accordance with the provisions of the law on organizations, notice of the proposed establishment of the "German-Social People's League in Austria," was given to the competent Austrian Minister, Odo Neustädter-Stürmer, and the statutes submitted. In this connection, the undersigned take the liberty, as proponents of the organization to be established, to state the following:

More than 6 months have elapsed since July 11, 1936, on which day Your Excellency and the Führer and Chancellor of the German Reich, Adolf Hitler, took the path of reconciliation between the two German States. The complete success of this work is contingent upon the internal pacification of Austria. Since July 11, 1936, there have been no serious disturbances to peace and order, nor other illegal acts. Nevertheless, it has thus far not been possible to achieve effective collaboration of the National Opposition under the predominant influence of Captain (ret.) Josef Leopold. There is no doubt that despite all efforts of the Government, the entire public life of the State suffers severely thereby and the development of the

economy lacks that much desired improvement which would be possible if all groups cooperated harmoniously. According to repeated official declarations, this condition is regarded as entirely undesirable by the Government also.

The undersigned are of the opinion that it would be a substantial step in the direction of domestic peace in Austria if the contemplated organization could be formed unhindered and the opportunity were thus provided to cultivate the national cultural and social interests of the German people in Austria while excluding all political issues which, according to existing regulations, cannot come within the scope of action of such an organization.

The undersigned therefore give their support to the proposed establishment of the organization with their whole personal influence and position in public and economic life and believe they can express the firm hope that, at a time beset with so many dangers, the opportunity to take such a vital step in the direction of domestic pacification will not be neglected, but rather that by permitting the organization, all the constructive forces in the State will be gathered together.

VIENNA, February 8, 1937.

### No. 211

2017/443593-95

*The German Ambassador in Austria (Papen) to the German  
Foreign Ministry*

A 1167

VIENNA, February 18, 1937.

Received February 22, 1937.

(Pol. IV 905)

Subject: The address of the Federal Chancellor and the reaction to it.

I have the honor to submit herewith the address of Federal Chancellor von Schuschnigg at the Third Federal Convention of the Fatherland Front on February 14, as published in the official *Wiener Zeitung* of the 15th.<sup>69</sup>

Besides the words, much more friendly than in the past, which the Federal Chancellor used to describe Austria's relations with Germany, his attitude toward Legitimism, as well as toward the National Opposition in Austria, deserves special attention.

The Federal Chancellor made three proposals for dealing with the question of Legitimism. The second of these stipulates that the

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<sup>69</sup> Not printed here.

form of government shall be decided solely and exclusively by the people of Austria, and under the constitution. This apparent concession to democratic principles is considerably restricted by the concluding clause. For, although article 65 of the Austrian Constitution provides for a referendum on certain questions, it is stipulated in the same article that the conduct thereof shall be regulated, especially as regards the qualifications of the voters, by a federal law to be promulgated later.

The third proposal contains a clear warning to the present leaders of the Legitimist movement, cautioning them against experimentation. The decision on the referendum and on the date are expressly reserved for the Head of the State and of the Fatherland Front; that is, for the Federal Chancellor. From this it may be expected that Herr von Schuschnigg intends to intervene more actively than hitherto in the conduct of the Legitimist movement, which he is, furthermore, forcing more and more vigorously into the Fatherland Front, the only organization legally entitled to mold the political will of the people.

It is understandable that, in view of this development, desired by the Federal Chancellor and undoubtedly aiming at the future restoration of Otto von Hapsburg, the efforts to bring the National Opposition together in the German-Social People's League and to legalize National Socialism in Austria could not obtain the definite approval of Dr. Schuschnigg. On the other hand, he avoided a flat rejection, in order that the conferences described in the report of the 13th (A 1073) might be continued.

Captain Leopold gave as his impression of the address that, although the Federal Chancellor spoke of the Nationals in Austria in warmer tones than heretofore, he had expected more material concessions. In his opinion, however, the address had not set up any obstructions.

The attitude of the Austrian press toward the Federal Chancellor's address does not furnish any new points of view. Considerably more interesting are two despatches from Rome, in the *Neues Wiener Tagblatt*, which claim to represent the opinion of authoritative Italian circles on the question of the restoration. The despatch of the 16th, referring to the fact that French diplomatic circles have somewhat modified their opposition to the restoration, states: "But if certain circles should pin their hopes on the possibility that the question of restoration would lead to misunderstandings between Rome and Vienna, it might happen that such diplomacy would again be disappointed." The despatch published on the 17th is clearer yet, professing to express the opinion of Italian Government circles:

"Italy's point of view concerning the restoration of the monarchy in Austria had been known for some time. In Italy's opinion, this was a matter of purely domestic concern to Austria. The problem would assume an international character only if it became a question of the restoration of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy. Since, however, the restoration was confined to the territory included in the Austrian boundaries, it remained a domestic affair of Austria."

PAPEN

### No. 212

115/118238-42

#### *Memorandum by the Foreign Minister*

RM 135

On my visit to Vienna on February 22 and 23 the following conversations took place:

On the morning of February 22, a conversation of about an hour and a half with State Secretary Schmidt, in the presence of Ambassador von Papen. Immediately thereafter, a short, half-hour conversation with Federal Chancellor Schuschnigg in the presence of Ambassador von Papen and State Secretary Schmidt.

On February 22, in the afternoon, Schuschnigg and Schmidt paid me return visits. Political problems were not touched upon at that time.

Then on Tuesday morning there was another one-and-three-quarter-hour conversation with State Secretary Schmidt in the presence of Ambassador von Papen, and in the afternoon, at the request of Federal Chancellor Schuschnigg, a conversation between him and me.

In the course of the conversation with State Secretary Schmidt, all our wishes were first discussed individually.

#### *The Position of Reich-Germans in Austria:*

We expressed the desire that the wearing of the Party insignia and the giving of the German salute be permitted. While he promised sympathetic consideration, and held out the possibility that permission would be granted, Herr Schmidt refused to make a binding declaration.

We requested permission for Reich-Germans to display the flag of the Reich on other German legal national holidays in addition to May Day. Herr Schmidt replied that the only national holiday of which the Austrian Government had been notified was May Day. Moreover, it was international practice to give notification to foreign governments of only one national holiday, to obtain permission for

foreign nationals to display their flag. Incidentally, on this occasion it turned out that the display of the flag of the host country along with the national flag, generally required elsewhere, apparently does not exist in Austria. Herr Schmidt raised considerable objections to displaying the flag other than on May Day, in view of the internal political tension still prevailing.

*Repeal of the rule prohibiting Reich-German children from belonging to the League of Reich-German Youth [Bund der reichs-deutschen Jugend] and from participating in activities of the League of Reich-Germans [Bund der Reichsdeutschen]:*

Herr Schmidt promised to advocate this before the domestic authorities.

*Cultural Relations:*

There was no detailed discussion concerning these, in view of the fact that the time set for the beginning of the negotiations of the German-Austrian Cultural Commission was fixed for February 25.

As far as permission for the Führer's book, *Mein Kampf*, was concerned, Herr Schmidt would propose that sale of the book be allowed, without, however, permitting window displays or other advertising devices.

*Amnesty Question:*

To my reproach that the figures given us for persons still in custody because of political crimes were inaccurate and, in particular, that the figure of 700 did not include those held in police custody, State Secretary Schmidt declared that these prisoners were included. In the afternoon Federal Chancellor Schuschnigg gave me the same assurance and in addition assured me that upon his orders considerable moderation had been introduced into police and administrative practices.

*Refugee Problem:*

This question was exhaustively treated, and it was, in particular, pointed out by us that thus far not even 100 of the 500 refugees whose repatriation had at one time been promised had been brought back.

To Herr Schmidt's objection that people who had acquired German nationality could not be taken back any more, we replied by calling attention to the fact that this naturalization had in part taken place not voluntarily but at the order of German authorities, because otherwise it would not have been possible to obtain employment for them in Germany. At the end of the long discussion Herr Schmidt promised to reconsider our wishes.

*Reich-German Landesgruppe Oesterreich of the Auslandsorganisation of the N.S.D.A.P.:*

In opposition to my request for the admission of Consul Bernard in Salzburg as *Landesgruppenleiter*, all sorts of misgivings were at first expressed by Herr Schmidt. In particular did he revert to the idea that the Austrian authorities would have to have some person "who could be apprehended," if necessary, should conflicts arise with the *Landesgruppe* Austria [of the *Auslandsorganisation*] of the N.S.D.A.P. I first pointed out that I did not consider such conflicts of a general nature as possible after the *Auslandsorganisation* had issued stringent regulations to its groups abroad. By the integration of the Chief of the *Auslandsorganisation* into the Foreign Ministry, complaints against individual members or the *Landesgruppe* itself could now be channeled through the Foreign Ministry or the Embassy in Vienna. In fact, I would have to request that this be made the regular channel. The complaints made would then be exhaustively investigated by us and redress granted, if necessary. In any case I would have to insist that Herr Bernard be recognized as *Landesgruppenleiter*. This Herr Schmidt finally granted me.

*Economic Questions:*

These were not discussed.

State Secretary Schmidt on his part now brought up various grievances. Among other things he pointed out that an *Ortsgruppenleiter* of the N.S.D.A.P. appointed in Bludenz had a criminal record. Then Herr Schmidt brought up the case of Hofer (Braunau), who by means of official assurance of safe-conduct had been enticed into German territory and had been arrested there. The letter of safe-conduct had been issued by the administrative office of the Freilassing district. Hofer was accused of smuggling foreign currency and had now been in prison for a long time without any trial having taken place. An Austrian by the name of Huber from Braunau, who was in a position to give information concerning the alleged acts of Hofer, had thus far not been interrogated. Herr Schmidt proposed that this man be interrogated in a court of justice.

v[ON] N[EURATH]

BERLIN, February 25, 1937.

## No. 213

115/118243-47

*Memorandum by the Foreign Minister*

RM 136

After I had discussed the individual points of difficulty relative to the execution of the Agreement of July 11, 1936, in my first conversation with State Secretary Schmidt, I turned to the political questions. I began by first of all expressing a desire to clarify our attitude toward the Hapsburg restoration in Austria. In that connection I was less concerned with obtaining any assurance from the Austrian Government than with leaving no doubt in their mind as to what effect a Hapsburg restoration in Austria would have on relations with Germany. In justification I called attention to the increased Legitimist agitation that was to be observed recently in Austria as well as abroad and then declared that any reestablishment of the Hapsburg Monarchy would by no means be tolerated by us. Herr Schmidt, to whom this conversation was obviously distressing, cut short any further discussion by stating that he was not authorized to take any official stand. Federal Chancellor Schuschnigg had rather reserved that to himself. During the call on Federal Chancellor Schuschnigg<sup>70</sup> immediately after my visit with Schmidt I again opened the conversation with the Hapsburg question. I made the same statements on the subject as indicated above. To the Federal Chancellor's expected retort that the question of the form of government was exclusively a matter for the Austrian State, I answered him that we absolutely conceded that. He could not, however, deny that we had a very great interest in the state of domestic affairs in Austria. This was all the more the case in the question of the Hapsburg restoration, since the members of this House did not conceal the fact that they did not intend to limit their political aspirations to present-day Austria. I also called attention to the assertions of the representative of the House of Hapsburg, Herr von Wiesner, who had declared that Austria under the House of Hapsburg must play the same role as Piedmont had formerly done in Italy. Herr Schuschnigg attempted to belittle the importance of Herr von Wiesner as well as any possible utterances of members of the House of Hapsburg in the above-mentioned sense, but stated simultaneously that in Austria there was great affection for the old ruling house and that the return to monarchy was considered the best means of quieting internal political conditions. The

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<sup>70</sup> A marginal note in Neurath's hand reads as follows: "The statements of the Chancellor on pp. 2 ff. are to be treated as strictly confidential."

restoration question was, however, not acute and, as I had learned from his recent speech, he had reserved to the Austrian Government complete freedom to decide on the advisability and the possible date of a restoration. I reiterated to Herr Schuschnigg our attitude toward the problem and told him that a Hapsburg restoration would be the best way for Austria to commit suicide.

In the afternoon Federal Chancellor Schuschnigg asked me to call on him alone and told me that he wished to discuss the restoration question with me again, in private. He stated that he was perfectly aware that a restoration of the Hapsburgs could never be carried out against the wishes of Germany. Even though he could give me no express assurance that he would in every case secure the advance approval of Germany, he could at least tell me that it went without saying that he would consult us beforehand. To my question as to what his attitude would be in the case of a possible Hapsburg *Putsch*, he declared that in such an event he would not hesitate to have the Pretender arrested even before he reached Vienna. He had informed Archduke Otto of this.

I then asked Herr Schuschnigg how he pictured the further development of our relations, whereupon he explained that, while maintaining the complete independence of the Austrian State, he desired close ties with the German Reich, in the military field as well as in the fields of foreign and commercial policy, and in the judicial sphere. I called the attention of the Federal Chancellor to the fact that such a development was difficult to achieve as long as the persecution of National Socialism continued in Austria. To this Herr Schuschnigg replied that he was striving gradually to include the National Socialists, too, in the Government. For this reason he had not long ago conferred with Herr Leopold, the representative of the National Socialist Party. We should not, however, forget that the memory of the severe conflicts which followed the assassination of Chancellor Dollfuss was still too fresh, and also that the differences of the National Socialist Government in Germany with the Catholic Church served to restrain and frighten the purely Catholic population of Austria.

Surprisingly, the Federal Chancellor suddenly asked me whether our objections to the restoration were directed merely against the House of Hapsburg or against the introduction in Austria of a monarchy as such. In reply to this I told him that, to begin with, we objected to the Hapsburgs; the other question had not yet come up for discussion at all.

Following this discussion, to which most of the time was devoted, I gave the Federal Chancellor a survey of the problems of European politics in which we were interested and the status of our relations with the individual countries.

BERLIN, February 27, 1937.

### No. 214

1744/403217-21

*The German Ambassador in Austria (Papen) to the Führer and Chancellor*

Tgb. Nr. A 1496

VIENNA, March 3, 1937.

Subject: Visit of the Reich Foreign Minister to Vienna.

Considering the instability of German-Austrian relations and considering the fact that, after three years of convulsions, progress in lessening the tension must needs be slow, it was clear that the political appraisal of the return visit of the Reich Foreign Minister would vary greatly according to the political grouping. While the foes of any German-Austrian understanding strove to discover in the demonstrations that attended the visit a sharp discord between Vienna and Berlin, it will not be without interest to examine what actual effect this visit had on the political situation of the Reich.

Apart from Reuter's canard of new, great foreign policy decisions, the world press determined with a fair degree of unanimity that this was, in the main, only a visit of courtesy at which, naturally, a number of domestic questions would come up for friendly discussion. Above all, it was surmised that there would be a discussion of the restoration problem, which recently had figured largely in the European press.

To come straight to the point: World public opinion did not get its money's worth there, a fact which surely ought to be welcomed from the standpoint of German-Austrian relations. In spite of the disappointment which the Head of the Government here must have felt at Herr von Neurath's unequivocally emphatic statement of our flat rejection of any Hapsburg restoration, it is nevertheless fortunate that this question, which at the same time affects the touchy problem of Austrian internal sovereignty, was not discussed publicly in any way. On the contrary, the other countries concerned are again, fortunately, in the foreground.

Among the problems that Baron von Neurath took up here (the question of cultural policy was reserved for the Committee on Cultural Relations), the restoration problem was undoubtedly the most

important for us at the moment. My attempt to get the Head of the Austrian Government to make a confidential written agreement to the effect that no final settlement would be made without prior agreement with us had, it is true, been rejected even before the arrival of the Reich Foreign Minister; although Herr von Schuschnigg had fully appreciated the motive that prompted me, which was that a heavy encumbrance would be lifted from German-Austrian relations by such a statement. Nevertheless, even the oral statements of the Federal Chancellor to Baron von Neurath produced an undeniable clarification of the situation. An effect was produced particularly by the Reich Foreign Minister's statement that the Reich would never sanction a historical development which, like the separation of the Netherlands and Switzerland from the German body politic, would necessarily result in a further weakening of the German nation in Europe.

The Federal Chancellor expressed himself unmistakably to the effect that, though preserving to the full his freedom of action, he would, in the first place, not embark on any experiments that might plunge his country into bloody strife, and, second, that before taking any action he would contact his friendly neighbors, thus including the Reich. It is encouraging in this connection that in the other countries, also, the most recent restoration campaign encountered determined opposition, the attitude of Italy and also of the Vatican making a deep impression here. Of the latter it may be said that, with all its partiality for Clerical Austria, the paramount consideration will be how peaceful relations with all of German Catholicism can be brought about. The Nuncio here, much more sensible than his predecessor, only recently told me that in view of the world danger from Bolshevism the Vatican attached very great importance to a peaceful settlement with the German Reich, and he would therefore refrain from anything that might prejudice the position of Austrian Catholicism with relation to the Reich.

If the visit of Baron von Neurath thus contributed directly and indirectly to a clarification of the German-Austrian relationship, the powerful demonstration of Austrian National Socialism upon his arrival presented us with another obvious success. In amazement, the world public had to learn that, despite all recognition of internal Austrian consolidation, the National Opposition lives; that, indeed, in spite of all persecution, imprisonment, and silencing, it has remained unbroken and, above all, a disciplined tool in the hands of its leaders. This welcome given to the first visit of a German Cabinet member was an encouraging gesture on the part of German Austria; it was an announcement of unprescriptible historical claims on the

future. It was furthermore an unmistakable indication to Italy that the Berlin-Rome Axis could be built up exclusively upon the real interest of the participants: the Mediterranean for them and the Danube area for us. It may be stated at once that Baron von Neurath's visit was construed very favorably in Rome, in large part because of the friendly interview granted to the *Agenzia Stefani*, and that therefore the emphasis on the things which Germany and Austria have in common in no way affected our collaboration.

The counterdemonstration of the Fatherland Front, a work of the pro-French Mayor Schmitz, although of course a discourtesy to the guest from the Reich and indeed considered as such by many persons not only in the Diplomatic Corps but also among the Austrian people, actually increased the political influence of the National Opposition. This was apparent from the fact that the city of Vienna, with a population of almost two million, was not even able to raise a few thousands adherents loyal to the regime, but had to bring them in from the outside. It is certain that many of these "extras" called upon by the Fatherland Front found the role exacted of them disgraceful and painful.

I have learned in confidence that the Federal Chancellor expressed an entirely favorable opinion of the visit of the Reich Foreign Minister at the last Cabinet session. The conclusion yesterday of the cultural negotiations and the determination of the Federal Chancellor to continue with the program of pacification show that the mood here is entirely favorable. Thus I can state in conclusion that the visit was a success in every respect, in that it demonstrated to our opponents our determination to make German-Austrian relations as intimate as possible and thus, not only force the Austrian Government to reciprocate, but also stabilize the Berlin-Rome Axis as a political power factor in Europe.

Viewed from the standpoint of domestic policy, the consistent progress of the National Opposition, and the penetration of Austria by National Socialist ideology remain the prerequisites for the further historical development of the "German question," which will be decided not in Austria herself, but only in the course of the power-political reorganization of Europe.

PAPEN

## No. 215

115/118251-56

*Memorandum Regarding the Negotiations of the German-Austrian Cultural Committee From February 26 to March 2, 1937*<sup>11</sup>

zu Kult W 3261/37

The Committee for Cultural Relations between the German Reich and Austria, contemplated in the Berlin Protocol of November 21, 1936, was constituted in Vienna on February 26. In accordance with Austrian wishes, the control of both delegations was to be in the hands of the authorities of the Foreign Ministry. The chairman of the Austrian delegation was Minister Max Hoffinger of the Federal Chancellery. The other members of the delegation were Baron von Hammerstein-Equord, former member of the Austrian Cabinet; Dr. von Loebenstein, section chief in the Ministry of Education, and Dr. Wolf, counselor in the Federal Chancellery. The German delegation consisted of Counselor of Legation von Twardowski of the Foreign Ministry, *Regierungsrat* von Weyssenhoff and Dr. Megerle of the Ministry of Propaganda, and *Geheimer Regierungsrat* Gürich of the Reich Ministry of Education.

When the Committee was organized, it was agreed that it would meet alternately in Vienna and in Berlin whenever the need arises, but at least twice a year. The German members of the Committee were received by Federal Minister of Education Pernter, by Minister of the Interior Glaise-Horstenau, and by State Secretary for Foreign Affairs Schmidt. All three gentlemen stressed the desire of the Austrian Government to achieve tangible results from the negotiations of the Committee, although State Secretary Schmidt did not fail to emphasize that the difficulties would be very great, that it would be necessary to have patience, and that the obstacles on both sides could only be removed slowly and step by step. All three gentlemen declared their willingness to intervene, if need be, in order to clear away the difficulties. The German delegation found itself obliged to make use of such intervention by Minister Glaise-Horstenau and State Secretary Schmidt when the negotiations regarding the admission of the Führer's book, *Mein Kampf*, did not lead to any agreement.

The very first discussion revealed that the distrust of German propaganda aims was exceedingly great on the part of the Austrians and that the after effects of the demonstrations occasioned by the

<sup>11</sup> Submitted to the Foreign Minister under a covering memorandum of March 8, 1937 (115/118250).

presence of the Reich Foreign Minister had, psychologically, created inhibitions which were not very favorable for the negotiations. In addition, at the beginning of the negotiations there appeared in the *Reichspost* as well as the *Telegraf* some extremely hostile articles regarding the possibilities of cultural cooperation between Germany and Austria, which apparently had considerable influence on the Austrian members of the Committee. Finally, things were rendered considerably more difficult by the recent ban on Austrian newspapers in Germany, which for a time threatened the very continuation of the negotiations.

At first the Austrian delegation wished to discuss only unimportant questions in the fields of higher education and scholarly research. Only after a rather long debate did we succeed in introducing as further subjects for discussion the question of motion-picture censorship, radio, the suppression of books, and the admission of *Mein Kampf* and of the speech of Reich Minister Goebbels, "Bolshevism in Theory and Practice." The Austrians then added the subject of artistic performances and lectures.

It developed that the questions being discussed in the field of the school system and matters of higher education (equalization of tuition, exchange of professors, admission of high school and university students, mutual recognition of high school diplomas and admissions to university faculties as lecturers [*Habilitation*], cooperation of state libraries, and the wild-life refuge on the Gross Glockner, etc.) raised such an abundance of special technical problems and necessitated so many preliminary preparations that a subcommittee was established for that purpose, which is at the present time still in session in Vienna.

With regard to film censorship, the principal objection on the part of the Germans was that German newsreels were frequently shortened and cut, especially when the Chancellor of the Reich appeared in the film in his capacity of Chief of State. The principal objections were to the cutting of a Reichstag speech of January 30, 1937—in which the refutation of the war-guilt lie was removed—as well as the reception by the Führer of the International Front Fighters' Organization, in which several Austrian generals had participated. The Austrians defended these cuts as necessary in order to prevent demonstrations in the motion-picture theaters. It was then conceded, however, that the censorship authorities were to be given instructions that pictures of the Führer in his capacity of German Chief of State were not to be considered objectionable.

With regard to radio, we wanted to avoid the previous treatment of German broadcasts as inimical to the State within the meaning

of the Austrian law and thus to prevent too narrow an interpretation of the concept of "group listening." The Austrians declared that it was certainly far from the intention of the Austrian Government to classify broadcasts from the Reich in general as inimical to the State, and the promise was made to exert discreet influence on the local authorities in the interest of a more liberal interpretation of the regulations.

Regarding the suppression of books, the exchange of lists of preferences regarding the reciprocal admission of books was agreed upon, which lists are then to be taken up in technical detail by a subcommittee.

The German delegation dealt with the question of the admission of *Mein Kampf*, involving the honor and a special desire of the German people, as a separate matter and not as an ordinary book suppression. There were very lively debates, until finally the intercession of State Secretary Schmidt and of Minister Glaise-Horstenau with Federal Chancellor Schuschnigg resulted in the following declaration being made: Austria is prepared in principle to accede to the German request as soon as possible, reserving time and circumstances of the book's admission, however.

With regard to admission of the speech of Reich Minister Goebbels, only the promise of another careful consideration of the question of admission could be attained, since the objection is made by the Austrians that this speech recommends National Socialism as the only cure for Bolshevism.

With regard to the exchange of artistic performances and lectures, the mutual desire of promoting the exchange as much as possible was entered in the protocol and the principle recognized that irrelevant influences in artistic matters are in principle to continue to be excluded (Austria complained about the influence of Austrian refugees in regard to the matter of admission of Austrian artists and lecturers).

Although the tangible results of the first session of the Cultural Committee are not great, the detailed discussions, which were always conducted very frankly, nevertheless clarified many matters and, according to the prevailing opinion on both sides, created an atmosphere in which further negotiations appear to have good prospects of success. The difficulties are, to be sure, very great because of the considerable insecurity of the Austrian Government and the timidity of the Austrian members of the Committee.

VON TWARDOWSKI

BERLIN, March 8, 1937.

## No. 216

1744/403222-25

*The German Ambassador to Austria (Papen), Temporarily in  
Berlin, to the German Foreign Ministry*

SECRET!

BERLIN, March 13, 1937.  
Received March 15, 1937.  
(Pol. IV 1394)

## MEMORANDUM OF MY ORAL REPORT TO THE FÜHRER ON MARCH 13, 1937

I reported to the Führer on the situation as seen from Vienna:

Since the British decision to rearm and to consider the possibility of a showdown with Italy later over imperial interests in the Mediterranean, the Berlin-Rome Axis has assumed much greater importance. The British have three possible courses:

- a) The destruction of the Axis through customary political channels;
- b) The dissociation of Germany at a very high price;
- c) In case the first two methods are not practicable, final preparation for a settlement by force [*machtpolitische Auseinandersetzung*], with all its consequences.

For attempts to reach the goal by the first method, Vienna serves as a splendid barometer. We find that everything has already been set in motion to this end. The Berlin-Rome Axis can only be injured at its weakest point, Vienna, and there with the maximum help of the Austrians themselves. For this purpose, the Mayor of Vienna, Schmitz, with the probable approval of the British Foreign Office, handed the Austrian President a memorandum a few days ago calling on him to abandon the policy of depending on Germany for support, because it was tearing the country asunder.

He said it was necessary to rally all Austrians, including the Marxists, under the banner of a People's Front Government. The agreement of Renner and Seitz had already been obtained. For this reason, too, the Socialists would go along with restoration. Austria enjoyed the full support of England and France and had to ally herself economically with the Little Entente, for which M. Hodza had already drawn up an economic plan. Naturally, the candidacy of Schmitz for the Chancellorship also finds widespread support in Clerical circles that desire to remove the Minister of Security, Neustädter-Stürmer, because of his policy of conciliation.

As against this plan, there is open for us only the course of supporting the Schuschnigg government—even if we do not like it. Schuschnigg is prepared to continue pacification with the National

forces. But this policy must not be made unnecessarily difficult for him by the Reich, as heretofore. Criticism by the German press of Austrian conditions, with which we naturally have much fault to find, only weakens the position of Chancellor Schuschnigg, who is between the devil and the deep blue sea. The policy of pin pricks must stop and the press ought to adopt a policy of following Austrian developments attentively but without noticeable criticism, and confine itself to describing progress made in the Third Reich. Likewise, the illegal Party must be repeatedly convinced that the ultimate decision with regard to Austria lies outside of Austria, that it therefore plays only a passive role, and that its first duty is not to disturb the European policy of the Führer. There are too many offices in the Reich concerning themselves with Austrian policy, and too many ties bind former Austrians in the Reich to their native country. Here, too, greater self-restraint is imperative.

If, therefore, the situation calls for strengthening the Berlin-Rome Axis against the attempts of its enemies to undermine it, then the necessity for strengthening the Schuschnigg government is a natural corollary.

The second possibility open to the British, the dissociation of the Reich from the Axis by payment of a high price, leads to the conclusion that the Berlin-Rome Axis must be strengthened and expanded until the psychological moment is reached for the highest offer from England. It is from this standpoint, on both the positive and the negative sides, that one should evaluate the efforts Rome is making to enlist Germany as far as possible for her own political ends and to dissuade Germany from making a settlement with England.

I hear in strict confidence that preliminary work is in progress in the Austrian Ministry of Finance on an Austro-Italian customs union. A high-ranking Italian official is in Vienna for the purpose. Such a customs union could be attractive for Austria economically if the Austrian quotas were raised and the customs reduced, but the risk remains that the good schilling currency will come under the influence of the bad lira. I am inclined rather to assign political reasons for the Italian actions and I assume that when Vienna and Rome have made up their minds about a customs union they will approach Berlin with the request to join them. Such an economic commitment would naturally constitute a substantial impediment to a possible German-British settlement.

The possibility of a German-British settlement on the basis of a really generous British offer should not be overlooked, if only because our present strong economic position in the southeastern countries

can probably be maintained only with difficulty. The rising grain prices on the world market mean that the Danube countries will no longer have to rely on disposing of their surpluses to us on a barter basis; they will naturally prefer to dispose of them in the world market against free western currency and thus effect their economic release from Germany. The increased activity of the British Foreign Office in the Danube States, which is clearly felt in Vienna, shows that the British have already properly recognized this danger point. [With the Axis] blockaded by Russia in the East, by Britain, France, and the United States in the West and overseas, Britain in the last analysis need not fear an armed showdown with Italy and Germany. The price she offers us in order to avoid war will therefore be determined by these possibilities.

Any settlement that is to be considered with England need not and should not at the same time mean an abandonment of the Italian position. This is not the proper place to go into the why's and wherefore's.

The résumé of the situation as seen from Vienna therefore reveals the absolute necessity for keeping the Berlin-Rome Axis intact through as careful handling of Austria as possible and the exclusion of all possibilities of conflict which threaten the Austrian question. The question of restoration, it may be added, as a result of Italy's resolute stand, is not acute at the moment. But it can become so overnight if the Austrian Government passes into the control of Schmitz. Such a change of Government would necessitate an immediate understanding with Rome, stating that Germany will oppose this solution, if need be, by force of arms.

PAPEN

## No. 217

2062/448578-80

*The German Ambassador in Austria (Papen) to the German Foreign Ministry*

A 1908/37

VIENNA, March 20, 1937.

Received March 22, 1937.

(Pol. IV 1513)

In continuation of the report of February 13 A 1073.

Subject: Continuation of the program of pacification.

The repeated conferences that Dr. Jury as Captain Leopold's deputy had with the Federal Chancellor in the past few weeks seem to be meeting with some success. The disharmony in his own ranks

which the Federal Chancellor had to recognize, and in which the Mayor of Vienna, Dr. Schmitz, is repeatedly mentioned as the motive force, likewise contributed to this end. On the other hand, the solidarity and the maneuverability of the Austrian N.S.D.A.P., as shown on the occasion of the visit of the Reich Foreign Minister to Vienna, seem to have made an impression upon the Federal Chancellor. It must always be borne in mind, however, that Dr. Schuschnigg is conducting the negotiations partly with the ulterior motive of splitting the National Socialist ranks, and thus leaving the radical groups outside the pacification movement. This also explains the tactics of dragging out the negotiations so that, despite definite promises mentioning a specific time limit, doubts as to their fulfillment are justified.

These promises concern:

1. The formation of executive committees in the Austrian provinces, with the Committee of Seven in Vienna at their head. They will consist of three National Socialists each and one National member of the *Heimatschutz*. They are now in the process of formation. A spacious office has already been set up in Vienna, and Captain Leopold has his headquarters there.

2. The Austrian Chancellor promised that the emergency laws would be repealed by the end of March, or at the latest by the first week in April.

3. The granting of amnesty to those convicted of crimes involving the use of explosives, as well as to those convicted in connection with July 25, 1934, will take place for the most part during Easter week. This amnesty will also include those National Socialists convicted after July 11, 1936. Those not at present affected by the amnesty are to be freed in the course of 2 months, provided that no disturbances of the peace take place.

4. Orders were given to the competent authorities to act sympathetically on petitions for pardon of disciplined officials. The same instruction is being issued to those offices which are to review the expulsions [*Regierungen*; evidently a misprint for *Relegierungen*] of college and secondary-school students.

5. Negotiations with State Secretary Zernatto relative to the creation of National sections [*Referate*] in the Fatherland Front will be started after the return of the State Secretary from Rome at the beginning of next week.

6. After permission for the German-Social People's League was refused for formal reasons within the 28-day time limit, another period of 8 weeks was agreed upon, during which the question of permission is to be decided. If it should not be possible to reach an agreement on the desirability of the association during that time, either, an extension of the period for 8 weeks more is contemplated, waiving the statute of limitations.

The concessions, which are not inconsiderable as the balance of power now stands, provided that they are not fulfilled too dilatorily, open up favorable prospects for continuation of the work of pacification.

PAPEN

## No. 218

2062/448581

*The German Ambassador in Austria (Papen) to the German  
Foreign Ministry*

Telegram

VERY SECRET

No. 30 of March 21

VIENNA, March 21, 1937—6:20 p.m.

Received March 21, 1937—8:35 p.m.

(Pol. IV 1538)

For the Führer and Chancellor.

Minister Glaise told me that, with a view to holding the foreign policy line and giving the necessary support to the Federal Chancellor, he had decided not to resign at the same time as the Minister of Security.<sup>71a</sup> I had supported him in this view. On the other hand, the Federal Chancellor had promised to abolish the emergency laws immediately, to proclaim an amnesty (prisoners convicted of criminal use of explosives, etc.) before Easter, to put President Mannlicher in charge of administrative reorganization and to appoint Party Member Gruber *Präsidialchef*. Further, Seyss-Inquart is shortly to be made special assistant for pacification of the National Opposition, and similar offices are to be established in the provinces. The Directors of Security at Salzburg and Vienna are to be removed, and Skubl has received instructions from the Chancellor to cooperate with Gui [*sic*]. Glaise requests our press not to extol the removed Minister of Security as a martyr, in order not to render his [Glaise's] position in relation to the Party too difficult.

Press commentators here agree in asserting that the change of Ministers will have no effect on the program of pacification.

PAPEN

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<sup>71a</sup> Herr Neustadter-Stürmer, who was removed as Minister of Public Security, the post being assumed by Federal Chancellor Schuschnigg.

## No. 219

1744/403238-40

*The German Chargé d'Affaires in Austria (Stein) to the  
German Foreign Ministry*

A 2228

VIENNA, April 3, 1937.

Received April 5, 1937.

Subject: Conversation with Minister von Glaise-Horstenau.

*Hodza's visit to Vienna.* Minister of the Interior von Glaise-Horstenau conferred with me today on current questions of Austrian policy. First he took up the subject of foreign policy. Hodza's visit to Vienna had made no impression upon Schuschnigg. Hodza had mainly been promoting his plan for a closer collaboration between Austria, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia and an orientation to a Prague-Paris axis. Schuschnigg had merely listened to these statements in silence. For the Schuschnigg government there was no question of a departure from the Berlin-Rome Axis.

*Schuschnigg's journey to Rome.* The Federal Chancellor did not look forward to the pending visit to Mussolini, especially since, according to a report from the Austrian Minister at the Quirinal, Mussolini wanted to urge him to expedite pacification in Austria by drawing upon broad circles of Nationals to share responsibility in the Government. This was not in accord with the attitude and temperament of the Federal Chancellor. The Federal Chancellor wanted to proceed slowly in order not to have any falling out with the Clerical groups that are powerful today.

*Internal pacification of Austria.* Schuschnigg's plan for the internal pacification of Austria was to begin this very month with the repeal of the emergency legislation directed against the National Opposition, which had been delayed through the ineptitude of Neustädter-Stürmer. The Federal Chancellor had granted an amnesty at Easter to 20 of the 150 or so National political prisoners. Amnesty of the remainder would follow at intervals. The slow, periodical method of amnesty and the simultaneous order of the Federal Chancellor that nothing be published with regard to the amnesty also resulted from the Federal Chancellor's previously mentioned fear of a quarrel with Clerical circles. The Federal Chancellor would gladly collaborate with the representative of the Austrian National Opposition, Party Member Dr. Jury, in the internal pacification of the country, and he also hoped that Party Member Seyss-Inquart would, together with the Federal Chancellor, bridge the gap between the Fatherland Front and the National

Opposition. The Federal Chancellor was convinced that domestic peace in Austria was impossible without collaboration or action by the Reich, and he therefore confidently hoped that assistance in the work of pacification, possibly through influencing the Austrian National Socialist movement, would not be denied him by the Reich. In the opinion of Minister von Glaise-Horstenau, the program of pacification will consist in the long-drawn-out bungling that is typical of Austria until such time as conditions are ripe for the "final, natural solution of German-Austrian relations." In German-Austrian relations at the present time, there was, in his opinion, only a deplorable discord, because of the fact that large groups among the Catholic population of Austria did not wish to hear of any conflict on religious issues.

*Maneuvers of Mayor Schmitz.* When I pointed out to the Minister the efforts of the Democratic-Clerical Mayor of Vienna, Schmitz, to increase his influence, Herr von Glaise said he thought that Schmitz was exploiting Schuschnigg's involuntary abandonment of the Legitimist course for his own ambitious plans for coming into power, but that a Schmitz regime was out of the question at present. The President of the Republic, who was, to be sure, receiving Herr Schmitz, would not undertake so heavy a responsibility as to entrust with the conduct of affairs of State a man who in matters of foreign policy favored the Prague-Paris axis and whose appointment would bring with it a relapse from the *Führerprinzip* to democratic black-and-red parliamentary control. The President did, it is true, subscribe to Clerical ideas, but he did not like bitter strife and unrest, which would inevitably accompany a Schmitz regime.

BARON VON STEIN

## No. 220

2017/443619-26

*The German Ambassador in Austria (Papen) to the Führer and Chancellor*

SECRET!

Tgb. Nr. A 2559

Subject: Austria's foreign political situation and the Chancellor's trip to Venice.

VIENNA, April 17, 1937.

Received April 19, 1937.

It is an open secret, confirmed by many other sources, that with the German-Italian ties growing ever closer, the Austrian Government considers itself in a more than uncomfortable situation.

Relations with Hungary have obviously suffered from the attempts at a *rapprochement* with Prague. The Hungarian Minister here, M. de Rudnay, who has been transferred to Athens, told me that the Austrian Government had demanded his recall because of his overfriendly relations with me, and that M. de Kanya would not fill his post again for some time.

The Italians seem put out not only because of the ill-fated Vienna soccer match, but even more because they find that the Mayor of Vienna, Herr Schmitz, and his clique, together with the Monarchists, are continually making new attempts in the direction of forming a Popular Front government, the basis of which would manifestly no longer be the Three Power Pact<sup>71b</sup> but close adherence to the Western Powers.

The State Secretary told Polish Foreign Minister Beck, who was traveling through here, that Austria must reject the alternative between *Anschluss* and restoration. Besides these two courses there was a third: good-neighbor relations with Germany. The State Secretary, speaking under the impact of the caustic attacks in the press on that day particularly, said this third way was, to be sure, being made almost impossible by Germany. It was, therefore, quite natural that Austria was seeking to secure her position on other sides too (Czechoslovakia!). The Polish Foreign Minister had replied that in his opinion one could not base one's policy on Czechoslovakia. Poland regarded this country simply as a "European impossibility."

As the State Secretary for Foreign Affairs told me yesterday, the meeting between the Federal Chancellor and Mussolini, which has been set for April 22, has been placed on a broader basis. The two Foreign Ministers will accompany the Chiefs of State, in order to prove to the world that no serious misunderstandings exist between Italy and Austria, and that Austria intends loyally to continue the policy of the Protocol Powers.

A somewhat different light is shed on this meeting by the knowledge of two instructions issued by the Federal Chancellery, which I received through very confidential channels with the request that they be treated with strictest secrecy. They are enclosed herewith.

From the instruction of April 14 to the Austrian Minister in London it is quite evident that Austria is endeavoring to obtain from the London and Paris Cabinets broader "effective" guarantees of its independence. That this is being done is evidenced by today's report of debates in the Committee for Foreign Affairs of the Lower House.

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<sup>71b</sup> The reference is to the three Powers who were signatories of the Rome Protocols: Italy, Austria, and Hungary.

Even more interesting is the instruction of April 15 to the Austrian Legation at Rome. To the well-known viewpoint of the Italian Government, that in the present European situation the Vienna Cabinet had to avoid anything that might impair the political effectiveness of the Berlin-Rome Axis, the Vienna Government opposes the arguments that adherence to the course of July 11, 1936, was being made almost impossible for two reasons:

- 1) the constant and systematic interference of the N.S.D.A.P. in the internal affairs of Austria.
- 2) the struggle of totalitarian National Socialism against the Catholic Church.

On the first point it may be said that the Austrian security officials are constantly informed of certain unofficial contacts of German Party offices with the illegal Party here (besides, when several *Hitlerjugend* groups were dissolved recently, Reich-German training material was found in their possession).

And German-Austrian press relations, which have been highly unsatisfactory lately, have probably contributed in no slight degree to the fact that the Austrian Government no longer believes in the earnest desire for an improvement of our mutual relations.

I have repeatedly reported on the influence of the Church controversy in this connection.

The last sentence of the instruction seems to indicate that the Federal Chancellor desires to receive an assurance from Mussolini in Venice that Italy would challenge every legitimate policy of the Reich in the Danube area.

The State Secretary for Foreign Affairs, whom I questioned regarding the program for the meeting, naturally divulged nothing of all this. He told me, on the contrary, that the discussion would take place entirely "within the framework of the Three Power Pact."

With regard to the Belgrade Conference of the Little Entente, I hear from a very competent source that the only result was a formal and binding assurance by Yugoslavia to its partners not to enter into any agreements with Hungary without *prior* approval of the others.

PAPEN

[Enclosure 1]

*The Austrian Foreign Ministry to the Austrian Legation in  
Great Britain*

IV/13/H1  
Z 3118/37

April 14, 1937.

By order of the Federal Chancellor, Your Excellency is requested at a suitable opportunity to inform the British Foreign Secretary in confidence of the following:

The Federal Government values very highly Great Britain's keen interest in all questions of Austrian foreign and domestic policy; a successful solution of these, in accord with the desires and purposes of Austria, could effectively establish and secure a lasting peace in the Danube region, *in keeping with the League of Nations concept*. In connection with the exchange of views recently resumed between the British Minister at Vienna, Sir Walford Selby; the Federal Chancellor, Dr. von Schuschnigg; and the State Secretary for Foreign Affairs, Dr. Guido Schmidt, with regard to the long overdue realization of an economic organization of the Danube area, the Austrian Government stresses the fact that the continued adherence of the Federal Government to the German-Austrian Agreement of July 11, 1936, made necessary by the policy of the German Reich with regard to Austria, and the unqualified loyalty of Austria to the Rome Protocols of 1934 and 1936, do not in the least affect the relations of Austria to the League of Nations. The Federal Government attaches quite especial importance to the fact that Austria's foreign policy will remain a conscious and consistent policy of peace, and that the efforts of British diplomacy to achieve a lasting and effective guarantee of peace for *the whole of Europe* will meet with complete understanding and energetic support on the part of the Austrian Government.

The Federal Government states very emphatically that Austria is dependent upon Italy for the preservation and guaranteeing of her political independence and territorial integrity. Austria must absolutely reckon with this fact as long as the principle of *collective security* proclaimed by the League of Nations and the organization of *general European* peace do not have real validity in international law.

A recognition only in principle of Austrian independence by Great Britain and France, without effective guarantees from both the said Powers, prevents Austria from adapting its foreign policy to that of London and Paris even to the modest degree consistent with a strict observance of the obligations arising out of the League of

Nations Covenant. The Federal Government is, however, fully aware that it could seriously consider closer adherence of Austria to Great Britain, France, and the Little Entente only if all the above Powers, but above all Great Britain and France, were in a position to give *effective* guarantees for the political independence and territorial integrity of Austria.

[Enclosure 2]

April 15, 1937.

On April 15 an instruction was issued by the Federal Chancellery in Vienna to the Austrian Legation in Rome, in accordance with which the Italian Government was to be informed in "unmistakable manner"

that the Austrian Government must to its regret concede a growing difference of opinion between Austria and the German Reich in the interpretation of the Agreement of July 11. The Federal Government will do its utmost to avoid further exacerbation of German-Austrian differences and to exploit every possibility of reaching an understanding with the Government of the German Reich, but must state in advance that

- 1) the constant and systematic interference of various agencies and offices of the N.S.D.A.P. of Germany in Austrian domestic affairs and

- 2) the menacing increase in the gravity of the apparently permanent conflict between the "totalitarian" aspirations of German National Socialism and the Catholic Church make it extraordinarily difficult for the Austrian Government to hold to the German-Austrian Agreement of July 11, 1936.

The Federal Government finds itself compelled to call the attention of the Royal and Imperial Italian Government to the possibility of a denunciation of the said Agreement with the German Reich, since it is becoming more and more evident that the contractual obligations assumed voluntarily by the German Reich toward Austria are being violated to such an extent that the Austrian Government is compelled to regard the Agreement of July 11, 1936, as a severe and almost insupportable impediment to Austrian domestic and foreign policy.

The Federal Government is also not in a position to participate in Germany's policy toward Czechoslovakia and notes with astonishment that the attitude of the Royal and Imperial Italian Government toward the problem of Czechoslovakia and toward the problems of a policy affecting the Danube area shows extensive deviations from the principles of the Rome Protocols of 1934 and 1936.

The Federal Government must absolutely insist that the Royal and Imperial Italian Government decide to disassociate itself un-

equivocally from the political objectives of German National Socialism with regard to the Danube area and to adopt a clear and well-defined attitude with regard to the individual Danube States.

## No. 221

2127/463264-66

*The German Ambassador in Austria (Papen) to the German Foreign Ministry*

SECRET!

A 2479

VIENNA, April 19, 1937.

(Pol. IV 2142/37)

Subject: Chart showing the illegal SA and SS formations in Styria.

The Director of Security of Styria had a chart made of the illegal SA and SS formations in Styria which, as the Consulate at Graz informs us, is intended for the Federal Chancellor personally. This and similar charts from the other Austrian provinces may well be submitted by Herr Schuschnigg to Mussolini in order to inform the latter of the extent of the illegal activity, with possible conclusions as to how they are being financed.

With regard to the chart, it may be said:

1. The chart was probably made on the basis of the SA and SS garrisons known to exist *before* the ban on the N.S.D.A.P. Moreover, the numerous conferences which have occurred in almost every place in Styria made it possible on the chart to make an SA or SS *Sturm* out of a mere handful of SA and SS members. That the correspondingly higher command posts are to be found in the larger cities in the provinces is obvious.

2. The SA and SS are completely unarmed.

3. After July 11, 1936, a strict injunction was issued to all SA and SS formations through the leadership of the illegal Party to confine their activity to purely ideological training. We know of no case in which this order was not obeyed.

4. All semimilitary formations will become proportionately less dangerous, the more rapidly internal pacification takes place.

I respectfully suggest that you inform the Embassy in Rome.

The photograph of the chart and the negative are included herewith.<sup>72</sup>

PAPEN

<sup>72</sup> Not printed. A copy of this letter, with one enclosure (presumably the photograph of the chart), was sent to the German Embassy in Rome on April 26, "for information and suggested further action," (2127/463263)

## No. 222

1486/368590-92

*The German Foreign Ministry to the German Embassy in France  
and the German Legations in Austria and Czechoslovakia*

BERLIN, May 8, 1937.  
(zu Pol. IV 2359 Ang. II)

Drafting Officer: Counselor of Legation Heiburg.

For your confidential information. During the Reich Foreign Minister's visit to Rome, Schuschnigg's visit to Venice and the question of Austria were discussed on May 3 in a conversation with Mussolini in the presence of Count Ciano. The Reich Foreign Minister told Mussolini that we were honoring the Agreement of July 11 and did not intend any surprises or rash actions. He did, however, have to make one reservation: we would not tolerate a Hapsburg restoration in Austria by this or any future government. Mussolini replied that he had again emphatically pointed out to Schuschnigg that a Hapsburg restoration would mean the end of Austria. Schuschnigg had declared that the matter was by no means acute. Mussolini had answered: if it remained permanently dormant, that was satisfactory. The Reich Foreign Minister then pointed out that we were not satisfied with Austria's execution of the Agreement of July 11. In particular, the promise made to us to include National ministers in the Cabinet had not been kept. In view of the persistent hostility of the Austrian Government to the National Socialists in Austria, it was difficult for us to calm these groups. Mussolini then remarked that he had called Schuschnigg's attention to the fact that he had to act more rapidly in this respect. Schuschnigg had replied that he feared if he proceeded too rapidly he would encounter strong resistance from the Popular Front groups. Mussolini had replied to Schuschnigg that if a Popular Front government were formed in Austria with the intention of orienting Austrian policy in the direction of Prague or Paris, it would lead to his taking a stand against Austria. This would also be the case if the Schuschnigg government effected a *rapprochement* with Czechoslovakia. Schuschnigg had denied any such intention. On the other hand, the Italians had learned from a reliable source that Herr Schmidt, after the meeting in Venice, had expressed himself in favor of an orientation of Austrian policy toward Prague.

By direction:  
BISMARCK

## No. 223

2091/452487-88

*The German Ambassador to Austria (Papen), Temporarily in Berlin,  
to the Führer and Chancellor*

Temporarily at LENNÉSTRASSE 9,  
BERLIN W 9, May 12, 1937.  
(Pol. IV 2449/37)

Subject: Seizure of the office of the Austrian N.S.D.A.P. in Vienna.

Some 10 days ago, the main organizational office of the Austrian N.S.D.A.P. in the Helfersdorferstrasse, Vienna, under the direction of Party Member Dum, was raided by the police. When I called upon State Secretary Schmidt before my departure, he told me that material had been found which would indicate close connections between Munich and the Austrian N.S.D.A.P. I replied that if connections which were irreconcilable with the Agreement of July 11 actually existed, this must have been against the express order of the Führer and Chancellor. As I was informed today by agents, and especially by the office of Minister Glaise-Horstenau, very incriminating papers regarding the connection between the German and the Austrian N.S.D.A.P. were in fact found, such as memoranda of conversations of Austrian National Socialist leaders with the Führer and Chancellor and other leading German personages; evidence of funds made available from the Reich for organizational purposes of the Austrian N.S.D.A.P.; material for purposes of political propaganda against Austrian Government officials and other persons, emanating principally from Austrian exiles in the Reich, but also official material of the Reich Food Estate [*Reichsnährstand*]; arrangements and cover addresses of the courier service; other correspondence of the Austrian SS with German SS offices.

State Secretary Schmidt is said to have had photostatic copies of a portion of the material sent to him in London.

In order to ascertain to what extent incriminating material may indeed have been found, all the files of Captain Leopold's deputy here were seized by the Gestapo at our request and looked over. This material contains very incriminating letters. I also sent instructions to Vienna that further details be obtained through our agents.

It is possible that the Austrian Government will try to show by means of the material that the Agreements of July 11 relative to non-interference have not been adhered to by us, and we must consider how this can be prevented.

As I reported some 10 days ago, very valuable documentary material disclosing connections between *Der Christliche Ständestaat*<sup>73</sup> and Austrian Government offices has been secured by agents of ours. This could be suitably employed; I request instructions on the matter.\*

V. PAPEN

No. 224

1486/368607

*The German Ambassador in Italy (Hassell) to the German Foreign Ministry*

Telegram

No. 125 of May 14

ROME, May 14, 1937—1:15 p.m.

Received May 14, 1937—3:40 p.m.

(Pol. IV 2483)

In continuation of No. 124 of the 13th.<sup>74</sup>

Supplementing the above telegram, I should like to draw attention to the following points in Ciano's Chamber speech, which seem of particular interest to me:

1) The emphasis on continued, unchanged Austro-Italian friendship; the statement that Austrian policy must be determined by the Rome Protocol and by the German-Austrian Agreement; the repudiation of the idea that the Austrian question could ever disturb German-Italian friendship.

2) The lack of any mention of Czechoslovakia.

3) Despite some acid comments on the smear campaign against Italian volunteers, the generally moderate tone adopted toward Great Britain. Note, for example, the express statement that Italy's Islamic policy was not directed against anyone.

4) Toward France, too, an apparent stress on positive elements.

5) The pronounced friendliness toward Poland, with the express reservation that a clearly defined western pact would first have to be sought.

6) The cool attitude toward the United States, combined with an attack on the American press.

HASSELL

<sup>73</sup> An Austrian Catholic periodical.

\* For this reason I respectfully request that I be called to report in person as soon as possible. [Footnote in the original.]

<sup>74</sup> Not printed.

## No. 225

2021/443863-66

*The German Ambassador in Austria (Papen) to the  
Führer and Chancellor*

Tgb. Nr. A 3435

VIENNA, May 26, 1937.

Received May 27, 1937.

(Pol. IV 2730)

Subject: The State Secretary on his trips to London and Paris.

The State Secretary for Foreign Affairs received me immediately after my return yesterday. I had already been informed by Minister von Glaise-Horstenau of the State Secretary's very optimistic reports to the Council of Ministers on the results of his journey.

To me, too, he emphasized that his participation in the coronation ceremonies had given him a deep insight into the fabulous political power of the British Empire and that his personal contact with the leading figures of England naturally meant a great deal to a young statesman like himself. Mr. Eden had received him with special courtesy and had discussed the situation in the Danube area with him in detail.

It had not at first been his intention to obtain in either London or Paris political assurances in regard to Austria's position; he had merely wanted to find out how much interest was shown in the central European question. The interest in the subject, especially in London, was beyond his expectations. Everywhere he had observed thorough familiarity with the situation in the Danube area and an amazing interest in that focal point of European politics. In London, as in the Paris interview, he had stated that Austria intended to base her policy on the obligations assumed through the Tripartite Pact and the July Agreement, and he believed that he had thus served the interests of Germans as a whole. The British Foreign Minister greatly appreciated his stating at the outset that Austria requested no assurances or commitments of any kind from other countries in regard to her independence or even any such public statement by the leading English statesmen. Mr. Eden had been particularly pleased at this, because it is common knowledge that the difficulties of the Empire Conference resulted not least from England's excessive continental commitments. Nevertheless, Mr. Eden had left no doubt that the Austrian question was arousing England's "keenest interest." Of course, British-Italian relations had also been touched upon, and he had gained the impression that a reconciliation of British and Italian interests was quite possible.

When he asked Eden whether the road from London to Rome was more difficult than that from London to Berlin, Eden replied that the road to Berlin was strewn with obstacles.

To show his adherence to Reich-German policies, he had attended Ambassador von Ribbentrop's reception in London and had had several conversations with Field Marshal von Blomberg. In Paris, after inspecting the Austrian pavilion, he had paid a visit to the German exhibition hall and had then gone to the German Ambassador, Count Welczeck. (On his visit to the German exhibition hall he had unfortunately been received with outright discourtesy by a Reich-German official there.) He had given a full statement to the press concerning his trip to Paris. In Paris, particularly, he had maintained to all officials that, after the difficulties of recent years, German-Austrian relations would return to normal of themselves and that the operation of these relations was, in any case, a "family matter" which the French should, more than heretofore, refrain from criticizing. In both London and Paris he had dissociated himself from Czechoslovakia and from M. Hodza's efforts toward collaboration. M. Delbos had been quite annoyed at this.

The State Secretary also asked me to report to Berlin that he had learned that, on the basis of an informant's report (referring apparently to the enclosure in my report A 2559 of April 17, 1937<sup>75</sup>), the Führer and Chancellor had expressed his disapproval of his, the State Secretary's, political activities. He could assure me that this informant's report was a forgery, that such instructions had never been issued by him to the Austrian Minister in London. (Perhaps he learned of this matter from an Italian source.)

In the second part of our conversation, I touched briefly on the reason for my protracted absence in Germany and presented to him very seriously the Führer's interpretation of the sabotage by the Austrian Government of the policy of pacification. I said that this constant poisoning of the atmosphere must be stopped at once; otherwise, through some unforeseen incident, an explosion would occur, the effect of which on Austria no one could predict. He should not depend on the possibility that at such a moment the British Government would actively intervene in Austria's behalf. Although his London impressions in this connection were very encouraging, the Reich Government considered the evolutionary solution of the central European problem a question in which it would tolerate no interference from England.

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<sup>75</sup> Enclosure 1, p. 416.

The State Secretary seemed to be impressed by the seriousness of my remarks and asked me to go fully into the German-Austrian problem the next day with the Federal Chancellor, on whose decisions in matters of domestic policy he unfortunately had too little influence.

PAPEN

No. 226

1500/370485-86

*The German Ambassador in Austria (Papen) to the  
German Foreign Ministry*

Tgb. Nr. A 3436

VIENNA, May 26, 1937.

Received May 27, 1937.

(Pol. IV 2731)

The Italian Minister came to see me today, in order to ask whether I was going to remain at my post. I could, of course, completely reassure him on this point, but I drew him a graphic picture of the increasing difficulties which were besetting the German-Austrian problem. I again asked him to put pressure on the Federal Chancellor to take a decisive step toward internal pacification by admitting some Nationals to the Cabinet. This is a matter I have been impressing upon the Italian Minister for months now. Following instructions, I told him that unless the tension here were relieved, we might easily find ourselves in a situation highly detrimental to the interests of the Berlin-Rome Axis. M. Salata, as usual attempting to limit National gains as much as possible, said that there would be no chance of getting Nationals into the Cabinet. One would have to be satisfied with the attempt to work through the Fatherland Front.

I left no doubt in his mind that I considered such an attempt quite futile. I urgently admonished him to the effect that he, too, should suggest to the Austrian Government that it take a decisive step.

M. Salata informed me that the Governor of Rome, Prince Colonna, would return Mayor Schmitz' visit and be in Vienna from June 7 to June 9.

PAPEN

## No. 227

1744/403277-81

*The German Ambassador in Austria (Papen) to the  
Führer and Chancellor*

Tgb. Nr. A 3437

VIENNA, May 26, 1937.

Subject: Conversation with the Federal Chancellor.

In connection with my conversation of yesterday with State Secretary Schmidt (see Report No. A 3435<sup>76</sup>) the Federal Chancellor received me this noon. At the beginning of our conversation, I observed that after my prolonged absence, which was necessitated by the flag incident,<sup>77</sup> I was taking the first opportunity to confer with him on the extraordinary gravity of the situation existing between our two countries. I explained to Herr Schuschnigg, in accordance with instructions, that the number of incidents and the more and more evident fact that the July Agreement was being sabotaged had induced the Führer and Chancellor to give serious thought to the question of whether, under such circumstances, the retention of an ambassador on special mission was still warranted.

Since July 11, the day on which the Austrian Government had declared itself ready to establish domestic pacification and summon the National Opposition to political participation, nothing of that nature had occurred which would indicate a serious intention of effecting an improvement by evolutionary means. The whole machinery created in 1934 for the suppression of National Socialism remained almost unchanged. The policy of pin pricks and the rude rebuffs to the interests and the symbols of the Reich had created an intolerable atmosphere. If this condition lasted, it would require only another incident to touch off an explosion the consequences of which no one could foresee.

If the Führer had now again authorized me to make the attempt to induce the Austrian Government faithfully to fulfill its obligations, it was evident from this fact alone how very anxious he was to preserve peace, as well as to promote the development of German-Austrian relations by evolutionary means. But there was a limit to these endeavors, for the Führer could not tolerate an anti-German minority in Austria pouring ridicule on everything that was sacred to Germandom.

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<sup>76</sup> Document No. 225, p. 422.

<sup>77</sup> An incident which occurred on May 1, 1937, at Pinkafeld in Steiermark, where a detachment of Austrian troops had hauled down a German flag hoisted on a house. As a result von Papen had been summoned to Berlin.

The Federal Chancellor replied that he was fully aware of the gravity of the situation. Upon conclusion of the July Agreement it had been his earnest intention to restore in as short a time as possible the former close and friendly relations with Germany. If he had not succeeded in this, then the growing radicalism of the Austrian National Socialists and the reaction it provoked in the Fatherland Front faction were to blame. In this connection, the Federal Chancellor, as he had done previously, broached the subject of the Church controversy, which had increased extraordinarily the opposition to reconciliation in the ranks of the Fatherland Front.

In the July Agreement the Reich had recognized Austrian National Socialism as an internal Austrian affair. Nevertheless, attempts by the Reich to exert a continuing influence had never ceased. He had the impression that right after Captain Leopold was received by the Führer and Chancellor the feeling in Austrian National Socialist circles had become more intense, and he had been informed that Captain Leopold had only recently been ordered to report to Minister President Göring in order to receive instructions for a more aggressive course of action. (Communication from Captain Leopold to Minister Glaise-Horstenau.)

I replied to the Federal Chancellor that I had to reject this interpretation fully and completely. The Führer had instructed me to declare that any violation of the July Agreement was contrary to his wishes. If the Austrian Government was in possession of evidence that would substantiate this, let it produce this evidence and the Führer would then take action. I could add of my own accord that in all the years since my appointment, the Führer and Chancellor had taken the view that the Austrian National Socialists had to decide their political attitude by themselves. Here the Federal Chancellor interrupted me to say: "I am fully convinced that this is the attitude of the Führer and Chancellor; but we know from many documents and communications that have fallen into our hands that the view is widely held in Party circles, even among high-ranking persons, that German troops will soon march into Austria and that such a solution is being urged." "The Führer," I rejoined, "cannot be held responsible for such statements. He told me again only yesterday that he desired a peaceful development of German-Austrian relations and that he was only afraid that the radicalism of the constantly oppressed National population would some day lead to an explosion."

After the Federal Chancellor had declared emphatically that he sincerely regretted the various incidents, such as that of Pinkafeld,<sup>78</sup>

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<sup>78</sup> See footnote 77, p. 425.

and that the present situation was a cause of grave concern to him also, he asked me to tell the Führer that he would consider very seriously what new path he might take in order to achieve pacification. My suggestion that he take persons of the National stamp into his Cabinet was evaded with the remark: "It has been my experience in former years that such Ministers, as soon as they are appointed, are no longer recognized by the National Opposition and are then useless." I told him that on that score one had to come to an agreement in advance with the National Opposition.

In any case, the situation required a new and decisive step on his part to give evidence of his serious intention to improve relations with the Reich and enable the National Opposition to collaborate.

I believe that the extraordinary earnestness of the conversation made a strong impression on the Federal Chancellor. It remains to be seen whether he will find the courage to take a new step in the desired direction.

I would be grateful if I could report in person in the next few days on further measures to be taken by us. For the present it does not seem as if the Government wants to publish the material found in the office of the Party. According to further information, it also contains records of conversations of SS-*Reichsführer* Himmler with Herr Leopold and Herr Kaltenbrunner on affairs of the Austrian SS.

PAPEN

#### E. SCHUSCHNIGG ISOLATED, JUNE-OCTOBER 1937

##### No. 228

C81/001314-15

*The German Ambassador in Austria (Papen) to the  
Führer and Chancellor*

Tgb. Nr. A 3557

VIENNA, June 1, 1937.

Received June 5, 1937.

Subject: The new British Ambassador to Berlin on Austria.

On the occasion of the 70th anniversary of the Union Club, I invited the new British Ambassador, Sir Neville Henderson, to dinner. Our conversation naturally very soon touched upon the political field, and I consider it worth while for the characterization of this new diplomat to record his attitude on the Austrian problem.

Sir Neville first of all stressed the fact that he was very grateful for the friendly reception that he had received here from all quarters, especially from the Führer. He entirely agreed with the Führer

that the first and greatest danger to the existence of Europe was Bolshevism, and all other viewpoints had to be subordinated to this view.

In England, too, people were beginning to perceive this more clearly, and the desire to understand the New Germany as well as to reach an agreement with her has gained ground, particularly in the past few weeks.

When, in the course of the conversation, I developed for the Ambassador the German-Austrian problem as we see it, he said he was convinced that England fully understood the historical need for a solution of this question in the Reich-German sense from the standpoint of historical perspective alone. When I told him further that the British Minister to Vienna took an entirely different stand, that he was doing everything possible to bolster the argument for Austrian independence in London and to make difficulties for German policy, he admitted that he was cognizant of these views of Sir Walford Selby. "But I am of an entirely different opinion and am convinced that my view will prevail in London, only you must not rush the solution of this problem. It is a question that concerns France rather than us and in which we must have time in order to correct the French standpoint." "But please," continued the British Ambassador, "do not betray to my Vienna colleague that I entertain this opinion."

It will be interesting to learn whether Sir Neville Henderson will really uphold before his Government the views expressed here.

PAPEN

### No. 229

2091/452491-93

*The German Ambassador in Austria (Papen) to the  
German Foreign Ministry*

VIENNA, June 5, 1937.

Received June 5, 1937.

(Pol. IV 2897)

In the enclosure I am forwarding for information a directive which I have issued regarding my relations with the leader of the Austrian N.S.D.A.P.

PAPEN

[Enclosure]

*Memorandum by the German Ambassador in Austria (Papen)*

CONFIDENTIAL!

VIENNA, June 3, 1937.

In the May issue of the *Oesterreichischer Beobachter*, its official organ, the Austrian N.S.D.A.P. stated in unmistakable terms that it had, "in the immediate jurisdiction of Vienna, temporarily broken off social relations with the Metternichgasse. This measure applies to the person of the Ambassador, whose mission, in the opinion of the Austrian N.S.D.A.P., ended on July 11, 1936."

If the Austrian N.S.D.A.P. were a purely Austrian affair, any criticism of my person would leave me unaffected. But since its leaders to a large extent shape their policy in accordance with instructions from the Reich, it is completely impossible to characterize the political course pursued here by the special envoy of the Führer and Chancellor as being out of harmony with theirs and to publish this in the official organ of the Party throughout the country. My opinion of this kind of political leadership does not enter into question here. But it is absolutely essential for the advancement of the Austrian policy ordered by the Führer that we avoid giving the Austrian Government even the slightest impression that two different official policies are being pursued by the Reich.

In order to remove this obstacle and bring about a retraction of the unprecedented attack upon the Ambassador of the Reich, I sent for Captain Leopold. He sent word to me that he was very busy at present, but might perhaps come in at some later date. And yet, at the same time, conversations had been taking place between him and other members of the Legation.

I therefore let Captain Leopold know that he might consider my relations with him as terminated as long as he did not comply with my request.

I request the following gentlemen of the Legation likewise to break off all relations with Captain Leopold and his agents until such time as I have designated.

To be circulated as follows:

- (1) Counselor of Embassy Baron von Stein
- (2) Lieutenant General Muff
- (3) Counselor of Legation von Heinz
- (4) Secretary of Legation von Nostitz
- (5) Attaché von Haeften
- (6) Attaché von Wallenberg
- (7) Press Counselor von dem Hagen
- (8) Baron von Ketteler.

PAPEN

## No. 230

2017/443870-72

*The German Foreign Ministry to Certain German  
Diplomatic Missions*<sup>79</sup>

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

BERLIN, June 5, 1937.  
(zu Pol. IV 2730 und 2781)

Drafting Officer: Counselor of Legation Altenburg.

Following a copy of document Pol. IV 2730<sup>80</sup> and in connection with the instruction of May 28, Pol. IV 2709,<sup>81</sup> there is to be sent to each addressee for information:

The loyal attitude which State Secretary Schmidt claims to have observed toward us in Paris and London and which, according to Count Ciano's statement to Ambassador von Hassell, the Hungarian Foreign Minister confirmed, appears doubtful as a result of confidential information of the Italian Government, which the Italian Ambassador brought to the attention of the Foreign Ministry a few days ago. According to Attolico, an allegedly reliable source reported that Austrian Federal Chancellor Schuschnigg had asked the French and British Governments to give a declaration amounting to a guarantee of the *status quo* of the Danube countries during the next League of Nations Assembly in Geneva, independently of the Hungarian attitude. State Secretary Schmidt promised to achieve this aim during his mission in Paris and London.

By direction:

[Marginal note:] The final draft was signed by Prince Bismarck.

## No. 231

2091/452513

*Herr In der Maur to the German Ambassador in Austria (Papen)*VIENNA, June 8, 1937.  
(Pol. IV 3292/37)

HERR AMBASSADOR: When I came to see you on Monday, June 7, for the customary weekly call, I was informed that you had forbidden your staff, including the Military Attaché, "to have any contact with Captain Leopold or his deputies until further notice."

After 17 years of untroubled association with the German Lega-

<sup>79</sup> The addressees of this instruction were the German Embassies in Great Britain, France, Italy, Poland, and Turkey and the Legations in Hungary, Rumania, Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, and Greece.

<sup>80</sup> The report of May 28, 1937, from Ambassador Papen, p. 422.

<sup>81</sup> Not printed.

tion, I take note of your order with the comment that I shall not again set foot in the Legation.

At the same time, I would inform you that all members of the National Socialist ideological community have been forbidden to have any professional or private contact with you or the gentlemen of the Legation.

Accept, Herr Ambassador, the expression of my respects.

IN DER MAUR

No. 232

2091/452514-15

*From a Letter From Party Member In der Maur to a  
National Socialist Party Member in the Reich*

VIENNA, June 8, 1937.

I take the liberty of sending you herewith a carbon copy of a letter addressed to the Ambassador<sup>82</sup> and of asking you to take note of the information it contains.

Let me say in this connection that the Special Envoy has brought things to a pretty pass, contact between the Austrian National Socialists and the envoy of the German Reich being broken off. The reasons are to be found in Herr von Papen's intrigues, which have simply become second nature to him.

As early as the beginning of last December, just when the question of the budget was up for decision, Herr von Papen was so well informed as to announce in an official Embassy report to Berlin that a *gauleiter* revolt was imminent "because Captain Leopold was removing all clever and intelligent elements from his entourage and from key positions in the Party."

That in the opinion of Herr von Papen only those are "clever and intelligent" who would be pliant instruments for him and his policy requires no further proof. All of the squabbles, and practically all of the numerous journeys undertaken by malcontents, can in some way be traced to the "Special Mission."

Against the views of the Party, Baron von Neurath's visit was hurriedly pushed through, although Captain Leopold advised waiting until the amendment of the emergency laws and the promises of Federal Chancellor von Schuschnigg were carried out. Just what we accomplished with this hurdle race of Herr von Papen's is shown by the complete paralysis that has since set in.

<sup>82</sup> Document No. 231, *supra*.

When, on the question of a Fatherland Front office, Captain Leopold did not consider a certain person desirable for this position and refused to approve him, it was Herr von Papen again who did everything possible to push through his own and the Federal Chancellor's candidate. Everywhere the echo resounded: "But the Legation wants Herr X." . . .<sup>83</sup> The consequence of this policy of Herr von Papen's is that in this manner the Government is always placed in the position of having "to wait patiently until the situation in the camp of the National Opposition has cleared up."

Finally, the proposals made by Herr von Papen in Berlin, which affected some of the vital functions of the Party, became known here. This could no longer be dismissed with a wave of the hand, but could only be interpreted as an unmistakably hostile act.

After the return of Herr von Papen to Vienna, Captain Leopold was invited to a conference which at the moment he could not attend because of the pressure of other business. Thereupon Herr von Papen resorted to the measure that is evident from the enclosure.

Although Herr von Papen pretended that he was forced to take this step because he had been attacked in the *Oesterreichischer Beobachter*, this version is nothing more than an attempt to settle the "war guilt question." . . .<sup>83</sup>

Ever since last October, Herr von Papen had been flirting with the idea of establishing a *Führerrat* which was to be a superstructure over the leadership of the National Socialist movement in Austria. At the beginning of February, Herr von Papen believed he had reached his goal through the organization, for reasons of expediency, of the Committee of Seven. That this Committee did not lead Captain Leopold by the nose but perceived in Captain Leopold the guiding spirit of the National Opposition, resulted at once in the bitter disappointment of Herr von Papen, which was so unmistakably evident in the personnel matter of the Fatherland Front office. The National Socialist movement was simply to exist "under cover and as a supply machine for sensible people in the foreground" (a statement of Papen's: "Then we will just turn the National Socialists out!" I have witnesses!) while we who fought and suffered are naturally not leaving the fate of our country and our movement to chance. This is the real reason: Herr von Papen just wanted to show that Austria was, on the whole, better off without the N.S.D.A.P., whose presence thus only constituted an impediment to a diplomatic understanding between the Reich and Austria. Since

<sup>83</sup> Marks of omission in the file copy.

Herr von Papen has been in Vienna, the Party to him has meant nothing but a hindrance.

Now the Party is strongly consolidated under strict leadership; in short, it is the decisive factor, and was not overwhelmed by out-and-out Nationals but, rather, has absorbed everything that called itself National. Some few exceptions confirm this rule. Now that the mistrust has become insuperable, Herr von Papen and his special mission can probably render but one last service to German interests in Austria: to disappear as quickly as possible without a fuss.

This in all friendship and with German greetings,

Yours,

IN DER MAUR

[EDITORS' NOTE. On June 24, 1937, a strategic plan for the German Armed Forces was issued by the War Minister, von Blomberg. This "Directive for the Uniform Preparation of the *Wehrmacht* for War," while stating that Germany, in view of the political situation, neither had to "consider likely an attack from any side" nor wished "to unleash a European war," added that the *Wehrmacht* must be ready "to repel attacks at any time" and "be able to exploit militarily any favorable political opportunity that might offer itself." The Armed Forces must be prepared for a two-front war with the emphasis in the West (Case *Red*) and for a two-front war with the emphasis in the Southeast (Case *Green*), as well as for three special cases: Armed intervention against Austria (Special Case *Otto*), war in Spain, and the entry of Britain, Poland, and Lithuania into a war against Germany. The instructions for war against Austria read as follows:

"Special Case *Otto*: Armed intervention against Austria in case she should restore the monarchy. The purpose of such an intervention will be to compel Austria, by force of arms, to renounce restoration.

"Making use of the domestic political dissension of the Austrian people, there will be a march on Vienna [*in allgemeiner Richtung nach Wien einmarschieren*], and all resistance is to be broken.

"Parts of the Air Force are to give direct support to the Army. Any further use of the Air Force is to be made only after decision by me.

"The Supreme Commander of the *Wehrmacht* is to decide whether, in addition to the Armed Forces, units of the Party are to join the operations.

"Special Case *Otto* is to be prepared

"a) as an isolated action

"b) as part of Case *Red*.

"Special Case *Otto* and Case *Green* are not to be prepared as simultaneous campaigns. Should the political situation necessitate both at the same time, then Special Case *Otto* must wait until campaign *Green* has been completed.

"The possibility that Case *Green* might develop as a result of Special Case *Otto* must be considered, and should not be overlooked."

A partial translation of this document appears in *Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression* (Washington, Government Printing Office, 1946), volume VI, document C-175, pages 1006-1011.]

### No. 233

1798/409044-50

#### *The German Ambassador in Austria (Papen) to the Führer and Chancellor*

Tgb. Nr. A 4335

VIENNA, July 1, 1937.

Received July 2, 1937.

(Pol. IV 3499)

Subject: The German-Austrian question in the framework of the present European situation.

One year after the conclusion of the Agreement of July 11, 1936, it seems fitting to take account of the political consequences of this step at the present time and for the future. The conclusion of the July Agreement was motivated by three ideas:

- 1) To exclude Austria to a great extent from international discussion,
- 2) To wreck the growing efforts toward a restoration of the Hapsburgs,
- 3) To pave the way for the spiritual influencing of Austria by the Reich in order to prevent the creation of an indigenous Austrian culture.

It may be stated with satisfaction today that the Agreement has essentially achieved its purpose:

Re (1) The efforts of various powers to guarantee Austrian independence by international action and to make it the subject of a European treaty have vanished from discussion in view of the German-Austrian peace. The problem is now discussed only on the basis of purely speculative considerations. This condition was the basis for the friendly development of German-Italian relations and for German policy with regard to the Western Powers.

Re (2) The restoration of the House of Hapsburg has been completely shelved.

Re (3) Even the most skeptical judge of the results of the July Agreement will have to concede that, since this step was taken, the door has been opened wide to spiritual influences from the Reich in all spheres of public life. We influence Austria not only through our press, through literature, and through cultural exchange in the sphere of the theater, of the film, of music, of radio; we also exert an influence through exhibitions here and in the Reich, through lectures, through sports. And, last but not least, we exert an influence by opening up the borders, thus permitting Austrians to see with their own eyes the dynamism of the political and economic life in the Reich.

Only those who are either unfamiliar with Austrian history and its fluctuations in the past with regard to the Reich or who have essentially underestimated the severe consequences of the events of July 1934 could nourish the hope that the peace concluded on July 11, 1936, would in so short a time also engender more far-reaching desires for new political ties.

The facts which always militated against the political incorporation of Austria into the Reich and to the same degree militate against it today are well known. It is not surprising that the Austrian Government has with growing mistrust, particularly since the amicable settlement, been endeavoring to fight the progress of German spiritual penetration and to erect new barriers against it. It is not the fault of the Agreement, but is inherent in the circumstances, that the Austrian Government, as a result of this mistrust, has done but little to help promote domestic harmony and to accept the cooperation of the National Opposition. It seeks to defend itself against this reproach by attacking the Reich, accusing us of not having, for our part, adhered to the Agreement and charging that interference in Austrian internal affairs had never been abandoned by the German contracting party.

The attempt will therefore have to be made in spite of these difficulties to progress along the lines of July 11. This is the purpose of the new discussions to begin in a few days. They are fully justified, because

- (1) the continuation of the policy of July 11 is a necessity in the framework of over-all German policy, and
- (2) Germany's position—even considering later solutions—can only benefit from it.

Re (1) As viewed from Europe, the goal of Anglo-French policy remains the securing of European peace on a collective basis, rejecting separate settlements. While a year ago there was some basis for

doubt as to whether the majority of the British people were not inclined to give free rein to German aims for Central Europe within the framework of an over-all settlement, Mr. Eden made the statement a few days ago that any reorganization in the Danube area would find the British intensely interested. At the same time he pointed out in unmistakable fashion that in 1914 the European war had broken out as a result of the "Austrian quarrel."

As far as France is concerned, it is obvious at present that in spite of a most serious financial crisis and in spite of a dictatorial move on the part of the Minister of Finance almost unprecedented in parliamentary annals, she is putting up with everything in view of possible diplomatic developments. In this connection M. Caillaux recently told one of my friends that they did not, it was true, have any commitments in writing from America but had very definite assurances, and that, as in 1914, any disturber of the European peace would find a united front of democracies. If one considers that British policy in such case would doubtless assure itself of Russia's cooperation, the freedom of movement of the Central Powers at present remains very restricted.

The German-Austrian question has always been a psychological problem, particularly with regard to world public opinion. The less it can, perhaps, be solved by power politics at the moment, the more we must prepare a psychologically correct solution. The policy of the Reich must be to utilize every opportunity to make it clear that it not only does not have annexationist intentions, but that it repudiates them even from purely historical considerations, because in the Austrian question it desires merely to exercise a "mandate" granted it by the Austrian race itself.

Perhaps I may take the liberty at this point to suggest that the Führer and Chancellor take some opportunity to clarify the German-Austrian problem from this angle. The doctrine of *Anschluss* has to a large extent been construed outside of the Reich as meaning that we want to absorb Austria as a German province and govern it centrally from Berlin. The Führer himself once said of propaganda: "While the final goals and the motivating ideas must be inflexible, the propaganda program must be geared in a clever and psychologically correct way to the souls of those without whose help the finest ideas would eternally remain only ideas." This certainly also applies to Austria. Austria [*die Ostmark*] must know that even with a close political relationship with the Reich, she will preserve her individual existence in order to fulfill within the framework of over-all German policy the role of mediator in the Danube area which history and experience have assigned to her.

Such treatment in the propaganda on the German question would at one stroke put an end to the ever-recurring talk in Austrian Party circles of an impending German invasion. It would also particularly serve to maintain faith in the treaty concluded by the Führer and thereby strengthen his international authority. It would also serve as a useful counterweight against the exploitation of the Church controversy, which is being used by the Clericals for a general attack on National Socialism. And the utilization of Austria for the over-all German policy in such a framework cannot meet with opposition from Italy. We ought consciously to take this course journalistically, too, in order—as the Führer showed us by the example of his movement—to seek to attain authoritarian ends by democratic means.

Re (2) The conversations shortly to begin ought in general to take this direction. If only in view of the reaction upon the western countries, the present situation, which makes it appear as if the Austrian N.S.D.A.P. receives its instructions from Berlin, must be altered. The Austrian N.S.D.A.P. is and remains the core of the whole National Opposition. The goal of the Führer's policy is known to it. No instructions from Berlin are therefore needed. The tactical procedure leading to the goal is prescribed for the Reich by the over-all European situation. The Austrian N.S.D.A.P. must adapt its attitude accordingly. It must, in any case, be considered by the Austrian Government as a purely Austrian affair. While it must continue its own way in the old fighting spirit, without any compromise, it should seek to as great an extent as possible to have suitable elements in the vanguard of the National Opposition included in the Austrian governmental machinery.

We must understand that this path is a difficult one, but that it is the only one possible.

The Austrian Government, caught between two authoritarian States, profiting from both, imitating this and that, will not meet with any success in its own country so long as it does not resolve on a general program. In view of the domestic split into Clericals, Legitimists, Socialists, and National Opposition, it remains highly improbable that it will do so. It is therefore not to be feared that the position of Germany, even with a view to later solutions, could possibly suffer through the tactics I have outlined.

The Führer has always been of the opinion that the solution of the German-Austrian question will emanate from Germany. It must be our task to prepare this psychologically and at the right time. I am convinced that the conversations of next week, even if they do not perceptibly lead to any great progress, will serve to develop

the July Agreement and thus be useful in the fulfillment of our task.

At any rate, however, among all the factors that play a part in the solution of the Austrian question, there must be a concerted plan of action, to which all must subordinate themselves.

PAPEN

### No. 234

115/118398-99

#### *Minute*

VIENNA, July 7, 1937.

In the course of a long talk with State Secretary Schmidt,<sup>85</sup> the following was discussed:

(1) Herr Schmidt desires a closer contact between the two army administrations.

I replied that we certainly had no objections to still closer ties in the military field [*militärtechnisch*]. We also believed that we could furnish war matériel to Austria to a greater degree than previously and even considered it necessary, just as any intensified military preparations on the part of Austria could also be of interest to us as flank coverage.

As far as closer relations between the General Staffs were concerned, I did, however, see some difficulties. I thought I ought to tell him that so long as people like Herr Zehner and Herr von Jansa were at the head of the Austrian Army, we would hardly have the confidence necessary for such closer ties. Herr Schmidt was somewhat displeased by this communication. But I nevertheless considered it necessary to speak quite frankly about the matter.

(2) Herr Schmidt assured me that the Press Attaché of the Austrian Legation in Berlin, Herr Schier, would shortly be replaced. I told Herr Schmidt I considered this change of personnel very desirable.

(3) State Secretary Schmidt inquired with interest as to the functioning of the German-Italian Axis policy. I told him that on the Italian side there was an urgent need to make this policy work. I then illustrated the smooth working of the Berlin-Rome Axis by citing an example from the Spanish crisis.

(4) Herr Schmidt attempted to represent the appeal of National Socialism in Austria as exhausted and also spoke of the not too

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<sup>85</sup> This conversation and those recorded in the documents immediately following, formed part of the deliberations of representatives of the German and Austrian Foreign Ministries. Cf. the Weizsäcker memorandum of July 12, 1937, p. 445.

distant possibility of elections or a referendum, in which connection it was necessary to take precautions lest they be unduly influenced through funds from Germany. In this connection Herr Schmidt quoted a statement made by General Göring to an Austrian industrialist.

(5) It was repeatedly evident in the conversation with State Secretary Schmidt that he was anxious to project himself into the picture and occasionally also receive some praise in the German press for his efforts on behalf of good German-Austrian relations.

WEIZSÄCKER

### No. 235

115/118403-04

#### *Memorandum*

On the afternoon of Thursday, July 8, 1937, a conversation took place in which the following participated:

State Secretary Schmidt  
Minister von Glaise-Horstenau  
State Secretary Zernatto  
State Counselor Seyss-Inquart  
Ambassador von Papen  
Herr Keppler  
Ministerial Director von Weizsäcker.

The discussion was entirely informal and was not restricted to any order of business or agenda. As a result of the approximately 2-hour conversation, agreement can be recorded on:

(1) the fact that the Agreement of July 11, 1936, must be honestly affirmed and carried out in the future;

(2) the fact that both sides should acknowledge openly the above-mentioned principle and, in fact, not just once, but continuously;

(3) the fact that noninterference with domestic Austrian affairs, on the one hand, and the pacification program within Austria, on the other hand, are interdependent; and that in a certain measure the one represents the function of the other. One party must therefore not wait for previous performance on the part of the other.

(4) As far as the inclusion of the National Opposition was concerned, this was affirmed in principle. Herr Seyss-Inquart developed his program in this regard. No definite reply had yet been given to State Secretary Schmidt's question to the Germans as to whether they were unequivocally in favor of this program.

Important in this connection was the unequivocal declaration of State Secretary Zernatto that the condition for participation of the National Opposition in the governmental machinery was that it enter the Fatherland Front.

(5) With regard to the emergency legislation, the content of a new bill was sketched which is to be enacted and which, with the exception of one point (legal consequences), was characterized by Herr Glaise-Horstenau as satisfactory. At the request of the Germans it was affirmed that various things could and would be done for the compensation of those who had suffered economic hardships as a result of having been convicted by the courts.

(6) With regard to the extent of the amnesty, State Secretary Schmidt promised to furnish figures by the following day.

WEIZSÄCKER

No. 236

223/150368-70

*Memorandum*

In the conversation I had yesterday with Minister von Hornbostel in accordance with instructions, he raised a number of minor complaints which have already been taken up through the Austrian Legation in Berlin. Herr von Hornbostel dwelt at some length on the question of the use of Austrian exiles (Frauenfeld) on matters closely related to Austria. It was necessary, he said, that this should be avoided as far as possible in order to spare Austrian sensibilities. With regard to the question of Frauenfeld, I replied that he had been entrusted with the position of the president of the Reich Theater Board for the purpose of removing him from occupation with Austrian affairs and setting him to different tasks. Herr von Hornbostel next spoke of the so-called "Hitler vacations." He stated that they were being organized by the Party. I replied that this matter had already been investigated on the occasion of the conversation held during the visit of the Reich Foreign Minister to Vienna. It had not been possible to establish the existence of the organization, especially as far as the *Flüchtlingshilfswerk* was concerned. The vacation trips could rather be accounted for by the fact that prisoners who had been pardoned were being taken to the Reich on private invitations from friends and relatives. There could hardly be any objection to this. Herr von Hornbostel agreed, but insisted that such trips were being organized through the Labor Front. I promised an investigation.

Herr von Hornbostel spoke next of the German-Austrian Relief Society. He stated that its activities constituted now, as in the past, an impediment to German-Austrian relations, since it was still active as a combat organization. I replied to Herr von Hornbostel that, although I was not willing to commit myself, a solution satisfactory to the Austrian Government might be found.

Herr von Hornbostel devoted special attention to certain attempts at interference on the part of the *Hitlerjugend*. I asked him to submit the evidence so that I might check it.

Herr von Hornbostel then took up the Dum papers which, according to him, are being supplemented by intercepted courier despatches. He had in his possession general reports II and IV of the *Landesleitung* and the reports of the "Envoy" of the *Landesleitung* in Berlin of April 9 and 11. It became clear that under the pseudonym of "Envoy" Holzer, the Austrians suspect *Oberführer* Rauter of the *Hilfswerk*. I denied this assumption, as being incorrect, without, of course, naming the real person. Herr von Hornbostel was visibly anxious to demonstrate the alleged importance of this material, which, however, unless other documents have been withheld, may be termed somewhat meager. To be sure, the communications in question do on many points, particularly as to the SS, arouse a suspicion of interference in financial matters and cultural questions, but fortunately do not in any instance furnish real proof. Hence it was not difficult to give replies to the individual points which Herr von Hornbostel brought up. But the material does offer proof of the pomposity, talkativeness, and imprudence of the authors.

ALTENBURG

VIENNA, July 9, 1937.

## No. 237

115/115405-08

### Memorandum

VIENNA, July 10, 1937.

During the afternoon of July 9 a conversation took place with Federal Chancellor Schuschnigg, in which the other participants were:

For Austria	State Secretary Schmidt and Minister von Glaise-Horstenau;
For Germany	Ambassador von Papen; Herr Keppler, and Ministerial Director von Weizsäcker.

The discussion, which lasted almost 2 hours, was conducted along quite general lines. The Federal Chancellor developed the well-known basic attitude of the Austrian Government, emphasizing very strongly the German attitude of Austria and its foreign policy, which was and would always be on the side of Germany's foreign policy. He then went on to stress the independence of Austria, which to him was axiomatic, and afterwards went into the matter

of domestic political tensions and his intention of eliminating them step by step. In regard to the organization of the Government machinery, he expressly stated that he would gladly include individually and at any time, suitable elements of the National Opposition, if they adapted themselves to his over-all program. Discrimination against the National Opposition would, under any circumstances, be avoided. Outright inclusion of the leader of the illegal Party, for example, or cooperation with the Party as such would, of course, be out of the question for him; on the other hand, he would be glad to keep in touch with these circles, through the person of Herr Jury, for instance, whom he liked. German representations on the need for greater speed in domestic pacification were countered by the Federal Chancellor's remark that time limits could not be set for such political activities. It was apparent that the Federal Chancellor was not refusing to include in his program progress in the direction of the National Opposition, but that he wishes to advance along this road only tentatively and is plagued by the obvious fear of leaving his support behind him and of reaching insecure ground by advancing. The Federal Chancellor's statements, therefore, did not really go beyond the assurances of good intentions.

In the further course of the conversation, a number of individual points were brought up by State Secretary Schmidt, among which must be mentioned an explanation of the rate of speed at which amnesties were being granted in Austria (cf. enclosure transmitted herewith). The Chancellor deemed it important that the great progress here indicated might, for once, be appropriately echoed in Germany.

As far as the amnesty of Austrian refugees was concerned, the Federal Chancellor made certain concessions with reference to the principles laid down by the Austrian Government during the previous discussions of the Commission, which will find expression in the definitive record now to be drawn up.

When the discussion returned to more general topics, and the possibility of including the National Opposition in governmental and administrative offices was again brought up, the Federal Chancellor emphasized that Germany could contribute considerably to speeding up this process. He stated that the inclusion of Dr. Seyss-Inquart, for example, had been delayed solely by outside influences, for in no case could the Austrian Government act under pressure. It would be a positive contribution, on the other hand, if the Führer should once take an opportunity publicly to disavow German interference in Austrian domestic matters and make an affirmative statement regarding Austrian sovereignty.

With regard to Captain Leopold and the illegal Party organization which he heads, the Federal Chancellor made some remarks which indicated a lack of appreciation of the intellectual capacity of the leaders of the *Landesgruppe* rather than actual enmity.

WEIZSÄCKER

[Enclosure]

According to the reports of the Austrian Ministry of Justice, National Socialists were pardoned as a result of the general amnesty of July 1936 as follows:

958 by commutation of sentence  
1,881 by quashing of charges  
12,618 by suspension of criminal proceedings against those less involved in the July 1934 *Putsch*; making a total of 15,457 persons.

To these are added the pardons granted in the spring of 1937, as well as those issued this July, to various persons against whom proceedings were pending on account of political crimes committed before July 11, 1936, so that the total number of National Socialists pardoned thus far amounts to 16,283 persons.

At the present time, 109 National Socialists are still in custody on account of especially serious offenses, committed prior to July 11, 1936, involving violence or use of explosives.

VIENNA, July 9, 1937.

No. 238

115/118419

*Memorandum*

BERLIN, July 12, 1937.

In a conversation with State Secretary Schmidt last week in Vienna, the talk turned to the common fight against Communism. As the cue of "Communism" had not been sounded from the Austrian side, I brought it up myself. However, I did not indicate any great German interest in the joint discussion of the subject, so that it was not necessary to refer to the previous discussions of the matter.

I arranged with State Secretary Schmidt for a conversation at a suitable time (possibly even during July) between a German delegate and the Austrian police authorities in Vienna on the subject of how hereafter to handle effectively the reciprocal intelligence service on border crossings by Communists and similar questions pertaining to the fight against Communists.

The discussion of this point was brief and quite vague. If there really is any German interest in the matter, however, we can easily continue this conversation. A small German delegation will be going to Vienna during the second half of July anyway, to discuss cultural questions. A German police delegate could join it quite informally and inconspicuously.

WEIZSÄCKER

No. 239

115/118364

*Memorandum*

BERLIN, July 12, 1937.

Thanks to the personal efforts of State Secretary Schmidt, the discussions dealing with the observance of the German-Austrian Agreement of July 11, 1936, made as much progress last week as was possible under the circumstances. It appeared that the State Secretary had supported the Agreement of July 11 to a greater extent than any other leading Austrian. Since the subject is by no means exhausted in the formal statement of the results of last week's negotiations, and there are to be further discussions, an early visit of State Secretary Schmidt to Germany would appear opportune. He is quite eager to make this visit, for he believes that German recognition of his activities is needed against Austrian elements at variance with him. Moreover, Colonel General Göring recently extended a cordial invitation to the State Secretary.

I told Herr Schmidt that an unofficial visit by him to Germany before long would be welcome, but made certain reservations as to the date, because I was not acquainted with the plans of the Reich Ministers in question for the summer months. Herr Schmidt is anxious for the visit to take place before the month is over. Besides the Reich Foreign Minister, he would definitely have to see Minister President Göring, and perhaps Minister Dr. Goebbels as well. If it should not be possible to arrange for this in Berlin during July, perhaps a trip to Bayreuth could be planned for Dr. Schmidt via Berlin.

WEIZSÄCKER

## No. 240

1798/409052-55

*Memorandum*<sup>86</sup>

(Pol. IV 3566)

Attached hereto are submitted, in two separate folders, the results and the minutes of the meetings and conversations of the first session of the committee of representatives of the two Foreign Ministries provided for in the Agreement of July 11, 1936, between Germany and Austria.

## THE COURSE OF THE NEGOTIATIONS

After the arrival of the delegation, July 5 was devoted to preliminary discussions with the Legation. On the same day the chief of the delegation paid his first visit to State Secretary Schmidt. The negotiations with the Austrian Committee began on Tuesday morning, July 6, and lasted until an hour and a half before the departure of the delegation on July 10. Preparations for the negotiations were made in subcommittees of experts. For this purpose three committees were constituted, for press, cultural, and legal questions. Simultaneously, the chief of the delegation held conversations with State Secretary Schmidt, Minister von Glaise-Horstenau, State Counselor Seyss-Inquart and, after his arrival, with Federal Chancellor Schuschnigg, to prepare the decisions that were to be taken. Items VIII (foreign policy) and IX (domestic policy—especially amnesty and internal pacification) were not dealt with at all in the committee meetings, but were discussed only in a restricted council in which, on the German side, Ambassador von Papen, in addition to the chief of the delegation and Dr. Keppler, and, on the Austrian side, State Secretary Schmidt, Minister von Glaise-Horstenau, State Secretary Zernatto, and State Counselor Seyss-Inquart participated. Besides, care was taken to maintain constant liaison with the *Landesleitung*. A conference with *Landesleiter* Leopold was held at the Legation in the presence of Ambassador von Papen.

<sup>86</sup> This memorandum is printed from a Pol. IV file on Austro-German relations. The two folders mentioned in the first sentence are not in that file. The files of the Foreign Minister (Serial 115) and of the State Secretary (Serial 223) contain numerous papers relating to these meetings and conversations. The documents immediately preceding are printed from these files. These copies were not numbered, and the references in this memorandum cannot, therefore, be identified with certainty. The minutes of the sessions (115/118376-97 and 118400-18) and the formal statement of results (115/118340-61) have been omitted because of their bulk, and because their contents are summarized in the documents printed.

## RESULTS OF THE SESSION

Progress may be reported as follows:

(1) A declaration of the Austrian Government which assures the position of the Reich-German *Landesgruppe* Austria of the German N.S.D.A.P.

(2) Admittance of German youth to the rallies of the League of Reich-Germans in Austria.

(3) Permission for the sale of the Führer's book *Mein Kampf* in Austria.

(4) An instruction from the Austrian Government to the offices of censorship in the Austrian provinces to the effect that the showing of German films and newsreels is not to be interfered with, unless they contain an anti-Austrian bias, or propaganda intended specifically for Austria.

(5) A meeting of the subcommittee on books in Vienna on July 21.

(6) The issuance of an identical directive to the press, in order to improve the atmosphere between the two countries.

(7) Appointment of a custodian of the press in each of the two countries, not merely to take precautionary measures to secure strict compliance with the agreements concerning the press, but also to put an effective stop to violations.

(8) Quashing of proceedings in less serious cases against Austrian refugees who in the meantime have not acquired another nationality, upon a petition for clemency, without the necessity for the refugee to surrender to an Austrian court.

(9) Promise of a final examination by the Austrian Ministry of Justice of the lists of refugees awaiting return, which were transmitted to State Secretary Schmidt in November, and the promise to examine an additional 1,000 cases to be designated by Germany.

(10) Permission for German nationals to display the swastika flag, not only on May Day, but also on Harvest Thanksgiving Day, on Heroes' Memorial Day, on January 30, and on special days of national mourning (for instance, in the event of natural disasters).

(11) Wearing of the Party emblem by German nationals domiciled outside of Austria and staying in Austria as tourists or while in transit.

## DOMESTIC POLICY IN AUSTRIA

On this subject reference is made to notes Nos. 9 and 10 by the chief of delegation in the collection: "Minutes of Meetings and Conversations."<sup>87</sup>

<sup>87</sup> Probably the Weizsäcker memoranda of July 8 and 10, 1937, pp. 439 and 441.

FOREIGN POLICY, MILITARY COOPERATION, ATTITUDE TOWARD  
COMMUNISM

On these questions reference is made to notes Nos. 7 and 13 in the same collection.<sup>88</sup>

## THE DUM PAPERS

The discussion regarding the Dum papers, insofar as it was brought up by the Austrians, elicited more conjecture than actual proof of interference in Austria by Party offices in the Reich. Documentary evidence of interference by Reich-German official agencies was not produced (cf. memorandum 8 in the said collection.)<sup>89</sup>

## ACCEPTANCE OF THE DECISIONS OF THE SESSION

The Austrian delegation was told that the German delegation would obtain a decision from the German Government with regard to the agreements made and this would then be communicated to Vienna. On the whole, the results of the session can be regarded as satisfactory. Accordingly, their acceptance is recommended.

Herewith submitted through the State Secretary to the Foreign Minister with request for approval.

WEIZSÄCKER<sup>90</sup>

BERLIN, July 12, 1937.

<sup>88</sup> Probably the Weizsäcker memoranda of July 7 and 12 of his conversations with Schmidt, pp. 438 and 443.

<sup>89</sup> Probably the Altenburg memorandum of July 9, 1937, p. 440.

<sup>90</sup> An instruction to German Missions abroad (1798/409060-71), drafted on July 16, 1937, by Altenburg for signature by Weizsäcker, summarized the course and the results of the meetings in Vienna, and concluded with the following instructions "For the orientation of your conversations":

"In conversations regarding the results of the session, you might state that the road entered upon through the Agreement of July 11, 1936, from both the German and the Austrian point of view has proved to be basically right. The discussions in Vienna from the 6th to the 10th of this month led to the clearing up of many misunderstandings and established valuable points of departure for the further implementation of the Agreement. The results of the session may, as a whole, be considered satisfactory; they constitute an advance along the path of internal pacification in Austria and of reconciliation of the two German States.

"Finally it may be noted that the Committee is to meet periodically and that it is planned to hold the next meeting, the date of which has, however, not yet been fixed, in Berlin. Emphasis can also be laid upon the friendly reception accorded the German delegation in Vienna and the special contribution made to the positive results of the deliberations by State Secretary Schmidt, through his personal efforts."

## No. 241

115/118339

*Memorandum*

BERLIN, July 13, 1937.

Herr Keppler today informed me that at the Obersalzberg yesterday the Führer had given him basic authority to handle questions connected with Austria in relation to the Party. Herr Keppler has still to confer with the Führer's Deputy, who will then presumably issue an appropriate instruction for the Party.

WEIZSÄCKER

## No. 242

1798/409128-30

*The German Ambassador in Austria (Papen) to the  
Führer and Chancellor*

Tgb. A 4673

VIENNA, July 14, 1937.

Received July 17, 1937.

Subject: Conversation of Dr. Seyss-Inquart with the Federal Chancellor.

Dr. Seyss-Inquart informed me today that after several conversations with the Federal Chancellor, the procedure to be followed for the inclusion of the National Opposition has finally been determined. From this repeated exchange of views, he gained an entirely favorable impression of the Federal Chancellor's intentions. It is particularly interesting that in the discussion of the release for Austria of the book *Mein Kampf*, Herr Schuschnigg expressed the opinion that, while under the Austrian Constitution it would never be possible to recognize the N.S.D.A.P., he was by no means opposed to the discussion and dissemination of the National Socialist ideology in Austria. This would permit the *de facto* restoration of the condition which existed when there was a National Socialist movement, but not yet a party, in Austria. The Federal Chancellor also made no objection when later in the course of the discussion of this problem, Dr. Seyss-Inquart explained that the Austrians, too, regarded Adolf Hitler as the leader of the entire Greater German nation, a position which he had assumed by virtue of his historic achievements.

With respect to the treatment of the National problem in the Austrian papers which are so oriented, Dr. Seyss-Inquart has had himself appointed "custodian" of these papers. As long as this

press takes a favorable attitude toward the Greater German problem, without violating the public interests of Austria in doing so, he will have a completely free hand. He will set up a special Press Section for establishing close contact with these newspapers.

Another discovery, quite embarrassing to us, which was unfortunately made by the Vienna police a few days ago, also gave occasion to discuss the question of legal counsel for National Socialists. The police found a trunk with the personal papers of Dr. Führer, a lawyer, which in the main contained accounts of funds supplied by the Reich for the compensation of National lawyers. During the course of the conversation, it was arranged that this would be stopped and that in the future the fees of lawyers defending National cases will be paid officially by the Langoth *Hilfswerk*. Agreements to this effect will be made shortly. Besides, there exists in the legal field a "Society of Jurisprudence," which, under the guiding influence of Dr. Seyss-Inquart, is engaged in the task of systematically interpreting the new German legislation to the jurists and university students here. It will be possible to do valuable work in this society in the future.

The Cabinet has been summoned for July 20 in order to pass the law amending the emergency legislation. Herr Zernatto declared today that from the viewpoint of the Fatherland Front he no longer had any objections.

In order to make possible a favorable start for Dr. Seyss-Inquart's activities, it will be of decisive importance that the Austrian N.S.D.A.P. have confidence in him and refrain from undermining his work in any way. With the approval of the Führer, Dr. Keppler will issue appropriate instructions to the leaders of the Austrian Party to prevent unnecessary trips to the Reich and not again make it appear as if the Austrian Party were receiving instructions from the Reich which are contrary to the agreements made here.

PAPEN

### No. 243

1291/345472

*Circular Letter From the Chief of Staff of the Deputy of the Führer  
(Bormann)*

91/37

MUNICH, the Brown House, July 17, 1937.

Subject: The maintenance of connections with Austrian circles.

At the beginning of July a certain Dr. Rauscher transmitted to all *Gau* headquarters a memorandum from the National Socialist German Workers' Party in Austria.

It therefore appears necessary to call attention again to the fact that the maintenance of political connections with Austria is forbidden all offices of the Party, subdivisions of the Party, and affiliated organizations.

M. BORMANN

No. 244

1798/409134

*Memorandum*

BERLIN, July 19, 1937.

Herr Keppler informed me today that Minister President Göring would treat his invitation to State Secretary Schmidt less urgently than had hitherto been intended.

WEIZSÄCKER

No. 245

8454/E017710

*Minute*

Dr. Keppler today informed me over the telephone that during a 4-hour conversation between the Federal Chancellor and Herr Seyss-Inquart, very good progress was made with respect to pacification in Austria.

The Federal Chancellor was prepared to grant an amnesty to all but twenty-nine of the National Socialists still in custody and to the rest at Christmas. In addition, Dr. Seyss is to take over the direction of the so-called Athletic League [*Turnerschaft*].

Finally, the question of completing the Austrian Government from the camp of the National Socialist Opposition also appeared to be making progress.

Herr Keppler accordingly considered the development in Austria to be favorable, and in the course of a vacation he will shortly look around a bit more in Austria.

Should State Secretary Schmidt in the near future accept an invitation to Germany,<sup>91</sup> Herr Keppler would like to be informed, so that he might also be present. With regard to the latter point, I told Herr Keppler that I had not yet received any information from Vienna; perhaps a meeting between State Secretary Schmidt and the Reich Foreign Minister would take place on Austrian soil.

WEIZSÄCKER

BERLIN, July 21, 1937.

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<sup>91</sup> A marginal note reads as follows: "Göring's invitation was omitted at the direction of the Führer. N[eurath]."

## No. 246

1798/409153

*The Foreign Minister to the Führer and Chancellor*

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

Temporarily at LEINFELDEN,  
August 10, 1937.

MY FÜHRER: As you will have seen in the press, Austrian State Secretary Schmidt called on me last Sunday when I was at Brand, near Bludenz, over the week end. I have the honor to enclose a short memorandum of the conversation<sup>92</sup> for your orientation. I purposely refrained from going into detail because it is not worth doing so. The whole conversation might just as well not have taken place.

With best regards,

Very sincerely yours,

BARON VON NEURATH

## No. 247

120/67710-12

*Memorandum by the Foreign Minister*

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL!

RM 689

On Sunday, August 8, at Brand in Vorarlberg, where I was spending the week end, Austrian State Secretary Schmidt came to see me. In the presence of State Secretary von Mackensen, who was also staying there, I had a 2-hour conversation with Herr Schmidt. It dealt almost exclusively with German-Austrian relations. From the explanations of State Secretary Schmidt, it was apparent that his desire to confer with me was to be attributed to the views of the Austrian domestic situation I expressed in the course of my trip to Belgrade, Sofia, and Budapest at the beginning of June, these views having become known to him. Herr Schmidt wished above all to convince me that my skeptical opinion of the Austrian domestic situation was incorrect. I told him in unmistakable terms that I was still convinced that the Schuschnigg government was opposed to the policy desired by the majority of the Austrian people. I further told Herr Schmidt that the Agreement of July 11, 1936, had been very imperfectly carried out by Austria. At Dr. Schmidt's reference to the new agreements recently concluded, I replied that these could only change my opinion if they were in fact loyally carried

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<sup>92</sup> *Infra.*

out. Finally, I called Dr. Schmidt's attention to the fact that in my opinion the economic distress of the Austrian people, especially in the mountain regions, which was plain to any impartial observer, could only be alleviated by a closer economic union with Germany. I was perfectly aware of the financial and economic difficulties to be overcome, but with good will they could be surmounted. At the present time I could see no political objection to a possible resumption of the discussions regarding a customs union. Political conditions had changed completely since the previous failure of this effort. Herr Schmidt evaded these obviously embarrassing references by saying that Austrian industry was opposed to close economic ties with Germany.

Our conversation became rather sharp in tone on the question of the treatment of Austrian exiles, which was brought up when Herr Schmidt again complained of German interference in Austria.

My total impression of this conversation is that the will to carry out the Agreement of July 11, 1936, is not present on the part of the Austrian Government, and that we shall hardly succeed in regulating German-Austrian relations by this method.

BARON VON NEURATH

LEINFELDEN, August 10, 1937.

No. 248

1788/408070

*Dr. Seyss-Inquart to the Commissioner of the Führer and Chancellor for Economic Problems (Keppler)*

SALZBURG, August 18, 1937.

DEAR HERR KEPPLER: When I discussed the controversy at Mondsee with Dr. Veessenmayer, he said that Captain Leopold had called my associates—in particular Globotschnig, Dr. Rainer, and Dr. Mühlmann—traitors, scoundrels, and blackguards. As I remember it, Captain Leopold or his followers said that my associates had been rejected by the Party and were in touch only with traitors, scoundrels, and blackguards. I understood this to refer to the Opposition group in Vienna.

Your opinion and recollection of what expression was used is of decisive importance to me, for my future conduct must be guided by it. Should I have misunderstood the statement in question, I would have to revise my final position. In view of the fact that this is a question for urgent clarification and decision, I request that

your esteemed and prompt reply be sent to my summer address:  
Dr. A. Seyss-Inquart, Mattsee bei Salzburg.

I remain, with best regards and the German salute,

Yours,

[File copy not signed]

No. 249

1788/408071-72

*The Commissioner of the Führer and Chancellor for Economic Problems (Keppler) to Dr. Seyss-Inquart*

AUGUST 20, 1937.

DEAR DR. SEYSS-INQUART: Many thanks for your letter of the 18th. In reply to your question, I would like to say that, according to my recollection, L[eopold] did not apply the expressions mentioned to the gentlemen whom you name, but used them merely in general statements. Whether in doing so he actually had some of these gentlemen in mind is another matter.

The more I consider the whole problem, the more necessary it appears to me to act in an unqualifiedly conciliatory spirit and to endeavor not to aggravate the differences, but rather gradually to eliminate them, as far as possible, unless real defects of character should become evident in this or that individual; and I would ask you, on your part also, to act in the same spirit. You are acquainted with the different factions and it will, of course, be necessary for you not simply to choose one side for your work, but also to show consideration for the other side as far as possible, since precarious situations are otherwise bound to develop.

Politics is a question of the mind rather than of the heart. To be sure, in dealing with Austria, the heart is more involved, and naturally younger people in particular—such as Dr. V[eesenmayer]—are often unable to silence the voice of the heart and be guided by pure reason, especially when they are so submerged in details and minutiae. I participated in the Party's period of struggle in Germany and know only too well that in such times it is never possible to gain acceptance of the same views in all circles; for the ways which appear suitable and promising to different individuals are extremely diverse, and the judgment of individuals is generally obscured by an insufficient grasp of the situation as a whole.

With best regards and wishes for your further activities, I am,  
with the German salute,

Very sincerely yours.

KEPPLER

## No. 250

1649/391733-36

*The German Ambassador in Austria (Papen) to the Foreign Minister*

PERSONAL

VIENNA, August 21, 1937.

DEAR NEURATH: Thank you very much for the memorandum concerning your conversation with State Secretary Schmidt, which was sent to me at the order of Herr von Weizsäcker. In the meantime I met the State Secretary at Salzburg on August 16. From his remarks regarding the conversation, I gathered that he appeared to be very well satisfied. You and Herr von Mackensen had, as usual, been very pleasant—he did not mention a single word regarding the serious remonstrances which you made to him. Apparently the reference to our desire for the resumption of conversations regarding a customs union was highly displeasing to him. I have repeatedly made the proposal to him and to the Federal Chancellor that relations with Germany be made closer and more intimate by bringing about closer treaty ties, at least in the field of economics and in military matters. The gentlemen never accepted the suggestion, and in my opinion there is for the time being no prospect for such a development.

In my Salzburg conversation, I explained in particular to the State Secretary how unwise, even from the Austrian standpoint, I considered the attitude of his Government toward the Wels and Breslau incidents.<sup>93</sup> Instead of rejoicing that these gatherings provided an escape valve for the National Opposition, they ascribed to the participants the intention of engaging in anti-Austrian demonstrations, when it was really only a matter of expressions of sympathy for the land of common origin and the Führer. The State Secretary admitted that I was right in this respect and intimated that it was difficult for the Federal Chancellor to defend himself against the reproaches of the Fatherland Front. I perceive from this entire situation that Herr Schmidt has long since lost the influence which he exerted over the Federal Chancellor before July 11, 1936. In the interplay of German-Austrian forces he should, at any rate, from now on be considered merely as a pawn, and not as a man

<sup>93</sup> On July 18, 1937, a gathering of Austrian and German veterans of World War I had taken place at Wels in Upper Austria, at which the Austrian Minister of the Interior, Glaise-Horstenau, and the German Ambassador von Papen had made addresses. The Austrian N.S.D.A.P. had attempted to turn the affair into a political demonstration, but the political manifestations were suppressed by police.

A group of Austrian National Socialist singers had greeted Hitler as their leader upon participating in the German Song Festival at Breslau at the end of July and during a tour of Germany thereafter.

who intends and is in a position to put through his own program.<sup>94</sup>

It was noteworthy that the State Secretary also corroborated the tension existing between the Federal Chancellor and the radical circles of the Fatherland Front, on the one hand, and the Executive and the Fatherland Front on the other. By establishing the Defense Corps [*Schutzkorps*],<sup>95</sup> which the day before yesterday at St. Veith engaged for the first time in independent house searches, the Federal Chancellor appears to have fostered an evil influence. It would indeed be advantageous to us, if by its autocratic procedure this Defense Corps increased the difficulties of the Government.

At present, things again appear to be rather bad as far as the press is concerned; one has the feeling that the deterioration in our relations with England, brought about by the *Times* incident,<sup>96</sup> has given the people here renewed courage.

The Press Agreement of last July 11 is really 90 percent to the disadvantage of Austria. For if she can inveigh less against National Socialism, she is deprived of her best means of agitation for the Fatherland Front. After that has been realized, it would not be at all unwelcome in many quarters, if, as a result of a renewed press feud, the Agreement were to be denounced by us because of Austrian sabotage. Herr Berndt<sup>97</sup> recently hinted at something like that over the telephone. But I should consider that a serious tactical error. It is to be hoped that his negotiations of yesterday with Herr Adam<sup>98</sup> have brought forth a somewhat more practical result.<sup>99</sup> However that may be, one thing is certain: as long as the Church controversy continues and as long as we do not obtain a better understanding with England, the enemies of the Agreement of July 11 will have the upper hand here, and the Austrian Government will surely not deplore this.

How little good will there is you can also recognize from the fact that the State Secretary has continually given a negative reply to my oft-repeated question as to whether he and Secretary General Zernatto would respond to an invitation to Nuremberg. Herr von

<sup>94</sup> A marginal notation in Neurath's hand reads as follows: "That is correct."

<sup>95</sup> Militia organization of the Fatherland Front.

<sup>96</sup> The request by the German Government that the British Government use its influence with the *Times* (London) to recall its Berlin correspondent, Mr. Norman Ebbutt, who was accused of doing his reporting in a spirit hostile to Germany. Mr. Ebbutt was ordered deported from Germany on August 22, 1937.

<sup>97</sup> Of the Reich Propaganda Ministry.

<sup>98</sup> Col. Walter Adam, head of the Austrian Government press service.

<sup>99</sup> Marginal note in the original: "P.S. Adam appeared well satisfied today with the 'sympathetic manner' in which his interview with Herr Berndt was conducted. This is quite gratifying, even if materially not much of consequence has resulted, since the main issue, 'criticism of the Church controversy,' just cannot be settled.

Glaise, who would naturally like to come, must therefore also stay away.

I hope to see you at Nuremberg, as usual, on one of the final days, and remain, with the most cordial greetings,

Yours,

PAPEN

No. 251

120/67716-19

*The German Ambassador in Austria (Papen) to the Foreign Minister*

CONFIDENTIAL!

VIENNA, September 1, 1937.

DEAR NEURATH: I should like to inform you of a conversation of several hours' duration concerning the German-Austrian political situation which I had yesterday with the Federal Chancellor in the presence of the State Secretary. The conversation came about at my initiative, because I am of the opinion that continuance of the present unsatisfactory condition will all too easily involve us again in strained relations, which might have unwelcome consequences.

I sought to make clear to the Federal Chancellor that the policy of maintenance of friendly relations with the Reich must be more strongly supported by him than hitherto. At present it was a thin veneer which deceived the outside world as regards the steadily increasing radicalism of the National Opposition in Austria. Instead of utilizing the meetings at Wels and Breslau as an escape valve for the National-minded population, he had, by accusing the Austrian participants of a lack of national dignity, achieved the exact opposite. The methods of the Fatherland Front, in particular those of the recently formed Defense Corps, were constantly increasing the tension. With reference to the suggestion which you had made to State Secretary Schmidt in regard to closer economic cooperation (customs union), I sought to make clear to the Federal Chancellor that, even while maintaining the Austrian aversion to the totalitarian principle of National Socialism, he could still give expression to his good will in other fields, such as economics and military relations. I was of the opinion that if something tangible were accomplished in these two fields, he would thus not only prove his German attitude, but would also lessen the tension in his own Austrian camp quite considerably.

The Federal Chancellor began his very detailed reply to my arguments with the statement that the maintenance of complete Austrian independence was for him an article of faith, although he did not consider this principle as the final stage of historical develop-

ment. At present he was convinced by hundreds of reports that, if not the leaders of the Reich, at least very strong and influential groups in the Party considered the absorption of Austria into the German Reich to be the immediate political task. Knowledge of this fact prevented him from proceeding in many fields as he might perhaps do under other circumstances.

Then followed some very long statements regarding the well-known complaint that the Reich had never ceased to exert its influence on the Austrian National Socialists in all ways. The Austrian Party leaders received funds from the Reich as before. For the rest, Austria had not undertaken and never would undertake to carry out any foreign policy which would injure the Reich, and it was also incorrect, if I had made the statement, that the Austrian Army was being armed against Germany.

The principal theme of his objections was the increasing acuteness, as he said, of the cultural situation in the Reich.

All in all his replies were *completely negative*, so that no change in his political course is to be expected.

The question now arises, and I have already presented it to the Führer, whether, if and when we have reached the conclusion that the policy of July 11 cannot be developed with Federal Chancellor Schuschnigg, we ought not, with the cooperation of the external and internal factors, consider bringing about a change of chancellors. It is certain that the President of the Republic has for a long time been sharply critical of the policy of Schuschnigg. He might be used as an opening wedge. It is also certain that people in the Clerical *Heimwehr* camp, such as Gleissner and, last but not least, Schmitz are striving to bring about the fall of the Federal Chancellor. Possibly the Chancellorship would first be entrusted to one of these men. That would mean an intensification of the course of the Fatherland Front in all matters and therefore would start anew the course of developments (with the prospect of a change). But it might also be that we could get the President of the Republic to place at the head of the Government a more objective man with fewer political liabilities, one more inclined to cooperate with the workers—a man who would, above all, undertake to further energetically the gradual *rapprochement* of the two States through the conclusion of binding treaties. In this connection, former Federal Chancellor Ender is being proposed by many groups (including the Austrian N.S.D.A.P.) as a useful personality. He was the Chancellor of the Customs Union, and I believe that he does not hold to the "Austrian ideology" so fanatically as the present Chancellor.

I bring up the question of this Cabinet change because I am convinced that with a continuation of the Schuschnigg methods we shall *very soon* be in an untenable position. One could perhaps take the viewpoint that the increasing gravity of the tension would give us the opportunity to attempt to solve the Austrian question by other means. But quite apart from the fact that, viewed historically, it would always appear to me to be a mistake to seek a violent solution instead of one presented by Austrian *domestic* developments, I should like to think that it would certainly be preferable for the general European situation to adopt the course I have in mind. But then one would have to have clearly in mind *now* the course to be followed in the near future, if one is not to be subjected to surprises; all the more so since, as I assume, the conversations with the Duce will also treat of the German-Austrian question.<sup>1</sup> As far as those conversations are concerned, in my opinion, the advantage to be derived for us from the policy of the "Axis" must, after all, be realized in some way. The Duce could probably be pledged to certain fundamental principles in the further treatment of the Austrian question. I should like to confer with you at Nuremberg in regard to this matter. On what day are you going to be there?

To supplement the facts of the situation, I add the further information that the State Secretary, with whom I had already discussed in detail the complex of problems and from whom I really expected support vis-à-vis the Chancellor, in no way differed with the latter's negative statements.

For the present, most cordial greetings and Heil Hitler!

Your,

VON PAPEN

No. 252

1798/409186/1

*Memorandum*

BERLIN, September 20, 1937.

(zu Pol. IV 4704)

As a result of the conversation between the Foreign Minister and Herr von Papen, which took place this evening in my presence, it may be stated that the question of Austria is to be brought up with Mussolini to secure Italian noninterference in plans for a gradual economic and military *rapprochement* with Austria. The façade of Austrian independence is to be maintained, in view of

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<sup>1</sup> A summary of the results of the visit of Mussolini to Berlin, as sent to German missions abroad, is printed as document No. 1, p. 1.

Mussolini's repeated statements on this question. (The Foreign Minister asserted in this connection that Colonel General Göring concurred in this latter opinion.)

The question of personnel (change of chancellors) would, of course, have to be brought into the conversation, since, after all, the negative attitude of Schuschnigg toward the Agreement of July 11 will have to be the starting point in the conversation. But there should be no mention of it in any possible written record of this exchange of views.

The Foreign Minister considers it expedient that, without taking into consideration whether or not a written agreement will ultimately be concluded, we submit to him, for his conversation with the Führer on the 24th of this month, the outline of such an agreement along the above-mentioned lines, adhering to a certain extent to the draft submitted by Herr von Papen.

Herewith forwarded to Ministerial Director von Weizsäcker.

MACKENSEN

### No. 253

825/194455

#### *Memorandum*

BERLIN, September 30, 1937.

The Austrian Minister today inquired about the result of Mussolini's visit. I referred him to the speeches made, and denied various assertions, quoted to me by the Minister as rumors, regarding a customs union, a military agreement, and other treaty possibilities which had allegedly been discussed here in the last few days. I added that nothing had been discussed or decided that might prejudice Austria's legitimate interests. Nevertheless, I had to assume that the inadequacy of the internal pacification of Austria, aimed at by the Agreement of July 11, 1936, had been discussed. Moreover, in the conversations held here, Austria had by no means been regarded as a problem standing between Germany and Italy and disturbing their mutual relations. I felt certain that there were no differences of opinion between Germany and Italy with respect to Austria.

WEIZSÄCKER

## No. 254

1798/409188-90

*The German Chargé d'Affaires in Austria (Stein) to the  
German Foreign Ministry*

IMMEDIATE

VIENNA, September 30, 1937.

Received October 2, 1937.

A 6273

(Pol. IV 4977)

Subject: Conversation with State Secretary Schmidt.

*Meeting of Schuschnigg-Hodza.*

On the evening of the 29th, State Secretary Schmidt asked me to call on him. He began by saying that the Federal Chancellor was unfavorably impressed by the comments of the *Völkischer Beobachter* and the *Essener National-Zeitung* on his conference with Hodza.<sup>2</sup> Apart from the fact that these comments in the semiofficial German press hurt him and endangered the press truce, the whole evaluation of the conference was entirely wrong. The Czechoslovak Prime Minister, who had been staying in Austria for a few days, had asked the Federal Chancellor for a personal meeting. Herr Schuschnigg could not decline, since, in the first place, Czechoslovakia was a neighboring country, with which Austria had to maintain good relations, and, secondly, several economic questions pending between Austria and Czechoslovakia had assumed great urgency, since Austrian interests frequently suffered in Czechoslovakia. Herr Schmidt asked me to report this to my Government. I promised to do so and added that while nobody was likely to object to normal relations between the Federal Chancellor and the Czechoslovak Prime Minister, the timing of the last meeting did not strike me as particularly good; in any event, the unpleasant shock which the visit caused among those who were anxious for the improvement of German-Austrian relations could easily have been avoided by selecting a date not coinciding exactly with the visit of Mussolini to Hitler. The opponents of German-Austrian *rapprochement* had already called the meeting a shadow cast on the Berlin-Rome Axis. Herr Schmidt said that he did not consider the time well chosen either; unfortunately he had been away on a stag hunt at the time. But the Chancellor's loyalty and his own would surely not be questioned.

*German-Austrian relations.*

Rather excitedly, he went on to say that his persistent efforts

<sup>2</sup> Which took place at Baden, near Vienna, on September 27, 1937, during M. Hodza's visit to Austria.

to promote collaboration with the Reich in Austria had hitherto met with no cordial response from the Reich. He had looked in vain for a friendly gesture in his direction from the Reich. I answered that I thought less of assurances of loyalty and of gestures than of proof of a loyal attitude confirmed by deeds. Thus far, the Agreement of July 11, 1936, had been observed by Austria in a completely unsatisfactory manner. Herr Schmidt replied that he was constantly striving to extend German-Austrian cooperation in the most varied fields; unfortunately he had thus far received but slight encouragement from the Reich. The failure, for instance, to invite General Zehner to the German maneuvers amounted to an obvious snub. I retorted that he was probably well-enough acquainted with the reasons for this; so long as men like Zehner and Jansa were at the head of the Austrian Army, relations of mutual confidence with the German Army were not possible; there was no lack of officers in Austria capable of creating a better and trusting relation with the German Army.

*German-Austrian economic negotiations.*

Continuing, Herr Schmidt said he thought that closer ties between Austria and Germany could most easily be established in the economic field. He was willing to reduce the existing clearing balance by placing more frequent orders in Germany and was also not averse to discussing the granting of preferential rates. He therefore asked me to transmit to my Government the suggestion that the trade negotiations, which were last conducted in Vienna during December 1936 and January 1937, be resumed around the beginning of November. This time he left it to us to select the place for the negotiations. I replied that I would immediately report this suggestion to Berlin and assumed that this time the negotiations might be conducted in Berlin.

I must emphasize that the nervousness which has for some time been evident in Herr Schmidt has greatly increased. Apprehension regarding his own position was plainly apparent from his uneasy and insecure manner during the whole conversation.

There may be a certain consciousness of guilt in the representations which Herr Schuschnigg saw fit to make to us on account of the newspaper comments in the *Völkischer Beobachter* and the *Essener National-Zeitung*. The economic proposal transmitted by Herr Schmidt is probably to be attributed to the fear that in the future the Italian market will no longer prove as ready an outlet as in the past. Since rumors are circulating in political circles here of German-Italian agreements with regard to a German-Austrian

economic *rapprochement*, the object may also be to forestall perhaps more extensive German wishes by taking the initiative in the matter of preferences.

STEIN

No. 255

1282/344183-85

*Memorandum of a Conversation With Reichsleiter Bormann on  
September 30, 1937<sup>a</sup>*

Subject: Austria.

To begin with, I described political conditions in Austria at the present time and the difficulties I am having with *Landesleiter* Leopold. Bormann realizes how difficult it is to work with Leopold and recommends that I demand absolute discipline of him and threaten him with dismissal from his post as *Landesleiter* if he does not obey orders. Bormann gave a report of the Führer's conversation with Leopold, in the course of which the Führer took the standpoint that he was attaching less importance to the Party organization; by working within the Party organization, political difficulties resulted and individuals were endangered. He had previously given Leopold the task of seeking a different medium for his work—in clubs, associations and, if the occasion arose, even in the Fatherland Front—in order to work there for a truly German policy. Bormann declared that my efforts to create an appropriate medium within the Athletic League and among the Austrian peasantry were altogether in accordance with the Führer's program.

His ban against Rauscher was to be maintained, as Rauscher was not the right man. Bormann agrees that Leopold be urged not to maintain a representative here and to limit himself to sending someone here from time to time.

In regard to the organizations in Germany working for Austria, Bormann again emphasizes that all questions regarding relief are to be left to the *Flüchtlingshilfswerk*, which is also to carry out the recruiting for the *SA-Hilfswerk Nordwest*. In regard to the latter, the Führer in a conversation with *Reichsführer* Himmler expressed himself to the effect that any military activity on the part of Reschny organizations was no longer to be considered, and that it was merely a question of SA training. Suitable people are to be admitted there for about 3 months of training, possibly also called back at longer intervals for drills. The present personnel

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<sup>a</sup> This and the two following unsigned memoranda appear to be by Dr. Keppler. They are taken from a file of Keppler's papers.

strength is, however, not to be maintained. Bormann requested me to discuss this question with Reschny and to issue instructions.

To my question as to whom I should consult from time to time regarding the general political part of my task, he referred me chiefly to Minister von Neurath. In addition, he requested me to get in touch with the Reich Chancellery, in order that I might be present if Leopold should, possibly, be received by the Führer.

Furthermore, Bormann also wishes to see to it that I be permitted to give the Führer a report on Austrian problems again soon.

The decree of the Führer's Deputy concerning visits with and invitations to foreign statesmen naturally did not apply to me and to Dr. Veessenmayer, in view of the special mission.

Bormann further requested me to confer with *Reichsschatzmeister* Schwarz<sup>4</sup> regarding the budget of the *Flüchtlingshilfswerk* and will himself announce my visit to Schwarz.

Funds for Dr. Megerle can ultimately be provided only by the *Flüchtlingshilfswerk*.

Furthermore, at the request of the *Reichsführer* I submitted to Bormann the reports concerning Dr. Sch[uschnigg?] by Stoppani and Helfferich, which he noted with interest.

BERLIN, October 1, 1937.

## No. 256

1282/344180-82

### *Memorandum of a Conversation With Foreign Minister Baron von Neurath on October 1, 1937<sup>4a</sup>*

Minister von Neurath informed me that during Mussolini's visit a separate conversation took place between the Führer, General Göring, and himself on Monday evening, in order to provide Göring with the necessary instructions for his conversations with Mussolini regarding Austria. The Führer did not approve of Göring's previous policy which was too severe, and stated that Germany should cause no explosion of the Austrian problem in the foreseeable future, but that we should continue to seek an evolutionary solution. We must merely obtain assurance that, in case the Austrian question were exploded by another party, intervention on the part of Germany would be possible. This has obviously been achieved. Mussolini is said to have stated that he was not pleased with Schuschnigg's policy in Austria; he [Mussolini] was alternately described as the archenemy of Austria, and asked for assistance. He was tired of

<sup>4</sup> National Treasurer of the Nazi Party.

<sup>4a</sup> See footnote 3, p. 462.

that game. On the other hand, Mussolini thought that a different policy could also be carried on with Schuschnigg. Neurath doubted it. I described the present situation. Neurath had just a few minutes previously received a call from Glaise von Horstenau, on his way back from Sweden. He told Glaise that he must still keep quiet.

We were both of the opinion that we on our part should not overthrow Schuschnigg without the certainty of a suitable successor. But in case the radical wing of the Fatherland Front was instigating an overthrow, we must do the same.

Neurath conferred with the Führer last night in regard to Austria. *Landesleiter* Leopold would not be received by the Führer, and he (Neurath) would not receive him either. The Führer was not pleased with Leopold, and the strictest discipline had to be demanded of him.

In case a reorganization of the Austrian Government should become imminent, Ambassador von Papen would have to interrupt his vacation. He would always be at my disposal for the purpose of discussing the Austrian question and would also welcome my participation in conversations with the Führer on the subject.

Neurath is also of the opinion that we should not wait until February in regard to the economic negotiations.

We went on to speak briefly about Henlein, of whom he likewise has a very favorable opinion.

Neurath further mentioned his Balkan trip, which had also served the Austrian policy, and he referred in particular to his successes in Yugoslavia.<sup>5</sup> Recently Schmidt had requested an invitation to go hunting in Yugoslavia; Neurath had received an inquiry from Stoyadinovich in this connection.

BERLIN, October 1, 1937.

#### F. DIVIDED NAZI COUNSELS, OCTOBER 1937-JANUARY 1938

##### No. 257

1282/344178-79

##### *Memorandum*<sup>5a</sup>

OCTOBER 4, 1937.

The details given below make the conclusion inescapable that *Landesleiter* Leopold is systematically opposing the efforts of State Counselor Dr. Seyss-Inquart to carry out point 9 of the Gentlemen's

<sup>5</sup> Neurath had visited Belgrade, Sofia, and Budapest in June 1937.

<sup>5a</sup> See footnote 3, p. 462.

Agreement between the German and Austrian Governments, although at a conference on July 10, 1937, after Dr. Seyss had been assigned to that task, Leopold had said that he would let him proceed at will, in order to judge the man by the results of his work.

(1) In July 1937, L. traveled through Austria, arousing sentiment against Dr. S. by falsely stating, among other things, that Dr. S. had attended the *Stella Matutina* in Austria and therefore was a pupil of the Jesuits.

(2) When L. was corrected with regard to this statement, he withdrew it before the Party, but followed it up immediately with other disparaging remarks about Dr. S.

(3) Efforts to have peasant leader Reinthaler<sup>6</sup> officially elected peasant leader in Austria were resisted by him; he asked Reinthaler to sign a declaration which contained a ban on association with Dr. S., with me, and with other persons. When R. refused to sign this declaration, L. instituted disciplinary proceedings against him within the Party and discharged him from all his official positions.

(4) In an instruction to the Party, he forbade all Party members to hold political conversations with Dr. Seyss and Keppler.

(5) Various pronouncements in the *Oesterreichischer Beobachter* directed against Dr. S. and his group.

(6) The expulsion of Party Member Globotschnig,<sup>7</sup> a close associate of Dr. S., without any Party proceedings or opportunity for defense.

(7) Publication of this expulsion in the *Oe[sterreichischer] B[eo]bachter*], although *Reichsführer*-SS Himmler had ordered his retention in the SS.

(8) Prohibition, through the *Gauleitungen*, of political activity and of association with Dr. Seyss and myself on the part of Dr. Seyss' associates (Party Members R. Rainer,<sup>8</sup> Counselor Pawelowski, Mohnschild, and Mühlmann<sup>9</sup>).

(9) Instruction to the Party, dated . . . ,<sup>10</sup> forbidding all Party members to associate with Dr. Seyss or me.

(10) Talks within the Party to the effect that "a certain Party Member Keppler intended to dabble in Austrian politics," adding that he would not permit another Habicht to be forced on him.

(11) The drafting of minutes of conversations with me, although I had specifically told him that anything in writing was dangerous and had to be avoided. One of these minutes obviously found its way into the hands of the Security Police.

<sup>6</sup> Anton Reinthaler, Nazi peasant leader, who became Minister of Agriculture in the Cabinet of Seyss-Inquart on March 12, 1938.

<sup>7</sup> Odilo Globotschnig (various spellings), one of the Austrian Nazi leaders.

<sup>8</sup> Possibly Dr. Friedrich Rainer, who was a political adviser to Klausner and an associate of Dr. Seyss-Inquart and others mentioned here.

<sup>9</sup> Dr. Kajetan Mühlmann, art historian, active in the National Socialist movement in Austria.

<sup>10</sup> Omission indicated in the original.

## No. 258

1649/391742

*Minute*

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

(zu Pol. I 5371g)

Zu W.A. 8651/37 II A

The *Landesleiter* of the illegal Party in Austria, Captain Leopold, is at present engaged in a vigorous personal and policy feud with various Party offices in the Reich, in particular with the Party Commissioner for Austrian Affairs, SS-*Gruppenführer* Keppler. His request to be received by the Führer and Chancellor one of these days was therefore refused. Herr Leopold has now been at pains to counterbalance somewhat the present Party repudiation of him by getting in touch with Reich governmental offices. He had therefore asked to be received by the Foreign Minister, who, after a discussion with SS-*Gruppenführer* Keppler, refused to see him. The desire referred to above may also be the reason Herr Leopold submitted his request to be received by the Field Marshal. Under existing circumstances, it would scarcely be advisable to comply with his request.

ALTENBURG

BERLIN, October 7, 1937.

*Minute for the State Secretary:*

I concur in this view and suggest that the matter be settled *orally* with the War Ministry.

W[EIZSÄCKER], October 7.

Concur

M[ACKENSEN], October 7.

The War Ministry has been informed orally.

[No signature or date]

## No. 259

1798/409191-93

*The German Chargé d'Affaires in Austria (Stein) to the  
German Foreign Ministry*

A 6411

VIENNA, October 7, 1937.

Received October 9, 1937.

(Pol. IV 5108)

Subject: The attitude of the Schuschnigg government, particularly with regard to the Austrian position in the Danube area.

*The connection between Schuschnigg and Hodza.*

I hear from a well-informed source that the visit of the Austrian President to Budapest some months ago gave Herr Schuschnigg occasion even then to advocate improved relations with the Little Entente; as an especially qualified intermediary, he mentioned M. Hodza, of whom he has had a high opinion for a long time. After his return from Budapest the President told my informant that large groups in Hungary were already in favor of closer economic relations with the Little Entente, and in regard to politics the proverb, "Drops of rain pierce hard stone," was applicable to the reconciliation of Hungary with the Little Entente. With respect to the meeting in Baden between Schuschnigg and Hodza,<sup>11</sup> my informant received his information not only here but also from Prague. The Vienna conversation began with economic questions, but later the Federal Chancellor, anxious about Austria's independence, also pleaded for a political *rapprochement* of the Little Entente with Austria and Hungary. In Prague, M. Hodza expressed great satisfaction regarding his conversation with Schuschnigg, who on this occasion not only spoke of the necessity of close economic cooperation of the countries of the Little Entente with Austria and Hungary, but also lent a very willing ear to Hodza's wish that at Budapest he support an improvement in relations with the Little Entente.

When, having received this information, I pointed out to State Secretary Schmidt on the occasion of a social gathering that the conversation between Hodza and Schuschnigg seemed, after all, to have covered more ground than he had indicated to me, he said that he expected to be able to tell me more about it in a few days; naturally, other things besides economics had also been discussed, but he could assure me that the Berlin-Rome Axis—the controlling factor for Vienna also—had in no way been affected; he, Schmidt,

<sup>11</sup> On September 27, 1937. See Stein's report of September 30, 1937, p. 460.

had always advocated to the Federal Chancellor the view that close ties with Czechoslovakia, which was politically very vulnerable, were dangerous for Austria; as a native of Vorarlberg, he favored a development for Austria on the pattern of Switzerland, in close friendship with that country and Hungary; only thus could Austria keep from getting involved in the event of great conflicts in Europe. To be drawn into such conflicts entailed far too great a danger for weak Austria. His, Schmidt's, orientation was fundamentally western European and not pro-Czech. This was what he had wanted to demonstrate by his visits to London, Paris, and especially to Bern.

*Basic orientation of the foreign policy of the Schuschnigg government.*

It is clear from all this that the Schuschnigg government continues, as in the past, to travel along several tracks. Fine words and many a phrase feigning sympathy for Germanism cannot conceal that fact. The strengthening of German-Italian relations, instead of inducing Herr Schuschnigg to adopt the line of the Berlin-Rome Axis, has rather added to his apprehensions concerning what is most important to him, Austria's independence. Being of Slovene ancestry and from the pro-Hapsburg military caste, and educated by the clergy, he does not find it too difficult to pursue rather openly a policy of security directed against the Reich, since he is connected with all the forces working against the Reich here. It is well known that, besides the Vatican and France, Czechoslovakia, too, is one of these forces. In this connection I might point out that the British Minister, Selby, who is still here although assigned to Lisbon a few months ago, is likewise doing his best to oppose a link with the Reich, just as Salata, the Italian Minister here, always maintained that, in its implementation, the Agreement of July 1936 should be interpreted as narrowly as possible.

This state of affairs makes it clear that in the field of foreign policy as well—notwithstanding all the assurances made by Herr Schmidt to protect his personal security—not only is a faithful implementation of the July Agreement not to be expected from the Schuschnigg government, but we may even assume that it will no longer refrain from cooperating with those forces which pursue a policy opposed to the Reich in the Danube region. The power of Schuschnigg's government is limited, however, by the attitude of the great majority of the German people of Austria, who positively desire peace with Germany and political, economic, and cultural cooperation with the Reich. In the event of a showdown, they would resist a call from their Government against the Reich. That

the Reich will turn to good account the moment when it will be able not merely to enforce the execution of the July Agreement but also to bring about a fundamental change of the political course in Austria is the firm belief of the majority of the German people of Austria, who, regardless of all their sufferings, remain faithful to their German mission in southeastern Europe.

STEIN

No. 260

1282/344176-77

*Memorandum of Call on Minister President Göring in the Company of Landesleiter Leopold on October 8, 1937<sup>12</sup>*

OCTOBER 8, 1937.

In opening the discussion, Gg. informs us of the complaints meanwhile received from Schmidt-Schmidtfelden about Dr. Veessenmayer in the matter of Hasslachner. I say that the information is absolutely incorrect and ask Gg. to investigate the matter himself or have it investigated by persons he trusted. This is promised.

Next, the present situation is discussed. A dispute arises between L. and me. After a lengthy discussion, Gg. decides that the leadership of the illegal N.S.D.A.P. is in Leopold's hands, but that the activities of Dr. Seyss are not to be hampered in any way but, on the contrary, must be supported. L. further promises to maintain strict discipline, if, in the course of those activities, it should become necessary for Party organizations to participate. The sniping at Dr. S.' associates would have to stop; the gentlemen concerned were to be granted leave of absence by the Party and work under S. Any unilateral action by L. against these associates was inadmissible. Even in difficult cases L. was not to proceed without S.' consent.

Gg. is very well satisfied with Dr. S.' speech, to which he had committed himself in public, and he wishes to see S. as soon as he comes to Berlin. I tell Gg. that Dr. S. is at present engaged in various negotiations and would probably come to Berlin afterwards.

Gg. next tells of his conversation with State Secretary Schmidt (map including Austria).<sup>13</sup>

<sup>12</sup> This and the two following unsigned memoranda appear to be by Dr. Keppler. They are taken from a file of Keppler's papers.

<sup>13</sup> On the occasion of State Secretary Schmidt's visit to Göring at his hunting lodge on the Schorfheide in September 1937, Göring had allowed Schmidt to see a map which omitted the boundary between Germany and Austria.

I then mention today's report in the Government newspapers of Vienna that Gg. would shortly come to Vienna for commercial negotiations. He knows nothing of it.

Finally, inquiry regarding the outcome of yesterday's negotiations at the Obersalzberg.

### No. 261

1282/344173

#### *Memorandum of the Report to Reichsführer-SS Himmler of October 12, 1937<sup>14</sup>*

OCTOBER 13, 1937.

At first the Austrian situation was discussed. The *Reichsführer*<sup>15</sup> then told of his interview with the Führer on the subject of reduction of the SA-*Hilfswerk Nordwest*. A cadre battalion with a comparatively high proportion of officers is to be retained, to serve as a skeleton unit in any recall of the men who had been discharged. It was calculated that even then a cadre of 1,000 men was needed. The SA-men among the refugees and those suitable for the SA were to remain in the camp for a 3-month period for their basic training and later be called up for a 2-week training period annually.

This would furnish approximately:

for 3 months of training—up to 200 men at any one time;  
for 2 weeks of training—20 training units of approximately  
500 to 600 men each.

Moreover, the *Hilfswerk* is to keep a muster roll for mobilization.

In addition, the question of Dr. Sch[uschnigg?] and the Four-Year Plan,<sup>16</sup> as well as Mussolini's visit, were discussed.

<sup>14</sup> See footnote 12, p. 469.

<sup>15</sup> The *Reichsführer*-SS, i.e., Himmler.

<sup>16</sup> The German Four-Year Plan for economic reconstruction and rearmament, for which Göring was Commissioner, was to a large extent dependent upon supplies of timber, ore, and other products from Austria. As a result of such shipments to Germany there was a considerable balance to the credit of Austrian exporters, which was frozen in Germany. Dr. Schuschnigg and the Austrian Government wished to improve the payments situation.

## No. 262

1282/344174-75

*Memorandum of the Visit to the Reichsschatzmeisterei<sup>17</sup> in Munich  
on October 13, 1937<sup>17a</sup>*

OCTOBER 13, 1937.

*Reichsschatzmeister* Schwarz asks to be excused; I thereupon discuss matters with *Stabsleiter* Saupert and Party Member Damson. The discussion resulted in complete agreement as to organizational aims, in particular with regard to the curtailment of the *Hilfswerk Northwest*, cessation of all separate training activities for Austrians (training is to take place on a Party and State level), and the greatest possible reduction of the waiting period at the Rodenbücher camp. Damson attempts to propose that a neutral camp be established for training and recruiting, besides the Rodenbücher and Reschny camps. I object, since this would make the machinery complicated and difficult to supervise and the selection of candidates for training would have to be made by the officials of the camp which is to take care of them.

The legal as well as the illegal Austrian relief organizations were discussed and Dr. Seyss-Inquart is to be consulted on the question of whether the legal relief work could be extended for the benefit of the illegal organization, particularly in regard to transfers. Damson's proposal to let the *Reichsschatzmeisterei* itself take care of this work, including the clandestine transfers, was strongly opposed by Saupert.

I requested to be allowed for the present to retain a budget of RM 500,000 for the *Hilfswerk Northwest*. Saupert intends to submit this to *Reichsschatzmeister* Schwarz and did not doubt that he would approve it. I predict a reduction of the expenditure to RM 10 million during 1938.

There is agreement on the point that no more men be recruited in Austria for the purpose of filling the camps. However, there was no objection to the recruiting of competent specialists.

In conclusion, Saupert emphasizes that our views are in complete accord and expresses his satisfaction that there now exists a neutral agency to which all questions can be referred.

<sup>17</sup> National Treasury of the Nazi Party. *Reichsschatzmeister* Schwarz was National Treasurer of the Party.

<sup>17a</sup> See footnote 12, p. 469.

## No. 263

2062/448609-12

*The German Chargé d'Affaires in Austria (Stein) to the  
German Foreign Ministry*

A 6495

VIENNA, October 14, 1937.  
Received October 16, 1937.  
(Pol. IV 5294)

Subject: Internal political situation of Austria.

The speeches made by Federal Chancellor Schuschnigg, State Secretary Zernatto, and other high officials of the Fatherland Front since the end of the political holidays were intended to strengthen the existing Austrian separatist regime, in total disregard of the contrary wishes of broad masses of the people. This regime, now as heretofore, sees its crowning achievement in the restoration of the Hapsburg monarchy, a fact which, for tactical reasons, is not stressed at the moment. To this basic idea all other problems are subordinated; from it stems the whole policy of the country.

*Relentless fight against National Socialism.*

The Federal Chancellor has recognized National Socialism as the real, indeed as the only dangerous enemy of these plans. If he had to agree, under pressure from the Reich, to mitigate the existing emergency regulations in the Law for the Maintenance of Order, this, together with the Law for the Safety of the State, gives him a sufficient pretext for further relentless oppression of the National Socialists, who, furthermore, are not only "police business" but who are also severely persecuted in the economic field. Not a day passes without convictions of National Socialists for prohibited political activities. After an unprecedented struggle lasting more than four years, it can only be attributed to the strength of the idea and to unshakable faith in the Führer that the National Socialist movement in Austria still exists in truly amazing strength. For the methods used in fighting it are in no way inferior to those of the Counter Reformation and it is more than symptomatic that the three-hundredth anniversary of the death of Emperor Ferdinand, the head of the Counter Reformation, was commemorated this summer with special ecclesiastical and official pageantry.

*Consolidation of the Fatherland Front.*

To achieve the aims of his domestic policy, the Federal Chancellor, as is well known, is using the Fatherland Front, in addition to the police and the armed forces. It is unmistakably clear that, originally

infected with all the shortcomings and weaknesses of a political coercive organization, the administrative mechanism of the Fatherland Front has, under the leadership of State Secretary Zernatto, become an efficient tool. The closing of the membership lists ordered for November 1 is, I have heard, to serve two aims: (1) To induce the inactive and weak who have not yet enrolled to join; (2) Beginning November 1, to "purge" the Fatherland Front of all those whose continued membership might lessen its power.

*Efforts toward pacification.*

Politically active between the National Socialists and the Fatherland Front are a number of National figures who have set themselves the well-nigh impossible task of aligning groups as opposite in their ideologies as fire and water. They see suitable bases for their efforts in the *Volkspolitisches Referat*<sup>18</sup> set up in June of this year, to which the Innsbruck lawyer, Dr. Pembaur, was appointed, and in the commission received by the Vienna lawyer, Dr. Seyss-Inquart, on his appointment as State Counselor (see report of June 19, 1937—A 4055<sup>19</sup>). In view of the well-known hostile attitude of the Federal Chancellor toward National Socialism, one is, to be sure, compelled to follow such efforts with skepticism. To the Federal Chancellor it is not a question of drawing the National Socialists into the policy-making levels of the State, as would correspond to the spirit of the political agreements of July 11, 1936, but of the well-considered attempt, with the assistance of the *Volkspolitisches Referat*, to divide the National Opposition. The portion of the Nationals thus won over is to form the National mantle which the system in power can put on as needed. To meet this danger, understandings have recently been reached between the National Socialists and Dr. Pembaur, under which he is to work in close contact with the *Landesleitung* of the N.S.D.A.P. in Austria.

In this obstinate struggle all the means of enforcement are at the disposition of the Government, and experience teaches that, in case of necessity, the Federal Chancellor is willing to employ them ruthlessly. In the hands of the National Socialists there are no other means of enforcement than the backing of the Reich and the will to hold out in spite of every hardship. In the age of machine guns and light armored cars, which make it possible for relatively small detachments to make short work of large but not equally armed masses of the people, the N.S.D.A.P. must reject the idea of an armed uprising.

<sup>18</sup> The *Volkspolitische Referate* were sections set up in the Fatherland Front during 1937, to facilitate entry of Nazis into the Front.

<sup>19</sup> Not printed.

*Legitimist Propaganda.*

In contrast to the struggle against National Socialism, there is toleration of Legitimism. As the only organization existing outside the Fatherland Front, the Austrian League [*Reichsbund der Oesterreicher*], the leading Legitimist organization, is able to hold propaganda meetings. It cannot be overlooked that the Legitimist movement has gained ground. Although these meetings made a sorry impression 2 years ago, they are now well attended by all classes of people. The theme has always been the same: the restoration of the monarchy will bring Austria not only rescue from National Socialism but also economic recovery. There is no doubt that Legitimism enjoys the tacit encouragement of the Federal Chancellor, since he sees in the restoration of the Hapsburg dynasty the ultimate goal of his policy. He probably hopes to see the movement in Austria, and possibly in neighboring Hungary as well, so strengthened that outside influences can no longer impede it.

The tensions inherent in the play of forces created by the cross currents of the Fatherland Front, the Legitimist movement, and National Socialism are bound to affect the Government as well. Although the Federal Chancellor assured Minister Glaise-Horstenau as well as other persons that he did not contemplate a reshuffling of the Government, rumors persist that, in the not too distant future, changes will occur in the Government. If they come, they will not be far from the above-mentioned line followed by the Federal Chancellor.

STEIN

## No. 264

1798/409208

*The German Chargé d'Affaires in Austria (Stein) to the German Foreign Ministry*<sup>20</sup>

A 6763

VIENNA, October 22, 1937.

Received October 25, 1937.

(Pol. IV 5436)

Subject: Conversation with Minister von Glaise-Horstenau.

Minister von Glaise-Horstenau called on me today and said confidentially that in the last few days he had obtained a shocking insight into the Federal Chancellor's political mentality. The Federal Chancellor had stated that, from the point of view of

<sup>20</sup> This report bears the notation in Neurath's hand: "To Hassell for communication of contents to Mussolini."

foreign as well as domestic policy, National Socialism was the enemy of peaceful development in Austria. The July Agreement had not fulfilled his expectations: the establishment of relatively close cooperation with the Reich in foreign affairs, and the maintenance of absolute freedom to pursue an entirely independent Austrian—meaning Clerical and Legitimist—policy in domestic affairs. The Federal Chancellor had then stated with relative frankness that after his disappointing experience with the Agreement of July 11, 1936, although he did not wish to turn against the Reich in his foreign policy, he would work for closer ties between Austria and the Succession States of the Danube monarchy, including Poland; such an orientation of foreign policy, independent of the Reich, would also help him in his struggle against the National Socialist movement at home. When Minister von Glaise-Horstenau had expressed grave misgivings about the Federal Chancellor's plans, he had been told that the new policy contemplated would by no means be directed against the Reich; perhaps after the formation of such a confederation, it might even be easier to arrive at a compromise with the Reich along the lines of the prewar situation. Herr von Glaise-Horstenau added that, as Berlin was well aware, he was not clinging to his post and would rather resign from it today than tomorrow. I asked him to carry on for the sake of the cause; only in that way might he still exert some influence on the course of events and at least keep us informed of possible developments.

STEIN

## No. 265

1798/409211

*The German Chargé d'Affaires in Austria (Stein) to the German Foreign Ministry*

CONFIDENTIAL

A 6778

VIENNA, October 22, 1937.

Received October 25, 1937.

(Pol. IV 5439)

Subject: Contemplated invitation of Minister President Göring to Austria.

Minister von Glaise-Horstenau told me that the Austrian Government is considering inviting Minister President Göring to a stag hunt in the Karwendel Mountains. In the opinion of the Federal Chancellor, a visit to Vienna, which would lead to National Socialist street demonstrations, would thus be avoided. Since these plans of the Austrian Government have already become more generally known, the leader of the N.S.D.A.P., Herr Leopold, informed me

that the National Opposition intended to extend a cordial welcome to Minister President Göring if he should visit Austria; the National Opposition would not understand it if this welcome were made impossible by a hunting visit in the mountains—particularly a visit to their enemy Schuschnigg. I then told Herr Leopold that I knew nothing of an impending visit to Austria by Minister President Göring.

STEIN

## No. 266

2062/448620-21

*The German Chargé d'Affaires in Austria (Stein) to the German Foreign Ministry*

A 6771

VIENNA, October 23, 1937.

Received October 25, 1937.

(Pol. IV 5437)

Subject: Remarks of State Counselor Dr. Seyss-Inquart concerning Federal Chancellor Schuschnigg's policies.

A social gathering in a small circle gave me the opportunity for a talk with State Counselor Dr. Seyss-Inquart, who, as an exponent of the National Opposition, is in contact with Federal Chancellor Dr. Schuschnigg and enjoys his confidence in a marked degree.

State Counselor Dr. Seyss-Inquart informed me that late last week he called on the Federal Chancellor in the company of Minister Glaise-Horstenau and told him that the ban on the admission of new members to the Fatherland Front, going into effect on November 1, terminated the assignment entrusted to him when he was appointed State Counselor, namely, that of making proposals for pacification. The Federal Chancellor appeared disagreeably surprised and said that this conception was mistaken. The assignment given to Dr. Seyss-Inquart remained in effect. The closing of the Fatherland Front would be relaxed after the Front had been consolidated and the elections had been held.

*Schuschnigg's views on National Socialism and Legitimism.*

From previous conversations with the Federal Chancellor it appeared that he by no means held the opinion that some day a different system of government might replace National Socialism in Germany. But he did expect that with the passage of time there would be a certain moderation in the views current in the Reich, which would then bring the fulfillment of his desire to establish a relationship between the Reich and Austria such as existed prior to 1933.

In the opinion of State Counselor Dr. Seyss-Inquart, the Federal Chancellor himself did not believe in the possibility of bringing about a restoration [of the House of Hapsburg], but he did believe that as a positive, ideal goal it had a certain significance in Austrian politics. Restoration could become a reality only if a Communist revolution should occur in the Reich. In that event, however, the restoration of the Hapsburgs would spread into the German area far beyond the boundaries of Austria.

Taken as a whole, the Federal Chancellor's policy was therefore designed to maintain the present situation in Austria, and any improvement for the benefit of the National Opposition could be wrested from him only with the strongest kind of pressure.

BARON VON STEIN

### No. 267

1282/344170-72

*Memorandum of Conversation With Reichsleiter Bormann on  
November 2, 1937, at 11 a.m.<sup>21</sup>*

I reported to Bormann on my call, in the company of *Landesleiter* Leopold, on Minister President Göring and on my negotiations with *Gruppenführer* Rodenbücher, the *Reichsschatzmeisterei*, Dr. Syrup,<sup>22</sup> and *Hauptamtsleiter* Hilgenfeldt. We were agreed on all questions. Bormann is also pleased with giving Austrian SA-men a vacation in the Reich, as well as with my efforts to obtain from Dr. Syrup and Hilgenfeldt certain funds for relieving the Rodenbücher budget.

I reported that *Obergruppenführer* Reschny had not yet come to confer with me and was obviously still in doubt as to my authority over him. Bormann will arrange for proper notification to Reschny of the letter to the Führer's Deputy.

He assented to Dr. Rauscher's resignation and to my intention to have Party Member Steindl set up a small office, and he agreed that the necessary expenses should be borne by the *Flüchtlingshilfswerk*. I further reported that Dr. Rauscher, after having been forbidden to remain in touch with agencies of the Party, was trying to negotiate with numerous governmental offices. Bormann said immediately that this was even less permissible than contact with the Party agencies.

<sup>21</sup> This unsigned memorandum appears to be by Dr. Keppler. It has been taken from a file of Keppler's papers.

<sup>22</sup> Friedrich Syrup, State Secretary in the Reich Labor Ministry and President of the Reich Office for Employment Exchanges and Unemployment Insurance (*Reichsanstalt für Arbeitsvermittlung und Arbeitslosenversicherung*).

He also considered unwise *Reichsleiter* Rosenberg's plan to bring sixty Austrian officials [*Amtswalter*] to Germany for training.

Continuing, I described the situation in Austria—that a great struggle had taken place within the Party last year between the faction favoring the path of evolution and the other faction, which was bent on continuing strictly revolutionary and illegal activities, and that, in view of the danger of a split, the latter faction had gained the upper hand. Bormann approves of my efforts to guide the Party toward the path of evolution; for, in view of the Führer's wishes, there is no alternative. I mention the possibility of a temporary solution similar to the Saar Front.<sup>24</sup> Only the Führer could make a decision concerning a problem of this kind, and Bormann intends to arrange for me to report to the Führer on this matter as soon as possible.

I then reported on my conversations with various prominent members of the Austrian Party and on Leopold's associates.

I was happy to find a complete agreement on all questions.

Next, the situation existing at the present moment in the Ministry of Economics (Four-Year Plan), etc., was discussed.

In conclusion, at Herr Jung's request, I brought up the Tobis matter. He suggests that I see Minister Goebbels; if this were to give no promise of success, we would have to await further developments.

BERLIN, November 2, 1937.

### No. 268

2017/443669

*The German Ambassador in Italy (Hassell) to the German Foreign Ministry*

4696/37

ROME, November 5, 1937.

Received November 6, 1937.

(Pol. IV 5729)

With reference to instruction Pol. IV 5436, of October 27.<sup>25</sup>

Subject: Austria and the Danube States.

A reliable informant has reported to me that from telegrams received in the Palazzo Chigi from Warsaw, Vienna, and Budapest, it was clear that Austria had initiated steps to bring about an accord

<sup>24</sup> An organization in which groups in the Saar favorable to reunion with Germany had been joined prior to the Saar plebiscite of 1935.

<sup>25</sup> This instruction forwarded a copy of the despatch of October 22 from the Legation in Austria, p. 474, with instructions to communicate it to the Head of the Italian Government.

among the Danube States. Austria, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and, if possible, Yugoslavia and Poland as well, would participate. By this means Austria wanted to create a broad basis for the guarantee of her independence, as she felt that she could no longer expect sufficient protection in that respect from Italy. (Cf. instruction Pol. IV 5436, of October 27.)

My informant reports further that, in reply to the representations of Federal Chancellor Schuschnigg during his last visit, the Hungarian Prime Minister gave the assurance that on his forthcoming visit to Berlin he would point out of his own accord the importance which Hungary and he personally attached to the independence of Austria.

HASSELL

No. 269

1291/344963-65

*Memorandum of the Confidential Conversation of Dr. Megerle With State Secretary Schmidt, in the Grand Hotel, Vienna, on November 17, 1937, From 9:30 p.m. to 10:30 p.m.*

In the course of the conversation, which began with questions of press policy and cultural policy, Sch. discussed in detail the forthcoming visit of the Minister President<sup>28</sup> and appeared quite anxious that the visit take place and not be called off because of preliminary conditions.

He has received the letter of the Minister President and has already drafted a reply, but seems to be in something of a quandary. On the one hand, he does not feel strong enough to urge upon Federal Chancellor Schuschnigg acceptance of the preliminary conditions indicated by the Minister President, but, on the other hand, he would like to make counterproposals acceptable to the Minister President. His reasoning is as follows: Although long-range developments should not be lost sight of, one ought during this particular visit to concentrate upon the concrete possibilities of the moment. The very fact that a large military unit (he spoke of a mountain brigade) was to parade before the Minister President, with the public having an opportunity to participate through friendly demonstrations, would create the strongest kind of impression both abroad and in Austria. During the 3 days contemplated for the visit, the Minister President and Federal Chancellor Schuschnigg would find abundant opportunity for improving the atmosphere and creating new openings. To this end, Schmidt had already ma-

<sup>28</sup> I.e., Göring.

neuvered in such a way as to make the invitation and the visit more and more a concern of the Federal Chancellor himself, so that the latter would have to assume the responsibility for its progress and its results. He believes that it is impossible at this early stage to win Schuschnigg over to larger vistas, as represented for instance in the economic field by the reference to a subsequent currency and customs union, and in the military field by the reference to a subsequent military convention. With regard to economics, he hopes to be able immediately to obtain a reduction of the clearing balance and an intensification of the exchange of goods. Regarding this point, he made the following suggestions, among others: The Reich could increase German exports to Austria by the system of export financing, seldom applied to Austria in the past. We could furthermore supply Austria with the products of our synthetic wool [*Zellwolle*] industry while he would undertake to see that no such industry was developed in Austria. He hinted that Austria was willing to pay separately, in foreign currency, for such German synthetic wool exports. In the military field closer relations between the two General Staffs would develop after Jansa's exit, i.e., in March 1938, at the latest. In the field of foreign policy he would publicly place himself on record as favoring close cooperation with the Reich. Questions of domestic policy, however, he had to leave to the Chancellor. I interjected that we could not lend ourselves to illusory results, a façade behind which, particularly in the domestic field, the anti-German trend could continue its activity unmolested; this, we had already experienced repeatedly. He agreed, but said that a cancellation of the visit would severely injure his personal standing in domestic politics and give encouragement to the opposing forces. He frankly admitted that, of all those at the Ballhausplatz, including the highly important press section, there was hardly another man besides himself willing to champion the policies of the Reich. (I can confirm this statement from my own experience and should like to suggest that, among other things, the Minister President insist on the assignment of a National to the Austrian Press Service in order to counteract the continuous poisoning of relations between the Reich and Austria. I attended the negotiations between Ministerial Counselor Berndt and Colonel Adam in Vienna and found that from that quarter no good will at all can be expected.) Domestically, State Secretary Schmidt also expects the visit of the Minister President to enable him to give the pacification program of State Counselor Seyss-Inquart a new start. I can confirm this view, since without a new impulse I would hesitate to predict any success for Seyss' program.

The total impression from my conversation was that Schmidt is entirely willing to assist us in every sphere. His domestic position, however, is so weak that he will hardly achieve anything without external aid. I was flooded with requests from our Austrian followers for vigorous cultural activity on the part of the Reich and besieged with concrete proposals, for the execution of which, however, only a fraction of the required means is at my disposal.

MEGERLE

BERLIN, November 19, 1937.

## No. 270

1798/409227

*The German Ambassador in Austria (Papen) to the German Foreign Ministry*

Telegram

VERY SECRET

No. 128 of December 7

VIENNA, December 7, 1937—5:30 p.m.

Received December 7, 1937—7:15 p.m.  
(Pol. IV 6435)

For the Führer and Chancellor.

The message of sympathy from the Austrian Episcopate, published in the *Osservatore Romano* and reprinted here, constitutes a relapse into the former ways of interfering in the ecclesiastical affairs of the Reich. The Government here disclaims all responsibility and tells me that it deplores the step. I have left no doubt that, considering the close relations between the Episcopate and the Government, which are well known to us, such public announcements cannot be without effect upon German-Austrian relations. I request an audience early next week so that I may make suggestions concerning general measures on our part toward the Schuschnigg government.

PAPEN

## No. 271

1291/345025-28

*The German Ambassador in Austria (Papen) to the Commissioner of the Führer and Chancellor for Economic Affairs (Keppler)*

VIENNA, December 7, 1937.

DEAR HERR KEPPLER: Since the settlement of the controversy which arose last summer between the *Landesleitung* of the Austrian N.S.D.A.P. and myself, I had hoped that in the future the *Landesleitung* would refrain from picking entirely baseless quarrels through

insidious intrigues. Unfortunately this hope proved to be too optimistic, as the following occurrence shows:

My Counselor of Embassy, Party Member Baron von Stein, showed me a letter sent to him by the *Landesleitung* of the Austrian N.S.D.A.P., which contains the following paragraph:

"Herr von Papen requested Weiser to keep you under surveillance. This was necessary because there was a possibility that you had been selected to take Papen's place. On that occasion Papen is said to have remarked that he felt your attempt to take his place was gross ingratitude, because he brought you to Vienna. He also expressed surprise that you have been a member of the Party since 1928."

The Weiser named in the letter is the notorious Court Counselor Weiser, chief of the Vienna police, well known for his harsh measures against members of the N.S.D.A.P.

I am informing you of this matter on the assumption that it will interest you. As one familiar with the favorite methods of fighting within the Austrian Party, I know that they do not shrink from calling on the police of the enemy system for help against adversaries in their own camp; nevertheless I consider it urgently necessary to make it unmistakably clear to these people at least that they are not at liberty to judge the conduct and character of the Führer's Ambassador by their own methods.

Regardless of my own feelings I declared last summer, *as soon as it was possible*, that I was willing, for the sake of the great common cause, to let bygones be bygones. This new intrigue, which aims at a split in my own official establishment, indicates that the subordination of personal considerations to objective aims is considered weakness by the residents of the Teinfaltstrasse. Consequently I consider it advisable that the State and Party authorities of the Reich in charge of Austrian affairs adopt a uniform attitude against such machinations, which interfere with a common policy.

How very dangerous it is, particularly abroad, to create in any way the impression that the German State or Party authorities are at odds is evident, for instance, from the article by Otto Strasser in the *Deutsche Revolution*, which is enclosed.<sup>28</sup> Anyone who has had the opportunity to work for National Socialist Germany abroad will agree with me that all enemies of the Reich base their campaign against the Third Reich essentially upon a propaganda which shows that various political groups in Germany are tending to pull apart.

With best regards and Heil Hitler,

PAPEN

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<sup>28</sup> Not printed here.

## No. 272

1291/345024

*The Commissioner of the Führer and Chancellor for Economic Affairs (Keppler) to the German Ambassador in Austria (Papen)*<sup>20</sup>

DECEMBER 10, 1937.

MY DEAR HERR VON PAFEN: I am most obliged to you for your letter of the 7th, from which I learn that rather peculiar difficulties have again arisen because of *Landesleiter* Leopold. From here I can hardly undertake anything in this matter. But as soon as I meet with *Landesleiter* Leopold again, I shall naturally bring up the subject.

Yesterday I was received in audience by Minister President Göring, and on that occasion this question of the personnel in the Austrian movement was also discussed.

With best regards and Heil Hitler!

Very truly yours,

[File copy not signed]

## No. 273

1549/376346, 376348-51

*The German Ambassador in Austria (Papen) to the Führer and Chancellor*

Tgb. Nr. A 8044

VIENNA, December 21, 1937.

Subject: Further development of Austria's domestic political situation.

Last Friday the Federal Chancellor of his own accord invited me to call on him. In the presence of State Secretary Schmidt, he requested me to tell him of my apprehensions regarding the further development of German-Austrian relations.

I told the Federal Chancellor that for quite some time, as he was aware, I had been of the opinion that German-Austrian relations were not only not developing favorably, but indeed contained a considerable number of factors causing tension. I had repeatedly informed the State Secretary of this view and requested him to promote an evolutionary development. He and the Federal Chancellor were informed of all the issues regarding which we found to our regret that the Agreement of July 11 was not functioning satisfactorily. I therefore did not wish to go into details again, but merely tell him this: The German Reich was now embarked on a movement of

<sup>20</sup> This letter, the file copy of which is unsigned, is from the files of Dr. Keppler.

the greatest historical significance. By exerting the best and strongest energies of the Reich and by utilizing the present international situation, the Führer was trying to restore the world position of the Reich. In this process Germany had to demand more than mere passive assistance from Austria; she had to demand that Austria, with heart and soul, wherever possible under existing circumstances, support this struggle of the German world for its existence. Though the Federal Chancellor had told me repeatedly that his foreign policy nowhere interfered with the policy of the Reich, I had to tell him that this was not enough. This passive attitude was itself in effect a negation. Particularly so, when every act of foreign policy ended with a new appeal to the world for the maintenance of Austria's independence. The Reich did not intend to attack this independence, but it demanded that Austria observe the second part of the treaty with equal conscientiousness, and that she lend active support to Germany in the struggle for the existence of the whole race. Both in the Spanish affair and in the fight against Bolshevism through the Anti-Comintern Pact, and also in her attitude toward the problem of the League of Nations, Austria had gone her own way. Instead of creating a close and cordial relationship by means of evolutionary development in the sphere of culture, defense, and economics, she would not go a fraction of an inch too far for fear of displeasing the Western Powers. Quite the contrary, actions such as the setting up of roadblocks, etc., even at the border of the German Reich, were bound to prove to the world how little friendship there really was in German-Austrian relations.

The sole aim of my policy, pursuant to instructions from the Führer, was to promote a solution of the German problem by way of evolution, in order to forestall any solution by force, in which the tragedy of German history abounded.

In conclusion, I observed that I had come to understand the Federal Chancellor's position regarding this problem particularly well after reading his book *Dreimal Oesterreich*. It was based upon a completely false historical conception and his views would be disregarded by history.

The Federal Chancellor made extensive remarks in reply, attempting to justify his views and his policy. Regarding these I shall only refer to his statement that the July *Putsch* was now almost liquidated by Austria, as only 45 persons were still in jail and the only existing concentration camp at, Wöllersdorf, had 105 inmates. I might add here that, as I have ascertained, there are still nearly 85 people in jail, but presumably he will again pardon approximately 40 of

them in a few days. The Federal Chancellor said he had to admit that both the Right and the Left Wing, as well as the Fatherland Front, had become much more radical. But any attempt to solve the Austrian problem by force would meet with considerably stronger resistance than in 1934 and would reduce Austria to a heap of ruins. He wished once more to demonstrate his willingness to arrive at a solution; he hoped to be able to meet General Göring soon for a satisfactory conversation and would meanwhile take further steps to relieve existing internal tensions. In conclusion, he asked me to embody forthwith in a written memorandum to him the requests which the Reich wished to make of Austria with respect to the extension of the July Agreement. I have sent him this memorandum.

Simultaneously with my reception, the Federal Chancellor again received State Counselor Seyss-Inquart, who today presented his program for the further development of the internal situation.

As will be recalled, Dr. Seyss-Inquart, on the occasion of a gathering held by the *Deutscher Volksbund* on December 16, gave a definition of the July Agreement which caused a considerable sensation in Fatherland [Front] circles. Among other things he said: "Not the compulsory clauses of these so-called peace treaties, the morally binding force of which we have never recognized, but the treaty between the Chiefs of the two German States is what gives an Austria merged in the greater German destiny her autonomy and her significance. The sole guarantor of the independence and autonomy of Austria can ultimately be none but the German people. All the others are only interested parties."

He further said: "This Agreement of July 11 is indivisible. There is . . .<sup>30</sup> no Austria, unless it is supported in common by the whole German people, and there is no truly German thought and action in this country which does not rest upon decisions made here and upon responsibilities borne in this country."

After an initial attempt by the *Neuigkeits Weltblatt* to brand this interpretation of the July Agreement as un-Austrian, the Federal Chancellor was compelled by prompt measures on the part of Dr. Seyss-Inquart to indicate where he stood and to announce through a bulletin of the official news agency that the views of Dr. Seyss-Inquart were in accord with those of the leader of the Fatherland Front.

Moreover, the work of the speakers of the *Volkspolitisches Referat* in various parts of the country is making excellent progress. Pro-

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<sup>30</sup> Omission indicated in the original.

fessor Dadieu<sup>31</sup> in Graz is able to hold meetings attended by as many as forty people and he has created subdivisions of the organization even in the cells of the Fatherland Front. Dr. Jury, who reported to me today, is collaborating in full confidence with Dr. Seyss-Inquart and desires this work of the "political outposts" to be not only unhampered, but really aided by the Austrian N.S.D.A.P.

The chief of the National Socialist *Hilfswerk*, Langoth, can also point to progress. The authorities have now permitted him to arrange official public collections in Austria itself to supplement the funds supplied by the Reich.

However, all the persons active in the work of the National pacification movement and in promoting the German mission of Austria are convinced that only by subjecting the Federal Chancellor to the strongest possible pressure can further progress be made.

The memorandum which I promised the Federal Chancellor will be submitted by me at the conference contemplated for early January at the Obersalzberg, where I shall also request further instructions.

PAPEN

### No. 274

1649/391763-66

#### *The Austrian Minister in Great Britain (Franckenstein) to the Austrian Foreign Ministry<sup>32</sup>*

SECRET

LONDON, December 22, 1937.

Zahl [?] 20/res.

(Pol. I 200g)

With reference to your instruction of December 16, 1937, (No. 46, 128-K) the Legation has the honor to submit the following report:

The British Government is not so interested as the German or Italian Governments in educating the masses along political lines, but only in keeping them in good spirits. This can only be done by means of somewhat ambiguous answers, from which everyone may select what happens to strike his fancy. Of course, one should not forget that the Cabinet reflects more or less accurately the mood of the nation: On the one hand, there are the Ministers

<sup>31</sup> Local Nazi leader in Graz.

<sup>32</sup> The archives of the German Foreign Ministry contain a large number of intercepted Austrian documents. Frequently there are two copies, one received from Vienna, and one from the capital to which the despatch was directed. The copies are usually accompanied by a covering note either from the German Legation in Vienna or from the *Geheime Staatspolizei* in Berlin, without indication of the source of the information.

friendly to Germany, on the other, those antagonistic to Germany. The result of their discussions: the formula of the Covenant of the League of Nations.

In many well-informed circles it is constantly pointed out that, once rearmament had been completed, the British Government would become much more unequivocal and resolute. However, one must ask when, during the past few centuries, responsible statesmen have ever declared the arming of their country to be complete, and how much more difficult it is to obtain such an answer at a time when practically every day brings new inventions in the art of war. But even if we go by the official publications, we can scarcely expect a more vigorous conduct of affairs by the British Government prior to 1940, when the first of the large battleships will be commissioned and the modernization of the Air Force will be complete; and until that time Europe will *volens volens* have to get along with the "Covenant of the League of Nations."

In the political parties, there is likewise no uniform, clear-cut alignment discernible. Each of the larger parties has a multitude of shadings, whether you take the Conservatives, the Liberals, or the Laborites. The small groups on the extreme right, organizations which are more or less successful imitations of the N.S.D.A.P., are at the moment unimportant, as their followers are negligible. Noteworthy, however, are the groups supporting Sir Oswald Mosley and his British Union of Fascists, and this by no means because of the ceaseless stream of propaganda with which they are flooding the country. They have set up an auxiliary organization on the National Socialist pattern which is not bad from a strictly organizational point of view, but which has not yet had any great success. Particularly well liked are the "drawing room meetings" of Sir Oswald Mosley and his aides. But not only these are followers of Mosley, but quite a number of well-known industrialists and financiers [*City-Leute*] as well, some of whom contribute substantial amounts to the Union of Fascists. The attitude of the British Fascists toward European problems is that England should give Germany, her "true" ally, a free hand in Europe.

The Fascist line is followed in the ranks of the Conservatives by Lord Rothermere and the people connected with the *Daily Mail*. Lord Rothermere's attitude toward the problems of Central Europe is characterized by his friendship for the Third Reich. But this might change very quickly for his Lordship is very versatile, when necessary, and has considerable experience in changing sides. He is the British peddler of the Hitlerite slogan that Germany had saved Western Europe from Bolshevism. Everything else plays only

a secondary role: as for instance, the physical fitness program for German youth, which was glorified for a time. Today a similar movement already exists in England; hence the references to the Third Reich have become much less frequent. To sum it all up:

However strongly Lord Rothermere may today be championing the Third Reich and claiming the supremacy in Europe for Berlin, subject, of course, to the control of England, his value to Hitler as an ally is not very great. The Conservative faction around Lord Beaverbrook is more cautious; they rarely commit themselves to such an extent that they can withdraw from their position only with some loss of prestige. Lord Beaverbrook has permitted his papers now and then, as he has done this year, to take a firm line against Germany, e.g., on financial questions or on Church problems, but Beaverbrook's basic attitude is this: We have nothing to do with European problems. The group associated with the Astor family are in the long run pro-German and the most dangerous for the Danube region because of their personal influence in British politics and the journalistic reputation of the *Times*. The latest master stroke by this group was Lord Halifax' visit to Berlin. Both Lord Halifax and the Minister of Defense, Sir Thomas Inskip, belong to this set, which is well known for its friendliness toward Germany. Among the members of the Conservative party the apathy with respect to European questions has this year given way more and more to increased activity. Following the precedent of the Duchess of Atholl, a number of Members of Parliament have reexamined their views on Central Europe and found that England could not only not keep aloof from the impending chaos, but would even have to collaborate vigorously in the solution of this problem. People have come to understand that England is bound to intervene not only in the case of an unprovoked attack upon Austria or Czechoslovakia, but also in case revolts should be engineered by the N.S.D.A.P. in these two countries. Thus it is understandable that the Duchess of Atholl and several other Conservative Members of Parliament, such as Vivyan Adams, speak at public meetings along with Liberals and Socialists. The most representative spokesmen of the pro-German trend among the Conservatives, Sir Arnold Wilson and General Fuller, had, as was known, a considerable following as late as 1936; but now their influence appears to be on the wane. The attitude of the prominent Liberals is somewhat inconsistent. On the one hand they want Germany to obtain "justice," but on the other they are taking a firm stand on behalf of the interests of the countries in the Danube region. That is why it is so difficult fully to comprehend the personality of Lloyd George, who on the

one hand condemns the injustices of the Treaty of Versailles, in the making of which he participated, and demands equal rights for Germany, but on the other hand condemns Germany's intrigues in Central Europe. It should be noted that since his visit with Hitler Lloyd George no longer speaks as much of the injustices inflicted on Germany. Even among the Laborites the attitude is not uniform. Among the Socialists one still finds Members of Parliament who cannot forget Roden Buxton's statements demanding that Germany be united with Austria and the German-speaking portion of Czechoslovakia because they had, after all, once belonged to Germany. And thus, even today, one may hear statements by pronounced opponents of the Hitler regime to the effect that Germany must in fairness be given a free hand. But the great majority of the Laborites take the view of Morrison, who said recently: "It would be madness for the British Government to purchase a brief peace with Hitler by giving him freedom of action in Central Europe." The attitude of the Communists toward central European questions is absolutely clear-cut because of their hostility to the Hitler regime. Winston Churchill, Seton Watson, Wickham Steed, Geoffrey Mander, and others are known for their anti-German attitude. We must realize that a very substantial effort will still be required in order fully to convince British public opinion of the justice of the demands of Austria and of the Danube region, particularly since we have to combat the ever increasing propaganda of the N.S.D.A.P. in England. That British leaders have become aware of the necessity of the absolute maintenance of Austria's independence, and are willing to support it, is evident.

The Minister:  
FRANCKENSTEIN

No. 275

2303/483987-88

*The German Ambassador in Austria (Papen) to the German  
Foreign Ministry*

Tgb. Nr. A 94

VIENNA, January 8, 1938.  
Received January 10, 1938.  
(Pol. IV 141)

Subject: Interference in Austrian domestic affairs.

Our tactical position for the discussion of the German-Austrian question, excellent until now, is substantially weakened by the incident discussed in the press some time ago: the smuggling of propa-

ganda literature, using the mayor of Passau's car. I do not know whether the Austrian Minister has discussed the details of the incident. According to information from State Secretary Schmidt, an enormous bundle of 10,000 post cards of the attached type<sup>33</sup> and several thousand National Socialist pamphlets—among others the pamphlet against the Hapsburgs, published by the Labor Front—as well as copies of *Mein Kampf*, which is permitted here. Most incriminating is the post card because, according to its stamp, it was produced for propaganda in 1938.

The persons who arranged the shipment or drove the automobile deserve to be punished, if for no other reason than that it must be termed boundless stupidity to attempt to smuggle in literature by the bale in a brand-new automobile belonging to the mayor of Passau, who is so well known here.

I would suggest that the Austrian Government be informed that steps will be taken against the persons responsible, so that the incident, which State Secretary Schmidt characterized as the crassest case so far of interference in Austrian domestic affairs, cannot be exploited against us in the coming conversations.

Another incident concerns a letter which, the State Secretary informs me, a district leader of the Reich-German N.S.D.A.P. from Steiermark gave to a member of the Austrian *Hitlerjugend* on the latter's trip to the Sonthofen Training Castle [*Ordensburg*].<sup>34</sup> In this letter the Austrian *Hitlerjunge* is most warmly recommended to German Party authorities because he has been making contributions to the illegal Party for many years and is a good National Socialist. This letter shows that, besides the meddling in Austrian domestic affairs on the part of the Reich-German Party, a Party which is legal here under specified conditions, courses for boys from the Austrian *Hitlerjugend* were held in the Sonthofen Training Castle. Ten boys had been expected for the course in question.

Here, too, a clear stand on the part of the Reich Government seems necessary.

PAPEN

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<sup>33</sup> Not printed here.

<sup>34</sup> The *Ordensburgen* were Nazi Party establishments for the advanced training of potential Party leaders.

## No. 276

120/67721-22

*Memorandum*

The Party Commissioner for Austrian Affairs, SS-*Gruppenführer* Keppler, has informed me by telephone that he received a letter from State Counselor Seyss-Inquart a few days ago, according to which he intends to resign from his post as *Volkspolitischer Referent* because various suggestions made by him have recently been rejected by the Austrian Federal Chancellor. Herr Keppler communicated this letter to Colonel General Göring, who had instructed him to inform Seyss-Inquart that he must remain at his post or, if he felt unable to comply with this instruction, to come to Berlin and report. Herr Keppler added that personally he regarded the State Counselor's resignation as politically inopportune, since it confronted Minister von Glaise-Horstenau with the same problem; this, from the viewpoint of the Agreement of July 11, 1936, could lead to undesirable consequences for us. I approved Herr Keppler's opinion. Herr Keppler will therefore write to Seyss-Inquart accordingly.

Herr Keppler related further that General Göring had ordered *Landesleiter* Leopold to come to the Reich for a conference to explain why he had removed Dr. Jury from his position as deputy *Landesleiter*. Herr Leopold replied that he could not obtain an exit visa and was therefore unable to comply with this request. He let it be known, moreover, that he was bound to observe only the Führer's directives.

ALTENBURG

BERLIN, January 8, 1938.

## No. 277

1798/409236-37

*The German Ambassador in Austria (Papen) to the Führer and Chancellor*

Tgb. Nr. A 236

VIENNA, January 15, 1938.

Received January 17, 1938.

(Pol. IV 362)

Subject: The Church controversy and the German-Austrian question.

As is well known, the controversy between National Socialism and the Christian Church has for a long time attracted the greatest interest here. Ninety percent of all arguments against an improvement in German-Austrian relations are drawn from the apparently

inexhaustible reservoir of this dispute. Thus the enclosed report from the *Neue Freie Presse*<sup>35</sup> concerning the New Year's article in the *Durchbruch* has created a great sensation—especially the statement by this organ of the Teutonic religion that “Germany, from the religious point of view, has taken the place of Christianity and embodies the totalitarian claim, which replaces the Biblical.”

Considering the harmful effects of such statements abroad on our relations with Austria, I take the liberty of suggesting that you have other German press organs criticize this article so that it will not be possible here to allege that the view of the *Durchbruch* had the approval of all authoritative quarters. For we know it is the rule abroad to say that everything published under an authoritarian press system must be consistent with the view of the Government.

PAPEN

### No. 278

74/56577

*The German Ambassador to the Holy See (Bergen) to the German Foreign Ministry*

No. 11

ROME, January 17, 1938.

Re: Foreign exchange permit for German theological students in the *Collegium Germanicum*.

In reply to the instruction of January 11 (Kult. A 5087 IV).<sup>35a</sup>

The Rector of the *Collegium Germanicum* gave his assurance that since he has been at the head of the College, that is to say, for over two years, Father Muckermann has given no more talks or lectures there and, as far as he knew, has not entered the Institute. He also confirmed the news that I had already received from another source to the effect that Father Muckermann had left Rome some time ago and resigned from his chair at the Oriental Institute.

I hear further that Father Muckermann is said to have settled in Vienna now. It might be desirable to ascertain through the Legation in Vienna what activity he is engaged in there. The Vienna *Reichspost* recently reported on his lectures there, which by no means deal exclusively with religious matters.

The removal of Muckermann from Rome took place, I hear, at the instigation of the Vatican, and might thus be attributable to the

<sup>35</sup> Not printed here.

<sup>35a</sup> Not printed.

repeated representations made by the Embassy on account of the political activity and anti-National Socialist agitation of Muckermann. It is, however, to be feared that this will amount simply to a shift in his sphere of activity from Rome to Vienna. A careful scrutiny of his conduct there becomes that much more necessary.

VON BERGEN

No. 279

120/67723

*The German Ambassador in Austria (Papen) to the German Foreign Ministry*

Telegram

STRICTLY SECRET

No. 10 of January 27

VIENNA, January 27, 1938—1:20 p.m.

Received January 27, 1938—3:40 p.m.

For the Führer and Chancellor.

During the Teinfaltstrasse raid<sup>36</sup> a memorandum written by Dr. Tavs on the present situation fell into the hands of the police. Subject: the impossibility of progress under Schuschnigg, German invasion the only solution, thereafter formation of a government under Leopold. The State Secretary intends to transmit a copy of it to me today. Last night a stormy Cabinet session took place, in which Glaise and Seyss-Inquart participated. I intend to report orally on Monday regarding the ideas expressed there and the earnest discussion which ensued.

This incident made the Federal Chancellor conscious of the impossibility of letting the present state of affairs continue. He is most eager for the personal meeting contemplated and in G[laise]'s opinion would also be prepared to change his attitude fundamentally.

On Friday I am leaving for the German-Austrian ski championship tournament at Garmisch and on Sunday I shall be in Berlin.

PAPEN

<sup>36</sup> On January 25, 1938, the headquarters of the illegal Nazi Party in the Teinfaltstrasse in Vienna was raided by the Austrian police and a number of documents seized. Dr. Leopold Tavs, a leading Austrian Nazi, was arrested.

## No. 280

2308/484004-05

*The German Chargé d'Affaires in Austria (Stein) to the German Foreign Ministry*CONFIDENTIAL  
A 491/IIVIENNA, January 29, 1938.  
Received January 31, 1938.  
(Pol. IV 608)In continuation of my telegram No. 9 of January 26, 1938.<sup>37</sup>

Subject: Arrest of Dr. Tavs and closing by the police of the offices in the Teinfaltstrasse.

The *Reichspost* of the 25th printed excerpts<sup>38</sup> from an interview given by Dr. Tavs, a member of the so-called Committee of Seven and well known as a National Socialist and close collaborator of Captain Leopold, to a reporter of the Prague newspaper, *Slovansky Hlas*. The interview was given last November, but did not appear in the Prague paper till the 22nd of this month. Dr. Tavs was thereupon arrested on the evening of the 25th, and a search was made of his home and his office in the Teinfaltstrasse. On the night of the 25th-26th, Federal Chancellor Schuschnigg called a conference of Ministers, which remained in session until 3 a.m. and in which State Counselor Dr. Seyss-Inquart also took part. Probably as a result of this conference Captain Leopold's office in the Teinfaltstrasse was then also searched by the police on the morning of the 26th and Captain Leopold was arrested in his hotel. The search of his office, the hotel room, and his apartment in Krems was fruitless. Captain Leopold was held at Vienna Police Headquarters until 2 a.m. of the 27th and then released; he must, however, remain in Vienna for the time being. In this action fifteen persons were arrested.

During his examination Captain Leopold was shown a document which had been found in Dr. Tavs' office and which, after a description of the international situation, discusses the possibility of the entry of German troops, the replacement of the present Government by a National Socialist government, and of a subsequent plebiscite. Captain Leopold told Counselor of Police Weiser that he did not know the document and that he did not believe it came from Dr. Tavs.

The police investigation of Dr. Tavs was concluded on the 28th, and a charge of high treason was lodged against him. He was

<sup>37</sup> Not printed.

<sup>38</sup> Enclosures containing newspaper articles, etc., referred to in the course of this despatch are not printed here.

turned over to the provincial court. A "Program of Action for the Year 1938," found in Dr. Tavs' desk, is called especially damaging. The offices of the "Committee of Seven" in the Teinfaltstrasse were padlocked.

There is apparently not much doubt that the Government has long had at its disposal evidence for measures against the Teinfaltstrasse. Since it has now gone into action, it probably thinks that the time has come when it can split the National Opposition through active measures.

The press has naturally seized upon the matter from the patriotic viewpoint, but has not as yet claimed that there is any connection between the Teinfaltstrasse and organs in the Reich.

Newspaper clippings are enclosed.

By direction:  
STEIN

No. 281

2303/484006-09

*Memorandum by the Foreign Minister*

RM 68

(zu Pol. IV 643)

The Austrian Minister, who had already complained to me some time ago about allegedly intensified activity on the part of the Austrian Legion, called on me again today and brought me the enclosed memorandum on the distribution of the Austrian Legion, its recruitment and training, as well as the concentration of Austrians within the SS. I told the Minister that the alleged distribution might be correct; this followed from the fact that no parts of the Legion were any longer stationed near the Austrian border. Concerning the alleged strength of the Legion I had no knowledge. The reception camp at Neu-Aubing had been organized to prevent Austrians from roving about the country uncontrolled. The assertion that there was great activity in this camp was certainly nonsense.

As for the concentration of Austrians in the SS, I had no knowledge of it. If, as I assumed, it was true that Austrians were serving in the SS, their enlistment in the SS automatically made them German citizens, and they were then no longer any concern of the Austrian Government. On the whole, this constant agitation with regard to the Austrian Legion was altogether incomprehensible to me. In conclusion the Minister asked whether I could send him

a reply to those points in his memorandum which I was unable to answer at the time. I promised him that I would consider the matter and then let him know.

BARON VON NEURATH

BERLIN, January 29, 1938.

[Enclosure]

MEMORANDUM

1) *Intensified Activity of the Austrian Legion.*

The following camps of the Austrian Legion are still in existence:

Godesberg near Cologne (Legion Command and Staff troops)

Becholt

Dorften

Lippstadt (Hanover)

Hohenkammern, all four [*sic*] located in western and north-western Germany. Besides these there are also the following camps in Bavaria:

Neu Aubing

Rottach am Tegernsee

The total strength of the *active* Legion at this time is estimated at about 4,000 men.

Neu Aubing serves as a refugee reception center, screening center, and central record office in which all Legion members are kept on active file. According to reports at hand, *there has of late been extraordinary activity in Aubing*. On leaving the reception center the men come to Deggingen a.d. Nordalb, the central training camp, where, as before, they are required to undergo military training and schooling. Upon completion of their training the men are transferred according to their choice either to *military Legion camps* or to *Legion labor camps*.

And now other *suitable unemployed Austrians* who are not refugees must also undergo training in Camp Deggingen for a few weeks at least if they wish to obtain a job. Thereby the Legion gains a *trained reserve contingent*, which is kept on active file by the central office. This precaution makes it possible quickly to raise the strength of the Legion to a high level at any time.

According to a report, which, to be sure, is unverified, a large number of Legionnaires are likewise being intensively trained in Coburg; and the Legion commander, Reschny, and his lieutenants are said to be working very hard of late on expanding the Legion.

2) *Concentration of Austrians within the SS.*

The Austrians taken over from the Legion into the Reich-German SS are not distributed among the individual formations, but stay together *within the latter in units of their own* or else in subunits, most conspicuously so in the SS *Standarte Deutschland*, whose 2nd battalion consists of Austrians only. But there are also other SS formations in which only Austrians are serving.

Finally, it is common knowledge that Austrians, even without having gone through the Legion, are *directly* accepted into the Reich-German SS, and, after satisfactory probational service, are given German citizenship. They evidently serve as replacements for losses in the Austrian units of the SS.

## G. BERCHTESGADEN, FEBRUARY 1938

No. 282

2307/484298-99

*The Commissioner of the Führer and Chancellor for Economic Affairs (Keppler) to the Foreign Minister (Neurath)*

BERLIN, February 2, 1938.  
(Pol. IV 775)

MY DEAR MINISTER: Yesterday afternoon State Counselor Dr. Seyss-Inquart sent me late reports concerning the status of his negotiations with Federal Chancellor Schuschnigg. According to these, Schuschnigg has declared himself ready to comply with the following demands of State Counselor Dr. Seyss-Inquart:

1) Release of all persons still held in jail in consequence of the *Putsch* of July 1934.

2) Restitution in cases of disciplinary measures affecting retirement and the forfeiture of pensions.

3) Elimination of economic discrimination because of National Socialist convictions.

4) Development of military, economic, and political relations with the Reich through the inclusion of persons from the ranks of the National Opposition, in which connection State Counselor Dr. Seyss-Inquart is to make recommendations.

5) Thorough settlement of press problems and attainment of a real press truce.

6) Inclusion of persons from the ranks of the National Opposition in various organizations (athletic clubs, school clubs, agriculture, and trades).

7) State Counselor Dr. Seyss-Inquart is to be granted control over the various Government committees, such as the Election Committee, the Committee on the Constitution, etc.

8) Federal Chancellor Schuschnigg has declared himself prepared in principle to go beyond these points, and to establish equality [*innere Gleichberechtigung*] for the National Opposition.

In conclusion Dr. Seyss-Inquart reports that for the time being the mood continues to be not unfavorable, and that, contrary to experience so far, there actually seems, at present, to be a somewhat more steadfast willingness to make concessions.<sup>89</sup> In the negotiations to be continued today Dr. Seyss-Inquart will try to obtain further concessions and, above all, to insure their realization. As agreed upon yesterday, Dr. Seyss-Inquart will, however, enter into no obligations whatsoever without previous consultation.

Permit me to extend to you my best wishes on the occasion of your birthday today.

Heil Hitler!

Very truly yours,

KEPPLER

No. 283

1958/437352

*The German Chargé d'Affaires in Italy (Plessen) to the German Foreign Ministry*

CONFIDENTIAL

ROME, February 3, 1938.

496/38

(Pol. IV 767)

Subject: Reports of alleged plans for a *Putsch* in Austria.

I am informed by a reliable contact man that the Palazzo Chigi had received reports from Munich regarding alleged plans for a *Putsch* to be staged in Austria in the spring. An associate of Mosley's by the name of Spranklin, who had recently been in Germany and Austria, had stated that he had obtained this information from Austrian National Socialist sources. Part of the Austrian Army was also to participate in the *Putsch*. Spranklin had further stated that these reports had been confirmed in Berlin. In Party circles there they had told him that a *coup d'état* would certainly occur in Austria in the spring, and Schuschnigg, if he did not listen to reason, would meet the same fate as Dollfuss before him.

The Italian Consulate General in Munich and the Foreign Ministry here considered this story tendentious, all the more since it came from a British source. Similar information had, however, been received by official Austrian circles, which considered them correct or at least worthy of attention.

PLESSEN

<sup>89</sup> A marginal notation, in Neurath's hand: "7"

## No. 284

1798/408244-45

*The German Ambassador in Austria (Papen) to the Führer and Chancellor*

Tgb. Nr. A 672

VIENNA, February 4, 1938.

Received February 5, 1938.

(Pol. IV 745/38)

On my return from Berlin I found a situation here which in every respect seems favorable for the conversations contemplated with the Federal Chancellor. In several conversations, the Federal Chancellor, State Counselor Seyss-Inquart, and Minister von Glaise discussed the measures to be taken by the Government in order to push the internal pacification provided for in the Agreement of July 11, 1936. State Counselor Seyss-Inquart was urged, in particular, to accept a ministerial post in the Cabinet. I asked him to abstain for the time being from making any promises, since, if the conference at the Obersalzberg can be arranged, we shall raise a number of demands which will have to be agreed upon in advance.<sup>40</sup>

In the strongest language I asked the State Secretary for Foreign Affairs yesterday to see to it that the speculative discussions in the Austrian press in connection with the "Blomberg crisis"<sup>41</sup> are stopped. I pointed out that this was a question of personalities, which it was up to the Führer and Chancellor to decide, and that everything else belonged to the realm of fable.

It is nevertheless clear that all elements interested in a deterioration of German-Austrian relations are trying to exploit the present situation. To my regret I hear that Captain Leopold has issued instructions to give expression to dissatisfaction with the Schuschnigg government through occasional acts of terrorism in the provinces. Underlying these instructions is probably the desire to force the Reich into early intervention in Austria.

I have again instructed all offices here to follow a political line which in no way anticipates the intentions of the Führer and Chancellor. But it strikes me as urgent, in view of this situation, that I be summoned as soon as possible for a personal report, so that the details of the contemplated conversation with the Federal Chancellor may be settled.

PAPEN

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<sup>40</sup> Despite a diligent search of the files of the German Foreign Ministry, the material found on the Obersalzberg conference is scanty.

<sup>41</sup> The crisis precipitated by the marriage of Field Marshal Blomberg and his forced resignation as War Minister, which resulted in a general reorganization of the German High Command.

## No. 285

1291/345330-35

*The Commissioner of the Führer and Chancellor for Economic Affairs (Keppler) to the Foreign Minister (Ribbentrop)*<sup>42</sup>

FEBRUARY 7, 1938.

DEAR RIBBENTROP: As we agreed, I am giving you<sup>43</sup> another written report on the state of Austrian affairs.

When the Führer in July 1937 entrusted me with handling the Austrian political questions within the N.S.D.A.P., he stated that an evolutionary solution should be tried, because any other solution would be unacceptable in the long run. Although the prospects of an evolutionary solution of the Austrian question appeared quite unfavorable, I nevertheless consistently strove to attain it and I now have the impression that its prospects have improved considerably. During the last 2 weeks in particular, Federal Chancellor Schuschnigg has been much more willing to comply with article 9 (b) of the Agreement of July 11 (inclusion of the National Opposition to collaborate and share the responsibility for the State). Last week there were exhaustive discussions between State Counselor Seyss-Inquart and Federal Chancellor Schuschnigg, in the course of which Schuschnigg expressed his willingness to comply with the following demands by Dr. Seyss-Inquart (the so-called Little Program):

1) Release of all persons still held in jail in consequence of the *Putsch* of July 1934.

2) Restitution in the cases of disciplinary measures affecting retirement and the forfeiture of pensions.

3) Elimination of economic discrimination because of National Socialist convictions.

4) Development of military, economic, and political relations with the Reich, through inclusion of persons from the ranks of the National Opposition, in which connection State Counselor Seyss-Inquart is to make recommendations.

5) Thorough settlement of press problems and attainment of a real press truce.

6) Inclusion of persons from the ranks of the National Opposition in the various organizations (athletic clubs, school clubs, agriculture, and trades).

7) State Counselor Seyss-Inquart is to be granted control over the various Government committees, such as the Elections Committee, the Committee on the Constitution, etc.

<sup>42</sup> This letter, the file copy of which is unsigned, is from the files of Dr. Keppler.

<sup>43</sup> In his correspondence with Ribbentrop, Keppler uses the familiar *du*.

8) Federal Chancellor Schuschnigg has declared himself prepared in principle to go beyond these points and to establish equality for the National Opposition.

Dr. Schuschnigg, moreover, declared that he was prepared to undertake a fundamental reconstruction of his Cabinet, too, putting outstanding representatives of our ideology in charge of some of the Ministries, while for others, neutral persons might be considered.

The question of why Schuschnigg is now more willing than before actually to carry out the Agreement of July 11 must, I suppose, be answered as follows:

1) He has come to realize more clearly that existing conditions in Austria cannot be tolerated in the long run.

2) His chances of escaping the pressure from the Reich by diplomatic measures are dwindling. Schuschnigg has obviously begun negotiations with Hodza and perhaps also with Hungary with a view to establishing something like a Danubian federation. The visits of the Hungarian and Yugoslav Prime Ministers, in particular, have probably shown him that there is really no longer any room for such a policy.

3) Schuschnigg is a person who finds it difficult to make decisions. Besides, his policy depends on his changeable moods.

The detailed plans for a forcible solution of the Austrian question which were found in the raid on the Teinfaltstrasse (illegal Party office) have evidently not failed to make an impression either.

Persons in the Austrian Government itself who are in sympathy with us have told me repeatedly that Schuschnigg was not in a position to let go the few National Socialists who are openly in the Government, and in my opinion the aim of any possible action should now be to obtain such a foothold in the Government that it would be impossible for the Federal Chancellor to permit the withdrawal of these men. When this goal is achieved, we shall be able, by a moderately adroit policy, to score more and more successes, particularly so since a very large part of the population is firmly behind us.

The political efforts of the last few years, particularly those of the last 6 months, were greatly handicapped by disagreement and opposition on the part of the Austrian *Landesleitung*. I have taken the utmost pains and shown very great patience in trying to bring *Landesleiter* Leopold into line; but these efforts were of no avail, with the result that today, like Field Marshal Göring, I too am of the opinion that the removal of *Landesleiter* Leopold is an urgent necessity.

Yesterday I was permitted to report to Field Marshal Göring on the state of Austrian affairs and he approved the efforts and the progress made so far by Counselor Seyss-Inquart; he wishes the negotiations to continue in order to obtain as comprehensive promises as possible from Schuschnigg and, if possible, secure definite time limits for certain of the measures contemplated. Field Marshal Göring, however, does not desire any kind of direct written agreement between Schuschnigg and Seyss-Inquart, but merely wishes that the groundwork be laid for negotiations on a different basis and between other persons.

Field Marshal Göring wants to arrange a conference with the Führer, at which he desires my attendance. It would be particularly nice if you, too, could attend.

If, in view of the international situation, we continue with the task of solving the Austrian question by way of evolution, I believe the present moment offers good prospects for substantial progress, and I am convinced that, with satisfactory initial success, we shall slowly gain political ascendancy over Schuschnigg.

Heil Hitler!

Yours,

[File copy not signed]

P.S. I should like to add that in my opinion a real and mutually advantageous revival of trade and the development of the natural forces and resources of Austria, which would be in the common interest, cannot take place until a currency union has been established. Everything done in the field of economics prior to that time must necessarily remain mere piecework.

No. 286

2307/484300

*The German Foreign Ministry to the German Legation in Austria*

Cipher Telegram

IMMEDIATE  
VERY URGENT  
No. 14

BERLIN, February 8, 1938.  
(e. o. Pol. IV 786)

State Secretary Keppler communicates that the promising negotiations for a settlement, initiated with the Austrian Federal Government by State Counselor Seyss-Inquart in agreement with Field Marshal Göring and Foreign Minister von Ribbentrop, are allegedly being thwarted by the conversations of Leopold, who is said to have the support of Minister von Glaise-Horstenau in this matter. Keppler requests that the matter be investigated and that, if possible, influ-

ence be exerted to end Leopold's separate negotiations and particularly to put a stop to Minister Glaise-Horstenau's support. Please report by wire.

MACKENSEN<sup>44</sup>

### No. 287

2307/484301-02

*The German Ambassador in Austria (Papen) to the German Foreign Ministry*

Cipher Telegram

No. 15 of February 8

VIENNA, February 8, 1938—10:10 p.m.

Received February 9, 1938—12:45 a.m.

(Pol. IV 807)

In reply to No. 14 of February 8.

The negotiations for a settlement, which I am continuing at the Führer's orders, are proceeding satisfactorily. A conference is planned for Saturday. The rumor concerning separate negotiations by Glaise and Leopold is incorrect. On the other hand, it seems to me as if Leopold is trying to upset the promising negotiations by actions of the Party. I should appreciate it if the Field Marshal immediately sent him instructions to refrain from any action.

PAPEN<sup>45</sup>

### No. 288

1798/409309-10

#### *Memorandum*

BERLIN, February 8, 1938.

(e. o. Pol. IV 1270)

The Austrian Minister, having returned from Vienna yesterday, called on me tonight in order to obtain information regarding the events of February 4, of which he had learned only through the press. I told him that the German press had correctly reported the significance, particularly insofar as it emphasized that the powers of the State were concentrated in the hands of the Führer.

\* A marginal note reads: "Telegram drafted at request of State Secretary Keppler."

\* A copy of the telegram was sent to Keppler, with the following information: "Transmitted herewith for your information, with reference to the telephone conversation. The office of Field Marshal Göring has been notified as requested."

Another copy was sent to the office of Field Marshal Göring for the attention of Brigadier General Bodenschatz, with the note: "Transmitted for your information at the request of State Secretary SS-Gruppenführer Keppler, who will call in regard to the matter."

Of course, as he correctly assumed, personal questions were also of importance. No change whatever in our foreign policy was intended. The Minister asked whether the new Foreign Minister had in mind a reorganization and rejuvenation of the Foreign Ministry, and hence far-reaching personnel changes. I replied that I did not know anything about that, but I did know that Herr von Ribbentrop believed firmly in the theory that such a subtle mechanism as the Foreign Ministry could not stand sudden changes.

The Minister then touched upon Herr von Papen's recall, which, he knew, came as a complete surprise to the latter. It appeared to him to indicate a contemplated change in our policy toward Austria. I replied that I could not share this opinion, since a time limit had been placed on Herr von Papen's mission from the very beginning. Herr von Papen, moreover—a fact the Minister did not know—had returned to Vienna yesterday to take charges of affairs once again. I did not know the reasons for this, nor in particular whether, as the Minister seemed to suppose, they might be in connection with the plans for a meeting between the Führer and Schuschnigg.

The Minister then mentioned a telephone discussion between State Secretary Guido Schmidt and Herr von Papen regarding a recent article in the *V[ölkischer] B[eobachter]*, which, in unjustified attacks, brought up the inclusion of Jews in the distribution of the Austrian Winter Relief. He himself had had nothing to do with the matter, nor did he have instructions to discuss it here.

MACKENSEN

## No. 289

1291/345325-29

*The Commissioner of the Führer and Chancellor for Economic Affairs (Keppler) to the Foreign Minister*<sup>46</sup>

FEBRUARY 10, 1938.

DEAR RIBBENTROP: In compliance with your request, I should like to supplement my letter of yesterday<sup>47</sup> on Austria with the following:

During the past half year, Foreign Minister von Neurath constantly sought to gain influence over political developments by promoting closer economic ties between Germany and Austria. I believe it is impossible to come closer to the actual goal in that way. Under the leadership of Kienböck, president of the National Bank,

<sup>46</sup> This letter, the file copy of which is unsigned, is from the files of Dr. Keppler.

<sup>47</sup> Probably the letter of February 7, p. 500.

Austria is pursuing a pronounced policy of deflation on the Brüning pattern, so much so that even Austrian Government circles (Schmidt, Glaise, and others) have complained bitterly to me about it. If we should again, as we did a year ago, strive to revive trade between Germany and Austria, we could, of course, multiply our present imports from Austria; but there would be no compensating deliveries.

This condition would then naturally lead to further reduction in trade, and on the other hand to greater political pressure on the Austrian Government. The revival of trade and the restoration of the Austrian economy are, however, child's play once the currency barriers between Germany and Austria have been abolished, while the tariff question is of only minor importance. I am convinced that if the currency barriers were abolished, Austria would after a very brief period become as prosperous as Germany. At present Austrian wood is left to rot in the forests and the cutting is far below normal for lack of a market, while we are practically depleting our forests. Austria's surplus of livestock, butter, and other farm products could be completely absorbed; in addition, it would greatly facilitate our domestic construction activities if we could make greater use of Austrian industry in supplying material for Germany, and the Four-Year Plan could thus be completed in less time. Furthermore, there would be every incentive to develop Austria's water-power resources. The water-power resources of the mountain regions (the Tauern Mountains, the mountains of western Tyrol, Lühnersee, etc.) would merit attention in this connection and, above all, the generation of electric current from the Danube, which would at the same time regulate the Danube waterway. The latter project, especially, appears urgent, for improvement of the Danube waterway would bring Austria and the entire Southeast considerably closer to Germany. According to fairly recent reports, 10 billion kw-hrs could easily be obtained from the Alpine rivers and about the same amount of current by development of the Danube. At present Germany could absorb a large portion of this, and the resulting reduced dependence on our coal mines would be altogether desirable. In other words, without the elimination of the currency barrier Austria will continue in economic misery, while after its elimination the unemployed would quickly obtain work and Austria's economic condition would improve at a surprising pace.

You also wanted another brief statement concerning the state of Party affairs in Austria. The Austrian Party is engaged almost exclusively in illegal activities, although the Führer has repeatedly expressed the opinion that we should do less illegal fighting, and try to shift our work more to lawful activities. As a result, *Landesleiter*

Leopold's work was always opposed to the efforts of the Foreign Ministry, of Dr. Seyss-Inquart, and of myself. Leopold and I therefore held a conference one day at Field Marshal Göring's office, at which Field Marshal Göring stated his views very clearly and L. promised to guide his future conduct accordingly. Unfortunately, Leopold did not keep his promise at all and, with short interruptions, continued to fight against me and against the activities of Dr. Seyss-Inquart. Göring is fully aware of this and has therefore for some weeks held the view that Leopold must be removed from Austria; for it goes without saying that the possibility of success is very much decreased if the movement in Austria works at cross-purposes with work done from here. Party discipline is very much impaired by these conditions, and if they were permitted to continue one could, within a comparatively short time, expect a breakdown of discipline and rifts in the Party which would greatly diminish its striking power.

Apparently Leopold learned of the negotiations now in progress and last week began to arrange big demonstrations. Consequently, 400 men were arrested 2 days ago and nearly 400 members of the *Hitlerjugend* were expelled from school. The *Hitlerjugend*, evidently in accordance with Leopold's wishes, also began rioting, etc., which led to a great many expulsions from school.

Yesterday I conferred with the executive officer [*Stabsleiter*] of the *Reichsjugendführer*, Party Member Lauterbacher, who is not at all pleased with these developments and who, after his talk with me, is now taking steps to put an end to these abuses; for it serves no useful purpose and is not in accordance with the Führer's wishes if arrests are made and misery inflicted on the Party members in Austria on such a scale, without any commensurate success.

You asked me this morning whether I knew anything about a meeting to be held in Berchtesgaden at the end of the week. I have only heard rumors that the Führer intends to hold a large-scale conference, to which he has also invited Dr. Seyss-Inquart and other gentlemen from Austria and which he also wants me to attend. I have not yet been directly notified.

You probably know that the Führer gave orders to intercept Ambassador von Papen in Linz, and that Papen visited the Berghof and is now in Vienna on special mission. It is therefore quite possible that consultations with the Führer himself are in prospect with regard to this resignation.

Heil Hitler!

Yours,

[File copy not signed]

## No. 290

1798/408248-51

*Memorandum on the Present State of German-Austrian Relations*<sup>47a</sup>

(e.o. Pol. IV 858/38)

The Agreement of July 11, 1936, constitutes the basis of the present relations between Germany and Austria. The Austrian Government has thus far delayed the execution of this Agreement in spite of all efforts on the part of the German Government to hold it to the observance of the treaty obligations assumed. In the main these are:

Complete amnesty for all persons who took part in the July *Putsch* of 1935 [1934], extension of this amnesty to the refugees in the Reich, removal of economic and other forms of discrimination against the members of the movement in Austria (including reinstatement of their pensions), and participation of persons of the National Opposition in the shaping of the political will of the State.

The resistance to the cooperation so often promised stems mainly from the person of the Federal Chancellor himself, who said recently in the well-known interview that a wide gulf separates him from National Socialism. He considers it his objective to gain time again and again through definite promises and half promises. Counseled by State Secretary Zernatto and others, he has thus far believed that he could split the movement in Austria and then take the amenable elements of the movement into the Fatherland Front as repentant sinners and proceed all the more ruthlessly against the intransigent elements. Whether the restoration of the Hapsburgs is Schuschnigg's ultimate aim may be left undecided here. The institution of the *Volkspolitische Referate* in the Fatherland Front is also presumably to aid in his struggle against the Party. Moreover, he has so far been able deftly to play off against one another and against the Reich the men who have placed themselves at his disposal for effecting a domestic reconciliation in Austria, such as Minister von Glaise-Horstenau, State Counselor Seyss-Inquart, and *Landesleiter* Leopold. The task confronting German policy is accordingly clear:

Maintenance of unity in the movement in Austria with energetic elimination of all cross-purposes and divisive tendencies, in order to create domestic political pressure on the Federal Chancellor, and use of all admissible diplomatic pressure from the outside by Germany in order to achieve full compliance with the Agreement of July 11, 1936. Judging from his traits of character, any compliance

<sup>47a</sup> Only the draft of the memorandum has been found. It is initialed at the end by Altenburg, and it was seen by Mackensen, Weizsäcker, and Bismarck.

could be wrung from Schuschnigg only with difficulty. It seems as if the growing resentment in the Reich over the delaying tactics of the Federal Chancellor, coupled with a growing unrest within the movement in Austria for like reasons, has lately alarmed Schuschnigg. At any rate, he was willing to have conversations with both Ambassador von Papen and State Counselor Seyss-Inquart on the domestic political settlement in Austria, dealing chiefly with the aforementioned points and thus far described by both gentlemen as promising. Nevertheless, from past experience, skepticism concerning further developments seems to be indicated. An essential condition for a satisfactory outcome of the conversations would seem to be the closest collaboration between the persons empowered by the Reich to conduct the negotiations and the exponents of the movement in Austria, so as to prevent the Federal Chancellor from being able to play off the Reich against the movement in Austria and vice versa.

Herewith submitted to the Foreign Minister.

BERLIN, February 10, 1938.

### No. 291

1798/409256-59

#### *The German Ambassador in France (Welczeck) to the German Foreign Ministry*

A 493

PARIS, February 11, 1938.  
(zu Pol. IV 902)

Subject: France's attitude toward the Austrian question.

Nearly all newspapers here, which always watch events in Austria very closely, used Herr Tavs' arrest in Vienna at the end of January as the occasion to sound a new alarm concerning the insecurity and the continuously endangered balance of the political situation in Austria.

1) It is generally claimed that the emphasis in the aims of German policy has shifted, insofar as Austria has now become "target number one" in place of Czechoslovakia, and that in the near future increased German activity was to be expected in that direction. The two principal reasons for this were:

(a) Whereas the Czechoslovak question could only be solved by military intervention, with all the risks that involved, the view here is that Germany believes she can solve the Austrian problem by a cold war [*auf kaltem Wege*]. They [the Germans] did not intend complete *Anschluss*; neither did they want to create a new situation by a *coup d'état*; but they hoped to accelerate developments

by intensive propaganda inside the country. The object would be to force the Austrian Government, under the pressure of the National Socialists and other pro-German elements, finally to hold a plebiscite, as the result of which Schuschnigg would be compelled to resign. The advantage of this solution, in the opinion of the Germans, was that it would deprive the powers interested in the preservation of Austrian independence of any pretext for intervention.

(b) The Rumanian events had created the hope in Germany that in case of war she could count on Rumanian oil and Rumanian grain. The road to Bucharest, however, led through Vienna and Budapest. It was believed that Budapest was secure, but Vienna still had to be "synchronized."

2) In discussing the possibilities of checking the German drive toward Austria, the necessity of an agreement between Prague, Vienna, and Budapest is being emphasized. There is, however, considerable skepticism regarding the realization of this political concept. As a prerequisite for such a development, so states Pierre Dominique in the *République*, Czechoslovakia would have had to treat the Hungarian and German minorities on a basis of complete equality during the postwar years. Such a policy might, perhaps, have succeeded in immunizing the minorities against the magnetic attraction of their mother countries.

But still more important for the success of such a plan was the support of Italy. Unfortunately, however, the times of Stresa were over. Although the press therefore writes off Italy to a certain extent as a potential foe of Germany, it does not refrain from reproaching Italy for the imprudence of her policy; it emphasizes on the one hand its doubts as to German willingness to pay for the Italian retreat from Central Europe with support of Italian interests in the Mediterranean and in Africa, and tries on the other hand to arouse Italian pride by intentionally stressing Italy's role as "brilliant second." Occasionally, there is still wishful thinking as in the claim that every time Germany makes an advance Italy strives energetically to apply the brake.

3) Regarding the treatment of the Austrian question in the press here, it appears significant that the role which France *herself* will be called upon to play in a crisis is hardly mentioned at all. This fact clearly shows how uncertain and hesitating the French are on the Austrian question in its present stage of development. They really have no clear conception of how France should behave in case of a political upheaval in Austria. Pierre Bernus very clearly expresses this in the *Journal des Débats* and adds that the only thing that must be demanded is that England and France agree in advance on their attitude toward the question. But he was com-

pletely in the dark as to whether there was unanimity of opinion between the two Powers. The Socialist *Populaire*, to be sure, states that England and France should pursue a *politique de présence* in Central Europe but does not say what it means by that.

4) The deeper reason for this inhibited attitude toward the Austrian question—as can be confirmed again and again from conversations here—lies in the fact that the French lack the moral position from which they could take a clear stand against German policy. To this extent there is for them considerable difference between the Austrian and Czechoslovak problems. Although Czechoslovakia has a large German racial group, she is not a “German State” in the sense that Austria herself professes to be. Furthermore, France is allied to Czechoslovakia by a treaty to which the Czech Government, incessantly asserting its friendship for France, clings desperately. In this situation, however, French statesmen can appeal to the emotions of the nation and state that France’s honor would not permit her to desert her friends. In the case of Austria there remains, basically, only the argument of distrust of Germany and the apprehension regarding a shift of the balance of power in Central Europe—all considerations of pure power politics, which do not furnish a satisfactory moral basis; with only these, the French feel uncomfortable and hard pressed. In this connection I should like to state that in certain circles of the Diplomatic Corps here the opinion is held that France would offer no military resistance to a “German solution” of the Austrian question. Even if these statements as such are not decisive, they nevertheless deserve to be mentioned as symptoms.

I enclose a number of newspaper clippings.<sup>48</sup>

H. WELCZECK

## No. 292

74/56587-88

### *The German Ambassador in Austria (Papen) to the German Foreign Ministry*

SECRET

VIENNA, February 12, 1938.

A 819/38

As the Legation is informed from a reliable source, Count Coudenhove-Kalergi, the head of the pan-Europe movement, recently gave a tea at his home in honor of the exiled Father Muckermann. A

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<sup>48</sup> Not printed here. This report was sent on February 18, 1938, to the German Missions in London, Rome, Warsaw, Prague, Vienna, Budapest, Belgrade, and Bucharest, and the Consulate at Geneva, for their information.

relative of the host's, Countess Marietta Coudenhove, who is known for her National sympathies, was present at this reception. Since her political attitude is evidently not known to Count Coudenhove, however, they spoke quite freely in her presence.

Muckermann himself said that he was in Vienna by order of the Vatican in order to organize the defense against National Socialism and to exterminate the Austrian National Socialists. As matters now stood, there could be no doubt at all of the success of his mission.

The wife of the host, the Jewess Ida Roland, later brought the conversation around to the subject of the Führer's trip to Italy. On this, Muckermann expressed himself somewhat as follows: "That is all prepared. While he is inspecting the Capitol, they can get close to him. I am convinced that the great Austrian plan will succeed entirely." Thereupon Ida Roland said: "Then we shall have reached our goal!"

I am passing on this information with reservations, despite the reliability of the source. As the result of a conference I had with a member of the clergy who is very close to Cardinal Innitzer, I can state as follows: Cardinal Innitzer has considered taking steps toward imposing silence on Father Muckermann and has to this end contacted the Superiors of his Order. There could be no question of an order from the Vatican to Father Muckermann. This lie was due to Father Muckermann's need to make himself important. I expect that my efforts in this direction will be successful, since the Cardinal, too, views the political activity of Muckermann with obvious displeasure.

I can take no definite stand on the statements indicating an attempt at assassination. That the Freemason Coudenhove and his set are among the bitterest foes of National Socialism, there is no doubt.

PAPEN

## No. 293

1282/344167-68

*Undated Report*<sup>49</sup>

TOP SECRET

Seyss-Inquart yesterday and today conducted the final negotiations, with the following result:

1. The Little Program which we discussed again last time was accepted by the Federal Chancellor in full and its execution can begin immediately.

2. The following appointments are conceded in principle: Interior, together with Public Security (Seyss-Inquart), and Finance. The Federal Chancellor, however, pointed to the recent acts of violence, e.g. the paper bombs with pieces of iron inside, the destruction of 200 telephone booths in Vienna, the preparations for blasting along Höhenstrasse, etc., and also an alleged instruction from Reschny to the SA; he is of the opinion that it is not possible to proceed with the appointments at this time, since that would be yielding to mob pressure. He wants to wait until March 20 in order to let things calm down sufficiently to make any action on his part acceptable to his own followers.

3. The mood is favorable and the Federal Chancellor is also willing to make further concessions, such as abolition of the so-called traditional offices [*Traditionsreferate*] (Legitimist activity) and freedom of the Austrian Army from all political indoctrination or influence, etc. The measures affecting the Reich are accepted in accordance with Papen's negotiations. Seyss-Inquart urgently requests you, *Gruppenführer*,<sup>50</sup> to see to it that:

1. The Federal Chancellor is definitely committed to make the ministerial appointments before February 20, as any work in the Interior is impossible so long as the demands set forth in the Little Program cannot be carried out by persons with authority. Moreover, it is imperative at this very moment to take firm domestic measures, since otherwise, in view of the heightened passions prevailing, domestic disorder will not only disturb the diplomatic agreements of the Führer but will also supply the Federal Chancellor with a plausible pretext for not honoring his commitments.

2. As Herr von Papen reported, the official communiqué will announce the removal by the Führer of the *Landesleitung* in Austria. You realize, *Gruppenführer*, that we are convinced of the unavoidable necessity of these measures. Nevertheless, we

\* This report cannot be precisely dated. There are three copies in the files of Dr. Keppler. The first (1291/345506-10) is in telegraphic form, i.e., strips of telegraph tape pasted on forms; neither the time of dispatch nor the time of receipt is recorded on the forms. The second copy (1282/344155-56) is headed "Copy" and bears a penciled date "12. II. 1938." The third copy, an attested true copy, is the one used here; it is undated. The report was almost certainly made to Dr. Keppler, although that fact is not stated on any of the copies.

<sup>50</sup> i.e., Keppler.

must urgently request you to keep this from the public, as the Federal Chancellor is anxious to make the removal of the *Landesleitung* by the Führer appear as though the Führer was abandoning the movement.

3. Immediate removal is, however, a prerequisite for any further domestic activity. The entire work of the Führer will be endangered, unless quick action is taken. Dr. Mühlmann will be ready with an oral report and on call at the Hotel Post in Berchtesgaden tomorrow morning after 7:30.

*SD Hauptamt III/2*

VEESENMAYER

Copy certified by:

RANTZKI, Duty Officer,  
SS-Untersturmführer

No. 294

1282/344187-93

*Protocol of the Conference of February 12, 1938<sup>51</sup>*

I. As a result of today's comprehensive exchange of views between the Führer and Chancellor and the Federal Chancellor, Dr. Schuschnigg, the following communiqué, to be released by the press of both countries (Sunday papers) has been agreed upon . . . (cf. enclosure 1<sup>52</sup>).

II. In the spirit of the decisions announced in the above communiqué, the Federal Chancellor will carry out the following measures by February 18, 1938:

1) The Austrian Government will from time to time consult with the Government of the Reich on questions of foreign policy of common concern to both countries. The Reich Government assumes the same obligation toward the Austrian Government.

2) The Austrian Government recognizes that National Socialism is compatible with Austrian conditions and consequently with allegiance to the Fatherland Front, provided that National Socialists recognize and adhere to the Austrian Constitution in carrying out their ideas. The Austrian Government will therefore take no steps which would in effect outlaw the National Socialist movement within the meaning of the above aims. Federal Chancellor Schuschnigg states that he agrees to the extension of the activities of the *Volks-politische Referate*.

3) Appointment of State Counselor Seyss-Inquart as Minister of the Interior, with authority over security. He has the right and the duty to see to it that the activity of the National Socialist

<sup>51</sup> The draft which, according to testimony given at the trial of Guldo Schmidt in Vienna, was handed to Dr. Schuschnigg at the Obersalzberg with a demand for his signature. This copy is in the Keppler files.

<sup>52</sup> Only one enclosure accompanies the file copy of this document.

movement can develop along the lines indicated in article 2, and to take appropriate measures for this purpose.

IV [4)] The Federal Chancellor will proclaim a general amnesty for all persons punished by the courts or the police because of their National Socialist activities. Such persons whose further stay in Austria appears detrimental to relations between the two countries may, after an examination of each individual case and by agreement between the two Governments, transfer their residence to the Reich.

5) Disciplinary measures taken in the fields of pensions, annuities, public welfare, and education, especially the withholding or reduction of benefits, because of National Socialist activities, will be revoked and restitution pledged.

6) All economic discrimination against National Socialists will be eliminated.

7) The unimpeded execution of the press truce agreed upon between the two Governments shall be assured by the replacement of Minister Ludwig and Federal Commissioner Colonel Adam.

8) Military relations between the German and Austrian armed forces will be assured by the following measures:

- (a) the appointment of Minister von Glaise-Horstenau as Minister of the Armed Forces,
- (b) a systematic exchange of officers (100 officers are to be involved),
- (c) regular conferences between the General Staffs,
- (d) a systematic cultivation of comradely and of professional relations.

9) All discrimination against National Socialists, especially that affecting enrollment in and completion of military service, will be stopped. All past discriminatory actions will be canceled.

10) Preparations will be made for the assimilation of the Austrian to the German economic system. For this purpose Dr. Fischböck will be appointed Minister of Finance.

III. The Reich Government acknowledges that the future Minister of the Interior, Seyss-Inquart, is the only person authorized to carry out article II (2) of this Protocol. The Reich Government will take measures to prevent interference in the internal affairs of Austria on the part of Reich-German Party organs. In case of differences of opinion concerning the interpretation of article II (2) of the foregoing Agreement, negotiations are to be conducted through Minister Seyss-Inquart exclusively.

[Enclosure]

*German Draft of a Communiqué*

The Federal Chancellor, Dr. Kurt Schuschnigg, accompanied by the Austrian State Secretary for Foreign Affairs, Dr. Guido Schmidt,

and the German Ambassador, Franz von Papen, paid a visit today to the Führer and Chancellor at the Obersalzberg, at the latter's invitation, with Foreign Minister von Ribbentrop present. This unofficial meeting was the result of a mutual desire to talk over all questions pertaining to relations between the German Reich and Austria and to discuss in detail the possibilities of strengthening the relations between the two States on the basis of the Agreement of July 11, 1936.

Both statesmen are convinced that the Agreement of July 11, 1936, is the starting point for an evolutionary development in the relations between the German Reich and Austria. They will therefore in the near future take practical measures to guarantee the full execution of the agreement reached today in order to create between the two States a close and friendly relationship consistent with their long common history and the mutual interests of the German people. They met in the conviction that by the creation of such an agreement they would at the same time make an effective contribution to the peaceful development of the whole European situation.

BERCHTESGADEN, February 12, 1938.

No. 295

2871/563849-54

*Protocol of the Conference of February 12, 1938*

TOP SECRET

(Pol. I 107 g.Rs.)

I. As a result of today's comprehensive exchange of views between the Führer and Chancellor and the Federal Chancellor, Dr. Schuschnigg, the following communiqué, to be released by the press of both countries (Sunday papers), has been agreed upon as per enclosure 1.<sup>63</sup>

II. The Federal Chancellor holds out the prospect of the following measures, concerning which he will send a definitely binding reply by Tuesday, February 15, 1938.

1) The Austrian Government will from time to time enter into a diplomatic exchange of views on questions of foreign policy of common concern to both countries. Austria will on request give moral, diplomatic, and press support to the desires and actions of the German Reich, to the extent that circumstances permit. The Reich Government assumes the same obligation toward the Austrian Government.

2) Federal Chancellor Schuschnigg declares that he is willing to take State Counselor Dr. Seyss-Inquart into his Government and entrust him with Security.

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<sup>63</sup> Only one enclosure accompanies the signed copy of this document.

3) The Federal Chancellor states that the Austrian National Socialists shall in principle have opportunity for legal activity within the framework of the Fatherland Front and all other Austrian organizations. This activity shall take place on an equal footing with all other groups, and in accordance with the constitution. Dr. Seyss-Inquart has the right and the duty to see to it that the activity of the National Socialists can develop along the lines indicated above, and to take appropriate measures for this purpose.

4) The Austrian Government will immediately proclaim a general amnesty for all persons in Austria punished by the courts or the police because of their National Socialist activities. Such persons whose further stay in Austria appears detrimental to relations between the two countries shall, after an examination of each individual case and by agreement between the two Governments, be made to transfer their residence to the Reich.

5) Disciplinary measures in the fields of pensions, annuities, and public welfare—especially the withholding or reduction of benefits—and in education as well, because of National Socialist activities, will be revoked and restitution promised.

6) All economic discrimination against National Socialists will be eliminated.

7) The unimpeded execution of the press truce agreed upon between the Governments shall be assured by the appointment of Dr. Wolf to an important post in the Austrian Press Service.

8) Military relations between the German and Austrian armed forces will be assured by the following measures:

- (a) The replacement of General Jansa by General Böhme,
- (b) A systematic exchange of officers (up to the number of 100),
- (c) Regular conferences between the General Staffs,
- (d) A systematic cultivation of comradely and of professional military relations.

9) All discrimination against National Socialists, especially that affecting enrollment in and completion of military service, will be stopped. All past discriminatory actions will be canceled.

10) Preparations will be made for the intensification of commerce between the Austrian and German economies. For this purpose, Dr. Fischböck will be appointed to a leading post.

The Federal Chancellor declares that he is prepared to carry out all measures agreed upon under II, 2, 4, 5, 7, by February 18, 1938, subject to the definitive reply agreed upon under II.

III. The Reich Government acknowledges that the future Minister of the Interior, Seyss-Inquart, is the only person authorized to carry out article II, 2 (3)<sup>54</sup> of this Protocol. The Reich Government will take measures to prevent interference in the internal affairs

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<sup>54</sup> The typed text of the signed copy reads "II, 2"; in each case "(3)" has been inserted in longhand. It will be observed that in the draft protocol printed from the Keppeler files the pertinent clause is II, 2.

of Austria on the part of Reich-German Party organs. In case of differences of opinion concerning the interpretation of article II, 2 (3)<sup>55</sup> of the foregoing Agreement negotiations are to be conducted through Minister Seyss-Inquart exclusively.

ADOLF HITLER  
RIBBENTROP

SCHUSCHNIGG  
GUIDO SCHMIDT

[Enclosure]

#### COMMUNIQUE

The Federal Chancellor, Dr. Schuschnigg, accompanied by the Austrian State Secretary for Foreign Affairs, Dr. Guido Schmidt, and the German Ambassador, von Papen, paid a visit today to the Führer and Chancellor at the Obersalzberg, at the latter's invitation, in the presence of Foreign Minister von Ribbentrop. This unofficial meeting was the result of a mutual desire to talk over all questions pertaining to relations between the German Reich and Austria.

No. 296

120/67728-29

#### *Memorandum by the Foreign Minister*

RM 95

I met Ambassador Attolico at the Japanese Ambassador's today and, at his request, gave him some information regarding the negotiations between the Führer and Schuschnigg. Attolico asked why he had not been previously informed of the visit, to which I replied that I myself had only heard of it in Berchtesgaden and that I had therefore not been able to inform him prior to his learning of it through the press. The visit had been arranged by Ambassador von Papen and kept secret in order not to give the press occasion for making misleading conjectures even before the departure of the Federal Chancellor.

I stated to Attolico specifically that it was to be hoped that contact between the Führer and the Federal Chancellor would lead to a better relationship between the two countries. The Agreement of July 11, 1936, which was to have formed the basis for future relations between Germany and Austria, had unfortunately operated imperfectly. The Führer had made it clear to Schuschnigg that things could not go on in this way. They were now contemplating measures that should really produce harmony between the two countries. I mentioned specifically the need for a change in the treatment of the Austrian National Socialists and the possibility of employing

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<sup>55</sup> See footnote 54, p. 516.

them within the scope of the existing arrangements. In this connection, certain changes in personnel might possibly be considered in order to assure this harmony. Also, amnesty to prisoners and abolition of certain discriminatory measures with compensation, as well as revision of the press truce agreed upon last July.

I told Attolico, finally, that the entire complex of the many problems existing between Germany and Austria had been discussed and that Ambassador von Papen had returned to Vienna to deal with matters further.

From a question of Attolico's as to whether, as he had heard, the Austrians were to give a definitive answer by tomorrow, I infer that he must already have heard more about the negotiations from another source. I promised to keep him informed of further developments. Of the signing of a protocol I said nothing.

VON RIBBENTROP

BERLIN, February 14, 1938.

### No. 297

120/67728

#### *The German Ambassador in Austria (Papen) to the German Foreign Ministry*

Telegram

VERY URGENT

VIENNA, February 14, 1938—10:40 p.m.

VERY SECRET

Received February 15, 1938—1:15 a.m.

No. 17 of February 14

For the Führer and Chancellor and the Foreign Minister.

The Federal Chancellor, deeply impressed by the conversation with the Führer, engaged in a sharp contest yesterday and today with all the opponents of pacification, since he is determined to carry out his Berchtesgaden pledge. The main obstacle is the placing of Security under Seyss-Inquart, which the President has thus far refused. It appears that France, in particular, but England also, are making very strong representations at the Ballhausplatz, warning against too far-reaching concessions to us. I refused categorically this morning to transmit to the Führer any proposal for weakening the Protocol that has been signed. The Federal Chancellor, who just received me, informed me that in spite of all opposition he hoped to put the agreement through tomorrow, if both sides reaffirm the Agreement of July 11 in the communiqué to be issued jointly tomorrow and if we guarantee that the measures promised by us in section III are taken simultaneously with his. With these promises he hopes to overcome the resistance of the President, supported by

(group garbled) Boeck and the Schmitz group. I would therefore ask for authorization to show a compliant attitude in this matter. The Austrian proposal for the joint communiqué will be made this evening.

State Counselor Seyss requests the Führer, as the prerequisite for the assumption of his difficult office, to order the removal of Leopold and Dr. Tavs to the Reich. Tavs, against whom proceedings for high treason are pending, would be free under the amnesty by February 18 and would then have to be made to leave immediately. I request assent on this important point, too, by Tuesday noon.

PAPEN

No. 298

120/67727

*The German Ambassador in Austria (Papen) to the German Foreign Ministry*

Telegram

VERY URGENT

VIENNA, February 14, 1938—10:40 p.m.

VERY SECRET

Received February 15, 1938—2 a.m.

No. 18 of February 14

For the Führer and Chancellor and the Foreign Minister.

The Austrian Government's draft communiqué is as follows:

"At the conference which took place between Federal Chancellor Dr. Schuschnigg and the German Chancellor on February 12 at the Obersalzberg, near Berchtesgaden, all questions concerning relations between Austria and the German Reich were discussed in detail with the object of finding ways to eliminate the difficulties which have arisen in connection with the application of the Agreement of July 11, 1936. It was agreed that the principles of the Agreement and the mutual desire for its full implementation are to be maintained. To this end measures were agreed upon by both sides, which are to guarantee the smooth execution of the Agreement and thus such close and friendly relations between the two German States as befit the interests of the German race." I suggest that the very last sentence be formulated as follows:

"To this end measures were agreed upon by both sides, which are to be carried out within a short time and through which a smooth execution of the Agreement is to be guaranteed, for the purpose of establishing such close and friendly relations between the two States as befit their long common history and the interests of the German people. Both statesmen believe that by this reaffirmed Agreement they are likewise making an effective contribution toward a peaceful development of the general European situation."

Should the Federal Chancellor succeed in obtaining the President's consent tomorrow, it is suggested that the communiqué be announced by both sides on the radio at 10 p.m. Please send instructions concerning the communiqué as soon as possible.

PAPEN

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[EDITORS' NOTE. On February 14, 1938, at 7:30 p.m., Hitler approved the suggestion submitted by the Commander in Chief of the *Wehrmacht*, General Keitel, that while neither the army nor the air force was to make any real military preparations, "false but credible information" should be spread and maneuvers near the border executed, creating the impression that detailed military preparations were being undertaken against Austria.

A translation of this document appears in *Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression* (Washington, Government Printing Office, 1946), volume IV, document 1775-PS, page 357.]

### No. 299

120/67730-32

#### *Memorandum*

Ambassador von Papen called me up at 7:50 a.m. today and informed me of the following:

The letter of confirmation from the Federal Chancellor would presumably arrive in half an hour.

It was agreed to announce the text of the communiqué at 10 p.m. over the radio and simultaneously inform the press. The measures of the Austrian Government in carrying out the Agreement would presumably be taken tomorrow. Ambassador von Papen would call up tomorrow morning and report at what time the measures of the Austrian Government were to be expected.

The Austrians expected that the German obligation provided for in the Agreement would likewise be published some time tomorrow.

He requested that the communiqué receive favorable comment, to the effect that the past was now buried and a new chapter was beginning. He requested, moreover, that the measures to be taken tomorrow by the Austrian Government should likewise be discussed favorably in the German press.

Herr von Kettler<sup>56</sup> called me up at 8:20 a.m. upon orders from Ambassador von Papen and informed me that the letter of con-

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<sup>56</sup> Papen's personal aide.

firmation by the Austrian President, promising to carry out by February 18 the measures agreed upon, had arrived in the meantime. He could not give me the text of the letter at the moment, because Ambassador von Papen had locked up the letter and had had to go to the Bulgarian Legation.

I told Herr von Kettler that I absolutely had to get the text of the letter.

Herr von Kettler then transmitted the enclosed text to me at 9 p.m.

Upon orders from Ambassador von Papen, Herr von Kettler also informed me that Ambassador von Papen had objected to the text of the letter, since it mentioned only the conversation at the Obersalzberg, but not the Protocol. State Secretary Guido Schmidt had thereupon immediately authorized Ambassador von Papen to insert the words "in the Protocol" before "promised measures." I have therefore inserted the words "in the Protocol" at the proper place in the enclosure.

DR. KORDT

BERLIN, February 15, 1938.

[Enclosure]

VIENNA, February 15, 1938.

YOUR EXCELLENCY: With reference to the conversation with the Chancellor at the Obersalzberg on February 12, I have the honor to inform Your Excellency that the measures promised by us (in the Protocol) will be carried out before February 18. I assume therefore that the steps promised by the Chancellor will also be carried out at the proper time.

With the assurance of my highest consideration,

SCHUSCHNIGG

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[EDITORS' NOTE. Identical German and Austrian communiqués on the Berchtesgaden conversations were broadcast simultaneously at 10 p.m., February 15, 1938, by Colonel Adam in Vienna, and from the German radio stations. For text, see *Documents on International Affairs*, 1938, volume II, pages 47-48.]

## No. 300

1798/400262

*The German Foreign Minister to the Austrian Foreign Minister  
(Schmidt)*

Telegram

BERLIN, February 16, 1938.

(Pol. IV 1003)

I am greatly pleased with your appointment as Minister for Foreign Affairs and congratulate Your Excellency on the conclusion of the agreements, so auspicious for friendly cooperation between the two German countries, which were reached upon the initiative of the Führer and Chancellor and thanks to the personal participation of His Excellency, the Federal Chancellor.

RIBBENTROP<sup>57</sup>

## No. 301

120/67783-84

*The German Foreign Ministry to Various German Diplomatic  
Missions and Consular Offices*

Telegram

FEBRUARY 16, 1938.

(zu Pol. IV 1004)

For information.

The conversation of the Führer and Chancellor with the Austrian Federal Chancellor on February 12 at the Obersalzberg led to a welcome clarification of the relations between the two German countries. The following results are to be stressed:

1. A consultative agreement concerning questions of foreign policy.
2. Appointment of State Counselor Seyss-Inquart, who is close to us politically, as Minister of the Interior and of Security.
3. Equal admission of Austrian National Socialists to legal activity within the framework of the Fatherland Front.
4. Immediate issuance of a general amnesty for all persons in Austria who have been penalized by the courts or by the police because of National Socialist activity.
5. Cessation of discrimination against National Socialists in the economic field, in pension, civil service, relief, and educational matters.
6. Execution of the press truce and intensification of the trade between the two countries. The installation of suitable persons in positions of authority in Austria as guarantors.

<sup>57</sup> "An unsigned marginal notation reads: "Herr Papen, as agreed upon, will see to it that this telegram is not published in Austria."

7. Assurance of the cultivation of close relations between the German and Austrian armed forces, by the appointment of suitable persons in Austria, among other things.

In conversations—without mentioning the above details, insofar as they have not been published in the newspapers—please interpret the results of the discussion as progress in the relations between the two German countries. The path to a close and friendly collaboration between the Reich and Austria on all decisive questions in political, cultural, and economic life is now cleared. The Agreement thus represents a valuable contribution to European peace.

MACKENSEN

### No. 302

1798/408260-61

*The German Embassy in France to the German Foreign Ministry*

Telegram

No. 79 of February 16

PARIS, February 16, 1938.

Received February 16, 1938—5:45 p.m.

Since the visit of Federal Chancellor Schuschnigg to Berchtesgaden, France has been following the developments in German-Austrian relations with the utmost interest. The attitude prevailing to date has been characterized by a feeling of impotence in face of the closer union of the two German States which is being initiated diplomatically and legally. Opposition to a possible *Anschluss* has not been given up. But even the Leftist press does not give vent to this opposition in very concrete terms, now that there is no legal recourse against the *rapprochement* being realized between the two countries by agreement. As a guarantee of the independence of Austria there would still exist only the clause of the Stresa Agreement, which is dead, and certain obligations toward the League of Nations, which is impotent. It is significant that the political commentator [*Offiziosus*] of the *Petit Parisien*, reporting on yesterday's conversation between Delbos and the British Ambassador here concerning the Austrian problem, considers it rather improbable that intervention of the Western Powers could result from such an exchange of views, since the matter is not legally within the scope of their obligations.

In the treatment of the matter by the press, a great difference is to be noted between the time *before* and *after* the publication of the Vienna and Berlin communiqués and of the new list of Ministers. While previously the view prevailed that the person of Schuschnigg and the political tendency of the Cabinet in Vienna provided a

guarantee for the full preservation of Austrian independence, it is generally asserted today that Schuschnigg and the Vienna Government had yielded to pressure from the Reich and that Austria was submitting to Germany. In many places they are saying "Finis Austriae." Quite generally, the success achieved by German diplomacy as a result of the agreement is characterized as a defeat for Mussolini, who had perhaps given up Austria in exchange for our support in the Mediterranean and North Africa; the Agreement is interpreted as an event of the greatest international historical importance, representing the first step in the realization of a Greater German Empire of the Germanic Nation.

Telegram will be continued plain as No. 79a.<sup>58</sup>

EMBASSY

### No. 303

1798/409272-73

*The Foreign Minister to the Führer's Deputy (Hess)*

IMMEDIATE

BERLIN, February 16, 1938.  
(e.o. Pol. IV 1044)

Article III of the Protocol of the conversation held at the Obersalzberg, signed by the Führer and the Austrian Federal Chancellor, Schuschnigg, on February 12, provides for measures by the German Government to exclude interference of Reich-German Party organs with the internal affairs of Austria. (Cf. enclosed copy of extracts.<sup>59</sup>) In accordance with the Führer's promise, the necessary instructions must be given immediately. May I assume that you will take these measures today, by renewing the old ban on interference of Reich-German Party organs with the internal affairs of Austria. Since I have to inform the Austrian Government of the implementation of article III of the Agreement, I shall assume that you concur, unless you inform me otherwise by this afternoon.

I should appreciate it if you could inform me, in writing, of the instructions which you issue.

R[IBBENTROP]<sup>60</sup>

<sup>58</sup> Not printed.

<sup>59</sup> Not printed here.

<sup>60</sup> An additional note in the draft reads as follows: "Unless the Führer's Deputy sends word by 6 o'clock tonight, Herr von Papen should be authorized by telephone to make the necessary communications to the Austrian Government. R[ibbentrop]"

## No. 304

1291/345458

*The Personal Adjutant of the Führer's Deputy (Leitgen) to the Foreign Minister*

Temporarily in BERLIN, February 16, 1938.

MY DEAR MINISTER: By direction of the Führer's Deputy,<sup>61</sup> I am informing you of an instruction which Minister Hess has issued today:

"The Führer's Deputy wishes to issue a reminder of his orders strictly forbidding Reich-Germans to meddle in the internal affairs of Austria, to carry on National Socialist propaganda across the border, or to issue directions to Austrian National Socialists. He expects strictest observance of these orders."

Heil Hitler!

LEITGEN

## No. 305

1716/399067

*The German Chargé d'Affaires in Great Britain (Woermann) to the German Foreign Ministry*

Telegram

No. 86 of February 17

LONDON, February 17, 1938—5:35 p.m.

Received February 17, 1938—7:50 p.m.

(Pol. IV 1004)

Reference your telegram of the 16th, No. 39.<sup>62</sup>

In today's conversation with Sargent, I made use of the arguments in the above-mentioned telegraphic instruction. I asked Sargent how the report had arisen that England and France intended a joint *démarche* in Berlin, a report which had in the meantime been denied. Sargent denied that a joint *démarche* had ever been contemplated by the British Government. From another source I hear that Paris was responsible for the publication, after the Foreign Office had been contacted but had given only a noncommittal reply; a joint step was then rejected by the Cabinet.

On the Austrian question itself, Sargent expressed himself quite tartly. He said that it boiled down to two things, namely, how the agreement came about and what the contents were. Henderson's attempt to obtain enlightenment in Berlin had led to no appreciable

<sup>61</sup> Rudolf Hess.<sup>62</sup> Document No. 301, p. 522.

results. The British Government, therefore, could not yet see clearly; its attitude was therefore one of "wait and see."

From the conversation as well as from Eden's statement in Commons yesterday and from conferences with other persons I have the impression that although the step has created a feeling of insecurity here, no appreciable British reaction is to be expected.

WOERMANN

### No. 306

1958/437355-58

#### *The German Chargé d'Affaires in Austria (Stein) to the German Foreign Ministry*

A 935

VIENNA, February 17, 1938.

In continuation of the report of February 14, 1938 (A 849).<sup>62</sup>

Subject: The reorganization of the Government in Austria and its first results.

#### *1. The reorganization of the Government.*

As a result of the conversation of February 12 at the Obersalzberg, Federal Chancellor Dr. Schuschnigg on the 15th carried out the expected reorganization of the Government. Because of the difficulties he encountered in his own camp, nothing but the joint German-Austrian declaration could be announced that evening. During the night, it was possible to make public the composition of the fifth Schuschnigg Cabinet. Its most important feature is the appointment as Minister of the Interior of Dr. Arthur Seyss-Inquart, who, though not without a fight, was also put in charge of Security. However, State Secretary Skubl was retained in his present post as Director of Security and at the same time was appointed inspector general of all the law-enforcement agencies, including the police. The retention of General Zehner as State Secretary for National Defense and the appointment of the Clerical engineer, Julius Raab, as Minister of Commerce must be considered as blemishes on the new Cabinet. The appointment of Zernatto and Rott as Ministers without Portfolio, and of the socialistic Adolf Watzek as State Secretary for the Protection of Labor are to be taken as a counterbalance to Seyss-Inquart's appointment. On the other hand, the appointment of State Secretary Schmidt as Foreign Minister may be interpreted as a recognition of his efforts for a settlement with the Reich. The new Minister of Justice, Professor Adamovich,

<sup>62</sup> Not printed.

may be considered as moderately Christian Social. The new State Secretary for Industry, Stepski-Doliwa, is a former *Heimwehr* man with a slight tinge of Legitimism. The State Secretary for Forestry, Matschnig, is likely to show understanding for good relations with the Reich.

## 2. *Amnesty.*

Simultaneously with the reorganization of the Government, a comprehensive amnesty was proclaimed, which covers all persons who prior to February 15 violated laws from political motives. The President's decree referring to the matter was published in the enclosed official section of the *Wiener Zeitung* of February 17.<sup>64</sup> Furthermore, an amnesty was decreed for all penalties under administrative law imposed for political offenses, and it was announced that disciplinary punishments affecting pensions, annuities, and relief, as well as education, are to be invalidated.

## 3. *Appointments in the Fatherland Front.*

Another result of what has occurred is a number of changes in the Fatherland Front. Minister Zernatto, retaining his office as secretary general of the Fatherland Front, was appointed deputy to Front Leader Dr. Schuschnigg. Minister Seyss-Inquart was appointed chief of the *Volkspolitisches Referat* in the Fatherland Front, and at the same time Dr. Pembaur<sup>65</sup> was put in charge of administration. In this capacity, Dr. Seyss-Inquart will be assisted by an advisory council, the chairmanship of which was given to Dr. Jury, who until recently was deputy to the *Landesleiter* of the Austrian National Socialist Party, Leopold.

Furthermore, the Embassy received a confidential report that 2 days ago a conversation was held between Schuschnigg and Notary Dr. Hueber, a former Minister.<sup>66</sup> As a result of the conversation it is assumed that in the very near future Dr. Hueber will be appointed deputy to the chief of the Austrian Sports and Athletic Front, Prince Starhemberg, in place of the present deputy, Hans Reimitz. Reimitz is secretary general of the Austrian Youth Organization [*Jungvolk*] in the Fatherland Front.

## 4. *The reaction to these events.*

The reaction to these events among the people of Austria is very mixed. The circles of the Fatherland Front fear an undermining of their authority, whereas the National Socialist sector of the

<sup>64</sup> Enclosures not printed here.

<sup>65</sup> Walter Pembaur, former head of the *Volkspolitische Referate*.

<sup>66</sup> Possibly Franz Hueber, attorney and associate of Seyss-Inquart and Neubacher.

population sincerely welcomes the visible progress but, remembering the past years of struggle, remains very skeptical regarding further developments.

##### 5. *Conclusions.*

It will be necessary to supervise, loyally but sharply, the compliance by the Austrian Government with the commitments undertaken. Although the good will of Foreign Minister Schmidt and Minister Seyss-Inquart may be counted upon, the political past of Federal Chancellor Schuschnigg, and particularly his hitherto completely negative attitude as regards the spirit of the Agreement of July 11, 1936, does not allow the same appraisal of him. Nor can it be overlooked that Schuschnigg's close associates in the Cabinet, Zernatto, Zehner, Raab, Rott, Watzek, and Skubl, justify no hopes that the new Cabinet will, of its own accord, move toward a *rapprochement* with the Reich more than will be absolutely necessary as a result of the dynamics of the events which have been set in motion. These dynamics, for which Seyss-Inquart and Schmidt will have understanding and interest, should, in my opinion, be encouraged by us as much as possible.

There will be a detailed discussion of the new Cabinet members in a special report.

STEIN

### No. 307

1798/409276-77

#### *Proposal for the Speech of the Führer and Chancellor*<sup>68</sup>

(Pol. IV 1044)

Within the next few days the Federal Chancellor will announce the content of item II, 3, of the Protocol of February 12, 1938 (with exception of the final clause), either in a speech or in a communiqué.

As an echo, so to speak, of the above-mentioned announcement, the Führer would then insert a remark in his speech before the Reichstag on February 20, indicating that there will be no interference on the part of the German Reich in Austrian domestic affairs (see item III of the Protocol).

In accordance with today's conversation with Dr. Seyss-Inquart, this passage of the Führer's speech might be formulated somewhat as follows:

<sup>68</sup> This proposal, submitted by Altenburg to the State Secretary on February 17, 1938, was, after consideration by the State Secretary and the Foreign Minister, discarded as outdated.

Brief discussion of the meeting of February 12 at the Obersalzberg. Next, enumeration of certain measures taken by Austria in the meantime. Then, a reference to the recognition of equal political rights for the National Socialists in Austria, which is to be announced by the Federal Chancellor in a few days. In connection with this, the Führer might say something like the following:

These measures taken by the Austrian Government bear witness that a new era is drawing near in the relationship between the two German States. The recognition of political rights for the National Socialists on equal terms with their fellow citizens, announced by the Federal Chancellor, is heartily welcomed by us in the Reich. The National Socialists in Austria will now, we venture to hope, come into their full rights. No longer humbled and slighted at home, they will not be impelled to gaze, and they will not gaze, longingly across the borders into the Reich. Thus the complaints that influences from Germany had made themselves felt in Austrian domestic affairs will die away of their own accord. We in Germany are prepared to cooperate to this end.

### No. 308

120/67743-46

#### *Memorandum by the Foreign Minister*<sup>69</sup>

The French Ambassador came to see me today and informed me that he had been instructed by his Government to call on me in regard to the Austrian problem. The reason for this *démarche* was the concern felt by the French Government over developments in the Austrian problem. His Government would, in particular, like to know whether the agreements concluded in Berchtesgaden between the Führer and Dr. Schuschnigg remained within the framework of the Agreement of July 11, 1936.

I expressed to the Ambassador my surprise at this communication. We had also noted with growing amazement the attitude of the French press these last few days. France and the world had to understand once and for all that for a great power like Germany it was in the long run impossible to view with complacency the incredible treatment that a part of the Germans living on her borders had been receiving in the last few years. Germany had in the past done everything to bring about an improvement in their lot by peaceful means through friendly agreements, and would continue to do so in the future. Should this, however, not prove to

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<sup>69</sup> Sent by telegram to German Diplomatic Missions on February 18 (120/67747-48).

be the remedy, it would have to be understood that in the protection of the interests and the lives of its racial comrades [*Stammesgenossen*] Germany would not shrink from the direst consequences, not even from a European war. It was quite incomprehensible to me that the French Government, instead of welcoming a new and significant step in the direction of such a peaceful solution with our Austrian sister nation, should make a "*démarche* of alarm" to the Government of the Reich.

The Ambassador then changed his attitude and stated that it was not a matter of a *démarche* in the sense that I had in mind (every visit that he made to me was really a sort of *démarche*), but that he was instructed by his Government to inform himself regarding the scope of the German-Austrian Agreement, since his Government continued after all, to be interested in this problem. In the further course of the conversation, the Ambassador repeatedly expressed the desire of his Government to know clearly whether Germany would in the future, as in the past, recognize the independence of Austria.

With regard to the general outline of the Agreement, I referred the Ambassador to the German-Austrian communiqué of February 15. As far as the future was concerned, I requested the Ambassador to take note of the fact once and for all that the further development of the German-Austrian relationship was a German family affair, a matter that concerned Germany and Austria alone. The Ambassador took note of this and asked our opinion on the further treatment of the British initiative inaugurated by the Halifax visit. I replied that naturally Germany was still working for an adjustment of differences and for European appeasement, but that we had so far not heard anything new concerning British intentions. We then came to speak at some length of the amazing campaign against Germany in the foreign press during the past 2 weeks, and I stressed the fact that first of all this had to be stopped, and a better atmosphere created, before the conversations could be continued. The Ambassador promised to collaborate with me very closely to this end, and again requested that the prohibition against the *Temps* be lifted. I told him that I was prepared to meet him half way on this and would transmit to him any further news.

At the close of the conversation, I again indicated to the Ambassador that Franco-German understanding, for which he knew I had been working for years, would only be advanced if the Austrian question were not again mentioned between us. For the rest, the conversation ran its course in a friendly way.

With regard to the communication of his visit to the press, the Ambassador agreed that Austria was not to be mentioned; it would merely be said that the conversation had extended to "all questions of European policy."

RIBBENTROP

BERLIN, February 17, 1938.

H. AN ACCELERATED EVOLUTIONARY SOLUTION,  
FEBRUARY-MARCH 1938

No. 309

120/67754-K7

*Memorandum*

RM 103

Ambassador von Papen called up today at 4:10 a.m. in order to communicate the following:

1) There was considerable agitation in Vienna because of the political and economic consequences of the German-Austrian Agreements. Vienna at the moment resembled an ant hill. Quite a few Jews were preparing to emigrate. The stock exchange was agitated, and the banks were under heavy pressure. Besides, Prague was doing its bit to add to the confusion, spreading rumors that Austria had decided on large-scale rearmament with German aid. Among other things, the rumor was circulating that four new divisions were to be set up at once.

2) After consultation with the Austrians, he obtained their agreement on the text of the attached communiqué. The communiqué differs from the draft agreed upon yesterday evening in the second sentence of paragraph 1, which is now to read as follows: "This activity can, however, take place only on the basis of the constitution, which excludes political parties, and on a basis of equality with all other Austrian groups."

3) Dr. Fischböck had been appointed State Counselor and Consultant of the Austrian Ministry of Commerce. Dr. Fischböck would be entrusted with the handling of German-Austrian economic questions.

4) Dr. Wolf would be placed in a key position in the Austrian Press Service without delay.

5) Independently of the question of the communiqué, the Austrian Government asked for our consent to announcement in suitable form—through the Fatherland Front or some other organization—that persons whose further sojourn in Austria seemed prejudicial to the relations between the two countries be required, after an

investigation in each case and with the consent of the two Governments, to move to the Reich.

6) Ambassador von Papen proposed that the Austrian wishes for revision of the communiqué be granted.

7) Ambassador von Papen further proposed that the Reich Foreign Minister give the press a statement to the effect that the measures envisaged in the conversations at Berchtesgaden had now been carried out. After such a statement, things would probably quiet down somewhat and the wild rumors of German-Austrian armament agreements would also subside.

DR. E. KORDT

BERLIN, February 18, 1938.

[Enclosure]

In accordance with the agreements reached at Berchtesgaden on February 12 between the Führer and Chancellor and the Federal Chancellor, Dr. Schuschnigg, Austrian National Socialists will now be able to engage in legal activities within the framework of the Fatherland Front and all other Austrian institutions. These activities must, however, be based on the constitution, which continues to exclude political parties, as well as on equality with other groups.

Enforcing the existing ban, Germany will take measures designed to exclude interference of Party authorities with domestic Austrian affairs, thus making another contribution toward a satisfactory development.

No. 310

F8/0008-0007<sup>10</sup>

*Memorandum by the Foreign Minister*

RM 108

The British Ambassador came to see me today and informed me that on instructions from his Government he wished to inform himself regarding the Austrian question. At the same time he wished to voice the interest that the British Government had always taken and would continue to take in the Austrian question.

In a somewhat more conciliatory form, I made the same statements to the British Ambassador I had made on the preceding day to the French Ambassador.

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<sup>10</sup> Another copy of this document may be found under 120/67760-61.

I further stated that I had been very glad that Mr. Eden, during one of his last conversations with me, had taken a very sensible view of the Austrian question. In connection with the press agitation staged after February 4,<sup>11</sup> I pointed out to the Ambassador the necessity of clearing the general atmosphere, especially in the press, since otherwise political conversations had little point.

The British Ambassador stated further that he was glad to have the opportunity to convey an important instruction of his Government at an audience with the Führer and Chancellor after February 20.

VON RIBBENTROP

BERLIN, February 18, 1938.

No. 311

120/67769

*Memorandum*

BERLIN, February 18, 1938.

The Counselor of the Italian Embassy came to see me today in the matter of the London Nonintervention Committee. The agreement we reached will be set forth in a telegraphic instruction to London.

In the name of the Ambassador, Count Magistrati addressed me on the subject of the rumors current here with regard to Austria. It was asserted that the conversations of February 12 constituted only one stage, to be followed by others in short order. In particular, Count Magistrati asked whether more National Socialist members were to be added to the Austrian Cabinet. People were also talking of imminent measures toward creating a German-Austrian customs union. I told Count Magistrati that both these reports were false. With regard to alleged military agreements, I told the Counselor of Embassy that the present Austrian Chief of Staff, Jansa, had been an obstacle to a comradely relationship between the Austrian and the German Armies. If, as was to be expected, Herr Jansa should shortly resign, then these comradely relations and exchanges between the two armies in military matters might improve in the future.

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<sup>11</sup> Apparently a reference to the treatment in the British press of the German military and diplomatic reorganization announced on February 4, by which Hitler became head of the armed forces, and Ribbentrop Foreign Minister.

From the manner in which Magistrati pursued the subject, I would conclude that he had not yet learned of the Protocol of February 12 through Austrian channels.\*

WEIZSÄCKER

### No. 312

120/87758-59

#### *Draft Press Release*

TO BE RELEASED BY D.N.B. AND THE AUSTRIAN PRESS SERVICE

In accordance with the agreements reached at Berchtesgaden on February 12 between the Führer and Chancellor and the Federal Chancellor, Dr. Schuschnigg, the Austrian National Socialists will now have the opportunity for legal activity within the framework of the Fatherland Front and all other Austrian organizations. This activity will take place on an equal footing with all other Austrian organizations, and in accordance with the constitution.

Enforcing the existing ban, Germany will take measures designed to exclude interference of Party organs with internal Austrian affairs, thus making another contribution toward a satisfactory development.<sup>71a</sup>

### No. 313

1282/344163-66

#### *Report on the Austrian Situation up to February 18, 1938, 7 p.m.*

1) According to the latest advices, Schuschnigg is under heavy pressure from both the Jews and, especially, the Catholics. The Jews are attacking mainly through the stock exchange, to exert pressure on the currency. Since February 17, 1938, there has been

\* But probably by the Austrians in Rome on the basis of the Consultative Agreement in the Rome Protocols. It might be well to consider frankly showing the text of the Agreements to Ambassador Attolico on his [one word illegible] informational call. M[ACKENSEN] 2/19 [Footnote in the original.]

<sup>71a</sup> The *Deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung*, No. 83, of February 19, 1938, in carrying the above despatch under the D.N.B. dateline of February 18, added the following editorial comments:

"The additional Agreement reached between Germany and Austria is another propitious sign of the resolute intention of both Governments to continue along the path entered upon after the Berchtesgaden conversation of February 12 between the Führer and Chancellor and the Federal Chancellor, Dr. Schuschnigg. Like the Austrian Cabinet changes which followed the amnesty of political prisoners, the present measures, granting full equality to National Socialists within the framework of the constitution, do much to contribute toward a *détente* between the two countries. The Agreement should also be interpreted as proof of the German Government's willingness to be extremely accommodating in all matters which serve to safeguard Austria's domestic tranquillity. The Agreement should be taken note of particularly by those people abroad who are at present displaying such concern over Austria."

an extraordinarily heavy flight of capital, which led to a substantial drop in Austrian securities in Switzerland and London, as well as in other foreign countries. Schilling notes are being taken over the border illegally in large quantities, so that they have not been quoted since last night. This development is, for the time being, not unfavorable for the Reich, but great care will have to be taken lest the undermining of the Austrian currency, and thus also of the economy, goes too far. This is now probably only a matter of days.

From the Catholic side, the Nuncio yesterday afternoon made a very sharp attack upon Schuschnigg. For this the Nuncio is using *Landeshauptmann* Gleissner,<sup>72</sup> who is mentioned in the Opposition camp as a possible successor. Under this twofold pressure, last night Schuschnigg again expressed the intention of resigning, and informed the President of the Administrative Court, Herr Dinghofer, that he might take over the latter's office. At the same time, Schuschnigg urgently requested the return of Minister Seyss-Inquart. He must have done so in order to remain in the saddle after all, with Seyss' help. In my opinion, Schuschnigg's intention to resign was under discussion, but he himself still seems to be striving to remain Federal Chancellor if possible.

2) On the basis of a detailed and comprehensive 4-day observation, it must be stated that the breakthrough succeeded absolutely and is much deeper than is assumed in many quarters in the Reich. After the powers had left Schuschnigg in the lurch, he immediately saw his former supports partly fall away, partly quarrel among themselves, and fight furiously over the succession to the Chancellorship. In Legitimist circles chaos prevails; all hope has been abandoned. In Jewish circles the conviction prevails that it is now only a matter of time until Austria is politically and economically united with the Reich. The collapse is so complete that, if an acceleration of developments fits into the Führer's foreign policy, a number of decisive positions can be captured within the succeeding weeks by means of definite pressure on the part of the Reich. Of great importance is the imminent removal of President Kienböck of the National Bank, who, as an avowed friend of the Jews, not only tolerates the present catastrophic policy of the Jews, but even promotes it. This view is even confirmed by the Austrian Ministry of Finance.

The appointment of Director Fischböck as Consultant of the Federal Ministry was put through in a completely unsatisfactory

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<sup>72</sup> Heinrich Gleissner, *Landeshauptmann* of Upper Austria.

way. From his letter of appointment, which he showed me on the afternoon of February 18, 1938, it is evident that he was only to be called upon to assist in certain cases. Since he has no independent authority nor the power of veto, his appointment is worthless for the time being.

3) The position of the illegal Party has become extremely critical. I succeeded through level-headed intermediaries in getting Herr Leopold to leave for the Reich on February 18, 1938, and he arrived in Berlin on the morning of February 19, 1938, stopping at the Hotel Fürstenhof. On February 17, 1938, another very unfortunate circular was issued by the Party, a copy of which has already been transmitted. In addition, telephone messages from Vienna today disclose that activities on a rather large scale are planned by the illegal Party. According to a communication just received, Dr. Tavs, who was released yesterday, gave instructions to smash all windows in the German Legation this evening. One of the most important persons in the entourage of Captain Leopold, Herr Rüdiger, an engineer, had the presumption to assert to some business executives whom he had called to a meeting that even the Führer had no right to meddle in Austrian affairs.

It is further planned to provoke the Minister of Security, Seyss-Inquart, into further arrests, and then brand him as a traitor to the National cause. Under these circumstances, Leopold's presence here became dangerous and something had to be done. On the other hand, it would have been intolerable for the movement if he had had to be sent to the Reich by force, therefore his departure yesterday in the manner stated was perhaps the only solution as regards time and manner. Our reliable Party people and the SS have strict instructions to prevent, as far as possible, any demonstrations, and it is to be hoped that they will succeed.

4) From numerous consistent reports, we may conclude that Foreign Minister Guido Schmidt has been playing none too gratifying a role during the last few days. It is he, in particular, who is preventing the inclusion of National persons or at any rate is so reducing their effectiveness that the positions thus far gained have no very great importance. The motive for his behavior is to be found both in his very strong Catholic ties and in some jealousy of Minister Seyss-Inquart.

5) In the last few days, Minister Glaise-Horstenau repeatedly intended to resign, but the joint efforts of Minister Seyss-Inquart and myself have thus far succeeded in dissuading him and it is probable that for the present he will stick to his job.

6) A very bad role is being played by State Secretary Skubl in the Ministry of Security, and we may expect that Minister Seyss-Inquart will soon have to remove him in order to bring his own position to full effectiveness.

7) The reports from Labor are very encouraging. There is a strong influx into the National Socialist labor organization. This influx is largely genuine and only in small part a rush to the bandwagon.

8) Difficulties are hardly to be feared from the Reds.

DR. V[EISENMAYER]

No. 314

120/67763

*Memorandum*

BERLIN, February 19, 1938.

The Hungarian Minister called on me today to discuss the present situation. He mentioned certain unfriendly comments of Hungarian Legitimists on the Berchtesgaden Protocol, and asked that those comments not be taken too seriously. As he had also told the Führer last Tuesday, Hungary naturally welcomed the Berchtesgaden visit.

There was nothing else of interest in the conversation.

WEIZSÄCKER

No. 315

120/67770

*Memorandum*

Very respectfully submitted to State Secretary von Mackensen.<sup>72a</sup>

The Foreign Minister asks you to inform Ambassador Attolico only cursorily on the basis of the text of the German-Austrian Agreement of Berchtesgaden, without, however, letting him look at the text itself.

ERICH KORDT

BERLIN, February 19, 1938.

<sup>72a</sup> This memorandum apparently constitutes a decision on the points raised in Weizsäcker's memorandum of February 18 (document No. 311, p. 533) and Mackensen's notation thereon.

## No. 316

120/67764

*The German Chargé d'Affaires in Great Britain (Woermann) to  
the German Foreign Ministry*

Telegram

No. 93 of February 19

LONDON, February 19, 1938—6:07 p.m.

Received February 19, 1938—9:40 p.m.

The Austrian Minister told me that on February 16, on the instructions of his Government, he had given Eden a reassuring statement on German-Austrian relations, leaving with him an *aide-mémoire*. In this *aide-mémoire*, all but the secret measures agreed upon were listed. It states that the Federal Chancellor had thus succeeded in getting over a difficult stage in Austro-German relations without any serious convulsions in domestic or foreign affairs. Attention is drawn to the need for ending nervousness abroad as well, and for Austria's relations with Germany now to develop normally on the basis of the Agreements of July 1936. Finally it mentions that it was now essential to establish general political peace. Austria sincerely hoped that her relations with Germany would develop normally along the lines of the Berchtesgaden conversations. Other explanations and suppositions were false and should be rejected.

Baron von Franckenstein said that Eden was "perplexed" by the news of the Berchtesgaden Agreements. Franckenstein, however, had also the impression that no British steps of any consequence were to be expected.

Franckenstein has today again been instructed to use his influence to calm the Government, the press, and the stock exchange. As he had not been able to speak to Eden today, he had written him a letter to this effect.

WOERMANN

## No. 317

1291/345323

*The Commissioner of the Führer and Chancellor for Economic Affairs (Keppler) to the Foreign Minister*<sup>73</sup>

FEBRUARY 19, 1938.

DEAR RIBBENTROP: I am taking the liberty of enclosing a short report by my assistant, Dr. Veessenmayer, who returned from Vienna this morning.<sup>74</sup>

I should nevertheless like to request that you receive Dr. Veessenmayer and myself as soon as possible, so that we may supplement the report, particularly as regards the Embassy there.

I was just informed by telephone of your instruction to make independent decisions for the time being in matters relating to Austria and to issue the necessary orders. I should like to thank you very much for this confidence. I shall, of course, try to perform this task to the best of my ability.

Heil Hitler!

Yours,

[File copy not signed]

## No. 318

1282/344137-40

*Memorandum of the Reception by the Führer on the Afternoon of February 21, 1938, in the Presence of Field Marshal Göring*<sup>75</sup>

First of all, a short conversation regarding Leopold and the Führer's decision to remove Leopold.

Göring reports that Leopold had declared I had never warned him about working against Dr. Seyss-Inquart.

The Führer inquires as to my impression of Klausner.<sup>76</sup>

Then Leopold is called in. The Führer states that the actions of the *Landesleitung* had been insane (the drafting of numerous memoranda of conversations with him and other persons, which had fallen into the hands of the police; the preparation of plans for conspiracies and plans for the entry of the German Army, etc.). He had succeeded this time in clearing up the difficulties. If the diplomatic situation were different, however, such actions could get him into the most painful and mortifying predicaments. He had now put Austrian policy on a different basis, and the new situation

<sup>73</sup> This letter, the file copy of which is unsigned, is from the files of Dr. Keppler.

<sup>74</sup> Document No. 813, p. 534.

<sup>75</sup> This unsigned memorandum is from the files of Dr. Keppler.

<sup>76</sup> Major Franz Klausner, leader in the Austrian Nazi Party.

called for new forces. It was therefore his unalterable decision to remove and replace Leopold.

Leopold makes a speech in reply, contending that I had not been in sufficient touch with him and that it was impossible to legalize the activities of some—for instance, the peasantry—while the other Party members still had an illegal status. The Führer interrupted him and again called attention to the “insanity” of the previous activities. Leopold complained of not having been informed in advance about the meeting at the Obersalzberg. He was sharply reprimanded for this and was in particular reproached for his activity after that conference and his criticism of the Führer's measures. He was ordered to keep aloof from Austrian politics; the Führer would look out for him and find other employment for him. Besides, Herren Schattenfroh, In der Maur, Rüdiger, and Tavs would have to leave Austria and come to Germany.

Leopold accepted the order and disappeared.

Then Klausner was summoned. The Führer informed him immediately that he wanted him to succeed Leopold and gave him a lengthy explanation of the way in which the Party in Austria was to be led. Illegal activity had to be transformed into legal activity. He cited the case of the inspired work of *Gauleiter* Bürckel in the Saar,<sup>7</sup> who at first had welded anything suitable into a “German Front” and then later, out of this Saar Front, had skilfully organized the Party again. The situation and the task in Austria were similar.

The Führer then approved Klausner's brief statements.

When we were alone together, he expressed satisfaction with Klausner's personality; his impression of him was much better than that he had of Leopold.

Later Leopold and Klausner were called in together, the final result was communicated to them, and Leopold was charged with fetching the above-mentioned Party members from Austria and loyally exhorting them to obey Klausner. The Party had to show blind discipline toward the new leader.

The Führer declared that Klausner could come to him at any time and that he could also speak openly about his visit to him. He alone was competent to issue orders on behalf of the Party, and if occasion arose he would use exclusively my mediation as a contact man.

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<sup>7</sup> Josef Bürckel, active Nazi organizer in the Saar before the 1935 plebiscite there, later *Gauleiter* of that district, and after the *Anschluss* transferred to Austria.

The Führer further stressed that good working arrangements had to be created with Dr. Seyss-Inquart, who had no ambitions of any kind to lead the Party. Dr. Seyss-Inquart had assumed a very hard task and had to be supported by the Party in every way. In particular, the radical element had to be curbed in order not to render impossible the situation of Dr. Seyss-Inquart, who now and then would have to lock up Nazis too.

I then spoke of the Reschny matter.<sup>78</sup> The Führer does not want to hear of a dissolution yet, since the need for intervention by force might still arise. But Reschny is to proceed in such a way in building up the organization as to come within the budget established by the *Reichsschatzmeister*.

The Führer further discussed with Göring and me the present diplomatic situation and said that in the Bl[omberg?] case he had been in a quandary for 2 days, but that then this debacle had turned into a great success for German policy. In particular, the departure of Eden was discussed and a connection with the Austrian question surmised.

Continuing, Göring mentioned his endeavors to bring about a currency union with Austria; he would then receive iron, metals, and wood, so that he could operate better.

Fischböck was to visit the Führer very soon.

The Führer had a good impression of Dr. Seyss-Inquart; he was not too strong a man and might best be compared with Dr. Frick.

FEBRUARY 22, 1938.

## No. 319

1291/345201-02

*The Commissioner of the Führer and Chancellor for Economic Affairs (Keppler) to the Reichsschatzmeister of the N.S.D.A.P. (Schwarz)*<sup>79</sup>

FEBRUARY 22, 1938.

DEAR HERR REICHSSCHATZMEISTER: I confirm herewith my telephone conversation just concluded with Herr Damson.

Yesterday I had an opportunity to speak with the Führer about the organization of the *Hilfswerk Nordwest*. The Führer wishes that the *Hilfswerk Nordwest* be retained for the time being, but he consents to having the expansion planned by Herr Reschny carried out in such manner that it stays within the framework of the monthly budget of RM 700,000 previously approved by you. In

<sup>78</sup> See *infra*.

<sup>79</sup> This letter, the file copy of which is unsigned, is from the files of Dr. Keppler.

view of the general political situation, I believe that in the course of the year a change will take place in this matter, which will lead to further alleviation.

On the other hand it is to be expected that the influx of refugees from Austria will now subside greatly so that we may expect that the financial requirements of the *Flüchtlingshilfswerk* will be considerably reduced in a few months.

I can further inform you that *Landesleiter* Leopold and four of the men who have been working with him were recalled from Austria by the Führer; in place of Leopold, Party Member Klausner, Carinthia, will take over the leadership of the Party there. I have spoken with Party Member Klausner about the future organization of the *Hilfswerk* and in a short while a great part of the illegal *Hilfswerk* will probably be shifted to the legal.

Heil Hitler!

Very truly yours,

[File copy not signed]

No. 320

120/67771

*Memorandum*

BERLIN, February 22, 1938.

Today, in accordance with instructions and on the basis of the text of the German-Austrian Protocol of February 12, I cursorily informed Count Magistrati, who called on me in place of his Ambassador, who was ill. I said nothing to him about a Protocol and did not show him the text. Above all, on the point of closer military comradeship and collaboration between Germany and Austria, I did not use the expression "conferences between the general staffs" which occurs in the Protocol, particularly since, as I hear, such discussions will not take place for the time being.

WEIZSÄCKER

## No. 321

120/67768

*The German Minister in Yugoslavia (Heeren) to the German Foreign Ministry*

Telegram

SECRET

BELGRADE, February 22, 1938—9 p.m.

No. 12 of February 22

Received February 22, 1938—11:40 p.m.

For the Foreign Minister.

Minister President Stoyadinovich requests me to communicate to the Foreign Minister in the strictest confidence that the French Government had asked him to join in a protest intended in the near future over the forcible assimilation [*Gleichschaltung*] of Austria and against a possible *Anschluss*. This he had roundly refused to do on the grounds that the Yugoslav State was based on the right of peoples to self-determination and could not therefore possibly take up a position opposed to this principle. For the rest, he could see no occasion for, nor any possibility of, protesting against agreements which were made between sovereign governments of third states, and which did not concern Yugoslavia.

The Minister President leaves this evening for Ankara.

HEEREN

## No. 322

1798/409299-300

*The German Chargé d'Affaires in Great Britain (Woermann) to the German Foreign Ministry*

CONFIDENTIAL

LONDON, February 22, 1938.

A 836 I

Received February 26, 1938.

(Pol. IV 1242)

In continuation of my telegraphic report No. 93 of the 19th.

Subject: The Austrian question.

In continuation of my above-mentioned telegraphic report I transmit a copy of the *aide-mémoire* handed to Mr. Eden by the Austrian Minister on February 16.

WOERMANN

[Enclosure]<sup>80</sup>

## COPY

As a result of the conversation at Berchtesgaden Chancellor Schuschnigg will take the following measures:

(1) A general amnesty for all political prisoners inclusive of Social Democrats and exclusive of emigrants is to be granted.

(2) State Counselor Seyss-Inquart will be the only representative of National Socialism in the Cabinet apart from Glaise-Horstenau.

(3) National Socialists who were pensioned off for disciplinary reasons will draw their pensions, but will not be reinstated.

(4) Political activities will be permitted to nationally minded persons within the framework of the Patriotic Front to the same extent as is permitted to other groups, provided that they are loyal to Austria and her constitution.

The Austrian Chancellor has thus succeeded in overcoming a difficult stage in Austro-German relations without any internal and external repercussions of a serious nature.

It is imperative that political calm should be established and nervousness at home and abroad allayed; it is further necessary that Austria's relations with Germany should develop normally on the basis of the principles laid down in July 1936, if the efforts of the Austrian Chancellor to bring about a clarification of the situation—a matter of general European interest—are not to be in vain.

Two things should be emphasized, namely that it was essential to bring about a general political tranquilization; and, secondly, that Austria firmly hopes that her relations with Germany as clarified in the Berchtesgaden conversations will now develop on normal lines. All other interpretations and conjectures are not true to fact and should be rejected.

LONDON, February 16, 1938.

## No. 323

1291/345338

*The Commissioner of the Führer and Chancellor for Economic Affairs (Keppler) to SA-Obergruppenführer Reschny of the SA-Hilfswerk Nordwest*<sup>81</sup>

FEBRUARY 23, 1938.

DEAR PARTY MEMBER RESCHNY: In connection with the further development of the Austrian question I finally had the opportunity

<sup>80</sup> File copy in English.

<sup>81</sup> Then at Bad Godesburg. This unsigned letter is from the files of Dr. Keppler.

to speak extensively with the Führer several times about Austrian political questions. In that connection I also touched upon the future organization of the *Hilfswerk Nordwest*, and the Führer decided that the present budget of RM 700,000 a month for the *Hilfswerk* should not be increased and that you should try to achieve as much as possible within these means.

The development of Austrian questions has now been taken hold of and I believe that it will now move faster than had previously been supposed.

Heil Hitler!

Yours,

[File copy not signed]

No. 324

120/67772

*The German Ambassador in Austria (Papen) to the German Foreign Ministry*

Telegram

VERY SECRET

VIENNA, February 24, 1938—11:15 p.m.

No. 21 of February 24

Received February 25, 1938—6:30 a.m.

For the Führer and Chancellor.

Today I had a somewhat dramatic conversation with the British Minister here, who asserted that the Berchtesgaden Agreement had come about only under the strongest pressure. From his statements I realize that there is truth in the assertion that Eden's fall was due less to the Italian question than to his readiness to make a public declaration of solidarity with France on Austrian independence. The request that I addressed urgently to Minister Schmidt, that he should induce the Federal Chancellor in his speech to deny the fable about brutal force, was not complied with. Schuschnigg did, in his speech, freely acknowledge his own full responsibility. His admission that Austria stands or falls with her German mission was drowned by the assertion, in his powerfully dramatized speech, of Austria's will to live on as an independent state. At the end of the speech, a diplomat, a friend of mine, asked me: Did he deliver it in order to die gracefully? The developments of the immediate future will show.

PAPEN

## No. 325

120/67773

*The German Ambassador in Austria (Papen) to the German Foreign Ministry*

Telegram

VERY SECRET

VIENNA, February 25, 1938—11:05 p.m.

No. 23 of February 25

Received February 26, 1938—3:40 a.m.

For the Führer and Chancellor.

The Chiefs of Missions of friendly and neutral powers reacted very critically to the speech of the Federal Chancellor. They are saying, with justice, that the small barbs directed against the Reich were entirely superfluous and weaken the general impression. The attitude of a heroic protagonist of independence is out of keeping with the realities of the political situation. On the other hand, they recognize the forcefully expressed will to faithful fulfillment of obligations. I hear from Cabinet circles that the Federal Chancellor had adopted this strongly Austrian attitude in order to retrieve his position in the Fatherland Front—a position severely shaken by Berchtesgaden. Furthermore, Mayor Schmitz and his associates had during the last few days planned to overthrow him. These elements are attempting to win over Socialist Labor and to create a Popular Front by propaganda. The speech should not, therefore, be taken too seriously. The work of Minister of the Interior Seyss-Inquart, in conjunction with the leading Austrian National Socialists, is proceeding according to plan and with the strongest support from all sides. The discipline of the Party members in yesterday's meetings was excellent.

I took leave of the Federal President today, am turning affairs over to Counselor of Embassy von Stein, and am going to Kitzbuehl.

PAPEN

## No. 326

120/67775

*Memorandum*

RM 123

Ambassador von Papen telephoned me today at 1 p.m. from Vienna to make the following communication:

He had just left the Federal Chancellor. Herr Schuschnigg had taken this opportunity to inform him that he had not instigated the debate in the Paris Chamber of Deputies on the subject of Austrian independence and that the whole affair was displeasing to

him. He regretted also its echo in the Czech press. Herr Schuschnigg intended to dissociate himself explicitly from this discussion tomorrow in the *Wiener amtlichen Zeitung*.

Press Director Adam had instructed the Austrian press to treat the debate in the French Chamber only very briefly, and without attaching much importance to it.

Ambassador von Papen suggested that the German press should also not make too much of the debate in the French Chamber.

ERICH KORDT

BERLIN, February 26, 1938.

### No. 327

#### *Memorandum by the German Ambassador in Austria (Papen)*<sup>62</sup>

##### MEMORANDUM OF MY FAREWELL VISIT TO THE FEDERAL CHANCELLOR

After an exchange of some perfunctory pleasantries, our conversation turned to the Federal Chancellor's speech. I told him that while he had found some very cordial words for Austria's German mission, these had been all but drowned out by his dramatic defense of Austrian independence, which he apparently considered threatened—to say nothing of some unnecessary asides against the Reich. If he assured me that his speech had reestablished his authority in Austria, then I would have to add that the speech had also been the cause of yesterday's Chamber debate in France. I thought it highly regrettable that thus the Austrian problem had again become the center of discussion in Europe. An Austrian independence supported by French and Czech crutches was unbearable for Germany, and would lead to the kind of polemics which might easily endanger the peace recently concluded.

The Federal Chancellor openly admitted this, and commissioned me to inform the Foreign Minister as soon as possible that neither he nor any other political authority in Austria had instigated the debate in the French Chamber, and that he agreed with me in considering the effects of the debate to be most disturbing. At my request, he expressed his willingness to publish an article in the Sunday morning edition of the *Wiener Zeitung*, which would draw a clear line between the problem of Austrian independence and

<sup>62</sup> No copy of this memorandum has been found in the archives of the German Foreign Ministry. The translation is from the original submitted at Nuremberg. A translation appears in *Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression*, vol. IV, document 1544-PS, pp. 103-104.

French interests. He had also instructed the Austrian press to print but a few excerpts of the Chamber debate.

I then turned our conversation to the widely held opinion that he had acted under "brutal pressure" at Berchtesgaden. After all, I had been present myself and had been able to ascertain that he had always and at every point possessed complete freedom of decision. The Federal Chancellor replied that he had actually been exposed to strong moral pressure; he could not deny that. He had made notes on his conversation with the Führer which bore this out. I reminded him of the fact that despite this conversation he had not seen his way clear to make any concessions, and asked him whether he would have been willing to grant the concessions he did make late at night without pressure. His reply was, "Frankly, no!" It seems important to me to record this.

When taking my leave of the Chancellor, I asked him not to delude himself into believing that Austria could ever maintain her position with the aid of non-German European alliances. The Austrian question would be decided only by the interests of the German people. He assured me that he was convinced of this, too, and that he would let this conviction guide his actions.

PAPEN

VIENNA, February 26, 1938.

P.S. At about 1 p.m. today I informed the Office of the Foreign Minister by telephone of the Federal Chancellor's attitude toward the debate in the French Chamber.

### No. 328

1282/344134-35

#### *Memorandum*<sup>83</sup>

On Saturday, February 26, 1938, the Führer had Minister von Ribbentrop's plane, in which I was riding, turn back from the flight to Berlin. Upon return to the airport, Ribbentrop and I were summoned to the Führer in the Führerhaus.

The Führer then reported that Leopold, Tavs, In der Maur, Schattenfroh, and Rüdiger were there and that I should be present at his interview with these gentlemen. Ribbentrop again mentioned that he wished to entrust the Austrian problem to me. The Führer gave his consent and declared that I would have to go to Vienna at least once every three or four weeks in order to guarantee the execution of the agreement. My first journey there was to take place this week.

<sup>83</sup> This unsigned memorandum is from the files of Dr. Keppler.

The five gentlemen were called in. The Führer stated that in the Austrian problem he had to indicate a different course for the Party, as the Austrian question could never be solved by a revolution. He had had to abandon this course for Germany after 1923 and saw no possibility of a solution by this method. Furthermore, German efforts to this end would necessarily plunge him into the most painful situation, since it would not be possible to choose the time for action. There remained only two possibilities:

1. Force,
2. Evolutionary means,

and he wanted the evolutionary course to be taken, whether or not the possibility of success could today be foreseen. The Protocol signed by Schuschnigg was so far reaching that if completely carried out the Austrian problem would be automatically solved. He did not now desire a solution by violent means, if it could at all be avoided, since the danger for us in the field of foreign policy became less each year and our military power greater each year. He mentioned military measures (a line of fortifications in the west, air force, the annual increment of half a million trained troops, etc.).

This change in tactics had occasioned their removal, but they were not to interpret this as discriminatory, and it was not impossible that they could later return to Austria. The Führer put the five gentlemen in my charge; they were to be paid well and, first of all, have a good look at Germany. In addition, they were to be at his disposal in case he required information now and then, particularly with regard to personalities.

Seyss-Inquart did not enter into consideration as Party leader and had, besides, already rejected this position.

He had quite clearly presented to Schuschnigg his views with regard to Austria, and Schuschnigg had declared that in the long run he would be able to cooperate.

Schattenfroh made a speech in defense. The *Landesleitung* had not done anything after February 12; after the removal of Leopold, he had, at a meeting of *Gauleiter*, admonished them to keep the peace and, for his part, had asserted his claim to succeed Leopold. He handed the Führer the only leaflet that he had issued since February 12.

The Führer informed the gentlemen that he had entrusted the Austrian problem to me.

BERLIN, February 28, 1938.  
K./Ho.

## No. 329

1798/409321

*Memorandum*<sup>84</sup>

FEBRUARY 28, 1938.

(Pol. IV 1318/38)

Dr. Seyss-Inquart today sent me the following report on the situation from Reichenhall:

In Austria, among the people, things have become fairly quiet. The Party is maintaining discipline. It was especially encouraging during the last few days to note to what an unexpected degree Labor has come over to our side. Even in the Alpine Mining Company, where the board of directors assumed 70 percent to be Communists, some two-thirds of the workmen are said to have marched on our side. Meanwhile, strong efforts to sabotage the Agreement are being made in Vienna by foreign countries, particularly by Soviet Russia, France, England, and Italy. Besides Prince Colonna, Salato, the former Minister to Vienna, has arrived in Vienna. Furthermore, Schuschnigg on the day of his speech (February 24) had a long talk with the Duce.

The Government, by-passing Dr. Seyss-Inquart, is also doing everything it can to sabotage the Agreement. Thus, instructions have been issued to officials by various provincial governments forbidding participation in National Socialist activities. Also, attempts are being made on the part of the Marxists, with Government support, to marshal Labor against the Agreement. The work of obtaining signatures,<sup>85</sup> in particular, is continuing. It has, moreover, been definitely established that Catholics and Marxists, perhaps to a certain extent in agreement with the Government, have distributed arms to the workers.

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<sup>84</sup> This memorandum was enclosed in a letter of February 28, 1938, from Keppler to the Foreign Minister (1798/409320). On the letter was a notation in Keppler's hand: "Perhaps under the conditions described it is a mistake that we have no representation in Vienna. Ke[ppler]."

<sup>85</sup> To resolutions by workers' organizations supporting Chancellor Schuschnigg.

## No. 330

1997/441687-91

*Memorandum*<sup>88</sup>

## [I.]

Article 80 of the Versailles Treaty provides:

"Germany acknowledges and will respect strictly the independence of Austria, within the frontiers which may be fixed in a treaty between the State and the Principal Allied and Associated Powers; she agrees that this independence shall be inalienable, except with the consent of the Council of the League of Nations."

The corresponding article 88 of the Treaty of St. Germain, which ended the war with Austria, reads:

"The independence of Austria is inalienable otherwise than with the consent of the Council of the League of Nations. Consequently Austria undertakes in the absence of the consent of the said Council to abstain from any act which might directly or indirectly or by any means whatever compromise her independence, particularly, and until her admission to membership in the League of Nations, by participation in the affairs of another Power."

## II.

The foregoing provisions of the 1919 treaties were supplemented by the exchange of notes which took place at the beginning of September 1919 between Germany and the Allied and Associated Powers with regard to article 61, paragraph 2, of the German Constitution. This article provides that German Austria, after her *Anschluss* with the German Reich, shall receive the right to participate in the *Reichsrat* with a number of votes proportionate to her population, and that until then the representatives of German Austria shall act in an advisory capacity in the *Reichsrat*. The Allied and Associated Powers claimed in their note of September 2, 1919, that this provision of the Constitution contained a twofold violation of article 80 of the Treaty of Versailles. Under the threat, presented as an ultimatum, of an occupation of the right bank of the Rhine, the German Government was at that time compelled to recognize this view and to declare in a formal protocol approved by the German legislative bodies that article 61, paragraph 2, of the constitution was void.

## III.

On the occasion of the loan granted her by the League of Nations, Austria also assumed the following special obligation, in the Protocol

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<sup>88</sup> This unsigned and undated memorandum is from the papers of Dr. Keppler.

of Geneva of October 4, 1922, which was signed by England, France, Italy, and Czechoslovakia, and later also by Belgium and Spain:

"Austria undertakes, in accordance with the terms of article 88 of the Treaty of St. Germain, not to alienate its independence; it will abstain from any negotiations or from any economic or financial engagement calculated directly or indirectly to compromise this independence.

"This undertaking shall not prevent Austria from maintaining, subject to the provisions of the Treaty of St. Germain, her freedom in the matter of customs tariffs and commercial or financial agreements, and, in general, in all matters relating to her economic regime or her commercial relations, provided always that she shall not violate her economic independence by granting to any State a special regime or exclusive advantages calculated to threaten this independence."

In this provision of the Geneva Protocol, therefore, the economic independence of Austria is defined as coming expressly under the protection of the 1919 treaties. It is further established that this independence can be impaired by purely economic or financial arrangements with third States. The German Reich did not sign this Protocol and is not bound by its provisions.

#### IV.

When in the year 1931 the plan for the creation of a German-Austrian customs union was discussed, the Council of the League of Nations decided to submit to the Permanent Court of International Justice at The Hague the question as to whether such a customs union could, in view of the provisions of the treaties which ended the war and of the Protocol of 1922, be established without its consent. The Court decided on September 5, 1931, by a majority of eight votes to seven, that the customs-union plan conflicted with the Protocol of 1922. Seven members of the majority, in separate opinions, expressed the view that the customs-union plan was not in accord with the provisions of the peace treaties either.

#### V.

In the Austrian Protocol signed at Geneva on July 15, 1932, to which Belgium, England, France, Italy, the Netherlands, and Austria are parties, it was provided that Austria should receive a loan of 300 million Austrian schillings, on the basis of the above-mentioned Geneva Protocol of October 4, 1922. The loan is for a period of 20 years, that is to 1952, but may be repaid in 10 years. The agreement of 1922 concerning Austrian independence was extended by this Protocol.

## VI.

Finally, England, France, and Italy, in the "Joint Resolution of the Conference of Stresa," agreed as follows with regard to Austria:

"The representatives of the three Governments examined afresh the Austrian situation.

"They confirmed the Anglo-Italian [*Anglo-Franco-Italian*] statements of February 17 and September 27, 1934, through which the three Governments recognized that the necessity of preserving the independence and integrity of Austria would continue to inspire their common policy.

"Referring to the Franco-Italian Protocol of January 7, 1935, and the Anglo-French declarations of February 3, 1935, in which the decision was reaffirmed to consult together as to the measures to be taken in case of threats to the integrity and independence of Austria, they agreed to recommend that representatives of all the Governments enumerated in the Protocol of Rome should meet at a very early date, with a view to concluding the central European agreement."

## No. 331

1798/409360-62

*The German Embassy in Great Britain to the German Foreign Ministry*

A 1097

LONDON, March 4, 1938.  
(Pol. IV 1453)

In continuation of the report of the 2nd—A 995.<sup>88</sup>

Subject: Chamberlain's statement in the House of Commons regarding the Berchtesgaden Agreements.

During the session of the House of Commons on March 2, Arthur Henderson<sup>89</sup> again raised the question of the German-Austrian Agreement. He repeated the assertion of numerous papers that the Führer had enforced his demands on Austria by threatening the impairment of Austrian independence. The Berchtesgaden Agreement was the worst example of secret diplomacy, Henderson continued. On an earlier occasion the Prime Minister had declared that, in the opinion of the British Government, the steps taken by the Austrian Government in implementing the Agreement represented no violation of the obligations assumed by Austria. According to the Geneva Protocol of 1922 and article 88 of the Treaty of St. Germain, the Austrian Government had undertaken not to renounce Austrian in-

<sup>88</sup> Not printed.

<sup>89</sup> Labor Member of Parliament.

dependence. It was now apparent that at Berchtesgaden the Federal Chancellor had assumed the obligation of settling domestic Austrian affairs in accordance with the wishes of the German Chancellor. He wished, therefore, to ask the Prime Minister two questions: first, whether the legal advisers to the Crown had examined the various legal aspects and the circumstances under which the Agreement had been reached, and, secondly, whether the British Government had reserved the right to bring the question before the Council of the League of Nations. He wished, moreover, to remind the Prime Minister of the recent declaration by the French Foreign Minister, who had called Austrian independence an essential element of European peace, and he wanted to ask the Prime Minister whether he did not wish to take the opportunity of joining M. Delbos in this courageous declaration. He would thereby give great moral support to the Austrian people in their struggle for the preservation of its independence.

In his answer Mr. Chamberlain stated that the Geneva Protocol of 1920 [*sic*] referred only to financial and economic questions. According to the opinion of the British Government, which relied upon the counsel of its legal advisers, there was juridically no violation of article 88 of the Treaty of St. Germain. What had happened was merely that two statesmen had agreed upon certain measures for the improvement of relations between their two countries. These measures included a general amnesty for all political offenders, including Socialists and Communists. He wished to recall that, in addition to the appointment of Dr. Seyss-Inquart as Minister of the Interior, other changes had been made in the Cabinet which apparently had not been suggested by the Führer. Juridically it appeared hardly possible to insist that just because two statesmen had agreed on certain domestic changes in one of the two countries—changes desirable in the interest of relations between them—the one country had renounced its independence in favor of the other.

On the contrary, he believed that those who had read the Federal Chancellor's speech of February 24 agreed with him that this speech contained nothing that might convey the impression that the Federal Chancellor himself believed in the surrender of the independence of his country. For the rest, the practical results of the Berchtesgaden Agreements would have to be awaited, but he wished to add that the British Government could not remain unconcerned about events in Central Europe, if for no other reason than that the aim of its policy was to aid in bringing about a feeling of greater security and confidence in Europe. This aim would inevitably be affected by

events in any part of Europe. In this connection he had read with great interest the recent statements by Delbos regarding this question.

At the present time it was too early to appraise the effects of the German-Austrian Agreements. First, it was necessary to wait and see how the obligations assumed would be carried out by each party. He was happy to learn from the Führer and Chancellor's speech of February 20 that the Berchtesgaden Agreements were to be considered as an expansion of the framework of the German-Austrian Agreement of July 11, 1936. This contained, among other things, the recognition of full Austrian sovereignty by the German Government. The British Government, for the time being, had to leave it at that, but it would follow further events in Austria with the greatest possible vigilance and interest.

It is significant that Chamberlain left unanswered Henderson's question as to whether he would join Delbos in his statements regarding the German-Austrian question.

The text of the two speeches is found in the official record of Parliamentary proceedings of March 2, volume 332, No. 65, column 1247 ff. It is enclosed.<sup>90</sup>

By direction:  
E. v. SELZAM

### No. 332

2017/443673

*The German Minister in Hungary (Erdmannsdorff) to the German Foreign Ministry*

A Nr. 47 P 3 Kanya

BUDAPEST, March 4, 1938.

Received March 7, 1938.

(Pol. IV 1426/38)

Subject: Visit of the Hungarian Foreign Minister to Vienna.

#### POLITICAL REPORT

Foreign Minister Kanya took advantage of a short unofficial stay in Vienna to call on Federal Chancellor von Schuschnigg and Foreign Minister Schmidt the day before yesterday and discuss with them in detail the Berchtesgaden conversations and their results.

M. de Kanya told me that Federal Chancellor von Schuschnigg, particularly, had stressed his determination to pursue a policy of the closest friendship with Germany, while preserving Austria's independence. Joining a coalition against Germany had never entered his mind.

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<sup>90</sup> Enclosure not printed.

M. de Kanya found the atmosphere in Vienna less depressed than it had been described to him.

The Legitimist press here continues to evoke the specter of pan-Germanism and of the appearance of Germany at the Leitha, whereas the Government press still comments favorably on the German-Austrian Agreement.

VON ERDMANNSDORFF

### No. 333

1997/441659-60

*Conversation With Minister Guido Schmidt in Vienna  
on March 4, 1938<sup>91</sup>*

I first call attention to the arming of Communists, the smuggling of arms, and the systematic inclusion of Communists in the Fatherland Front. Schmidt declared, and he is prepared to make the statement in writing, too, that such measures are not approved by the Government (see Schuschnigg). I promise to supply him with evidence.

Concerning point II (3),<sup>92</sup> he declares he had no authority, referring me to Dr. Seyss-Inquart in this matter.

I demand that the general press ban be lifted and Party literature admitted. The *V[ölkischer] B[eobachter]* would have to be admitted immediately. Schmidt promises the latter; the former is being negotiated by Dr. Megerle.

I call attention to the bad impression made by the formation of the Cabinet and by Schuschnigg's speech and emphasize that something had to be done to correct this. The idea of making Fischböck Minister had been given up by the Führer on February 12; regarding the official attitude I was referred to Schuschnigg.

A draft is being prepared for an amnesty for Austrians in the Reich, to facilitate their entry for visits.

I call attention to the unsatisfactory execution of points 5, 6, and 9.

I ask for suggestions in the economic field. Aside from rather large orders for armaments he holds out the prospect of a 20 million order for Knorr brakes, suspension of the production of large automobiles, further reduction of duties, and he wishes an increase in the clearing accounts [*Z.A.V.*]. I call attention to the insufficiency of the proposals. I state that severe regulation of foreign exchange was necessary to avoid flight of capital.

<sup>91</sup> This unsigned memorandum is from the papers of Dr. Keppler.

<sup>92</sup> Of the Berchtesgaden Agreement; see p. 515.

Joint representation of German and Austrian citizens in countries where only one of the two countries has a Consulate agreed on.

As usual, the conversation was not very satisfactory, particularly since Schmidt is never willing to take the responsibility for a decision. He holds out the prospect of an interview with Schuschnigg on Saturday.

### No. 334

1282/344126-29

#### *Conversation With Minister Guido Schmidt and Federal Chancellor Schuschnigg in Vienna on March 5, 1938<sup>93</sup>*

In lieu of a conversation with Schuschnigg I am to get in touch with Dr. Seyss-Inquart. I declare that this would cause great tension, particularly so since he had described his promise regarding the *V[ölkischer] B[eobachter]* only as his personal attitude. Thus it had only been an exchange of mere words, since each office disclaimed authority. The outcome of my visit had been so unsatisfactory that special steps decidedly would follow. I state—in case this outcome might still be corrected—that I would leave at 7 p.m.

Thereupon there follows an invitation to the private quarters of Schuschnigg—at 5:45 p.m. At first, rather philosophical views on the concepts of “German,” “Austrian,” “racial policy,” and “National Socialism.” Still quite angry about Obersalzberg; threats had been used. If we wanted to fight he was prepared to do so, too, though he knew that it was within the power of Germany to overrun Austria. I assert that February 12 had been an historical necessity. If plans successful, all parties might be satisfied later. Schuschnigg expressed anger at Göring’s speech mentioning 10 million oppressed Germans. I reminded him of the treatment of the Sudeten Germans as well as of the fact that the sacrifice of blood and property by the National Socialists in Austria had been much greater than in Germany. Schuschnigg has evidently not realized this. Precisely in this connection I called attention once more to the necessity of managing, despite pressure, to renounce outlawry [*das Abgehen vom illegalen Weg zu erreichen*]; for this method had never been able to do away with National Socialism in Austria but, on the other hand, necessarily, had led only to revolution and never to evolution. A state of being outlawed brought the most radical persons to the fore, so that a constant worsening of the situation took place, and the Führer had now of his own accord removed the old *Landesleitung*

<sup>93</sup> This unsigned memorandum is from the papers of Dr. Keppler.

in the most sweeping manner in order to make room for a new leadership that was prepared to take the evolutionary path. Schuschnigg declared that he had hardly been able to work with Leopold but that he esteemed Dr. Jury and believed that he would be able to cooperate with the new people. Jury was a good National Socialist and in conversations with him he had discovered that many of the views of National Socialism were also to be found in his own ideas of 1920 to 1925. He further asked me to study his great efforts, especially in Burgenland, on behalf of Germanization. He emphasized his absolute loyalty to the German race and to a common policy—in which he would never disappoint us—and declared further that in the long run he considered it right that *one* German Reich be created. As to the date, there is evidently still difference of opinion. National Socialism was therefore acceptable to him insofar as it did not at the same time mean an anti-Austrian attitude. The conversation then turned to June 1934. He brought up the Church question and declared that he agreed with the Reich Chancellor that the Church must remain aloof from politics and he knew that the Führer himself was not orientated [*selbst nicht orientiert sei*] in the Church question and desired no *Kulturkampf*.

I further called his attention to the fact that there were many rumors about the smuggling of arms, distribution of arms, and inclusion of Communists in the Fatherland Front, and he declared in the most definite manner that he disapproved of such things and asked me to send information on the subject to the Government for investigation.

In the course of the conversation I further called attention to the fact that the Fatherland Front would also have to undertake a certain reorientation and that a few changes in personnel would be necessary. Schuschnigg made corresponding promises with respect to this point as well as with respect to changing Fischböck's appointment as discussed with the Führer and with respect to the admission of the National Socialist press and readmission of youths to the athletic associations, since we attach importance to reaching youth with our political ideas.

The conversation began tempestuously but concluded in an entirely conciliatory manner, and I had the impression that Schuschnigg will by no means submit to force but that if treated sensibly he will come along to a great extent, if this is made possible for him without loss of prestige. We can rely on his loyalty as regards the Berchtesgaden Agreements.

## No. 335

1282/344130-32

*Memorandum of Trip to Vienna, March 3 to 6, 1938<sup>95</sup>*

In Austria the Party is now in fine shape. Klausner has made himself respected and meets with loyal cooperation everywhere. Leopold is hardly mentioned any more. In particular there is satisfaction wherever one goes at the fact that the road for further progress is now clearly outlined. The various parades and demonstrations have taken place under surprisingly good discipline, and the joining of the Fatherland Front is understood. The expression "The New Fatherland Front" was coined as a contrast with the old Front. National Socialist demonstrations everywhere had five to ten times as many participants as the parades of the old system. Graz has progressed most; it is estimated that about 80 percent of the population has professed National Socialism. In the other parts of the country they are jealous because it has not yet been possible to prove that the percentage of National Socialism there is of corresponding importance. At present we are inclined to apply the brakes to the movement, in order to wring more and more concessions from Schuschnigg. It seems the prime necessity, for the time being, to secure for the future further possibilities of organizing legally and for that reason to forego a parade or two.

This coming Sunday, on the occasion of Heroes' Memorial Day, great National Socialist celebrations and parades will take place. It has further been promised that a "German Day" for all of Austria will soon take place, with great National Socialist parades.

Dr. Seyss-Inquart is working with extraordinary dexterity and has in that short time secured himself a rather important position—in the Party, too. He made it clear to Schuschnigg that the old organization should not be destroyed before something new had been built up, since otherwise the masses would be without leaders. He also intends to try by this line of reasoning to legalize the SA and SS, for instance as troops to maintain order for the *Volkspolitisches Referat*. The *Volkspolitisches Referat*, and the racial-German labor union connected with it, will now be extended down to the single local groups, and the direct leaders of the Party are now to be firmly placed in it. The *Hitlerjugend* has already to a great extent been incorporated into the Youth Organization [*Jungvolk*] of the Fatherland Front and in many parts of the country already controls it. Schuschnigg has further promised the readmittance of youth to the athletic associations.

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<sup>95</sup> This unsigned memorandum is from the papers of Dr. Keppler.

"Heil Hitler" and the Hitler salute are permitted and the negotiations regarding permission for a National Socialist badge with a swastika look quite favorable. While stamped swastikas are not yet officially approved, they are tolerated everywhere.

Dr. Seyss-Inquart makes use of the SA and SS to a great extent, even in his official tasks; with their help he brought about orderly conditions again within a very short time in Graz, where it was generally feared that the movement would get out of hand, and he emphasized to Schuschnigg that this was only possible by utilizing the old organizations and leaders, as a result of the discipline which prevailed there.

On Friday, March 4, a meeting of *Gauleiter*, speakers of the *Volkspolitisches Referat*, and other prominent members of the Party took place in the presence of Minister Dr. Seyss-Inquart and Minister Glaise-Horstenau. Reports were submitted on the state of affairs in all the districts. There is great confidence everywhere. Guiding principles were laid down for the establishment of a broad front and for the institution of complete discipline.

On the basis of all my impressions I believe that the Party is again ready for action and, as a disciplined body, can be used in the political game and that Dr. Seyss-Inquart will to a great extent be successful in obtaining the possibility of organizing legally.

There is no more material for flags and no brown cloth to be had in Austria. The factories have large orders for more.

In Graz extensive fraternization has taken place with the military and the police, who took a very correct attitude everywhere. It is to be hoped that after further fraternizing and after the incorporation of exchange officers [*Austauschoffiziere*], the use of the military and the police against the Party will no longer be possible. Apparently there is also a great influx from Labor, although the Communists and the trade-unions and radicals from the Fatherland Front are endeavoring to mobilize a popular front. (See consultation with Schuschnigg and Schmidt.)

In the Opposition camp there are many who are now discovering long-standing National Socialist convictions and are seeking to join. On the other hand, many are coming forward who previously found it impossible to show their colors freely. Rebertera (Security Chief in Upper Austria) has offered to incorporate 1,000 SA and SS men in the militia. People like Skubl and Zernatto are also obviously seeking to join up.

Working against National Socialism are first of all Mayor Schmitz and the trade-union group. (Rott and . . .<sup>96</sup>)

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<sup>96</sup> Omission indicated in the original.

Miklas is manifestly creating great difficulties; he signed the appointment of Dr. Jury as State Counselor only after 3 days.

It is further interesting that so far Schuschnigg has not dared to submit the complete Berchtesgaden Protocol to the members of the Cabinet.

## No. 336

1291/345383

*The Commissioner of the Führer and Chancellor for Economic Affairs (Keppler) to the Austrian Minister of the Interior (Seyss-Inquart)*<sup>97</sup>

MARCH 7, 1938.

DEAR DR. SEYSS-INQUART: Yesterday afternoon I had a conversation with Foreign Minister von Ribbentrop and the *Reichsführer*-SS and Chief of the German Police, Himmler. You no doubt know that on his visit to Mussolini this May the Führer intends to travel through Austrian territory and the Brenner Pass.

*Reichsführer* Himmler wishes to discuss this matter, and especially the measures necessary, with your Ministry and would be most grateful if you were prepared to have State Secretary Skubl visit Berlin in order to discuss this subject. I should be very grateful to you for prompt approval in principle.

Most respectfully yours,

[File copy not signed]

## No. 337

1798/409357

*Memorandum for the German Counselor of Embassy in Vienna (Stein)*<sup>98</sup>

The former State Secretary, Karwinsky, went to Steenockerzeel last Friday to inform Otto von Hapsburg about recent events in Austria.

VIENNA, March 7, 1938.

Respectfully submitted to the Counselor of Embassy.

<sup>97</sup> The unsigned file copy of this letter is from the papers of Dr. Keppler.

<sup>98</sup> A notation by Stein indicates that a copy of this unsigned memorandum was submitted to the Foreign Ministry.

## No. 338

1959/437400

*Memorandum*

SECRET

(Pol. IV 1597)

The representative of Rheinmetall-Borsig, Herr von Reichel-Erlenhorst, with whom I am acquainted, learned the following from Secretary General Wiedemann of the *Gewerbebund*, to whom former Minister Stockinger<sup>99</sup> had related the occurrence:

Last Friday afternoon, March 4, a conference between Schuschnigg, Schmitz, Zernatto, Pernter, and Stockinger took place. At that conference it was decided to hold elections in Austria as soon as possible. Schmitz was charged with preparing a memorandum by Tuesday, March 8, regarding the necessary preliminaries.

During the conference the following estimate was arrived at:

At the last election there were 4,100,000 persons entitled to vote. By raising the voting age to 24, the number of eligible voters was reduced to 3,800,000. As 2,300,000 are included in the labor unions [*Betriebsorganisationen*], it is hoped through the cooperation of Christian and Red Labor to obtain an absolute majority at the elections.

MUFF

MARCH 8, 1938.

## I. CONQUEST, MARCH 1938

## No. 339

1798/409372

*The German Foreign Ministry to the German Embassy  
in Great Britain*

Cipher Telegram

VERY URGENT  
No. 53

BERLIN, March 9, 1938—2:30 p.m.  
(e.o. Pol. IV 1485)

For the Foreign Minister.

The Austrian Government intends to hold a plebiscite next Sunday on a Christian, independent, corporate, and authoritarian Austria. *Gruppenführer* Keppler is flying to Vienna by special plane this noon at the Führer's orders to prevent the plebiscite or, if this is not possible, to have added to the plebiscite a question on the *Anschluss*.

WEIZSÄCKER

<sup>99</sup> Fritz Stockinger, former Austrian Minister of Commerce.

## No. 340

F7/0425

*The German Foreign Ministry to the German Embassy  
in Great Britain*

No. 55 of March 9

BERLIN, March 10, 1938—12:50 a.m.  
Received London, March 10, 1938—9 a.m.

For the Foreign Minister:

Schuschnigg announced in his Innsbruck speech today [i.e., March 9] that a plebiscite would be held next Sunday. The election slogan is: "With Schuschnigg for Austria. We want a free and a German Austria, an independent and a social Austria, a Christian and a united Austria. We desire bread and peace in the country and the equality of all who stand for their people and their nation." The plebiscite ballots give a choice of yes or no.

The Federal Chancellor declared that the result of the plebiscite would decide his fate. In spite of a formal pledge of allegiance to the Agreements of July 1936 and February 1938, the speech was strongly polemical as far as both domestic policy and the Reich were concerned and categorically refused any concessions beyond them. Furthermore, Schuschnigg strongly emphasized the social idea as a bait for the Marxist workers. Despite the appeal to everyone for unity, discipline, and loyalty, an attempt to take the National Socialists off guard is obvious. The voting age for the plebiscite has been raised from 20 to 24.

Keppler will arrive Thursday morning at 10 o'clock to report personally to the Führer.

MACKENSEN

## No. 341

120/67789

*The German Chargé d'Affaires in Austria (Stein) to the German Foreign Ministry*

Telegram

No. 29 of March 10

VIENNA, March 10, 1938—1:20 p.m.

Received March 10, 1938—3:20 p.m.

With reference to Pol. IV 1408 of the 7th.<sup>1</sup>

Minister Schmidt promised to ask Schuschnigg after his return from Innsbruck to issue Zehner the desired full powers. Schmidt stated that the plebiscite was the Federal Chancellor's personal wish. After a brief consultation with a very small group, among whom were Zernatto, Pernter, Reiter, and Schmitz, Schuschnigg had surprised not only the public but also most of the members of the Cabinet. I remarked, speaking personally, that, at the very moment of the beginning of a promising evolutionary development in Austria, new unrest could be created by elections scheduled unexpectedly. Schmidt said that the Federal Chancellor considered the plebiscite a strictly internal Austrian question, for which reason he, Schmidt, would stay out of the affair. I remarked, only personally, that the matter might well also affect German-Austrian relations as established in the Berchtesgaden Protocol.

STEIN

## No. 342

F17/317

*The German Foreign Ministry to the German Embassy in Great Britain*

Telegram

No. 56 of March 10

BERLIN, March 10, 1938—2:25 p.m.

Received London, March 10, 1938—2:10 p.m.

For the Foreign Minister.

By order of the Führer, Seyss-Inquart was instructed by the Embassy in Vienna not to engage in any negotiations whatever, but at most to intensify the protest already made against the plebiscite.

MACKENSEN

<sup>1</sup> Not printed. This instructed the Chargé d'Affaires to call on Minister Schmidt and tell him that it would be desirable for General Zehner on his forthcoming visit to Berlin to be supplied with full powers to negotiate on questions involved in point II, 8, of the Berchtesgaden Agreement.

## No. 343

1291/345103-08

*The Chief of the Sicherheitshauptamt of the Reichsführer-SS  
to SS-Gruppenführer Keppler*

SECRET!

MARCH 10, 1938.

III 224/1 AZ. 1790/38

Ro/Rlg

Subject: Plan of organization of the movement in Austria and situation report.

Previous: none.

Herewith are transmitted the plan of organization of the movement in Austria and a report of the situation for your information.

Chief of the *Abwehramt*

by direction

[Signature illegible]

SS-Hauptsturmführer

for the Chief of the *Sicherheitshauptamt*

[Enclosure]

SECRET!

Subject: Plan of organization of the movement in Austria and report on the situation.

The following is a copy of a report just received here transmitted for your information:

At the head is the Leader of the Austrian National Socialists, Major Hubert Klausner. Directly under him is Globotschnig as Organization Leader (according to his official title, "for Problems Concerning the Movement"). An equivalent rank is held by Friedl Rainer, as the political leader of the movement.

Under this very restricted *Führerrat* are the *Führerstämme*. These are: Farmers, under Engineer Reinthaller; Labor, under Sepp Nemetz; the *Mannschaft* under First Lieutenant Lukesch; Youth, under Schoas; the *Dienst* SS under Kaltenbrunner;<sup>2</sup> Welfare under Langoth.

Each *Führerstamm* has a leader for the Provincial Circle [*Landesarbeitskreis*], the District Circle [*Bezirksarbeitskreis*], and the Local Circles [*Ortsarbeitskreise*]. The objective of these *Führerstämme* is 7 million Austrians.

<sup>2</sup> Ernst Kaltenbrunner, Austrian Nazi leader, later head of the *Sicherheitsdienst*.

Aiding Klausner are Minister Seyss-Inquart and Dr. Hugo Jury. The latter has a double function: 1) as *Volkspolitischer Referent*; and 2) as Leader of the *Volksdeutsche Gemeinschaft*. The *Volksdeutsche Gemeinschaft* is to be directed by Baron von Conrad (former *Obergruppenführer* in the SA of Austria). Under him come the business associations directed by Maierzet; the national and cultural associations, directed by Count Peter Czernin, and the professional associations provisionally [*kommissarisch*] directed by Sepp Nemetz.

The structure of the movement looks as follows: At the center is Klausner, with the circle of leaders. In the next ring is Jury in his capacity as official leader of the *Volksdeutsche Arbeitsstelle*. One circle beyond this, we again find Jury as *Volkspolitischer Referent* and in charge of constitutional problems. In the outermost circle, which, however, as a measure of security, surrounds the whole like a cloak, there is the Minister of Security and of the Interior, Dr. Arthur Seyss-Inquart.

As to the situation:

Indications are constantly increasing that our opponent in the near future will be the Popular Front, in all its shadings. Orders have already been issued to various militant formations closely connected with the Fatherland Front to be on the alert. Distribution of arms and rubber truncheons has been reported from the various provinces of Austria. This evening the Fatherland Front and the *Sicherheitskorps*, probably reinforced by Communists, began to rip swastika emblems off National Socialists in the center of the city. Measures against this street terrorism have been taken by the movement.

Enclosed is a chart of the organization of the movement.<sup>3</sup>

### No. 344

1798/409440-41

*The German Chargé d'Affaires in Austria (Stein) to the  
German Foreign Ministry*

A 1484

VIENNA, March 10, 1938.  
Received March 14, 1938.  
(Pol. IV 1581)

In continuation of my telegram No. 29 of March 10.

Subject: Announcement of a plebiscite in Austria.

It was a great surprise to learn at about noon of March 9 that the Federal Chancellor, Dr. Schuschnigg, in a speech scheduled for the

<sup>3</sup> Not printed.

evening of the 9th in Innsbruck before officials of the Fatherland Front, would make known his decision to hold a plebiscite in Austria on March 13.

Concerning preceding events, I learn that this decision was reached on the night of the 8th in a consultation of the Federal Chancellor with Ministers Zernatto and Pernter, Mayor Schmitz, the president of the National Bank, Kienböck, and *Landeshauptmann* Reither. Seyss-Inquart, the Minister in charge of internal affairs, was not advised until the following day, when the Federal Chancellor had already left Vienna.

That evening, in Innsbruck, Herr von Schuschnigg made the announced speech, which was not broadcast until 2 hours later. Immediately afterward, the questions to be put to a vote, as well as the formalities for the plebiscite, were announced by Minister Zernatto and the *Amtsleiter* of the Fatherland Front, Becker. The question is put in the form of a slogan in the proclamation, which Herr von Schuschnigg issued not in his capacity as Federal Chancellor but as Leader of the Fatherland Front. The *Landeshauptleute* and the mayor of Vienna have issued the necessary instructions for carrying out the plebiscite.

What a muzzling of the people's will was intended from the very outset may be concluded from the fact that the plan originally provided that ballots marked "No" would be considered valid only with full signature and address. It was not announced until the 11th that printed "No" ballots were valid as well as the "Yes" ballots and would be available. To be sure, the instructions of the mayor of Vienna in this regard have not yet been changed (there is no information at hand yet from the provinces), so that printed "No" ballots will possibly be counted as invalid.

The constitutionality of the plebiscite is absolutely denied by Austrian jurists, since under article 65 of the Constitution of 1934 plebiscites must be ordered by the President after a decision by the Government. The Federal Chancellor, however, cites article 93 of the constitution, which however, merely provides that he is to determine the guiding principles of policy.

The announcement of a plebiscite on such short notice with the intention, obvious to any layman, of falsifying and later misusing its results, has provoked a growing agitation in the National-minded population. It has already led to sporadic clashes, in some instances with the police and in others, between National Socialists and Communists.

The press, almost unanimously, is coming out for the Government.

The *Wiener Neuesten Nachrichten* of the 11th was confiscated by the public prosecutor because of an article by State Counselor Dr. Jury.

The newspaper clippings mentioned are enclosed.<sup>4</sup>

STEIN

[EDITORS' NOTE. For Göring's telephone conversations during the period of March 11-14 with Seyss-Inquart, Keppler, General Muff, and others in Vienna, and with Prince Philip of Hesse and with Ribbentrop, as well as for a telephone conversation between Hitler and Prince Philip, see *Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression* (Washington, Government Printing Office, 1946), volume V, document 2949-PS, pages 628-654. These conversations contain valuable material—not found in the files of the Foreign Ministry—on the pressure put on President Miklas to accept the new Cabinet. They are also indicative of the improvisation which characterized most measures taken in these days. Finally, they contain additional material on Mussolini's reaction to the Austrian coup.

Evidence that Hitler planned an invasion of Austria "should other means fail" is contained in his "Directive No. 1" to the armed forces, dated March 11, 1938. Supreme command is to be exercised by the Führer, and the roles assigned to army and air force are outlined in detail. The invasion should proceed without bloodshed, if possible, but should resistance be offered, then "it must be broken most ruthlessly by force of arms." The directive is initialed by Jodl, Warlimont, and Keitel. A translation of this document appears in *Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression*, volume VI, document C-102, pages 911-912.

An additional directive by Jodl, issued the same day, states that any Czech troops encountered in Austria are to be considered enemies, while Italian troops should be greeted as friends. A translation of this document appears in *Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression*, volume VI, document C-103, page 913.]

<sup>4</sup> Not printed here.

## No. 345

120/67791

*The German Chargé d'Affaires in Austria (Stein) to the German Foreign Ministry*

Telegram

VERY SECRET

VIENNA, March 11, 1938—1:30 p.m.

No. 32 of March 11

Received March 11, 1938—3 p.m.

Also for War Ministry.

The following information is from a reliable source:

- 1) Trained reservists of the class of 1915 have been called up.
- 2) The industrial militia of the municipal plants in Vienna and of the Federal railroads—from the former railroad security forces of Lower Austria—have been armed.
- 3) The Front Militia of Vienna has been alerted.
- 4) Vacuum Oil has been asked by the Ministry for Defense to supply fuel for motorized troops.

STEIN

## No. 346

1798/409389

*The German Ambassador in France (Welczeck) to the German Foreign Ministry*

Telegram

URGENT

PARIS, March 11, 1938.

No. 130 of March 11

Received March 11, 1938—5:30 p.m.

(Pol. IV 1529)

Acting Foreign Minister Delbos asked me to call on him today at noon and, with a reference to the guaranteed continuity of French foreign policy as well as with strong emphasis on his own proved policy of *rapprochement* and understanding toward us, told me of the French Government's grave anxiety over the alarming reports from London regarding Austro-German border incidents and partial mobilization, which, once started, would jeopardize the peace and the central European balance and could finally lead to a war the prevention of which was surely of equal interest and concern to all great powers. He was convinced that the reports from London were incorrect or exaggerated, but considered it his duty to inform me of the alarm and anxiety of the French Government.

I replied that aside from newspaper reports I had no information. Furthermore, I had to point out that we considered Austria and Germany as one big family and wished to settle big or little family quarrels between ourselves alone; we had to refuse any advice, however well meant.

Delbos answered that Europe, too, had to be considered as one big family in which absolutely every conflict affected the other members of the family.

WELCZECK

### No. 347

1716/399085

#### *Memorandum*

GERMAN EMBASSY, PARIS,  
March 11, 1938.

I informed Herr von Weizsäcker over the telephone that there is extraordinary agitation in Government circles and among the Deputies over the occurrences in Austria. Herr von Weizsäcker then communicated to me the version of the Austrian events given in my memorandum of March 11 (A 934).<sup>5</sup> I informed Herr von Weizsäcker that Parliamentary circles and, among others, M. Comert,<sup>6</sup> too, held the opinion that France was glad that she was not bound to Austria by a pact of military assistance as in the case of Czechoslovakia, since otherwise she would doubtless have to intervene. According to the version that Herr von Weizsäcker had given me of the events, there would really be no reason for intervention, even if there were a treaty of assistance. Herr von Weizsäcker confirmed that.

B[RÄUER]

### No. 348

120/67795

#### *Minute*

BERLIN, March 11, 1938.

This afternoon Count Magistrati asked to be informed how we viewed the situation in Austria. There were many rumors circulating, from which it was difficult to form a true picture.

<sup>5</sup> Not printed.

<sup>6</sup> Pierre Comert, chief of the press and information service of the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

I answered Magistrati that that was correct, that we had also received unfavorable information regarding internal developments in Austria. The Federal Chancellor, evidently under the influence of Herr Schmitz, had reached an agreement yesterday with the Social Democrats, according them rights similar to those of the National Socialists. There was also talk of arms being handed out to the workers. In certain places in Austria there seemed to have been disturbances. I had read of shooting in Linz, in which 17 had been wounded and 1 killed. To Magistrati's question whether Seyss-Inquart would remain in the Cabinet, I replied that if he did not obtain satisfaction I could not imagine that he would stay. As far as I knew, Seyss-Inquart had submitted a definite demand [*eine bestimmte Forderung*] to Schuschnigg; the answer was not yet known to me. In order to obtain a clarification, Herr Keppler had flown to Vienna this afternoon at the order of the Führer. I hoped that we would receive further information by evening.

To allusions by Count Magistrati to troop movements in Munich, I answered that in view of previously mentioned disturbances in Austria we had also, so far as I knew, taken precautionary measures in southern Germany.

Magistrati urged that his Government be informed quickly of any new development in the matter or of any specific decisions by the Berlin Government. I answered that the Führer would undoubtedly see to it that Mussolini received adequate notification.

Count Magistrati showed understanding for the fact that the Führer must feel deeply hurt by the actions of Federal Chancellor Schuschnigg.

WEIZSÄCKER

## No. 349

120/67796

*Minute*

BERLIN, March 11, 1938.

The Counselor of the Italian Embassy, Count Magistrati, just read me the following telegram from Rome:

If by chance the rumor should arise that Mussolini had advised in favor of the plebiscite in Vienna, he wished to let it be known that, although he in no way interfered with internal Austrian affairs, he had flatly advised against the plebiscite.<sup>7</sup>

Count Magistrati urged that this information be brought to the attention of the Führer as quickly as possible.

WEIZSÄCKER

## No. 350

120/67800

*The German Chargé d'Affaires in Italy (Plessen) to the German  
Foreign Ministry*

## Telegram

No. 60 of March 11

ROME, March 11, 1938—9:16 p.m.

Received March 12, 1938—12:20 a.m.

Count Ciano, upon whom I called today, requested me to report the following:

1) The Italian Government had been informed by Schuschnigg on March 7 of the plan for a plebiscite. Mussolini had strongly advised him against it.

2) The French Government had attempted to discuss with the Italian Government joint action, to include Britain, over the Austrian question. The Italian Government had refused to discuss the matter.

PLESSEN

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<sup>7</sup> The following notation has been added, apparently in Weizsäcker's hand: "Consequently he was asked beforehand!"

## No. 351

120/67813

*The German Foreign Ministry to the German Legation,  
in Yugoslavia*BERLIN, March 11, 1938.  
(Pol. IV 1491)

For your information:

Shortly before leaving for Belgrade the Yugoslav Minister<sup>a</sup> called on the Foreign Minister and brought up the Austrian question. Herr von Ribbentrop presented our point of view to the Minister and added that we were striving for a peaceful solution. But, in case foreign powers should interfere in this internal German affair, we were armed in the West, and all those who were thinking of intervention would do well to realize clearly that Germany would know how to defend herself with all her might.

To this the Minister replied that the Yugoslav Government held the point of view that the Austrian question was an internal German affair; Yugoslavia placed particular importance on good relations with the German Reich.

The Yugoslav Minister then touched on the Anglo-Italian negotiations. In this connection the Foreign Minister told him that we would welcome a relaxation of tension in the relations between Britain and Italy. Such tranquilization would naturally also be of interest to Yugoslavia.

M. Cincar-Markovich said that he would report in detail to Prince Regent Paul and to Premier Stoyadinovich.

By direction:  
WEIZSÄCKER

## No. 352

120/67782-84

*The Führer and Chancellor to Benito Mussolini<sup>b</sup>*

MARCH 11, 1938.

EXCELLENCY: In a fateful hour I am turning to Your Excellency to inform you of a decision which appears necessary under the circumstances and has already become irrevocable.

<sup>a</sup> Alexander Cincar-Markovich.

<sup>b</sup> No complete text of this letter has been found in the archives of the German Foreign Ministry. The German copy from which the translation has been made gives the letter as it was published in March 1938. The passages omitted on German insistence when the letter was published have been translated from a copy in Italian which is in the archives of the Italian Foreign Ministry. These passages are enclosed in double parentheses.

((In recent months I have seen, with increasing preoccupation, how a relationship was gradually developing between Austria and Czechoslovakia which, while difficult for us to endure in peacetime, was bound, in case of a war imposed upon Germany, to become a most serious threat to the security of the Reich.

In the course of these understandings [*accordi*], the Austrian State began gradually to arm all its frontiers with barriers and fortifications. Its purpose could be none other than:

1. to effect the restoration at a specified time;
2. to throw the weight of a mass of at least 20 million men against Germany if necessary.

It is precisely the close bonds between Germany and Italy which, as was to be expected, have exposed our Reich to inevitable attacks. Incumbent on me is the responsibility not to permit the rise of a situation in Central Europe which, perhaps, might one day lead to serious complications precisely because of our friendship with Italy. This new orientation of the policy of the Austrian State does not, however, reflect in any way the real desire and will of the Austrian people.))

For years the Germans in Austria have been oppressed and mistreated by a regime which lacks any legal basis. The sufferings of innumerable tormented people know no bounds.

Germany alone has so far received 40,000 refugees who had to leave their homeland, although the overwhelming majority of the people of Austria entirely share their ideology and their political views.

With a view to eliminating a tension which was becoming increasingly unbearable, I decided to make a last attempt to reach an agreement with Herr Schuschnigg and definitely establish full equality for all under the law.

During our conversation in Berchtesgaden, ((I called Herr Schuschnigg's attention in a most serious way to the fact that Germany is not disposed:

1. to permit a hostile military power to establish itself at its borders, the more so since such plans are clearly in contradiction to the true wishes of the Austrian people;

- 2.)) I called Herr Schuschnigg's attention to the fact that Germany could no longer tolerate mistreatment of the National-minded majority in Austria by a negligible minority. I myself am a son of this soil. Austria is my homeland, and from the circle of my own relatives I know what oppression and what sufferings the overwhelming majority of these people who embrace Nationalist ideas have to endure.

I called his attention to the fact that it was impossible—this case being in fact without a parallel in the world—for a great power to permit people of common blood, common origin, and common history to be persecuted, mistreated, and deprived of their rights for these very reasons.

Furthermore, I informed Herr Schuschnigg that if the equality of all Germans in Austria were not restored, we should some day be forced to assume the protection of these kinsmen, abandoned by everyone.

My demands were more than moderate.

In fact, according to all principles of reason, right, and justice, and even according to the precepts of a formalistic democracy, Herr Schuschnigg and his Cabinet should have resigned to make room for a government enjoying the confidence of the people. I did not demand this. I was satisfied with a number of assurances that henceforth, within the framework of the Austrian laws—which, although they had been enacted unjustly, were in force at the present time—all inhabitants of the country were to be treated in the same way, receive the same privileges or be subject to the same restrictions, and, lastly, some security was to be established in the military sphere ((in order that the Austrian State might not one day become a dependency of Czechoslovakia)).

Herr Schuschnigg made me a solemn promise and concluded an agreement to this effect.

From the very beginning he failed to keep this agreement.

But now he has gone so far as to deal a new blow against the spirit of this agreement by scheduling a so-called plebiscite which actually is a mockery.

The results of this newly planned oppression of the majority of the people are such as were feared.

The Austrian people are now finally rising against the constant oppression, and this will inevitably result in new oppressive measures. Therefore, the representatives of this oppressed people in the Austrian Government as well as in the other bodies have withdrawn.

Since the day before yesterday the country has been approaching closer and closer to a state of anarchy.

In my responsibility as Führer and Chancellor of the German Reich and likewise as a son of this soil, I can no longer remain passive in the face of these developments.

I am now determined to restore law and order in my homeland and enable the people to decide their own fate according to their judgment in an unmistakable, clear, and open manner.

May the Austrian people itself, therefore, forge its own destiny. Whatever the manner may be in which this plebiscite is to be carried out, I now wish solemnly to assure Your Excellency, as the Duce of Fascist Italy:

1. Consider this step only as one of national self-defense and therefore as an act that any man of character would do in the same way, were he in my position. You too, Excellency, could not act differently if the fate of Italians were at stake, and I as Führer and National Socialist cannot act differently.

2. In a critical hour for Italy I proved to you the steadfastness of my sympathy. Do not doubt that in the future there will be no change in this respect.

3. Whatever the consequences of the coming events may be, I have drawn a definite boundary between Germany and France and now draw one just as definite between Italy and us. It is the Brenner.

This decision will never be questioned or changed. I did not make this decision in 1938, but immediately after the end of the World War, and I never made a secret of it.

I hope that Your Excellency will pardon especially the haste of this letter and the form of this communication. These events occurred unexpectedly for all of us. Nobody had any inkling of the latest step of Herr Schuschnigg, not even his colleagues in the Government, and until now I had always hoped that perhaps at the last moment a different solution might be possible.

I deeply regret not being able to talk to you personally at this time to tell you everything I feel.

Always in friendship,

Yours,

ADOLF HITLER

No. 353

1798/409422

*Communication From the British Ambassador in Germany  
(Henderson) to Reich Minister von Neurath*<sup>10</sup>

(Pol. IV 1492)

I impressed on Herr von Ribbentrop that I attached the utmost importance to everything being done to insure that the plebiscite was carried out without interference or intimidation; we assumed

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<sup>10</sup> This document, the original of which is in English and typed on a letterhead of the British Embassy in Berlin, is an extract from the "agreed text" of the summary of a conversation between Lord Halifax and the German Foreign Minister in London on March 10, 1938 (document No. 145, p. 253). The extract bears the notations, apparently in Weizsäcker's hand: "Handed by the British Ambassador to Reich Minister von Neurath on March 11, 1938"; and "(Halifax to Henderson)."

that the German Government would share our views and would therefore take all measures in their power to restrain Nazi followers from any action which might interfere with smooth and free holding of the plebiscite. It really was of the first importance in our view that every care should be taken to avoid anything that might lead to or encourage violent action, for if any explosion should occur at any time it was quite impossible for any man to tell what might be the limit or end.

## No. 354

1798/409423-24

*The British Ambassador in Germany (Henderson) to Reich Minister von Neurath*<sup>11</sup>

URGENT

BERLIN, March 11, 1938.  
(Pol. IV 1516)

MY DEAR REICH MINISTER: I learn that Dr. Schuschnigg has agreed to cancel the plebiscite rather than risk bloodshed in Austria, but that he has been informed that this is not enough and that he must now himself resign.

Lord Halifax informs me that he has spoken to Herr von Ribbentrop on the effect that would be produced in England by such direct interference in Austrian affairs as the demand for the resignation of the Chancellor enforced by ultimatum, especially after the offer to cancel the plebiscite. I should be extremely grateful if you would represent this aspect of the question to the Chancellor and use your influence toward the settlement of the question on the basis of Dr. Schuschnigg's offer to go back on his decision to hold the plebiscite.

Yours very sincerely,

NEVILLE HENDERSON<sup>12</sup>

<sup>11</sup> The original of this document is in English and typed on a letterhead of the British Embassy in Berlin.

<sup>12</sup> A marginal notation by Weizsäcker reads as follows: "No reply is necessary." For Ribbentrop's account of his conversation in London on March 11, cf. documents Nos. 150 and 151, pp. 273 and 276.

## No. 355

1798/409429-30

*The British Ambassador in Germany (Henderson) to Reich Minister von Neurath*<sup>13</sup>

BERLIN, March 11, 1938.  
(Pol. IV 1565)

DEAR REICH MINISTER: My Government are informed that a German ultimatum was delivered this afternoon at Vienna demanding *inter alia* the resignation of the Chancellor and his replacement by the Minister of the Interior, a new Cabinet of which two-thirds of the members were to be National Socialists, and the readmission of the Austrian Legion to the country with the duty of keeping order in Vienna.

I am instructed by my Government to represent immediately to the German Government that if this report is correct His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom feel bound to register a protest in the strongest terms against such use of coercion backed by force against an independent State in order to create a situation incompatible with its national independence.

As the German Minister for Foreign Affairs has already been informed in London such action is bound to produce the gravest reactions of which it is impossible to foretell the issues.

Yours sincerely,

For His Majesty's Ambassador:  
I. KIRKPATRICK<sup>14</sup>

## No. 356

1798/409366

*The French Ambassador in Germany (François-Poncet) to Reich Minister von Neurath*<sup>15</sup>

BERLIN, March 11, 1938.

M. THE MINISTER: I have been instructed by my Government to inform the German Government immediately that the French Government, in view of the reports which it is receiving from Austria, protests most emphatically against the coercion, supported by violence, of which an independent State has been the victim for the purpose of creating a situation that is incompatible with its national inde-

<sup>13</sup> The original of this document is in English and typed on a letterhead of the British Embassy in Berlin.

<sup>14</sup> A marginal notation by Weizsäcker reads, as follows: "A reply is being drafted."

<sup>15</sup> The translation of this document has been made from the French original.

pendence. Such an action is bound to produce the most serious reactions, the outcome of which it is impossible to foresee.

Requesting you, since Herr von Ribbentrop has not yet returned to Berlin, to bring this communication to the attention of the German Government, I have the honor [etc.]

ANDRÉ FRANÇOIS-PONCET

No. 357

120/87798-99

*The German Foreign Ministry to Various German Diplomatic Missions*

Cipher Telegram

URGENT!

BERLIN, March 11, 1938.

For information and guidance in your conversation.

By the Berchtesgaden Agreement of February 12, the Führer had once more made an effort to transform the increasingly dangerous Austrian situation by means of agreements into a calm development. If faithfully carried out, these measures would actually have guaranteed such a development. In crass contradiction to the Berchtesgaden Agreement the Federal Chancellor, as a complete surprise, announced the decision on March 9 to hold a plebiscite within three days on future Austrian policy. The announced details for carrying out the plebiscite make it fully clear that this action could only mean and was intended to mean doing political violence to the National Socialist part of the population. The Federal Chancellor has reached this decision without the participation of the National Cabinet members. This obvious contradiction has led to a Cabinet crisis and an aggravation of the general situation in Austria. A provisional government formed under Seyss-Inquart's leadership after Schuschnigg's resignation has asked the Führer and Chancellor to send military and police forces to maintain law and order. In order to prevent catastrophic chaotic conditions the German Government considered it necessary to comply with this appeal addressed to it.

MACKENSEN

## No. 358

1798/409461

*The Austrian Minister of the Interior (Seyss-Inquart) to the  
Führer and Reich Chancellor*<sup>16</sup>

Telegram from VIENNA Z 579 66/65 11 2110 Etat.

Received March 11, 1938—9:40 p.m.

(Pol. IV 1620 14/3)

THE FÜHRER AND CHANCELLOR, BERLIN: The Provisional Austrian Government, which, after the resignation of the Schuschnigg government, considers it its task to restore law and order in Austria, urgently requests the German Government to support it in its task and to help it to prevent bloodshed. For this purpose it asks the German Government to send German troops as soon as possible.

SEYSS-INQUART

## No. 359

120/67852

*The German Chargé d'Affaires in Great Britain (Woermann) to the  
German Foreign Ministry*

Telegram

URGENT!

LONDON, March 12, 1938—10:35 a.m.

No. 121 of March 12

Received March 12, 1938—12:35 p.m.

In connection with telegram No. 120 of the 12th.<sup>17</sup>

The press generally is making use of the version officially inspired here yesterday that action against Austria seriously hampered Anglo-German relations, entirely refraining, however, from threats of any sort or demands for reversal of the new situation. Methods of

<sup>16</sup> This document bears the following notation in Neurath's hand: "To the Foreign Ministry files. v. N[eurath] March 12." The text was dictated by Göring in a telephone conversation with Keppler, who was in Vienna. The conversation took place between 8:48 and 8:54 p.m. on March 11, 1938. At 9:54 p.m. Keppler stated in a telephone conversation that Seyss-Inquart had agreed to the dispatch of the telegram. The transcripts of these and other important telephone conversations on the Austrian question are translated in *Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression*, vol. v, pp. 628-654. No evidence has been discovered to support the statements of Erich Kordt (*Wahn und Wirklichkeit*, Stuttgart 1947, p. 102, footnote 2) that the telegram was dated back to 9:30 p.m. and that it was made public over Seyss-Inquart's protest. One copy of the telegram in the archives of the German Foreign Ministry consists of strips of telegraph tape pasted on a telegram form; another (the copy translated here) is typed on a telegram form; both give the time of dispatch as 9:10 p.m. There is a reference to the telegram in the Altenburg minute of March 12 printed on p. 584.

Hitler's order to the German armed forces to enter Austria on the morning of March 12 was dated March 11, 8:45 p.m. A translation of this "Directive No. 2," initialed by Jodl and Warlimont, appears in *Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression*, vol. vi, document C-182, p. 1017.

<sup>17</sup> Not printed.

German action are, it is true, sharply condemned in the press, yet the general impression given is one of resignation at the ending of the Schuschnigg policy in Austria.

WOERMANN

No. 360

969/302492-94

*The German Ambassador in France (Welczeck) to the  
German Foreign Ministry*

Telegram

VERY URGENT!

PARIS, March 12, 1938.

No. 132

Received March 12, 1938—1:55 p.m.

The French press describes the events in Austria as a severe blow to France and England. Indignation is coupled with perplexity and uncertainty. Emphasis on the protest to Berlin by France and England is being weakened by the fact that it is already considered too late and by statements that it would not alter accomplished facts. Its purpose, which acquires special significance through Anglo-French cooperation, is widely described as being to set up a barrier against any further German expansion, especially in the direction of Czechoslovakia. The press, almost without regard for party differences, makes the following circumstances responsible for the new blow: the disturbed domestic situation in France and the weakness of French policy, England's aloof attitude toward developments in Central Europe, and, with particularly bitter reproach, the fact that Italy refuses to take joint action against German expansion in Austria. Particularly strong resentment against Italy has been expressed since a *démarche* made in Rome yesterday, urging Italy to cooperate in joint intervention, won favorable notice and apparently aroused false hopes.

Especially characteristic are the statements in the *Petit Parisien* by the semiofficial spokesman [*Offiziosus*] of the Quai d'Orsay. After stating that the moment was particularly well chosen because of French weakness, Eden's resignation, and Italian difficulties, Bourgues declares that, in view of English reserve in regard to developments in Central Europe, an active and decisive manifestation against Germany which could put a stop to this monstrous new disturbance of the European *status quo* could scarcely be expected. Any French and English protest is discounted by Bourgues with the recognition that, however energetic it might be, it would do very little to change the accomplished fact.

The *Anschluss* in the real sense of the word would, it is said, perhaps not be carried out at this time, but Austria was coming under the domination of Germany and would be ruled from Berlin like a colony. The protecting powers of the peace treaties received a very severe blow, more keenly felt, perhaps, than the occupation of the Rhineland. The abandonment of the ties with Rome resulting from the Stresa Treaties of 1935 was bearing bitter fruit. The French inquiry in Rome as to whether Italy was prepared to cooperate with France in the Austrian matter had been answered in the negative. The power of the Rome-Berlin Axis had thus revealed itself in all its hideous reality. At any rate, Mussolini would soon realize that morally he had suffered just as serious a blow as France and England.

WELCZECK

No. 361

120/87854

*The German Chargé d'Affaires in Italy (Plessen) to the  
German Foreign Ministry*

Telegram

ROME (QUIRINAL), March 12, 1938—12:40 p.m.

No. 63 of March 12

Received March 12, 1938—3:10 p.m.

Reference our telegram No. 60 of the 11th.

The following details of yesterday's conversation with Ciano might also be of interest:

1) According to a summary of conversation which Ciano gave me to read, the French Chargé d'Affaires asked by telephone yesterday afternoon that, "in view of Austria's appeal and the expiring German ultimatum," the date of the appointment already arranged with Ciano be advanced "in order to reach an agreement (French *concerter*) between Britain, France, and Italy on common action." In reply he was told quite plainly that the Italian Government refused to discuss common action, and if he had nothing else to propose it was unnecessary to meet earlier. After consultation with Paris, the Chargé canceled the appointment altogether. This was announced to Ciano while I was in the room.

In answer to my question whether the Austrian Government had appealed to the Italian Government, Ciano replied that it had communicated the fact of the ultimatum, but there was no question of an appeal.

2) After Ciano had asked me to communicate the two points reported yesterday, I endeavored to ascertain by means of an inter-

jected remark what he thought of Austro-German developments. Ciano made a gesture which could perhaps be rendered by the words: "What can I say?" and added "we observe, and take part in nothing which is directed against Germany."

3) Ciano likewise received the news of Schuschnigg's resignation by telephone while I was present. He thereupon made it clear that he was in a hurry to end the conversation.

PLESSEN

### No. 362

1798/409416

*The German Ambassador in the United States (Dieckhoff) to the German Foreign Ministry*

Telegram

No. 78 of March 12

WASHINGTON, March 12, 1938—2:52 p.m.

Received March 12, 1938—3:30 p.m.

(Pol. IV 1556)

With reference to No. 58 of the 11th.<sup>18</sup>

I called on Secretary of State Hull today and informed him of the contents of the telegram of information. Mr. Hull had before him the text of the Führer's proclamation, which was immediately given the widest possible publicity everywhere here by press and radio, and he was obviously still thoroughly impressed by the proclamation. He thanked me for the information. From a few questions which he asked, it was apparent that he thoroughly understands our action.

DIECKHOFF

### No. 363

969/302503

*The German Chargé d'Affaires in Yugoslavia (Janson) to the German Foreign Ministry*

Telegram

No. 13 of March 12

BELGRADE, March 12, 1938—8:30 p.m.

Received March 12, 1938—11:10 p.m.

The swift change in Austria is accepted here with absolute calm by the public as well as by official circles.

The press is publishing impartial accounts without any tendency to excite alarm. Regarding the Yugoslav position foreign correspondents here are being informed as follows by a semiofficial

<sup>18</sup> The circular telegram of March 11, document No. 357, p. 579.

source: Yugoslavia was preserving absolute neutrality in respect to events in Austria from the two following viewpoints:

1) The solution of the Austrian problem was a domestic problem of the German people; the people's right of self-determination was also the principle on which the Yugoslav State was founded;

2) The question of the balance of power in international politics was the concern of the Great Powers.

It is further stated by the same semiofficial source that Yugoslavia was glad that, as a consequence of her policy toward Germany, she now had on her borders 80 million friends and not 80 million enemies.

JANSON

### No. 364

120/67828-29

#### *Minute*

At 2:10 this morning Lieutenant General Muff, the Military Attaché of the German Embassy in Vienna, called me up and stated that on instructions of Federal Chancellor Seyss-Inquart he was requesting that "the alerted troops should remain but not cross the border. If this had occurred at any point, they should be withdrawn." State Secretary Keppler followed Lieutenant General Muff to the telephone and, on further inquiry on my part, supported Seyss-Inquart's request.

Upon agreement with and on instructions of Ministerial Director von Weizsäcker, I called up SS-*Obergruppenführer* Brückner in the Reich Chancellery and communicated to him the substance of the conversation with General Muff. Herr Brückner replied that after all we had Seyss-Inquart's appeal for armed assistance, and that it seemed difficult at this time to halt the action, which was already under way, but that he would get in touch with the *Wehrmacht*.

After this conversation, as a matter of precaution, I informed the War Ministry, Major von Heimbürg, of General Muff's telephone call. At 2:30 a.m. *Obergruppenführer* Brückner called up and once again emphasized the fact that it was not possible to halt the entry of our troops, and then asked why General Muff had not inquired directly at the Reich Chancellery, which I could not answer. Herr Brückner then voiced the suspicion that it was perhaps a question of a fraudulent conversation and asked whether it was really quite certain that General Muff and State Secretary Keppler had telephoned. I confirmed this positively. Thereupon Herr Brückner expressed his readiness to communicate the General's telephone call

to the Führer. Ten minutes later he telephoned me again and gave me the order to inform General Muff that the Führer had decided that the entry could no longer be stopped. I thereupon informed General Muff of the Führer's decision. General Muff replied to the effect that he regretted this message and that he would write a memorandum on the subject. I replied that I would do the same. General Muff then asked what else could be done. I replied that I would have to leave it to him whether he might perhaps, on his own initiative, want to consult the *Wehrmacht* directly; I could only transmit to him the order of *Obergruppenführer* Brückner.

ALTENBURG

BERLIN, March 12, 1938.

No. 365

1649/391905-08

*Memorandum*

BERLIN, March 12, 1938.

The attached sheet was taken to the Führer by Reich Minister Baron von Neurath on the morning of March 11, since it was to serve as the basis for the tenor of all announcements concerning the entry into Austrian territory. A similar text appears in the letter from the Führer to Mussolini, delivered by Prince Philip of Hesse personally on the afternoon of the 11th.

WEIZSÄCKER

[Enclosure]

The sole purpose of the action is to prevent the spilling of blood of the German race in Austria and to insure that the Austrian nation, in conformity with its right of self-determination, [is] to decide its own fate.

Recognition of the Brenner frontier.

## No. 366

120/67836-39

*The German Foreign Ministry to Various German Diplomatic Missions*

Cipher Telegram

BERLIN, March 12, 1938.

(Pol. IV 1551 I)

For information and orientation of your conversations.

On the evening of March 11 the British and French Governments, through their Ambassadors here, delivered notes in which they protested against the pressure supported by force, which had been exerted on an independent State in order to create a situation incompatible with its national independence.

Our reply delivered today is in substance as follows:<sup>19</sup>

The British and French Governments had no right to assume the role of protectors of Austria's independence. In the course of diplomatic conversations concerning the Austrian question we had left no doubt that the shaping of relations between the Reich and Austria could only be considered an internal affair of the German people, not affecting any third powers. The German Government consequently had to reject the protest from the outset as inadmissible.

Nevertheless, for the sake of truth, we wanted to make the following statement: The conversation which was brought about a few weeks ago between the Reich Chancellor and the Federal Chancellor had been for the purpose of countering the dangerous situation which had arisen in Austria by measures to assure a calm and peaceful development serving the interests of the entire German people. Instead of faithfully carrying out the Berchtesgaden Agreement, the former Federal Chancellor intended to arrange a surprise plebiscite which, under the circumstances and in the light of the details devised for carrying out the plebiscite, could only result and was intended to result in political violence to the overwhelming majority of the Austrian population. This procedure, which was in flagrant contradiction to the Berchtesgaden Agreement, had led to an extreme aggravation of Austria's internal situation, to a Cabinet crisis, and to the formation of a new government. That forceful pressure was exerted by the Reich in this development was untrue. The statement of the former Federal Chancellor that we had presented an ultimatum with the demand that a government be formed in conformity with our proposals or that otherwise the entry of German troops

<sup>19</sup> Texts of the replies are not printed (1798/409367-71 and 409431-34).

would ensue, was sheer fabrication. The truth was that the question of sending military forces from the Reich was first raised in the well-known telegram of the newly formed Austrian Government. In view of the imminent danger of civil war, the Reich Government decided to comply with this appeal.

That our conduct might lead to unforeseeable repercussions was completely out of the question, unless an attempt should be made by a third party—contrary to the friendly intentions and legitimate objectives of the Reich Government—to exert an influence on the shaping of the situation in Austria which would be incompatible with the right to self-determination of the German people.

WEIZSÄCKER

No. 367

120/67831

*Memorandum*

BERLIN, March 12, 1938.

Colonel von Toppelskirch called me up on instructions from the Chief of the General Staff, General of Artillery Beck, to obtain the view of the Foreign Ministry on the following matter:

The Chief of the General Staff was thinking of sending the second line division assigned to duty in Austria; not on foot, as hitherto planned, but by railway. Thus a certain amount of rolling stock would be withdrawn from military purposes, which would delay by 24 hours the security measures contemplated for the West, so that these would require not 2 days but 3, since General Beck did not wish to upset the peacetime schedule, if only because of economic repercussions, and therefore did not want to deprive it of any more rolling stock. The Chief of the General Staff requests a statement as to whether our evaluation of the situation in the West warrants the carrying out of his idea. In agreement with Baron von Neurath I informed him that, according to our appraisal, the situation in the West permitted an extension of the preventive measures to be taken there from 2 days to 3.

MACKENSEN

## No. 368

120/67832

*Minute*

Naval Lieutenant Friesius of the War Ministry reports that operations are continuing according to plan. Further, there were no reports whatsoever from other countries of Europe, especially France, concerning orders issued for more rigorous guarding of the borders and the like.

ALTENBURG

BERLIN, March 12, 1938.

## No. 369

120/67841

*Memorandum*

Naval Lieutenant Friesius of the War Ministry reported by telephone that German planes had arrived in Vienna at 10:15 a.m. and that, at about noon, the Führer was at the Headquarters of the Eighth Army with Colonel General Keitel.

According to information which has reached the War Ministry, the Austrian Legion, which, of course, is not under the command of the military, is to follow. The Führer had expressed the wish that the Legion should not be armed, but the War Ministry was unable to say whether or not this would be the case. SS Death's-Head units were also to be brought in to hold propaganda parades in Austria.

ALTENBURG

BERLIN, March 12, 1938.

## No. 370

120/67842 -

*Memorandum*

Counselor of Embassy von Stein reports, in connection with the inquiry concerning ultimatums allegedly delivered by Germany, that it was a question of two ultimatums which were mentioned in today's *Reichspost*.

The first ultimatum was allegedly delivered to President Miklas by State Secretary Keppler. Herr Keppler told Counselor of Embassy von Stein that he had in no way spoken with the President in terms of an ultimatum. Herr Keppler simply stated to the President that it was the *wish* of the Reich Government that the plebiscite in Austria be postponed and that, perhaps, certain changes in the Austrian Government be taken under consideration.

As for the second ultimatum, which was allegedly delivered to the President by the Military Attaché, Lieutenant General Muff, on orders of Field Marshal Göring, Herr von Stein requested of Herr Muff a written statement on the matter, which the General was not yet in a position to prepare because he was taken up with the welcome being given the German Air Force units. As soon as the General's memorandum is submitted, Herr von Stein will communicate the text by telephone. Herr von Stein further stated that, of course, in the General's conversation with the President, as far as he was informed, certain time limits are said to have been mentioned.

ALTENBURG

BERLIN, March 12, 1938.

No. 371

120/67843-45

*Memorandum*

Counselor of Embassy von Stein transmitted by telephone the enclosed memorandum by Lieutenant General Muff concerning the latter's conversation with the Austrian President, and added that he was not present during the proceedings, otherwise he would have attempted to prevent the step. However, an attempt is to be made to induce the Austrian Government to deny that any ultimatum had been presented by Germany. State Secretary Keppler will discuss this with Federal Chancellor Seyss-Inquart this noon.

ALTENBURG

BERLIN, March 12, 1938.

[Enclosure]

MEMORANDUM

On March 11, at 6:45 p.m., Field Marshal Göring telephoned me and gave me the following order:

President Miklas refused to make Dr. Seyss-Inquart Federal Chancellor. He wished to appoint Herr Ender<sup>10a</sup> Chancellor, and Dr. Seyss-Inquart Vice Chancellor. I was to go to the President immediately with Herr Seyss-Inquart and declare:

"If by 7:30 p.m. Field Marshal Göring had not received the report that Seyss-Inquart had become Chancellor, 200,000 men standing in readiness at the border would march in. The President would bear full responsibility for the consequences of his refusal."

<sup>10a</sup> Otto Ender, Chancellor 1930-31.

I immediately called up Minister Seyss-Inquart to inform him of this order. He replied:

"I have already been informed. Now it's up to you. Come at once!"

At the Federal Chancellery, Seyss-Inquart told me that I must go to the President by myself since he, as an Austrian Minister and future Chancellor, for reasons of expediency ought not to be present at the presentation of this ultimatum.

After I had presented the ultimatum to the President in accordance with my orders and in the form ordered, I further asked him whether I might speak to him as one German to another, and urgently requested that he proceed to the appointment of Seyss-Inquart. The President resolutely, and at times pathetically, refused to make the appointment under the threat of force. With this my orders were carried out.

I reported the outcome to State Secretary Keppler, who was with Seyss-Inquart, and he forwarded it to Berlin.

MUFF

## No. 372

120/67857

### *Telephone Message*

High Command, Foreign Division, Major (retired) Baron von Eisebeck, the Duty Officer, reports at 1:20 a.m. on March 13, 1938:

By phone from France from a reliable agent who has important contacts with Parliamentary circles:

- 1) The Maginot Line is manned throughout, but exclusively for defensive purposes.
- 2) Military measures are not to be expected on the part of France except in the case of an attack on the Czechs.
- 3) The Austrian coup is a heavy blow for Chamberlain. In the event of an election the return of Eden is likely.
- 4) An early agreement between Britain and Italy is to be expected.

## No. 373

1798/409418

*The German Chargé d'Affaires in Italy (Plessen) to the  
German Foreign Ministry*

Telegram

ROME (QUIRINAL), March 13, 1938—2:20 p.m.

No. 65 of March 13

Received March 13, 1938—5:25 p.m.

In continuation of my telegram No. 64 of the 12th.<sup>20</sup>

Today's morning papers, which published the Führer's letter to Mussolini<sup>21</sup> and the communiqué regarding the third session of the Grand Council<sup>22</sup> in banner headlines, show that the Italian press is now in complete agreement with our viewpoint regarding the Austrian question. The Führer's letter has made a very great impression on the public here. Foreign despatches also are now entirely on the side of Germany. The advance of the German troops and the Führer's journey are fully and warmly described.

PLESSEN

## No. 374

120/67863-64

*Memorandum*

The Federal Chancellery in Vienna just telephoned. It was Minister of Justice Hueber speaking, and he explained that he was speaking also in the name of Foreign Minister Wolf. The Austrian Government had, he said, just adopted the following law in regard to the reunion of Austria with the German Reich:

The law is as follows:

By virtue of article 3, section 2, of the law concerning extraordinary measures relating to the constitution (*Bundesgesetzblatt*, page 255, 1934), the Austrian Government has decreed as follows:

## ARTICLE 1

Austria is a province of the German Reich.

## ARTICLE 2

On Sunday, April 10, 1938, a free and secret plebiscite of the German men and women of Austria over 20 years of age shall be held on reunion with the German Reich.

<sup>20</sup> Not printed.<sup>21</sup> Document No. 352, p. 573.<sup>22</sup> The communiqué contained extracts from the minutes of the Fascist Grand Council of March 12, 1938, in which the conduct of the Italian Government in the Austrian situation was reviewed and approved, describing it as inspired by a realistic appreciation of the situation in relation to Italian national interest.

## ARTICLE 3

In the said plebiscite the decision shall be by majority vote.

## ARTICLE 4

The regulations necessary for executing and supplementing this Constitutional Law shall be provided by decree.

## ARTICLE 5

*First paragraph*

This Constitutional Law shall enter into force on the day of its proclamation.

*Second paragraph*

The Federal Government is entrusted with the execution of this Constitutional Law.

Minister of Justice Hueber added: In the opinion of the Austrian Government the reunion of Austria with the German Reich had thus become effective an hour ago. In the future there would be but one foreign policy, which would be set by the Foreign Ministry in Berlin. He requested that the Reich Foreign Minister be informed of this, and at about 11 o'clock he would telephone to the Hotel Kaiserhof to greet him personally.

Furthermore, the Austrian Foreign Minister had decreed that the Chiefs of Austrian Missions abroad should place themselves at the disposal of the corresponding German Chief of Mission.

BERLIN, March 13, 1938.

## No. 375

120/67850

*Memorandum*

Naval Captain Frisius of the War Ministry reports by telephone:

- 1) The advance continues according to plan; the *Luftwaffe* is making propaganda flights over Austria. Sections of the armored troops employed and of the 27th Infantry Division will enter Vienna this noon. It is assumed that the Führer will take part in the entry.
- 2) Reports of our agents in France tell in general of prevailing calm and normal routine in the army.

In Switzerland frontier barriers have been tested here and there.

ALTENBURG

BERLIN, March 13, 1938.

No. 376

1798/409475

*The British Ambassador in Germany (Henderson) to  
Field Marshal Göring<sup>28</sup>*

BERLIN, March 13, 1938.

(Pol. IV 1688/38)

HERR MINISTER PRÄSIDENT UND GENERAL FELDMARSCHALL: I duly reported to my Government the assurance Your Excellency gave me on the night of March 11th that the German troops would be withdrawn from Austria as soon as the situation was stable and that after their withdrawal free elections would take place without any intimidation whatever.

I am now instructed to inform the German Government that His Majesty's Government have taken note of these undertakings.

Yours sincerely,

NEVILLE HENDERSON

## J. THE REPERCUSSIONS, MARCH-JULY 1938

No. 377

1798/409679

*Memorandum*

BERLIN, March 14, 1938.

(Pol. IV 1995)

Counselor of Legation Clodius informs us by telephone from Vienna at 11:30 a.m. as follows:

On the basis of article 2 of the law concerning the reunion of Austria with the German Reich, leaving present Austrian laws in force until further notice, it was decided at the Vienna discussions to adopt in principle the following view:

- 1) Treaties and agreements concluded between Austria and third states shall remain in force until further notice;
- 2) The customs boundary between Austria and Germany shall also remain in force until further notice;
- 3) The German Reich shall, as legal successor, take over all Austrian international obligations, including loans.

Discussions on the execution of these principles are continuing. They are to be held in Vienna, at least so far as the internal German-Austrian decision on the procedure to be adopted with respect to third countries is concerned. They are also beginning to be uneasy

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<sup>28</sup> This document, the original of which is in English, was typed on a letterhead of the British Embassy in Berlin.

in Vienna regarding negotiations with third countries for the transfer of treaties, etc. In this connection I pointed out that such negotiations with third states could be entered into only after the latter had decided to recognize the *Anschluss*.

As far as his return to Berlin is concerned, Herr Clodius mentioned that Herr Keppler had expressed the desire that he remain in Vienna today. I told Herr Clodius that I expected him back here tomorrow in case he was no longer needed for the conversations taking place in Vienna. I informed him that the Foreign Minister would probably fly to Vienna today. He was to call on Herr von Ribbentrop there and obtain his decision as to whether to remain or return.

WIEHL

### No. 378

1798/409446-47

#### *The German Foreign Ministry to All German Diplomatic Missions Except Vienna<sup>24</sup>*

Telegram (clear)

IMMEDIATE

BERLIN, March 14, 1938.

PRIORITY

(Pol. IV 1600)

Please deliver immediately to the Government to which you are accredited a note reading as follows:

"By order of the German Government, I have the honor to notify the aforesaid of the following law of March 13, 1938, concerning the reunion of Austria with the German Reich:

#### 'ARTICLE I

"The Government of the Reich has enacted the following law, which is hereby proclaimed:

"The Constitutional Law of March 13, 1938, enacted by the Austrian Government, concerning the reunion of Austria with the German Reich, hereby becomes a German law. Its text is as follows:

"By virtue of article III, section 2, of the law concerning extraordinary measures relating to the constitution, (*Bundesgesetzblatt* I, number 255/1934) the Austrian Government has decreed as follows:

"Article I. Austria is a province of the German Reich.

"Article II. On Sunday, April 10, 1938, a free and secret plebiscite of the German men and women of Austria over 20 years of age shall be held on the reunion with the German Reich.

"Article III. In the said plebiscite, the decision shall be by majority vote.

"Article IV. The regulations necessary for executing and supplementing article II of this Constitutional Law shall be provided by decree.

"Article V. This Constitutional Law shall enter into force on the day of its proclamation.

<sup>24</sup> A marginal note reads: "This telegram was telephoned to the Legation at Vienna at 1:40 p.m. (Counselor of Legation von Nostitz) by order of Ministerial Director Gaus, with instructions to have a transcript handed to Foreign Minister von Ribbentrop immediately upon his arrival at the airport in Vienna."

"The Federal Government is entrusted with the execution of this Constitutional Law.

"Vienna, March 13, 1938."

#### ARTICLE II

"The laws at present in force in Austria shall remain in force until further notice. The introduction of German law into Austria will be effected by the Führer and Chancellor or by the Minister to whom he may delegate this power.

#### 'ARTICLE III

"The Reich Minister of the Interior, in consultation with the other Reich Ministers concerned, is empowered to issue the legal and administrative regulations necessary for executing and supplementing this law.

'This law shall enter into force on the day of its proclamation.

'LINZ, March 13, 1938.

'THE FÜHRER AND CHANCELLOR  
'THE MINISTER OF THE INTERIOR  
'THE FOREIGN MINISTER  
'THE DEPUTY OF THE FÜHRER'

"The present Austrian diplomatic representatives abroad have received orders to place themselves and their staffs under the German Missions."

End of note.

The practical execution of the concluding sentence of the note is subject to a further instruction.

Please notify accordingly all consular representatives within your jurisdiction.

*Addendum for London:*

Please inform the British Government at the same time that the Governments of Eire and South Africa will be notified directly.

RIBBENTROP

No. 379

1798/409435

*The German Ambassador in China (Trautmann) to the  
German Foreign Ministry*

Telegram

No. 128 of March 14

HANKOW, March 14, 1938—7:15 p.m.

Received March 14, 1938—4:25 p.m.

Marshal Chiang Kai-shek asked me today to wire the Führer and Chancellor that he personally warmly welcomed the union of Germany and Austria in accordance with the motto, "One people, one Reich."

For my own ear he added that he regretted that Germany had taken a different stand with regard to Manchukuo.

The Marshal further expressed his thanks for the Red Cross shipment.

TRAUTMANN

## No. 380

1716/899087-88

*The German Ambassador in France (Welczeck) to the  
German Foreign Ministry*

Telegram

No. 134 of March 14

PARIS, March 14, 1938.

Received March 14, 1938—6:30 p.m.

In continuation of our telegram No. 132 of March 12.

As regards events in Austria, recognition is increasingly gaining ground here that France can do nothing more in the Austrian question. In semiofficial circles it is asserted that the attitude of Austria herself makes any diplomatic intervention difficult because Federal Chancellor Seyss-Inquart has summoned the German troops to help and even Schuschnigg had instructed the Austrian Army to offer no resistance to an invading German force. In these circumstances the summoning of the League Council would also be impossible because the Austrian Government would deny that it was the victim of an attack. This argument is used against those believers in the League of Nations, still to be found in political circles, who in isolated cases have during the last few days urged the summoning of the League Council.

France's main source of anxiety is now Czechoslovakia, which, after the union of Austria with Germany, is regarded as standing in special danger and as being directly menaced. France is now considering the official extension of the Franco-Czechoslovak Treaty of Mutual Assistance, now designed to meet only the eventuality of a military attack upon Czechoslovak territory, to the eventuality of camouflaged action against Czechoslovakia, on the pretext, for instance, of an appeal for help from the German minority.

Further, the Government is trying to secure the agreement of Britain to a joint declaration which would express British interest in the territorial inviolability of Czechoslovakia. So far, however, no great confidence is felt that England will respond to this suggestion to the extent desired.

Disappointment at the attitude of Italy continues. As seen by France, Italian policy is incomprehensible since Italian interests had been injured by the *Anschluss*. It is only to be understood on the assumption that Italy had received far-reaching assurances from Germany with respect to her imperial designs. At the moment they are racking their brains to find out to what these assurances could refer. Nevertheless, the Quai d'Orsay seems to be pressing for a

normalization of relations with Rome. It is indicative of this, that a candidate for the Embassy at Rome is already mentioned in semi-official circles, the former Finance Minister, Bonnet. According to semiofficial disclosures his appointment will be dependent upon the conclusion of an agreement between England and Italy over the recognition of Abyssinia, and acceptance by the League of Nations of the resulting new international situation.

WELCZECK

No. 381

1798/409465-86

*The German Chargé d'Affaires in Great Britain (Woermann) to the German Foreign Ministry*

Telegram

URGENT

LONDON, March 14, 1938—4:13 p.m.

No. 126 of March 14

Received March 14, 1938—8 p.m.

In accordance with the Foreign Minister's oral instructions, I called on Cadogan today and discussed the following with him:

1) I pointed out that the British press was still making false statements regarding an alleged German ultimatum and requested of Cadogan that in today's official declarations in both Houses the correct German version be given. Cadogan dodged my repeated question as to the British version; he confined himself to the statement that the British Government had information from various sources. In any case, it was the intention to present the German standpoint too, in official declarations, presumably by a reading of excerpts from the German reply to the British note of protest. I again urgently requested that a fair statement be made conforming to the facts.

2) I then discussed the indiscretion and misrepresentation concerning the London conferences of the Reich Foreign Minister. I showed him the Press Association report of March 12. Cadogan admitted that there was some misrepresentation, particularly where it was said that the statements of the Reich Foreign Minister were extremely disappointing. As instructed, I said that the Foreign Minister had been especially grateful for Chamberlain's oral message to the Führer. Herr von Ribbentrop had received from the conversations a different impression from that now being given by the press. He had found a sympathetic and friendly attitude here and had also reported to the Führer that Chamberlain and Halifax honestly desired an understanding.

Cadogan said that the discussions had actually proceeded in a friendly spirit until Friday. To be sure, the disappointment at the result of the conference between Henderson and the Führer had been clearly shown in these conversations. The British Government had nevertheless hoped to be able to get the conversations to show progress, and the statements of the Reich Foreign Minister had contributed to that end. Since Friday, however, the situation had greatly changed. The country's reaction to the use of force in Austria was very strong and this was bound to have an effect on Anglo-German discussions. I contradicted this vigorously, by again describing the actual events in Austria and the spurious plebiscite contemplated. I referred further to the Führer's interview with Ward Price, in which it is stated that there has been no change in Germany's relations with England. In reply to my question on this point, Cadogan said expressly that the door was not closed to negotiations but that it would probably take a long time to get over the shock.

In conclusion, I pointed out that in the British press, the German press now . . . (group garbled) basis against England was being attacked, and declared myself ready to clear up such grievances with the press section of the Foreign Office, since in our view, too, a correct attitude of the press must, of course, be based upon reciprocity.

WOERMANN

No. 382

1798/409477

*The German Minister in Switzerland (Köcher) to the  
German Foreign Ministry*

Telegram

No. 10 of March 14

BERN, March 14, 1938—6:45 p.m.

Received March 14, 1938—9:45 p.m.

(Pol. IV 1672)

Federal Councilor Motta<sup>25</sup> expressed to me his admiration for the manner in which the Führer had carried out the *Anschluss*, which he had long regarded as inevitable because of Austrian internal dissensions. He characterized the *Anschluss* as the greatest historical event since the World War. He took the view that there was no danger of a conflict, even at some future date; that, on the contrary, the elements of conflict that had previously existed because of the

<sup>25</sup> Giuseppe Motta, member of the Swiss Federal Council and head of the Department of Foreign Affairs.

Austrian question had been eliminated. In spite of the fact that I encountered an almost joyous mood where Motta and Minister Frölicher were concerned, they did not fail to point out that the elimination of the fourth neighboring State of course necessitated considerable reorientation for Switzerland. Motta stressed the fact that he would continue to do everything possible to cultivate the most friendly relations with the now greater German Reich, not overlooking press matters. He declared himself grateful that the dispatch of a small number of German troops to Vorarlberg had not been directed in any way against Switzerland. Border traffic was normal. Only a few refugees had thus far come to Switzerland. I did not fail to represent as absurd the apprehension expressed in the press here and by the general public that now Switzerland also would soon be "violated" by us. I referred to Germany's previous attitude, particularly to repeated statements of the Führer and to the entirely different historical development of the Austrian question.

My Italian colleague, Tamaro, congratulated me and stressed the excellent impression that the Führer's sincere letter to Mussolini had made in Italy.

KÖCHER

No. 383

120/67873

*Memorandum*

BERLIN, March 14, 1938.

Immediately before his departure by air for Vienna, Herr von Weizsäcker received the Italian Counselor of Embassy, Count Magistrati. Upon instructions from Rome the Italian brought up for discussion the fact that, while the troops were marching through Innsbruck, there had been demonstrations which not only might be, but must be, interpreted as anti-Italian. There had been talk that this march was the answer to the action of Mussolini in 1934. It had been said, further, that the plebiscite scheduled to be held on March 13 was to be attributed to a conspiracy between Mussolini and Schuschnigg, etc. In reply to this, Count Magistrati had called attention to the clear and unequivocal attitude of the Italian Government and declared that Count Ciano found these incidents particularly unfortunate in the present extraordinarily delicate situation.

In regard to the latter matter, Herr von Weizsäcker agreed with Count Magistrati and promised to investigate and to take appropriate measures, if necessary, to prevent a repetition.

Referred to the Acting Director of Political Affairs with a request for further action, preferably through the Führer's Deputy.

MACKENSEN

No. 384

120/67892

*Memorandum*

The Italian Counselor of Embassy made the following ostensibly personal remark to me today in connection with his official communication concerning anti-Italian agitation reported in Innsbruck:

Now that the Austrian problem had been settled, with Mussolini and the Führer in complete agreement, and the Brenner boundary had finally been recognized as the German-Italian border, it would—this was Magistrati's personal opinion—sooner or later be necessary to find a radical and friendly solution for the South Tyrol. Italy acknowledged the racial policy of the Reich. Some sort of decision would therefore have to be made and a clear-cut, definitive solution found with respect to the 120,000 Germans in the South Tyrol.

WEIZSÄCKER

VIENNA, March 14, 1938.

No. 385

120/67894

*Memorandum*

The Italian Counselor of Embassy today gave me the following personal message from Mussolini to the Führer:

Mussolini wished to repeat once more, through diplomatic channels, how highly he valued the letter that the Führer had sent him through Prince Philip von Hesse on the 11th, and he again expressed his thanks for it. He was no less appreciative of the Führer's permission to publish this letter.

I reported the foregoing to the Foreign Minister during our flight from Berlin to Vienna.

WEIZSÄCKER

VIENNA, March 14, 1938.

## No. 386

1798/409462-63

*The German Chargé d'Affaires in Great Britain (Woermann) to the  
German Foreign Ministry*

Telegram

URGENT

No. 130 of March 14

LONDON, March 14, 1938—9:46 p.m.

Received March 15, 1938—1:15 a.m.

(Pol. IV 1622)

1. As may be seen from the text of Chamberlain's statement in the Commons on the Austrian question, transmitted in clear, he did not, in the historical portion of his statements, speak with absolute certainty of a German ultimatum. His version is that three ultimatums were issued. In the second ultimatum Seyss-Inquart had stated that, in case of nonacceptance, German troops would be ordered to march at 5 p.m. This fact seemed to show that Germany was behind the ultimatums. Seyss-Inquart's last ultimatum appeared to have been delivered by German planes.

On the other hand, Chamberlain informed the Commons of the German version by reading the Neurath letter. The general impression derived from this part of the statements is that the British Government believes that the German ultimatums were indeed issued.

2. Further statements strongly condemn Germany's conduct. The following main conclusions are drawn: (1) England had no obligation to Austria to take any action. (2) The sole obligation consisted in consultation with Italy and France; this obligation had been fulfilled. (3) In appraising events, it was necessary to look squarely at the facts. It was hard fact that the German action could have been stopped only if England and other powers had been determined to use force. (4) The Government could not regard the German action with indifference or complacency. The action was bound to have an effect that could not yet be calculated. (5) Definitive decisions or careless words were to be avoided. England must study the new situation quickly but with full knowledge of the circumstances. (6) The Prime Minister expressed the belief that no one would hold back from that part of the national effort to which he might be called. (Whether this is an allusion to the introduction of conscription or only to an extended armament program, is a matter for conjecture.) (7) A new armament program is being announced.

3. The statements of Attlee, the leader of the Opposition, were rather lame, demanding only the calling of the League Assembly to prevent *further* breach of law. The debate is still in progress.

4. Please forward immediately by wire to the Legation at Vienna for the Foreign Minister.

WOERMANN

No. 387

969/302567

*The German Chargé d'Affaires in Japan (Noebel) to the  
German Foreign Ministry*

Telegram

No. 106 of March 15

TOKYO, March 15, 1938—8:40 p.m.

Received March 15, 1938—6 p.m.

Events in Austria have aroused the greatest interest and find an enthusiastic response on the part of the Japanese public. In an abundance of despatches that kept streaming in, circulated partly through extra editions, the official German version of developments was from the first fully accepted.

In commentaries many columns long, with historical observations on the Austrian question, the whole press celebrated the *Anschluss* as a triumph for the determined, courageous policy on the part of the Führer which was instructive for Japan's domestic and foreign policy, as a natural fulfillment of Germany's destiny, as a tremendous gain in prestige and power for their friend Germany, as strengthening German ascendancy in central, eastern, and south-eastern Europe, as fresh proof of the gradual retreat of internally rotten "*status quo*" powers, and, in particular, as a striking test of the unflinching firmness of the Berlin-Rome Axis.

Mentioned as probable direct international effects of the *Anschluss* were a temporary postponement of the Anglo-German Agreement, the strengthening of Mussolini's position in the Anglo-Italian negotiations, and more concrete Anglo-French-Russian collaboration to insure the integrity of Czechoslovakia.

The Foreign Ministry, the army, the navy, as well as leading personalities in other circles, congratulated the Embassy or the Military and Naval Attachés, and expressed their deep satisfaction over the increase in power of a friendly group of European states as a result of the *Anschluss*.

NOEBEL

## No. 388

120/67904

*The German Ambassador in France (Welczeck) to the  
German Foreign Ministry*

Telegram

URGENT

No. 141 of March 15

PARIS, March 15, 1938.

Received March 15, 1938—7:40 p.m.

(Pol. IV 1683)

A reliable and usually well-informed agent confirms that France has more or less written off the Austrian question, but on the other hand is giving increased attention to the Spanish and Czechoslovak questions. The tendency is to end the period of inaction. Accordingly, German and Italian intervention in Spain is to be countered and French intervention apparently is to be intensified above all by means of war material and provision of technical assistance. Blum gave the Soviet Ambassador a pledge to this effect on March 14.

The Czechoslovak Minister who, as reported in the press, was likewise received by Blum on March 14 in the presence of Boncour, was given a binding pledge that, in the event of a conflict with Germany, immediately on notification by the Czechoslovak Government that it considered itself the object of an unprovoked attack, France would regard herself as being at war with Germany. Thus, in the event of German action against Czechoslovakia, waste of time by League intervention in the matter would be avoided. The pledge would hold regardless of what Britain's attitude might prove to be. The Supreme Military Council summoned for this afternoon would deal with the matter and attend to the working out of details of military measures relating to the new commitment. Appropriate negotiations with the Czechoslovak General Staff therefore are to be initiated during the course of this week.

WELCZECK

## No. 389

909/302569

*The German Ambassador to the Holy See (Bergen) to the  
German Foreign Ministry*

Telegram

No. 9 of March 15

ROME (VATICAN), March 15, 1938—6:10 p.m.

Received March 15, 1938—8 p.m.

The *Anschluss* of Austria will in due time open the Church question. Today I should like to confine myself to suggesting that

we avoid anything that might be construed as a continuance of the Austrian Concordat, which is intolerable for us. I do not, of course, know how the treaties concluded by Austria with foreign powers are to be handled.

BERGEN

### No. 390

120/67934

*The German Minister in Rumania (Fabricius) to the  
German Foreign Ministry*

Telegram

No. 54 of March 15

BUCHAREST, March 15, 1938—9:45 p.m.

Received March 16, 1938—1:10 a.m.

Beneš tried, in connection with events in German Austria, to induce Rumania to have a meeting of the Council of the Little Entente called at Bucharest. Stoyadinovich declined, so the conference was not held.

Tatarescu appears strongly influenced by the Parliamentary debate in London and concerned for the future of Czechoslovakia; this may reflect the King's sentiments.

The journey of the King to London is to be postponed. I have warned against attributing the postponement to German events, since there was no occasion to do so. Should this reason be given in the proposed communiqué, however, the German press might point out, as the more probable reason, displeasure at the refusal of Parliament to grant funds for the visit.

- FABRICIUS

### No. 391

1798/409498

*The German Ambassador in the United States (Dieckhoff) to the  
German Foreign Ministry*

Telegram

No. 80 of March 15

WASHINGTON, March 15, 1938—4:56 p.m.

Received March 16, 1938—1:25 a.m.

(Pol. IV 1712)

With reference to 61.<sup>28</sup>

The instruction was carried out last evening. Mr. Hull accepted my note without a word. In the State Department one can feel

<sup>28</sup> The circular instruction of March 14, p. 594.

plainly that there has been a change since Saturday, obviously as a result of the stiffening in the British attitude. Whereas Mr. Hull was still very sympathetic 3 days ago (see my telegram 78<sup>27</sup>), yesterday he was quite reserved, and Mr. Sumner Welles, whom I saw later, even gave expression to a sort of malevolent bitterness. This occasion again showed in characteristic fashion how the State Department takes its cue from London. In the statements of Sumner Welles, whose right to criticize, by the way, I categorically denied, one could actually recognize "his master's voice" from London. They were all arguments from Chamberlain's speech. Another source of annoyance to the State Department is probably the fact that it is being besieged by the Jews here to intervene on behalf of Jews in Vienna. Mr. Sumner Welles intimated as much to me. When he pointed out that sentiment in the United States with respect to Germany would grow very much worse if we persecuted "minorities" in Austria, I merely replied that we would do in Austria, as in the rest of Germany, exactly what we considered right, and that his remark about the possible deterioration of public opinion here could make no impression, since public opinion, at least as far as the press was concerned, was, as a result of the laissez-faire policy of the American Government, so spiteful and so bad now that it could not become worse.

The indignation in the State Department and the impotent rage to which a large section of the press gave expression yesterday and today naturally do not in any way alter the fact that the reunion of Austria with Germany is regarded here as a *fait accompli* which will have to be accepted.

DIECKHOFF

### No. 392

120/67916-17

#### *Memorandum*

In accordance with instructions, I called Mr. Kirkpatrick of the British Embassy this morning. I drew his attention to the statements of Under Secretary Butler in the House of Commons yesterday, and read to him the following D.N.B. extract:

"Under Secretary Butler stated, among other things, that the British Government had made representations through the Ambassador in Berlin looking toward the withdrawal of German troops from Austria, as well as with regard to the treatment of Catholics, Jews, and Socialists in Austria. It was impossible, said Butler, to

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<sup>27</sup> Document No. 362, p. 583.

express in words how deeply the British Government felt, particularly on the latter question, and what significance it attached to the representations for mercy and tolerance. Reports had originally been received to the effect that Germany would withdraw the army from Austria after a certain time, as soon as normal conditions had been restored.

"In view of the reports that the German and Austrian Armies had been merged, however, representations had been made in Berlin. He earnestly hoped that the assurances that had been received would be carried out (laughter from the Opposition). Stern and solemn representations had also been made with regard to Jews, Socialists, and Catholics, and assurances had been received that everything would be done to secure moderation. (Again, laughter from the benches of the Opposition.) The British Government had done its utmost to direct the attention of the authorities to this point."

It had not been possible for us to determine in the Foreign Ministry on what occasion or to whom Sir Nevile Henderson had made the above-mentioned representations.

Mr. Kirkpatrick replied that he knew nothing of such representations of the British Ambassador nor had any instructions been received from London to make such representations in Berlin. He would get in touch with London at once by telephone in order to clear up the matter and would then call me again.

After a short time, Mr. Kirkpatrick called me again and stated that in the conversation that Sir Nevile Henderson had had yesterday morning with the President of the Secret Cabinet Council, the British Ambassador had expressed to Baron Neurath the hope that the German Government would act with moderation in dealing with the followers of Herr Schuschnigg and with the Jews. Otherwise the danger existed that sentiment in England would be very unfavorably affected. I replied to Mr. Kirkpatrick that this statement by no means coincided with the statements of Under Secretary Butler in the House of Commons. Mr. Butler had spoken of the fact that "stern and solemn representations had been made on account of the Jews, Socialists, and Catholics, and that promises had been received that everything would be done in order to insure moderation." Mr. Kirkpatrick admitted that the conversation of the above-named two gentlemen was not to be construed this way, assured himself by another telephone call that Butler had actually spoken the words quoted above, and promised to investigate again in London and let me know further in the course of the day.<sup>28</sup>

BISMARCK

BERLIN, March 15, 1938.

<sup>28</sup> Since the extensive discussions and correspondence concerning this statement did not reveal any facts other than those contained in the memorandum, they have been omitted.

## No. 393

2185/472204

*Memorandum*

BERLIN, March 16, 1938.

On the occasion of the celebrations in Austria of the reunion, various statements, including official ones such as the speech of Governor [*Reichsstatthalter*] Dr. Seyss-Inquart of the 15th (see D.N.B. No. 400 of March 15), speak of a "Racial-German Reich" [*"volksdeutsches Reich"*] created by the reunion of Austria with the Reich. This phrase provides cause for serious thought both with respect to racial groups and for reasons of foreign policy, and is, moreover, contrary to the terminology established by the Führer and Chancellor personally on the occasion of *Gauleiter* Bohle's speech in Budapest, which differentiated sharply between German nationals abroad [*Auslandsdeutschtum*] and the Racial-German element [*Volksdeutschtum*].

In the presence of *Gauleiter* State Secretary Bohle, I appealed to Minister Lammers in the matter yesterday and received his permission again to call the attention of the authorities concerned to strict observance of the prescribed terminology, and, particularly, to have the question brought up at the press conference.

I would therefore ask you, in agreement with the *Reichspressechef*, to take the necessary steps—particularly to have it pointed out that the expression "Racial-German Reich" is, under all circumstances, to be avoided. I may add that State Secretary Bohle, for his part, will suggest to the Führer's Deputy that the Party authorities be instructed accordingly.

To Minister Aschmann with reference to this morning's discussion and with the request for further action.

MACKENSEN

## No. 394

1649/391808

*Memorandum*

BERLIN, March 16, 1938.

The Foreign Minister asked Herr von Weizsäcker in Vienna whether and in what way the Foreign Ministry had participated in drawing up the law concerning the reunion of Austria with the Reich, of which the Foreign Minister had been a cosignatory. Herr von Weizsäcker replied that he was not aware of any participation by the Foreign Ministry, and as I told him over the phone today,

neither was I. The Foreign Minister then spoke to the Minister of the Interior about the matter and expressed his regret that his Department had not been consulted. Reich Minister Frick replied that this view did not correspond to the truth, that, on the contrary, the Foreign Ministry had participated, Counselor of Legation Clodius having taken part in the conversations in Linz.

To Ministerial Director Wiehl with the request that, in the name of the Foreign Minister, he ask Counselor of Legation Clodius for a written official statement as to whether and by virtue of what order he was in Linz and took part in the conversations.

MACKENSEN

### No. 395

1649/391809-11

#### *Memorandum*

On the morning of Saturday, March 12, I suggested to Ministerial Director Wiehl that he send me to Vienna as soon as possible in order to assist Herr Keppler in the economic part of his conversations and assure in advance the participation of the Economic Policy Department of the Foreign Ministry in the conversations, because it would probably be necessary, particularly in the economic field, to make urgent decisions with the greatest speed. Herr Wiehl thereupon informed me that the State Secretary (the Foreign Minister being in London) had agreed to the trip. Herr Wiehl informed me at the same time that Herr Keppler had in the meantime been appointed State Secretary in the Foreign Ministry for special assignments [*zur besonderen Verwendung*] and that upon my arrival I should therefore report to him and conduct my conversations in closest liaison with him.

When I arrived in Vienna toward evening, I learned that Herr Keppler was in Linz. I therefore took advantage of a chance opportunity that evening to drive to Linz and meet Herr Keppler there. Since, however, upon my arrival next morning, Herr Keppler had already left Linz during the night, I returned to Vienna by plane after a few hours' stay and on Sunday noon placed myself at the disposal of Herr Keppler.

In Linz, State Secretary Stuckart, with whom I am well acquainted from previous negotiations in which we had both taken part, showed me various drafts of the *Austrian* law and asked me for my opinion concerning several points, and I assisted him in the formulation of a draft (I think it was the fifth). There could be no doubt in Herr Stuckart's mind that it was merely a matter of my personal opinion

in this question and that I was certainly not acting on orders from the Foreign Ministry. Herr Stuckart knows that I am at present dealing with economic questions in the Foreign Ministry; in addition, I had told him that I had come to Linz merely to meet Herr Keppler. In our short and hasty conversation (Herr Stuckart was waiting to be called to the Führer) nothing was said as to the question of approval of the drafts on the part of the Foreign Ministry.

After I had reported to Herr Keppler in Vienna at noon on Sunday the 13th, Herr Keppler and Herr Stuckart went to Federal Chancellor Seyss-Inquart. About an hour later I was called to the Chancellery by the two gentlemen because in the formulation of the *German* law, taken up there in the meantime, the question had arisen whether and to what extent the Austrian commercial treaties and payment agreements as well as the agreements concerning the Austrian foreign loans would have to be maintained. In connection with this question (article 2 of the German law), which is within my competence, I then made an exhaustive statement and participated in the negotiations with the Austrian gentlemen concerning this problem. It was originally intended to incorporate in article 2 a clause according to which the rights and obligations under the agreements concluded by Austria were to be expressly maintained. I objected on various grounds to the inclusion of this clause. Since State Secretary Keppler shared my misgivings, the clause was stricken from the draft.

After this conference in the Chancellery Herr Keppler and Herr Stuckart again left for Linz. Concerning the further handling of the draft and the manner in which the approval of the participating Reich Ministers was brought about, I know nothing.

Concerning the discussion in regard to article 2 and its interpretation in relation to commercial agreements, payment agreements, and interest service, I made a report by telephone to Ministerial Director Wiehl on Monday morning.

CLODIUS

BERLIN, March 16, 1938.

## No. 396

F14/009

*Memorandum for the Führer*

RM 170

The Counselor of the Italian Embassy, Count Magistrati, who today called on me for a different reason, informed me of the following:

He had received a telegram from the Italian Foreign Minister, Count Ciano, saying that the Italian Government would greatly welcome publication of the Führer's letter to Mussolini<sup>29</sup> in the German press as well.

I replied to Magistrati that I would be glad to ask the Führer, but that I did not think a belated publication of the letter wise. Count Magistrati then asked whether the Führer would insert into his coming Reichstag speech a passage recognizing the Brenner frontier again. Such a public confirmation would be particularly welcome to the Italian Government, since it would be the best corrective for certain tendencies which some people were showing with regard to the Tyrol.

RIBBENTROP

BERLIN, March 17, 1938.

## No. 397

1519/373085

*The Italian Ambassador in Germany (Attolico) to the German Foreign Minister<sup>30</sup>*

THURSDAY [March 17, 1938.]

MY DEAR RIBBENTROP: I am unfortunately still in bed! Magistrati has told me all about the conversation with you. Everything is all right, but allow me to tell you that a definite statement—intended for German hearers—about the Brenner is, under the circumstances, absolutely essential.

Believe me very sincerely yours,

ATTOLICO

<sup>29</sup> Document No. 352, p. 573.

<sup>30</sup> This note, the original of which was in English, was transmitted on March 17, 1938, by Erich Kordt to the State Secretary and the Director of the Political Department of the Foreign Ministry under a covering note reading as follows:

"The Foreign Minister discussed the matter with the Führer. In his address tomorrow the Führer will insert a passage concerning the Brenner frontier. Erich Kordt, B[erlin], March 17, 1938."

## No. 398

969/302625

*The German Embassy in France to the German Foreign Ministry*

Telegram

No. 155

PARIS, March 19, 1938.

Received March 19, 1938—11 a.m.

A well-known source reports as follows on the visit of the Soviet Ambassador to the Foreign Minister:

1) In answer to Litvinov's proposal to call a conference in order to prevent a repetition of attacks similar to that on Austria,<sup>81</sup> the Foreign Minister expressed the interest of the French Government and his own approval of the considerations and principles underlying the proposal. Further:

"These suggestions in their present form are very general, however, and require thorough study and painstaking research by the Governments concerned before they can be given practical expression."<sup>82</sup>

2) The Polish-Lithuanian conflict was examined.<sup>83</sup> The French Government is continuing its efforts in Warsaw to have the problems settled through normal channels. It is believed here that similar mediation by the Soviet-Russian Government in Kaunas would facilitate a friendly settlement. Should resumption of diplomatic relations, broken off between Poland and Lithuania 20 years ago, result without any serious incident from the situation, then the crisis, deplorable in itself, would in the end have served the cause of peace by eliminating one of the causes of friction in Europe.

EMBASSY

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<sup>81</sup> M. Litvinov's proposals were reported in telegram No. 83 of March 17 from Moscow, printed in vol. II, p. 176.

<sup>82</sup> The original of the quoted passage is in French.

<sup>83</sup> Documents on the Polish-Lithuanian crisis will appear in a subsequent volume.

## No. 399

1798/409706-08

*The German Chargé d'Affaires in Italy (Plessen) to the  
German Foreign Ministry*

1621/38

ROME, March 25, 1938.  
(Pol. IV 2069)

Subject: Italy and the reunion of Germany and Austria; Mussolini's address in the Chamber on March 16.

## POLITICAL REPORT

If one asks what impression the reunion of Germany and Austria has made in Italy, the following should, I think, be said:

It has undoubtedly long since been clear to Mussolini that sooner or later the *Anschluss* would become an accomplished fact. That this would happen in such an overwhelming manner, he certainly expected just as little as did the rest of the world. It was hoped here that, after the meeting in Berchtesgaden between the Führer and the then Federal Chancellor, Schuschnigg, German-Austrian relations would continue to develop peacefully. Interest in the maintenance of Austria's independence had, to be sure, abated by comparison with the past, but still existed. This is evidenced among other things by the attitude of the Italian press, which, after Schuschnigg's last speech and the publication of his plebiscite plan, was still following completely the Schuschnigg line (cf. last press report<sup>34</sup>). Then, when the well-known events took place, Mussolini oriented himself without delay to the new situation. He at no time contemplated a stand *against* us, I am firmly convinced, especially not after he had received the Führer's letter, which, according to what I was told by its bearer, had made an exceptionally strong impression on him.

How unreservedly the Duce has reconciled himself to the changed situation is evidenced among other things by the boldly formulated speech which he delivered in the Chamber on March 16, the sole subject of which was the reunion of Germany and Austria. The Foreign Ministry is familiar with the speech from the press. An indication of the contents is therefore unnecessary. I enclose the Italian text in a clipping from the *Messaggero* of March 17.<sup>35</sup>

In my opinion the speech is to be characterized as a real masterpiece of adaptation and political realism. This characterization should in no way be taken as a derogatory opinion. Quite the contrary. I was present during the speech in the Chamber; the en-

<sup>34</sup> Not printed.

<sup>35</sup> Not printed here.

thusiasm of the deputies was tremendous; the impression on public opinion here was very strong, definitely influencing its attitude. This, however, does not change the fact that in many Italian circles one meets with lack of understanding, not to say criticism, of Mussolini's stand. The circles in question are unable to reorient themselves so quickly and grasp the idea that what for many years had been pointed out to them as a primary objective of Italian policy—maintenance of Austria's independence—was given up overnight, and that the accomplished *Anschluss* with Germany is now unreservedly approved by Mussolini. That he does so from considerations of political realism, and that in his heart Mussolini is undoubtedly just as unenthusiastic about the developments in the Austrian situation as most Italians, is perhaps not quite clear to these circles.

Summing up, it should, in my opinion, be stated that the *Anschluss* is unpopular in Italy in large, politically minded circles, that, however, the Government organs have reconciled themselves to it and are endeavoring to inculcate in the public an understanding of the new situation. The "Axis" has not been weakened by it, as might have been feared, but rather has been strengthened. In addition, it is interesting that, as I hear, Count Ciano disagrees with his friends and in conversation with them expresses himself quite approvingly on the latest events.

PLESSEN

## No. 400

1798/409263-66

### *Memorandum by the Foreign Minister*

RM 206

(Pol. II 1003)

The British Ambassador, Sir Nevile Henderson, called on me today at 10:30 a.m. to give me the following information:

The British Government had sent him the two enclosed notes<sup>38</sup> on the reunion of Austria with the German Reich, with instructions to transmit them to the German Government.

I thanked the British Ambassador and said I was glad to see that the British Government, too, now acknowledged the reunion of Austria with the Reich. To my question regarding the nature of the reservations contained in the note, Sir Nevile replied that the British Government recognized the reunion. In his opinion, the reservations referred to questions of customs, trade, and consular

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<sup>38</sup> Not printed.

representation. He had not received any definite information on this subject yet, but expected to receive instructions shortly.<sup>37</sup>

Sir Nevile then made the request that Mack, the British Secretary of Legation, who was remaining in Vienna for the time being, might continue to enjoy his extraterritorial status until the Legation had been changed to a Consulate General. He further requested that, as far as possible, Mr. Mack's work in Vienna be facilitated.

I told the British Ambassador that I would take the necessary steps.

Sir Nevile then asked me whether he might sometime write me privately about certain persons in Austria who had found themselves in personal difficulties there after the reunion. He wished to emphasize that he was not making an official appeal to me, as he had no authority whatever for so doing. It was a matter, among others, of Prince Hohenberg, whose father-in-law, Wood, had appealed to him.

I informed the British Ambassador that I would be glad to receive his letter and would have the subject looked into.

Sir Nevile next mentioned the case of the expulsion of the Vienna representative of the *Daily Telegraph*, Gedye. Lord Halifax had written that he had been put in a somewhat awkward position because of this expulsion. During his stay in Berlin he had talked to Dr. Goebbels about the question of expelling newspapermen, and at that time it had been agreed that, before an expulsion, the case should first be discussed through diplomatic channels in order to give the newspaper concerned an opportunity to recall its representative of its own accord. In the case in question this had, unfortunately, not been done. Sir Nevile further stated that in the future, before newspapermen were expelled, he would be grateful if we could proceed in this manner. I expressed my agreement.

The conversation then turned to my interview of March 10 in London with Lord Halifax, in which he gave me an interpretation of the British standpoint on the colonial question.<sup>38</sup> I said that I was not quite clear on this matter and should like to inform him of my interpretation:

If I had correctly understood, the offer made by Sir Nevile Henderson had the following content:

1) England wished to ascertain whether Germany, in case of a transfer of colonies in the Congo basin, would be prepared to accept certain restrictions;

<sup>37</sup> The archives of the German Foreign Ministry contain voluminous material both on the more technical problems growing out of the annexation of Austria and on the representations, similar to that of Sir Nevile Henderson, made in favor of imprisoned Austrians by foreign governments and individuals.

<sup>38</sup> Document No. 145, p. 253.

2) If Germany were prepared to do this, England would consider, as Lord Halifax stated to me on March 10, transferring to Germany a colonial territory with full rights of sovereignty.

3) The British Government, however, had not intended to offer through Henderson a territory already definitely delimited.

The British Ambassador assured me that this interpretation corresponded with his personal view. As far as the continuation of our conversations was concerned, we would now probably have to start from the beginning.

I answered Sir Neville Henderson in a manner similar to that in which I had expressed myself on March 10 to Lord Halifax. In my opinion, since the clarification of the Austrian problem, the further development of Anglo-German relations seemed much easier than before. I had been pleased to read that the Archbishop of Canterbury had, a short while ago, taken such a realistic position on the Austrian question in the House of Lords. Mr. Neville Chamberlain had, it was true, stated in the House of Commons that the present moment did not appear favorable for negotiations.

Sir Neville Henderson replied that it was, of course, necessary to reckon with public opinion and democracy in England. Some time might well elapse before it was possible to have further talks. I replied to Sir Neville that we should probably have an opportunity soon to come back to this question.

RIBBENTROP

BERLIN, April 2, 1938.

## No. 401

1798/409919-27

*The German Ambassador in the United States (Dieckhoff) to the German Foreign Ministry*

Nr. 690

WASHINGTON, April 18, 1938.

Received April 30, 1938.

(Pol. IV 2987)

Subject: The attitude of the United States toward the reunion of Austria with the Reich.

I reported in March on the reception which the news of Austria's reunion with the Reich found in the United States. It might be of interest if I gave a summary description of how public opinion here reacted, now that the accomplished fact of the *Anschluss* has everywhere been accepted and the American Government has finally taken account of it in its note of April 6.<sup>39</sup>

<sup>39</sup> Text in Department of State, *Press Releases*, vol. XVIII (1938), p. 465.

It was interesting to note that the reports concerning the plebiscite announced by Herr Schuschnigg on March 9 were received here with apprehension and even annoyance. In the State Department, after the first surprise, the opinion was expressed that this step could hardly turn out well for Herr Schuschnigg; "that fellow is asking for trouble."<sup>40</sup> The press, too, which usually treated Herr Schuschnigg with particular sympathy, held its breath and was surprisingly reticent; in no reputable newspaper did I find gratification at the idea of this plebiscite, or even the expectation that through a plebiscite of this kind the Austrian problem could possibly be brought closer to a solution. On the contrary, the *New York Times* gave clear expression to the opinion that it was a trick and a farce, by describing in detail the peculiar character of this plebiscite, which was to take place only 4 days after being announced and was obviously to give no opportunity to the Opposition to state their case. Under these circumstances the excitement in National Socialist circles in Austria and the tense interest in the Reich, as reported in the press here on March 10 and 11 ("Berlin stunned"<sup>40</sup>), found rather wide understanding. And when it became known on the afternoon of March 11 that Herr Schuschnigg had given up his plan for a plebiscite and resigned, it was considered an altogether logical development; Herr Schuschnigg was even made the subject of ironic remarks of all kinds concerning his pitiful exit and his melodramatic parting words over the radio "God bless Austria."

The news of the Chancellorship of Seyss-Inquart was also received here with perfect calm. The report that the new Chancellor had requested the dispatch of German troops was given full credence, and even the rapid succession of despatches on March 12 concerning the entry of the German Army and the appearance of German air squadrons were at first predominantly impartial; many of these reports, which gave details concerning the enthusiastic reception of our troops by the Austrian population, were actually sympathetic. A particularly profound and lasting impression was made by the Führer's proclamation of March 12, which became known here in the morning hours and which I found Secretary of State Hull studying carefully when I called on him toward noon and gave him our interpretation of the developments of the last few days. Mr. Hull asked a number of questions, showed a keen interest, but gave no evidence of any apprehension, nor did he express any critical or even disapproving attitude. This was also the tone of the newspapermen who, after my call on Mr. Hull, interviewed me in the

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\* The original of the quoted passage is in English.

corridor of the State Department and who obviously appreciated fully the German point of view as I briefly explained it to them. When, in conclusion, I told them that my friend, the Austrian Minister, had asked me to let him have a swastika flag and that this flag was now waving over the Austrian Legation, they all dashed off to convince themselves of this with their own eyes as quickly as possible; the afternoon newspapers carried not only illustrations of the Austrian Legation with the swastika flying over it, but published the substance of my brief statements in detail and really quite favorably. The Sunday morning press (March 13) was also, on the whole, still quite reasonable, even though there were already heard some discordant notes which placed our entry into Austria on a level with the 1914 invasion of Belgium and spoke of a big defeat for Mussolini, who had been badly taken in by Hitler, etc.

On Monday the 14th a sudden change took place. The Linz laws of the preceding day, the swift execution of the *Anschluss*, the large number of German troops that had marched in, the plebiscite announced for April 10—all this was discussed very critically and, in some papers, with hostile condemnation. The German action was stigmatized as a breach of treaty, as militarism, as the rape of defenseless little Austria by her big neighbor bristling with arms, and as the consequence of the policy of "might makes right." I have been unable to find out the exact cause of this sudden change. Probably several factors were at work. As far as the shaping of the opinion of the American Government is concerned, I have reason to believe that the President intervened personally and gave instructions to both the State Department and the press. Whether he made this decision on his own initiative or whether British and French influence played a contributory part, I cannot tell. There was probably no need for foreign influence. Considering what the President thinks of democracy as opposed to the authoritarian state, and considering how he has publicly committed himself—partly, of course, for obvious political reasons—he can hardly welcome the fact that an authoritarian state should acquire such increased power and such heightened prestige as Germany has through its annexation of Austria, especially by a method which Mr. Roosevelt, from his point of view, probably considers a breach of existing treaties. I cannot tell to what extent the additional idea was in the President's mind that after the successful Austrian coup Germany might be led to violate Czechoslovakia next, thus endangering the peace of Europe, and that it was therefore necessary for America to speak up and deter the Germans in time. I have before me reliable reports that, during the days in question, influence to

this effect was exerted on the President by England and especially France. Finally Mr. Roosevelt may also have been influenced by the fact that a diversion of public opinion from the unpleasant domestic economic and political conditions would be desirable, as well as by the fact that he had a certain interest in making the international situation appear as sombre as possible in order to use "the danger of war" to justify more plausibly the big Navy bill pending in Congress. In the State Department they were probably, from the very outset, thinking less of Austria than of Czechoslovakia, with all the possible complications, and for that reason wanted to pull vigorously in an opposite direction; at any rate the *Anschluss*, carried out with such surprise, brought into action during the 13th and 14th all those forces in the State Department which disapprove of any strengthening of Germany—a fact which contributed toward the change in tone. I have described elsewhere in my reports with what reserve Mr. Hull received me the afternoon of March 14, when, in accordance with instructions, I notified him of the reunion. Although he was courteous as always and did not belie the "Southern Gentleman"<sup>42</sup> that he is, he carefully avoided saying a word on the topic, and merely made a dry remark that he would have the note translated; for the rest, he spoke at length of his being overloaded with work and of a sore throat. More animated was the subsequent conversation with Under Secretary of State Sumner Welles, who in contrast with his usual correct and friendly attitude, received me almost sourly. When I remarked that I had come only to inform him briefly of my call on Mr. Hull, and not to discuss Austria with him officially, he retorted that if that was the case, he wanted to give me his personal opinion, which he then gave to me without reserve and which to a large extent tallied with the Chamberlain address in the House of Commons of the same date, received by cable a few hours earlier. I did not fail to answer him.

As far as the press is concerned, aside from the cue given by its own Government, two further factors might have contributed to the change in mood on the 14th. First, the news from London and Paris, in which, beginning with the evening of the 13th, after the Linz laws had become known, all the stops were drawn against Germany; then, the campaign of the numerous anti-German elements in this country, who had been unable to keep up with the breathtaking developments of the first few days but had now found their voice again and were giving vent to their anger in the shrillest tones. Which of these various factors may have carried most weight, it is difficult to tell. When one now notes how, in the last few

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<sup>42</sup> The quoted phrase is in English in the original.

days, in complete synchronization with the calming down in the British press, the American press has suddenly grown quieter again, one arrives at the conclusion—which I have repeatedly seen confirmed—that the *British* watchword is of considerable, if not decisive, significance to the American press, at least in all questions concerning European policy. It is important to establish this fact: the key to the attitude of the American press, as far as European questions are concerned, is no doubt at present in London, even though this is energetically denied by most Americans.

The press campaign, which began on March 14, is known to the Foreign Ministry. Apart from the *Wehrmacht*, whose behavior was universally commended in the reports of American correspondents, pretty nearly everything else that had come from Germany to Austria or that was done in Austria by Germany was regarded with suspicion, was garbled, and was distorted. The method of the *Anschluss*, the measures which were taken between March 13 and date of the plebiscite, and the plebiscite itself and its result were presented in an altogether unfavorable light and were accompanied at times by almost morbid outbursts of hatred. The newspapers were full, and are still full, of general and detailed reports of looting and ill-treatment of Jews, brutal treatment of the aged scholar Freud, of the alleged holding of Schuschnigg's son as a hostage, of the dismissal without notice of non-Aryans from their posts as musicians, physicians, etc., of the harsh treatment of Catholic priests and members of religious orders, and much more. This campaign continued for more than 3 weeks and reached its zenith shortly before the plebiscite. Then a certain amount of sobriety and calm set in, in which connection it was again to be noted that the press here followed London's lead. The return to moderation here was probably also due in some measure to the fact that, in spite of all the statements to the contrary, the Catholic clergy in Austria, headed by Cardinal Innitzer, sided openly with Germany and that the speeches delivered during the plebiscite campaign, especially the exceedingly impressive addresses of the Führer and Chancellor, had a very telling effect here. The realization that large numbers of Austrian refugees, especially of the Jewish race, would constitute no blessing for America, might also have contributed to this sobering up; and it was interesting to note the letters to the papers, especially from the middle strata of the population, criticizing the American Government's readiness to admit such refugees and thus further depress the labor market. The fact that the British and French Governments as early as the end of March had officially drawn the logical conclusions from the *Anschluss* and turned their diplomatic

missions in Vienna into Consulates, contributed further to the cooling down here, so that finally the American Government could not do otherwise than follow the same course, even though quite belatedly and in a very reluctant and ungracious manner. That it did so even before the plebiscite has been explained to me by various sources as due to the fact that it did not wish to wait until afterward because this could have been interpreted by Germany as a recognition of the plebiscite. The note to Berlin was therefore purposely delivered as early as April 6 in order to show that no significance was attached to the plebiscite. Although the attitude of the United States Government was sullen and surly, it was not incorrect; Austria no longer appears in the official Washington *Diplomatic List* for April, published by the Department of State, which has just appeared. In these exciting weeks it was interesting that the Diplomatic Corps was either as quiet as a mouse or showed its disapproval of the German action rather openly. The Polish Ambassador, Count Potocki, was the only one who openly and cordially congratulated me and who did not hide this attitude of his before the Americans either. The Italian Ambassador, M. Suvich, was neither seen nor heard during all these decisive days. The German-American element was completely silent. With the exception of an insignificant demonstration by a few German-American societies in New York, which was passed over in complete silence by the English-language press and of which the greater part of the population was therefore unaware, the German-Americans, as usual, kept timidly aloof. It was striking that the Congress took no stand on the German action in Austria and that neither Representatives nor Senators made use of the popular method of expressing their opinions on everything between heaven and earth. Only Senator Borah, in a really classical radio and press statement, elucidated the Austrian problem and its development, and he may to a certain extent have promoted an understanding of the German action among wide circles.

The Embassy, of course, has tried everything to bring enlightenment. In political circles here and in financial circles in New York I have tried especially, wherever I was able to do so, to counter the false news and the apprehensions of war.

DIECKHOFF

## No. 402

1519/373095-97

*The German Foreign Ministry to Various German  
Diplomatic Missions*<sup>43</sup>BERLIN, April 28, 1938.  
(Pol. IV 2869)

For information.

As a consequence of the reunion of Austria with the Reich we have obtained new frontiers with Italy, Yugoslavia, Switzerland, Liechtenstein, and Hungary. These frontiers are considered by us as final and inviolable. On this point the following statements have been made:

*1) Italy:*

In his Reichstag address of March 18, 1938, the Führer and Chancellor referred to the letter he had addressed to Mussolini on March 11 and pointed out that he had assured Mussolini in it "that in the German attitude toward Italy after this event not only will there be no change, but that, just as in regard to France, Germany also recognizes the then existing frontiers with Italy as final."

In the same Reichstag address the Führer made the following additional declaration: "We know what Mussolini's attitude has meant for Germany in these days. If any strengthening of relations between Italy and Germany was possible, it has now taken place. What was a bond based on our common ideology and interests has become for us Germans an indissoluble friendship, and the territory and frontiers of this friend are for us inviolable. I repeat that I shall never forget this attitude of Mussolini's! I want the Italian people to know that my word is backed by the German nation!"

*2) Switzerland:*

On March 14 the German Minister at Bern reminded Federal Councilor Motta of the assurances of respect for the independence and inviolability of Switzerland, which, on entering on his post and on authorization from the Führer and Chancellor, he had transmitted to M. Motta. In substance these assurances amounted to a repetition of the well-known declaration by the Führer and Chancellor, made to the former Federal Councilor, M. Schulthess, on February 23, 1937, the keynote of which was: "Come what may, we shall always respect Switzerland's inviolability and neutrality." On March 15 the

<sup>43</sup> List of addressees not printed.

Swiss Government informed the press of these statements of the German Minister to M. Motta, which then were published, though in some cases not quite accurately.

3) *Liechtenstein:*

Concerning the Principality of Liechtenstein the German Minister in Bern informed the Swiss Government of the attitude of the German Government, which was to the effect that we had no objection to the continued existence of an independent Principality of Liechtenstein in its present status, but that we considered undesirable any endeavors intended to bring the Principality into closer relations to Switzerland than those already existing. Likewise efforts aimed at the neutralization of the Principality of Liechtenstein, separate from that of Switzerland, seemed undesirable to us, since such neutralization could acquire real significance only if Switzerland on her part gave up her policy of neutrality in a manner running counter to our interests.

4) *Yugoslavia:*

The Yugoslav Government has been informed by an authoritative German source that German policy had no aims beyond Austria and that the Yugoslav border would in any case remain untouched. The Führer and Chancellor then declared in his address of April 3 in Graz that Yugoslavia and Hungary had taken the same attitude as Italy toward the reunion of Austria. We were happy to have frontiers here which relieved us of the trouble of providing military protection for them.

5) *Hungary:*

The Hungarian Government has been informed by our Minister at Budapest that the declarations which we had made to Italy, Yugoslavia, and Switzerland concerning the new frontiers were, of course, equally valid for the new German-Hungarian frontier. With our approval the Hungarian Foreign Minister, Kanya, in his address of March 23 before the Committees on Foreign Affairs of the House of Deputies and the Upper House, pointed out that the Reich Government had left no doubt whatsoever that it considered the present German-Hungarian frontier just as inviolable as the German frontiers with Yugoslavia, Italy, and Switzerland.

WEIZSÄCKER

No. 403

2308/484319, 484318

*The German Foreign Ministry to the Office of the Foreign Ministry  
in Vienna*

BERLIN, May 2, 1938.

(Pol. IV 2927)

A certain Herr Oskar Janiczek, Pereiragasse 23, Vienna 14, is sending out a circular letter, a copy of which is enclosed. The purpose expressed in this circular letter, namely, to give a comprehensive picture of the activities of the courier service of the *Landesleitung* of the N.S.D.A.P.-Austria, seems objectionable because such a publication might give a clue to the conduct of certain Party authorities in interfering [*hinsichtlich der Einmischung*] during the period of conflict with Austria, which could hardly serve the interests of Reich policy.

I should appreciate a clarification of the facts in the case and, if necessary, suitable intervention. I respectfully await your report.

By direction:

A[LTENBURG]

[Enclosure]

VIENNA, April 20, 1938.

MY DEAR COMRADE: At the time I sent you our last illegal *Oesterreichischer Beobachter* I did not suspect that in a few days—thanks to our Führer—victory would be won for our movement. Not even our firmest faith led us to imagine that we should experience a political upheaval of such suddenness and such magnitude, with attainment of what we thought were our still distant goals.

Now we can admit openly that we are National Socialist and give our real names without fear for our daily bread and our freedom. Thus I, known as Karl Born, Vienna, during the illegal period, now introduce myself correctly as Oskar Janiczek, railway employee, Pereiragasse 23, Vienna 14.

I am endeavoring to write a complete report of the activities of the courier service of the *Landesleitung* of the N.S.D.A.P.-Austria, which I directed, and, among other things, I request all the comrades to whom, by order of the executive offices of the *Landesleitung*, I sent our *O[esterreichischer] B[eobachter]* to acknowledge the receipt of our illegal literature, supplying their names, occupations, and addresses, and indicating the dates.

Upon receipt of such acknowledgment, I will gladly send by return mail the remaining unused stamps sent by any of my comrades to my former cover address to defray the cost of postage. My thanks for your trouble!

Heil Hitler!

Faithfully yours,

JANICZEK

No. 404

1649/391822-23

*Memorandum*

(Pol. IV 3614)

Drafting Officer: Counselor of Legation Altenburg.

It is understandable that the harshly oppressive methods which the former regime in Austria used against the National population were bound to produce a reaction after the revolution [*Umbruch*]. This expressed itself in the arrest of numerous leaders and officials of the former Federal Government, for instance State Secretary Skubl, President Kienböck, Mayor Schmitz of Vienna, Ministers Vollgruber,<sup>44</sup> Hornbostel, Ludwig, Jordan (Consul General in Munich), and others. Likewise a number of leading personalities of the Legitimist movement were sent to concentration camps because of the provocative public announcement by Otto von Hapsburg. Of these we might mention the two Princes Hohenberg and Count Balthasar Hoyos. As more than two months have now elapsed since the *Anschluss*, it seems advisable to examine the entire situation in order to coordinate the situation in Austria with the domestic situation in the Reich. In this connection one should proceed from the assumption that all persons who may rightfully be charged with disloyalty, treachery, treasonable conduct, and the like should be brought to trial and sentenced accordingly. However, those persons against whom the institution of court proceedings does not seem feasible should be set free; any need to secure their persons could be satisfied by taking away their passports and requiring them to report to the police. Action in this direction would be desirable for reasons of foreign policy, because international public opinion, especially in political circles in England, has eagerly followed the events in Austria since the *Anschluss*, and because the various arrests are time and again exploited in England in order to spread atrocity stories against us. The suggested procedure would serve to produce in international public opinion a calmer appraisal

<sup>44</sup> Alois Vollgruber, former Austrian Minister in France.

of the situation in Austria. It might be best to discuss the matter orally with the *Reichsführer-SS*.

Herewith submitted to the Foreign Minister.

WEIZSÄCKER<sup>45</sup>

BERLIN, May 16, 1938.

No. 405

1649/391824-26

*Memorandum*

BERLIN, July 5, 1938.

(Pol. I 1676 g)

Today I carried on a lengthy conversation with *SS-Gruppenführer* Heydrich concerning the settlement of pending cases of arrested persons in Austria.

I made a distinction between:

- 1) Former officials of the Austrian Foreign Service
- 2) Well-known political personalities
- 3) Legitimists and
- 4) Scholars.

As far as the first category is concerned—the officials of the former Austrian Foreign Service—I requested that the Foreign Ministry be informed of the specific charges against those under arrest. We had no intention of exerting our influence in favor of persons who were to face court proceedings. We would, however, like to know the facts concerning this group. In some cases, as for instance that of Herr Vollgruber (Paris), the arrest was perhaps based solely on material from the Foreign Ministry; in others, there might also be charges with which we were not familiar.

*Gruppenführer* Heydrich will proceed in accordance with my request and place the evidence at the disposal of the Foreign Ministry. Wherever, in the opinion of both of us, a release might be feasible, we could always come to an agreement as to whether a definite place of residence as well as the duty to report to the police are to be required and also whether a reduction in pension might be indicated.

Any further action will have to be taken after receipt of the material promised.

As regards the better known political personalities that come under No. 2, *Gruppenführer* Heydrich mentioned that State Secretary Skubl was free. Schuschnigg was held under quite tolerable

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<sup>45</sup> A notation in Weizsäcker's hand reads as follows: "The Foreign Minister would like to defer for 4 weeks this inherently welcome suggestion. W."

conditions of custody. Whether court proceedings were to be started against Schuschnigg could not as yet be determined with certainty from the material so far available. The fate of Herren Hornbostel, Adam, Ludwig, Schmitz, and so on, would necessarily depend on the possible action against Schuschnigg. His release could not be considered for the time being because of the danger of subversive activities.

As for the Legitimists, there were quite objectionable activities chargeable to them. Heydrich offered me additional material concerning Prince Ernst Hohenberg, which we could use in dealing with the British Ambassador. The Legitimists had obviously received British subsidies for a long time. British intercession in behalf of the persons in question was a clear indication of their strong anti-German attitude.

Concerning category 4) *Gruppenführer* Heydrich took notes after I had given him the names from telegram No. 311 from London.<sup>46</sup> As regards Professor Schroedinger, there was already supposed to be some information in the Foreign Ministry. This should be checked.

In general *Gruppenführer* Heydrich had the following to say: the requirements of foreign policy not to let the Austrian arrests become a constant burden for us was in full accord with his personal wishes and plans. Of the persons arrested after the *Anschluss*, about four-fifths had already been discharged. The remainder numbered not quite 2,000 persons in all (I think Heydrich mentioned the figure 1,900). About two weeks ago the Gestapo ordered a sifting of the records of all prisoners. It intended to have court proceedings instituted wherever there was evidence for it. The others are to be released with the exception of those who, although they could not be tried, could not be released either, since they might become the center of politically dangerous groups.

In principle Heydrich and I were agreed that in reply to queries on the part of foreign diplomats concerning individual Germans, no official information was to be given out. On the other hand, in some cases, where suitable material was available, the baselessness of foreign accusations might be demonstrated. *Gruppenführer* Heydrich intends to inform the Foreign Ministry of such cases.

WEIZSÄCKER<sup>47</sup>

<sup>46</sup> Not printed.

<sup>47</sup> An unsigned notation on this document reads as follows: "Please continue to follow such cases. If no progress is made in relations with the Gestapo officials, then I would have to speak to *Gruppenführer* Heydrich again in about a month.

"Please consider to what extent Ambassador Dirksen should perhaps be informed for his own information."

CHAPTER III  
GERMANY AND THE UNITED STATES,  
AUGUST 1937-SEPTEMBER 1938

A. THE IDEOLOGICAL CONFLICT, AUGUST-DECEMBER 1937

No. 406

2422/511380

*The German Ambassador in the United States (Dieckhoff) to the  
German Foreign Ministry*

Telegram

URGENT

WASHINGTON, August 5, 1937—6:42 p.m.

VERY SECRET

Received August 6, 1937—4:45 a.m.

CONFIDENTIAL

(Pol. IX 780)

No. 222 of August 5

With reference to telegram No. 150 of the 5th.<sup>1</sup>

For the Foreign Minister and the State Secretary.

1. It has thus far not been possible to obtain the exact wording of Dodd's statement.<sup>2</sup> Excerpts containing the essential parts have meanwhile been cabled by D.N.B.

2. I took advantage of a call which I made at the State Department on another matter today to mention Dodd's statements both to Secretary of State Hull and to Under Secretary Welles, and to inquire what was known about them. Hull, and later Welles also, told me that so far they had seen only the short Associated Press report in the *New York Times* and consequently could not yet comment on the statements. Hull added that Dodd's pet hobby was known to be ideal Jeffersonian democracy and world peace; on this subject Dodd was "somewhat insane."<sup>3</sup> Moreover, Dodd certainly had had no particular country in mind. I said that I was speaking without instructions; I assumed, however, that the derogatory remarks of the Ambassador, who was accredited to the German Government and had just come from Germany, would be widely interpreted as applying to Germany. Under these circumstances

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

<sup>2</sup> William E. Dodd, American Ambassador in Germany, June 13, 1933-December 29, 1937. In his remarks at Norfolk on August 4, 1937, Ambassador Dodd had made a statement to the effect that the basic objective of some of the powers in Europe was to frighten and even destroy democracies everywhere.

<sup>3</sup> The quoted passage is in English in the original.

I feared that Dodd's personal standing in Berlin would be unfavorably affected. I also stressed the fact that, as was apparent from Associated Press despatches, it was a question not of a slip of the tongue but of a prepared statement.

I think this incident should be ignored in the German press, or at least not played up too much, in order not to cool the inclination to recall Dodd from Berlin, which has existed in various quarters here for some time.

DIECKHOFF

No. 407

2422/511391-92

*The American Ambassador to Germany (Dodd) to the  
German Foreign Minister<sup>4</sup>*

AUGUST 31, 1937.  
(zu Pol. IX 1002/37)

DEAR MR. SECRETARY: I was surprised yesterday when Secretary Hull told me that my good friend, Ambassador Dieckhoff, had protested against my little interview given to press people in Norfolk August 4. The Secretary said to me that he saw nothing wrong at all in my interview. I am sending verbatim copy of what I said. You will see no reference at all to Germany, except appreciation of Martin Luther. If there was any criticism at all it was of certain things done in my own country where not a word of criticism has yet been published—if so I would simply give historical proof. I am sure you agree that history ought to be recognized by us all.

Yours sincerely,

WM. E. DODD

No. 408

2422/511388-90

*Memorandum*

(Pol. IX 1002)

On August 5 the following D.N.B. despatch was received at the Foreign Ministry:

"New York, August 4. The United States Ambassador in Berlin, Dodd, upon his arrival at Norfolk, Virginia, declared in a prepared statement that European nations, in spite of their tragic experiences in the World War, were rushing headlong into debt in order to prepare for another world war, which would in all probability destroy

<sup>4</sup>The original of this letter is in English. It was written during Ambassador Dodd's absence in the United States.

civilization. A basic objective of some powers was to frighten, even destroy democracies everywhere."

The Embassy at Washington was requested by wire the same day to send a telegraphic report of the Dodd interview.

The Embassy replied that it had not been possible to obtain the exact wording of the statement. But Ambassador Dieckhoff had taken advantage of a call at the State Department on another matter to mention Dodd's statements to both Secretary of State Hull and Under Secretary Welles and to inquire what was known about them. Hull, and later Welles also, told the Ambassador that so far they had seen only the short Associated Press despatch in the *New York Times* and consequently could not yet comment on the statements. Hull added that Dodd's pet hobby was known to be ideal Jeffersonian democracy and world peace; on this subject Dodd was "somewhat insane."

We have no newspaper clippings here giving the exact text of the Dodd interview, nor do we have the Associated Press report referred to by Secretary of State Hull.

Nothing more was done by Pol. IX,<sup>5</sup> since Ambassador Dieckhoff also considered no further steps necessary.

In the event that the interview actually appeared in the American press in the form communicated by Mr. Dodd to the Foreign Minister, there will be no grounds for protest, although it cannot be denied that several of the statements are likely to be interpreted by the American public as referring to Germany (for example: "A basic objective of some powers is to frighten, even destroy democracies everywhere").

I recommend that no reply be sent to Dodd's letter. Dodd apparently has a bad conscience as far as we are concerned because of his protest against the acceptance by the American Chargé d'Affaires here<sup>6</sup> of the invitation to the Party Rally, and would now like to improve his position in Berlin. We have no reason to help him fulfill this wish. Besides, a reply will be superfluous, because, according to newspaper reports, Dodd will resume his post here in October.

FREYTAG

BERLIN, September 23, 1937.

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<sup>5</sup> The political division of the German Foreign Ministry dealing with American affairs.

<sup>6</sup> Prentiss B. Gilbert, who had accepted an invitation to attend the Nazi Party Rally at Nuremberg during the absence of Ambassador Dodd in the United States.

Herewith respectfully submitted, together with two enclosures,<sup>6a</sup> to the Reich Minister through the Director of the Political Department and the State Secretary.

FREXTAG<sup>7</sup>

No. 409

224/150498-97

*The German Ambassador in the United States (Dieckhoff) to the German Foreign Ministry*

Telegram

VERY SECRET

New York, September 27, 1937—9:36 a.m.  
No. 67 of September 27      Received September 28, 1937—7 a.m.

Confidential; for the Foreign Minister and the State Secretary.

On the *Europa* I met Sumner Welles, who was returning to Washington after a short trip through Italy, France, England, and Belgium. The purpose of his trip was not, as reported in the newspapers, sounding out the European powers most interested in the Far East problem, but relaxation. To be sure, Welles availed himself of the opportunity to discuss with some leading men the important questions now pending and, in addition to a talk with Eden, had extensive conversations with Cadogan,<sup>8</sup> Chautemps, Bonnet, and van Zeeland. Welles gave the following details, requesting that they be treated as confidential:

1) No change in the passive attitude of England toward the Sino-Japanese conflict was to be expected for the time being. As to the attitude of the United States, Welles asserted that he was at present uninformed, but he assumed that here, too, no change would take place.

2) With regard to the Spanish question, Chautemps, in particular, had emphatically assured him that the two Western Powers were prepared to come to terms [*paktieren*] with Franco, if given assurance that the *status quo* of Spanish territory (as far as continental Spain, the islands, and African possessions were concerned) would be maintained. He had found in London and Paris a strong

<sup>6a</sup> No enclosures accompany the file copy of this memorandum.

<sup>7</sup> A marginal notation, apparently in Mackensen's hand, dated September 23, reads as follows: "I concur with this suggestion."

A marginal notation by Weizsäcker, dated the 24th, reads: "I agree with the memorandum, but recommend that Ambassador Dieckhoff be given an opportunity to give his opinion, so that we may have it here when Dodd calls on the Foreign Minister about the middle of October."

Another marginal notation, apparently in Kotze's hand, dated the 28th, reads: "The Foreign Minister wishes to have this statement before Dodd's return."

<sup>8</sup> Sir Alexander Cadogan, British Deputy Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

distrust of Italy's willingness to respect the *status quo* of Spanish territory.

3) The general armament race was anxiously followed in the capitals Welles had visited, and everywhere—even in London, he said—there was the primary wish to enter soon into conversations on armament limitation with Germany and Italy. This desire had been expressed to him with especial emphasis in Paris; Chautemps and Bonnet (the latter of whom, Welles believes, will in the near future become Prime Minister) had both told him that France attached great importance to conversations with Germany.

As far as raw materials and colonial questions are concerned, Welles said that he had found in London and Paris a readiness to make concessions, but only in connection with the limitation of armaments.

4) Anglo-American negotiations for a trade agreement had recently entered upon a favorable stage. The British Government finally recognized that conclusion of the trade agreement was a necessary condition for Anglo-American cooperation on a wider scale—a point on which Welles, pursuant to instructions, had laid particular emphasis in London. The Dominions, too, were now prepared to make concessions. If the October elections in Australia endorsed the present Government and if certain difficulties in Canada were eliminated, there were good prospects for an early conclusion of the trade agreement. As Welles emphasized, the way would then be open for negotiations for a trade agreement between the United States and Germany.

5) Dodd's position in Germany was well enough known. Dodd, as he frankly confessed, is as incomprehensible to him as to us. Dodd's recall had been as good as decided upon some time ago, but in recent weeks, so Welles had heard from Washington, this decision had again been put off for domestic reasons. Welles will take up the Dodd case immediately upon his return.

DIECKHOFF

## No. 410

2422/511393

*The German Ambassador in the United States (Dieckhoff) to the German Foreign Ministry*

Telegram

VERY SECRET

WASHINGTON, October 1, 1937—12:26 p.m.

CONFIDENTIAL

Received October 1, 1937—8:25 p.m.

No. 261 of October 1

(Pol. IX 1053)

For the Foreign Minister and the State Secretary.

In continuation of the last item of the telegram of September 27 from New York.

Sumner Welles asked me to call on him today and informed me, as Hugh Wilson<sup>9</sup> had Herr Thomsen<sup>10</sup> on September 20 (see Report No. 1236 of September 20<sup>11</sup>), that the American Government had decided to recall Ambassador Dodd from his post on January 1. Mr. Dodd would return to Berlin soon, but only to arrange his affairs there. Upon his departure from here Mr. Dodd would probably announce his resignation to the press; the Government requests that it be kept secret until then.

DIECKHOFF

## No. 411

2422/511417-18

*Memorandum*

BERLIN, October 2, 1937.

The American Chargé d'Affaires called on me for the first time today and spoke at great length and with concern about the serious and disturbing effects upon German-American relations caused by the conduct of Germans in the United States. Gilbert, whom I have known for a long time and who for that reason was very frank, did not claim that actions or directives of the *Auslandsorganisation* were to blame. However, the mere fact that it was believed in America that the German colonies there took orders from Germany made his countrymen nervous. This uneasiness was increased by the parading of Germans in brown uniforms, by antidemocratic statements, and by questionnaires allegedly sent out from Berlin to the leaders of

<sup>9</sup> Hugh R. Wilson, American Assistant Secretary of State from July 9, 1937, and Ambassador to Germany, January 17, 1938-January 31, 1940.

<sup>10</sup> Hans Thomsen, Counselor of Embassy in the German Embassy in the United States.

<sup>11</sup> Not printed.

the German colonies concerning the private affairs of German citizens, etc. Gilbert assured me that he had not been instructed to make an official *démarche*, but mentioned letters which he had received from the State Department regarding this matter.

I asked the Chargé to cite specific cases rather than mention generalities. For only then could I investigate matters successfully. I asked him in particular whether these Germans in the United States had violated the laws of the land; in that case the police would presumably have intervened of their own accord. However, Gilbert maintained that not everything which was not prohibited in the United States was at the same time popular and beneficial to our relations. He really would feel serious concern if belief in the direct and strict dependence of the Germans in the United States upon the home organizations was not dispelled. The situation was aggravated by the fact that German nationals in the United States who had so-called "first papers" could vote in some States. For this reason, concern over German meddling in American domestic politics was inevitable.

I recommended to the Chargé that he request an early conversation with the Chief of the *Auslandsorganisation*.

WEIZSÄCKER

[A marginal notation reads as follows:]

Herr Lehmann: I request our material regarding this question, such as Embassy reports, etc., possibly in other departments, too.  
F[reitag]

## No. 412

153/82163

*The German Ambassador in the United States (Dieckhoff) to the  
German Foreign Ministry*

Telegram

No. 264 of October 7      WASHINGTON, October 7, 1937—2:49 p.m.  
Received October 7, 1937—11 p.m.

The view I expressed in telegram No. 263,<sup>12</sup> that the President's speech was directed mainly against Japan,<sup>13</sup> continues to find corroboration. For the time being, a cautious attitude by the United States toward European problems, particularly Spain, is probable. But even in the policy toward Japan, according to impressions which

<sup>12</sup> Not printed.

<sup>13</sup> President Roosevelt's speech delivered at Chicago, October 5, 1937, the so-called "Quarantine Speech." For text, see *Foreign Relations of the United States, Japan, 1931-1941* (Washington, Government Printing Office, 1943), vol. 1, pp. 379-383.

the Military Attaché has thus far received from the best sources, no measures apparently have been contemplated which might lead to military conflict with Japan. The President's speech caused surprise in the armed services.

DIECKHOFF

No. 413

1927/432352-53

*The German Ambassador in the United States (Dieckhoff) to the  
German Foreign Ministry*

Telegram

URGENT

WASHINGTON, October 9, 1937—7:26 a.m.

No. 268 of October 9

Received October 10, 1937—4 a.m.

In continuation of my telegram No. 264 of the 7th.

For the Foreign Minister:

The President returned to Washington yesterday, but while he discussed the foreign policy situation thoroughly in the Cabinet meeting as well as in conferences with Hull, Welles, and Norman Davis, no indications of a more active American foreign policy have as yet become discernible. Since the Chicago speech there has thus far been only the declaration of October 6 by the Department of State, the text of which has been wired by D.N.B.<sup>14</sup> From this declaration and from everything else that has become known during the last few days, it is clear, in the first place, that the President's outburst in Chicago was mainly, if not exclusively, directed against *Japan* and that the possibility of assuming a more active role in European questions was not contemplated. Furthermore, it is becoming increasingly apparent that in the Far Eastern conflict as well, there is no evidence of any great inclination to go beyond moralizing admonitions and that there is, now as before, fear of action of any kind in the economic or military field. Even the adherence to the position of the League of Nations, confirmed in the State Department's declaration of October 6, is thus far purely theoretical. There is haste to circulate statements that there will probably be no formal conference of the Nine Powers, but that an exchange of views through diplomatic channels would be preferable; furthermore, that the conference should not be held in Washington; and, finally, that in this conference or this exchange of views, the leading role should not in any case be assumed by the United States of America. So the fanfare in Chicago has rather quickly

<sup>14</sup> For the text of this statement, see Department of State, *Press Releases*, vol. XVII (1937), p. 284, or *Foreign Relations, Japan, 1931-1941*, vol. I, p. 396.

become a call to retreat, and a calmer and more sober attitude is clearly apparent in all those quarters which had been aroused against Japan after the Chicago speech. It cannot be definitely determined at present whether the President originally had in view merely a warning to Japan, or whether he really intended to announce some action but was led to change his course because of the cool reception of his speech in England and because of the considerable if not preponderant opposition of the American public opinion to action of any kind. I prefer to assume that the former was the case and that he and his Government are still resolved to continue their previous passive role in the Far Eastern conflict.

In summary I might say that the passive role of American foreign policy in the Far East as well as in Europe would probably be abandoned only if a world conflict should break out in which Great Britain is involved. Then, of course, we will have to expect that the weight of the United States of America will soon be thrown into the scale on the side of the British.

DIECKHOFF

No. 414

2422/511410-16

*Memorandum*

The statements of October 2 by the American Chargé d'Affaires to the Director of the Political Department give rise to the following considerations:

1. The United States, as a land of immigration, has consistently opposed any political influence upon its citizens and new immigrants by foreign governments. This became particularly evident in 1922 and 1923, when the Italian Government attempted to organize local Fascist units within the American borders.

The Government of the United States at that time raised strong objections, succeeded in dissolving the local units, and demanded the recall of a number of Italian career Consuls whom it considered compromised. The Italian Government thereupon confined itself to purely cultural activities in the United States and organized the Dante Alighieri Society, which pursued only cultural aims. To be sure, there are in the United States a great many members of the Fascist Party. But, as far as I know, there is only a loose connection between them. Local units have not been formed again.

2. Two years ago the United States Government took a similar and perhaps even stronger attitude toward us since, as a result of Jewish agitation, the hostility toward us was greater. At that time,

however, it was not a question of political organizations of National Socialist Party members, but of a National Socialist organization, the "Friends of the New Germany," which was composed of Germans and Americans. In order not to jeopardize our political relations with the United States, we then took the view, with the concurrence of the National Socialist Party, that any relations between the Friends of the New Germany and German governmental or Party authorities were to be severed. German nationals were instructed to resign their membership in that society in order that it might appear to be a purely American organization.

3. This decision meant a sacrifice for us, because the Friends of the New Germany consisted of young idealists who vigorously upheld National Socialist principles. The usefulness of the Friends of the New Germany, however, was limited. In my opinion their main task consisted in drawing the German organizations closer to the new Germany. This task has been essentially accomplished. In nearly all American cities with a German population, there are now central organizations of the German clubs, which are in sympathy with the New Germany. The political successes which Germany achieved and the work of reconstruction undertaken within Germany have, of course, contributed to this changed attitude of the German organizations as much as, or more than, the activity of the Friends of the New Germany.

4. A year ago the Friends of the New Germany changed their garb and they now call themselves the German-American Bund.<sup>15</sup> Actually, however, they are the same people with the same principles and the same appearance. The question, is, therefore, how we should now act toward this substitute organization. Shall we just as categorically refuse any connection? Shall we persuade all German nationals to withdraw from the Bund? In my opinion these two questions are to be answered in the affirmative, because otherwise a new strain on our political relations with the United States is to be feared. The *Auslandsorganisation* agrees with this view. It is alleged that there are no connections with the German-American Bund, and that no German nationals are members of the Bund. From my own experience I know, however, that the Bund is still composed mainly of German nationals. There are also connections with offices inside Germany, such as the *Volksdeutsche Mittelstelle*, which are not under our control.

The withdrawal of German nationals from the German-American Bund would deal it a fatal blow. However, for reasons of prestige

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<sup>15</sup> A marginal notation in Freytag's hand reads as follows: "Very weak. 3,000 members."

the collapse of the Bund would not be in our interest unless we could replace it by another organization. I shall return to this later.

In making our decisions we must not disregard the fact that all German measures are observed with the greatest suspicion by the Government of the United States. The Government is not very favorably disposed toward us. The President and Mrs. Roosevelt do not love Germany; besides, they have among their advisers a large number of people from Jewish circles who for this reason alone are unfriendly toward us (Frankfurter, Baruch, Morgenthau, to mention only a few names). The United States Secret Service is, moreover, so efficient that we cannot count on keeping camouflaged measures concealed from it.

5. On the other hand, I should consider it wrong simply to abandon the Racial-Germans in the United States to their fate. Our efforts should rather be aimed at giving them moral support. We can best do this by confining ourselves entirely to cultural activities, as Italy has done.

Since neither the German-American Bund nor the other German societies are able to carry out the tasks which we must assign, the creation of an organization with purely cultural aims should, in my opinion, be considered.<sup>16</sup> I have in mind a society organized along the same lines as the Italian Dante Alighieri Society. It could perhaps be called the Immanuel Kant Society. This would be a name which appeals both to the New Germany and to the best representatives of the Old Germany. Kant's philosophical principles may still be endorsed by any German, just as in the past century. If this new organization confines itself to the pursuit of purely cultural aims, the opposition of the United States Government to German influence could in my opinion also be overcome. However, it would have to refrain from practices like those of the German-American Bund, such as the wearing of clothes resembling uniforms, drilling, etc. Whether this organization could later be expanded into a sports organization would depend upon further developments.

6. I would suggest that a proposal be made to the Head of the *Auslandsorganisation* to call a meeting of the interested Party and governmental authorities to discuss these questions, the importance of which should not be underestimated.

7. In the meanwhile the American Chargé might be given approximately the following reply:

\* A marginal notation, apparently in Freytag's hand, reads as follows: "V.D.A.? [Volksbund für das Deutschtum im Ausland—League for Germanism Abroad] Im. Kant Ges. [Immanuel Kant Society]?"

There were no connections whatever between German Government or National Socialist Party authorities and the German-American Bund or other German organizations. Several years ago all German nationals were specifically ordered to withdraw from American National Socialist organizations, such as the German-American Bund and Friends of the New Germany. There were no parades of Germans in brown uniforms, since, as far as we knew, the German-American Bund did not wear uniforms. At their meetings the young men wore white shirts and black trousers, which, after all, they could hardly be forbidden to do. Questionnaires concerning Racial-Germans were not being sent to America. Would the Chargé present them in evidence? Neither were the many other German-American societies under the control of German organizations. The National Socialist Party had nothing whatever to do with the German-American clubs. The great number of German organizations in America would alone preclude this (for instance, New York, approximately 1,200; Chicago, 750, St. Louis, 200).

That German officials abroad participated in the festivities of German organizations was a right that could not be denied them. In this matter they did not act any differently from the representatives of other powers, who likewise joined their countrymen on such occasions.

We could not avoid the impression that the American Government measured with two different yardsticks. In America there were numerous organizations of other nationalities to which the American Government apparently had no objections, such as Polish clubs, *Sokols* and the like, not to mention the big Communist organizations, which staged parades with displays of Communist flags and emblems, and systematically organized demonstrations in front of German Consulates and even the German Embassy.

In addition, there were the numerous unjustifiable attacks in the press, which caused strong feeling among the people of German descent and naturally bound them more strongly to Germany than ever.

The freedom of the press in the United States was well known to us, but we also knew that the Government of the United States could exert a moderating influence upon the press if it really wanted to. This should be brought up in all frankness.

The Chargé could render a great service if he exerted his influence to bring about a cessation of the unheard-of attacks which appeared almost daily in the American press.

FREYTAG

BERLIN, October 11, 1937.

## No. 415

2431/314053-59

*The German Ambassador in the United States (Dieckhoff) to the  
German Foreign Ministry*

Nr. 1344

WASHINGTON, October 15, 1937.

Received October 25, 1937.

(Pol. IX 1130)

In continuation of previous reports.

Subject: President Roosevelt's speech at Chicago.

The sharp tone of the speech which President Roosevelt made in Chicago on October 5<sup>16a</sup> probably surprised no one more than Mr. Hull and the officials of the State Department. It had, to be sure, been planned that the President during his stay in Chicago should deliver an address on foreign policy. The State Department had prepared a draft which contained the familiar ideas regarding the impossibility of isolating America completely from world conflicts and the necessity of some cooperation by America in the maintenance of world peace. The draft did not, however, contain anything about a specific implementation of this cooperation, let alone a "quarantine" threat to foreign countries. These passages originated with the President himself and, as I learned, were not incorporated into the text of the speech until immediately before his arrival in Chicago. What induced the President to insert such notes into the originally rather colorless draft is not quite clear. The intensification of the Japanese campaign in China probably alarmed him; obviously the Japanese note of rejection which had been delivered a few days previously in Washington angered him,<sup>17</sup> and he was undoubtedly influenced against Japan during his trip through the Northwest, particularly the west coast, which always keeps a sharp lookout in the direction of the Far East. Possibly there may have been a domestic factor, too, i.e., the attempt to drown out and perhaps silence the public discussion of the Black case,<sup>18</sup> which was embarrassing to Mr. Roosevelt, by a spectacular fanfare in the field of foreign policy. This discussion had become very sharp, especially during the first days of October. Roosevelt is a tremendously shrewd politician, and this might possibly have been his intention. One thing, at any rate, is certain: the sharp tone of the Chicago speech can only be attributed to the intensification of the Far Eastern

<sup>16a</sup> For text, see *Foreign Relations, Japan, 1931-1941*, vol. I, pp. 379-383.

<sup>17</sup> For text, see *ibid.*, p. 507.

<sup>18</sup> Discussion of the qualifications of Hugo L. Black of Alabama, who had recently been made an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court.

conflict; the speech would not have been made in this form if the reports from Shanghai and the other Chinese fronts had not been so alarming, in the very days before the Chicago speech. In short, the sharp passage in the speech was aimed principally at Japan. The speech, it is true, also contains some statements of a general nature which could refer to other countries, such as the remarks regarding internal freedom in foreign countries, etc. However, these phrases, which the President has repeatedly used in recent public addresses, were incorporated in his speech mainly for reasons of domestic policy. At all times and on every possible occasion the President wants to defend himself against the reproach that he himself has dictatorial aspirations. The meaning of such attacks against foreign countries is, therefore, that while he talks foreign policy, he means domestic politics. Of course, these attacks are improper and tactless, and it was quite appropriate for the German press to protest against this part of the speech. On the other hand, it was not very clear here why part of the German press reacted so violently to the rest of the speech. The term "aggressor nations" did not refer to Germany; this passage referred only to Japan, and perhaps to Italy, whose actions in Abyssinia, Spain, and the Mediterranean have been criticized here and whose reputation here is not very good. That Germany felt hurt caused astonishment here, and repeated reference was made to the reserved attitude of the Japanese press, which had far more reason to be offended. I believe that it would have been better if our press had singled out from the President's speech the sentence, "It is true that the moral consciousness of the world must recognize the importance of removing injustices and well-founded grievances," and had strongly emphasized this theme. However that may be, it is certain that the Chicago speech was aimed principally at Japan. This is apparent from the following facts: The only American action in the foreign field following the speech, the acceptance of the invitation to the Nine Power Conference,<sup>19</sup> was directed exclusively against Japan; the Chicago speech was interpreted in the press as being aimed principally, if not exclusively, against Japan; and the motion-picture theaters of the entire country, in which the President was shown delivering his Chicago speech, accompanied it with newsreel shots of air attacks in China and of battles between the Japanese and Chinese.

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<sup>19</sup> The conference of the parties to the Nine Power Treaty of Washington of 1922, regarding the Chinese situation. The conference met in Brussels, November 3-24, 1937.

Meanwhile, as I reported by wire, the Chicago fanfare has turned into a call to retreat. The reception in the country was overwhelmingly negative; the war cry, which was immediately sounded by some groups, caused considerable reaction, and meanwhile things have become rather quiet. Little is said any more of "concerted action"; the bad word "quarantine" is no longer mentioned anywhere, and the President himself hastened to blur the impression made by his sharp words by speaking in his radio address of October 12<sup>20</sup> only of the fact that an attempt must be made to arrive at a solution of the Far Eastern problems "by agreement" and with the cooperation of China and Japan. Furthermore, he strongly emphasized again the words he had used in Chicago, "America hates war." In the State Department an attitude of skepticism, if not resignation, prevails with regard to the coming Nine Power Conference, in which America did not want to play any leading role and which was not to be held in Washington in order not to commit the United States too definitely. We shall now have to wait and see what results will be achieved at Brussels. The American Government will try to prevent an aggravation of the Far Eastern conflict, i.e., unless a new situation arises as a result of incidents in the Far East, America will, according to all indications, avoid anything which might have the appearance of coercive measures of an economic or military nature against Japan.

In summary, I should like to repeat what I previously reported, that thus far there are no indications that the United States intends to intervene actively in the Far Eastern conflict, let alone in European conflicts. Only if a world conflict should break out in which Great Britain is involved would the United States ultimately intervene. In such an event, it may be expected that the weight of the United States will be thrown into the scales on the side of the British at the very beginning of the conflict or shortly thereafter.

Five copies of the text of the President's Chicago speech and of his radio address are enclosed.

DIECKHOFF

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<sup>20</sup> For extracts from this address, see *Foreign Relations, Japan, 1931-1941*, vol. 1, p. 400.

## No. 416

710/261914

*The State Secretary and Chief of the Reich Chancellery to the  
Foreign Minister and the Reich Propaganda Minister*

Rk. 16067 B

BERLIN, October 15, 1937.

Received October 16, 1937.

(Pol. IX 1096)

I enclose a treatise by Baron von Rechenberg, "Roosevelt—America—a Danger!" for your information.<sup>21</sup> The Führer and Chancellor has read this treatise with great interest. It is sent to you by his personal order.

By direction:  
WILLUHN

## No. 417

710/261926-28

*Memorandum*

(zu Pol. IX 1096)

Subject: Baron B. G. von Rechenberg's treatise: "Roosevelt—America—a Danger!"

I. Regarding the author the following information has been located in the Foreign Ministry:

1) In the VI E files concerning emigration to North America, volumes 13, 19, and 20, numbers VI E 1566/27, 1261/29, 626, 1068, and 1481/30.

It appears from these data that Herr von R[echenberg], after his emigration in 1924 with his wife and two sons, at first stayed for several years in the States of New York, New Jersey, and Maryland, then settled at Green Cove Springs, Florida, with the assistance of the Penney-Gwinn Corporation, a real estate and development company, operating a dairy there. At first he made rapid progress. From there he negotiated with German authorities regarding the settlement of 100 German farm families at the Penney Farm Colony; he wanted to take over the management of the colony. The plan, however, could not be carried out. According to VI E 1261/29 he is identical with the former chief of the Hamburg Branch of the Foreign Ministry.

2) From a record, "Personal data, Baron von Reichenberg alias Friedrich von Pilis" (III A 3074/32 to 1554/35), it appears only

<sup>21</sup> Enclosure not printed.

that a Baron E. V. von Rechenberg lived at Sausalito, California, in 1932 and claimed to have run into trouble occasionally by being confused with Baron von Reichenberg. The latter was evidently an Austrian and apparently an unreliable person; he also acted as a political speaker at that time (III A 3074/32). The discrepancy in the Christian names has not been explained, but that the same person is involved seems well established. There are no further personal references in that file.

3) From report III A 2164/34 (Personal data Baron von Rechenberg) it appears that from Florida Herr von R[echenberg] in 1934 asked the Consulate at New Orleans for a loan from Reich funds, to enable him and his family to return to Germany. According to this report, Baron von Rechenberg had been active "for several years" exclusively as a lecturer on behalf of German interests, no longer as a farmer. The request was denied, since no need for aid within the meaning of the regulations existed. As indicated in a memorandum, a file of papers which had been attached to the report of the Consulate and which has been returned to the Consulate showed among other things that this repatriation case had been pending since 1930 (a letter on this subject from the Embassy at Washington to Consul Steinke at Jacksonville, dated April 4, 1934, is in that file). The Embassy and the New Orleans Consulate might be in a position, if necessary, to supply more detailed information on this matter as well as on his lecturing activities.

4) Although Herr von R[echenberg] does not mention it in his "commentary," there appears to be no doubt that he is identical with the former chief of the Hamburg Branch. He gave much trouble to the Foreign Ministry at the time; among other things, by a plan of his to transfer the Personnel Division of the Foreign Ministry to Hamburg and to make the appointments of consuls in the foreign service dependent upon the approval of the Hamburg Senate. Later he suddenly left the service and emigrated to the United States with the financial assistance of Max Warburg, a friend of his. The Personnel Department or R.F.A.<sup>21a</sup> can probably shed light on the circumstances.

II. Regarding the treatise the following should be said:

The author makes use of the well-known method of giving his statements the appearance of trustworthiness by quoting extensively from "sources." These "sources" consist mainly of radical, polemical literature, published under the protection of American free speech and free press. This kind of political reading matter has no claim to reliability and, in any event, cannot serve as a factual basis for forming political opinions.

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<sup>21a</sup> *Reichsstelle für Aussenhandel.*

In its own words, the treatise seeks to prove that the Roosevelt era signifies "the beginning of the final catastrophe for the United States" and its results amount to "the fulfillment of the Communist Manifesto and the paving of the way for Communism in the United States." This is not proved and cannot be proved. The author's concluding statement that the treatise "has made it clear that Roosevelt represents a terrible danger for his country and for the world" cannot be called correct. It is sufficient to point to the fact that in the last Presidential elections in November 1936, Communism made an especially poor showing. In New York, the citadel of Communism, the Party obtained approximately 37,000 votes; thus, less than the 50,000 votes necessary under the law to qualify any party to present itself as a party in the next election. The Socialist candidate could enlist only a fraction of his former voters. The figure is the smallest that the Socialist Party polled in any of the last nine elections, and even the previous figures were small enough. As everybody knows, the Socialist Party has *never* succeeded in obtaining more than *one* representative in Congress.

The treatise, especially chapter IV, dealing with the failure of N.R.A.<sup>22</sup> and the allegedly only artificial recovery, also contains some statements which are in conformity with the facts and some appraisals of the economic situation which can be substantiated. But these are known facts and the opinions are neither new, profound, nor the author's own. In that respect, therefore, the treatise does not add to our knowledge of Roosevelt and of America.

The picture given by the treatise of American conditions as a whole is completely distorted. Circulation of the treatise could only create confusion. Any disclosure that there was official, Party, or semiofficial cooperation in its origin and circulation would gravely impair our relations with the United States.

Respectfully returned with all the above-mentioned files to Pol. IX for any further appropriate action.

DAVIDSEN

BERLIN, October 28, 1937.

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<sup>22</sup> National Recovery Administration.

## No. 418

710/261823-25

*Memorandum*

(Pol. IX 1096)

Concerning Baron B. G. von R[echenberg]'s treatise: "Roosevelt—America—a Danger."

I. Regarding his person. From the attached memorandum of *Geheimrat* Davidsen, of October 28, 1937,<sup>22a</sup> it appears that the author, Baron B. G. von Rechenberg, is identical with the former Chief of the Foreign Trade Branch of the Foreign Ministry at Hamburg. The attached letter of November 1 from the Hamburg Chamber of Commerce<sup>23</sup> contains the following opinion of von Rechenberg's activities at that time:

"From my recollection I can state that at that time there were incidents connected with a firm which had been established by the wife of Herr von Rechenberg. The firm ran into financial difficulties, involving, it was said, notes which had been endorsed by the Baron. The impossibility of finding funds for payment forced the couple, as far as I remember, to escape from Hamburg on a foreign vessel."

II. I know that Counselor of Legation Leitner submitted a brief evaluation of the treatise to the Office of the Foreign Minister early in August. As I remember it, this paper is identical with my own draft, which contained ideas similar to those in the attached memorandum by *Geheimrat* Davidsen of October 28, 1937.

As indicated, the treatise uses almost exclusively one-sided and unreliable propaganda material against the Roosevelt regime. For instance, on page 23 Rechenberg quotes a source according to which the percentage of Jewish influence in the American banking trusts is supposed to amount to 100 percent, while it is usually assumed that, in spite of the strong Jewish influence in the American economy, the Jewish element is still a minority in the management of American banking concerns.

It is also quite false to interpret the position taken by the American Government in the *La Guardia* affair<sup>24</sup> as proof of Roosevelt's

<sup>22a</sup> Document No. 417, *supra*.

<sup>23</sup> Letter not printed.

<sup>24</sup> Mayor La Guardia of New York City, in a speech on March 3, 1937, had suggested that at the New York World's Fair there should be a "chamber of horrors" in which Adolf Hitler would be the leading exhibit. In reply to a German protest, Secretary of State Hull expressed regrets. The American Ambassador in Germany was also instructed to protest the tone of the German press in its attacks on the United States following the *La Guardia* incident. On March 15, 1937, Mayor La Guardia, in a speech at Madison Square Garden, made a renewed attack on Chancellor Hitler, which produced a further German protest.

pronounced hostility to Germany, as asserted by Rechenberg on page 35. Actually, the President has only limited control over the Governors of the States and over the press, which particularly exploited the La Guardia affair. The sensational methods of the American press and the slight extent to which the American Government is able to exercise censorship have frequently impaired the relations of the United States with other countries. This has affected not only Germany, but also Chiefs of State of other Great Powers on good terms with the United States.

FREYTAG

BERLIN, November 15, 1937.

Respectfully submitted, with the enclosures, to the Office of the Foreign Minister.

FREYTAG<sup>25</sup>

BERLIN, November 16, 1937.

### No. 419

1620/387741-44

*The German Ambassador in the United States (Dieckhoff) to the German Foreign Ministry*

Nr. 1497

WASHINGTON, November 22, 1937.

Received December 6, 1937.

(Pol. III 5928)

Subject: Resolution of the Annual Conference of Catholic Archbishops and Bishops of the United States.

Under the chairmanship of the Apostolic Delegate, the annual Conference of Catholic Archbishops and Bishops of the United States was held here recently. The Conference defined its position on foreign affairs as well as on specifically American problems of the day (excessive consumption of alcohol, immoral motion pictures, immoral vaudeville shows, etc.). In two special resolutions the archbishops and bishops dealt with the situation of the Catholic Church in Spain and in Germany; the text of both resolutions is enclosed.<sup>26</sup> From the German point of view no objections can be made to the position taken toward Spain. However, the resolution regarding the situation of the Catholic Church in Germany is full of hatred and ill will. Whether the initiative for this came from the Americans or from the Vatican I have not been able to determine for certain; I am inclined, however, to assume that the initiative

<sup>25</sup> A marginal note reads as follows: "On the basis of a conversation with Herr von Merchtaler of the Office of the Foreign Minister—the matter is to be submitted to Herr von Kotze, with whom further steps are to be considered."

<sup>26</sup> Not printed here.

came from Rome. It is well known that the Vatican, if only because it derives its revenue to an increasing degree from the United States, has for several years, paid particular attention to the Catholic Church here; it is continually establishing new bishoprics and archbishoprics, and is unusually liberal in the bestowal of cardinals' hats. Since the visit of Cardinal Pacelli these tendencies have increased. Furthermore, efforts by the Vatican to extend favors to the United States Government, too, have also become evident recently. This is apparent from the treatment of the Father Coughlin case. Whereas in the Mundelein case<sup>26a</sup> last May the Vatican refused to intervene against the Cardinal, it has now called to order Father Coughlin, whose inflammatory speeches against Roosevelt are well known, and has forbidden him to make political statements. In this connection it is also interesting to note that the Bishops' Conference considered it appropriate to pay homage to the democratic principles of America by solemnly pledging allegiance to the "great democratic principles upon which the American Government is founded."

Presumably we must expect a further strengthening of these tendencies in the immediate future. Obviously, the Vatican is trying to secure religious and political support in the United States for a continuation of the struggle against the German Government. An appeal is made for the defense of Christianity, allegedly threatened by the German Government, and allegiance is pledged to American democratic principles. These resolutions, moreover, have the effect of a warning to the South American Catholics, especially the Brazilians, who are being shown the "antireligious attitude" of National Socialism—a result which is, of course, hailed here in Washington for political reasons.

I do not want to overestimate the importance of the annual Bishops' Conference and its resolutions, and so far the American press has not paid too much attention to it. However, we must expect this Catholic challenge to Germany to have a certain effect, at least among the Catholic population of the United States, i.e., among 25 million Catholics living in this country, who—regardless of whether they are of Irish, Italian, German, or other descent—are rather solidly united behind their Church. American Catholics formerly were among the Americans who understood Germany best, and many of them up to 4 years ago sympathized with Germany as the champion in the struggle against Communism. We cannot ignore the regrettable fact that they have gone over to the enemy camp in increasing numbers during the last few years. This result has been produced by the reverberation of the conflict between the

<sup>26a</sup> See chap. vi, p. 268.

State and the Catholic Church in Germany and, above all, by certain recent publications which have created the impression here that Germany was in the process of breaking away from Christianity.

I assume that you are aware that among the numerous Protestant groups in the United States, too, the controversy over the Church and Christianity in Germany, reported daily and in detail by the American press, is making an increasingly profound and unfavorable impression. Of late it is beginning to cause doubt and wavering even among the Lutherans, who until now had least of all let themselves be misled.

DIECKHOFF

No. 420

1146/325513-20

*The German Ambassador in the United States (Dieckhoff) to the State Secretary in the German Foreign Ministry (Mackensen)*

WASHINGTON, November 24, 1937.  
(Pol. IX 1416/37)

DEAR MACKENSEN: The aged Ambassador Schurman<sup>27</sup> came to see me a few days ago. He is one of the few prominent Americans who have not wavered in their friendship for Germany and who have the courage to demonstrate this in public. He spoke rather apprehensively of the recent developments in the question of Germans in the United States. He said that Germany was, of course, entitled to take care of her nationals residing here and to demand their allegiance and obedience, but that the German-Americans, meaning American citizens of German blood, were in a different position. They were, of course, American citizens only, and to exert any political influence over them from Germany was risky business. I explained to the old gentleman that his apprehensions were unfounded. We were adhering strictly to the principle of concerning ourselves politically with none but our nationals in America and we were taking the utmost pains not to interfere in any way whatever in the political concerns of American citizens, including American citizens of German descent. All that we expected from American citizens of German descent was interest in their German cultural heritage, especially in the German language. Mr. Schurman agreed with me that no exception could be taken to these principles but expressed apprehension that these rules were not being observed, either by Germany or by certain German-

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<sup>27</sup> Jacob Gould Schurman, American Ambassador in Germany, 1925-30.

American groups. Germany was spreading a good deal of political propaganda aimed at German-Americans. He mentioned as an example the books of Colin Ross, which could not have been printed in Germany unless their content had official approval, and certain statements said to have been made during the Stuttgart meeting. He also referred to organizations existing in Germany that were keeping in touch with Racial-Germans abroad, hence with the German-Americans, too. According to his account, these organizations did not limit themselves to purely cultural matters. In this country, certain German-American groups which had recently become the self-styled champions of German political philosophy on American soil, rightly or wrongly gave most of the American public the impression that they were acting under German orders or that they were at least encouraged by Berlin. This political teamwork between Germany and American citizens was an exceedingly risky matter. Any American, regardless of where he stood politically, had to resist such interference. He, Schurman, had hitherto emphasized to his American acquaintances that what had happened in Germany since 1933 was strictly a German domestic affair. He had always pointed out that, for instance, the manner in which the German Jews were being treated in Germany was just as exclusively Germany's own business as it was the business of the United States how it chose to proceed against the Japanese in California and Hawaii. But if it should really prove to be true that a systematic attempt was being made from Germany, using American citizens, to disseminate National Socialist principles in America and, using certain German-Americans as the Trojan Horse, to conquer the American fortress from within, then this was an exceedingly serious matter, which could not fail to affect every American. We might perhaps succeed in gaining some slight successes, but in the long run we should be the losers; for the relations between Germany and the United States would be impaired to a dangerous extent. I pointed out to Mr. Schurman that he had not given me any proof of his assertions with regard to German political propaganda among German-Americans, and reiterated that we were adhering strictly to our instructions and avoiding any interference in American affairs. But he could not be entirely convinced and said to me that he would probably find himself compelled to resign his office as president of the Carl Schurz Memorial Foundation and to give the reasons for this step in a public statement. He would be loath to do this, for he was not at all anxious to be identified with Germany's opponents, and the prospect of being cheered by anti-German elements in America was

profoundly distasteful to him. But he felt that this matter was so serious that he would probably have to decide on such a step.

Much though I esteem the old gentleman, I am reporting this to you in such detail, not because I attach undue importance to the person of Mr. Schurman—or because I am alarmed at the step which he announced. But I cannot deny that the developments which I have been observing here in the last 6 months are beginning to worry me, too. No one at all acquainted with the situation can deny that the German position here, inherently very difficult because of the clash of ideologies, has become even more difficult because of the Jewish question and the critical stage of the religious question. If to all this a new factor were now to be added, namely, German political propaganda making use of American citizens, then our relations with the United States would indeed be under a strain which I should consider extremely serious. If there is anything certain to enrage an American it is questioning his concept of the nation. After all, he is convinced that from the various races of immigrants to America it is possible to form a unified nation with uniform political ideals, uniform American language, etc. No American will admit that there are racial minorities in the United States. On the contrary, the whole aim of Government and people is to melt the various national and racial groups into a homogeneous, typically American entity. Any effort at blocking or even reversing this process of amalgamation will be felt here as interference striking at the very foundations of the United States.

In that respect things are not at all the same here as in the European countries where there are racial minorities. Here in America people are in practice comparatively tolerant regarding the use of foreign languages, foreign-language schools and societies, foreign-language newspapers. But the principle of assimilation of all national and racial groups into the American community remains unshaken and the United States would be giving up its very existence if it did not consistently and forcefully apply this principle. Nothing has resulted in so much hostility toward us in the last few months as the stupid and noisy activities of a handful of German-Americans. I am referring to the efforts of the German-American Bund, with its few thousand members scattered all over the country, to preach German National Socialism here and to introduce the outward forms which are customary in Germany today. These efforts not only have offered to our Jewish opponents, such as Mr. Dickstein,<sup>27a</sup> etc., a welcome occasion for a new hate campaign,

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<sup>27a</sup> Samuel Dickstein, Member of Congress from New York.

but have aroused almost all Americans, who see an attempt to introduce "un-American" ideas and forms in America. No one here believes the argument that the German-American Bund is a group of American citizens, whom we cannot influence. Then, too, Mr. Kuhn, the leader of this Bund, refers again and again to his close connections with Germany and to his reception by the Führer last year, and he more or less lets it be understood that his movement is being encouraged by Germany. I know that the *Auslandsorganisation*, correctly interpreting the situation, has clearly dissociated itself from the German-American Bund; but I am not so sure that all the agencies in Berlin which have anything to do with foreign countries are observing a similar restraint. Probably the time will soon come when we shall have to consider how to express our disinterestedness in these activities of the German-American Bund, which are useless and only damage us: the idea that this Bund could ever unify the 12 to 15 million German-Americans and weld them into an effective political factor is absurd, and even if it should succeed in this, such a development would only serve to weld the remaining 115 million Americans the more strongly together against anything German. Otherwise, we shall constantly be identified with these tendencies, and that will most seriously impair our relations with the United States.

How deeply these questions affect public opinion here, you may see from numerous publications of the last few days, of which I enclose here only the *Congressional Record* of November 17 with the remarks of Senators Barkley and Pepper (cf. p. 170), the article by Tolischus in the *New York Times* of November 21, the editorial in the *New York Times* of November 23, which is well worth reading, and a despatch in the *New York Times* of November 24.<sup>28</sup>

So far I am deliberately refraining from reporting officially on this question, which is still in its initial stage. But I should be most grateful if I were informed whether the Foreign Ministry still favors the same lines of conduct.<sup>29</sup>

With cordial regards, Heil Hitler.

As ever,

DIECKHOFF

<sup>28</sup> Enclosures not printed here.

<sup>29</sup> A marginal notation in Neurath's hand reads: "Yes."

## No. 421

1097/318320

*Minute*

BERLIN, November 27, 1937.

The Italian Ambassador asked me today whether we had had any reports that there was alarm in America over the conclusion of the Anti-Comintern Tripartite Pact.

I replied to Attolico that we were not particularly popular now anyway in the United States. I had not heard that there was anything like alarm.

WEIZSÄCKER

## No. 422

2431/514063

*The German Ambassador in the United States (Dieckhoff) to the German Foreign Ministry*

## Telegram

URGENT

WASHINGTON, November 30, 1937—6:30 p.m.

VERY SECRET

Received December 1, 1937—2:45 a.m.

No. 306 of November 30

(Pol. IX 1363)

For the Foreign Minister and the State Secretary. Confidential.

I have reason to assume that today's editorial in the *New York Times* (cf. D.N.B. despatch) had the approval of the State Department, at least in broad outline. Hull is very anxious to arouse American public opinion, in order to get it away from its isolationist and pacifist views, which are still advocated by influential groups, particularly in . . . (group missing), and whose paralyzing dead weight, in Hull's opinion, makes a strong American foreign policy impossible. This was just recently demonstrated again in the Far Eastern question.

Thus far, there are no indications that the trumpet call of the *New York Times* will soon be followed by action. Unless there are definite incidents, American foreign policy may be expected to become more active only if Britain abandons her reserve.

DIECKHOFF

## No. 423

2431/514064-70

*The German Ambassador in the United States (Dieckhoff) to the  
German Foreign Ministry*

Nr. 1560

WASHINGTON, December 7, 1937.

Received December 20, 1937.

(Pol. IX 1421)

Subject: American foreign policy: Isolation or action?

Since the Brussels Conference, the future course of American foreign policy has again become the center of public discussion. American foreign policy in general, and toward Far Eastern problems in particular, had been widely discussed in politically minded circles of the United States for months, and interest had increased after the President's Chicago speech.

There is no doubt here that Brussels was a failure. There is likewise widespread agreement here that American foreign policy has suffered a considerable loss of prestige through this Conference. The only question is that of responsibility. Some blame British foreign policy, which is said to concentrate only upon the North Sea and the Mediterranean and therefore shied away from any commitment in the Far East. Had England shown any readiness for action against Japan, the United States could have changed its bark to a bite. But to expect America to take the lead or, all alone, to pull the Chinese chestnuts out of the fire for England, was really asking too much, particularly after the experiences of 1932 in the question of Manchuria, when America only burned her fingers. Others blame the President and the State Department for having caused the Brussels fiasco. It should have been plain that without Japan's participation the Conference was doomed to failure from the very beginning. But how could Japan be expected to cooperate after the President in his Chicago speech of October 5 and the State Department in its statement of the following day had more or less explicitly branded Japan as an aggressor, and thus assigned her the role of defendant? The fundamental mistake lay in the ill-considered fanfare at Chicago and in the inept statement by the State Department. The State Department in turn, which is all the more annoyed by these charges since it cannot entirely refute them, places the blame on pacifist and isolationist circles, particularly on these groups in Congress. How could either the American Government or the American delegate in Brussels make Japan more conciliatory while press articles and congressional resolutions were

advocating a thoroughly pacifist policy consisting only of admonitions and warnings, but of no energetic measures?

Thus, the fight over American foreign policy has broken out with renewed intensity all along the line. Isolationists here—interventionists there! The former display considerable activity at public meetings and in the press and have introduced a bill in the House amending the Constitution to the effect that except in case of enemy invasion, Congress could declare war only after a popular referendum. The interventionists, meanwhile, have started their counter-attack. They fired the opening shot in this fight in a long sensational *New York Times* editorial of November 30, and it may be expected that more will follow. The article in the *New York Times* received all the more attention since it was admittedly inspired by the State Department. Not only was I able to confirm this latter fact from confidential sources, but it is also perfectly apparent from Mr. Hull's statement during the press conference of November 30 and from the fact that the Administration leader in the Senate, Senator Barkley, had the article inserted in the *Congressional Record*. The article to which my report of November 30 (No. 306)<sup>30</sup> refers—I transmitted the text with my report of December 2 (No. 1552)<sup>31</sup>—calls for the abandonment of the present weak foreign policy of the United States in favor of an energetic, active one. Even blockade measures are envisaged.

It is difficult to define the relative strength of the two groups. The isolationists believe that, at least for the time being, the majority of the American people are behind them. This majority, they believe, long ago realized that America's participation in the World War resulted only in sacrifices and losses and brought no lasting gain. They therefore abhor any policy which might involve America in another war. I, too, believe that, for the present at any rate, the majority of the American people are opposed to any foreign entanglement, even though I would not go so far as an English observer who has traveled all over the country during recent months and who told me a few days ago that he estimated 85 percent of the population to be isolationist.

From the German point of view the attitude and activity of the isolationists are welcome, since, considering the present state of public opinion in the United States, we could by no means count on active intervention by America on our side in case of a world conflict. However, we must realize one thing: except for a few small groups, particularly among the German-Americans, the pacifists

<sup>30</sup> Document No. 422, *supra*.

<sup>31</sup> Not printed.

are by no means guided by friendship or sympathy for Germany. The pacifists are to be found mainly among the large masses who are indifferent toward foreign policy and only want to be left alone. This holds true particularly in the Midwest. To a lesser extent, they are recruited from the various peace organizations, particularly in liberal and labor circles. Nowhere is the Japanese policy in China or the Italian policy in Abyssinia, the Mediterranean, and Spain criticized so vigorously and so severely as in these circles. Since Germany maintains, or seems to maintain, close contact with Italy and Japan, and since for many other reasons she is not liked by these circles, she is lumped together, in the thoughtless or perfidious manner customary here, with the other two "aggressor nations" which "do not observe treaties" and "violate the principles of international law." We must not delude ourselves about that. These elements are opposed to foreign entanglements only through indifference or on principle. But if they should ever be frightened out of their lethargy, or if they should come to realize that their doctrinaire conception cannot be carried out or that it benefits the foes of liberalism and democracy, the jump from isolationism to interventionism would not be too big for them. The interventionists, encouraged by the Government, are vigorously engaged in arousing the country and pointing out the dangers of apathy, as they see it. Working hand in glove with them is an amazingly active British propaganda, which is being carried on inconspicuously and in a cleverly restrained manner. It is aimed only at people in key positions and seeks to explain to the Americans that the United States, in its own interest and in the interest of world democracy, must not permit Great Britain to be defeated in any future conflict with the "aggressor nations." At present this double propaganda still has great resistance to overcome; it encounters not only the indolence and indifference of the rank and file toward foreign affairs, and the rigid dogmatism of the pacifists, but also the effective and sarcastic reply: "England expects that every American will do his duty."<sup>32</sup> However, it should be stated that Hull's thesis, repeatedly proclaimed during the last few months, to the effect that the United States could not remain unaffected by a future world conflict and that isolationism was therefore a utopia, has already gained considerable ground. Agitation over the radio, in the press, and in moving pictures, particularly against Japan, is beginning to have its effect. At any rate, we must not count on American isolationism as an axiom. According to all indications the United States will continue to follow an essentially passive foreign

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<sup>32</sup> The quoted passage is in English in the original.

policy as long as Britain is not prepared to become active herself, or as long as the United States is not subjected to intolerable provocation, or values which vitally concern the United States are not at stake. Should any of these occur, the United States, despite all resistance within the country, will abandon its present passivity. In a conflict in which the existence of Great Britain is at stake America will put her weight into the scales on the side of the British.

DIECKHOFF

### No. 424

2422/511403

*The German Foreign Ministry to the German Embassy in the United States*

[Telegram]

No. 212 of the 11th

BERLIN, December 11, 1937.  
(Pol. IX 1375)

Drafting Officer: Counselor of Legation Freytag.

The speech of Secretary of the Interior Ickes of December 9<sup>33</sup> was commented on ironically in an article inspired by the Propaganda Ministry in the *Völkischer Beobachter* of the 11th. Although we recognize the domestic political character of the address, the offensive references to "nightshirt nations" have caused a sensation among the German public. I leave it to your judgment to point this out to the Department of State and, should the occasion arise, protest against the speech.

WEIZSÄCKER

### No. 425

2422/511409

*The German Ambassador in the United States (Dieckhoff) to the German Foreign Ministry*

Nr. 1595

WASHINGTON, December 13, 1937.  
Received December 23, 1937.  
(Pol. IX 1452)

In continuation of Report No. 1588 of December 9<sup>34</sup> and with reference to the instruction of December 11.

Subject: Secretary of the Interior Ickes' speech.

I have done nothing in regard to the matter. Since it is not a question of an attack on the Head of our State, and since Germany

<sup>33</sup> Secretary Ickes' speech was delivered December 8 before the American Civil Liberties Union. For a report, see the *New York Times* of December 9, 1937.

<sup>34</sup> Not printed.

is not expressly mentioned, I thought that I ought to refrain from making a protest or taking any other steps. The Italian Ambassador, with whom I had an informal conversation on the subject a few days ago, told me that he did not make an issue of such speeches; he was particularly afraid of laying himself open to the retort that at least as many attacks had been made and were still being made from Rome on the democracies as from the United States on the Fascist regime.

Naturally, I avail myself of every opportunity to make clear to the leading personalities here how German-American relations become strained when leading men in the United States constantly make public statements of this sort.

DIECKHOFF

B. THE EMBASSY AND THE BUND,  
DECEMBER 1937-JANUARY 1938

No. 426

1146/325521

*Memorandum From the Office of the State Secretary*

URGENT

BERLIN, December 17, 1937.  
(zu Pol. IX 1416/37)

Respectfully returned to the Head of the Political Department.<sup>35</sup>

The State Secretary would appreciate a short conference after the Directors' meeting tomorrow morning. The letter was submitted to the Head of the *Auslandsorganisation*. The *Auslandsorganisation* and the *Volksdeutsche Mittelstelle* agree that German-Americans shall not be included in the field of activity of these agencies.

The State Secretary believes that a provisional reply can be sent to Ambassador Dieckhoff even prior to the personal report to the Foreign Minister, which will not be possible before January, and he requests suggestions for such a reply.

SIEGFRIED

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<sup>35</sup> The reference is to the letter of November 24, 1937, from Dieckhoff to Mackensen, document No. 420, p. 648.

## No. 427

2422/511421-26

*The German Ambassador in the United States (Dieckhoff) to the Head of the Political Department in the German Foreign Ministry (Weizsäcker)*

WASHINGTON, December 20, 1937.

DEAR WEIZSÄCKER: Many thanks for your lines of December 6.<sup>36</sup> Meantime General von Boetticher has brought me your friendly greetings, for which I am very grateful and which I heartily reciprocate. I sincerely hope that the New Year will bring you every happiness!

Looking back upon the 7 months in Washington which now lie behind me, in many respects I am quite satisfied, but in many others I am rather worried. Organizing the Embassy into a completely efficient body was soon accomplished. Thomsen and the other gentlemen give me valuable assistance and the whole Embassy is working like a harmonious family. The social position of the Embassy has again reached its proper level, especially since my wife and I are now living in a dignified house and no longer in the unsuitable building which functioned as the German Embassy until May of this year. Contacts with the American Government, in particular with the State Department, are, on the whole, satisfactory. I have had several interviews with the President, which were frank and illuminating. Mr. Hull, it is true, is an idealist who lives somewhat up in the clouds, but my personal relations with him are always carried on under the proper forms, and I can work harmoniously with the Under Secretary, Sumner Welles. It is gratifying that Dodd has been recalled and replaced by a very sensible man with whom you are well acquainted.<sup>37</sup> In other particulars also (Zeppelin, helium, etc.) I am satisfied with the attitude here. However, in the really decisive question, the improvement of relations between Germany and the United States, no progress has been made during the last 7 months.

The position of the United States on foreign policy is decided by American public opinion, on which the President and Congress depend. Several factors have, in recent months, influenced this public opinion against Germany:

1) The fact that *Germany*—even though no aggressive action (apart from Spain) is imputed to her—is, or seems to be, in closer

<sup>36</sup> Not printed.

<sup>37</sup> Mr. Dodd resigned, effective December 29, 1937, and Hugh R. Wilson became Ambassador to Germany January 17, 1938.

accord than before with the "Aggressor States," Italy (Abyssinia, the Mediterranean, Spain) and Japan (Manchuria, North China, Shanghai, Yangtze). It is feared that these three "Aggressor States" will go further and further and that they may constitute a constant threat to the peace of the world.

At the present moment, public opinion in America is divided as to the method of protection against this danger. Some, the isolationists, want to remain aloof, under any circumstances, from all world affairs and creep into their American shells. Others, the interventionists, believe that isolation is a kind of utopia, since it is not possible to keep out of world conflicts; therefore, they advocate the view that a stand must be taken against the "Aggressor States," at least if American interests are infringed upon as in China at present. These people say: "There is a limit to American patience,"<sup>38</sup> and appeal to the country: "Wake up, America!" British propaganda works to the same effect. There is hardly a voice raised for Germany (except those of a few German-Americans with no influence at all). The problem is merely this: either isolation or *opposition* to the "Aggressor States."

2) Sharper emphasis on ideological factors: here democracy—there the totalitarian state; here alleged freedom—there alleged despotism; here alleged Christianity—there alleged neopaganism, etc.

3) The impression prevalent in America that both Germany and Italy have given up their previous postulate that National Socialism and Fascism were not for export. Several factors have contributed to this impression: some of the Stuttgart speeches<sup>39</sup> and, particularly Mussolini's speech in Berlin,<sup>40</sup> together with the allegedly increasing activity of Racial-Germans abroad, especially by the German-American Bund in the United States, and the suspicion that this activity is promoted by Germany. People no longer believe that National Socialism and Fascism will be confined to Germany and Italy, and are beginning to feel that this foreign propaganda is threatening them in their own country. Comparisons are being drawn between the activities of the Comintern and the "Nazintern," and they insist that one must defend oneself against both. Developments in Brazil and events in other South American countries have

<sup>38</sup> The quoted passage is in English in the original.

<sup>39</sup> Speeches delivered at the annual meeting of the *Auslandsorganisation* and assembly of Germans from abroad held at Stuttgart in August 1937. For extracts, see *National Socialism* (Washington, Government Printing Office, 1943), pp. 101-108, 321-354.

<sup>40</sup> Mussolini's speech of September 28, 1937, during his visit to Berlin, in which he referred to an expansion of Fascism. Text printed in *Documents on International Affairs*, 1937 (London, 1939), pp. 297-302.

increased the apprehension that the ideology of the totalitarian state is reaching out from Europe to the Western Hemisphere. Here, too, the cry rings out: "Wake up, America!"

For the moment, I should not attach too much importance to this whole development. We cannot, however, close our eyes to these facts, and it is incontestable that they have made our position in the United States more difficult. It may be argued that it is a matter of indifference to us what the American public thinks of Germany. But I believe that we should remember that once before, only 20 years ago, the development of unfavorable public opinion in America proved fateful for us. Meanwhile, this country has grown even stronger and all rumors about social dangers, economic decline, etc., at least as far as the next few years are concerned, are pure fantasy. A conflict with this country would, therefore, be a very grave matter for us. In conversations with the President, Government officials, and Members of Congress, with businessmen and politicians, I have done all I could to explain our peaceful views. In speeches, too, I have expounded German policy. But the three above-mentioned factors form a wall against which I cannot do very much here.

I was greatly pleased with the trip of Herr Wiedemann.<sup>41</sup> Herr Wiedemann, accompanied by his wife, spent about 4 weeks in this country, and not only made a close acquaintance of New York and Washington but likewise visited Chicago, San Francisco, and Los Angeles during this brief period, making the trip from Chicago to the west coast and back by air. He looked around very thoroughly. I believe that he returned with very deep impressions of America, and I suppose that he will also tell the Führer what he observed here. I was struck by Herr Wiedemann's considered and correct judgment of American affairs. The visit, Herr Wiedemann told me, was a holiday trip resulting from a conversational suggestion made by Princess Stephanie Hohenlohe. The Führer gave his approval of the journey, but Herr Wiedemann had no instructions whatever. He merely wished to see something new and, in particular, to visit this country about which his daughter, who had been in America for a short while last summer, had told him so much. Both the Wiedemanns, who lived with us during their stay in Washington and whom I saw again in New York at the Schmeling prize fight shortly before their return, were extremely agreeable and congenial guests.

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<sup>41</sup> Captain Fritz Wiedemann, Aide to the Führer.

At the end of your letter you speak of press reports which the Embassy had been sending to Berlin regularly up to a few months ago. This work demands a great deal of time and practically all the energy of one of my assistants; is it really necessary? Who reads these reports and what is done with them? In my opinion, the Embassy's telegrams and political reports, to which I frequently attach press clippings, are sufficient for judging the political situation in America, and I should be very glad to have the matter rest with the procedure which I introduced. As far as I have observed in Berlin, these voluminous press reports go only to one or two gentlemen in the Political Department, or the Press Department, where, after they are read, or not read, they are filed away. Hence, I should be extremely grateful if these reports were waived, especially as I believe that such reports are not made by other Embassies. I attach principal value to reporting from here to Berlin on particular problems (domestic and foreign policies, economic, financial, cultural questions, etc.) as quickly as possible and in the form of the briefest, most readable telegraphic or written reports. This seems to me of the greatest importance for the practical political work of the Foreign Ministry. If I had excess personnel here I should be glad to continue to have the long press reports prepared, but I have too few rather than too many assistants, and my staff is already overburdened with the volume of work.

Many thanks for the memoranda on Herr von Rechenberg's treatise.<sup>42</sup> I assume that herewith this remarkable document is disposed of.

Please give my best regards to your charming wife. With cordial greetings,

Always yours,

DIECKHOFF

P.S. I have just received from an old American acquaintance a letter, of which I enclose a copy.<sup>43</sup> The letter may contain exaggerations, but it comes from a good friend and expresses his honest apprehensions.

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<sup>42</sup> See pp. 642-646.

<sup>43</sup> Not printed.

## No. 428

2422/511404-05

*The State Secretary in the German Foreign Ministry (Mackensen)  
to the German Ambassador in the United States (Dieckhoff)*

BERLIN, December 22, 1937.

(zu Pol. IX 1416)

DEAR DIECKHOFF: Thank you for your letter of November 24, which interested me greatly. I can assure you that the question of how to deal with German-Americans is followed here with the closest attention and that all authorities concerned, especially the Head of the *Auslandsorganisation*, the Chief of the *Volksdeutsche Mittelstelle*, SS-Obergruppenführer Lorenz, the Foreign Minister, and I, fully approve the contents of your letter. The question of German-Americans has, in our opinion also, reached a critical stage, and we are following with great concern the attacks of the press and of American authorities, which are directed against alleged German interference in the American domestic situation.

Even before the receipt of your letter, we took practical steps in this matter. Until a few months ago there had been no correspondence between German governmental or Party offices and the German-American Bund. It was found 4 weeks ago, however, that several persons in the *Volksdeutsche Mittelstelle* had established relations with this organization. We took immediate steps against that, stopped all correspondence, and instructed the Consulate General in New York to demand of Mr. Kuhn, the leader of the German-American Bund, the surrender or destruction of this correspondence. This was all the more necessary, since the American Embassy here had shown great interest in the matter and brought up at the Foreign Ministry the subject of alleged connections between American citizens and German governmental authorities.

From the foregoing you can see that the principles mentioned in your letter, which were laid down in connection with the question of the attitude toward German-Americans, are being adhered to.

Instructions concerning these questions are on the way to the Embassy.

With best regards and Heil Hitler!

Always yours,

VON MACKENSEN

## No. 429

2431/514071

*The German Ambassador in the United States (Dieckhoff) to the  
German Foreign Ministry*

Telegram

URGENT

No. 1 of January 3

WASHINGTON, January 3, 1938—3:33 p.m.

Received January 3, 1938—11:50 p.m.

(Pol. IX 3)

The important message with which President Roosevelt today opened the session of Congress included only a short portion on foreign policy; nine-tenths of his speech concerned domestic political problems which predominantly claim the interest of the country and therefore also of Congress. In the part on foreign policy (see D.N.B. despatch) the President stated again the propositions which he and Mr. Hull have repeatedly expressed for months: that America could not remain unaffected by world events and hence could not pursue a policy of absolute isolationism. The familiar phrases about the need of maintaining and observing the fundamental principles of international law were likewise reiterated. At the end there is the statement, which the President had already made on several previous occasions, that peace was chiefly threatened "by those nations where democracy has been discarded or has never developed."<sup>44</sup>

The foreign policy part of his speech with its sharp language—though less strong than his Chicago fanfare—has a double purpose:

To create sentiment against the policy of absolute isolation and in favor of greater preparedness. A great naval construction program is already being prepared.

DIECKHOFF

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<sup>44</sup> The quoted passage is in English in the original.

## No. 430

2422/511451-73

*The German Ambassador in the United States (Dieckhoff) to the  
German Foreign Ministry*

SECRET

Nr. 53

WASHINGTON, January 7, 1938.

Received January 24, 1938.

(Pol. IX 144)

Subject: Relations between the United States and Germany and the German-American element. Are we in a position to exert political influence on the German-Americans? The German-American Bund.

I. Anyone who at the turn of the year makes a close examination of the relations between Germany and the United States will be forced to conclude regretfully that they have not improved during the last 12 months. Ideological differences have become even sharper. Jewish agitation goes on unchanged. Animosity in the liberal and Marxist camps has not diminished. The Church controversy in Germany, Protestant and Catholic, has given many Americans the impression that Germany was attempting to solve religious problems by governmental coercion; wide circles even fear that Germany might turn away from Christianity and thus be forced into a course which would be regarded with apprehension and aversion by the Christian element in this country. Distrust and dislike of Germany have been intensified also by one-sided reports about German rearmament and by the news of Germany's closer cooperation with Italy and Japan, that is, with those powers which are represented to the American people by the press here, day in and day out, as violators of treaties, disturbers of the peace, and aggressors. However, to these two factors there has recently been added a third, the unfavorable effect of which is particularly serious and noteworthy.

II. Earlier, people here had believed the German assurance that National Socialism was a purely German affair and not, so to speak, for export. Hence, in spite of the antagonistic attitude toward National Socialism, no one has felt directly menaced by it. This has changed in the last few months. Some speeches made at the Stuttgart meeting were circulated extensively and caused much comment. They were in part taken here to mean that, in future, full allegiance to the Third Reich would be expected not only from Reich-Germans but also from Racial-Germans abroad. The straightforward and informative statement by the Head of the *Auslandsorganisation*, in his speech at London early last October, was sup-

pressed.<sup>45</sup> Mussolini's speech in Berlin, in which he expressed his expectation that the world would become Fascist, has been greatly stressed here and received with displeasure by many. The idea that the Fascist-National Socialist concepts might reach out from Europe to the Western Hemisphere and that this ideology might one day threaten American "democracy" has been further fostered by two things. First, events have taken place in some Latin-American countries which could be interpreted as a setting up of Fascism on American soil and were so interpreted by many; and second, some occurrences in the United States itself might indicate a growth in "undemocratic" ideas. The Jewish and liberal press immediately took good care that everything which could in any way be construed as a Fascist menace was brought to the attention of the American people as graphically as possible. In particular, these papers seized upon certain developments among German-Americans and represented them as the beginning of a National Socialist campaign of conquest against the United States. For months, in Congress and the press, an ever louder alarm has been sounded against "Nazi activities," and against the "un-American activities"<sup>46</sup> observed recently throughout the country. Particular attention is called to the activities of the German-American Bund. By its program, by its uniformed parades, by its flag (identical with that of the German Reich), by its summer camps, in which thousands of German-Americans gathered, allegedly not merely for pleasant sociability and sport, but for military drill and exercises as well, the Bund showed determination to change the American Constitution and introduce an authoritarian regime in America. What we should especially note is the accusation, not only that German-Americans who are also American citizens pursue these objectionable aims, but also that this agitation is promoted and supported from Germany; that a systematic German attack on the American citadel is in progress, with the German element in the United States, or at least a part of it, playing the role of the Trojan Horse. Thus a situation is said to be created which differs but little from the subversive communistic operations emanating from Moscow; side by side with the Comintern, directed from Moscow, the "Nazintern" is

<sup>45</sup> Ernst Wilhelm Bohle was head of the *Auslandsorganisation* and State Secretary in the Foreign Ministry. In a speech delivered in London on October 1, 1937, before members of the German colony there, he had said:

"The National Socialists do not disseminate hatred and discord, but are anxious to deliver the messages of good will emanating from a country whose Leader loves peace because he loves his people and wants to make them happy."

The full text of the speech is printed in *Germany Speaks* (London, 1938), pp. 326 ff., and in *National Socialism*, pp. 387-396.

<sup>46</sup> The quoted passages are in English in the original.

now engaged in subversive activities in the United States. While Moscow is making use of the American Communists to attain its ends, Berlin is said to be making use of the German-Americans. In both cases the aim was more or less the same: the elimination of the old established democratic freedoms in the United States and their replacement by a totalitarian regime.

Of course, this does not mean that the American people, or even the majority of the American people, have accepted these assertions of the newspapers and of some Members of Congress, or feel seriously alarmed by them. On the contrary, the great majority of the American people does not allow itself to be influenced by this unscrupulous hue and cry, still has much more respect and liking for the German way of life and for many of the Third Reich's achievements than public expressions in the press and elsewhere would indicate, and fully understands, from centuries of observation, what a peaceful element in the State these German-Americans constitute. It must not, however, be overlooked that the seed sown, not only by Representative Dickstein and his colleagues but also by other Members of Congress and by a large part of the press, have produced a certain effect. We must make up our minds that the time is gradually approaching when we must take up this question, so that we may not some day be confronted with a situation which might prove decidedly unpleasant and seriously prejudicial to the relations between Germany and the United States. With this in view, it will be well to ascertain, first of all, how important the German element in the United States is, how strong it is, and what might be expected of it for the benefit of Germany. Anyone who considers the racial mixture of the American people must take up these questions: What political role does the German element play? Is there not a possibility of strengthening the influence of this German element on the direction of the destinies of the United States? Should it not, at least, be possible to weld the German element so closely together and make it so strong that, in any case, a repetition of 1917 would be impossible?

I add that these questions arise of themselves. And they do so more today than in previous years for two reasons. *First*, because the danger of a change in American foreign policy from the former isolationism to a more active foreign policy—probably again directed, in the last analysis, against Germany—has of late grown greater, and we must therefore give redoubled consideration to discovering ways in which this danger can be met. *Secondly*, because, since the German element in the United States, or at least wide circles of the German-American element, have within the past 5 years

undoubtedly become more conscious of being German and prouder of their German origin and of the old country, in consequence of the strengthened power of the Reich, the problem of rousing them and welding them together should present fewer difficulties today than before. In the past 8 months I have resumed the study of these questions, unbiased by my experience during my previous stay in the United States and by the observations I had made while Chief of the Anglo-American Section in the Foreign Ministry in Berlin. To my regret, I must state that I have once more reached a completely negative conclusion.

First of all, my investigations showed that the German element in the United States is numerically weaker than we in Germany are commonly inclined to assume.

In a total population of approximately 130 million, there may be today, at the most, from 12 to 15 million people of German descent, that is, people who can count at least one grandparent or great-grandparent of German blood. This figure is probably too high; all higher figures, in my opinion, are pure guesswork. The majority of these 12 to 15 million persons have long been completely anglicized; they speak hardly a word of German, do not read German at all, and are only aware, often very vaguely, that German blood flows in their veins. Hence these 12 to 15 million people can by no means be considered as a homogeneous *German* ethnical group comparable to the Transylvanian Saxons<sup>47</sup> who, as immigrants, have for centuries preserved the German language, and still less comparable to the Alsatians or the Sudeten Germans, who have been settled on their own soil for over a thousand years and retain the German language. Almost without exception, these 12 to 15 million people speak the American language, that is, English; only part of them are still familiar with German. Anyone who knows the difficulties of the German-language press and of German book distribution in the United States can confirm how insignificant this portion is. I believe that the number of German-Americans who still really speak German, read and write German, think in German, and are fully cognizant of their German origin, may be estimated, at the most, at from 4 to 5 million; many experts would probably consider these figures too high. In answering the questions posed above, however, under the most favorable circumstances only these 4 to 5 million German-Americans can be considered. Any political action, any political stand for Germany can, of course, be expected only from those German-Americans who not merely have

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<sup>47</sup> Inhabitants of the Siebenbürgen district in Rumania.

a German grandmother or great-grandmother but who have a real *consciousness of being German*. And such consciousness can exist only in those who truly feel an inner bond between themselves and the old homeland, especially in those who still retain the speech of their German forefathers. Hence, for our purposes, under the most favorable circumstances we are dealing with from 4 to 5 million German-Americans; the others, in spite of their extraction, are so completely submerged in the American element that an appeal to their German heritage can no longer arouse any response in them.

This German element will not grow stronger, but will diminish. Immigration from Germany, which in the nineteenth century and into the second decade of the twentieth century continually increased and strengthened the German element in America, has been almost completely halted since the war. The quota system introduced by the Immigration Act of 1925 [1924] leaves us with only a very insignificant quota; even this quota has not been filled for some years. In 1937, with an available quota of 28,000 for Germany, only about 12,000 "Germans" immigrated to the United States legally, 6,750 of whom were Jews! With such an addition of "German" blood, the German element in the United States cannot last long. The loss taking place daily through assimilation into American ways cannot be made good either by births or by this practically vanishing immigration. And, in all likelihood, this trend will continue. In view of the protest of organized labor, which is unwilling to permit an increase in the labor supply under any circumstances, even if the economic situation again showed a decided improvement, and in view of the antagonistic attitude of nationalistic and chauvinistic circles, no change in immigration legislation can be counted on in the foreseeable future. Moreover, Germany will certainly do nothing to encourage or promote emigration to the United States. Hence, for the present, we can, at most, count upon 4 to 5 million German-Americans conscious of being German, and even this figure will, with almost mathematical certainty, diminish from year to year.

Perhaps this objection may now be raised: 4 to 5 million people are better than nothing; why should we not at least see what can be done with them? And, in this connection, reference is occasionally made to the fact that the great National Socialist movement in Germany began with only 7 men at first and now embraces the whole German population of 65 million. I should like to voice a warning against such alluring but false comparisons. In the United States this is *not* possible. Even if success were attained in bringing together all Americans of German origin who have more or less

German blood in their veins, there would still remain 115 to 120 million Americans on whom this process could not have any effect, since they are different as far as blood and race are concerned. But, in all probability, it will not only be impossible to bring together 12 to 15 million persons of German origin; even the 4 to 5 million Americans who are conscious of being German probably could not be organized into a unified program and course of action in behalf of Germany. A politically unified German-American element never has existed, not even in the eighties, in the era of Carl Schurz, at a time when the German-American element included several real leaders and when it had a certain, even though not very great, influence in the northern States. In the Civil War, the voters of German origin, the German-American regiments, and the generals with German names had made a real contribution to the victory of the North, though without gaining much gratitude. With the exception of the Lincoln era, the German-American element was always divided; social, denominational, political party lines ran right across it. In no Presidential election since Lincoln's has the German element voted as a bloc; part of it was always on the other side. Thus it came about that, in spite of the many capable men in its ranks, this German element hardly ever enjoyed any political influence. Attempts to produce an impression before elections by using the German element as a factor in the voting have always miscarried, since the leaders of the Republican as well as of the Democratic Party were well aware that this was, at best, only a political scarecrow, of which no one need be afraid. Hence the Germans have never accomplished anything politically. Nor have they ever been able to place one of their people, Carl Schurz excepted, in a really important Government post, not to mention the fact that there has never been a German President of the United States, (whereas, for example, the weak Dutch element has already supplied three of the thirty-two Presidents, and three very important Presidents). Except in Lincoln's time the Germans have never influenced the political development of the country, and in the great hour of 1917, when the United States entered into a life and death struggle against Germany, the German element stood miserably aloof, and its sons, without batting an eyelash, went into battle against the homeland of their forefathers. After such experiences, which are repeated daily (no Senator of German blood, no Representative of German descent, insofar as there are any, espouses the cause of Germany in Congress), how can it be expected that the German element in America will unite in the future and prove itself capable of a common political action? It is true that pride in German

descent has been awakened in many hearts by the revived strength of their homeland in recent years. But the German-Americans of 1914 were also proud of the Germany of their day; yet anyone measuring the political significance and power of the German-Americans by the enthusiasm which prevailed on the occasion of Prince Henry's<sup>48</sup> visit in 1907 would have been deceived, just as today anyone would err in regarding the magnificent spirit which greets the colors at German Day celebrations in New York or Chicago or San Francisco as a criterion of the political influence of the enthusiastically cheering German-Americans. No, the German-American element has no political influence, and it will not have any, because it lacks unity. It must be added that since 1933 the German-American element is divided even more than previously. At present it is split into three camps: those who take the part of the Third Reich; those, Liberals, Marxists, and many others with religious objections, who cling to their Germanism but will have nothing to do with the Third Reich; and lastly, the great mass, who are either completely uninterested in politics or who, without inner conviction, attend the functions of now one group, now the other. The figures on German-Americans in Chicago are significant. There, 700,000 are of German descent, in the broadest sense; of these about 40,000 are members of clubs of a definitely German character (athletic clubs, choral societies, German regional societies, etc.); of these, in turn, only 450 are in the German-American Bund, the only really politically minded organization which energetically stands up for Germany! In brief, 700,000, 40,000, 450! These figures hold good for most of the other sections of the country, and I feel that they speak volumes. Things being as they are, any attempt to urge or force any pro-German political activity on the German-Americans would not lead to unification; on the contrary, it would rather intensify the existing differences. As influential German-Americans have told me recently, there is danger that any increase in the activities of the groups which support the Third Reich would lead to a stiffening of the defense front on the part of groups with a hostile or hitherto indifferent attitude, that is, to a deepening of the existing cleavage and to an uproar in the ranks of the German element. Hence a unified organization of the German element, even of the mere 4 to 5 million who are conscious of their German origin, is a hopeless affair.

Now, I have been told: it may well be that it is impossible to bring together all those who are conscious of their German origin. But

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\* Prince Henry of Prussia, brother of Kaiser William II.

even though the 4 to 5 million could not be secured, why could one not, in any case, organize a handful of people who could act as a sort of assault troop and render valuable services at the crucial moment? In such a contingency 10 to 20 thousand energetic men, ready for any sacrifice, distributed throughout the United States, could render good service. I cannot express my warning against this viewpoint with sufficient emphasis. With such conspiratorial child's play something may, perhaps, be accomplished now and then in the Balkans or in other parts of the world, but most certainly not in the United States. The membership roll of this assault troop would be in the hands of the American police shortly after it was founded; the investigations of the German Bund just terminated by the Department of Justice demonstrate how such things are done here by undercover men. Members of the troop would be immediately arrested at the crucial moment, and even if they could go into action here and there, it would all come to naught. I know that scarcely anyone sincerely believes in anything so nonsensical, but I repeat that such ideas are not merely childish, they are dangerous. They could only tend to arouse justifiable distrust throughout the American Government, from which they could, of course, not remain hidden. They would render our contacts difficult and even endanger those German-American endeavors which are legitimate and in which we have an established interest.

Any attempt intended to influence the German-Americans politically toward us would consequently be hopeless. Furthermore, it would be prejudicial and dangerous. Because, first of all, as I have already stated above, it would only lead to a deeper division in the German-American element; any increase in the activity of the German-American groups which side with the Third Reich would result in a stronger defense on the part of groups with other opinions. That might, if necessary, be tolerated, if such efforts had any prospects of success in other directions and if two other much graver dangers did not exist. I see one danger in the following situation: As the first reaction of American circles has shown in recent months, any increased German-American political activity in behalf of Germany would encounter the sharpest opposition from these circles. The idea that a racial segment of the population is trying to influence American policy, if possible to influence it in the interest of a foreign power, would thoroughly antagonize every American. The tradition of the American nation, the American national ideology, is really built upon the concept of the amalgamation of races, the dissolving of racial segments into the great American whole. Anything which would give rise to the impres-

sion that this development was to be stopped or completely reversed would encounter strong antagonism on the part of the Government and the people. In the same way, the idea of setting up a totalitarian regime in place of democracy would evoke violent reaction. And if it should prove that existing legislation is not sufficient defense against such tendencies, laws would inevitably be enacted putting a stop to all such efforts. Furthermore, a struggle might possibly flare up against the German element in America, the outcome of which, in view of the ratio between the forces (115 million against 15 million), could not be doubted. It would be quite conceivable that the reaction would assume the same form it took once before in the years from 1917 to 1919, and that the chief sufferer would be the whole German-American element, which would either be completely destroyed or at least so weakened that it could never recover from this blow. What this would mean for the German language, etc., in the United States can readily be imagined. The other danger would apply to the relations between the United States and Germany. It is obvious that, if the American Government were in a position to prove that such "un-American and undemocratic activities"<sup>49</sup> in the German-American element were encouraged or even promoted by Germany, our political relations with the United States would be seriously affected. I do not know whether the American Government has already taken occasion to refer to these matters in Berlin.<sup>50</sup> Nothing has been said to me here officially, and I should most emphatically contradict any such statements and refer to our instructions concerning the German element abroad. But I know that the Government here is giving close attention to this question and has for some time intended to take the matter up in Berlin. In my opinion, any political connection between any authorities in Germany and the German-American element, if any such exists, must be broken off. As I have explained above, no good can come of it, only injury to Germanism in America and to our relations with the United States. No one denies our right to work here among the German element for cultural purposes, to preserve the German language, etc., and in this field there is no cause for complaint. But we must abstain from seeking political contact with German-Americans. Just as, in deference to the Russian Government, Bismarck abstained from any contact with the Germans in the Baltic provinces (I refer, among other things, to his letter of December 19, 1868, to Prince Reuss, and to the Decree of April 5,

<sup>49</sup> The quoted passage is in English in the original.

<sup>50</sup> A marginal note in Weizsäcker's hand reads as follows: "Yes. As a current rumor [*als zirkulierende Vermutung*]."

1870) and just as today we consider it necessary to sacrifice the German element both of Alsace and in the South Tyrol for the sake of our relations with France and Italy, respectively, we must absolutely avoid political contact with the German-Americans if we do not wish to disturb or seriously prejudice our important relations with the United States. Here no compromise is conceivable; we must make a clean sweep of it. The Italian Government takes the same stand; it abstains punctiliously from politically furthering any Italian-American endeavors whatever and limits itself to a cultural policy which can cause no offense.

III. In conclusion, I should like to say a few words about the *German-American Bund*.

If the Bund is considered exclusively from the German viewpoint, one can only express approbation of the spirit which animates its members. No other organization among citizens of German origin in this country has such clear aims, or aims pursued with such ready cooperation by the members, regardless of sacrifice, as have the local Bund groups.

Deriving its origin from the former local groups of the Party in the United States, the Bund today still unites aggressive young German-Americans, mostly postwar immigrants whose ties with the German homeland are still strong. The Bund carries on the fight against Jews and Communists, it advocates an American racial policy, it has taken as its aim the fight against the defamation of National Socialist Germany, and wishes to promote understanding between the two countries by enlightening the public about Germany. But its methods produce the opposite results. The tactics, the outward form, and the means which the Bund and particularly the Bund leaders employ in the pursuit of these aims are such that, instead of arousing sympathetic understanding of the German cause among the masses of other Americans, they engender antagonism. Moreover, the Bund's methods are likely to cause difficulties and discord between the United States and Germany.

The other day the president of the large Steuben Society called upon me and told me that the Steuben Society, as an association of American citizens who consciously stress their German origin, felt obliged to disavow the German-American Bund in a public statement. That, of course, might be brushed aside as a mere struggle for German-American leadership between two organizations. Then there is the visit of such a firm friend of Germany as the former American Ambassador in Berlin, Schurman. Deeply concerned over the "propaganda activities of National Socialist groups among persons of German origin in this country," he told me that, in view

of developments so opposed to the interests of the United States, he could no longer retain the vice-presidency of the Carl Schurz Memorial Foundation. The objection may perhaps be raised that, in this instance, it was a representative of the older generation of Americans speaking, who had not kept pace with the changed times. But a somewhat closer study of the Bund and its methods becomes imperative when we consider these facts:

Through contacts with influential and really friendly Americans, one is forced to conclude that this reaction to the activities of the German-American Bund is affecting ever widening circles. Senators and Representatives who have hitherto lent no support to the tactics of Representative Dickstein, and who have even voted down his repeated resolutions for an investigation, are now expressing themselves most emphatically, both in and out of Congress, against the German-American Bund and its methods. The alleged collaboration of the Bund with German governmental and Party authorities which Americans infer from the external make-up and conduct of the Bund has displeased the American Government.

It should be borne in mind that the Bund, since its reorganization under the present leader Kuhn, purports to be an American organization of American citizens, and that he has stressed this both publicly and to Government officials and members of Congress. The Bund definitely wishes to be an influence in American domestic politics. Such a program, considered from the standpoint of German interest, can only be welcome. If, however, the Bund intends to exert any influence whatever upon the destinies of the country, if it intends to make the German element a factor in the domestic politics of this country and to carry on a successful campaign against Jews and Communism, it must keep its eyes on America and adapt its methods to the American mentality. For here the Bund, with its present small membership of about 6,000, is pitted not only against millions of German-Americans whose views are different, but also against more than 100 million in other racial groups belonging to circles alien in culture and language to the Germans. This is overlooked by those who believe that they can brush aside all practical considerations by a reference to the seizure of power in Germany by National Socialism. The mere transplanting of Reich-German concepts into the population of this country, with such a different mentality, is a futile undertaking, no matter how valuable these concepts are in themselves for the inner strength of a movement carried on by German people.

But here we have the essence of the problem. It must always be borne in mind that the Bund has developed from local National

Socialist groups and was, in reality, carried on by German postwar immigrants during its first transformations from the Friends of the Hitler Movement through the German Bund into the Friends of the New Germany. Even though many members, at the instigation of Bund leaders, have meanwhile acquired American citizenship, they still carry on this old tradition. Their one interest is working for Germany and recognition by Germany; the American goals set up by the Bund are essentially foreign, if not completely indifferent to them. Their attitude, which even in its outward form (uniforms, *Führerprinzip*, and military training) emulates the example of the Party and its organization, would redound to the honor of any Reich-German group. But for an organization which wants to be accepted in American domestic politics as an American organization of American citizens, in the face of the antagonistic attitude of the overwhelming majority of the population toward authoritarian States, this keeping its eyes fixed on Germany and this attention to external Reich-German forms are out of place. By adopting the flag of National Socialist Germany, for example, the Bund is made to appear to Americans as an alien organization tied to Germany. The Bund thus inevitably isolates itself, calls forth numerous opponents, and does not succeed in reaching those Americans upon whose support it depends for every goal it has set for itself on American soil. Moreover, it may well be concluded from the Bund's behavior that National Socialist Germany, contrary to all solemn assurances, wishes to interfere in American domestic affairs through the German-American Bund. It does not help the German cause that the Bund's leaders, not merely when among Germans but among Americans as well, stress their alleged connections with the very highest Party authorities in Germany. Hence it is not surprising that, whenever I refer to the Bund as an American organization unconnected with German authorities, friendly Americans ask me, for the sake of improving German-American relations, openly to disavow the German-American Bund or to have an authoritative German spokesman declare that the Bund receives no assistance or encouragement from Government or Party.

It may be remarked parenthetically that German representatives here have found Bund leaders disinclined to avoid practices which are contrary to German interests. The Bund leaders claim to have had different instructions from Party authorities, which are, however, not stated in detail. In like manner, Bund leaders are working contrary to the instructions of the Führer's Deputy to German nationals here not to join the Bund. They allege that Party

authorities had subsequently approved of the admission of Reich-Germans to Bund membership.

These conclusions with regard to the reaction of the American public to the activities of the German-American Bund do not rest solely upon my observations and those of my staff here; I have received confirmation of them from the heads of our Consular Service in the United States, whom I recently invited to Washington for a conference lasting several days. Local differences in the conduct of the different local groups in no wise change the picture.

There is no chance of progress with the present methods of the Bund. The membership roll of the Bund in the entire United States, with a population of 130 million and with several million persons of German origin who are conscious of this origin, amounts at present to about 6,000. The main contingent consists of young postwar immigrants who are neither rooted in the country nor able to exert any influence in the economic or the political field. If the Bund adheres to its methods, it will, under the most favorable conditions, succeed in assembling 10 to 20 thousand persons from the same category.

In my opinion, not only Reich-German interests but also consideration for more important Racial-German work in the United States require that clear directives in regard to the German-American Bund be established for all German governmental and Party authorities, wherever this has not meanwhile been done:

- 1) Germany should pursue no aims and employ no methods among the German element in America which, without good grounds, tend to disturb existing relations between Germany and the United States.

- 2) Political contact between authorities in Germany and the Bund, if any such exists, must be stopped. Further, the Bund cannot be utilized for official purposes, as the *Volksdeutsche Mittelstelle* has evidently done in connection with the applications of Reich-Germans and Racial-Germans for foreign exchange remittances. Direct communications of any nature between the Bund and domestic German authorities must be avoided. Liaison with the Bund should be maintained only through contact men of the *Mittelstelle* assigned to our offices abroad. The Bund leaders must not be in a position to communicate with Party offices from our offices abroad and vice versa, and to make references in the course of their activity to "instructions" from Reich-German authorities.

- 3) Strict adherence must be given to the decision that Reich-German members must withdraw from the Bund and that Reich-Germans cannot join the Bund, because of its political character and its activity in American domestic politics. In order to carry out these instructions, our authorities abroad should be empowered, if necessary, to withdraw the passports of Reich-Germans contravening these instructions.

4) In conformity with the principle that we should not interfere in the domestic affairs of another country, Reich-German authorities should not concern themselves with the internal affairs of the Bund.

5) Our Missions abroad will govern their relations with the Bund in accordance with local conditions and exert their friendly influence with the Bund within the scope of effective Racial-German work. A copy of a letter written by the leader of the Bund's Chicago branch, Mr. Gissibl, stating the same view as that in Nos. 2 to 5, is enclosed.

6) The Bund must be given to understand that the use of the German flag as a Bund flag is not desirable. Through this misuse of the German flag, incidents might well arise to disturb our relations with the United States. The Bund should procure a different flag of its own.

7) An open disavowal of the Bund by the German Government should be considered only as a last resort in case the Bund's conduct gravely disturbs Germany's relations with the United States or jeopardizes the Racial-German work in general. An irreparable open break with the Bund must, as far as possible, be avoided. But this attitude must not lay itself open to interpretation by the Bund as weakness or as a secret understanding; on the contrary, it must be made clear to the Bund that its own conduct will determine whether such a disavowal on the part of Germany is waived or not.

I should be grateful if the questions raised in this report, to which I attach considerable political importance, could be examined as soon as possible in consultation with the competent offices, and if I might be given instructions as to the principles I have proposed for our attitude toward the German-American Bund. Meanwhile I shall continue to observe the previous regulations with respect to the relations of our offices abroad with Reich-Germans and Racial-Germans.

DIECKHOFF

[Enclosure]

1041/311124

GERMAN-AMERICAN BUND  
GAU MITTELWEST, ORTSGRUPPE CHICAGO

3855 N. Western Avenue, January 3, 1938.

MITTELSTELLE FÜR DAS  
DEUTSCHTUM IM AUSLAND,  
*Berlin.*

DEAR GERMAN COMRADES: With reference to your inquiry in regard to G. Penning of Dubuque, Iowa, we beg to inform you that the German-American Bund has no connections with Germans in

the above-mentioned city and that we are therefore not in a position to give you the desired information.

Quite apart from this, however, the Bund cannot, as an American political organization, state its position on questions of this kind without running the risk of compromising itself, as an organization of American citizens, in the eyes of public officials and enemies of our movement. We ask you therefore to apply to the proper German officials in Chicago, who, in cases where we can be of assistance, will make an "oral" request of us to that effect.

With German greetings,

GERMAN-AMERICAN BUND

By direction:

PETER GISSIBL

No. 431

2422/511476-77

*The German Ambassador in the United States (Dieckhoff) to the  
State Secretary in the German Foreign Ministry (Mackensen)*

WASHINGTON, January 13, 1938.

(Pol. IX 161)

DEAR MACKENSEN: I have just received your letter of December 22. Thank you very much. I am pleased to gather from your remarks that the Foreign Minister, you yourself, and all the competent offices for Racial-German questions agree with my interpretation of the German-American problem. Meanwhile I had prepared a fuller report which seeks to elucidate all these questions and which concludes with proposals for handling this problem, especially for the attitude to be taken by German agencies toward the German-American Bund. I am afraid that the report has become far too long, but I should be very grateful if you could find time to read it; I enclose the report and all the carbon copies, as I should not like to send it by the customary channels because of the delicacy of its subject matter. In brief, the content of the report is as follows: under no circumstances must we try, in any way whatsoever, through governmental or Party authorities, to exert political influence on the German-Americans. The effort would be hopeless and should therefore not be made. Moreover, it is dangerous, because it would

1) Deepen the existing cleavage among the German element in America;

2) Stimulate a violent reaction in American circles against German-Americans, perhaps seriously discrediting and possibly even destroying the German element in the United States;

3) Arouse the suspicion of the American Government and imperil the relations between Germany and the United States.

Today's newspapers announce (cf. the enclosed clipping from the *New York Times*<sup>52</sup>) that the investigation of the German-American Bund carried on since last August by the Department of Justice has produced no proof that the German-American Bund violates federal laws. However gratifying this statement may be, after all the hue and cry raised against the Bund, it does not alter the fact that we must keep politically aloof from the German-American Bund. The fact that no *criminal* derelictions can be imputed to the Bund in no way changes the *political* rejection of the Bund which is to be observed everywhere here.

With cordial greetings, Heil Hitler!

Always yours,

DIECKHOFF

No. 432

2422/511432-33

*The German Ambassador in the United States (Dieckhoff) to the German Foreign Ministry*

Telegram

VERY SECRET

No. 14 of January 14

WASHINGTON, January 14, 1938—3:28 p.m.

Received January 15, 1938—12:55 a.m.

(Pol. IX 89)

For the Foreign Minister and State Secretary.

Today I took up with Secretary Hull the speech delivered by Dodd last night, to which the morning newspapers are devoting a good deal of space. I entered the sharpest protest against the outrageous insults to the Führer and Germany.<sup>53</sup> I emphatically pointed out that this was not merely a question of the statements of a private person. Even though Dodd was no longer Ambassador, he had previously been sent to Berlin by the American Government as its official representative and was active in this capacity until a few weeks ago. The American Government therefore could not refuse to share the responsibility for the statements made by its recent representative, immediately after his return, concerning the Government to which he had been accredited and the country whose hospitality he had enjoyed for more than 4 years as an official representative of the United States. The American Government, which likes so much to talk about the necessity of observing the universally acknowledged rules of international relations, could not permit such an insolent breach of the most elementary forms of

<sup>52</sup> Not printed here.

<sup>53</sup> For a memorandum by Secretary Hull on this interview, see *Peace and War* (Washington, Government Printing Office, 1943), pp. 402-403.

propriety to go unpunished. Where would it get us if, immediately after their return, ambassadors were simply to turn around and in such a tactless way publicly attack and insult the countries to which they had been accredited—not to mention the actual untruthfulness of a large part of Dodd's statements? After Dodd's conduct, how could the American Government in the future expect its ambassadors to be received with confidence in Germany? I spoke very seriously and left no doubt in Hull's mind that there are limits to everything. The relations between Germany and the United States were unsatisfactory enough without needless and wanton aggravation. In the present case the American Government could not remain inactive but had to express its disapproval openly. In addition, it would have to do everything in its power to prevent further agitation of this kind. I was sure that it was possible to exert pressure on Dodd, who, I knew, intended to give other lectures around the country, to abstain from similar attacks in the future. Hull made no secret of the fact that he thought just as I did about Dodd's conduct. He seemed to be in doubt only as to what he could do. At first, he hesitated to take a stand on the speech publicly, as this would only result in increased publicity for Dodd. Finally he decided to promise me that he would disavow Dodd in a public statement. Furthermore, he told me that he would try to prevent further aberrations, but he set no great hopes on such efforts, since Dodd was the sort of fool with whom one could not reason.

DIECKHOFF

No. 433

2422/511427-29

*The Head of the Political Department in the German Foreign Ministry (Weizsäcker) to the German Ambassador in the United States (Dieckhoff)*

BERLIN, January 18, 1938.

DEAR DIECKHOFF: Many thanks for your comprehensive letter of December 20, which was a very valuable supplement to the official reports. Your success in restoring the Embassy's work and also its social position to the desired level, in the short time you have been in Washington, gives us cause to congratulate ourselves. The echo of Wiedemann's journey is further evidence of this.

You can imagine that we here at the Foreign Ministry have made observations regarding the development of the relations be-

tween Germany and the United States similar to those you describe in more detail in your letter. Regarding the factors you mention as having influenced American public opinion against Germany recently, there is nothing new to report from here. It may be hoped that several of these factors which are being exploited there to our disadvantage, e.g., the Spanish Civil War or our attitude in the Far Eastern conflict, can this year no longer be misused to the same extent for such purposes. On the other hand, however, we intend to dissipate that American distrust, which you mention under item 3, concerning indirect interference in American domestic affairs through the German-American Bund, for instance. As you will have gathered from the State Secretary's letter of December 22, we have already considered that intensively, and in the meantime you will also have received instruction Kult. A 5619 of December 31, 1937.<sup>54</sup> Your reply will undoubtedly enable us to continue our efforts here. We are trying at the same time to see to it that events in America are presented more objectively in the German press. A beginning has perhaps been made by the series of articles by Kircher,<sup>55</sup> which has been received with approval by the American Embassy here.

In accordance with your request, we shall forego the press surveys. But I should like to request in this connection that you at least continue to watch the despatches of the American correspondents here and to report regularly on them. We have no other effective check on their reporting.

As I have been informed in confidence, your house guest has reported on his impressions, as you had expected. Apparently, however, their persuasive power was somewhat diminished by the R[echenberg] treatise.

WEIZSÄCKER

### No. 434

2422/511478-81

*The German Ambassador in the United States (Dieckhoff) to the Head of the Political Department in the German Foreign Ministry (Weizsäcker)*

WASHINGTON, January 19, 1938.  
(Pol. IX 196)

DEAR WEIZSÄCKER: I am sorry that I must bother you again with a few lines. But, at the moment, what we used to say in Berlin

<sup>54</sup> Not printed.

<sup>55</sup> Rudolf Kircher of the *Frankfurter Zeitung*.

can be said in Washington: "*nulla dies sine linea!*" Since Mr. Dodd a few days ago emptied his chamber pot before our door (the metaphor originated with the Rumanian Minister here), an anti-German propaganda film, "Nazi Regime 1937," has appeared. In the Dodd case I intervened immediately, first because it involved an outrageous affront to the Führer, and then because it set a precedent for conduct which simply cannot be accepted in diplomatic procedure. I felt sure that my step with the good but timid Hull would have no important consequences and I entirely agree with your opinion that the public statement on which, by dint of great efforts, he finally decided, was a very lukewarm one. But nothing more could be accomplished, nor can more be done in the future. I had from the very beginning looked into the question of whether our protest should also be based on the American law concerning public officials, but arrived at a negative conclusion. In the first place, the decisions are not as clear as Gilbert,<sup>50</sup> in Berlin, has apparently represented them to be, and, in addition, I hesitated to reproach Mr. Dodd with publicizing *facts* which had come to his knowledge through official channels. I should thereby have admitted, at least implicitly, that Dodd's statements were facts, and that would have been seized upon possibly even by Hull, but certainly by Dodd, and used against us. For this reason, I should prefer not to take a step such as that suggested in the telegram of January 18,<sup>51</sup> especially as several days have passed since then, and taking up the matter again would look like a retouching job. It goes without saying that, at the first available opportunity, I expressed to the State Department how unsatisfactory Mr. Hull's statement was, and I shall also state this fact clearly to Mr. Hull, as soon as I see him; but to go back to Hull now, 5 days after my first *démarche*, and make a new representation on the basis of a vague provision in the law on public officials, especially at the risk of permitting the inference to be drawn that I concede that Mr. Dodd was revealing *facts*—that is a thing I should prefer not to do. I am sure that the Foreign Ministry will agree to that.

In the matter of the film, the "March of Time" people set a clumsy trap for us which we did not fall into. On the afternoon of the day before yesterday, a man came to see me on behalf of the

<sup>50</sup> Prentiss B. Gilbert, Counselor of Embassy and Chargé d'Affaires in the American Embassy in Germany.

<sup>51</sup> Not printed. The telegram, from the German Foreign Ministry to the Ambassador in Washington, suggested that Dieckhoff might, if he found it advisable, point out to the Department of State that it could control Dodd's public utterances under the law which forbade revelation of official secrets. The telegram stated that this was Gilbert's view also.

"March of Time" and invited me in a most cordial manner to be present at a preview of the film, as was the custom in such cases; it would only be necessary for me to fix an hour for this preview, the film would then be shown me and I could express my wishes in case any parts of it proved objectionable; he could, of course, not promise me that my wishes would be respected. I replied that I was too busy to look at his film. Had I attended, my presence would, in tried and true fashion, have been exploited for advertising purposes, and had I expressed a wish for any deletions this would have been branded by part of the press as a highhanded attempt to introduce "Nazi censorship" into America. So I did not do them that favor, and the film is now being shown without this additional publicity. As I have already informed you by wire today, there is no chance that if we lodged a protest, the American Government would suppress the film or even order deletions made. Such a step would become known at once, produce the greatest publicity for the film, result in a strong outcry against Germany in the press, and, in the end, be completely ineffectual. The film is vile—nothing else is to be expected from the "March of Time." It only serves to prove that Mr. Ingersoll<sup>57a</sup>—about whom Princess Hohenlohe, who was in the United States some weeks ago with Herr and Frau Wiedemann, proudly stated that he was now completely favorable to National Socialism—is still raising the same hue and cry he has been carrying on for a long while in varying degrees in his periodicals *Time*, *Fortune*, and *Life*. Unfortunately, Mr. Ingersoll does not seem to have succumbed completely to the charm of Princess Hohenlohe! Fortunately, however, some police authorities have, of their own accord, taken a stand against the film, and that, in my opinion, is the only way in which the evil effects of this film can be somewhat weakened. A point of interest in the film is its attempt to prove that the German-American Bund here (Mr. Fritz Kuhn and his stalwarts) is the advance guard of a National Socialist campaign of conquest against the United States; one can see how ready and quick our opponents are to grasp the opportunity thus offered them for effective agitation against Germany. I refer to my report of January 7 on the reactions which political contact with the German-American Bund on the part of German authorities would have on the relations between Germany and the United States.

With cordial greetings, Heil Hitler!

Always yours,

DIECKHOFF

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<sup>57a</sup> Ralph Ingersoll, vice president and general manager of Time, Inc., publishers of *Time*, *Life*, and *Fortune*.

## No. 435

2422/511438

*The German Ambassador in the United States (Dieckhoff) to the  
German Foreign Ministry*

Telegram

URGENT

WASHINGTON, January 21, 1938—7:44 p.m.

VERY SECRET

Received January 22, 1938—4 a.m.

No. 27 of January 21

With reference to instruction Kult. A 5619 of December 31<sup>58</sup> and in continuation of my report No. 53 of the 7th.

For the State Secretary:

According to an article by Deuel in yesterday's *Chicago Daily News*, Peter Gissibl, the *Ortsgruppenleiter* of the Chicago German-American Bund, while visiting his brother, Fritz Gissibl in Stuttgart, gave a lecture there on the 14th, publicly announced in the press, in which he described his efforts toward unification [*Gleichschaltung*] of Chicago's German population. Gissibl, although now an American citizen, allegedly said that he came to America in 1924 as a convinced National Socialist with the deliberate purpose of furthering the cause of the Party in America.

I consider it a great mistake that Gissibl, whom our Consul General at Chicago advised before his departure to be especially cautious and silent, should have been induced to speak publicly in Germany. In the face of such facts, it will be harder for us to create faith in our assertion that there are no political connections between the German-American Bund and German governmental or Party authorities.

I should be grateful if steps can be taken there to prevent any further public appearance of Peter Gissibl during his visit to Germany. Gissibl is at present in Berlin.

DIECKHOFF<sup>59</sup>

<sup>58</sup> Not printed.

<sup>59</sup> A pencilled note by Freytag, dated January 24, 1938, reads as follows: "I have taken up the matter with *Gauamtsleiter* Grothe, who shares the opinion of the Ambassador. He will take the necessary steps to prevent further public appearances by Gissibl. Cf. also the protocol of today's conversations regarding the German-American Bund, attended by *Gauamtsleiter* Grothe of the A[uslands]-O[rganisation], Consul General Lorenz of the Cultural Section, and Freytag, von Strempele, and Lehmann of Pol. IX."

A memorandum concerning this conference will be found on p. 685.

## C. THE BUND OFFICIALLY REPUDIATED, JANUARY-JUNE, 1938

No. 436

2422/511446-47

*The Reich Minister and Chief of the Reich Chancellery (Lammers)  
to the Foreign Minister*

SECRET

BERLIN, January 21, 1938.

Rk. 29 B

(Pol. IX 124)

Subject: Speech of former American Ambassador Dodd.

MY DEAR FOREIGN MINISTER: I have reported in detail to the Führer and Chancellor on the contents of the address of former American Ambassador Dodd, as well as on the steps taken with regard to it up to the 18th. The Führer approves the steps taken so far by the Foreign Ministry. If the American Government should be disinclined to straighten out the matter in a manner satisfactory to the Reich, the Führer is considering the idea of not receiving the new American Ambassador until this is done.

Please send me word concerning your view of this matter as soon as possible.

Heil Hitler!

Sincerely yours,

DR. LAMMERS

No. 437

1146/325589-92

*Memorandum*

(Pol. IX 147)

A long discussion was held, as requested, with *Gauamtsleiter* Party Member Grothe, the representative of the *Auslandsorganisation*, in regard to the guidance of the German element in the United States of America. Consul General Lorenz, representing the Cultural Department, which has primary responsibility, attended this meeting. *Gauamtsleiter* Grothe pointed out that the *Auslandsorganisation* had received full reports on the activities of the German-American Bund, showing that it was essentially a substitute for the "Friends of the New Germany." American nationals, German citizens, and Party members belonged to the organization. As everyone knew, the activities of the former organization, "Friends of the New Germany," had given rise to serious complaints. Consequently, by agreement with the Führer's Deputy, the *Gauleiter* of the *Auslandsorganisation* had, at the end of 1935, prohibited Party

members as well as German citizens from membership in the "Friends of the New Germany" organization.

It was hoped that these experiences would cause the heads of the new organization, the German-American Bund, especially Bund Leader Kuhn, to avoid the earlier errors. Unfortunately, these hopes had not been warranted. The German-American Bund had increased disunion in the German element in the United States still further. Moreover, through its propaganda, which was unsuited to the United States, it had occasioned strong tension between the German element in America and American authorities and public opinion. Bund Leader Kuhn had rejected all advice and admonitions and, contrary to the wishes of the *Auslandsorganisation*, had particularly encouraged the membership of Reich-Germans and Party members. In view of such experiences, the *Auslandsorganisation* deemed it essential to draw a clear dividing line between German governmental and Party authorities, on the one hand, and the German-American Bund, on the other, and to tell Reich-Germans and Party members living in America immediately to renounce their membership. Publication through the D.N.B. of a semiofficial notice to this effect was the most suitable means of doing this.

Counselor of Legation Freytag expressed his thanks for the detailed report and stated that the Foreign Ministry had had similar reports on the activities of the German-American Bund. He deeply regretted the impossibility of cooperation with an organization whose goal was propaganda for the New Germany among the German element in the United States. But Germany could not allow the development and cohesion of the German element to be endangered by an organization that could organize only five thousand of the hundreds of thousands of German-Americans. The German-American Bund had no future prospects as a comprehensive organization of the German element in America. He therefore agreed with the statements of the representative of the *Auslandsorganisation*. The measures proposed were also appropriate for the reason that they would prove to the American Government and the American public that Germany had no intention whatever of interfering in America's domestic affairs. Exerting political influence on the German element in America was out of the question. We should fall back upon purely cultural activities. Since the German-American Bund pursued domestic political aims too, it was no place for Reich-Germans. The representative of the Cultural Department was in complete agreement with the foregoing suggestions and made further statements on this subject.

It was agreed that the Cultural Department, which has primary responsibility, should have the following instructions cabled to the German Embassy in Washington:

"The Head of the *Auslandsorganisation*, by agreement with the Führer's Deputy, has again called attention to the fact that Reich-Germans may not belong to the German-American Bund. This order applies likewise to the Prospective Citizen League which is affiliated with the Bund, and to any substitute societies.

"It is proposed, about a week hence, to publish this order at home and abroad by means of the following D.N.B. despatch:

"D.N.B.: 'Following various inquiries from Reich-Germans in the United States, attention is called to the fact that Reich-Germans may not be members of the German-American Bund. Reich-Germans who, through ignorance of this prohibition, have acquired membership in the German-American Bund or in the Prospective Citizen League must immediately give up their membership.'

"Please inform the American Government of this measure and point out that in taking such action we are endeavoring to remove the impression prevalent among the American public that we wish to interfere in American affairs."

Herewith respectfully transmitted, with six enclosures<sup>60</sup> which are to be returned later to Party Member Grothe, to Cultural Section A for appropriate action. Pol. IX requests continued participation. The memorandum has not yet been submitted to the Head of the *A[uslands]o[rganisation]*.

BERLIN, January 26, 1938.

No. 438

2422/511512-13

### *Memorandum*

Kult. A 606.38

607.38

Drafting Officer: Dr. Goeken (acting).

The question of the German-American Bund was discussed on February 3 at a meeting of the Cultural Policy Department of the Foreign Ministry, which was attended by representatives of the Head of the *Auslandsorganisation* of the N.S.D.A.P., the *Volks-deutsche Mittelstelle*, the Ministry of Public Enlightenment and Propaganda, the Political and Political Intelligence Department of the Foreign Ministry, and the German Embassy in Washington. The deliberations were based on the report of the German Ambassador in Washington, of January 7, 1938, on the content of which the representatives of the *Auslandsorganisation* and of the *Volks-*

\* Not printed.

*deutsche Mittelstelle* expressed their full agreement, and the memorandum of the Political Department of January 26, 1938, concerning the outcome of a discussion of the matter with the *Auslandsorganisation*.

*Gauamtsleiter* Grothe reported that the *Auslandsorganisation* was not maintaining any contact with the German-American Bund but was merely observing it; in the opinion of the *Auslandsorganisation*, the organization of the German-Americans must develop of itself without any intervention by Reich-Germans.

*Oberführer* Dr. Behrends of the *Volksdeutsche Mittelstelle* demanded as a decisive step the total organizational separation of Reich-Germans from German-Americans, in order not to give American public opinion any point of attack for claiming interference on the part of Reich-Germans. The question of establishing contact with the leaders of the German-American Bund could be left for decision at a later date.

It was decided to issue a reminder of the prohibition against membership of Reich-Germans in the German-American Bund, its affiliated organizations, and any substitute organizations, and to publish this in a D.N.B. despatch; at the same time the German Ambassador in Washington was to inform the American Government of this. The enclosed draft of the telegraphic instruction was approved.

The use of Reich emblems and of Reich-German designations and Party insignia by the German-American Bund is to be forbidden. Leader Kuhn after the return to Washington of Counselor of Embassy Scholz. If Bund Leader Kuhn should come to the Reich, he is to be received by no officer except the director- or staff head of the *Volksdeutsche Mittelstelle*. The *Volksdeutsche Mittelstelle* shall instruct the *Gauleiter*, the *Volksbund für das Deutschtum im Ausland* and the *Deutsche Auslandsinstitut* to this effect and forbid officers of the German-American Bund to deliver addresses in the Reich without special permission from the *V[olksdeutsche] M[ittel] S[telle]*.

Herewith respectfully submitted—together with the draft of a telegram to Washington<sup>61</sup>—through the Head of the *Auslandsorganisation*, to the State Secretary.

BERLIN, February 4, 1938.

<sup>61</sup> See telegram No. 33 of February 10 to Washington, p. 691.

## No. 439

2422/511448-49

*Reich Minister von Neurath to the Reich Minister and Chief of the  
Reich Chancellery (Lammers)*

BERLIN, February 5, 1938.  
(Pol. IX 124/38)

DEAR HERR LAMMERS: Since I have not been able so far to report to the Führer in response to your letter of January 21 concerning the reception of the new American Ambassador by the Führer and Chancellor, please tell the Führer when you next report to him that it seems to me more advisable not to inflict on the new Ambassador our justified indignation over Dodd's indescribable conduct. As you know, on Herr Dieckhoff's *démarche*, the American Secretary of State did disavow Dodd publicly and disapproved of his statements. In his conversation with Dieckhoff he further promised to make an effort to stop Dodd from delivering any more lectures. In point of fact, Dodd has not spoken in public since, even though several more lectures by him were announced. This could be attributed to intervention on the part of the Department of State.

On the other hand, the new Ambassador, Wilson, according to all information reaching us, is filled with the best intentions, is a figure to be taken much more seriously in diplomatic intercourse, and in spite of various difficulties has already begun his journey to Germany. I therefore think that, if no other incidents in connection with Dodd occur in the meantime, we should at least give him a chance to try to establish better relations.

Heil Hitler!

Sincerely yours,

BARON VON NEURATH

## No. 440

2422/511484

*The German Ambassador in the United States (Dieckhoff) to the  
German Foreign Ministry*

Telegram

No. 48 of February 9      WASHINGTON, February 9, 1938—4:43 p.m.  
Received February 10, 1938—4 a.m.

Under Secretary Sumner Welles asked me to call on him yesterday and, as on several previous occasions, expressed in general terms

his concern that the state of international affairs was constantly becoming graver. I replied that we had no responsibility for this development of which he spoke, but that a full measure of guilt should be attributed to the incredible campaign which had been carried on day in and day out for some time among the American public. I referred him, as often before, to the flood of mendacious news about Germany which pours over the country here through the press, the radio, and the movies and which the American Government either could not stop, or did not want to stop. Thus a kind of war psychosis, of an essentially artificial nature, was being created here.

How strongly the uneasiness of American public opinion has increased during recent weeks is evidenced not only in the press and in numerous speeches, but in a very clear manner by the recent Senate debates on foreign policy on which I have reported in detail. Hull's declaration yesterday that no secret agreement existed between the American Government and the British or any other foreign government with regard to pursuing a common policy (see wording of Hull's letter in my telegram No. 47<sup>62</sup>) has, it is true, somewhat relaxed the tension, but hardly anyone here is under the illusion that this declaration, though perhaps literally true, means very much. In 1917, likewise, there was in existence no agreement on the part of the American Government; nevertheless the United States of America in due time joined the Allied Powers. In spite of the widespread indifference of the American people toward anything which does not directly concern America, in spite of the activity of isolationist and pacifist circles, the American Government, should it so desire, will encounter no insuperable difficulties in again pushing this country into the war at the psychological moment, just as quickly as in the World War, and perhaps even more quickly.

DIECKHOFF

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<sup>62</sup> Telegram not printed. The letter was that of February 8, 1938, from Secretary Hull to Senator Pittman of Nevada, chairman of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, which was read by Senator Pittman in the Senate on February 8. For text, see *Foreign Relations, Japan, 1931-1941*, vol. 1, pp. 449-450.

## No. 441

2422/511511

*The German Foreign Ministry to the German Embassy in the  
United States*

Telegram

Kult. A 606.38

BERLIN, February 10, 1938.

607.38

Drafting Officer: Dr. Goeken (acting).

No. 33 of February 10

With reference to report 53.<sup>63</sup>

The Head of the *Auslandsorganisation*, by agreement with the Führer's Deputy, has again called attention to the fact that Reich-Germans may not belong to politically active American organizations such as, for instance, the German-American Bund. This order applies likewise to its affiliated organizations, such as the Prospective Citizen League and any substitute organizations.

It is proposed to publish this order at home and abroad by means of the following D.N.B. despatch:

D.N.B.:—"Following various inquiries from Reich-Germans in the United States, attention is called to the fact that Reich-Germans may not be members of the German-American Bund or of any of its substitute organizations. Reich-Germans who, through ignorance of this prohibition, have acquired membership in the German-American Bund or in the Prospective Citizen League must immediately give up their membership."

Please inform the American Government of this measure and point out that in taking such action we are endeavoring to remove the impression prevalent among the American public that we wish to interfere in American affairs.

It is important that the D.N.B. announcement be made concurrently with your *démarche* in order to forestall premature false comments in the American press in connection with your step. I therefore request that the step be not taken for about 8 days and that you inform us by cable of the time, well in advance.

VON MACKENSEN

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<sup>63</sup> Dated January 7, 1933, p. 664.

## No. 442

1146/325607-09

*Memorandum*

(zu Pol. IX 278)

On Monday, February 28, Ambassador Dieckhoff will call on Secretary of State Hull to inform him of our position with respect to the German-American Bund.

The following D.N.B. notice will be released on the morning of March 1:

"Following various inquiries from Reich-Germans in the United States, attention is called to the fact that Reich-Germans may not be members of the German-American Bund or of any of its substitute organizations. Reich-Germans who, through ignorance of this prohibition, have acquired membership in the German-American Bund or the Prospective Citizen League must immediately give up their membership."

In the interview with the Director of the Political Department, likewise scheduled for February 28, the following information might be given the American Ambassador:<sup>64</sup>

The Reich Government has observed with growing concern that anti-German propaganda in America continues to rest upon the assertion that Germany was seeking to meddle in American domestic affairs. As proof of this alleged interference, it was adduced that German governmental and Party authorities were maintaining connections with American organizations, such as the German-American Bund, and giving them instructions for their [conduct in] domestic political contests. Such assertions had always been characterized as unfounded by Germany. But, in order to give the American Government and the American public fresh proof that it was far from our intention to intervene in American domestic affairs, on March 1 the Reich Government would once more publicly disavow the German-American Bund and call attention to the fact that Reich-Germans are not permitted to be members of the German-American Bund or of any substitute organizations. Reich-Germans who, through ignorance of this order, acquired membership in the German-American Bund or the Prospective Citizen League would be called upon to give up their membership immediately.

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<sup>64</sup> A marginal notation by Freytag, dated March 1, reads as follows: "In accordance with instructions, I today informed Mr. Heath, First Secretary of the American Embassy, of the tenor of this memorandum. Counselor of Embassy Gilbert is sick."

Confidentially, and not for publication, the following could be added:

The German Consulates in the United States will be instructed to employ every means for executing this order, possibly even cancellation of passports.

All official and Party authorities have again been reminded that they were not permitted to maintain any connection whatever with the German-American Bund and like organizations.

Use of emblems of the German Reich by the German-American Bund, which has in many cases occasioned offense, will be prohibited to the German-American Bund.

We hoped that the American Government and the American public would now realize what great pains we were taking to improve the evidently unsatisfactory relations between Germany and the United States. It would now devolve upon the American Government duly to direct the attention of the American public to this German contribution to conciliation.

FREYTAG  
*Counselor of Legation*

BERLIN, February 24, 1938.

No. 443

1146/325610

*The German Ambassador in the United States (Dieckhoff) to the  
German Foreign Ministry*

Telegram

VERY URGENT

WASHINGTON, February 28, 1938—8:24 p.m.

CONFIDENTIAL

Received March 1, 1938—4 a.m.

No. 64 of February 28

For *Obergruppenführer* Lorenz personally:

1) I have just learned that Stahmer<sup>65</sup> has renewed his promises of assistance for the Bund to the leader of the German-American Bund in Chicago, Peter Gissibl. Since Fritz Kuhn will shortly arrive there, I urgently request you to forbid Stahmer to communicate with him.

2) Work on repatriation of German compatriots has already begun. A written report will follow in about 4 weeks. Scholz.<sup>66</sup>

DIECKHOFF

<sup>65</sup> Heinrich Georg Stahmer of the *Dienststelle Ribbentrop*.

<sup>66</sup> Herbert Scholz, First Secretary of the German Embassy.

## No. 444

2809/548566-69

*The German Ambassador in the United States (Dieckhoff) to the German Foreign Ministry*

Nr. 507

WASHINGTON, March 22, 1938.  
(Pol. IX 493/38)

Subject: Address by the new American Ambassador in London, Joseph P. Kennedy.

The new American Ambassador in London, Mr. Joseph P. Kennedy, at his first public appearance in England, on the occasion of the Pilgrims' Dinner on March 18, gave a noteworthy address.

In contrast with Ambassador Kennedy's predecessor, Mr. Bingham, who, on his frequent appearances as a speaker, confined himself either to an encomium on Anglo-American kinship, or invective, unworthy of his office, against totalitarian systems of government, Ambassador Kennedy in the political part of his speech attacked the problem of Anglo-American relations with great vigor, probably to the considerable astonishment of his English audience.

In its conclusions the address arrives at political maxims that have of late run like a guideline through all the utterances of influential representatives of the American Government: It was the policy of the United States not to enter into any sort of alliances, since, in concluding such an alliance, it was never possible to judge in what position one might some day be placed. But this cautious policy, said Kennedy, by no means indicated that America would under all circumstances refrain from the use of arms. In view of the great wave of isolationism that is making itself felt at present—greatly to the annoyance of the Administration—in the Congressional debates on the Navy bill, Ambassador Kennedy clearly believed he must emphasize that the rest of the world should make no mistake about America's readiness to intervene.

On the other hand, as Kennedy pointed out, the assumption of those who believed that in a future general conflict America could not remain neutral was likewise wrong. Mr. Kennedy characterized this supposition as a serious misunderstanding. On the contrary, the attitude of the United States depended solely on its own decisions. Particularly in this present period, America was prepared to cooperate with England in anything that might further the maintenance of peace. But if the nations should again be drawn into a general conflict, such a situation would find the United

States strongly armed and on the alert; the decision on American policy could not, however, be made in advance; it could be adopted only in such an acute situation.

The text of the address had obviously been dictated by the State Department as evidenced by the fact that it was given to the press here before it was delivered. In content the address closely follows the statements of Secretary Hull in his speech of the 17th before the National Press Club.<sup>67</sup> Kennedy's address differs from Hull's statements on the foreign policy of the United States only in form. While Secretary Hull treats the problem with his usual academic and monotonous phraseology, Ambassador Kennedy does not shrink from employing an unmistakable and resolute tone. Mr. Kennedy really says nothing new. He merely says what he has to say more clearly than it has hitherto been expressed by the President or Mr. Hull. Kennedy's well-considered speech is a fresh indication that the United States does not wish to obligate itself, that it will not, however, commit itself to an unconditional isolationist policy, but that it is prepared, if necessary, to take an active part in a conflict. Public opinion in the United States, as I have reported again and again, has for months been so influenced by the Administration, by well-nigh all the press, by numerous organizations, and by increasingly effective British propaganda, that not only can no commitment on foreign policy be made in the direction of isolation but the Administration can, at a given moment, join the "democracies," that is to say, England. For the time being, the opposition of isolationist circles to this propaganda is still very active, but, from the unscrupulousness of the means employed and the energy with which it is carried on, it is to be expected that the isolationist opposition will become steadily weaker. As things are today, the United States will not remain neutral in a great world conflict into which the British Empire is drawn, but, carried along by the vast propaganda painstakingly prepared and fostered by the Administration, will, when the Administration deems it advisable, come in on the British side.

DIECKHOFF<sup>68</sup>

<sup>67</sup> For text of Secretary Hull's speech of March 17, 1938, see *Peace and War*, pp. 407-419.

<sup>68</sup> Copies of this despatch were transmitted by the Foreign Ministry on April 13, 1938, to the Reich Chancellery, the Führer's Deputy, the Supreme Headquarters of the *Wehrmacht*, Foreign Section, the Reich and Prussian Economic Ministry, the Reich Ministry for Public Enlightenment and Propaganda, the Reich and Prussian Ministry of the Interior, the Reich Ministry of Finance, the Reich Ministry of Justice, Reich Minister Frank, Reich Minister Schacht, and the N.S.D.A.P. *Auslandsorganisation*. A typed note, dated April 23, on the copy used here states: "The Führer has been informed."

## No. 445

2422/511538-41

*The German Ambassador in the United States (Dieckhoff) to the  
State Secretary in the German Foreign Ministry (Weizsäcker)*

WASHINGTON, March 22, 1938.  
(Pol. IX 647)

DEAR WEIZSÄCKER: I do not know whether such a fantastic press campaign as that which has been making itself heard here for about a week has also started elsewhere in the world in connection with the reunion of Austria with Germany.<sup>69</sup> From the telegraphic reports of the Embassy and from the D.N.B. telegrams you will have learned how the propaganda against us operates here. First it was stated that we had ravished poor little Austria, and marched in only to prevent the Schuschnigg plebiscite, which would certainly have been against us; then, however, it could hardly be denied that the Führer and our troops were received with enthusiasm throughout Austria, but immediately every attention was centered on the poor Jews, the disheartened Catholics, the grieved aristocracy, and the unhappy Socialist workers, and then an atrocity propaganda began such as I have never observed elsewhere since the war. Our police, our SA-men, our SS looting in Vienna and elsewhere, brutally destroying Jewish shops, removing Jewish scholars of world-wide reputation to concentration camps, insulting bishops and priests, etc., etc.! In short, the Prussian wolf raging amongst the Austrian sheep. The beautiful *gemütlich* Vienna and the beautiful *gemütlich* mountains are of course gone forever. The tramp of the boots of German soldiers is everywhere, and everywhere the SA-man wields his whip. Of course, this propaganda emanates, first of all, from our Jewish friends, who are obviously not much pleased that their already somewhat straitened funds are further drawn upon for Austrian Jewry, now reduced to poverty. That many other quarters where we are not well liked are joining in the attack is a matter of course and hardly surprising. Dorothy Thompson had a downright hysterical attack, and screams herself hoarse every day in articles published throughout the country. From London the wind seems to be blowing a little less sharply again for the last day or two. During the first week and, in particular, directly after Chamberlain's speech on March 14, London vigorously fanned the flame.

Face to face with this situation, we are remaining calm here, although, of course, we are not inactive. With regard to the Govern-

<sup>69</sup> See chap. II, pp. 562 ff.

ment, I have limited myself to stating our position in brief just once, when I delivered the note on the reunion; however, I did not embark upon any further discussions there. On the other hand, as far as lay in my power, I have tried to convince the press here and in New York of the absurdity of this whole commotion. But even if I was, perhaps, successful in quieting a few writers, it rarely penetrated the columns of the newspapers, which are under either Jewish or other hostile control. It is regrettable that the Administration here not only gives its entire consent to such activities but, in fact, openly pours oil upon the fire. The President, who for a long time has not been very well-disposed toward us, is said to be greatly upset by the Austrian coup and to believe that the moment when the "democracies" must fight the "dictatorships" is not far off. He is very systematically getting this country ready both in sentiment and in armament for that moment; the present Navy bill, which was passed yesterday by a big majority of the House of Representatives, and which the Senate will undoubtedly adopt, is the first step in this direction; the active propaganda—Wake up, America!—is being promoted in every way throughout the country by the Administration. I am perhaps becoming a bore in Berlin<sup>70</sup> because I repeatedly point out in my telegrams and reports that we can no longer count on America's isolation, and that, on the contrary, we must certainly be prepared, in case of a world conflict, to see the Americans throw their weight into the British scale. Nevertheless, I consider it my duty to bring forward this view over and over again, because I am convinced of its correctness and because I do not wish us to encounter unpleasant surprises at some future time. As I wrote you months ago—and I believe that you agree with me—the key to the American attitude is in London. If England remains calm and accepts our increased strength and expansion, even if some circles here are not pleased, no action will be taken; after all, one cannot be more Catholic than the Pope. But if England decides to oppose us, and it comes to war, the United States will not hesitate very long to range itself on the British side. Even if we do not repeat psychological blunders like the invasion of Belgium and unrestricted submarine warfare, blunders which, in their time, made it so easy for hostile propaganda to turn American public opinion against us, some motive will be discovered to kindle the fire here, and, considering the odious ideological hostility which is, I believe, worse in America than anywhere else in the world, it will not be hard to fan the flame into a blaze.

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<sup>70</sup> A marginal notation in Weizsäcker's hand reads as follows: "Certainly not."

What role is Hugh Wilson playing in this situation? Is anything known about the tenor of his reports? Is he making fair reports or has he already allowed himself to be taken in by François-Poncet and other "*chers collègues*"? I was informed today that he had telegraphed the State Department the day before yesterday that the Foreign Ministry was in full agreement with Hull's speech of March 17. That is inconceivable to me, as the speech was thoroughly vicious and directed essentially against us. In my opinion, this speech could only have been ignored or sharply rejected by Germany.

I take it for granted that all of you at headquarters are tremendously busy. But I should be very grateful if, during a lull, you could write me some particulars of the dramatic development of the Austrian affair and continue to keep me posted as you have in the past.

Cordially yours,

Heil Hitler!

DIECKHOFF

No. 446

1479/368257-58

*The German Foreign Minister to the German Ambassador in the United States (Dieckhoff)*

CONFIDENTIAL

BERLIN, March 29, 1938.

DEAR HANS: I have discussed with Captain Wiedemann the plan for large-scale information activities in the United States. According to this plan, Captain Wiedemann would leave for America at the end of May in order to conduct unofficial conversations there with prominent Americans. I might characterize the trip as a sort of "goodwill tour." At the same time Captain Wiedemann is to organize a sort of lecture tour, which might cover the entire current year. In this connection I am thinking of lectures that would be given in large American cities by the President of the Reichsbank, Dr. Schacht, Director General Lindemann, and Professor Berber, as well as by other men prominent in the economic and academic fields.

I should be obliged to you if you would inform me as soon as possible of your opinion of a project of this kind and if you could make further suggestions of your own. In view of the ever increasing anti-German activities there, I consider information work

in the United States of especial importance and am of the opinion that we cannot remain inactive in this respect.

Most cordial regards to you and Eva—from Anneliese, too.

Always yours,

RIBBENTROP

Postscript: For the time being please treat the information on Wiedemann's intended trip as confidential. J. R.

### No. 447

2431/514087-90

*The German Ambassador in the United States (Dieckhoff) to the German Foreign Ministry*

Nr. 574

WASHINGTON, March 30, 1938.  
(Pol. IX 528)

Subject: American foreign policy. The Neutrality Act.

The American Neutrality Act of May 1937 was, as is well known, unwelcome to the President and the Administration from the beginning, and it was only with reluctance that Mr. Roosevelt signed it. First, such a rigid fixing of the course of foreign policy as that provided by the Act could not be welcome to the Administration, which naturally desires freedom of action. Secondly, the adoption of neutrality was bound to create the impression abroad that the United States wished to withdraw completely into herself and under all circumstances remain aloof from foreign conflicts, an impression calculated to weaken in advance the position of America in world politics. Lastly, Congress, in its ill-considered legislation, had kept its eyes fixed on coming conflicts in Europe only, not in the Far East; in a Far Eastern conflict, however, the "cash-and-carry" clause would be bound to operate in favor of the Japanese, and thus precisely in favor of those whose policy has been most sharply condemned by American public opinion.

During the last few months increasingly loud criticism of the Neutrality Act has arisen in this country. It is argued that in war the Neutrality Act made no distinction between "aggressor nations" and their victims, between "violators of treaties" and those who observe them, but must, if occasion arises, be applied to "good" and "bad" alike, which is contrary to the spirit of justice. A storm has of late raged in the press—especially in the *New York Times*, the latest editorials of which, dated March 20 and 21, I enclose<sup>18</sup>—and in speeches and resolutions against the Neutrality Act. At one point it appeared that the Administration, which obviously

<sup>18</sup> Not printed here.

sympathizes with this movement, might throw itself into the struggle and bring about the repeal of the Act. But that did not happen. On the contrary, on March 22 the Administration suddenly and rather unexpectedly put the engines in reverse and, at least until further notice, the attack has been called off. At the instance of the Administration, the Foreign Affairs Committee of the House of Representatives on the 22d indefinitely postponed all discussions of motions and bills on the question of neutrality. Apparently the Administration has suddenly become afraid of the spirits which it had itself evoked. In the confused and troubled world situation, the Administration was bound to be frightened by the idea of involving Congress in legislation on foreign policy—and on an extremely controversial, bitterly contested subject which would have led to long debates in the House and Senate. In view of the serious economic depression in the country, of the growing lack of confidence, of the widespread discontent and the Administration's ever increasing difficulties in guiding its own party and the Congress, the Administration had to guard against opening discussions on controversial issues of foreign policy. This is true especially in an election year, when one can never know how the voters will react, and when all the signs indicate that the majority of them are not yet ready to go along with such a shift of foreign policy without further preparation—in cold blood, as it were. For, in spite of all the propaganda, in spite of the unflagging campaign of a large section of the press, in spite of the "educational campaign"<sup>74</sup> launched by the President and the Government with the slogan "Wake up, America!", in spite of the fog with which British propaganda is covering the country by cable and radio from London and through individuals here, matters have not gone so far that the isolationist stronghold could be stormed in broad daylight.

But even though the Administration and circles close to it have for the time being stopped the attack on the Neutrality Act, we must not be deceived in regard to the true situation. It is not a question of an isolationist victory; on the contrary, the postponement of the fight over the repeal of the Act is merely a breathing space. I doubt whether this breathing space is of much importance. Even if the Act remains in force, there is no question of any real neutrality on the part of the United States. Moreover, the law can be repealed at any time if necessary, by an act of Congress and a stroke of the President's pen. Just when this may be necessary is not expressly stated in Secretary Hull's last speech or in the London speech of Ambassador Kennedy, but it is quite clearly intimated;

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<sup>74</sup> This quoted passage is in English in the original.

namely, when the great "democratic" powers, especially Great Britain, become involved in a serious struggle and the "parallel" interests of the United States no longer permit her to stand on the side lines. That Administration propaganda and British propaganda could at such a moment cause a reversal of public opinion in this country without too much difficulty, cannot, unfortunately, be doubted in the present state of affairs.

DIECKHOFF

## No. 448

809/276113-16

*The Aide to the Führer and Chancellor (Wiedemann) to the Head of Political Division IX in the German Foreign Ministry (Freytag)*

Office of the Aide, Captain Wiedemann      REICH CHANCELLERY,  
W/DA      BERLIN W. 8, April 7, 1938.

MY DEAR MINISTER: Enclosed you will find briefly listed the points which I have discussed with Mr. Kuhn, and my stand on them.

I have meanwhile notified Ambassador Wilson.

With German greetings,

Yours,

WIEDEMANN

[Enclosure]

*Text of the Conversation of March 30, 1938, Between Captain Wiedemann and Mr. Kuhn, the Head of the German-American Bund*

MR. KUHN: The purpose of the call is to clarify the relationship between the German-American Bund and Reich-German agencies.

I am an American citizen, who expects no instructions but who would like to express his wishes. I have the feeling that Reich-German officials are opposed to the Bund. I wish to remove the obstacles, the causes of which are both unknown and incomprehensible to me.

The German-American Bund has the task of unifying Americans who are racially German and of guiding them in racial matters. In a written statement, which was approved by *Gauleiter* Bohle and Minister Stieve, I advanced a proposal for accomplishing this task.

I am therefore astonished at treatment which is tantamount to the destruction of the Bund, the more so since we have never disregarded Reich-German instructions. Question: Does or does not

the Reich attach importance to the work of the German-American Bund? If not, I shall dissolve it, but I call attention to the fact that unification of German-Americans will then never again be achieved.

There is no ground for the action against me personally. I have never claimed to have had a second conversation with the Führer in Berchtesgaden or even to have received instructions from him.

I have likewise tried gradually to reduce the radicalism in the German-American Bund to suit the American mentality, and to give the Bund an American tinge.

Until now we have always respected the attitude of Reich-German agencies. All the more incomprehensible to us is the present order to our economic group [*Wirtschaftsgruppe*] to leave our Bund.

CAPTAIN WIEDEMANN:

1. You are an American citizen; I have therefore no instructions to give you.

2. I shall inform Ambassador Wilson of our conversation.

3. You are not acting honestly insofar as you make unfair use of previous conversations with Reich-German officials.

You have assured me in writing that you would not divulge anything of our conversation. Your conduct will determine my future attitude toward you.

4. I shall not discuss with you anything that is beyond the duties of the *Volksdeutsche Mittelstelle*.

5. The termination of membership in the German-American Bund by Reich-Germans is a final decision.

6. The German-American Bund has made relations between the German and American Governments more difficult, since in its outward appearance it has assimilated itself to German organizations (display of the swastika flag, uniforms) and thus was bound to arouse the distrust of the American Government.

In regard to character most members of the Bund are described as unobjectionable; their methods, however, are wrong.

MR. KUHN: Since you intend to inform Wilson of this, I disclaim responsibility if any of the conversation reaches the public.

The militant appearance of our organization is necessary since the mentality of the American who is racially German demands it.

We shall gladly change our position.

However, one should not merely criticize but point out to us the general direction, which we will then follow.

We desire friendly relations with Reich-German officials, but the desire to understand us is lacking.

CAPTAIN WIEDEMANN: The latter remark is a serious accusation, which I reject and which, besides, does not tally with the facts.

I shall ask Ambassador Wilson to treat the matter confidentially.

For the rest, the person for you to contact is always Herr Behrends of the *Volksdeutsche Mittelstelle*; and respect American laws.

No. 449

1479/368254-56

*The German Ambassador in the United States (Dieckhoff) to the German Foreign Minister*

WASHINGTON, April 14, 1938.

DEAR JOACHIM: I quite agree with you that anti-German feeling in the United States is strong and that we must make greater efforts than ever to give it a more favorable turn. I am also of the opinion that this will have to be brought about partly, though not exclusively, by intensified publicity; unfortunately, one of my recent suggestions in this connection (an interview of the Führer with the president of the United Press) has been rejected for the time being. This increased publicity should, as I have always pointed out, come chiefly from Europe; for whatever has to be done in America, only the most suitable persons should be employed, in which connection English men and women might be particularly useful to us. Herr Wiedemann, too, whose presence here has had a good effect, could certainly give us valuable assistance. This spring and summer, however, such an intensification of publicity, at least in the United States itself, *cannot* be launched. In the first place, the feeling here at present is so antagonistic that no one, not even Herr Schacht, would be effective here; the ground is so hard at present that no seed can sprout. Lord Rothermere, who arrived the day before yesterday with Eva on the *Europa* and talked very sensibly to the assembled reporters on landing at New York, has been almost completely ignored by the press. In the second place, the interest of the American public will be concentrated this summer exclusively on the elections (in November the whole House of Representatives and a third of the Senate will be elected, and the elections have considerable importance as a prelude to 1940); a German publicity campaign would not only arouse no interest but might possibly be interpreted at such a time as meddling in domestic political affairs and might produce ill feeling. The moment for our intensified publicity campaign will come in November immediately *after* the elections. I shall bring detailed proposals with me when I come to Berlin in June or July, as soon as Congress is adjourned. At that time I should like to give you an exhaustive report on the situation here. Meanwhile, I urgently request you

not to take any action; not only would it be of no use, but it might act as a boomerang.

Please let me know whether you agree to this.

Eva has returned from Germany full of enthusiasm. She was especially glad to see Annelies several times and to be able to be with her. We send Annelies and you our most cordial greetings.

As ever,

HANS DIECKHOFF

### No. 450

2422/511536-37

#### *Memorandum by the Foreign Minister*

RM 217

American Ambassador Wilson, after having made an appointment, called on me at noon to inform me of the following:

He recently had a lengthy discussion with Field Marshal Göring, and on this occasion he requested that in carrying out Austria's return to the Reich the German authorities respect the interests of foreigners. Field Marshal Göring answered that he had given strictest orders to avoid any encroachment upon the interests of foreigners in Austria. Mr. Wilson took note of this declaration with great satisfaction and now wished to inform me of this conversation.

I then mentioned to the Ambassador the numerous misrepresentations of the American press, and I stated that in the long run the German press could not leave these attacks unanswered. I wished to talk quite frankly to him. It appeared to me that little had been done by the White House to improve the attitude of the press. I had repeatedly heard that the position of the press did not correspond with that of the population. According to my personal experiences in the United States, where I stayed before the war, it was also incomprehensible to me how the American people could be brought to such a hostile attitude against Germany. I had the impression that, disregarding Jewish and Masonic circles, other forces were also at work, which intended to poison the relations between our two countries.

The American Ambassador admitted to me that the attitude of the press was really not very gratifying. He could inform me confidentially that it was particularly the press on the east coast, which was dependent on banks and trusts, that was hostile to Germany. For the rest, there was, among the American people, much sympathy for Germany.<sup>75</sup> If anti-German attacks were particularly conspicuous in the American press, and if they were less criticized by official circles

<sup>75</sup> A marginal notation, apparently in Freytag's hand, reads: "7"

than in England and France, it was probably because of the fact that in England and France it was dangerous for these circles to comment in such a manner on Germany, whereas in the United States these circles had no such inhibitions. I could rest assured that he was doing all he could to bring about an improvement of the atmosphere. I replied to the American Ambassador that I was convinced of that. I could assure him that he had succeeded in winning warmest personal sympathies in his short term here. Unfortunately, however, it seemed to me that the relations between our two countries needed considerable improvement. To the rejoinder by the American Ambassador that he had the feeling that his country was not particularly esteemed in Germany, I replied that this was definitely not so. The American people were regarded with respect and sympathy by Germans, and for this reason particularly they were disappointed at the unrestrained anti-German agitation over there.

RIBBENTROP

BERLIN, April 29, 1938.

No. 451

2422/511542-43

*The State Secretary in the German Foreign Ministry (Weizsäcker)  
to the German Ambassador in the United States (Dieckhoff)*

BERLIN, April 30, 1938.  
(Pol. IX 647)

DEAR DIECKHOFF: Now, just as I am about to leave for Rome, the Foreign Minister has returned to me your letter of March 22,<sup>76</sup> and I find that I still owe you a reply.

As far as the events in Austria are concerned, I regret that you did not feel sufficiently informed. With developments moving at an exceptionally rapid pace, it was hardly possible to say anything more about it than was said in the various publications, announcements, and speeches. I have ordered a checkup of the German press dispatches which are going out to America. Should the results prove unfavorable, efforts will be made to improve the service.

That events in Austria have caused excitement over there in general, and among American Jews in particular, in the form of a press campaign against Germany, did not come as a surprise to us. That they also resorted to the spreading of wild atrocity stories was not to be wondered at. But we hope that this agitation will have run its course within the near future.

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<sup>76</sup> Document No. 445, p. 696.

Your warnings that we should have no illusions as to the American stand in the event of a world conflict are by all means valuable; it can do no harm if you point this out again and again.

We have not as yet had many dealings with the new Ambassador. From first impressions, however, we assume that he will act fairly and independently. In certain cases, on the helium question, for instance, there is convincing evidence of this.

Please excuse my brevity, caused by my preparations for the trip.

With cordial regards and Heil Hitler!

As ever,

W[EIZSÄCKER]

No. 452

2422/511548-49

*The German Ambassador in the United States (Dieckhoff) to the German Foreign Ministry*

Telegram

CONFIDENTIAL

No. 154 of May 20

WASHINGTON, May 21, 1938—1:51 a.m.

Received May 21, 1938—11:10 a.m.

In continuation of telegram No. 145 of the 12th.<sup>77</sup>

The President, who received Eckener<sup>78</sup> and me today, was plainly embarrassed. He greeted us in an excessively friendly manner and then immediately brought up the helium question. In his opinion the question had no military significance, and he was firmly convinced that helium should be delivered to us. Unfortunately, the law required the unanimous approval of the six members of the Munitions Board, and, because of the opposition of the Secretary of the Interior, such unanimous approval could not be obtained. He, the President, could not disregard this legal requirement, however much he might regret it. The matter was, however, not definitively disposed of; it was being considered further, and there was hope that it would be settled to our satisfaction.

Eckener very effectively pointed out that the spirit of the helium law, although perhaps not the letter, was to supply helium. Eckener further stressed the large expenditures made by the Zeppelin Company, on the basis of the promise given by the United States last year, and the disadvantages that would arise for the enterprise, as well as for scientific progress, from a shutdown of any considerable duration. The President agreed with all this, but finally ended the

<sup>77</sup> Not printed.

<sup>78</sup> Dr. Hugo Eckener, German dirigible expert, who was in the United States in connection with an effort to secure permission for the export of helium from the United States to Germany for use in dirigibles.

conversation with the remark that that was all he could say for the present.

It is a great pity that Eckener, who is leaving New York on the *Columbus* tomorrow, is returning without any tangible results. His presence, however, was very valuable; not only did it prevent a negative decision in the helium question at this time, but we have thus succeeded in greatly strengthening those forces that are *in favor* of furnishing helium.

The helium problem, as I have reported again and again, has become a purely political question. Five Cabinet members are in favor of providing it; the Secretary of the Interior is preventing this under the pretext of military considerations but in reality because he is being subjected to pressure by forces which are opposed to the Third Reich and which are horrified at the thought of Zeppelin flights over the United States and the resultant great propaganda effect for Germany. The President vacillates between the two groups and does not know what he should do; he can hardly . . . (group missing) Ickes and his followers in the forthcoming political campaign; on the other hand, he is privately of the same opinion as the other five Cabinet members and probably also feels ashamed. Pressure is being exerted on him by both sides; unfortunately, this time, too, the German-Americans are a total loss.

I think that we should continue to be cautious in discussing the helium question in the German press; it has not yet been decided and a great fuss about it would be to the advantage only of those who are arrayed against us. The best answer to Ickes would be a training flight by the new airship over New York and Washington using hydrogen gas; then Ickes would not have achieved his goal, after all, and the impression made by German courage and German achievement would be enormous. Eckener will probably arrive in Berlin on May 29.

DIECKHOFF

### No. 453

49/32782

#### *The German Foreign Ministry to the German Embassy in the United States*

Telegram

No. 155 of May 28

BERLIN, May 28, 1938.  
(Pol. IX 853)

The newspaper correspondent, von Wiegand, expressed the opinion in a conversation with the State Secretary that the activities of the

German-American Bund are just as harmful to Germany as ever, and help to make German-American political relations more difficult. The reinstatement of the Committee on "Un-American Activities" likewise appears to us to indicate that we have not yet succeeded in calming things, as we had hoped to do by our order of February 10. I should therefore like to have your opinion of the present activities of the German-American Bund. In this connection, please also report fully on the carrying out of our orders, which were intended to bring about a complete separation of German-American political organizations from German governmental and Party authorities.

WOERMANN

No. 454

49/32783

*The German Ambassador in the United States (Dieckhoff) to the German Foreign Ministry*

Telegram

No. 169 of June 2

WASHINGTON, June 2, 1938—5:30 p.m.

Received June 3, 1938—3:50 a.m.

In reply to telegram No. 155 of May 28.

The conduct of the German-American Bund continues to cause uneasiness here. Our numerous enemies are taking advantage of the opportunity for agitation against the Reich provided by the mistaken methods of the Bund; our friends are becoming increasingly discouraged on account of the clumsy actions of the Bund. My statement of February 28 regarding the strict separation to be maintained between German nationals and German-American political organizations has actually had a good effect here and has undoubtedly taken considerable wind out of the sails of the enemy agitation; the order concerning the strict separation between German governmental and Party authorities and the Bund, which has been carried out everywhere here, has clarified the situation. It would, however, be well if all the *home* offices concerned disassociated themselves from the German-American Bund even more thoroughly than before, so that there will actually no longer be any connection that could have a political interpretation. Obviously, certain connections still exist here and there which give rise to the belief among the leaders of the German-American Bund that the separation contemplated in the order of February was not really meant to be taken too seriously. The details are given in the reports of the Consulates General in New York, Chicago, and San Francisco, which I am sending by

today's pouch. A new official German statement does not appear to me to be advisable at the present time. I shall reserve any additional remarks for an oral report.

DIECKHOFF

No. 455

2810/548575-77, 548580-83

*The German Ambassador in the United States (Dieckhoff) to the  
German Foreign Ministry*

Nr. 939

WASHINGTON, June 2, 1938.

Received June 11, 1938.

(Pol. IX 974)

Subject: The German-American Bund.

Four copies each of the statements of the Consulates General at New York, Chicago, and San Francisco on the German-American Bund are transmitted herewith.

DIECKHOFF

[Enclosure 1]

*Statement by the German Consul General at New York (Borchers)*

The principles and the conduct of the German-American Bund have undoubtedly led to the deterioration of political relations with the United States as well as to tension within the German element here, and are seriously prejudicing German-American understanding. The highhanded manner of the Bund leaders on numerous occasions, as well as gross tactical errors, has gradually led to the ever increasing resistance and resentment of American public opinion and of official agencies also. Today the holding of a Bund meeting or the public appearance of groups of uniformed Bund members is sufficient to arouse indignation in the American public against the organization and at the same time, unfortunately, often against the New Germany. This situation seems to be aggravated by boastful remarks in public by inexperienced Bund leaders concerning allegedly good and secret relations with governmental and Party authorities in Germany. An extreme example of the hostile attitude of American circles toward the Bund was furnished by a recent incident here at the commemoration exercises of the National Maritime Association before the customhouse on Broadway, where the mere appearance of some 150 uniformed Bund members sufficed to bring about an immediate change in the program and postponement of the

celebration, as well as consequent unfriendly press comments on the so-called Nazi demonstration. Tension in the German element in New York recently caused the German-American Conference, the leader among the large German-American organizations here which are politically responsible, to decide to organize the coming German Day on October 2 in Madison Square Garden without the Bund.

Execution of the instructions from Germany forbidding Reich-Germans to be Bund members has met with stiff opposition so far, not from the individual Reich-German member called to account, but exclusively from the Bund leadership. The latter openly seeks to cause confusion regarding the unequivocal German order among Reich-Germans who are still members, and to prevent any resignations. I refer here to the statement of Bund Leader Kuhn in the Bund newspaper, *Deutscher Weckruf und Beobachter*, of May 5. Strict execution of the instructions from Berlin is especially difficult here because the names of Reich-German members are learned only by accident. We are constantly attempting to ascertain the names of those Reich-Germans who still hold influential positions in the Bund. Within the last few days another Reich-German member who has also had a great deal to do with the Bund newspaper was asked to resign immediately. Mund, the Reich-German concerned, has complied with the order and will return to Germany for good at the beginning of June. Such actions, however, are necessarily limited to individual cases and will be possible only from time to time.

In view of the political burden resulting from the Bund and the refractory attitude of Bund leaders in regard to the exclusion of Reich-German members, I recommend the continuation of extreme reserve on the part of governmental and Party authorities with reference to this organization. This should, in particular, be recommended to the *Volksdeutsche Mittelstelle* in Berlin, which, in view of the nature of its work, may still be carrying on certain relations with the Bund. Through an extremely reserved attitude on the part of German authorities, the Bund would be completely isolated and would perhaps gradually be forced into more reasonable conduct. Any further official statement through D.N.B. or other offices, however, seems inadvisable to me, since, in view of the investigation of un-American activities recently instituted here, that would be labeled by the anti-German-American public as an admission of guilt and a measure taken by the German authorities to hush matters up.

BORCHERS

NEW YORK, May 31, 1938.

[Enclosure 2]

*Statement by the German Consul General at Chicago (Baer)*

The German-American Bund and its leading figures are uncompromisingly repudiated in the Middle West, not only by the opponents of the New Germany, but also, and just as strongly, by those who are friendly, including very wide circles of the valuable German-American element. Even if the leaders should radically alter the tactics employed up to now, I do not believe that the Bund could assemble any proportion worth mentioning of people of German descent in my Consular district or that it could be of any real importance for the promotion of cultural relations with Germany. In the eyes of the public here, the Bund is not only a political organization but a fighting organization serving to disseminate the National Socialist ideology, and, all statements to the contrary notwithstanding, acting in this country either at the instigation of or with the approval of German Party authorities. For public opinion here firmly maintains that the Bund would not be able to continue functioning without at least the moral support of German Party authorities, and certainly not against their will. The German order of February 10 failed to change this attitude. The hostile even contended that the withdrawal of the Reich-Germans took place at the instigation of the Bund, for the sole purpose of eliminating any occasion for serious American objection, and thus to increase if possible the fighting strength of the Bund in the United States. However, the known evidence shows that after Kuhn's return the Bund leaders (despite the previous promises of the local group leaders in my Consular district) do not intend to comply with the wishes of the German Government in this matter. On the contrary, they are attempting to sabotage the execution of the German order of February 10 by make-believe changes in the structure of their organizations. In its desperate efforts to preserve its existence, the Bund has of late more and more taken on the character of an organization that—first of all, no doubt, for the purpose of obtaining larger financial resources and, secondly, for defense against the attacks of opponents—would like to embrace all Reich nationals, allegedly in order to prepare them ideologically for the acquisition of American citizenship in accordance with the tenets of the American Constitution. Moreover, the Bund leaders consider it imperative to declare open war upon the representatives of the Reich in case the latter, within the framework of the obligation incumbent upon them to take care of Reich nationals, should put obstructions in the way of the aspirations and wishes of the Bund.

Summarizing, I should like to offer the following as my opinion: The Bund has failed miserably in its efforts to attract large or influential sectors of the German element here. Any prospects for the attainment of this goal in the future have been destroyed. Today the Bund stands in complete isolation, the object of constant attack and of constant criticism, with no possibility of constructive influence. Its claim to the exclusive guardianship of the German element in America can earn only pitying smiles from objective observers. The Bund, with its pretended claim to totality, even constitutes a great obstacle to the efforts, under a positive German cultural program, to activate the many other organizations of persons of German origin. Its principles and tactics were wrong from the outset and full of inner contradictions. These certainly cannot be profitably transformed by the Bund's present leadership, if such a transformation is still possible at all. Responsibility for their actions, which are arousing constant criticism, is laid largely to us by wide circles of ill-wishers. The sensation-seeking press is, of course, only too glad to support these groups in every way. To that extent then, whether the Bund desires it or not, German-American relations are being unfavorably influenced. Gradual relief from this onus could, in my opinion, be expected only if it should prove possible and advisable, in addition to the resignation measure of February 10, to calm public opinion in the United States by a much clearer disavowal of the Bund and its activities, and at the same time to break off all relations existing not only between German governmental and Party authorities, but also between private cultural organizations in Germany on the one hand, and, on the other hand, not only the Bund leaders but all their subordinates as well.

BAER

CHICAGO, May 30, 1938.

[Enclosure 3]

*Statement by the German Consulate General at San Francisco*

The Bund, which pretends to be a great movement but can count barely one hundred members altogether in the four local groups in my Consular district, is hurting Germany's reputation and the German element here by its inept public appearances; it is thus strengthening the Communist cultural association. Proof of this is the tempest

in a teapot that is now raging here because of the meeting of the *Gau West*. The Consulate General has long avoided participation in Bund meetings.

PONSCHAB<sup>79</sup>

SAN FRANCISCO, May 29, 1938.

D. THE CONFLICT OF INTERESTS, JUNE-SEPTEMBER 1938

No. 456

F6/6258

*Memorandum by the Foreign Minister*

RM 237

Today I had a lengthy conversation with the American Ambassador concerning the problems now under discussion. The conversation also turned to the subject of the agitation against us in the American press. The American Ambassador replied that he intended to do everything in his power to stem this press agitation. He said that the last address of the American Under Secretary of State, Sumner Welles, was gratifying. Furthermore, the Ambassador himself had recently received a number of letters from Mississippi Valley residents, from which it was clearly evident that the unrestrained anti-German agitation by certain circles in recent months would now have the opposite effect. His main objective was to keep America out of any conflict in Europe, and he would do everything in his power to accomplish this.

RIBBENTROP

BERLIN, June 10, 1938.

No. 457

438/220953-62

*The German Ambassador in Great Britain (Dirksen) to the State Secretary in the German Foreign Ministry (Weizsäcker)*

JUNE 13, 1938.

DEAR HERR VON WEIZSÄCKER: Thank you very much for your letter of June 3,<sup>80</sup> which provided me with so much material for my conversation with Ambassador Kennedy. During my conversation with Kennedy today, which lasted almost an hour, I used it extensively. The Ambassador will go to Washington the day after tomorrow; he will stay there for 9 days and will be back here again

<sup>79</sup> August Ponschab, Vice Consul in the German Consulate General at San Francisco.

<sup>80</sup> Not printed.

by the middle of July. He will then call on me. In broad outline the course of our conversation was as follows:

1. Mr. Kennedy opened the conversation by mentioning the question of delivery of helium to Germany; it was extremely regrettable that this had not yet materialized. The only one opposed to the project had been Secretary of the Interior Ickes. During the decisive secret Cabinet meeting Roosevelt had stated that as Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy he wished to instruct Ickes to supply helium gas to Germany. Nevertheless, Ickes had refused; he had told him this recently during his stay in London. Kennedy, however, added that he hoped Ickes had changed his mind as a result of his trip to Europe.

The Ambassador appeared to attach particular importance to this question: he repeated his story later and requested that I report it to the Führer and Chancellor.

2. We then touched upon Kennedy's trip and its purpose: departure the day after tomorrow, 9 days' stay in Washington, return here approximately the middle of July. Purpose of the trip: to give President Roosevelt detailed information about European conditions; Kennedy added that if he did not believe an improvement could be achieved in Europe, he would resign from his position here. However, he was convinced that this was possible, and he believed above all that the United States would have to establish friendly relations with Germany.

Kennedy seemed to be strongly convinced of the strength of his position; he said that neither Secretary of State Hull nor any of the other Cabinet members or influential persons could jeopardize his position. He also felt absolutely secure as to his constituency and the number of votes [*sic*]. The only one whom he had to recognize as superior was President Roosevelt. Roosevelt himself, like all Presidents, was on bad terms with the State Department and did not have much use for it. Only two of his Ambassadors were close to him: Grew in Tokyo and Wilson in Berlin.

The President was not anti-German, but desired friendly relations with Germany. However, there was no one who had come from Europe and had spoken a friendly word to him regarding present-day Germany and her Government. When I remarked that I feared he was right in this, Kennedy added that he *knew* he was right. Most of them were afraid of the Jews and did not dare to say anything good about Germany; others did not know any better, because they were not informed about Germany.

Although he did not know Germany, he had learned from the most varied sources that the present Government had done great

things for Germany and that the Germans were satisfied and enjoyed good living conditions. The report by the well-known flier, Colonel Lindbergh, who had spoken very favorably of Germany, made a strong impression upon Ambassador Kennedy, as I know from an earlier conversation with him. Lindbergh and his wife spoke to me in the same manner regarding their impressions of Germany and of German aviation when I became acquainted with them recently at a court ball in Buckingham Palace.

As an illustration of how wrong impressions regarding Germany were being spread, Ambassador Kennedy related that recently "Johnnie" Rockefeller, a very influential and sensible man, had told him that according to a report by one of the leading professors of the Rockefeller Institute the limited amount of food available in Germany was being reserved mainly for the army, with the result that the rest of the population had to suffer want. As far as he knew, the professor who made the report was a Jew. He—Kennedy—had set Rockefeller right.

When he spoke favorably of Germany, people would have absolute confidence in his statements, because he was a Catholic.

I repeatedly and emphatically welcomed the Ambassador's intention to enlighten President Roosevelt about the New Germany, and told him I considered it very important that influential Americans become acquainted with Germany in order to get a picture of National Socialist Germany; they could travel with an official escort or they could look around on their own; they could take part in the Labor Service—they would be given every opportunity to form their own opinion independently. I strongly advised Mr. Kennedy to go to Germany himself. He appeared to be willing to do so in principle, but—as on a previous occasion—he doubted whether he would be given permission, because in such an event the public would immediately conclude that Roosevelt had definite purposes in mind with a trip by Kennedy.

3. The Ambassador then touched upon the Jewish question and stated that it was naturally of great importance to German-American relations. In this connection it was not so much the fact that we wanted to get rid of the Jews that was so harmful to us, but rather the loud clamor with which we accompanied this purpose. He himself understood our Jewish policy completely; he was from Boston and there, in one golf club, and in other clubs, no Jews had been admitted for the past 50 years. His father had not been elected mayor because he was a Catholic; in the United States, therefore, such pronounced attitudes were quite common, but people avoided making so much outward fuss about it. I replied to Mr. Kennedy that the

Jewish question was to be understood in the light of the whole history of the German people; if it had now become acute again, this could be attributed to the incorporation of Austria and to the extreme bitterness of the Austrian people about Jewish mismanagement in Vienna and elsewhere.

4. The conversation then turned to the question of what could be done to improve German-American relations. I doubted Kennedy's remark that public opinion in the United States was by no means so unfavorable toward Germany, and stated that a German professor who recently returned from the United States had told me he was convinced that in case of conflict, 90 percent of the American people would be in favor of war against Germany.

Kennedy stated that this observation was correct in the event of war. However, it did not apply to normal times. The overwhelming majority of the American people wanted peace and friendly relations with Germany. The average American took a very simple view of problems of foreign policy; there were only 3½ million Jews in the United States all told, and the overwhelming majority of them lived on the east coast. Elsewhere, however, the anti-German sentiment was—as mentioned above—by no means widespread; neither did the average citizen of the United States have any particular liking for England; regarding England he only knew that she had not paid her war debts, and that she had deposed her King because he wanted to marry an American; he had no prejudice against Germany.

Using statements contained in your letter, I replied that the decisive point was recognition of the fact that countries with authoritarian governments could maintain wholly satisfactory friendly relations with democratic states. It was as dangerous as it was wrong to set up the two opposite poles, dictatorial and democratic states. In the first place, there was still a third type of state, the Bolshevik, such as Soviet Russia and Red Spain, and, secondly, the democratic states were also subject to internal variations. Thus, for instance, the United States in 1933-35 had leaned more toward the totalitarian states, and had again become a country with a democratic and parliamentary government only after overcoming the economic crisis. Furthermore, who could say to what type Poland, Rumania, Yugoslavia, and many other countries belong—were they democratic or totalitarian? They were a mixture of both.

Mr. Kennedy agreed with my statements wholeheartedly and stated that they had given him entirely new points of view; in particular, he considered it correct that during the first years of the Roosevelt

administration the United States had been governed in an authoritarian manner.

In conclusion, I added that the most important thing was that the democratic states, and in particular the United States, should not refuse to make a settlement and to enter into negotiations with the totalitarian countries, just as the present British Government did not refuse to negotiate with Italy and Germany.

Kennedy confirmed this and stated that Chamberlain in particular was extremely anxious for a settlement with Germany.

5. I then mentioned the poisonous role of the American press in the relations between the two countries and suggested to Mr. Kennedy that he use his influence in order that the Government, and in particular President Roosevelt, might give the signal to speak of Germany in a friendly manner. He did not have much to say to these statements and merely mentioned that the press on the east coast was unfortunately predominant in the formation of public opinion in America and that it was strongly influenced by Jews.

6. We then discussed Czechoslovakia, regarding which I said the same as in my last conversation with Halifax (airgram No. 276 of June 9<sup>81</sup>) ; I particularly stressed the sole responsibility of the Czechs for the crisis and the attempted encirclement of Germany by France, and the fact that by supporting Czechoslovakia, the settlement of the autonomy question was made more difficult. In this connection I showed him pictures from a German pictorial magazine, which showed the war preparations of the Czechs very clearly. Mr. Kennedy was obviously impressed by this. I concluded that an early settlement of the Sudeten German demands for autonomy was urgently desirable, because one could not know what outlet the tension in the country might otherwise seek.

7. Mr. Kennedy then touched again upon the question of what the further aims of the Führer actually were and whether Germany was not now making propaganda in other countries, such as in South America. I explained to him that German policy had no territorial aims in Czechoslovakia, but definitely did aim to put an end to the disenfranchisement of the Sudeten Germans, and that the question of the Corridor was not urgent and would be settled between us and Poland. Furthermore, we had demanded that our colonies be returned to us and that we be given the chance to procure the raw materials necessary for our economy.

The reports circulated by foreign newspapers regarding alleged propagandistic activity of National Socialists in some South American countries had meanwhile proved to be completely incorrect and

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<sup>81</sup> Vol. II, p. 396.

untrue. All Germans living abroad had been given the strictest orders to refrain from any political activity or interference in the domestic politics of the country of their residence; and these instructions were complied with to the letter.

8. In the course of the conversation Ambassador Kennedy repeatedly expressed his conviction that in economic matters Germany had to have a free hand in the East as well as in the Southeast. He took a very pessimistic view of the situation in the Soviet Union.

Such, in broad outline, was the course of the conversation; I gained the impression that Kennedy is sincere in his efforts to create a better atmosphere in German-American relations. I do not know whether the motivation that influences him is the idealistic conviction of the necessity of bringing about general pacification in the world, or tactical considerations relating to the next Presidential election, or, finally, personal political motives for bringing himself into prominence. I do not really believe the latter; I have received a very good impression of Mr. Kennedy, and he is also favorably regarded in every way in diplomatic and Government circles here.

Two copies of my letter are transmitted herewith; one of them is intended for Dieckhoff, whom I have not informed directly in regard to this matter.

With many regards and Heil Hitler I remain

As ever,

DIRKSEN

### No. 458

2000/442052-55

*The German Ambassador in the United States (Dieckhoff) to the German Foreign Ministry*

Nr. 1046/W

WASHINGTON, June 25, 1938.

In continuation of reports No. 256/W of February 5 and No. 294/W of February 14, 1938.<sup>82</sup>

Subject: German-American commercial relations.

As I reported by wire on June 17 (telegram No. 187<sup>83</sup>), people in a position to know still think that the British-American negotiations for a reciprocal trade agreement will be concluded during July, that is, in the very near future. Therefore, the question arises whether, after the conclusion of this agreement, we may expect the American Government to enter into discussions on commercial policy with us also, as Secretary of State Hull and Assistant Secretary of State Sayre said at the end of last year they considered possible.

<sup>82</sup> Neither printed.

<sup>83</sup> Not printed.

I am still convinced; as I stated in my report of February 5, that the American Government will enter into no commercial policy negotiations with us before this year's Congressional elections in November. The opposition in this country to Hull's commercial policy is still rather strong, and the Government will endeavor not to permit its commercial policy to become a football in the political campaign. Consequently, I do not expect any new negotiations at all within the framework of the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act to be begun after the conclusion of the negotiations with Great Britain and Canada and before the election.

But, quite apart from the approaching Congressional elections, it must be said that the prospects for an agreement with the United States on commercial policy have worsened considerably since my last report. In this connection, I refer to my statements in the report of February 5 and in the supplementary report of February 14, which are still appropriate for the interpretation of the trend here. In those reports I stressed the fact that within as well as outside the State Department there are strong forces at work striving with all the means at their disposal to prevent the conclusion of an agreement with National Socialist Germany; the stronger the anti-German sentiment becomes in this country the greater is the influence of this group on the Government. Today the anti-German circles in the State Department are in the majority, and men like Assistant Secretary of State Sayre must be considered just as determined opponents of an understanding with Germany on commercial policy as Assistant Secretary of State Messersmith. That the President also has turned against us more and more is known from my reports and from his public statements.

This stiffening of the attitude of the Administration and of persons who at the beginning of the year still believed in the possibility of immediate commercial policy discussions with us is no doubt attributable to the fact that anti-German sentiment in this country has become more acute and more bitter since the beginning of this year. The unrestrained anti-German propaganda has caused the friends we still had here to become silent.

The inflammatory reports on the occasion of the reunion of Austria with the Reich have not failed to impress the American public, and the lies and misrepresentations spread here in speech and in writing, particularly by the daily newspapers, in connection with the recent crisis on the Sudeten-German question have aroused a feeling of resentment against us.

But still more decisive has been the effect of things that are interpreted here as direct violations of or threats to American interests.

These include the activities of the German-American Bund, which, in spite of our unequivocal disavowal, continues to be represented by the Jewish, liberal, and Marxist press as a National Socialist propaganda organization, and which through various outward manifestations is constantly giving fresh fuel to this interpretation. Such a threat to American interests was seen by the public here in the espionage case,<sup>84</sup> which was exploited for anti-German propaganda by the Jewish and liberal press with a heavy outlay of money and will therefore agitate feelings for a long time to come. The skillful exploitation of this case is falling on fertile soil in those very circles which, because of their nationalistic viewpoint, used to show some understanding of National Socialist Germany. That applies particularly to the business world.

These public sentiments are, of course, strongly reflected in official Washington. In addition, two measures of the German Government have had direct influence on the attitude of the American Government toward Germany: the decree of April 26 concerning the seizure of Jewish property, and the nonrecognition of Austrian political debts. I should like to say immediately that nothing has been left undone by the Embassy to explain the significance of these measures and to counteract the extremely violent criticism; but it must be realized that these measures are regarded here purely from the American viewpoint, and that the American Government considers the former measure, since it affects Jews of American nationality also, to be a violation of the German-American commercial treaty and considers the latter a breach of international law. In view of this attitude it is quite openly stated in Administration circles that it would hardly be justifiable to conclude a new commercial agreement with Germany when the latter thus publicly indicates that she does not consider herself bound by the old commercial agreement which is still in force, and when she refuses to fulfill her international obligations.

Such arguments are being used only too effectively against entering commercial policy discussions with Germany; conditions will have to become more settled in Europe and existing tension between us and the United States eased before the American Government will be prepared to enter into negotiations with us on commercial policy. Whether we, for our part, are particularly interested in sitting down at the conference table with the Americans is another matter.

DIECKHOFF

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<sup>84</sup> On June 20, 1937, a Federal grand jury in New York City had found that Germany was conducting extensive espionage operations in the United States for the purpose of discovering military secrets.

No. 459

2422/511563-68

*The German Ambassador in Great Britain (Dirksen) to the State  
Secretary in the German Foreign Ministry (Weizsäcker)*

SECRET

JULY 20, 1938.  
(Pol. IX 1290)

DEAR HERR VON WEIZSÄCKER: In my letter of June 13 I reported to you my conversation with the American Ambassador, Kennedy, and promised that the conversation would be continued after his return from the United States. This conversation took place today. I have already sent a telegraphic report in regard to some of the topics discussed. Regarding the details of the conversation the following may be reported:

1) Kennedy's report was very strongly influenced by economic considerations. He told me that the economic situation in the United States had, to be sure, improved recently through the pumping of several billion dollars into circulation in industry; this was, however, not an intrinsic improvement. Basically, the problems of the general reorganization of world economy, the establishment of general confidence, and the reabsorption of the many millions of unemployed were still unsolved.

2) During the 4 months since his departure from Washington he had found that American public opinion as regards Germany had deteriorated appreciably. The average American blamed Germany for the general insecurity which prevailed in the world and which prevented economic recovery. Germany was accused of wanting to provoke war. People were not clear about the intentions of the German Government, and all this resulted in increasing hostility toward Germany, which, of course, was also being fomented for a great many other reasons.

President Roosevelt, with whom he had had a long conversation regarding the world situation and to whom he had repeated the contents of the conversation with me, thought calmly and moderately and did not permit himself to be influenced by the mood of the masses. He would be prepared to give the most extensive support to any efforts to promote general tranquillity and create favorable economic conditions. He would be prepared to support Germany's demands vis-à-vis England or to do anything that might lead to pacification.

Ambassador Kennedy also gave various examples of the general confusion prevailing in American high finance; he said that the banker J. P. Morgan had called on him and had been very depressed;

he had even mentioned giving up his business. Baruch had also been pessimistic; he had talked with him after one of his conferences with President Roosevelt in the White House.

Of course, Roosevelt's above-mentioned ideas and plans were dictated by the desire to achieve great positive results by the end of his administration, in view of tactical considerations of domestic politics; he naturally wanted to be able to face the voters with a successfully concluded term as President. The situation in the United States and England was therefore the same, in that the Governments of both countries were pressed for time and had to carry out the most essential parts of their programs within one year.

3) From all the statements by the American Ambassador one fact became very obvious: the United States regards itself as the protector and helper of England, which in turn, however, has to pay for this help with subservience and obedience.<sup>85</sup> Furthermore, his remarks showed very clearly that the present Government of the United States supports the Chamberlain Cabinet and assists it in overcoming all difficulties; in this sense are to be interpreted his report that Eden would be transferred to Washington as Ambassador, his mention of amendment of the Neutrality Act in a manner favorable to England, and the support of Chamberlain's desire for a settlement with Germany—support which would undoubtedly be sufficient to break the resistance of the British opposition.

But on the other hand—so Kennedy stated in substance—the United States and he would watch closely to see that the British Cabinet now did some real work, in the American sense; if they used American aid only to obtain a favorable tactical position for themselves, he personally would object vigorously; furthermore, he would immediately resign from his post if he were convinced that his mission in Europe was fruitless.

4) I took occasion to explain to Kennedy the present status of Anglo-German relations and to point out that we were striving for a settlement with England but saw no reason—after Chamberlain's declaration of March 23 in the House of Commons<sup>86</sup>—for us to take the initiative.

I further took the opportunity to inform Kennedy of the highly unsatisfactory progress of the negotiations between the Czech Government and the Sudeten Germans; the Czechs had no sincere desire to reach a real settlement but, by making some fictitious concessions,

<sup>85</sup> A marginal notation in Weizsäcker's hand reads as follows: "This view is considered erroneous by Ambassador Dieckhoff."

<sup>86</sup> It is possible that a reference is intended to Mr. Chamberlain's speech of March 24, 1938, in the House of Commons, in which he made a lengthy statement on foreign policy.

were only maneuvering in order not to lose the sympathy of the world. I told Kennedy that Germany had no confidence in Beneš (to which he replied that neither did the rest of the world) and I explained to him that British influence upon the Czechoslovak Government was insufficient also because the British Minister in Prague, Newton, did not have a thorough grasp of the details of the problem and his sympathies were one-sidedly with the Czechs. Kennedy received this also with lively interest.

5) We then came back to Kennedy's plan to visit Germany in order to establish contact there with the persons in authority. Kennedy considered a visit without official pretext as impracticable, because it would attract too much attention. However, he considered it entirely possible that in his capacity as president of the International Wheat Conference<sup>87</sup> he could come to Berlin shortly. He had taken the chair at the Conference held here a few weeks ago; he was prepared to take it again at the next meeting, which was to be held in Berlin in September. This would give him the opportunity for conversations and short tours.

This is therefore a question of immediate concern to which Kennedy expects a reply; I request that it be examined and that further instructions be issued to me or Herr Kordt, who will take my place during my leave. At any rate, Kennedy expects a reply from us.

This was, in broad outline, the content of the conversation with Kennedy, which was very spirited and interesting: Kennedy was much more worried and pessimistic than he was during my last conversation with him; the idea that Germany might go to war against Czechoslovakia, which would then result in the intervention of England and France and, first indirectly and then directly, of the United States, appeared to have a pretty firm hold on him.

Personally he still made a good impression upon me. It was even more obvious—and meanwhile I received confirmation of this from various sources—that he is acting on orders from Roosevelt, who must be able to point to world successes in the economic field for his election campaign. Furthermore, Kennedy is perhaps counting on being proposed, himself, as a Presidential candidate.

I enclose two copies, one of which is intended for Dieckhoff.

With cordial regards and Heil Hitler I remain

Yours,

DIRKSEN<sup>88</sup>

<sup>87</sup> I.e., the International Wheat Advisory Committee.

<sup>88</sup> A marginal notation by Weizsäcker, dated July 25, reads as follows: "Ambassador Dieckhoff gave me various reasons against Kennedy's trip—poor judgment, consideration for Wilson, Hoover precedent, and the like. Dieckhoff requested that [Kennedy] not be encouraged, for which a proper pretext would have to be found.

"Transmitted to the Under Secretary with the request to have instructions wired to London."

## No. 460

2422/511561-62

*Memorandum*

WIII 5694/38

During the conversation with American Secretary of State Hull which Ambassador Dieckhoff had before beginning his vacation trip,<sup>89</sup> Mr. Hull first of all explained the principles of American policy. American policy sought general order, equal treatment of all countries, and respect for the independence of other countries by non-interference in their domestic policies. America had tried to establish relations with Germany also on this basis. But Germany, on the other hand, had in the last few years consistently tried, and been able to take advantage of America. As proof of this contention Hull mentioned—

1. The failure to pay the costs of the Army of Occupation and the mixed claims;
2. The discriminatory treatment of German bonds held by foreigners, particularly of the Dawes and Young Loans, to the detriment of American interests;
3. The harsh and unfair treatment of American trade by Germany;
4. The application of foreign-exchange control, among other things, to the transfer of proceeds from estates or of dividends on American investments in Germany;
5. The unilateral refusal to assume Austrian foreign debts;
6. The extension of legislation concerning compulsory property registration to American Jews.

Hull stated that the German procedure was an injustice to American interests and added that America could never be induced to recognize that it was right for a country to take possession of another country's property without satisfying the claims of the foreign creditors of that country.

To the objection of the German Ambassador, Hull replied that the files of the State Department definitely contradicted the view that the Austrian debts were of a political nature.

In conclusion Hull stated that public opinion was crystallizing to an ever increasing extent against this German attitude, although the Government tried to check this tendency because it hoped that a friendly settlement was possible based on agreed principles of reciprocal treatment. America could not, however, continue to pursue these efforts unless the selfish policy of Germany, which was detrimental to America, were changed.

BERLIN, July 28, 1938.

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<sup>89</sup> For extracts from a memorandum by Secretary Hull concerning this interview, see *Peace and War*, pp. 423-424.

## No. 461

2422/511569-71

*The Under State Secretary in the German Foreign Ministry  
(Woermann) to the German Chargé d'Affaires in Great Britain  
(Th. Kordt)*

URGENT

AUGUST 16, 1938.<sup>90</sup>

DEAR HERR KORDT: As you know, Ambassador von Dirksen, in his letter of July 20 to State Secretary von Weizsäcker, reported the plan of American Ambassador Kennedy to come to Germany and stated that Kennedy expected an answer. Kennedy himself said that he had to have some pretext for going to Germany and that there might be a chance of going to Berlin in September as president of the International Wheat Conference.

We also discussed the matter here with Herr Dieckhoff, who at first had serious doubts. These doubts were to the effect that Kennedy's appraisal of American policy toward Germany was too optimistic and that Kennedy might, therefore, create a false impression here. However, we finally agreed with Herr Dieckhoff that this consideration should be no reason for preventing Kennedy's trip. Moreover, immediately upon assuming his post Kennedy had expressed to the Foreign Minister the desire to come to Germany some time, and the latter had then given Kennedy a favorable reply.

As to the occasion for the trip, it is not certain yet whether the Wheat Advisory Committee will hold a meeting in Berlin at all; if it does, this would be held in October. So far Germany is not particularly anxious to hold the meeting in Berlin, since it is not expected to be a success. The final decision, however, has not yet been made; it is expected at the beginning of next week. At any rate, we could not use the fact that Kennedy would like to come to this meeting in Berlin as justification for urging the domestic authorities to hold an unwanted conference here.

Under these circumstances we request you to tell Mr. Kennedy in a friendly manner that his visit to Berlin, for the reason mentioned by him, would be very welcome. However, you could not tell yet whether the meeting of the Wheat Advisory Committee would be held in Berlin in September or in October. However, as far as Kennedy's trip is concerned, the conversation should have a decidedly positive note.

With best regards and Heil Hitler,

As ever,

WOERMANN

<sup>90</sup> This draft copy is dated August 4; it was transmitted to the Foreign Minister for approval, and sent to Great Britain by courier on August 16.

## No. 462

2431/514099-107

*The German Chargé d'Affaires in the United States (Thomsen) to the German Foreign Ministry*

Nr. 1576

WASHINGTON, September 12, 1938.

Received September 24, 1938.

(Pol. IX 1654)

In continuation of my telegraphic report of September 10, No. 245.<sup>92</sup>

Subject: American foreign policy in relation to the European crisis.

The European crisis has reawakened the interest of the American public in the Neutrality Act of April 28, 1937. The history of this Act during the past 2 years is characteristic of the development of foreign policy in the United States. The Act was conceived as a means for strictly carrying out America's isolation in future world conflicts; but it very soon took on a different character. Its employment to the detriment of Abyssinia and in the Spanish Civil War evoked the liveliest criticism because it applied to both attacker and attacked without distinction. When a state of war was not proclaimed by the President in the Sino-Japanese conflict and, under this pretext, the Act was not invoked, since it would have favored Japan, the critics of this tricky maneuver had to keep quiet, whether they liked it or not. Interventionist circles—to which in America as everywhere else in the world the so-called pacifists characteristically belong—are now hotly demanding the repeal or modification of the Act, in order to release the democratic powers in advance from those restrictions to which the Act would, in practice, subject them. With equal energy pressure is being exerted for the repeal of the Johnson Act, which prohibits the raising of loans in America and the granting of credits to foreign powers that are in default.

In its first session, which will, however, not begin before January 1939, the newly elected Congress will be obliged to devote time to the Neutrality Act, as some of its provisions are limited to 2 years and hence will expire in the spring of 1939 unless renewed. But it must be assumed that the question of repealing the Neutrality Act, in view of the clearly ascertainable swing of public opinion in favor of the Administration's interventionist policy, will also play an important role in the interval before the opening of both Houses of Congress.

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<sup>92</sup> Not printed.

The isolationists have of late steadily lost ground. But it would be wrong to assume that their influence has vanished completely. Even today there are countless Americans, especially in the Middle West, to whom the thought of a fresh entanglement of America in a European war with all its consequences, once experienced and never forgotten, seems almost like sacrilege. But even these circles are being influenced by the propaganda of the Jewish-controlled press, which is using every possible means at its command. In 1914 and the years that followed, it was not an easy matter for the average American to judge the reasons which led to war and to American intervention: British propaganda was counterbalanced by British encroachments on American trade. But today, a skillful emphasis on the concept of ideologically clearly opposed fronts makes it so easy for the average American to form an opinion that little is needed to change a confirmed isolationist into an equally confirmed interventionist.

Side by side with the systematic misguidance of public opinion by means of the press, the example of Senator Norris<sup>93</sup> has substantially contributed to shaking the faith of the partisans of isolation. Norris, the only surviving member of Congress who had the courage in 1917 to vote in the Senate against America's entry into the war, was immediately hailed as the spiritual father of isolationism. This same Senator Norris publicly declared a short while ago that, in the present situation, he counted himself among those who "would consider a preventive war against the Fascist nations." This declaration produced a tremendous sensation here, and it will exercise a considerable influence, especially in the Middle West, from which Norris comes. As one of the newspapers here expressed it: "From fear of Fascism, Senator Norris' pacifism has completely melted away."

Many isolationists exposed to the constant influence of press and radio probably have similar sentiments. To this is added the psychological preparation of the whole nation, shrewdly managed by the Administration, for abandonment of the policy of nonintervention, so that by now there will probably be strong opposition if a Senator or Representative espouses the cause of isolationism as such.

The demand for the modification or repeal of the Neutrality and Johnson Acts must, in terms of this "preparedness campaign,"<sup>94</sup> be judged essentially as a tactical move. Those familiar with the Neutrality Act are well aware that in case of a European war it

<sup>93</sup> Senator George Norris, Independent Republican, of Nebraska.

<sup>94</sup> The quoted passage is in English in the original.

merely allows for a sort of technical neutrality of the United States, permitting the powers in control of the seas to obtain without restriction any raw materials needed for the conduct of the war as long as they pay cash and carry the goods themselves. But abandonment of the principle of parity, the principle that the Neutrality Act shall be applied to attackers and attacked without distinction, is sought on ideological grounds; moreover, demands are being made for an extension of the President's discretionary powers. As for the Johnson Act, its provisions only superficially seem to run counter to the need of England and France to obtain loans in America. The assets of both Powers in America are estimated at 7 billion dollars, which will permit financing the war requirements in raw materials until America's renewed entanglement in the war economy makes the repeal of the Johnson Act a matter of course. Like all American laws, the Johnson Act is couched in casuistic terms; it prohibits, it is true, "individuals" from negotiating British or French Government loans; but that does not in any way preclude the American Government itself from appearing as a moneylender. In banking circles an early repeal of the Johnson Act is considered desirable because, in case of a European war, large offers of English and French holdings would throw the market into great confusion.

If a European war should break out, it is quite conceivable that America would enforce her present neutrality law, or a slight modification of it, and apply it until she made up her mind about her own entry into the struggle. When this would be, depends upon developments in Europe. It would be very soon in case of violent developments, such as the threat of a British defeat, or of grave incidents involving injury to American interests by Germany. As the Embassy has reported, there has thus far been no evidence of preparations on the part of America for her own active participation in a European war either in the field of war economy or in the purely military field. Doubtless, the Administration does not believe at this time that the intervention of active American military force will be necessary to assist the democratic powers to win the victory. It believes rather, pending proof to the contrary, that the moral and economic aid rendered by America will suffice to guarantee the victory of the democratic powers. The Neutrality Act is not considered an obstacle. If Congress should decide to repeal the Neutrality Act and the Johnson Act, the Administration would not oppose such a demonstration, although it would, perhaps, prefer being able to keep the mask of pseudo-neutrality during the period of transition and preparation.

Any doubt as to the attitude of America in a European conflict is the less possible because President Roosevelt and Secretary Hull have made no secret of their position in their well-known speeches and proclamations; on the contrary, they have constantly, and with considerable success, proceeded against the concepts of American isolation, a course in which they have of late been supported by the Ambassadors in Paris and London in a most striking manner. That these voices from America have contributed to the stiffening of Czech resistance must be obvious.

America's present foreign policy cannot be explained merely by an ideological aversion to the totalitarian states or by indignation over allegedly infringed human rights. The causes go deeper. The Administration, however, is cleverly exploiting the country-wide hostility to the totalitarian states, because it is far simpler for it to achieve spiritual mobilization by whipping up existing passions than by setting forth practical political considerations, which would not always allow its position on world politics to appear in the light of selflessness and altruism. It should not be overlooked that the United States owes her consolidation and greatness to the same unscrupulous power politics with which her elected leaders, now that the nation has reached the saturation point, believe that they can reproach the German leadership. When, quite justly, the question is repeatedly asked in Germany, to what the hostile attitude of America can be attributed, since we have not injured American interests, the answer, after dispassionate consideration of the matter, will run somewhat as follows:

The purely emotional opposition to our ideology, to which, from the President on down, the great majority of the American people is subject in complete good faith, cannot be regarded as a sufficient motive for prescribing a course of action for an administration conscious of its responsibilities. In 1917 also, the anti-German campaign under the slogan, "Make the world safe for democracy,"<sup>95</sup> was only the façade behind which the real political game was played. Today's ideological rift between America and the totalitarian states is, of course, much greater than that between the United States and Germany in 1917. Nevertheless, these things play a secondary role, although to many an observer they might appear to be decisive. The truly decisive factors are the position and role of the United States as a Great Power which, in a kind of common destiny with the other democratic powers, feels oppressed, if not threatened, by the possibility of a hegemony of the totalitarian states in Europe and Asia. The heritage of Washington and

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<sup>95</sup> The quoted passage is in English in the original.

Jefferson, who bequeathed to the American people the principle of keeping out of European conflicts, was observed only so long as the waves of European conflict did not roll as far as America. By 1812 America was forced to take part in a world war. Her participation in the World War of our times came to pass in order to prevent a threatened shifting of the balance of power in Europe, which would have had a serious effect upon American political and economic importance in the world. —

The relations between America and England are much clearer today than in 1914, now that America has consciously waived the rights of a neutral and conceded to England unrestricted control of the seas. This clearly reveals the solidarity of Anglo-American interests. The history of Anglo-American relations since 1914 teaches us that in normal times they occasionally become strained, but that in a crisis the principle of solidarity is forthwith adopted. The Embassy has frequently reported on the parallelism of Anglo-American policy in recent years. The imminent conclusion of a trade agreement has a significance which goes far beyond economic matters. If England is involved in a life-and-death struggle, America will, as in 1917, seek by every possible means to prevent the defeat of England, because this would result in a shifting of the balance of power in Europe and Asia, which would directly affect America. Herein lies America's vital interest, which she already feels to be threatened by the urge toward expansion and the desire for power of the totalitarian states. America will never be able to learn except through hard facts; she will never voluntarily concede that the totalitarian states have a well-founded claim to the extension of their spheres of influence; America will rather do her utmost to prevent an increase in the power of the totalitarian states, which, after a decisive change in the *status quo* in Europe, might mean the beginning of a shift in the preponderance of the "haves" over the "have-nots."<sup>86</sup> Even though, today, a direct threat to American territory by the totalitarian powers—from our point of view—would seem to belong to the realm of Utopia, America has, nevertheless, ever since the existence of the Berlin-Rome-Tokyo triangle, been preparing systematically—psychologically at first—for the possibility of such an attack, which might even necessitate, according to the American view, defense on two fronts.

It is not surprising that Secretary Hull believes in the doctrine that all political problems are capable of an economic solution. The preponderance of the economic over the political is the result of the involvement of American commerce with the whole world.

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<sup>86</sup> The quoted phrases are in English in the original.

The prosperity of the United States in spite of her extensive self-sufficiency, rests largely upon her economic relations with the other powers. For this reason alone isolation from events elsewhere in the world is not possible for America; any change in the political and hence in the economic field affects American interests. Economic isolation would lead to the lowering of living standards in America. It would, in addition, be equivalent to the relinquishment of American capital investments abroad, which today amount to 14 billion dollars. Hence, the natural interest of America lies in the greatest possible encouragement of international trade and in the maintenance of peace. She feels that both interests are threatened by the totalitarian powers. Therefore American policy is perforce directed toward checking the advance of the totalitarian states to a position of power which might acquire decisive significance. In the opinion of Americans with realistic political views, it is a question of two alternatives: peace at the price of surrender or resistance by every possible means, by war if necessary, the latter to be considered only as a last resort, however. For the present, America's moral and economic support of the powers standing in the forefront against the totalitarian states suffices to prevent a future threat to her security. The actual entry of America into a new world war depends, as stated above, essentially upon whether and when the prospects of victory incline toward the totalitarian states.

That America's offensive against the totalitarian states has already taken shape is shown by the reports of our Missions in Latin America, which, independently of one another, mention the impact of the American propaganda barrage, the activation of which has been frequently reported by the Embassy. To abandon Latin America (inclined as it is toward forms of government resembling dictatorships) to "Fascist" influence would be equivalent to the renunciation by America of an important position. America is already fighting against us today in Latin America with means which have a more realistic character than the moral indignation over the violation of the Treaty of Paris with which the totalitarian states are charged. The fight becomes comprehensible when it is realized that there are many influential American politicians who claim to have proof that the totalitarian states, Germany among them, aspire to the acquisition of Latin-American soil and would thus not hesitate to challenge America by a clear infringement of the Monroe Doctrine.

These observations cannot be concluded without mentioning also those factors which could retard the dynamism of the American

policy here described. There are such factors; they are both immediate and long term.

Domestic reasons militate against America's involvement in a European war. Neither conservatives nor liberals relish the thought that, upon America's entry into the war, the very situation might be brought about, against the manifestation of which in totalitarian states they have allegedly decided to fight, namely, the emergence of wartime dictatorship. The liberals are against it, because—just as under Wilson's administration—they see in it the end of all social reforms and perhaps also the end of American democracy. The conservatives are against it because, in case of war, absolute power would be concentrated in the hands of their hated President Roosevelt.

Furthermore, in America, as everywhere else, the shadow of Soviet Russia looms in the background. With the exception of outspoken communist and liberal circles, no American relishes the thought that in a future world war in which America participates, he will have the pleasure of an alliance with Moscow. It is clear to many Americans, including responsible members of the State Department, that Russia is only waiting for the opportunity to set the democratic states against the totalitarian states, and to light the torch of the communist world revolution at the ensuing conflagration.

Lastly and above all, one must not underestimate the influence which leading authorities of the American armed forces exert on the shaping of American foreign policy in the way of a cool and objective appraisal of the situation. In the armed forces, they examine matters without bias, hold aloof from the influences of propaganda, and pass judgment with a detached outlook and within the framework of world politics. They warn against any premature fixing of American policy and against commitments with respect to the policies of other powers. When President Roosevelt just recently endeavored to dissipate the impression that the United States is all but allied to Britain and France, this certainly met with the approval of the armed forces and he probably acted under their influence.

THOMSEN

CHAPTER IV  
GERMANY AND THE FAR EAST,  
JULY 1937-SEPTEMBER 1938

A. NEUTRALITY, JULY-AUGUST, 1937

No. 463

153/82141-42

*The German Foreign Ministry to Various German Diplomatic  
Missions*

Telegram

BERLIN, July 20, 1937.  
(e.o. Pol. VIII 775)

1. German Embassy, London, No. 310
2. Diplogerma,<sup>1</sup> Washington, No. 137
3. Germadiplo,<sup>1</sup> Paris, No. 351
4. Diplogerma, Rome, No. 234
5. Diplogerma, Brussels, No. 57
6. German Legation, The Hague, No. 47
7. Diplogerma, Lisbon, No. 125
8. Diplogerma, Tokyo, No. 141
9. Diplogerma, Nanking, No. 77
10. Diplogerma, Moscow, No. 79

For your private information and for the orientation of your conversations.

To 1-10:<sup>2</sup> The German Government will observe strict neutrality in the Far Eastern conflict. The Foreign Minister has already so stated in conversations with the Chinese and Japanese Ambassadors here. We are following developments with great concern and earnestly desire an early peaceful settlement of the incident for the sake of our economic interests in the Far East and (this is *not* to

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<sup>1</sup> "Diplogerma" and "Germadiplo" were the telegraphic addresses of the German Missions at these capitals.

<sup>2</sup> A marginal note reads: "Addressees 1-9 are parties to the so-called 'Nine Power Treaty.'"

be used) in view of our anti-Comintern policy.<sup>2a</sup> A military showdown between China and Japan would benefit the Soviet Government, which has an interest in engaging Japan elsewhere and weakening her by military operations.

To 1-9: (Exclusive of Moscow) Observations on the part of our Embassy at Moscow lead us to the conclusion that the Soviets are stirring up conflict in every way, in order to divert Japanese pressure from the Soviet Union. Thus far inquiries have not shown that the Soviet Government had promised support to the Chinese. Statements of the Chinese Military Attaché at Moscow lead, rather, to the conclusion that the Chinese distrust the Soviet attitude.

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<sup>2a</sup> The so-called Anti-Comintern Pact between Germany and Japan had been signed in Berlin on November 25, 1936. The Agreement provided for measures toward a common defense against the activities of the Communist International, and for inviting third powers to join. (An English translation of this published part of the Pact will be found in *Documents on International Affairs*, 1936, pp. 297-299.) Added to the published part, however, was the following secret agreement (serial 101):

*"Secret Additional Agreement to the Agreement Against the Communist International"*

"The Government of the German Reich and the Imperial Japanese Government, recognizing that the Government of the Union of the Soviet Socialist Republics is working toward a realization of the aims of the Communist International and intends to employ its army for this purpose; convinced that this fact threatens not only the existence of the High Contracting States, but endangers world peace most seriously; in order to safeguard their common interests have agreed as follows:

**"ARTICLE I**

"Should one of the High Contracting States become the object of an unprovoked attack or threat of attack by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the other High Contracting State obligates itself to take no measures which would tend to ease the situation of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

"Should the case described in paragraph 1 occur, the High Contracting States will immediately consult on what measures to take to safeguard their common interests.

**"ARTICLE II**

"For the duration of the present Agreement, the High Contracting States will conclude no political treaties with the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics contrary to the spirit of this Agreement without mutual consent.

**"ARTICLE III**

"The German as well as the Japanese text of the present Agreement is to be deemed the original text. The Agreement comes into force simultaneously with the Agreement against the Communist International signed today and will remain in force for the same period.

"In witness whereof the undersigned, being duly and properly authorized by their respective Governments, have signed the Agreement and affixed their seals.

"Done in duplicate at Berlin on November 25, 1936, i.e., November 25 of the 11th year of the Showa period.

**"JOACHIM VON RIBBENTROP  
Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary  
Ambassador of the German Reich**

**"VISCOUNT KINTOMO MUSHAKOJI  
Imperial Japanese Extraordinary  
and Plenipotentiary Ambassador."**

To 3-7 and to 10: (Paris, Rome, Brussels, The Hague, Lisbon, and Moscow) As regards the attitude of the British and American Governments, it has thus far become known that they are constantly exchanging views and are considering mediation. They have urged moderation on both parties. The British Government has, besides, let it be known in Tokyo that it was prepared to extend a helping hand if the Japanese Government so desired. There has been no reaction yet on the part of the Japanese Government.

MACKENSEN

No. 464

224/150472

*The German Ambassador in Italy (Hassell) to the German Foreign Ministry*

Telegram

No. 192 of July 21

ROME, July 21, 1937—2:05 p.m.

Received July 21, 1937—5 p.m.

With reference to telegram 234.<sup>3</sup>

Ciano today gave me the official Italian point of view on the Far Eastern conflict, which coincides with the German position. Genuine sympathy for Japan's action is evident. Ciano added that, in accordance with the German-Italian Agreement, he had made inquiries through Attolico concerning the retention of the military mission, etc., with the Chinese Government, since participation in military operations would certainly be incompatible with good relations with Japan.

The Japanese Ambassador, Sugimura, told me that, according to the information he had received, war was probably unavoidable. The Soviet Russians were inciting the Chinese, but the Chinese hardly believed in their support. In any case, Japan did not want a clash with Russia at this time. The aim of the Japanese action was the large-scale and definitive disruption of all lines of communication between Soviet Russia and China, which necessitated the advance of Japanese troops as far as the Hwang. Japan was less concerned with the form of government of northern China; this could be discussed after attaining the goal mentioned. Were Soviet Russia actually to intervene in favor of China the Japanese would push forward across Mongolia in the direction of Irkutsk.

HASSELL

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<sup>3</sup> Document No. 463, *supra*.

## No. 465

224/150473

*The German Ambassador in China (Trautmann) to the German Foreign Ministry*

Cipher Telegram

No. 91 of July 21

NANKING, July 21, 1937—6:50 p.m.

Received July 21, 1937—3:30 p.m.

With reference to telegraphic instruction No. 71,<sup>4</sup> item 2.

The Military Adviser<sup>5</sup> states in strict confidence as follows:

1) Chiang Kai-shek aims at a peaceful settlement of the conflict, but not by sacrificing vital Chinese interests. Rather than that, he is determined to have a military showdown, since the hatred of Japan holds the nation together, and capitulation to Japan by his Government would lead to personal attacks on him and to serious internal political conflicts.

2) The military showdown with the Japanese would begin with the Chinese driving the Japanese from the Yangtze, seizing or putting Japanese merchant and naval vessels on the river out of commission (bombing attacks, surprise attacks); furthermore, the war would be waged, not locally, but everywhere. On the northern front (Hopei), in Shantung, and in Shanghai the Chinese feel militarily secure.

3) The military prospects of the Chinese are not at all unfavorable. How a war will finally end cannot be predicted with certainty. However, the Japanese have no chance unless they employ their entire army, and whether they can do this in the face of the Russian attitude is doubtful. By using only a part of their armed forces the Japanese would have no prospect of full success. The Chinese lack heavy artillery and specialized weapons, but their infantry, which is well equipped, even with heavy arms, is strong. The Japanese Fleet will blockade the coasts and start some operations in the South: in the air the Chinese and Japanese may be considered as of about equal strength. F[alkenhausen] declared it essential that Field Marshal Blomberg<sup>6</sup> should not believe a Japanese victory certain. The morale of the Chinese Army was good. It would fight desperately, and a war would turn into a death struggle.

TRAUTMANN

<sup>4</sup> Not printed.

<sup>5</sup> General Alexander von Falkenhausen, head of a group of former German Reichswehr officers acting as military advisers to the Chinese Government.

<sup>6</sup> German War Minister.

No. 466

153/82133

*Memorandum*

BERLIN, July 22, 1937.

The Japanese Counselor of Embassy called on me today to discuss the British suggestion to various Great Powers that the latter tender their good offices or otherwise intervene to promote a peaceful settlement of the conflict in the Far East. Mr. Yanai said that the United States of America had not followed the British suggestion. The Italians were indeed prepared to do so, but did not wish to proceed without similar action on the part of Germany.

I told the Japanese that we had not received an invitation to that effect from Rome and that we had no intention of tendering our good offices in the Far East, since we had no political interests there.

The Japanese hastened to reply that the intervention of third powers and their good offices were not at all welcome to Japan.

The Italian Ambassador, with whom I spoke later, told me that he had no orders to approach us concerning such action. The Italian Government was confining itself to the friendly urging of a peaceful solution in the Far East.

WEIZSÄCKER

No. 467

153/82132

*Memorandum*

BERLIN, July 22, 1937.

The Japanese Counselor of Embassy called on me today to protest alleged German shipments of arms to China.

He maintained that the Foreign Minister, in his first conversation with Count Mushakoji<sup>7</sup> after the Peking incident, had already declared himself "quite willing" to stop the exportation of arms to China. About July 15 the Foreign Minister, in reply to a second inquiry, had told Count Mushakoji that he had given his promise.

Nevertheless, the Japanese went on to say, it was reported that a quantity of war materials was on its way to China. It was a question of seven vessels already at sea; three more were to follow.

Mr. Yanai represented his *démarche* as very important and urgent, referred also to a conversation between Hirota<sup>8</sup> and Dirksen, and

<sup>7</sup> Japanese Ambassador in Germany.

<sup>8</sup> Koki Hirota, Japanese Foreign Minister, June 4, 1937-May 26, 1938.

virtually threatened seizure of any further arms shipments reaching China.

I replied to the Japanese that I had no knowledge of the promises of the Foreign Minister to which he referred; that I was no munitions dealer and did not know what was on the high seas in the way of war materials. If something of the sort was on its way to China, it was not even known at all who had the property right to it. I could therefore not be certain without a closer examination whether, in this connection, any German intervention would be possible. Still, I intended to look into his assertion concerning the Foreign Minister's conversations with Mr. Mushakoji and would investigate the whole subject he had raised.

WEIZSÄCKER

No. 468

153/82130-81

*Memorandum*

BERLIN, July 24, 1937.

The British Chargé d'Affaires called on me today to bring up the Far Eastern situation again. He left with me the enclosed *aide-mémoire*.

His question as to what we thought of the situation and what steps we had taken in the Far East (cf. Dr. Kung's<sup>9</sup> statement), I answered as follows:

It was true that in both China and Japan we had in the same friendly manner expressed our wish and definite hope that the conflict would not become aggravated but would reach a peaceful solution. We had tendered our good offices to neither of the parties, nor would we do so, for we had no political interests in the Far East.

The situation itself seemed to me, at the moment, to be shaping up somewhat more hopefully than at the time of the Chargé's last visit. The reports varied, to be sure. But for the last 48 hours they had sounded more favorable. Our Ambassador to China was, I knew, on his way from Peitaiho to Nanking. It should not be concluded from this, however, that we feared a further aggravation of the situation just now.

WEIZSÄCKER

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<sup>9</sup> Dr. H. H. Kung, Chinese Minister of Finance and Vice Premier, 1933-38.

[Enclosure]

AIDE-MÉMOIRE<sup>10</sup>

His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom view with serious concern the situation in the Far East.

The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs informed the Japanese Ambassador in London on July 21 of the great importance His Majesty's Government attached to a peaceful solution. He requested His Excellency to urge upon his Government the need for the greatest possible restraint in their own interests no less than in those of the Far East as a whole. The Government in Tokyo might be under the impression that Chinese resistance would be limited to words. The Secretary of State was sure that they were mistaken in this. While China ardently desired peace, there was a point beyond which Chiang Kai-shek could not go. The Japanese Ambassador replied that he would report fully to his Government and informed Mr. Eden that he was sure that the Japanese Government had no desire to see major operations develop from present troop movements which they regarded as made in self-defense.

The Secretary of State also expressed to Dr. Kung and the Chinese Ambassador in London his anxiety over the situation. Dr. Kung stated that he knew that the German Government were anxious that the dispute should not develop seriously and agreed with Mr. Eden that His Majesty's Government should cooperate with the German Government as much as possible.

Similar representations were made on July 21 by Mr. Hull to the Chinese and Japanese Ambassadors in Washington.<sup>11</sup>

Although from the latest reports the situation momentarily appears less menacing, His Majesty's Government are of opinion that it is still full of potential danger and intend to watch developments closely in case an opportunity occurs to do anything to help to avert a serious clash.

The Secretary of State would be interested to learn whether the German Government have any observations to make and how they view the present situation.

JULY 24, 1937.

<sup>10</sup> The file copy of this document is in English.

<sup>11</sup> For a memorandum by Secretary Hull concerning representations made by him to the Japanese Ambassador on July 21, 1937, see *Foreign Relations, Japan, 1931-1941*, vol. I, pp. 330-333. On the same day Secretary Hull asked the Chinese Ambassador to call and made to him a statement along the same lines.

## No. 469

153/82128

*The German Ambassador in Japan (Dirksen) to the German Foreign Ministry*

Telegram

No. 193 of July 27

Tokyo, July 27, 1937—1:28 a.m.

Received July 27, 1937—9:15 a.m.

1) The Japanese War Minister's Aide expressed his pleasure to the Military Attaché<sup>12</sup> that the German Government had stopped the shipment of arms to China, but he regretted that this decision, obvious in view of the friendship established by treaty between Germany and Japan, had been made only after a Japanese protest.

The Military Attaché replied that the utterly unexpected action of Japan in North China was seriously affecting German economic relations with China and that the German-Japanese Pact was designed only to meet situations created by Russia.

2) The Aide stated further that the activity of the German Military Adviser on behalf of China during the present strained situation was seriously prejudicing the sentiments of the Japanese officers' corps toward Germany. The Japanese Army Command could raise no legal objections against the Military Adviser, but its policy of German-Japanese collaboration was gravely jeopardized by Germany's conduct, since opposition already present in individual officers' groups threatened to spread throughout the forces.

The Aide requested in a friendly but pressing manner that Germany improve these sentiments by a friendly gesture.

The Military Attaché pointed to cases attesting very active friendship toward Japanese officers on the part of the German Army and to our desire that the Japanese armament program be carried out. The Japanese Army could therefore certainly not complain of our lack of readiness to help.

3) In view of the obvious deterioration of Japanese feelings toward us, it is my opinion that, as a friendly gesture, our position with respect to Japan and China should at least be confidentially discussed by a high German official with the Japanese Ambassador and the Military Attaché in Berlin.

I request telegraphic instructions.

DIRKSEN

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<sup>12</sup> General Eugen Ott.

No. 470

153/82125-28

*The German Ambassador in China (Trautmann) to the German Foreign Ministry*

Telegram

No. 99 of July 27

NANKING, July 27, 1937—6:12 p.m.

Received July 27, 1937—2:45 p.m.

During my conversation today with Marshal Chiang Kai-shek, he asked me about our position, which I explained to him on the basis of your instruction. He then asked whether, in the conversations our Ambassador in Tokyo had just had with the Japanese, the Japanese Government had not invoked the Anti-Comintern Pact. I replied that this Pact had not been mentioned at all and, as regards our attitude (group missing) of no importance, which visibly relieved him. The Marshal then made some very earnest statements about the situation. It would be quite misleading to believe that it was a question of a local conflict. If Japanese aggression continued one would have to expect hostilities that would involve all of the Far East—and a severance of diplomatic relations between China and Japan. I asked him whether he thought that Russia, too, would intervene in a possible war. He replied that this could not yet be determined, but that the possibility of its occurring later must be considered. He could assure me that thus far he had entered into no agreements whatsoever with the Russians, but that the situation had now changed and that from now on he was a free agent.

We then took up the diplomatic situation. I said that from my conversation with the Foreign Minister I had the impression that China anticipated much from mediation by third powers, whereas I believed that, considering the Japanese attitude, such mediation was quite useless. To this the Marshal replied that we had the Anti-Comintern Pact with Japan, aimed at Russia. A Sino-Japanese conflict was therefore not in our interest. We were, however, so intimate with the Japanese that we were the only power that could talk with them in peaceful terms. I told him that our Government would most deeply regret the outbreak of a war in the Far East. We were therefore working for peace in Tokyo. But I doubted whether we could use the small administrative Anti-Comintern Pact as a means in influencing the Japanese in this great question. The Marshal, however, urgently requested me to report his statements.

TRAUTMANN

## No. 471

153/82124

*The German Foreign Ministry to the German Embassy in China*

Cipher Telegram

No. 82

BERLIN, July 28, 1937.

With reference to telegram No. 99,<sup>15</sup> last paragraph. The statements which you made to the Marshal give a true picture of the situation. The Anti-Comintern Pact offers us no basis for exerting influence on the Japanese, but, on the other hand, we have given the Japanese clearly to understand that they cannot invoke the Anti-Comintern Pact in their action against China, since the Pact does not have for its object the combating of Bolshevism on the territory of a third state. At the same time we have again counseled moderation to the Japanese.

WEIZSÄCKER

## No. 472

153/82119-20

*The German Foreign Ministry to the German Embassy in Japan*

Cipher Telegram

No. 148

BERLIN, July 28, 1937.

(Pol. VIII 814)

With reference to telegrams Nos. 182<sup>16</sup> and 193.<sup>17</sup> Japanese attempts to explain their action in China as the combating of Communism under the Anti-Comintern Pact are misleading. As already stated in our telegram 140,<sup>18</sup> the purpose of the Pact is not the combating of Bolshevism on the territory of a third state. Japan's action may rather be regarded by us as being contrary to the Anti-Comintern Pact because it will prevent the consolidation of China, will thereby further the spread of Communism in China, and will, in the final analysis, drive the Chinese into the arms of Russia. (In this connection I may say confidentially that in his conversation with Ambassador Trautmann, Chiang Kai-shek replied to a question on the subject that the possibility of Russia's intervening later in a possible war had to be considered. He, Chiang Kai-shek, had thus far not entered into any agreements with the Russians; but the situation was different now.) The Japanese have, therefore, no reason to expect us to favor their undertaking; rather can we expect

<sup>15</sup> Document No. 470, *supra*.<sup>16</sup> Not printed.<sup>17</sup> Document No. 469, p. 740.

them not to stir up any trouble in China. We remain of the opinion that the so-called "creation of a strategically clear situation" will create no advantages for Japan in preparation for a possible future showdown with Russia. The more Japan gains a footing in North China, the more the consequences of intensified hatred of the Japanese by the Chinese will have to be expected for many years to come. The Japanese might therefore have to wage a two-front war, even if the maximum program of the Japanese military, the severance of five provinces, were to be carried out.

The Japanese have recently been carrying on radio propaganda in German, beamed to Germany, in which they constantly try to represent war against China as a struggle against Communism and to force at least moral participation upon us. We do not welcome this propaganda.

The Foreign Minister informed the Japanese Ambassador some time ago, upon the latter's representations, that arms shipments had not been made and were not being made to China in any considerable quantities. The Japanese cannot reproach us for the fact that the Chinese bought limited quantities of arms from us. This business was built up on a purely commercial basis. We readily demonstrated our new weapons to the Japanese and have granted extensive inspection privileges to Japanese commissions. It is not our fault if the Japanese have so far refrained from placing orders; we only regret the fact. The German deliveries of arms to China cannot be made the subject of German-Japanese negotiations. But, since a situation approaching a state of war has now developed, further deliveries of war materials to China will cease because of our neutral attitude.

The recall of our military advisers in China would at the present juncture mean taking sides against Nanking and is therefore out of the question. The recall of advisers would possibly cause the vacated positions to be filled by Russians, an undesirable result for the Japanese also. At the War Ministry, the Japanese Military Attaché has thus far merely expressed the wish that advisers should take no part in active military operations. The advisers have all along had instructions to this effect, which were expressly restated recently. Informed of this, Mushakoji acknowledged the measure with thanks.

We fail to understand the remark of the War Minister's Aide that the collaboration policy of the Japanese Army was jeopardized by our attitude on the question of advisers because opposition already present in individual groups of Japanese officers threatened to spread throughout the forces.

I have just explained matters in a friendly manner to Ambassador Mushakoji, in the sense of the foregoing statements, and request you to orientate your conversations accordingly and continue impressing upon the Japanese the need for moderation.

WEIZSÄCKER

No. 473

153/82121-22

*Memorandum*

BERLIN, July 28, 1937.

The Japanese Ambassador called on me today to give me the enclosed situation report,<sup>18</sup> which had, according to my information, already appeared in the press.

The Ambassador then inquired about our conversations with London and Washington concerning the Far Eastern conflict. I thereupon again described our attitude to the Ambassador in general terms. This satisfied Mushakoji. But then he went on to say that Japan felt the lack of a complete understanding of the anti-Communist achievement inherent in the Japanese action against China. He tried stubbornly to prove that in China, Japan was performing an anti-Communist task for us as well. In my reply I used the tenor of today's telegraphic instruction to Tokyo.<sup>18a</sup> When Mushakoji said that the lack of understanding he had met with in Germany for the anti-Communist actions of his Government was a threat to a genuine continuance of the German-Japanese Agreement of the autumn of 1936, I told him not to exaggerate. German-Japanese friendship was not under discussion. But we did not assume, on the basis of our contractual relationship, that we had to approve or give moral support to a Japanese action that might very well lead to the opposite of the aim pursued by both of us; namely, to the further strengthening of Communism in China and the driving of the Chinese into the arms of the Russians. Mushakoji then spoke of the idea of convening soon the secret special committee, not yet set up, before which he could then explain the anti-Communist tendencies that had moved Japan to her present action in China (Mushakoji mentioned that Herr von Ribbentrop and the Foreign Minister were informed about constituting the committee).

Mushakoji thanked me when I informed him confidentially that our instructors in China had received orders not to intervene in the Japanese-Chinese conflict. Mushakoji briefly mentioned the question

<sup>18</sup> Not printed here.

<sup>18a</sup> Document No. 472, *supra*.

of arms shipments, too. I told him that Japan had no right to stop any arms shipments from Germany to China. We did not, however, pursue the subject further.

In conclusion, Mushakoji again made a few partly regretful and partly threatening remarks about the failure of his mission in Berlin. I laughed off these remarks.

WEIZSÄCKER

No. 474

133/82113-16

*Memorandum*

(Pol. VIII 845)

Japanese Counselor of Embassy Yanai, whom I had asked to see me for another reason, communicated to me today first of all a telegram from Tokyo concerning the situation in North China, according to which the evacuation of Peiping had been completed, the main body of the 29th Army destroyed, and the rest of the troops withdrawn across the right bank of the river. The battles in Tientsin, also, had ended in favor of the Japanese. Furthermore, the Nanking Government now had, although for the time being only covertly, made known its intention to recognize the local armistice.

To my remark that the Chinese had just published a very sharp proclamation by Chiang Kai-shek which, on the contrary, showed the will to resist further, the Counselor of Embassy remarked that the Chinese were barking like a little dog, but that barking dogs do not bite. In reply to my question whether, in view of the Chinese willingness to reach an understanding, the Japanese, too, would now withdraw their troops, the Counselor of Embassy intimated that Japan could not rely on Chinese statements; further strict supervision in North China was necessary. The Japanese, through the Japanese Navy, had also given the governments in southern China a warning.

The Counselor of Embassy then read me another telegram, just received from the Japanese Foreign Ministry, with the request that I note its contents and bring them to the attention of higher authorities.

The telegram reads approximately as follows:

The Japanese Government believes that a special friendship exists between Japan and Germany. It therefore feels that it should point out that the Comintern is very active in China.

The Japanese Government has received reports to the effect that up to the present large quantities of arms have been exported from

Germany to China. Japan has received no word from Germany concerning Germany's future attitude in this respect.

Through her Ambassador in Washington, Germany gave out a statement concerning her attitude in the present conflict in North China without notifying the Japanese Government of the fact that such a statement had been given out. The Japanese Government cannot understand the failure to send such notification.

Now as before, it is the aim of the Japanese Government to localize the conflict in North China, but, in view of the attitude of the Nanking Government, no binding prediction can be made concerning the future. It is evidently the Chinese policy to induce other powers to intervene. If the Chinese Government is given the illusion that it will be supported by third governments, it will make the situation more difficult by its actions. Yet behind the Nanking Government stands Communism. Continued stubbornness on the part of China may lead to intervention by Soviet Russia, an intervention which is most undesirable. It would therefore be in the interest of general peace not to encourage the Nanking Government; for this reason no arms should be sent to the Nanking Government.

Should the Soviets intervene in North China, Japan would feel bound to request a broadening of the German-Japanese Agreement.

After having read the telegram, the Counselor of Embassy underscored the significance for Japan of the question of German arms deliveries to China and of the presence there of the German advisers. In this connection Japan was not concerned over the military and strategic aspect of the matter, but over the moral effect that German assistance to China must have both on China and on the Japanese public. The Counselor of Embassy then requested clarification of the arms deliveries, about which he had already spoken with Ministerial Director von Weizsäcker, and of the further intentions of the German Government in this regard. I gave him information in accordance with the statements in telegraphic instruction No. 148 to Tokyo,<sup>19</sup> and particularly emphasized the fact that Germany had no legal obligation toward Japan by virtue of which any German deliveries of war materials to China could form the subject of German-Japanese negotiations. Germany would be guided in the matter by purely political considerations; and, naturally, in this connection the friendly relations between Germany and Japan would be taken into account. I did not inform the Counselor of Embassy of the fact that deliveries of war materials to China have already been stopped by order of the War Ministry, as I did not wish to anticipate our Embassy in Tokyo; he seemed, however, to under-

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<sup>19</sup> Document No. 472, p. 742.

stand my remark in a sense agreeable to Japan. He then asked to be informed of the result of the inquiries promised by Herr von Weizsäcker concerning the seven vessels allegedly on their way to China with arms. On the question of advisers he remarked that the Japanese were satisfied with the renewal of the order that the advisers were not to take part in military operations. He agreed with me that in any recall of advisers there was the danger that the vacancy might be filled by nationals of another power, whose presence in China would be less agreeable to Japan.

In answer to a question of the Counselor of Embassy concerning the alleged *démarche* of Ambassador Dieckhoff in Washington, mentioned in the telegraphic instruction from Tokyo, I informed him that it was a question of a routine conversation in which we expressed our anxiety over events and our hope that peace would be maintained.

In conclusion, I pointed out to the Counselor of Embassy that Japan could not claim that the Anti-Comintern Pact made lawful her action in China, ostensibly directed against Communism, since the Pact did not provide for the combating of Communism on the territory of a third state.

VON SCHMIEDEN

BERLIN, July 30, 1937.

### No. 475

153/82109

#### *The German Foreign Ministry to the German Embassies in China and Japan*

Clipher Telegram

Nanking No. 84

BERLIN, July 31, 1937.

Tokyo No. 151

(Pol. VIII 838)

News of alleged Communist anti-Japanese agitation in North China, mostly from Japanese sources, is appearing more and more frequently in the press.

In the Lower House, on July 29, Prince Konoye<sup>20</sup> stated that there was increased Comintern activity in North China.

Please inform us by telegram how these reports are judged there, and whether and to what extent increased Soviet influence in the Far Eastern conflict is actually noticeable.

WEIZSÄCKER

<sup>20</sup> Fumimaro Konoye, Japanese Prime Minister, June 4, 1937-January 4, 1939.

## No. 476

1927/432209

*The German Ambassador in China (Trautmann) to the German Foreign Ministry*

Telegram

No. 108 of August 1

NANKING, August 1, 1937—9:24 p.m.

Received August 1, 1937—9 p.m.

With reference to telegraphic instruction No. 84.

I consider the reports\* Japanese propaganda. Japan has likewise justified the establishment of the East Hopei regime and her operations in Suiyuan on grounds of the struggle against Communism, of which there was actually no trace. The propaganda is an old Japanese cliché, which no one in the Far East believes.

On the other hand I consider it quite possible that China is being driven by the Japanese action into the arms of Soviet Russia. On the domestic political front the Chinese Government is ceasing its struggle against the representatives of the Popular Front. The Marshal, who until now has been against a settlement with Soviet Russia, can now no longer entirely reject the idea. Sun Fo<sup>23</sup> can now agitate openly for joining up with the Russians.

Nothing more is heard of the Communists in the Northwest. They probably have instructions from Moscow to lie low.

By their policy of violence the Japanese are producing just what they claim to be combating.

TRAUTMANN

## No. 477

1927/432210-11

*The German Ambassador in Japan (Dirksen) to the German Foreign Ministry*

Telegram

SECRET

No. 199 of August 3

Tokyo, August 3, 1937—12:40 p.m.

Received August 3, 1937—9:20 a.m.

With reference to telegrams 148 and 151.<sup>24</sup>

1. On the occasion of delivering the letter of the Führer and Chancellor,<sup>25</sup> I had a fairly long conversation with Foreign Minister

\* Concerning Communist anti-Japanese agitation in North China. [Footnote in the original.]

<sup>23</sup> Sun Fo, chairman of the Legislative Yuan and member of the standing committee of the Central Executive Committee of the Kuomintang.

<sup>24</sup> Document No. 472, p. 742, and document No. 475, p. 747.

<sup>25</sup> Hitler's letter acknowledged a letter from Hirota in which Hirota gave assurances that he would be faithful to the policy of the Anti-Comintern Pact; Hitler in reply expressed his satisfaction and pledged German cooperation in the struggle against Communism.

Hirota, in which I mentioned the grave concern with which we were following the progress of the North China conflict, the tying down of Japanese military and economic forces there, and the possibility of Russia's intervention by joining China or by independent action.

The Foreign Minister repeated his hope even now of a settlement, since negotiations were continuing in Nanking and Chiang Kai-shek desired a peaceful solution, but he had to make concessions to the radical wing through troop movements. In any case, Japan's aim was to bring about a quick, local solution.

2. The Foreign Minister's optimism is obviously not borne out by the facts of the situation or by the impression formed by the Military Attaché from his admonitory conversations with military men, that the latter are now seeking the complete overthrow of the military might of the Nanking Government in order to eliminate the Chinese threat for a long time. Mobilization measures have been greatly extended recently.

3. The authorities here have in their possession allegedly unimpeachable evidence, endorsed by Hirota, of intensified Communist activity in China on the part of the Chinese Communists as well as of the Comintern and the Soviet Government. A written report follows.

4. During the discussion of German deliveries of military equipment to China and of the activities of the advisers, I recounted the assurances communicated in telegraphic instruction No. 148 that there will be no further deliveries and that the advisers will take no active part in military operations. Recall of the military advisers and suspension of our deliveries of arms even before the outbreak of the conflict, mentioned in telegram 148, were *not* requested here by the Japanese.

5. During the discussion of this topic, Hirota remarked that the Italian advisers to the Nanking Government were recommending a peaceful settlement of the conflict. That the Italians are currying favor with the Japanese at our expense is evident from (group garbled) from military sources that of their own accord the Italians have announced here the suspension of arms deliveries to China.

6. The *démarches* of the American and British representatives here for the protection of their subjects in Peiping were made separately. The French Ambassador called on the Vice Minister merely for a general discussion of the situation.

7. The other statements in telegraphic instruction 148 will be taken up in a written report.

DIRKSEN

## No. 478

1927/432228

*Memorandum by the Foreign Minister*

During yesterday's report to the Führer our policy with regard to China was also exhaustively discussed. The Führer stressed the fact that he adhered, in principle, to the idea of cooperating with Japan, but that, in the present conflict between China and Japan, Germany must remain neutral. As for the deliveries to be made pursuant to the agreement with China, these should be continued insofar as China covers them by foreign exchange or corresponding deliveries of raw materials, camouflaged as much as possible, of course. Further Chinese orders for military materials should, as far as possible, not be accepted.

The War Minister has been informed of these decisions of the Führer.

BARON VON NEURATH

LEINFELDEN, August 17, 1937.

## No. 479

1824/417197-99

*Memorandum for Ambassador von Ribbentrop*

AUGUST 17, 1937.

CONVERSATION WITH GENERAL OSHIMA<sup>28</sup> ON AUGUST 13, 1937

Present:

Count Mushakoji, the Japanese Ambassador

General Oshima

General Sawada, Japanese Military Attaché at Warsaw

Lt. Col. Yoshinaka, representative of the Japanese Foreign Ministry (passing through Berlin)

Dr. von Raumer<sup>29</sup>

Professor Langsdorff as the expert on Rumania

Dr. Kleist as the expert on Poland.

To begin with, Dr. von Raumer gave a short survey of the possibility of drawing other states into cooperation in the tasks of the German-Japanese Agreement.<sup>30</sup> He pointed out that it seemed particularly important to him at the present time to win the cooperation of Rumania and Poland in combating the Communist International. Ambassador Mushakoji reported that he had already had

<sup>28</sup> Military Attaché of the Japanese Embassy in Germany.

<sup>29</sup> Of the *Dienststelle Ribbentrop*.

<sup>30</sup> I.e., the Anti-Comintern Pact of November 25, 1936.

a short conversation with Polish Ambassador Lipski<sup>31</sup> in regard to this matter. It was his opinion that it would be very difficult to induce these two States to cooperate closely. Above all, the present situation in Poland was very obscure. Colonel Koc<sup>32</sup> and his new nationalist movement had aroused strong opposition, since the real rightist-nationalist circles were in opposition to the Government and therefore energetically opposed Colonel Koc's movement. On Colonel Koc's side were principally the group of colonels, and also some socialist circles. The National Democrats, on the other hand, who are violent enemies of Communism and the Jews and at the same time the bitterest foes of Germany, were at the present time in the National Opposition.

Dr. von Raumer answered that he was well aware of the difficulty of the task, but that it had to be tackled and, given sufficient energy, it could surely be accomplished if we only set out on the right path from the beginning.

Then Brigadier General Sawada, the Japanese Military Attaché at Warsaw, declared that he also considered the task very difficult, but believed that it could be achieved. To be sure, it would have to be carried out with high political skill in order, on the one hand, to create a favorable sentiment for Germany but, on the other hand, to produce the required pressure. The problem which interested Poland most at the present time was the minority question. If Germany were able to make a friendly gesture in this matter by declaring to the Poles that Germany was prepared to discuss the solution of this question with Poland in a friendly manner, a very favorable condition for the anti-Comintern work, too, would be created. On the other hand, however, keeping in mind Polish psychology, Germany would have to exert sharp pressure in some form or other, either by displaying tangible evidence of her power on her eastern boundary by increased troop concentrations (maneuvers, fortifications, etc.) or better yet by occupying Memel and possibly Lithuania also.

Dr. von Raumer replied that in theory he considered these tactics correct, but that their practical application in the present situation was very doubtful. Since Poland saw in the German minorities a very strong and culturally superior opponent, she sought with all her might to destroy them. In the face of this struggle Germany could not stand idly by; and a friendly settlement, even if it were realized on paper, could scarcely count on really faithful execution

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<sup>31</sup> Josef Lipski, Polish Ambassador in Germany.

<sup>32</sup> Colonel Adam Koc, close collaborator of Marshal Pilsudski and founder of the National Unity Group, formed on March 1, 1937.

on the part of the Poles. Nevertheless, he would study these proposals further.

Dr. von Raumer then made some suggestions as to the practical work which was necessary for laying the groundwork for existing plans. It was above all a question of finding one or more persons who would not only enter the struggle against the Comintern but also have the necessary influence in the Government to carry out these plans. Colonel Koc, who at present enjoyed very great influence in the Government, was generally mentioned as the proper person for this work. In this connection it was proposed that the Japanese, by exploiting the anti-Semitic and anti-Bolshevist sentiments of the National Democrats, should work especially in those circles in behalf of our mutual plans, since Germany would not be able to exert any influence on the National Democrats. These proposals were generally welcomed, and are to be put into effect immediately.

VON RAUMER

### No. 480

153/82094

#### *Memorandum*

BERLIN, August 19, 1937.

I called the attention of State Secretary Funk<sup>33</sup> to the statements in which Herr Berndt,<sup>34</sup> at his press conference of the 17th, had taken a strongly anti-Chinese and thoroughly pro-Japanese stand on the Japanese-Chinese conflict. In my opinion, this was contrary to the decision of the Führer and Chancellor ordering our absolute neutrality, even though continuing our friendship with the Japanese. I informed him of the Foreign Minister's memorandum of his conversation on this subject with the Führer in Nuremberg. He stated that he had not known of the matter before. He added that Herr Berndt had no doubt only expressed himself in accordance with the directions for dealing with the matter which had reached the Ministry of Propaganda previously. He admitted that my information concerning the Führer's new instructions changed matters. He would discuss the subject with Herr Berndt, who was absent today for talks with Colonel Adam,<sup>35</sup> but who was expected to return tomorrow.

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<sup>33</sup> Walter Funk, Chief of the Press Section and State Secretary in the Reich Propaganda Ministry; later Minister of Economics and president of the Reichsbank.

<sup>34</sup> Alfred Berndt of the Reich Propaganda Ministry.

<sup>35</sup> Head of the Austrian Federal press service.

Upon my remarking that I hoped that his talk with Berndt would settle the matter satisfactorily, so that a Neurath-Goebbels conference would not be necessary, State Secretary Funk declared emphatically that he was certain this would suffice and that he would handle the matter accordingly.

MACKENSEN

No. 481

153/82093/4

*Memorandum*

BERLIN, August 19, 1937.

General Keitel,<sup>36</sup> who called on me today at the instance of the War Minister, brought up among other things the subject of "Germany and the Japanese-Chinese conflict." He referred to the result of last Monday's Nuremberg conference of the Führer, the Foreign Minister, and the War Minister. His version, which was based on the Field Marshal's reports, was in substantial agreement with the corresponding memorandum of the Foreign Minister. Concerning the question of continuing deliveries to China, he went somewhat further in certain particulars.

I took the opportunity to call the General's attention to our discussion with the Propaganda Ministry concerning instructions to the press (cf. the text of the press conference of the 17th containing the statements of Ministerial Counselor Berndt) and to request that he too, on a suitable occasion, influence the Propaganda Ministry to the same end. The General replied that, on the basis of the Nuremberg conference, he had just given his Press Chief instructions in accord with our ideas.

MACKENSEN

No. 482

224/150482

*Memorandum*

BERLIN, August 20, 1937.

State Secretary Funk reports by telephone that telephonic instruction was received from Reich Press Chief Dietrich during the night to the effect that the press should write in a more friendly vein about Japan. After my report yesterday concerning the results of

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<sup>36</sup> General Wilhelm Keitel, Chief of the Armed Forces Department (*Wehrmachtsamt*) in the War Ministry and Chief of Staff to Field Marshal von Blomberg, the War Minister.

last Monday's discussion between the Führer, the Foreign Minister, and the War Minister, State Secretary Funk was just as surprised as I at this instruction. He thought the reason was that some surprise had been expressed in the foreign press that, contrary to our political friendship with Japan, we treated her cause so indifferently in our papers.

We agreed that, subject to possible further steps by the Foreign Minister, the new instructions would have to remain in force.

MACKENSEN

### No. 483

1927/432243-44

*The German Ambassador in Japan (Dirksen) to the German Foreign Ministry*

Telegram

VERY SECRET

No. 228 of August 23

TOKYO, August 23, 1937—10:46 a.m.

Received August 23, 1937—8:25 a.m.

I. On the basis of up-to-date confidential information from the [Japanese] Army and Navy, the Military Attaché has arrived at the following estimate of the situation, with which I agree on the basis of impressions formed from my last conversation with Hirota and from other evidence:

Developments are leading toward a decisive struggle with Nanking. The bloody events in Shanghai and the forced evacuation of all Japanese commercial centers in China with heavy losses have given rise to embittered determination here. A new wave of mobilization measures has set in.

Operations will probably be launched by the seizure of Shanghai and Tsingtao as points of departure for deeply penetrating movements by the military and naval air forces and for the large-scale attack in North China.

The immediate goal is to deal a permanent blow to the fighting power of the Nanking Government, to cut it off from the most important commercial centers and railroad networks, and to force it to transfer its seat to Hankow—which is expected to weaken decisively its economic and political power.

The ultimate aim of Japan is to compensate herself for the unexpected expenditure of lives, materials, and money by the complete overthrow of Chiang Kai-shek and the Nanking Government and by an autonomous North China, and with rather dangerous optimism she is counting on success in a few months.

II. Because of this military situation, as well as the extension of the theater of war, our neutral position must, in my opinion, be expected to become more difficult. If only geographically, the policy of keeping our military advisers away from the theater of war is becoming illusory as a result of the inclusion of North China in the operations. The planning of Chinese operations by them is becoming more obvious. With increasingly heavy fighting and losses the Japanese will be more and more inclined to believe the lying report from foreign sources about direct intervention by German advisers, or use this as a scapegoat for their public opinion. The Japanese will soon take the view that, in the actual situation, German neutrality is being modified to the disadvantage of Japan. These possibilities stood out clearly in my conversation with the Foreign Minister as well as in the simultaneous conversation which the Military Attaché had with the General Staff and the Ministry of the Navy.

III. The surest way of avoiding such conflicts with Japan would be to recall our military advisers from Nanking. As the situation stands today, this course will hardly be practicable without greatly endangering our relations with China.

But at least, in agreement with the Military Attaché, I should like to recommend an examination of the question of military advisers, with a view to attempting to make their future activity in China much less objectionable to Japan by strict instructions for the greatest restraint and by other suitable measures, and by reporting these measures to the Japanese in order to reassure them.

IV. (Group garbled) timely consideration should be given to the question of whether German mediation, which would extricate us from the difficulties of neutrality, would be advisable—perhaps at a later date, if and when, after heavy fighting, there began to awaken in China the feeling of military inferiority and, in Japan, anxiety on account of a war whose end could not be foreseen. A necessary condition for this, however, would be to have some concessions from the Chinese which would make the prospect of successful influence on Japan seem promising. In such an event an important task for the military advisers might be to warn Chiang Kai-shek against continuing the struggle till China is bled white, and to prepare the way for mediation.

DIRKSEN

## No. 484

153/82111-12

*Memorandum*

BERLIN, August 30, 1937.

The Chinese Ambassador called on me at noon today. He stated that he had been instructed by his Government to inform us of the conclusion of the Chinese-Russian Nonaggression Pact<sup>37</sup> and of the motives that had actuated his Government in the matter. He regretted not having been able to give this information as early as Saturday, before the announcement of the Pact; unfortunately, he had not been in Berlin.

The negotiations regarding the Pact, as was well known, had been going on for a considerable time. The difficult situation in which China found herself at present as a result of the Japanese advance had forced his Government to bring the negotiations to a conclusion quickly. It had been urgently necessary for China to eliminate the possibility of conflict with Soviet Russia in order to secure her rear for the defense against the Japanese attack. Not only in text but also in spirit, it was an actual nonaggression pact and not an alliance. There were no secret agreements in addition to the published treaty provisions. The Pact was not an indication of tendencies in China toward friendliness with Bolshevism; there had not been the slightest change in the attitude of the Chinese Government toward domestic policy. The release of Communist leaders in China already reported in the press was not a result of the Pact, nor a concession to Moscow; it had merely been carried out in order to bring about the greatest possible domestic unity in China for the defensive struggle against Japan. His Government was, above all, anxious to assure us that there had been no change in the friendly attitude of China toward Germany. Therefore, it was hoped that Germany would also maintain her previous neutral attitude in accordance with the statements made to him by the Foreign Minister.

I thanked the Ambassador for his communication and promised to inform the Foreign Minister and the State Secretary immediately. But at the same time I told him that the report which came to us Saturday concerning the conclusion of the Treaty had caused great surprise and serious misgivings among us. Germany had learned from experience that in the case of such treaties it was not so much a question of the concrete contents as of the political aims and background. Public opinion in Germany would, above all,

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<sup>37</sup> Concluded August 21, 1937. For text, see League of Nations Treaty Series, No. 4180, vol. CLXXXI, p. 102.

note the fact that China had concluded a pact with the Soviet Government, and, as could readily be understood, would quite naturally interpret it as an internal agreement for the purpose of more or less extensive political cooperation. We would undoubtedly appreciate the Chinese motives explained by the Ambassador, and our press comments on the report had thus far been thoroughly objective. Nevertheless, serious misgivings would doubtless be felt in Germany in regard to China's bond with Russia. Moreover, I had personally been struck by the absence in the text of the Treaty of any non-intervention clause, which should have suggested itself very strongly in the light of existing circumstances.

The Ambassador replied that he understood our apprehensions; but he hoped that we would have confidence in the explanations he had given and would maintain our previous attitude toward China. He promised to send me a full text of the Treaty as soon as possible.

GAUS

BERLIN, August 30, 1937.

#### B. DIVIDED COUNSELS, SEPTEMBER-NOVEMBER 1937

##### No. 485

153/82081

*The German Ambassador in Japan (Dirksen) to the German  
Foreign Ministry*

Telegram

VERY SECRET

No. 255 of September 8

TOKYO, September 8, 1937—12:18 p.m.

Received September 8, 1937—9:10 a.m.

In regard to Japanese-Italian relations, Hirota told me that the negotiations for the conclusion of an anti-Comintern agreement were progressing well. But Mussolini had proposed in addition the conclusion of a political agreement providing for benevolent neutrality in case of war, as well as for mutual consultation. Hirota had misgivings about entering into such an agreement for fear that Italy thereby wished to commit Japan against England. The entire attitude of Italy toward Japan appears to confirm this anxiety of the Foreign Minister. From numerous conversations with members of the Italian Embassy here, the impression has been gained that Italy is very anxious to make far-reaching concessions to the wishes of Japan in the matter of the retention of military advisers and the transmittal of intelligence from Nanking, obviously with the ulterior aim of obtaining a freer hand in the Mediterranean by committing Japan against England.

I replied to Hirota's question in regard to the status of German-Italian relations by stating that they were excellent, but without any treaty commitments.

DIRKSEN

No. 486

8245/E000106-07

*Memorandum for the Führer*<sup>28a</sup>

BERLIN, September 19, 1937.

In continuation of my memorandum of August 24<sup>39</sup> I am enclosing three maps and an explanation<sup>39</sup> regarding the present situation in the Chinese theater of war, as General Oshima described it to me today during a visit.

General Oshima believes that the first great decision will occur in the North in the course of the next few weeks, whereas the operations at Shanghai will probably take longer. While the encircling offensive by the Japanese is in full progress in the North, the attack on Shanghai is only about to begin, as the landings and the difficult strategic concentration of the Japanese troops are only now being concluded.

Contrary to all rumors that have been spread, especially in Nuremberg, that the Japanese had bogged down and had undertaken a task beyond their powers, I still have the clear impression and the firm inner conviction that the Japanese troops will win a decisive victory over China in the not too distant future. The intention then appears to be to make an agreement with the Chinese Nanking Government to the effect that the latter shall conclude an anti-Comintern agreement with Japan.

Japan seems to have passed brilliantly the test of strength which she engaged in with Britain and the United States—by the Shanghai action in particular (Britain has 250 million pounds sterling invested there). This test of strength would seem to be of particular importance to us.

General Oshima today again mentioned the proposal for an early agreement on a joint economic program with Japan in China. I communicated this to Minister President Göring, who will appoint

<sup>28a</sup> The document printed here is from the files of the *Dienststelle Ribbentrop* and thus may not necessarily have come to the knowledge of the Foreign Ministry.

<sup>39</sup> Not printed.

a confidential representative to arrange for the appropriate preliminary negotiations in cooperation with a member of my staff [*Dienststelle*].

R[IBBENTROP]

### No. 487

153/82078

*The German Ambassador in Japan (Dirksen) to the German Foreign Ministry*

Telegram

No. 280 of September 21

Tokyo, September 21, 1937—2 a.m.

Received September 21, 1937—10:45 a.m.

With reference to telegram No. 198 of the 9th.<sup>40</sup>

1) The denial by the *Deutsches Nachrichtenbüro*, in the version given here by Domei, leaves out the real facts in the case. The Japanese know that the military advisers are not regular German officers. They object to the fact that, on the basis of a private agreement, former German officers continue to act as advisers to the Chinese during the war and allegedly influence military operations decisively in favor of the Chinese, even though they should be subject to instructions from home, considering the authority the German regime has.

2) In this connection the General Staff communicates the following United Press despatches: Five German advisers are active in Shanghai on the Chapei front. The staff of advisers has been transferred to Nanchang, but a considerable number take part in the fighting and are in command of troops. The retreat of the Chinese on the northern front in the face of the threatened Japanese encircling movement took place against the wishes of the Chinese General Staff on the recommendation of the German advisers, eighty-seven of whom took part in these operations.

3) A reliable German source who arrived here from Shanghai told me that General Falkenhausen was in Shanghai for a considerable time and led the operations there. In addition, two other German advisers had fought on the line in order personally . . .<sup>41</sup>

Same text to Nanking. Telegraphic instruction requested.

DIRKSEN

<sup>40</sup> Not printed. The telegram called attention to a D.N.B. despatch clarifying the role of the German officers in China, and instructed Dirksen to assure the Japanese again that the officers were not active in combat areas.

<sup>41</sup> This passage was garbled in the original. A repetition was requested, but the corrected text has not been found.

## No. 488

1927/432321-22

*Memorandum by the Foreign Minister*

RM 760

The Japanese Ambassador today suddenly made the suggestion in a roundabout way that we should recall Ambassador Trautmann from Nanking. He was the only ambassador still in Nanking, and it would undoubtedly have a strong moral effect on the Chinese if we ordered our Ambassador to leave Nanking. I answered Mr. Mushakoji sharply that Ambassador Trautmann would remain in Nanking. It was not customary for us to recall ambassadors, even if Japanese bombers dropped bombs on an open city in which our ambassadors resided.

The Japanese Ambassador then spoke again about the exchange of information. He said that the Italians had supplied them with substantially more information concerning conditions in Shanghai than had our Ambassador. I replied that we supplied our Ambassador in Tokyo with information. Herr Trautmann was in direct contact with our Ambassador in Tokyo, and that would have to suffice.

Finally, Mr. Mushakoji brought up the pending negotiations between Italy and Japan regarding the conclusion of an anti-Comintern pact. In reply to my question as to how far these negotiations had progressed, he answered evasively. I then asked him whether Japan had fulfilled or would fulfill the condition of the Italians—namely, the recognition of the Empire. He did not reply to this question, but then began to speak about a joint German-Italian-Japanese agreement. I told him that we did not desire such an agreement. We already had the Anti-Comintern Pact with Japan. We had also made agreements with Italy, as he knew. It was now for Rome and Tokyo to decide whether they wished to make similar direct agreements.

Finally, I informed the Ambassador that we, like Italy, had declined an invitation from the Secretariat of the League of Nations to be represented on the Far East [Advisory] Committee.

BARON VON NEURATH

BERLIN, September 22, 1937.

## No. 489

1927/432330

*The German Foreign Ministry to the German Embassy in Japan*

Cipher Telegram

No. 219

BERLIN, September 23, 1937.

(zu Pol. VIII 1285)

1) With reference to the dropping of bombs in the vicinity of German buildings, reported in the telegram of the 22d from Nanking,<sup>42</sup> please reiterate strong representations against the bombing of the Nanking areas mentioned.

2) Please renew the precautionary filing of damage claims, ordered in telegraphic instruction No. 174 of August 26,<sup>42</sup> and leave a memorandum.

MACKENSEN

## No. 490

153/82075/1

*The German Ambassador in China (Trautmann) to the German Foreign Ministry*

Telegram

No. 220 of September 22 NANKING, September 23, 1937—1:47 a.m.

Received September 23, 1937—3:15 a.m.

With reference to yesterday's telegram from Tokyo.<sup>43</sup>

1) It is now too late to change our policy. If we recall the advisers it may have very grave consequences. On the other hand, I have told Falkenhausen as well as the Marshal that the advisers are not to be employed at the front. Formally, we are covered by the fact that no war has been declared. The same Japanese agitation took place here.

2) The United Press report is a pure fabrication. The office of the Mission declares: There is no German adviser at the Chapei front. The staff of advisers is not at Nanchang; it is engaged in education and training as before, not in active operations. None of the advisers is in command of troops or belongs to a higher staff. On the northern front there is no German adviser.

3) The German source gave incorrect information; Falkenhausen has never been in Shanghai or at the front since the fighting began. The truth of the matter is that he was invited by Headquarters to

<sup>42</sup> Not printed.

<sup>43</sup> i.e., No. 280 of September 21, document No. 487, p. 759.

acquaint himself with the situation at the same time as the foreign military attachés.

4) The last eight groups of the telegram are garbled.

5) I notified the advisers again today that it was not the wish of the German High Command that they should be active at the front. I consider it feasible for them to make trips to Headquarters for information. This the advisers cannot avoid.

6) I still consider all press polemics inadvisable.<sup>43a</sup> Tokyo has not been informed.

TRAUTMANN

### No. 491

1927/432314

*The German Foreign Ministry to the German Embassy in Japan*

Cipher Telegram

No. 222

BERLIN, September 24, 1937.

(zu Pol. VIII 1287)

With reference to telegram No. 280.<sup>44</sup>

For your information. Not to be made public.

In the meantime the advisers have again been notified by the Ambassador at Nanking that they are to refrain from participation in the fighting.

The Ambassador at Nanking says that the United Press report referred to is a pure fabrication. According to the office of the Mission there is no German adviser at the Chapei front. The advisers are, as before, engaged in education and training, not in active operations. No adviser is in command of troops or belongs to a higher staff. There is no adviser on the northern front.

The Ambassador at Nanking says that the report by your source regarding Falkenhausen is incorrect. Falkenhausen has never been in Shanghai or at the front since the beginning of hostilities. The truth of the matter is that he was invited by Headquarters to acquaint himself with the situation at the same time as the foreign military attachés.

WEIZSÄCKER

<sup>43a</sup> A marginal notation in Weizsäcker's handwriting reads as follows: "I agree with Tr[autmann]."

<sup>44</sup> Document No. 487, p. 759.

## No. 492

153/82070

*The German Ambassador in China (Trautmann) to the German Foreign Ministry*

Telegram

No. 226 of September 25    NANKING, September 25, 1937—6:40 p.m.  
Received September 25, 1937—9:25 p.m.

With reference to telegraphic instruction No. 126.<sup>45</sup>

General Chang Chun, General Secretary of the Political Council of the Party, told me that the Russians desired an airline, but that no negotiations were being conducted with the Soviets on the subject. From another reliable source I hear that Chinese military authorities are negotiating with the Russians in regard to ground preparations for sending Russian planes via Sinkiang. General Chang Chun asks us to realize the situation of the Chinese Government, which, in its struggle for existence, cannot refuse help from Russia. China, however, wanted to do everything possible to cultivate relations with Germany. He requested my advice. I said that it was a matter of importance to us that China should not become wedded to the Russians. He declared that this was also the policy of the Chinese Government.

TRAUTMANN

## No. 493

153/82153

*The German Ambassador in China (Trautmann) to the German Foreign Ministry*

Telegram

No. 245 of October 11    NANKING, October 11, 1937—9:20 p.m.  
Received October 11, 1937—8:20 p.m.

I had a long conversation today with Marshal Chiang Kai-shek and his wife. Mussolini's public attack on the Archbishop of Canterbury has had an extraordinarily disquieting influence on the Chinese. It is interpreted by them as taking sides directly with Japan. Chiang Kai-shek brought up the subject and contrasted our absolutely neutral attitude with that of Italy. I reassured him, saying that Mussolini's statements, rather than referring so much to the Far Eastern conflict, had been directed at the British double standard of morality. Chiang Kai-shek asked me whether we could not exert influence on Rome so that Italy would adopt the same

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\* Not printed.

attitude toward China as Germany did. In return, China would be inclined to conclude a barter agreement with Italy after the war similar to the one with Germany. I promised to support his request.

Furthermore, the Marshal would like to know our attitude toward the Nine Power Conference.<sup>47</sup> I explained that we had unpleasant memories of the Nine Power Treaty, because China had at that time expressed herself in opposition to our accession to the Treaty. Moreover, I neither knew what our attitude toward the Conference was nor whether we had even been invited.

The Marshal obviously felt some constraint about saying that he wished we would take part, but I got the impression that this is his inmost desire. I said that I did not expect much from the Conference. It would probably only stiffen the Japanese attitude. I request instructions.

TRAUTMANN

No. 494

151/82456

*Memorandum*

(zu Pol. VIII 1463 Ang. 3)

According to reports from our representatives in London, Washington, and The Hague, it appears probable that Germany will be invited to the projected Nine Power Conference, at which the Far Eastern conflict is to be considered.

According to the report from our Embassy in Tokyo the Japanese Vice Foreign Minister declared that Japan would most likely decline the invitation, since the Conference was being convened on the basis of the League of Nations resolution condemning Japan. For this reason the Japanese Government would be pleased if Germany did not attend either.

In view of the poor prospects of success for the Conference, and out of consideration for Japan, German participation is scarcely advisable. But, in order to deprive foreign countries of the possibility of exploiting our refusal as proof of our lack of interest in world peace, it would perhaps be advantageous to forestall an invitation to the Conference. This could be done by having the State Secretary, for example, summon the British Ambassador, discuss the Conference with him, and make clear that we do not expect

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<sup>47</sup> The conference of the parties to the Nine Power Treaty of Washington of 1922, held at Brussels, November 3-24, 1937, to discuss the Chinese situation.

any success from it and for this reason feel no inclination to take part in such a hopeless undertaking.

Herewith respectfully submitted to the Head of the Political Department through the Chief of Pol. VIII.

STRACHWITZ

BERLIN, October 13, 1937.

No. 495

151/82454

*The German Foreign Ministry to the German Embassy in China*

Cipher Telegram

No. 147

BERLIN, October 14, 1937.  
(zu Pol. VIII 1463 Ang. I)

In reply to your telegram No. 245 of October 11.

Tokyo reports that the Japanese Government, while reserving definite decision until after the receipt of an invitation, considers Japanese participation in a Nine Power Conference as scarcely possible, since it is being called on the basis of a League of Nations resolution condemning Japan. For the same reason Japan would welcome Germany's nonparticipation.

According to reports from London and Washington, little enthusiasm exists there for the Conference, and there is disinclination to any decision in favor of energetic measures.

Thus far no invitation has been received here. In view of the slight prospects of a successful outcome and the circumstance that the Conference is based on League of Nations resolutions implying moral condemnation of one of the parties, we would presumably decline in order to keep open the opportunity to cooperate in any later attempts at settlement directed solely toward practical goals.

MACKENSEN

No. 496

151/82450-51

*Memorandum by the Foreign Minister*

RM 792

The Italian Ambassador, who called on me today, asked me two questions:

1) Should Italy comply with an informal request from Belgian Minister Spaak<sup>48</sup> and for her part also give Belgium a statement similar to that of Germany?

<sup>48</sup> Paul Henri Spaak, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

I replied that naturally we had no objection if the Italian Government wished to make such a statement. I was, however, of the opinion that it would be better to wait for a more precise request from the Belgian Government as the basis for such a statement. In addition, I should like to request, in case the Italian Government entered into negotiations regarding the issuance of a statement, that care be exercised so that the text of the statement should not contradict ours. For this reason it would be advisable to discuss the wording of the statement with us in detail.

2) What is the attitude of Germany toward the coming Nine Power Conference on the Far Eastern conflict, and is it desirable in the opinion of Germany for Italy to participate?

I told the Ambassador that in case we were invited to take part in the Conference, we would presumably decline as things now stand. We were not a signatory to the Nine Power Protocol. Our participation had in fact been expressly refused at that time. Moreover, the proposal for the meeting of the Nine Powers emanated from the League of Nations, although the invitation would probably be issued by some other power. On the other hand, I considered it advisable for Italy as a signatory to the Nine Power Protocol to accept a possible invitation.

Finally, I informed the Ambassador orally of the instruction given on October 14 to Woermann for the discussion of the subject of volunteers in the nonintervention committee.<sup>49</sup>

BARON VON NEURATH

BERLIN, October 14, 1937.

No. 497

1927/432363

*Memorandum by the Foreign Minister*

RM 795

The Chinese Ambassador, who called on me today, asked me whether Germany had already been invited to the Nine Power Conference and what we intended to do in such an eventuality. I replied that, first of all, we had not yet received an invitation. However, in case we were invited, we would not take part in the Conference. When the Ambassador expressed his regret at this decision, I told him that in 1926 China herself had refused to have us participate in the Nine Power negotiations.

<sup>49</sup> German Foreign Ministry documents dealing with the Spanish Civil War will be included in vol. III.

The Ambassador then wished to know whether Italy had been invited and would participate. I told him that up to yesterday evening Italy had not received an invitation; nor did I know how the Italian Government would respond to an invitation. Italy's position was, after all, different from ours, since she was a member of the League of Nations as well as a cosignatory to the Nine Power Pact.

The Ambassador then inquired whether the rumors that we would withdraw our advisers from China were true. I replied that this was not the case; but, as he probably knew, we had given instructions that the advisers were not to take part in the fighting at the front.

BARON VON NEURATH

BERLIN, October 15, 1937.

### No. 498

151/82447

#### *The German Ambassador in China (Trautmann) to the German Foreign Ministry*

Telegram

No. 253 of October 16

NANKING, October 16, 1937—9:40 p.m.

Received October 16, 1937—6:10 p.m.

In view of the statement by the President of the United States that the main purpose of the Nine Power Conference was mediation between China and Japan,<sup>50</sup> and in view of Eden's speech,<sup>51</sup> I consider it advisable to participate in the Conference, should we be invited. Same text to Tokyo.

TRAUTMANN

### No. 499

153/82146

#### *Memorandum*

BERLIN, October 19, 1937.

Colonel Thomas<sup>52</sup> called me today on the telephone and informed me that since yesterday afternoon he had been getting reports from various industrial sources that yesterday General Göring had issued instructions to industry according to which all deliveries to China were to be stopped on orders from the Führer. Colonel Thomas asked whether we were acquainted with these instructions

<sup>50</sup> For President Roosevelt's statement on this subject in his radio address of October 12, 1937, see *Foreign Relations, Japan, 1931-1941*, vol. 1, p. 401.

<sup>51</sup> In which Mr. Eden promised Great Britain's cooperation at the Nine Power Conference. See *Documents on International Affairs*, 1937, p. 51.

<sup>52</sup> Colonel Georg Thomas, in charge of economic and war material production matters in the War Ministry.

and what we knew about them. After conferring with Herr von Weizsäcker, I answered the question to the effect that we knew nothing of such instructions here. Colonel Thomas will immediately call the matter to the attention of General Keitel, who will, he thinks, in view of the importance of such instructions, have to decide upon some sort of measures, inasmuch as Field Marshal von Blomberg could not be reached at present.

I requested Colonel Thomas to keep in touch with us in regard to the question, which naturally was also of vital concern to the Foreign Ministry, and to take no step which he had not discussed with us.

MACKENSEN

### No. 500

153/82148-82147

#### *Memorandum*

(e.o. Pol. I 5475 g.)

General Keitel asked me to see him today and requested me to give the State Secretary the following information:

Herr von Raumer telephoned General Keitel on Saturday on behalf of Ambassador von Ribbentrop. The Ambassador had not been able to call on General Keitel personally before leaving for London. He [Ribbentrop] requested, however, that General Keitel be informed of the Führer's decision that in the Japanese-Chinese conflict the *Wehrmacht* was to avoid doing anything which might in any way hinder or obstruct Japanese aims.

On Monday Colonel General Göring personally telephoned General Keitel and told him that the Japanese had threatened to withdraw from the Anti-Comintern Pact if the support of the Chinese by Germany was continued in its present form. The Führer had decided that an unequivocal attitude was to be adopted toward Japan. He (General Göring) therefore requested General Keitel to issue the necessary instructions that no further military deliveries whatever be made to China. He himself had already given instructions to that effect to HAPRO.<sup>52a</sup> General Keitel, in reply to this command transmitted from the highest level, stated that he would carry out the directive. He thereupon gave instructions, in particular to Colonel Thomas, to stop all deliveries. Tomorrow General Keitel will report on the matter to the Field Marshal upon the latter's return.

<sup>52a</sup> Handelsgesellschaft für industrielle Produkte m. b. H. This was a German company organized to supply arms to China in return for Chinese products required by Germany. Its activities were based on two agreements with China, a trade agreement of August 23, 1934, and a credit agreement of April 8, 1936. In October 1937 HAPRO was taken over by the Office of the Commissioner for the Four Year Plan, General Göring.

In the further course of the conversation General Keitel intimated that simply stopping deliveries in this manner would probably not be feasible, since an advance payment in foreign exchange had probably been received already, and certain orders transmitted to industry. Industry had already begun to fill certain orders. General Keitel had arranged that the necessary data should be gathered, particularly by Colonel Thomas. He expressed the opinion that in all probability the Field Marshal on his part would then go to the Obersalzberg to report to the Führer in order to determine whether our changed attitude toward the Japanese-Chinese conflict, as indicated by the various instructions, was really in accordance with the intentions of the Führer.

Finally, General Keitel stressed that in this matter he attached great importance to keeping in particularly close touch with the Foreign Ministry.

Herewith respectfully submitted to the State Secretary.

VON DER HEYDEN-RYNSCH

BERLIN, October 19, 1937.

### No. 501

151/82442

#### *The German Ambassador in Japan (Dirksen) to the German Foreign Ministry*

Telegram

URGENT

TOKYO, October 21, 1937—7:22 p.m.

SECRET

Received October 21, 1937—2:45 p.m.

No. 331 of October 21

In continuation of my telegram of the 18th, No. 323.<sup>52b</sup>

Foreign Minister Hirota informed me that the invitation to the Nine Power Conference had arrived today. The Government was deliberating its reply, but would in all probability decline.

In discussing the German attitude toward the invitation, Hirota said that the Japanese Government would welcome it if the German Government likewise declined.

The Italian Government, as a signatory to the Nine Power Pact, would probably participate. He had arranged with the Italian Ambassador, who had asked him how Italy could be of use to Japan at the Conference, that Italy would represent and explain the Japanese standpoint. He had told the Italian Ambassador, however, that it would be even more agreeable to the Japanese Government if Italy declined the invitation.

<sup>52b</sup> Not printed.

The Foreign Minister added that Japan was opposed on principle to the idea of such comprehensive conferences, because they were detrimental to the settlement of the conflict. The Japanese were at all times prepared for direct negotiations with China, and would also welcome it if a power friendly to China, such as Germany or Italy, should persuade the Nanking Government to seek a settlement.

Same text to Nanking.

DIRKSEN

### No. 502

1927/432388-89

*The German Ambassador in the United States (Dieckhoff) to the German Foreign Ministry*

Telegram

URGENT

No. 279 of October 21

WASHINGTON, October 21, 1937—4:37 p.m.

Received October 22, 1937—1:45 a.m.

With reference to my telegram No. 270 and your telegram No. 180.<sup>53</sup>

Sumner Welles, upon whom I called today on another matter, spoke to me regarding the Nine Power Conference and asked whether the German Government had reached a decision with regard to participation. I said that, as far as I knew, the Reich Government had not yet received an invitation, and that I also did not know whether, if the occasion arose, it would accept an invitation, since, in spite of the interest that we took in a constructive development of Far Eastern affairs, there was much that militated against Germany's participation in the Conference which has been called for Brussels. Sumner Welles first explained that, in the opinion of the American Government, the Conference had nothing to do with the League of Nations and would have met even if Geneva had made no decision. He further undertook to explain that there had been no moral condemnation of one party, though he admitted that by its comments on Roosevelt's speech of October 5 and on the statement by the State Department of October 6 a large part of the American press had created the impression of a condemnation of Japan.<sup>54</sup> In reality, the President and the Government of the United States had only declared that the behavior of Japan conflicted with the Nine Power Agreement; such a statement was not a moral condemnation, but something of almost daily occurrence in

<sup>53</sup> Neither printed.

<sup>54</sup> For President Roosevelt's so-called "Quarantine Speech" of October 5, 1937, see *Foreign Relations, Japan, 1931-1941*, vol. I, pp. 379-383. For the statement by the Department of State of October 6, see *ibid.*, pp. 396-397. See also documents Nos. 412, 413, and 415, *ante*, pp. 633, 634, and 639.

the relations between nations. Finally Welles emphatically stressed the fact that at Brussels it was by no means important to arrive at a condemnation of Japan, but rather that the American Government desired that the Conference, in agreement with China and Japan, achieve constructive results for the future. Norman Davis had instructions to that effect. In conclusion, Welles stressed the fact that the American Government was very anxious for Germany to participate and earnestly hoped, in the interest of a joint practical settlement of the future of the Far East, that the invitation which would be sent to Germany in the next few days would be accepted.

To my question as to whether Japan had accepted the invitation to Brussels, he replied that no decision had as yet been reached in Tokyo.

DIECKHOFF

### No. 503

1726/401243-44

*The German Foreign Ministry to the German Embassy in China*

Cipher Telegram

No. 152

BERLIN, October 22, 1937.

(zu Pol. VIII 1548)

Drafting Officer: Counselor of Legation Count Strachwitz.

With reference to No. 264 of October 21.<sup>55</sup>

Japan's disinclination toward the Conference reported in telegram from Tokyo of October 21 will probably be strengthened by Eden's speech in Parliament, in which the League of Nations was expressly designated as the sponsor. We are expecting an invitation, but will probably decline. The Italians have accepted the invitation, but, as members of the League of Nations and signatories of the Nine Power Treaty, and with hardly any economic interest in China, they have a different viewpoint.

Please explain to the Government there that the reason for our probable refusal is not dislike for China or special sympathy for Japan, but the futility of a conference if it is not attended by Japan. We consider direct negotiations more promising for the present and would, if the occasion arose, be prepared to serve as a channel of communication.

I leave it to your discretion to make use of the contents of the concluding sentence of the telegram from Tokyo of the 21st.

Same text to Tokyo.

MACKENSEN

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<sup>55</sup> Not printed.

## No. 504

224/150510

*Memorandum*<sup>51</sup>

General Keitel asked me to see him today and requested that I communicate the following information to the State Secretary:

After his directive of October 18 to stop all war-material transactions with China, Colonel General Göring again called Colonel Thomas on October 20 and told him that after again getting in touch with Herr von Ribbentrop, he instructed him to continue business with China in its present form.

Field Marshal von Blomberg thereupon took the opportunity to set down the facts in a letter to General Göring and again explicitly to draw the conclusion that he, Blomberg, had given the order to the army offices concerned to continue doing business with China in the camouflaged form used up to the present.

General Keitel showed me the letter and observed that the 3-million-dollar credit would now be fully utilized. The merchandise was being delivered to a British firm in Singapore on Danish ships and the participants were enjoined to the strictest secrecy.

Respectfully submitted to the State Secretary.

HEYDEN-RYNSCH

BERLIN, October 22, 1937.

## No. 505

1928/432398

*Memorandum by the Foreign Minister*

RM 836

(Pol. VIII 1583)

In my report to the Führer today I broached, among other things, the subject of participation in the Brussels Conference. The Führer decided that, if an invitation comes, we should decline.

BARON VON NEURATH

BERLIN, October 27, 1937.

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<sup>51</sup> Notation in Mackensen's handwriting: "Gen. Göring today summoned Herr Kriebel in regard to this question."

## No. 506

1728/401245

*The German Ambassador in Japan (Dirksen) to the German Foreign Ministry*

Telegram

No. 336 of October 28

Tokyo, October 28, 1937—1:10 p.m.

Received October 28, 1937—9:30 a.m.

(Pol. VIII 1588)

The Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs today gave me a copy of the negative Japanese reply to the Brussels invitation even before it was handed to the Belgian Ambassador. The text will be published tomorrow. He requested prompt information regarding the definitive German attitude should Berlin be invited.

With reference to Japan's negative attitude toward joint mediation, the Vice Minister remarked that the Japanese Government would welcome it if Germany would . . . ("count" is what came over the wire) friendly influence on the Chinese Government with a view to the initiation of peace negotiations by China.

Same text to Nanking.

DIRKSEN

## No. 507

151/82425

*Memorandum*

BERLIN, October 29, 1937.

I received the Japanese Ambassador today at his request. He asked for information about our attitude toward the invitation to the Nine Power Conference, which must surely have been sent to us also. With a short explanation of our reasons, I informed him that we had just declined the invitation. I gave him a carbon copy of our *note verbale* addressed to the Belgian Legation.

The Ambassador was extraordinarily pleased at the decision to decline as well as at the reasons given for it.

MACKENSEN

## No. 503

151/82064-66

*The German Ambassador in China (Trautmann) to the German Foreign Ministry*

Telegram

URGENT

NANKING, October 30, 1937—1 a.m.

VERY SECRET!

Received October 29, 1937—9:45 p.m.

No. 268 of October 29

In reply to No. 152 of October 22.

For the State Secretary personally.

Today I gave Vice Minister Chen Chieh the communication as directed and at the same time I told him that the time had now come to seek a settlement with Japan. We would be prepared to serve as a channel of communication. He said that the Marshal would first like to know what the Japanese conditions were, whereupon I replied that I would speak to the Marshal within the next few days. But the first step would have to be taken now, for this was the psychological moment for peace. Nothing would come of the Brussels Conference. The Vice Minister was of the same opinion, but asked me how we could get things started. I recommended that he inform his Government of our willingness to serve as a channel of communication to Japan and that I be authorized to tell the Japanese Government, to begin with, merely that China was ready for a settlement. In answer to the Vice Minister's question regarding Italy's accession to the Anti-Comintern Pact and the Italian denial, I referred to my experience that the importance of denials was for the most part overrated; but at the same time I stressed the fact that this Pact had no practical importance in the present conflict. China had, however, made a serious mistake in concluding a treaty with Russia, because in this way she had rendered the conclusion of an agreement with Japan more difficult. It would be necessary to revise China's policy toward Russia. The Vice Minister said that a revision would be difficult if Russia could actually furnish assistance on a large scale. Thus far he did not, however, have that impression.

I am going to see the Marshal in a few days; it would be desirable if I could at least tell him something with respect to the general attitude of the Japanese as regards conditions for a settlement. The Japanese Ambassador was rather vague about this and referred me to the article which Prince Konoye had published before taking office and which was still valid. That is not enough.

The Vice Minister told me that the Shanghai question could not be taken up separately but would have to be taken into consideration from the beginning.

Same text to Tokyo.

TRAUTMANN

No. 509

160/131197-98

*The German Foreign Ministry to the German Embassy in Japan*  
Cipher Telegram

No. 268

BERLIN, October 30, 1937.  
(zu Pol. VIII 1588)

Drafting Officer: Counselor of Legation von Schmieden.

With reference to No. 336.<sup>58</sup>

Our negative reply to the invitation to Brussels was delivered to the Belgian Legation here yesterday. At the same time a copy was handed to the Japanese Ambassador. The latter appeared to be extraordinarily glad of the decision and the reasons that prompted it. *Re paragraph 2:* Please tell the Japanese that in our opinion we have done everything possible since the outbreak of the conflict to exert a friendly influence on China, and we consider a more far-reaching and pointed move premature.

I should like to know whether, in your opinion, the Japanese Government is actually ready for peace negotiations. The fact that today, according to Reuters, a spokesman for the Gaimusho<sup>59</sup> advised that Japan would not decline to enter into negotiations in case China submitted peace proposals directly may be construed as meaning that the Japanese are more concerned with creating propagandist effects than with actual peace negotiations. The initiative can now hardly be expected of China, while Japan, after the attainment of her military goal, could take the first step without loss of face.

MACKENSEN

<sup>58</sup> Document No. 506, p. 773.

<sup>59</sup> The Japanese Ministry for Foreign Affairs.

## No. 510

151/82063

*The German Foreign Ministry to the German Embassy in China*

Telegram

No. 160

BERLIN, October 30, 1937.

For the Ambassador personally.

Your telegram No. 268 of October 30 makes us fear that the Chinese may possibly interpret your previous approach taken in connection with our telegram No. 152 of October 22 more broadly than we intended. At the present time we wish only, in accordance with Japanese desires and in the sense of the closing paragraph of telegram No. 21 from Tokyo,<sup>60</sup> to urge the Nanking Government to seek a settlement. We do not wish, for the moment, at least, to go beyond the role of letter carrier.

We shall also instruct the Embassy in Tokyo, in reply to telegram No. 336 of October 28, which was also sent to you, to tell the Japanese that we have already done enough to influence China to seek a settlement, and that we consider any more forceful and far-reaching action now to be premature.

MACKENSEN

## No. 511

151/82423

*The German Ambassador in China (Trautmann) to the German Foreign Ministry*

Telegram

No. 271 of October 30

NANKING, October 30, 1937—5:05 p.m.

Received October 30, 1937—2:50 p.m.

In reply to telegram 156 of October 27.<sup>61</sup>

I should like to point out that it is of no advantage to us here to be lumped with Italian policy on Far Eastern questions. The Italians play a quite negative role in China and are regarded as allies of Japan. They can afford to carry on such a policy, whereas we have to protect our important economic interests in China, which are second only to those of the Anglo-Saxon powers and Japan.

Same text to Tokyo.

TRAUTMANN

<sup>60</sup> A reference appears to be intended to telegram No. 331 of October 21, 1937, document No. 501, p. 769.

<sup>61</sup> Not printed. This was an information telegram explaining that Ribbentrop and Mushakoji were in Rome to discuss the form of Italy's adherence to the Anti-Comintern Pact.

## No. 512

1928/432421

*The German Ambassador in China (Trautmann) to the German Foreign Ministry*

Telegram

URGENT!

NANKING, October 31, 1937—9:08 p.m.

VERY SECRET

Received October 31, 1937—6 p.m.

No. 272 of October 31

In reply to your telegram No. 160 of October 31 [30].

For the State Secretary personally.

I can change the nature of my *démarche* at any time and withdraw to the role of a letter carrier. My statement was based on the fact that I had obtained the main points of the Japanese General Staff's peace conditions from General Ott in Shanghai. Ott's idea was that they could be conveyed to the Marshal somehow, through me or Falkenhausen; after his return to Tokyo he was going to speak about it to Dirksen, who would then inform the Foreign Ministry. He had asked me not to take any steps in the matter, in order to leave the initiative with Dirksen. The conditions are, to be sure, somewhat obscure, but they do perhaps constitute a bridge for China. For the time being I shall do nothing further. I shall merely inform the Marshal of my conversations with the Japanese in Shanghai, which contained nothing very positive.

TRAUTMANN

## No. 513

2185/472173

*Memorandum*

BERLIN, November 3, 1937.

On the basis of his previous impressions, the Foreign Minister does not think that in the conversation scheduled for tomorrow with the Führer on the question of the withdrawal of the German military advisers in China, Field Marshal von Blomberg will confine himself solely to receiving instructions to this effect. Besides, he [the Foreign Minister] would point out to the Field Marshal the necessity for counterarguments. As an important argument I suggested asking whether the Führer preferred General von Falkenhausen or a Soviet general on the Chinese side.

MACKENSEN

## No. 514

1726/401253-54

*The German Ambassador in Japan (Dirksen) to the German Foreign Ministry*

Telegram

URGENT

No. 345 of November 3

Tokyo, November 3, 1937—5 a.m.

Received November 3, 1937—11:35 a.m.

(Pol. IV 1651)

With reference to telegram No. 268 of the 30th.<sup>63</sup>

1) In today's conversation with Foreign Minister Hirota, I explained, in accordance with instructions, our position with regard to German mediation. In the further course of the conversation Hirota explained in detail the Japanese basis for concluding peace. I. Inner Mongolia would establish an autonomous government corresponding to the status of Outer Mongolia under international law. In the light of this precedent, China could have no objections. II. In North China a demilitarized zone would be created along the Manchukuo border to a point south of the Peiping-Tientsin Line. Here a Chinese police force with Chinese officers would maintain order.

The whole administration of North China would be left to the Nanking Government if peace were to be concluded at once, on condition that a pro-Japanese top official were appointed. If no peace were concluded now, and the necessity therefore arose of creating a new administrative authority for North China, they would . . . (group missing) the administration to continue when peace was concluded later. Thus far the Japanese Government had abstained from the establishment of an autonomous government of any kind in North China.

On the economic side, the negotiations started before the outbreak of the conflict on the granting of concessions for mineral deposits would have to be concluded in a satisfactory way. III. Shanghai. Creation of a demilitarized zone which was to be larger than the present one. Control by an international police. No other changes. IV. Cessation of anti-Japanese policy means only fulfillment of the demands made on the occasion of the Nanking negotiations of 1935 (revision of schoolbooks, etc.). V. A common fight against Bolshevism. According to information received from the Chinese Ambassador here, this would be compatible with the Sino-Russian Nonaggression Pact, provided that there is no secret agreement. VI. Reduction of customs duties on Japanese goods. VII.

<sup>63</sup> Document No. 509, p. 775.

The rights of aliens shall be respected. Hirota expressly emphasized the fact that, in case Japan were forced to continue the conflict, he would carry the war to the point of the total defeat of China and then exact far more difficult terms.

2) From the conversation with the Foreign Minister, I gained the conviction, just as did the Military Attaché from his conversations with military leaders here and in Shanghai, that Japan seriously desires peace on the above-mentioned basis and that it is just as seriously determined on ruthless continuance of the war until the final overthrow of China in case the Nanking Government does not accept the conditions now. Since these, in my opinion, are very moderate, and acceptance is possible for Nanking without loss of face, it now seems advisable for us to exert pressure on Nanking to accept these conditions. Please consider whether the military advisers could not be employed to encourage peace negotiations by their appraisal of the war situation to Chiang Kai-shek.

Same text to Nanking.

DIRKSEN

### No. 515

1726/401255

*The German Foreign Ministry to the German Embassy in China*

Cipher Telegram

URGENT!

BERLIN, November 3, 1937.

No. 162

(zu Pol. VIII 1651)

Drafting Officer: Counselor of Legation v. Schmieden.

Please apprise Chiang Kai-shek of the Japanese peace terms contained in telegram No. 345 of the 3d from the Ambassador at Tokyo, which seem acceptable to us as the basis for the opening of negotiations, and report on how they are received.

NEURATH

## No. 516

1726/401262-64

*The German Ambassador in China (Trautmann) to the German Foreign Ministry*

Cipher Telegram

VERY SECRET

NANKING, November 5, 1937—7:25 p.m.

No. 290 of November 5

Received November 5, 1937—7 p.m.

(Pol. I 5850 g)

With reference to telegram No. 162 of the 3d. For the Foreign Minister.

Chiang Kai-shek, whom, in accordance with instructions, I informed today of the Japanese peace terms, in the presence only of Finance Minister Kung, asks that I convey to the German Government his sincere thanks for its efforts in this matter. He asked me first of all for my opinion. I said that I believed, as you do, that the terms could furnish a basis for discussions. We had seen from the World War that one must not wait until one was completely exhausted. I could not judge the military situation. He then said that he could not accept any Japanese demands so long as the Japanese were not prepared to restore the *status quo ante*. It was of course possible to discuss some of the terms and to seek a friendly understanding on them, but only after this had been done. Quite confidentially and only for the information of the German Government, he added that the Chinese Government would be swept out by the tide of public opinion if he agreed to these demands. There would be a revolution in China. The Japanese were pursuing the wrong policy. Instead of making a friendly gesture toward China now, thereby laying the basis for a later friendship, they were making demands. If they continued with the war, China would, of course, not have a chance in the long run to win a military victory, but neither would she lay down her arms. If the Government were to fall as a result of the Japanese course, the only result would be that the Reds would gain the upper hand in China. But this would mean that it would be impossible for Japan to make peace, for the Communists would never capitulate. I said that I had just reread the history of the Russian Revolution. If that were to happen in China, it would be a terrible prospect, indeed, for the country. Kung admitted that it would be terrible, but he saw no other way out in that case.

The Marshal added that it was also impossible for him to take official cognizance of the Japanese demands because China was now the concern of the powers at the Brussels Conference, and they had

the intention, for their part, to work for peace on the basis of the Washington Treaty. I told him that the step I was taking meant nothing more than that we were informing the Chinese Government in confidence of the Japanese views on peace, which had been expressed to our Ambassador. The Marshal asked me to keep strictly secret the step I had taken today, which I promised to do, with the request that he do the same. Kung asked me to leave with him a copy of the Japanese terms, which I could not very well refuse to do.<sup>64</sup>

I hear from another source that a large number of the leaders in Nanking, and, above all, in Shanghai also, are opposed to a compromise. Yu<sup>65</sup> told a member of the Embassy in confidence that the policy of the key men favored Anglo-American mediation, the first step in which would be the appeal to both parties to arrange an armistice.

The largest Chinese newspaper in Shansi lashed out at me because, according to a Japanese source, it was my intention to mediate. Secrecy as to today's step would therefore be desirable in Japan also.

Tokyo has not been informed.

TRAUTMANN

### No. 517

2128/463382

*The German Foreign Ministry to the German Embassy in Italy*

Cipher Telegram

STRICTLY SECRET

No. 352 of November 6

BERLIN, November 6, 1937—8:41 p.m.

Received in Rome, 8:45 p.m.

Received in Embassy, 11 p.m.

For the officer in charge or his deputy personally.

To be treated as confidential.

To be decoded by himself.

If you are asked about the rumors circulating, also in the press, regarding German mediation in the Far Eastern conflict, please stamp them as completely unfounded.

MACKENSEN

<sup>64</sup> A marginal notation, apparently in Mackensen's handwriting, reads as follows: "nor does it do any harm, either."

<sup>65</sup> Yu Yu-jen, member of the Standing Committee of the Central Executive Committee of the Kuomintang.

## No. 518

2128/463386

*The German Ambassador in Italy (Hassell) to the German Foreign Ministry*

Cipher Telegram

SECRET

ROME, November 7, 1937.

No. 310 of November 7

In reply to No. 352 of November 6.

For the State Secretary.

During a conversation yesterday with Mussolini the latter told me in regard to the Far Eastern conflict that it was desirable that it be settled between the two parties in dispute, on the basis of Japanese successes and with the mediation of Germany and Italy (cf. my telegram No. 304 of October 28<sup>66</sup>). Ciano today corroborated that the Japanese Vice Minister had expressed himself to the Italian Ambassador in a similar vein as to our Ambassador regarding mediation with China. The military, however, was obviously not in accord with Hirota. In any case, German-Italian mediation would not be possible until Japan had won an undisputable military victory; but even then any steps we might take would have to be taken very carefully and in complete secrecy.

HASSELL

## No. 519

153/82145

*Memorandum*

BERLIN, November 8, 1937.

Through Herr von Heyden-Rynsch, I had inquiry made of General Keitel the day before yesterday, Saturday, as to whether in the discussion between the Führer and the War Minister the question of the recall of the military advisers from Nanking had been cleared up. General Keitel sent me word in reply that this question had not been touched upon by either the Führer or the War Minister, but that the Führer had pointed out to Field Marshal von Blomberg that the War Ministry should undertake to rid itself of the reputation of having a pro-China attitude.

I advised the Foreign Minister accordingly.

MACKENSEN

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\* Not printed.

No. 520

1928/432446

*The German Ambassador in Japan (Dirksen) to the German  
Foreign Ministry*

Telegram

VERY SECRET

No. 356 of November 8

Tokyo, November 8, 1937—6 p.m.

Received November 8, 1937—1 p.m.

With reference to telegram No. 273 of the 3d<sup>67</sup> and in continuation of telegram No. 228 of August 23.

1) In agreement with the Military Attaché, I do not consider withdrawal of the military advisers expedient or necessary for the time being, since the pressure on the central authorities in Tokyo by the combat troops around Shanghai, who had grown more and more embittered of late, has subsided. Since the visit of the Military Attaché to Shanghai and since the military success there, the General Staff and the Foreign Ministry have not repeated their complaints here.

2) As long as there is a prospect of success for German mediation in favor of a speedy termination of hostilities and as long as we must therefore strive to retain the confidence of the Nanking Government in us, the withdrawal of advisers, which would doubtless have a bad effect on our relations with China, should be avoided if possible.

3) In the present situation, advisers can, moreover, become instruments of German influence on Chiang Kai-shek. I consider it imperative to employ them as soon as it seems advisable to prevail upon the Marshal to give thought to peace by seriously representing to him the consequences for China of prolonged war.

4) In case the present peace feeler fails, we may expect Japanese pressure against the advisers to be intensified. In reaching our decision, we will have to keep in mind above all our general attitude toward the continuation of the conflict and toward the two parties.

Same text to Nanking.

DIRKSEN

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<sup>67</sup> Not printed.

## No. 521

1928/432449

*The German Ambassador in China (Trautmann) to the German Foreign Ministry*

Telegram

No. 299 of November 9

NANKING, November 9, 1937—4:30 p.m.

Received November 9, 1937—3 p.m.

With reference to telegram from Tokyo No. 356, secret.<sup>68</sup>

At my request, Falkenhausen pointed out to Chiang Kai-shek, his wife, Finance Minister Kung, and General Pai Chung-shi the gravity of the military situation. He called Kung's attention to the fact that, in case of a long-drawn-out war and economic disorganization of China, Bolshevism would come to China. It was poor consolation that Japan might also look forward to all kinds of convulsions.

Same text to Tokyo.

TRAUTMANN

## No. 522

210/145987

*Memorandum*

BERLIN, November 10, 1937.

The British Ambassador, who called on me today in regard to another matter, asked me to what extent the reports concerning alleged German mediation in the Far Eastern conflict corresponded to the facts. I answered that these reports were pure fabrications.

MACKENSEN

## No. 523

210/145971-71/2

*Memorandum*

CONFIDENTIAL!

BERLIN, November 20, 1937.

(Pol. VIII 1824)

The Italian Ambassador came to see me today in some urgency on the following matter:

Both the Japanese Ambassador in Rome and Minister Hirota had during the last few days urgently requested that the Italian Government recognize Manchukuo on November 25, the anniversary of the German-Japanese Treaty. The Foreign Minister already knew, he

\* Document No. 520, *supra*.

continued, that such a request was being made. However, Tokyo had pushed its demand more urgently in Rome, as compensation for its recognition of the Italian Empire. Japan, in fact, held a blank check with regard to the recognition of Manchukuo. It was only a matter of inserting the date. The promise was given. Rome now had to honor the check.

The Ambassador's instructions were to obtain the German Government's simultaneous recognition of Manchukuo or its agreement to Italy's proceeding alone. As an additional reason for recognizing Manchukuo, Attolico advanced the argument that it was possible, even if not formally, then secretly and *de facto*, to acquire a preferential economic position in return for the recognition of Manchukuo, and at the same time proceed in a way which would not compromise the neutral position which qualified Germany and Italy to mediate in the Far Eastern conflict.

Since I received this disclosure of the Ambassador's in silence and somewhat skeptically because of the short notice, the Ambassador said he would inquire once more in Rome with regard to the date contemplated (November 25). He added confidentially, however, in support of his *démarche*, that Ambassador von Ribbentrop had already stated in Rome that the Führer agreed to the recognition of Manchukuo, and without any return favor.

I told the Ambassador I would transmit his communication to the competent office as quickly as possible.

WEIZSÄCKER

No. 524

1928/432486

*Memorandum by the Foreign Minister*

RM 899

Today the Italian Ambassador again took up the subject of the recognition of Manchukuo. He stated that he had instructions to inquire as to our attitude in the matter. Ciano was prepared, in principle, to grant recognition and was even obligated to do so insofar as Italy had incurred the obligation to recognize Manchukuo when Japan recognized the Roman Empire. To be sure, the date for recognition had been left open. If at all possible, Ciano would prefer to recognize Manchukuo jointly with us.

I replied to the Ambassador that I considered recognition inexpedient at the present moment, because we would thereby abandon the neutral position, which we had taken up to the present in the Far Eastern conflict, quite openly in favor of Japan. This would at least have the effect that we would not come into consideration as mediators in the settlement of the conflict, since the Chinese would

regard us as their foes. Besides, we were not prepared to make the Japanese a gift without something in return. The Führer, in speaking to me, in no way favored recognition on the occasion of the anniversary of the conclusion of the Anti-Comintern Pact, for which the Japanese are pressing here too.

BARON VON NEURATH

BERLIN, November 22, 1937.

No. 525

1728/401293

*Memorandum for Minister Aschmann of the German Foreign Ministry*

BERLIN, November 24, 1937.

In reply to inquiries as to alleged German mediation in the Far Eastern conflict, I usually express myself as follows:

German mediation in the Far East might seem quite natural, since Germany is on good terms with both parties. But mediation by Germany, or by any third power whatever, cannot be contemplated as long as the two parties to the conflict do not ask for it. I have so far had no knowledge of such a request. Nor will it presumably enter into consideration as long as the Brussels Conference remains a disturbing element between the parties. With regard to Japan, the Conference first tried friendly tactics, then threats, and thus antagonized Japan. On the other hand, the Conference had deluded the Chinese with false promises of help and thus paralyzed whatever intention the Chinese had of reaching an understanding.

WEIZSÄCKER

No. 526

1928/432490

*The German Foreign Ministry to the German Embassy in Italy*

Cipher Telegram

No. 375

BERLIN, November 27, 1937.

Drafting Officer: Counselor of Legation von Schmieden.

With reference to telegram No. 328.<sup>69</sup>

The Italian Ambassador asked the Führer on the evening of the 24th whether Germany was now ready to comply with the Japanese desire for recognition of Manchukuo.

<sup>69</sup> Not printed. In this telegram, dated November 24, 1937, Ambassador Hassell reported that Count Ciano was pressing for an answer to the Italian query on Germany's willingness to recognize Manchukuo.

The Führer has meanwhile directed the Foreign Minister to inform the Ambassador that, while we were prepared in principle to recognize Manchukuo, we had to refrain from setting a date. Also, we should have to require of the Japanese certain guarantees for our trade not only with Manchukuo but also in whatever other Chinese areas Japan might occupy. On the other hand, we would have no objection if Italy, on the basis of declarations exchanged with Japan on the occasion of the recognition of the Roman Empire, undertook independently to recognize Manchukuo.

Attolico was advised accordingly.

MACKENSEN

C. MEDIATION, DECEMBER 1937-JANUARY 1938

No. 527

1726/401300

*Memorandum by the Foreign Minister*

RM 926

(Pol. I 6402 g)

In the course of the conversation, the Chinese Ambassador, among other things, spoke of the situation in China. I told him that I would consider it more advisable in the interest of China not to refuse possible Japanese peace offers without consideration, but rather to conclude peace as soon as possible. The military successes of the Japanese could, as things were, no longer be reversed even by the greatest efforts on the part of China. It was therefore necessary, first of all, to become reconciled to this situation. The longer the Chinese Government postponed the conclusion of peace, the greater would become the danger of a disorganization of the Chinese Empire.

BARON VON NEURATH

BERLIN, December 1, 1937.

No. 528

1726/401327-29

*The German Ambassador in China (Trautmann) to the German Foreign Ministry*

Telegram

URGENT

NANKING, December 3, 1937—12:55 a.m.

VERY SECRET

Received December 3, 1937—1:50 a.m.

No. 2 of December 2

For the Foreign Minister.

Chiang Kai-shek first expressed his sincere gratitude for Germany's efforts to bring about peace. China was prepared to accept the

mediation of Germany because she considered us a friend of China. I recapitulated precisely the last declaration by the Japanese, whereupon Chiang Kai-shek asked whether Japan's . . . (group missing) remained the same. I replied that this was the case. The telegram mentioned only main points, but the terms included only main points. To this Chiang Kai-shek said that he could not accept the viewpoint that the Japanese had emerged from this fight as victors. I replied that the whole world had admired the feats of the Chinese Army. Thereupon Chiang Kai-shek . . . (group missing) that neither could he accept an ultimatum by the Japanese. I replied that this was not an ultimatum. Chiang Kai-shek then formulated the Chinese point of view as follows:

- 1) China accepts the terms as a basis for a discussion of peace.
- 2) The sovereignty and the integrity as well as the . . . (group garbled) independence of North China may not be violated.
- 3) Germany is to act as mediator in the peace negotiations from the beginning.
- 4) Agreements between China and third powers may not be touched upon in the peace negotiations.

In regard to point 1) I told him I considered it necessary that China declare herself prepared to discuss these terms in a conciliatory spirit and with the will to . . . (group missing). Chiang Kai-shek declared that he intended to do so but also expected the same from Japan.

In regard to point 2) I called Chiang Kai-shek's attention to the Japanese condition that the top official in North China should be friendly toward Japan. Chiang Kai-shek answered that naturally if a man were chosen for this post [it would be one] who was not anti-Japanese.

In regard to point 3) I stated to Chiang Kai-shek that Germany would not care to participate directly in the peace negotiations or conduct them. We would rather try to do what we could behind the scenes to help China. Chiang Kai-shek expressed the hope that we would be willing to use our good offices to the end.

In regard to point 4) I called Chiang Kai-shek's attention to the Japanese demand for a fight against Communism. I was of the opinion that this demand was not in conflict with the Sino-Russian Nonaggression Pact. Chiang Kai-shek did not contradict me.

In reference to cessation of hostilities I said to him that I imagined the procedure would be that after Chiang Kai-shek's statements had been handed to the Japanese and Japanese assent had been received, the Führer and Chancellor would appeal to both Governments to discontinue hostilities. Chiang Kai-shek agreed.

Finally Chiang Kai-shek urgently asked that the Japanese Government keep the preliminary negotiations and especially the terms secret. That would be one of the preliminary conditions for peace. I believe that we should support this request with all our power. Chiang Kai-shek's position will otherwise be so seriously shaken that he will have to go and the Government will fall into the hands of the pro-Russian group. Japan should do everything to facilitate Chiang Kai-shek's courageous stand for peace and make it possible for him to carry through the negotiations. Since Chiang Kai-shek had said during my previous interview that it was impossible for China to accept the demand regarding autonomy for Mongolia because it would mean the loss of two provinces, I asked him whether he wished to say something regarding this matter. He stated that the Mongolian question could be negotiated with Japan. During the whole conversation Chiang Kai-shek was extremely friendly, in good spirits, and showed no nervousness at all. He expressed himself optimistically in regard to the defense of the capital. I am going back to Hankow today, where I expect further instructions. Members of the Embassy and the Germans are all well.

Same text to Tokyo.

TRAUTMANN

### No. 529

1726/401302-03

#### *The German Ambassador in Japan (Dirksen) to the German Foreign Ministry*

Telegram

VERY SECRET

No. 385 of December 3

TOKYO, December 3, 1937—3 p.m.

Received December 3, 1937—2:25 p.m.

(Pol. I 6435 g)

Also for the War Ministry and the Air Ministry.

From the current conversation between the Military Attaché and the General Staff the situation at the beginning of December appears to be as follows: North China is conquered; the large-scale attack has been discontinued; Japanese troops have been reorganized for occupation purposes. Further fighting for the province of Shantung is not to be expected.

In the main theater of war around Shanghai a rapid advance is being made upon Nanking, the fall of which is expected before the end of December.

In the opinion of official Japanese circles, the Chinese situation is as follows: The power of resistance of the troops is seriously im-

paired; new troops, ready to face battle, will not be available before the summer of 1938; the supply of arms and munitions is becoming increasingly smaller, and Chinese reliance on a weakening of Japanese economic strength will prove to be a mistake.

Regarding Russian assistance in the form of arms, there is so far positive evidence of 30 airplanes, which number, it is said, is being increased to 200.

In Japanese General Staff circles consideration is again being given to speedy peace negotiations, which would be advantageous for China in view of her serious defeats and the disappointment over the failure of the Brussels Conference, and for Japan because of the constant expansion of the area of military operations and the constant increase in war expenditures.

According to confidential personal information, the General Staff is hesitant at present in regard to peace overtures by Japan, in view of the radical opposition and the striving on the part of some army groups to eliminate Chiang Kai-shek completely. In these circumstances influential persons on the General Staff are hoping that the initiative of the Führer and Chancellor will open the door for negotiations; they believe that if the Führer and Chancellor obtained Chiang Kai-shek's consent in principle to opening direct negotiations with Japan, the same inquiry in Japan would be received with approval.

The General Staff stresses the necessity in such a case of maintaining complete secrecy in order to avoid interference by England and America, which it rejects most strongly.

An official suggestion to this effect by the Japanese Government cannot be expected for the time being.

Continuation follows.

DIRKSEN

## No. 530

1928/432515-16

*The German Ambassador in Japan (Dirksen) to the German Foreign Ministry*

Telegram

URGENT

Tokyo, December 3, 1937—6:15 p.m.

VERY SECRET

Received December 3, 1937—3:35 p.m.

No. 386 of December 3

Secret! For the Foreign Minister personally.

Continuation of my telegram No. 385.<sup>70</sup>

1. If there is the intention on the part of a third power to facilitate, through mediation, the initiation of direct negotiations, or to assist in the negotiations themselves, this is the opportune moment, since Japan has achieved her military aims and would like to avoid another campaign, while China has not yet been forced to surrender. In the event of a continuation of hostilities, Japan would no longer be interested in an amicable settlement and China would be too badly split to be a party to any negotiations.

2. The only power that can be considered for the role of mediator is Germany, since the Western Powers and the United States of America have eliminated themselves through Geneva and Brussels, and Italy through her one-sided partisanship for Japan.

3. For well-known reasons Germany is interested in an early cessation of hostilities (friendly to both countries, has large economic interests in both, and [desires] no weakening or pinning-down of Japan in view of her mission against Russia).

4. Added to this is the circumstance that Russia's gradually growing assistance to China will soon confront us with the choice of withdrawing our hand from China or of bringing about an end of hostilities; the situation shaping up, in which German military advisers would employ the Russian military aviators in the service of the Chinese in operations against Japanese troops, would be intolerable.

5. Our mediation would at first have to be limited to bringing both parties to the conference table. This would be in accordance with Japanese aims and would impose no responsibility on us for the contents of any agreement.

6. Since Japan is ready for negotiations, our efforts would have to be concentrated on China.

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<sup>70</sup> Document No. 529, *supra*.

7. Such an act of mediation would have prospect of success or would be taken seriously by the Japanese only if Chiang Kai-shek were approached directly by the Führer and Chancellor.

8. As bases for peace negotiations military circles have in mind those mentioned in telegraphic report 345 of November 2 [3], with the reservations that Chiang Kai-shek must resign himself to a possible reconstruction of the State and that it has in the meantime become necessary to prolong the stay of the Japanese garrison.

9. If the Führer and Chancellor consents in principle to the step to be taken by him to initiate negotiations, the question arises whether an explicit and official Japanese request would still have to be obtained. In favor of this course is the fact that we should then be clearly entitled to act; against it, that the Chinese would regard us as Japan's attorney; it would also place upon us a responsibility for the action that we would not otherwise have.

10. In view of the situation in the theater of war, speed is necessary.

DIRKSEN

### No. 531

1928/432518

#### *Memorandum*

BERLIN, December 3, 1937.

In my conversation with General Keitel today he spoke to me, among other things, of how we in the Foreign Ministry judged the prospects of settling the Far Eastern conflict. He explained that it would be very interesting for the War Ministry to hear from General Falkenhausen how he rated the military prospects of the Chinese. He himself had deliberately broken off all direct contact with the military advisers and had no idea of reestablishing contact for this purpose. But perhaps it would be possible to induce the General to make a statement through Ambassador Trautmann and the Foreign Ministry. I told General Keitel how things had developed meanwhile and informed him in particular that we were awaiting eagerly a report from Ambassador Trautmann, who would have a significant conversation with Marshal Chiang Kai-shek within the next few days on the possibility of settling the conflict. Under these circumstances I considered it advisable to wait for the time being and not to request the desired report from Falkenhausen until we knew the outcome of the Trautmann-Chiang Kai-shek conversation and could then judge whether it was still necessary to question Falkenhausen. General Keitel agreed to this proposal.

Later I informed the General of Trautmann's telegraphic report, which he is going to examine in regard to the question he asked me.

MACKENSEN

No. 532

1726/401310-20

*The German Foreign Ministry to the German Embassy in Japan*

Cipher Telegram

IMMEDIATE

BERLIN, December 4, 1937.

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

(Pol. I 6483 g)

SECRET

No. 306 of December 4

For the Ambassador personally.

A. Your telegraphic reports Nos. 385<sup>71</sup> and 386<sup>72</sup> crossed Ambassador Trautmann's telegraphic report of December 2 from Nanking—which you have already received—regarding his detailed conversation with Chiang Kai-shek. Through the telegraphic report by Ambassador Trautmann the Japanese suggestions have already been satisfactorily met on almost all important points. I therefore think, just as you do, that the time has come to take steps, in fact immediately, with the Japanese Government, leading to the cessation of hostilities in the Far East and leading, in the further course of events, to direct negotiations between the parties regarding the conclusion of peace.

It will be necessary, in order to preclude all misunderstanding, to give the Japanese Government a written record of the German action so far. The action, as I should like to emphasize once more, constitutes no mediation, but only transmission as information of the views of the belligerent parties as brought to our notice. The text of your communication is to be worded as follows:

1) "On November 3 the Japanese Foreign Minister gave the German Ambassador in Tokyo the following statement of the Japanese view regarding the basis for a conclusion of peace:<sup>73</sup>

I. Inner Mongolia would establish an autonomous government corresponding to the status of Outer Mongolia under international law.

II. In North China a demilitarized zone would be created along the Manchukuo border to a point south of the Peiping-Tientsin Line, in which zone a Chinese police force with Chinese

<sup>71</sup> Document No. 529, p. 789.

<sup>72</sup> Document No. 530, p. 791.

<sup>73</sup> See telegram No. 345 of November 3, 1937, from the German Ambassador in Japan, document No. 514, p. 778.

officers would maintain order. The whole administration of North China would, in the event of an immediate conclusion of peace, be left to the Nanking Government on condition that a pro-Japanese top official were appointed. In case an immediate conclusion of peace should not come about, and the necessity therefore arose of creating a new administrative agency for North China, this new administrative agency would be retained when peace was concluded later. Thus far the Japanese Government has abstained from the establishment of an autonomous government of any kind in North China.

In the economic field, the negotiations begun before the conflict on the granting of concessions for mineral deposits would have to be concluded in a satisfactory way.

III. Shanghai. With the exception of the creation of a demilitarized zone, which would have to be larger than the present one and be controlled by international police, no further changes are contemplated.

IV. The discontinuation of anti-Japanese policies demanded by Japan merely means only fulfillment of the demands made on the occasion of the Nanking negotiations in 1935 (revision of schoolbooks, etc.).

V. A common fight against Bolshevism (it being understood that the Russian-Chinese Nonaggression Pact or other Chinese-Russian agreements do not conflict with this).

VI. Reduction of customs duties on Japanese goods.

VII. Respect for the rights of foreign citizens in China.

2) The German Ambassador at Nanking was instructed to inform Marshal Chiang Kai-shek of this Japanese view of the possible basis for a conclusion of peace between the two sides.

3) In the subsequent conversation with the German Ambassador, Marshal Chiang Kai-shek informed him as follows:<sup>74</sup>

The Chinese Government could not accept any Japanese demands so long as the Japanese were not prepared to restore the *status quo ante*. It was, of course, possible to discuss some of the terms and to seek a friendly understanding on them, but only after this had been done. The peace settlement had to lay the basis for future friendship between the two countries. On the Chinese side it was added that they could not at the present time take official cognizance of the Japanese communications for the additional reason that China was at present working with other powers at the Brussels Conference for the achievement of peace.

4) On November 8 the German Ambassador at Tokyo informed the Japanese Government of this Chinese viewpoint.

5) Approximately 2 weeks after this incident the Japanese Foreign Minister informed the German Ambassador that Japan expected the initiation of peace negotiations within a short time, with Germany participating. In spite of the recent military successes of the Japanese, the previously transmitted Japanese demands would not

<sup>74</sup> See telegram No. 290 of November 5, 1937, from the German Ambassador in China, document No. 516, p. 780.

be made more severe on the main points; in particular, autonomy in North China would still not be demanded.

6) The German Ambassador to China was then instructed to bring this new Japanese overture to the knowledge of the Chinese Government.

7) In the resulting conversation on December 2 between the German Ambassador and Marshal Chiang Kai-shek, the German Ambassador recapitulated the last Japanese statement, whereupon the Marshal asked whether Japan's demands remained the same.<sup>75</sup> The German Ambassador confirmed this, adding that the last Japanese overture, to be sure, mentioned only main points but that the demands transmitted had likewise included only main points.

Marshal Chiang Kai-shek then formulated the Chinese point of view as follows:

I. China accepts the Japanese demands as a basis for a discussion of peace.

II. The sovereignty and the integrity as well as the administrative independence of North China may not be violated.

III. Germany is to act as mediator in the peace negotiations from the beginning.

IV. Agreements between China and third powers may not be touched upon in the peace negotiations.

In conclusion the Marshal declared that China was prepared to discuss the Japanese demands in a conciliatory spirit and with the will to reach an understanding. But he expected the same from Japan.

During the conversation the question of a cessation of hostilities was also brought up. Marshal Chiang Kai-shek said he agreed that after his statements had been transmitted to the Japanese Government and the agreement of the Japanese had been obtained, a solemn German appeal for a cessation of hostilities should be addressed to the two Governments.

8) In regard to the above point III under No. 7, Ambassador Trautmann answered the Marshal that German mediation at the peace negotiations or participating in or conducting them would not be considered by the German Government. Marshal Chiang Kai-shek then limited his wish for German mediation to the request that the German Government at least use its good offices.

The aforementioned statement by the German Ambassador at Nanking corresponded not only to a previous statement by the German Ambassador at Tokyo, but was also consonant with the whole character of the German participation in the Japanese-Chinese exchange of view described above."

End of the written communication to be transmitted by you to the Japanese Government.

B. The necessity of communicating the above detailed historical statement to the Japanese Government in writing and soon also

<sup>75</sup> See telegram No. 2 of December 2, 1937, from the German Ambassador in China, document No. 528, p. 787.

to the Chinese Government arises from the high responsibility which the German Government is taking upon itself in its attempt to contribute to the cessation of hostilities and the restoration of peace, if only in the role of an intermediary. The responsibility will be increased still further if at a given moment the Führer and Chancellor should step into the picture.

When transmitting the above historical communication to the Japanese Government it will therefore be your task to make sure that the Japanese Government is prepared to open direct armistice negotiations on this basis, and, subsequently, peace negotiations between the military and later the political authorities of the Japanese and the Chinese. I call attention to the fact that only this communication should serve as the authoritative basis, so that later reference to previous objections or reservations of any other kind whatsoever (cf., for instance, No. 8 of your telegraphic report No. 386 of December 3) would not come into consideration. As soon as this promise has been given by Japan, Ambassador Trautmann would be instructed to obtain a similar promise from the Chinese Government, leaving with it the same document. On the basis of the agreement between the two sides then ascertained, the above-mentioned solemn German appeal for a cessation of hostilities for the purpose of restoring peaceful conditions could follow.

This appeal, which, if made, would come from the Führer himself, would refrain from taking any political stand. It would be based on the need for restoring peace in the Far East—strongly felt by the world in general and certainly also by the two peoples engaged in conflict. It would urge the two Governments concerned to get into direct contact with each other for the purpose of suspending hostilities, after which negotiations for the conclusion of peace might follow.

In your *démarche* you are requested to bring to the knowledge of the Japanese Government, in full accord with the wish expressed by it, too, the strong desire of the Chinese that absolute secrecy be observed regarding all the preliminary negotiations up to the appeal for peace to be made by Germany. This wish of the parties corresponds completely to that of the German Government. It may therefore be assumed that it will be respected by all.

NEURATH

## No. 533

224/150534-35

*The German Ambassador in China (Trautmann) to the German Foreign Ministry*

Telegram

URGENT

HANKOW, December 5, 1937—1:10 p.m.

VERY SECRET

Received December 6, 1937—1:55 a.m.

No. 336 of December 5

In continuation of my telegram 2 from Nanking:<sup>76</sup>

The Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs has summed up the Nanking conversations as follows:<sup>77</sup>

"Relying on the friendship of Germany and deeply appreciating her mediatory efforts the Chinese Government is prepared to take the points as presented by His Excellency the German Ambassador as the basis of discussion. There are, however, two conditions to which we attach greatest importance. In the first place it is China's profound hope that throughout the process of the restoration of peace Germany will render assistance by way of mediation. In the second place China's sovereignty and administrative power in North China must remain intact and their integrity must be maintained.

"Replying to the Ambassador's inquiry if China is willing to show her conciliatory attitude during her discussions with Japan, the Generalissimo said that such an attitude should be shown by both sides.

"With hostilities going on it is impossible to enter into discussions of any kind. Therefore if the Chancellor will propose to both China and Japan the cessation of hostilities as a preliminary step to the restoration of peace China is ready to accept such a proposal.

"Japanese Government must be strongly urged not to disclose any proposed terms to the public before discussions are completed. If Japan does so especially when assuming the role of the victor dictating terms of peace to the vanquished, then great harm will be done to the prospect of a real reconciliation between China and Japan. It is hoped that Germany will make this clearly known to Japan.

"While the points as presented by the Ambassador may serve as the basis of discussion, they should under no circumstances be considered as unalterable demands in the form of an ultimatum."

Same text to Tokyo.

TRAUTMANN

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<sup>76</sup> Document No. 528, p. 787.

<sup>77</sup> The quoted passage is in English in the original.

## No. 534

210/145923

*The German Representative at Hsinking (Knoll) to the German Foreign Ministry*

Telegram

VERY SECRET

HSINKING, December 6, 1937—3:28 p.m.

No. 39 of December 6

Received December 6, 1937—11:40 a.m.

I hear very confidentially that the attitude toward Germany among leading circles within the Kwantung Army and the Manchukuo Government has suddenly changed radically as a result of the nonrecognition of Manchukuo. A Japanese politician who has arrived here from Tokyo for confidential discussions reports the same from there. The attitude of distrust is strengthened by rumors regarding alleged efforts on the part of our Ambassador at Nanking to mediate with the Chinese Marshal. The public authorities here still retain their former attitude toward me, but obviously for personal reasons only.

I consider it my duty to report that we shall lose our economic, and perhaps political, position here in Japan if from other considerations we delay our recognition of Manchukuo . . . (group garbled).

KNOLL

## No. 535

1928/432519

*The German Foreign Ministry to the German Embassy in Japan*

Cipher Telegram

No. 309

BERLIN, December 6, 1937.

Drafting Officer: Counselor of Legation von Schmieden.

I. In substance, the synopsis of the Nanking conversations by the Chinese Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs, transmitted from Hankow, agrees with the note which was to be delivered in accordance with our instruction of the 4th. There might seem to be a divergence in the concluding passage, where the Chinese emphasize that the Japanese points communicated by us should not be considered as unalterable demands in the form of an ultimatum; however, this is also expressed in the text of section A 7), number I, of the communication.

Please make appropriate use of the Chinese synopsis vis-à-vis Hirota. Thus, by a repetition of the oral explanations ordered in part B, paragraph 2, of the instruction, the clarification that is

desirable according to the concluding sentence of the Chinese synopsis may result.

II. We have not told the Spanish [*sic*] Embassy here of the last Nanking conversation and the subsequent action on it.

NEURATH

No. 536

1726/401342

*The German Ambassador in Japan (Dirksen) to the German Foreign Ministry*

Telegram

URGENT

TOKYO, December 7, 1937—8:35 p.m.

VERY SECRET

Received December 7, 1937—4:55 p.m.

No. 391 of December 7

(Pol. I 6516 g)

With reference to No. 306 of the 5th [4th].

Secret! For the Foreign Minister personally.

Today I gave Foreign Minister Hirota the memorandum as ordered, translated into English, with oral explanation in accordance with instructions.

Hirota received the memorandum with thanks and the remark that he would now obtain the opinion of the Army and the Navy. Hirota doubted whether it would still be possible to negotiate on the basis drawn up a month ago, that is, before the great Japanese military successes. To my remark that as late as the middle of November, after the first successes, he had said to me that this basis remained unchanged, he replied that the last few weeks had brought about a different situation; the Field Army had become more exacting in its demands. Hirota inquired in detail as to my opinion of Chiang Kai-shek's position. I explained at length that a peace signed by Chiang Kai-shek would be the best solution for Japan and that his overthrow or his refusal to conclude peace would be far more disagreeable for Japan. In discussing with me the basis for peace, which he had communicated to me on November 2, Hirota maintained that it had dealt with main points which required further definition; thus, for instance, Japan naturally demanded other concessions in North China in addition to those for minerals.

In my opinion a certain broadening of the main points of the Japanese is unavoidable, considering the extraordinary military successes and the serious Chinese collapse of the last few days, as I stated in telegram No. 386 of December 3 under No. 8. Same text to Hankow.

DIRKSEN

## No. 537

1928/432535

*Memorandum*

BERLIN, December 8, 1937.

The Italian Ambassador called on me today and discussed, among other things, the Far Eastern conflict. He requested that we let the Italian Government know, either through him or Ambassador von Hassell, whenever we intended to take steps for the purpose of bringing about peace. Attolico said this not in an indiscreet manner, but nevertheless with an undertone of doubt as to whether his Government was kept completely informed by us.

To the wish expressed by Attolico I answered neither yes nor no. For the rest, I presented my personal opinion regarding the possibilities for peace in this way: Considering the status of military operations in the Chinese areas of interest to Japan, the prospect is rather for a kind of armed administration on the basis of local agreements than for a general Sino-Japanese peace.

WEIZSÄCKER

## No. 538

1726/401343-44

*The German Foreign Ministry to the German Embassy in Japan*

Cipher Telegram

No. 313

BERLIN, December 10, 1937.

(Pol. I 6516 g)

With reference to telegram 391.<sup>78</sup>

Strictly confidential. For the Ambassador.

We naturally realize that, along with the progress of the military operations, the war aims of the belligerents also change and that therefore the Japanese might now be more exacting in their demands. To be sure, we would not, simply because of this fact, waver in regard to our original willingness to contribute, as far as this is possible, by serving as a channel of communication in bringing the two sides together at the conference table. Of course, there is a limit even to our previous simple function as letter carrier—if humiliating, unacceptable demands should be made on China. Nor can we permit ourselves to be placed in a position of transmitting to China terms which Japan herself within a very short time might say needed broadening.

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<sup>78</sup> Document No. 536, p. 799.

In case Hirota should now hand you broader terms on a new basis to communicate to the Chinese, the aforementioned viewpoints will be useful to you when receiving these terms. But, on the other hand, it naturally cannot be our intention to exert any influence whatsoever on the contents or the wording of the Japanese terms. This might have to be stated in your conversation with Hirota.

NEURATH

### No. 539

1726/401367

*The German Ambassador in China (Trautmann) to the German Foreign Ministry*

Telegram

VERY SECRET

HANKOW, December 13, 1937—8:25 p.m.

No. 370 of December 13

Received December 14, 1937—1:50 a.m.

(Pol. I 680 [?] g)

In view of rumors circulating in the city to the effect that Sun Fo has concluded an alliance with the Russians, I asked General Chang Chun<sup>79</sup> about it today. He told me very confidentially that Sun Fo had intended to fly to Russia but had interrupted his journey because of my visit with Chiang Kai-shek and had returned here. Chang did not conceal from me that in ever wider circles, mainly among the younger generation, sentiment was inclining more and more toward Soviet Russia and that a growing pressure was exerted on the Government by influential circles to make it grasp at this last sheet anchor. I asked him about the Russian attitude. He expressed the opinion that war between Soviet Russia and Japan would undoubtedly come; the only question was when. The change of Ambassadors was symptomatic. Chang Chun had attached great hopes to my visit with Chiang Kai-shek; all these hopes had now vanished. If after the fall of Nanking the Japanese should offer the Chinese humiliating terms, no government could accept them or it would immediately be overthrown. Even now, after my conversation with Chiang Kai-shek the Government had been violently attacked. The problem of a Japanese-Chinese settlement was not military but political. Even if Japan subjugated all of China militarily, it would not achieve any solution of the Far Eastern question.

The General then asked me whether, in case of Russian intervention, Germany would enter the war on the side of Japan, to which I answered that we had no alliance with Japan but that it would create a very bad impression on German public opinion if China

<sup>79</sup> Vice President of the Legislative Yuan.

allied herself with Russia, for Communism would then come to China. The General replied that China was very grateful to Germany for everything she had done for China and hoped that she would always retain German friendship.

From the conversation I got the impression that the General himself is very pessimistic in regard to future developments and that if China is driven to despair through a Japanese policy of annihilation, she will slip into the hands of Russia.

Same text to Tokyo.

TRAUTMANN

No. 540

1726/401373-76

*The German Ambassador in Japan (Dirksen) to the German Foreign Ministry*

Telegram

URGENT

TOKYO, December 23, 1937—1:13 p.m.

VERY SECRET

Received December 23, 1937—10:35 a.m.

No. 410 of December 22

(Pol. I 6903 g)

Secret! For the Foreign Minister personally.

With reference to your telegram No. 306 of December 4.

I. Today the Foreign Minister informed me orally of the reply of the Japanese Government to our memorandum and afterwards gave me a copy of his statement. The text of the statement in translation from English reads: I should like to express my sincere appreciation of the friendly interest of the German Government and the good offices of the German Ambassador in China regarding direct negotiations between Japan and China for settling the present matter—of which you kindly informed me during our conversation of December 7 and in my [*sic*] memorandum of the same date.

In view of recent rapid developments in hostilities and the great change in the general situation, the following . . . (group missing) are contemplated by the Japanese Government as a basis for peace negotiations. Should China accept them in their entirety and indicate to Japan a desire to make peace, the Japanese Government would be prepared for direct negotiations between the two countries.

In this connection I should like to inform Your Excellency that if China should not be in a position to accept these terms, Japan—though reluctantly—would be forced to treat the present situation from an entirely different point of view from that maintained hitherto.

## II. Basic conditions:

1) China must abandon her pro-Communist as well as anti-Japanese and anti-Manchukuo policy and cooperate with Japan and Manchukuo in carrying out their anti-Communist policy.

2) Demilitarized zones and special regimes shall be established in areas where necessary.

3) Agreements for close economic cooperation shall be concluded between Japan, China, and Manchukuo.

4) China shall pay Japan the required indemnity.

III. The Foreign Minister also read me the following statements, which he let me write down without handing me the text:

1) If China accepts the basic conditions, she must prove her sincerity by deeds—by combating Communism. Chiang Kai-shek shall send delegates to the peace negotiations at a place to be determined by Japan within a specified period. Japan expects the reply by about the end of the current year.

2) When Chiang Kai-shek has declared his willingness to accept the basic conditions of which Your Excellency has just been confidentially informed, the Japanese Government would be pleased if the German Government did *not* recommend to Japan and China the extension<sup>80</sup> of hostilities, but rather the beginning of direct negotiations between them.

In this connection Hirota remarked that Japan would have to continue military operations during the peace negotiations; cessation of hostilities would not be possible until the conclusion of the treaty.

3) With reference to the peace terms the Foreign Minister, in reply to my detailed questions, then made the following additional statements, which he said were very secret and under no circumstances intended for the Chinese.

*Re condition I, 1.* This meant the recognition of Manchukuo. Termination of the Russo-Chinese Agreement or accession to the Anti-Comintern Pact was not required but was nevertheless very desirable.

*Re condition I, 2.* In addition to the demilitarized zones in the North, one is now apparently contemplated for the Yangtze Valley.

A "special regime" was contemplated only for Mongolia. The Government of North China must have extensive powers and not be dependent on the Central Government, but under Chinese sovereignty. The Foreign Minister could not be persuaded to make any exact statements.

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<sup>80</sup> The German text here is *Aufbau*, "extension," a mistake for *Abbau*, "cessation." When the telegram was repeated to the German Embassy in China, the text was corrected.

*Re condition I, 3.* This meant agreements on tariffs, general trade, etc.

IV. I told the Foreign Minister that these terms went far beyond those communicated to me on November 2, and that I also considered acceptance by the Chinese Government as extremely improbable. Hirota answered that the changed military situation and the pressure of public opinion had not allowed any other formulation.

V. The new terms are the compromise which has emerged from serious conflicts within the Government during recent weeks. Of late, the Army has wanted to impose on Chiang Kai-shek an acknowledgement of war guilt before he would be informed of the terms in detail, but did not succeed in doing so. In regard to the "basic terms," as well, there had at first been a fight for a more severe version. Their present form has been decided upon by the Cabinet and approved by the Emperor; they thus constitute a binding Japanese state document. As I hear confidentially, a considerable part of the Cabinet, under the pressure of the Field Army and industry, considers the terms too mild and hopes that they will be rejected by China in order to make it possible to carry through the war of annihilation against Chiang Kai-shek.

VI. I have refrained from direct transmission to Hankow.

DIRKSEN

### No. 541

224/150547

#### *The German Ambassador in Japan (Dirksen) to the German Foreign Ministry*

URGENT

VERY SECRET

No. 411 of December 23

TOKYO, December 23, 1937—4 p.m.

Received December 23, 1937—7 [?] p.m.

In continuation of telegram No. 410 of December 22.

For the Foreign Minister personally.

After having advised me of the Japanese conditions, the Foreign Minister read me a document stating that the Italian Ambassador here, after referring to published reports and other rumors, had asked to be informed about the German-Japanese conversations concerning a settlement of hostilities, so that Italy could join Germany in mediating the conflict. Hirota added that he had made no such promise, but that in view of the friendly relations existing with Italy he felt obliged to inform the Ambassador now.

I protested this intention of his, since the German Government had not informed Italy so far, and since the reaction of my Govern-

ment would at least have to be heard first. I said that I was surprised, too, by the Italian wish to participate in the conversations, since the Italian attitude toward China would condemn to failure any attempt at mediation in which Italy were to participate.

I then suggested that the Foreign Ministry be informed by telegram, so that in the event Italy were to be informed, it could be done simultaneously.

The Foreign Minister agreed to this. I request telegraphic instructions whether you agree to inform the Italians here and in Berlin or in Rome, or whether I am to attempt to have the information withheld. I rather doubt, however, (group missing) is still possible, since subsequent observations lead me to believe that some information has been given the Italian Ambassador after all.

DIRKSEN

No. 542

1726/401387-93

*The German Foreign Ministry to the German Embassy in China*

Cipher Telegram

URGENT

BERLIN, December 24, 1937.

No. 211

(zu Pol. I 6903 g)

A.

The Japanese Government has now delivered to Ambassador von Dirksen its answer to our memorandum. According to the Ambassador's report, the new terms represent a compromise which is the result of serious conflicts within the Japanese Government during the last few weeks. In their present form the conditions have been adopted by the Japanese Cabinet and approved by the Emperor. They therefore represent a binding Japanese state document. Although these conditions deviate considerably from those previously transmitted by us to the Chinese Government, we still consider it our duty to forward the Japanese answer in our role of letter carrier, which we accepted, and which precludes any expression of our own views regarding the terms.

You are requested, therefore, to deliver to the Chinese Government a memorandum reading as follows:

1) On December 7 the German Ambassador in Tokyo informed the Japanese Foreign Minister of the position which Marshal Chiang Kai-shek communicated to the German Ambassador in Nanking on December 2 concerning the basic Japanese peace terms transmitted to the Chinese Government at the beginning of November via the German Ambassadors. When he received the communication from

the German Ambassador the Japanese Foreign Minister stated that he would ascertain the position of the competent parties, adding that, in view of the change in the military situation which had occurred in the meantime, it seemed doubtful whether it would still be possible to negotiate on the basis established in November.

2) Marshal Chiang Kai-shek was meanwhile informed by the German Ambassador in China regarding this reception by the Japanese Foreign Minister of the communication from the German Ambassador.

3) On December 23 the Japanese Foreign Minister informed the German Ambassador in Tokyo orally of the Japanese Government's reply to the message given him on December 7 and left with the German Ambassador the written text of the reply, which reads as follows:

"In view of recent rapid developments in hostilities and the great change in the general situation, the following points are contemplated by the Japanese Government as a basis for peace negotiations. Should China accept them in their entirety and indicate to Japan a desire to make peace, the Japanese Government would be prepared for immediate negotiations between the two countries.

"In this connection I should like to inform Your Excellency that, if China should not be in a position to accept these terms, Japan—though reluctantly—would be forced to treat the present situation from an entirely different point of view from that maintained hitherto.

*"Basic conditions:*

"1) China must abandon her pro-Communist as well as anti-Japanese and anti-Manchukuo policy and cooperate with Japan and Manchukuo in carrying out their anti-Communist policy.

"2) Demilitarized zones and special regimes shall be established in areas where necessary.

"3) Agreements for close economic cooperation shall be concluded between Japan, China, and Manchukuo.

"4) China shall pay Japan the required indemnity."

(At this point—from "In view of" to "indemnity"—the original English text, which is being transmitted to you by wire from Tokyo, is to be inserted.)

In connection with the delivery of the written text of the answer, the Japanese Foreign Minister also read to the German Ambassador the following statements, which the German Ambassador jotted down:

"1. If China accepts the basic conditions, she must prove her sincerity by deeds—by combating Communism. Marshal Chiang Kai-shek shall send delegates to the peace negotiations at a place to be determined by Japan within a specified period. Japan expects the reply by about the end of the current year.

"2. When Marshal Chiang Kai-shek has declared his willingness to accept the basic conditions, the Japanese Government would be pleased if the German Government did *not* recommend to Japan and China the cessation of hostilities, but rather the beginning of direct negotiations between them."

The Japanese Foreign Minister added orally that Japan would have to continue military operations during the peace negotiations; cessation of hostilities would not be possible until the conclusion of the treaty.

End of the memorandum which you are requested to transmit to the Chinese Government.

B.

For your information only:

With regard to the individual peace terms, the Japanese Foreign Minister answered Ambassador von Dirksen's questions by the following additional statements, which he designated as very secret and under no circumstances intended for the Chinese Government.

*Re condition 1.* This meant the recognition of Manchukuo. Termination of the Russo-Chinese Treaty or accession to the Anti-Comintern Pact was not required but was nevertheless very desirable.

*Re condition 2.* In addition to the demilitarized zone in the North, one is now apparently contemplated for the Yangtze Valley. A "special regime" was contemplated only for Mongolia. The Government of North China must have extensive powers and not be dependent on the Central Government, but under Chinese sovereignty. The Japanese Foreign Minister could not be persuaded to make more concrete statements on this subject.

*Re condition 3.* This meant agreements on tariffs, general trade, etc.

C.

In view of the above information in B, you are requested, when you deliver the memorandum to Chiang Kai-shek, to add the following orally:

1) Continuing our previous role as letter carrier, we thought it our duty to transmit the Japanese answer, just as it was, to the Chinese Government. This statement, of course, by no means indicated a stand pro or contra.

2) We were prepared to continue in the role of letter carrier and placed ourselves at the disposal of the Chinese Government for any further communications to the Japanese, should the Chinese Government consider this advisable.

3) In view of the date mentioned—the end of the current year—the Ambassador in Tokyo has been instructed to call the attention of the Japanese Government to the fact that for technical reasons the intermediary activity took a certain amount of time.

D.

For your information I add that Herr von Dirksen learned from a confidential source that a substantial part of the Japanese Cabinet, under pressure of the Field Army and of industry, considered the conditions too mild and hoped for their rejection by China, in order to be able to carry on the battle of annihilation against Chiang Kai-shek.

NEURATH

No. 543

1726/401394-96

*The German Foreign Ministry to the German Embassy in Japan*

Cipher Telegram<sup>a</sup>

URGENT

BERLIN, December 24, 1937.

SECRET

(zu Pol. I, 6904 g, Ang. I.)

No. 329

With reference to telegrams 410 and 411.<sup>82</sup>

I.

The uncertainty arising from the Japanese terms and the explanatory statements not intended for transmittal, coupled with the demand—amounting to a quasi ultimatum—that Japan expected China's answer by the end of the year, and the fact that Japan wants to continue military operations during the peace negotiations, has caused us to have serious doubts as to whether we should transmit the Japanese terms. On the other hand, however, in the role of letter carrier, which we have accepted and which precludes any expression of our own views, we do not feel that we have the right not to transmit the terms. I therefore instructed Ambassador Trautmann to transmit to the Chinese Government a memorandum which is to contain Hirota's declaration, given to you in writing and intended for transmittal to the Chinese, as well as points 1 and 2 of number III of your telegram No. 410. To this end you are requested to wire the original English text to Hankow immediately in order that it may be inserted in the document to be transmitted.

You are requested, in view of the date mentioned—the end of the current year—to call the attention of the Japanese Government to

<sup>a</sup> A marginal notation reads: "The Foreign Minister approves. Please send."

<sup>82</sup> Document No. 540, p. 802, and document No. 541, p. 804.

the fact that an exchange of Japanese-Chinese communications, because they must go by way of Berlin, will always require several days, even if expedited as much as possible.

## II.

I agree with you that the participation of Italy cannot increase the success of the present operation but may well jeopardize it.

As far as informing the Italians is concerned, we cannot, of course, prevent the Japanese Government from keeping the Italian Government posted, if it sees fit to do so. However, in the next few days we shall inform the Italians in general terms here as well as through our Ambassador in Rome, following the general custom existing between us and Italy.

Since thus far it has only been a question of service as a letter carrier, and not mediation, German-Italian cooperation need therefore not be considered.

NEURATH

## No. 544

1726/401400

*The German Ambassador in China (Trautmann) to the German Foreign Ministry*

Telegram

URGENT

HANKOW, December 26, 1937—8:30 p.m.

No. 396 of December 26

Received December 26, 1937—11:15 p.m.

(Pol. I 6908 g)

With reference to telegram No. 211 of the 24th.

Since Chiang Kai-shek is ill, I delivered the memorandum to Dr. Kung . . . (group garbled) at 7 o'clock this evening and gave the oral explanations. Kung, as well as Madame Chiang Kai-shek, was filled with the deepest consternation when I read the text of the Japanese terms to them. Madame Chiang Kai-shek stated that it was no wonder the German Government did not want to take a stand with regard to such demands. Tomorrow I shall deliver a copy of the memorandum to the Foreign Minister.

Same text to Tokyo.

TRAUTMANN

## No. 545

1726/401404

*The German Ambassador in China (Trautmann) to the German Foreign Ministry*

Telegram

URGENT

HANKOW, December 27, 1937—11:15 p.m.  
 No. 398 of December 27 Received December 27, 1937—10:30 p.m.  
 (Pol. I 6940 g)

Since Chiang Kai-shek is still ill, I informed H. H. Kung of Hirota's statements, transmitted in telegram No. 212 of December 26.<sup>83</sup> Kung thanked me and asked what reaction the Japanese demands called forth in Germany. The Führer and Chancellor had told him that Germany wished to bring about a friendly solution of the conflict between Japan and China. Japan now stipulated terms which might mean anything. Japan might demand 10 special regimes and 10 demilitarized zones. Nobody could accept such terms. Japan should think of the future; she would bring about her own ruin. I did not reply to Kung's question, but informed him of what Dirksen had wired regarding the origin of the terms, and that they were criticized by extremists in Japan as being too mild.

The Minister for Railroads visited me and asked my advice as to whether China should accept the conditions. I replied that I could give no advice. He then asked whether it would not be possible with our help to obtain a cessation of hostilities after all. I informed him confidentially of telegram 212 and told him that there were two sides even to an armistice, as was shown by the armistice which we were forced to conclude in 1918.

Same text to Tokyo.

TRAUTMANN

## No. 546

1726/401405-06

*The German Foreign Ministry to the German Embassy in Japan*

Cipher Telegram

No. 335

BERLIN, December 29, 1937.  
 (e.o. Pol. I 6966 g)

Drafting officer: Counselor of Legation von Schmieden.

According to reports received here, there are increasing indications that the Chinese Government is seeking the support of the Soviet

<sup>83</sup> Not printed. This telegram stated that Foreign Minister Hirota had refused to consider an extension of the time period set for the acceptance of the Japanese terms, or to consider a cessation of hostilities while negotiations were in progress.

Union. Finance Minister Kung recently informed a German contact man\* that if the efforts to open peace negotiations were unsuccessful, China intended to continue resistance to the last, even at the risk of ruining the country economically and driving the Chinese people into the arms of Russia. Russia would then, without any doubt, be the victor in this war.

Of course, we instructed Ambassador Trautmann to warn the Chinese Government emphatically against any further *rapprochement* with Russia, pointing out that this would result in a re-examination of our relations with China. However, I request that, on a suitable occasion, you point out to the Japanese Government the risks to it which a possible bolshevization of China involves, and that you indicate that such a result would not be consistent with the Anti-Comintern Pact. The common interest of Germany and Japan directed against the Comintern requires that normal conditions in China be restored as soon as possible, even if this could be done only by peace terms which did not meet all the Japanese aspirations. The lessons derived from the history of the Treaty of Versailles should be pondered by Japan.

MACKENSEN

### No. 547

1726/401415-16

*The German Ambassador in Japan (Dirksen) to the German Foreign Ministry*

Telegram

URGENT

VERY SECRET

No. 427 of December 30

Tokyo, December 30, 1937—8 p.m.

Received December 30, 1937—4:05 p.m.

(Pol. I 7005 g)

Secret! For the Foreign Minister personally.

1) Current conversations of the Military Attaché with the General Staff and a conversation which the Naval Attaché had with influential Admiralty officers give the impression that the initiation of peace negotiations is of great importance to the central military authorities in Tokyo.

2) In order to induce the Foreign Minister to inform us of the details of the four Japanese peace terms, which Ambassador Trautmann considered desirable, I had a conversation with him today in which I informed him of the over-all impression gained from the reports of the Embassy at Hankow and stressed the necessity of additional details and of the partial cessation of hostilities [Ab-

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\* Klein. [Footnote in the original.]

*schwächung der Fortdauer der Feindseligkeiten*] after the beginning of negotiations.

3) Thereupon Hirota agreed that the statements made to me on December 22 and expressly designated as not intended for transmittal to the Chinese (cf. No. III of telegram 410 of December 22) can be passed on to Chiang Kai-shek—not as a statement by the Japanese Government, but as my impression gained from conversations with leading Japanese personalities.

4) The Foreign Minister supplemented and elaborated the statements as follows:

*Re condition 2:* Three demilitarized zones had been contemplated, namely, Inner Mongolia, North China, and a part of the occupied territory in the vicinity of Shanghai, perhaps as far as the coastal plain.

In regard to “special regimes” Hirota stated: autonomy for Inner Mongolia; a government with extensive powers for North China, but no autonomy, to be under Chinese sovereignty; moreover, a “special regime”—not to extend over a very large area—for Shanghai outside the International Settlement.

*Re condition 4:* Hirota gave the scope of the indemnity demanded from China as: partial reimbursement of the cost of the war, compensation for destroyed Japanese property, and payment of the occupation expenses.

5) The Military Attaché has heard that the General Staff is considering the establishment of a control commission to prevent Chinese rearmament, as a suitable guarantee in the sense of number 5 of telegram No. 420 of December 28;<sup>85</sup> thus the continuance of hostilities after the beginning of negotiations would become unnecessary.

Same text to Hankow.

DIRKSEN

## No. 548

1928/432610

*The German Ambassador in China (Trautmann) to the German Foreign Ministry*

Telegram

VERY SECRET

No. 407 of December 31

HANKOW, December 31, 1937—1:30 p.m.

Received December 31, 1937—2:45 p.m.

Secret. Falkenhausen told me yesterday that the Chinese can carry on the war for 6 months more if the right military measures

<sup>85</sup> Not printed. The telegram stated that the Japanese General Staff was willing to halt hostilities once negotiations were begun, and if the Chinese gave a guarantee to fulfill the peace terms.

are taken, domestic morale is restored, and sufficient ammunition is furnished. I myself am not so optimistic. In order to prevent the Chinese from perhaps being strengthened in the overestimation of their own prospects, I secretly informed Falkenhausen of the situation.

A conference of all the leading persons in China appears to be taking place here at present; Marshal Yen Hsi-shan arrives here today.

TRAUTMANN

No. 549

1929/432856-57

*Memorandum by the Foreign Minister*

RM 17

During his visit today the Japanese Ambassador touched upon Germany's "role as mediator" in the Japanese-Chinese conflict. By order of Minister Hirota he thanked us for our work. I availed myself of the opportunity to point out to Mr. Togo the dangers which a prolonged war involved for Japan also. Mr. Togo stated that Japan wanted to cooperate peacefully with China and desired, therefore, to terminate the hostilities as soon as possible. On the other hand, however, the Japanese Government was determined to continue the war to the bitter end and, naturally, the longer the war lasted the more severe the peace terms would be. The Japanese Government, moreover, no longer considered Chiang Kai-shek to be the representative of the Chinese Central Government. Although the Government was still prepared to negotiate with him, the Japanese would make peace with the individual provincial governors if he did not accept the Japanese terms. It would be fantastic to believe in the possibility of a military victory for China.

The Ambassador then emphasized that Japan was very much interested in cooperating with Germany in the economic development of China. The elimination of German trade in China, frequently feared by German businessmen, would not occur.

Then I discussed the recognition of Manchukuo and explained our views on this question to the Ambassador. I pointed out that, for example, our present activity as letter carrier between Japan and China would be absolutely impossible if we had recognized Manchukuo jointly with the Italians. It appeared that the Ambassador understood this; at any rate, he did not insist on German action in this regard.

BARON VON NEURATH

BERLIN, January 10, 1938.

## No. 550

1929/432674

*The German Ambassador in Japan (Dirksen) to the German Foreign Ministry*

Telegram

URGENT

Tokyo, January 12, 1938—10 p.m.

VERY SECRET

Received January 12, 1938—5:45 p.m.

No. 16 of January 12

Secret. For the Foreign Minister personally.

I wired Hankow under No. 13 of January 12[:]

["]With reference to telegram No. 14 of January 11.<sup>86</sup>

The Deputy Foreign Minister asked the Counselor of Embassy to see him this evening and expressed the desire that the Embassy in Hankow be requested by wire to do everything it could to obtain an immediate answer from the Chinese Government. If no answer was received by the 15th, the Japanese Government would have to reserve the right to freedom of action.

In reply to the question by the Counselor of Embassy, whether this now meant an ultimatum, the Deputy Foreign Minister stated that Japan could not be blamed if she desired an answer at long last. At first the end of December, then January 10 had been set as a fixed date, without the force of an ultimatum; it was now the 12th; they could not wait more than two or three days longer.

By 'answer' he meant a clear statement of position, or possibly also specific inquiries concerning individual points, if they showed China's basic desire for an understanding. A reply to the effect that they were still considering the matter would not suffice.

Same text to Berlin.["]

DIRKSEN

## No. 551

1929/432670

*The German Ambassador in China (Trautmann) to the German Foreign Ministry*

Telegram

URGENT

HANKOW, January 12, 1938—12:30 p.m.

VERY SECRET

Received January 12, 1938—8:35 a.m.

No. 18 of January 12

With reference to telegram No. 10 of the 11th.<sup>87</sup>

At 10:30 this morning I called on the Foreign Minister and explained to him the situation in Japan on the basis of telegrams

<sup>86</sup> Not printed. Ambassador Trautmann's telegram to Berlin stated that the Chinese were still studying the Japanese terms.

<sup>87</sup> Not printed. The telegram instructed Trautmann to convey the substance of Dirksen's telegrams Nos. 13 and 14 to the Chinese. See document No. 550 and footnote 89.

Nos. 13<sup>88</sup> and 14<sup>89</sup> from Tokyo. I told him that they had to act immediately if the Chinese Government still intended to send an answer. It was 5 minutes to 12, if it was not already too late. The Foreign Minister, who thus far has been irresolute, intends to call a Cabinet meeting immediately and to inform me of the result.

Same text to Tokyo.

TRAUTMANN

No. 552

1929/432680-81

*The German Ambassador in China (Trautmann) to the German Foreign Ministry*

Telegram

URGENT

HANKOW, January 13, 1938—7:40 p.m.

VERY SECRET

Received January 13, 1938—11:50 p.m.

No. 22 of January 13

The Chinese Foreign Minister today read me the following text of an oral statement which he requested us to transmit to the Japanese Government:

"On November 5th 1937 certain peace terms proposed by Japan were made to us at Nanking through the kindness of Your Excellency. Subsequently on November 28th and November 29th and also December 2nd Your Excellency again communicated to Chinese authorities at Hankow and Nanking the intentions of the Japanese Government and informed us that Japanese authorities had stated in spite of the best military success gained by Japan the terms proposed by the Japanese Government early in November were still to stand. In view of the good offices performed by Germany and the desire for the restoration of peace on the part of Japan we requested Your Excellency to inform Japanese Government that China was prepared to take the points proposed by Japan as the basis of discussion.

"On December 26th and December 27th Your Excellency communicated to us certain 'basic conditions' from Japan saying that the German Ambassador at Tokio had been informed by the Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs that those new conditions were proposed by Japan because of the changing of circumstances. After due consideration we have found that the altered terms are rather too broad in scope. The Chinese Government desires therefore to be apprized of the nature and content of the newly submitted conditions in order to make a careful examination and reach a definite decision."<sup>90</sup>

<sup>88</sup> See document No. 550, *supra*.

<sup>89</sup> Not printed. In this telegram Dirksen stated that radical Japanese military groups favored ending negotiations and continuing the war.

<sup>90</sup> The quoted passage is in English in the original.

The Minister told me that the text had been ready since yesterday evening, but that he had had to have a colleague's agreement to it. I asked him whether he did not fear that the Japanese would consider this communication evasive. Besides, it appeared to me that the communication revealed no desire for an understanding. The Minister replied that the Government could make no decision and express no opinion, unless it knew the details of the Japanese demands.

Same text to Tokyo.

[Original not signed]

### No. 553

1929/432687

#### *The German Ambassador in Japan (Dirksen) to the German Foreign Ministry*

Telegram

URGENT

VERY SECRET

No. 22 of January 14

TOKYO, January 14, 1938—7:40 p.m.

Received January 14, 1938—4:20 p.m.

Secret! For the Foreign Minister personally.

1) Today I handed the Foreign Minister the text of the statement (Hankow telegram No. 22 of the 13th) transmitted by the Chinese Foreign Minister to Ambassador Trautmann.

Hirota was very annoyed about the noncommittal Chinese statement, considered it plain subterfuge, and stated that the Chinese had all the particulars necessary for a reply in the affirmative or the negative. After all, it was China which had been beaten and had to sue for peace and not Japan, which was continually being called on to give information.

I pointed out to the Foreign Minister that thus far the Chinese Government *officially* knew of only four basic conditions. All further communications from him to me had, upon his request, been transmitted to the Chinese Government only in a very vague form. I suggested that he either make those statements specific, or agree that they now be transmitted to the Chinese as the official statements of the Japanese Government.

Hirota replied that he had to consult the Cabinet and promised an early answer.

2) At a question from me, Hirota replied confidentially that the Chinese attempt to win American support for the peace negotiations had failed. Roosevelt had declined to intervene in any way.

3) The United States had denied the report that American banks had extended a 150-million-dollar credit to China.

4) The Italian Ambassador is being informed by the Foreign Minister.

Same text to Hankow.

DIRKSEN

No. 554

1929/432692

*The German Ambassador in China (Trautmann) to the German Foreign Ministry*

Telegram

URGENT

HANKOW, January 15, 1938—3:50 p.m.

VERY SECRET

Received January 16, 1938—12:20 a.m.

No. 24 of January 15

Prime Minister Kung today expressed to me his gratitude for all that the German Government and I myself had done to bring about peace, as well as for the words of the Führer and Chancellor to the Chinese Ambassador at the New Year's reception.

Referring to the Chinese answer, Kung told me that the Chinese Government had by no means intended to assume an evasive attitude; there had been many discussions in Government circles, because the decision had such grave national and international implications. China had suffered so much that she would like to arrive at a genuine understanding with Japan, which would guarantee a durable peace; therefore she earnestly desired "to seek every possibility of peace."<sup>92</sup> For this reason she had also requested more sovereignty.

Kung requested that the following oral statements, which he had formulated beforehand, be transmitted to the Japanese Foreign Minister: "It is most unfortunate that China and Japan should be engaged in the present armed conflict with all its disastrous consequences to both countries. China still entertains the desire to reach a real understanding with Japan so that durable peace may be maintained in East Asia.

"We have expressed the earnest wish to be informed of the nature and content of the 'basic conditions' proposed by Japan because we want to use every sincere effort to seek the sign of restoring peace between the two countries. With this additional information initiative believe we shall be in a better position to express our views concerning the terms offered by Japan."<sup>92</sup>

<sup>92</sup> The quoted passage is in English in the original.

I have the impression that the Chinese Government, by this statement, would like to minimize the inadequacy of its reply.

Same text to Tokyo.

TRAUTMANN

No. 555

375/208808-09

*The German Ambassador in Japan (Dirksen) to the German Foreign Ministry*

Telegram

URGENT

TOKYO, January 15, 1938—5:45 p.m.

VERY SECRET

Received January 15, 1938—1:10 p.m.

No. 25 of January 15

In continuation of my report 2362/1937 of December 20.<sup>93</sup>

Secret. For the Foreign Minister personally.

1. Japanese Commander Maeda, now chief aide to the Commander in Chief of the Combined Fleets, and until recently specialist on Germany in the Ministry of the Navy, who was present on the voyage of the cruiser *Ashigara* to Kiel, expressed himself to the Naval Attaché as follows:

The year 1938 would perhaps be decisive for Germany as regards German colonial questions. Because of her South Sea mandate Japan had an interest in this; Japan, or at least the Japanese Navy, was prepared in this connection to contribute to a mutually satisfactory solution, if Germany would speak freely and frankly with Japan. The Japanese Navy would, if necessary, even take the initiative in arranging for the necessary conversations. It seemed a conceivable solution that, without regard to the Peace Treaty of Versailles and the League of Nations, Japan should simply return the South Sea mandate to Germany and then buy it back from Germany. So much for the statements of Maeda, who must be considered the spokesman of the top Navy authorities.

2. Since the idea of the return of the mandate and its subsequent repurchase by Japan is now presented to us for the second time, and this time in the form of a suggestion from a source which can be taken very seriously, I should like to recommend an early examination of this possibility.

3. The position of Japanese policy with respect to the South Sea mandate is perfectly clear. Japan will under no circumstances, even at the risk of losing Germany's friendship, relinquish the South

<sup>93</sup> Not printed.

Sea Islands. The mandate question is an extremely sensitive point in Japanese policy.

4. Since the imminent negotiations on colonies by the Western Powers will bring up for discussion the German colonial question as a whole, it may be assumed with absolute certainty that the question of the South Sea mandate, at least on grounds of tactical considerations on the part of the British, will become a subject of discussion in the world press. For the sake of maintaining the line of the Anti-Comintern Pact, an early clarification by direct German-Japanese discussions would be most desirable.

Request telegraphic instructions.

DIRKSEN

### No. 556

210/145780-81

*The German Ambassador in Japan (Dirksen) to the German Foreign Ministry*

Telegram

URGENT

TOKYO, January 16, 1938—2:53 p.m.

VERY SECRET

Received January 16, 1938—12:30 p.m.

No. 27 of January 16

Secret! For the Foreign Minister personally.

1. At 10:30 this morning the Foreign Minister handed me the following text of the Japanese Government's reply to the Chinese Government's statement of January 13, and requested that it be transmitted to Hankow as soon as possible. Hirota repeatedly and emphatically expressed the Japanese Government's appreciation of the efforts of the German Government to arrange peace negotiations. He then handed me the declaration which is to be announced this afternoon by the Government to the Japanese people and which D.N.B. will transmit.

2. Text of the note of reply:

*"Strictly confidential."*

"I desire to express my sincerest appreciation of the good offices of Your Excellency's Government and the earnest efforts of Your Excellency regarding the question of opening direct negotiations for a peaceful settlement of the Sino-Japanese affair. However, the Chinese reply concerning the said negotiation, having been postponed several times, failed to reach us even on the 10th January, so that we had to wait a few more days for its arrival. When received at last, yesterday, the Chinese reply was found to be merely a perfunctory one, asking for details of our terms. We cannot but conclude that the attitude of procrastination on the part of the Chinese Government reveals no intention to sue for peace

by accepting in their entirety the basic conditions for peace negotiations, which I had previously made known. Therefore the Imperial Government have now decided to abandon, much to their regret, the present negotiations for peace between Japan and China undertaken through the kind endeavors of Your Excellency's Government, and to deal with the present affair from an entirely new standpoint.

"Let me tender again to Your Excellency an expression of my heartfelt gratitude for the friendly solicitude and efforts of the German Government in connection with the question."<sup>94</sup>

3. Finally, the Foreign Minister requested our consent to publish the fact of our cooperation in arranging the negotiations. I replied that I would request instructions from the German Government. Hirota requested an answer as soon as possible. Early telegraphic instructions are requested.<sup>95</sup>

4. The Foreign Minister is informing the Italian Ambassador. Same text to Hankow.

DIRKSEN

### No. 557

1929/432695

*The German Foreign Ministry to the German Embassy in China*

Cipher Telegram

URGENT

BERLIN, January 17, 1938.

No. 15

(zu Pol. I 133 g (VIII) 137 g (VIII) Ang. 1)

Drafting officer: Counselor of Legation von Schmieden.

With reference to telegram 24.<sup>96</sup>

1) Evidently Kung's communication transmitted by your telegram No. 24 of the 15th did not arrive in Tokyo until after the Japanese reply had been handed to our Ambassador on the 16th.

2) Please inform the Chinese Government of the Japanese reply (text of telegram No. 27 of the 16th from Tokyo) and at the same time indicate that in view of the Japanese statement we consider our role of letter carrier ended for the time being.

3) As for the fact of our cooperation in arranging the negotiations, we shall issue a communiqué ourselves, the text of which will be sent to both the Chinese and the Japanese Governments before it is released to the press.

MACKENSEN

<sup>94</sup> The quoted passage is in English in the original.

<sup>95</sup> A marginal notation, apparently in Weizsäcker's handwriting, reads as follows: "Yes, but ask the Chinese."

<sup>96</sup> Document No. 554, p. 817.

No. 558

1929/432701-02

*The German Ambassador in Japan (Dirksen) to the German  
Foreign Ministry*

Telegram

URGENT

Tokyo, January 17, 1938—4:13 p.m.

VERY SECRET

Received January 17, 1938—12:15 p.m.

No. 28 of January 17

In continuation of my telegram No. 27 of the 16th.

Secret. For the Foreign Minister personally.

1) In the course of the conversation that took place after the Japanese reply was delivered, I expressed to the Foreign Minister my regret that a decisive Government declaration was published so quickly after the reply was delivered, and that the Japanese reply cut off all further discussion. Comprehensible as was Japanese impatience over the dilatory and unsatisfactory Chinese attitude, Japan, in the eyes of the world, incurred the onus of breaking off discussions.

2) I then inquired of Hirota regarding Japan's further intentions. Was a declaration of war intended, or a movement on Canton and the island of Hainan? Hirota declared that neither was contemplated for the time being.

3) Then I expressed my concern over the threefold unfavorable effect which the continuation of the war would have on German-Japanese relations.

a) The danger of further worsening of Anglo-Japanese relations, which we considered undesirable.

b) The bolshevization of China.

c) The weakening of Japan vis-à-vis Russia by tying down of Japan's whole strength against China.

To this the Foreign Minister replied:

Re a) Any further deterioration of relations with England was to be avoided. Strict instructions to this effect had been issued to the armed forces for the purpose of avoiding incidents.

Re b) Chiang Kai-shek was coming more and more under Communist influence anyway. Continuance of operations, therefore, did not imply any change for the worse.

Re c) In case of a protracted war, my concern was justified. But this was definitely not to be expected.

4) The breaking off of contact with the Chinese Government and the abrupt statement were decided on only after many hours of bitter debate, in which some of the military authorities undoubtedly favored a continuance of the negotiations.

DIRKSEN

## No. 559

1929/432704

*The German Ambassador in China (Trautmann) to the German Foreign Ministry*

Telegram

URGENT

HANKOW, January 17, 1938—9:50 p.m.

VERY SECRET

Received January 17, 1938—8:50 p.m.

No. 32 of January 17

With reference to telegraphic report No. 27 from Tokyo.<sup>97</sup>

In order to give the Chinese one more chance to reconsider Kung's statement, I have not yet informed them of the Japanese note. Same text to Tokyo.

TRAUTMANN

## No. 560

375/208810-11

*The German Foreign Ministry to the German Embassy in Japan*

Cipher Telegram

No. 22

BERLIN, January 18, 1938.  
(Pol. X)

With reference to telegram No. 25 of January 15.

The contents of the above telegram have aroused keen interest here. However, I consider it necessary to direct the matter into an official channel, and I therefore request you to inform the Foreign Minister of the substance of Commander Maeda's conversation with the Naval Attaché and to ascertain whether Maeda's ideas are shared by the Foreign Minister or the Cabinet.

I may tell you for your *own* information that, on the basis of a preliminary examination, we have formed the following opinion of Maeda's proposal. If Maeda's idea is adopted officially by the Japanese Government it will have something of a precedent-setting nature for us, both in a favorable and in an unfavorable sense. The favorable effect would lie in the recognition by one of the principal Allied Powers of the obligation to return former German colonies. This undeniable advantage, however, is offset by the unfavorable aspect of the proposed repurchase by Japan, since, in the present early stage of the colonial debate, German consent to such repurchase would detract from our colonial demands politically and morally, and would also indicate to other powers that it was possible to reach a money settlement with us. The latter possibility, however, is so

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<sup>97</sup> Document No. 556, p. 819.

damaging to us that our agreement with Japan regarding it must under no circumstances become known to the other powers at the present time. As a way out a *pactum de contrahendo* would appear conceivable, possibly stating the minimum repurchase price and reserving to us the right to designate the date of publication or coming into effect of the said *pactum de contrahendo*. It would be most advantageous from our point of view if the Japanese Government, in addition to such a *pactum de contrahendo*, which would have to be kept secret until further notice, immediately announced publicly that it was prepared to discuss the colonial question with Germany.

NEURATH

No. 561

875/208812-13

*The German Ambassador in Japan (Dirksen) to the German Foreign Ministry*

Telegram

URGENT

TOKYO, January 24, 1938—6:50 p.m.

VERY SECRET

Received January 24, 1938—3:50 p.m.

No. 40 of January 24

Secret. For the Foreign Minister personally.

Urgent. With reference to telegram No. 22 of the 18th.

1. Before arranging a conversation with the Foreign Minister I considered it necessary, with the Naval Attaché's concurrence, to inform Commander Maeda. Since the latter had meanwhile gone for several months of maneuvers with the fleet and was therefore not available for a discussion of this question, the Naval Attaché had a confidential conversation with Admiral Nomura, Chief of the Information Division of the Admiralty.

Nomura confirmed Maeda's statements and added that the Navy had settled the question of the South Sea mandate with the Army and the Foreign Ministry recently, and had discussed it along the lines of the ideas reported in telegram 25 of the 15th, No. 1. The Cabinet would soon decide on the matter, and the Foreign Minister would probably then make a friendly proposal for a definitive settlement of the question of the South Sea mandate that would be satisfactory to both parties.

2. On the basis of this information, I shall now wait for the Foreign Minister to make the first move.

3. The legal arguments communicated in telegraphic instruction No. 22 of the 18th regarding the favorable and unfavorable precedent-setting nature of a mandate agreement with Japan are undoubtedly

weighty. But any objections raised by the other side in this matter could, in my opinion, be rendered ineffective if in our retrocession claim we met them by a realistic differentiation, among our former colonies, between those now useful to us economically and otherwise, the return of which we therefore demanded, and those that, because of lesser economic importance, great distance, etc., would not be of any great value to us. In the case of the latter we attached no importance to their return and would agree to monetary compensation for our rights. The present Japanese South Sea mandate belonged in the latter category; hence the deal with Japan.

By presenting our argument in that manner, prompt settlement of the mandate question with Japan on a plurilateral and friendly basis would be possible without giving the mandates over our valuable colonies any ground for legal objections.

I am afraid that the complex construction involved in a *pactum de contrahendo* is completely foreign to the Japanese mentality and would be at variance with the motivation of the Japanese proposal, which was apparently designed for an immediate political effect. Likewise, if we raised objections, the Japanese would doubtless interpret this as the rejection of an offer intended to be friendly. Even if, therefore, a political effect could be achieved partially by the public announcement contemplated in the last paragraph of your telegraphic instruction, I should appreciate your concurrence in my foregoing line of reasoning.

DIRKSEN

No. 562

1929/432724-25

*Memorandum by the Foreign Minister*

RM 57

The Japanese Ambassador called on me on the 21st. The occasion was to return my official call on him. The Ambassador used the opportunity to convey the gratitude of the Japanese Government for Germany's efforts to restore peace in the Far East. In reply to my query concerning Japan's conception of the further course of developments in China, the Ambassador declared that the Japanese Government, after the military defeat of Chiang Kai-shek, could no longer recognize him as the representative of the Chinese people; the Chinese Central Government no longer existed. Japan would now try to negotiate, with a view to ending the war, with a new Chinese government which would presumably be formed from the governments already existing in Peking and Shanghai. To my

objection that it was likely that a large Chinese area would still remain unpacified, the Ambassador replied that Japan was prepared for all eventualities and would know how to bear the burdens of a war of some duration.

The Ambassador then mentioned the fact that his Government had the desire further to expand trade with Germany. To be sure, it had to attach great importance to obtaining long-term credits for the purchase of German goods in excess of the present volume. I told the Ambassador that he was acquainted with our situation and I could tell him right now that even with the best intentions we were not in a position to grant large, long-term credits. The Ambassador thereupon stated that Japan did not wish to make any change in the present structure of our trade relations and was prepared to use foreign exchange for the payments provided for in our agreements. But anything exported to Japan from Germany in excess of the present volume would have to be paid for by exchange for Japanese goods. He—the Ambassador—would shortly get in touch with the economic authorities in Germany regarding the details.

BARON V. NEURATH

BERLIN, January 25, 1938.

No. 563

375/208814

*The German Foreign Ministry to the German Embassy in Japan*  
Cipher Telegram

SECRET

No. 31

BERLIN, January 25, 1938.

(Cf. Pol. I 220 g)

For the Ambassador personally.

With reference to telegram No. 40 of the 24th.

I request that, as you proposed, you first wait for the Foreign Minister's communication and, upon receiving this communication, maintain a noncommittal attitude.

NEURATH

## D. CONCESSIONS TO JAPAN, JANUARY-MAY 1938

No. 564

155/130870-80

*The German Ambassador in Japan (Dirksen) to the German  
Foreign Ministry*

SECRET

J. Nr. 314/38

Tokyo, January 26, 1938.

Received February 17, 1938.

(Pol. VIII 336)

## POLITICAL REPORT

Subject: Adjustment of German-Japanese relations to the present status of the Japanese-Chinese conflict.

1. The conclusion of our mediation activities
2. The China conflict and German-Japanese relations
3. Military advisers
4. Deliveries of war material
5. Recognition of Manchukuo
6. Reorientation based on North China

## 1. CONCLUSION OF OUR MEDIATION ACTIVITIES

The unsuccessful conclusion of the German efforts to bring both parties to the Sino-Japanese conflict to the conference table marked the beginning of a new chapter in the war, with all its attendant repercussions in the field of foreign policy, especially as far as relations with Germany are concerned. It is therefore of little avail to analyze in detail these negotiations which have now been concluded; it suffices rather to say that China did not seize the second opportunity offered it by Japan to start peace negotiations either; for it was evident, from the fact that Marshal Chiang Kai-shek had avoided a final discussion of the Japanese terms with Herr Trautmann, and the fact that the Chinese Council of Ministers up to the last few days had not taken up in official session the Japanese terms and the comments we made on them, that the Chinese had not decided even to give serious consideration to the Japanese terms. It is to be feared that unnecessary bloodshed is now taking place and Chinese provinces are being destroyed with no other result than that the Chinese—as in the example of the Sibylline books—will have to pay many times the price originally asked, to secure much harder terms than those offered them by Mr. Hirota at the beginning of November.

The task immediately confronting us is to draw the conclusions from the situation that has arisen with respect to German-Japanese relations. This is to be attempted below on the twofold assumption

that Japan will emerge from the conflict as the military victor and that China, insofar as it does not rely upon Britain and America, will drift farther and farther into the Russian orbit.

## 2. THE CHINA CONFLICT AND GERMAN-JAPANESE RELATIONS

We have thus far defined our position with regard to both parties by the statement of Germany's absolute neutrality. And this was undoubtedly correct for the first part of the Japanese-Chinese conflict, although the retention of the military advisers and the continued deliveries of war material were of advantage to China only—to a Nanking Government, therefore, which sought a close alliance with our bitterest foe by concluding the Nonaggression Pact with the Soviet Union and which, moreover, leaned toward the Western Powers and the Geneva ideology. We have thus got into a situation with respect to Japan which might have become difficult if Japan had pressed us very strongly for a decision. In my annual report<sup>98</sup> I stated why Japan, for reasons of domestic and foreign policy, had no choice but to let Germany wear a halo of innocence. Thus there resulted a quite topsy-turvy picture: Each month the Japanese submitted to us summaries of the substantial German exports of war material to China, in which the reproach was clearly implied, while, on the other hand, the spokesman for the Foreign Ministry coolly explained to the British and American press correspondents who referred angrily to these imports that the German Government had stopped them long ago.

It is obvious that this condition *must* come to an end as soon as Japan gets out of this situation in which she can exercise no choice. We have to take into consideration the fact that Japan will then, in her deep ill-humor, confront us with unpleasant decisions, perhaps at an inopportune time. We shall therefore do well, precisely on the most thorny problems of military advisers and deliveries of war material, to redefine our position now in good time, and, if occasion arises, to explain it to the Japanese. This task is the more pressing since we must expect that third states, especially Britain, out of rancor over the increasing importance of the role of Germany in the Far East (mediation activity) and in order to divert attention from their own exports of arms, will probably direct Japan's attention systematically to the sore spots in German-Japanese relations.

## 3. MILITARY ADVISERS

The unsuccessful conclusion of the German attempt at mediation nullifies the most important argument for explaining the activity

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<sup>98</sup> Not printed.

of the military advisers in the face of the ever increasing pressure from the Japanese for their recall—that such a recall would cost Germany the confidence of the Chinese Government, which she has thus far enjoyed, and would thus from the outset deprive German attempts at mediation of any prospect of success. This argument is no longer valid, because no peaceful settlement of the conflict is in early prospect—and even if peace negotiations were to come about, they would not be with the present Chinese Government.

Nor, for the same reason, can we take the position any longer that the German military advisers, as objective experts, can make clear to the Chinese military authorities the hopelessness of further resistance.

Above all, however, it is to be feared that the retention of the advisers will injure German prestige. Already Chinese agitators are venturing, according to a report from the Consulate General at Canton, to accuse the German officers of having betrayed plans of operation to the Japanese, while, on the other hand, the Japanese Field Army suspects that the advisers are planning the operations of the Chinese Army and directing their execution. The continual defeats which the Chinese Army is suffering will, in the long run, be blamed on the German advisers, not only by the parties to the conflict but also by third countries interested in lowering German prestige in the Far East. Nor can it benefit our military reputation that General von Falkenhausen and his colleagues, together with the Chinese, retire from Soochow to Nanking, from there to Hankow, and then farther on to Chungking, and even farther into inner Asia. The advisers will in the long run have to share the responsibility for the Chinese defeats, however much these defeats may have been caused precisely through disregard of the advice given by the Germans. Thus the argument used for the retention of the advisers, that in case of their recall the Russians would take their place, collapses at the same time.

More cogent perhaps is the argument, based on both foreign policy and military policy, that for representatives of the German Army such close collaboration with the representatives of the Red Army and of Bolshevik Russia is impossible. That Sino-Russian military collaboration has not long since become much closer is attributable not to Chinese hesitation but to Soviet doubts. To overcome these doubts is the purpose of Sun Fo's journey to Moscow. But already the material help that the Russians are giving by dispatching Russian planes and pilots, which has led to a resumption of Chinese air attacks, is becoming increasingly apparent. That the slogan, "German-Soviet collaboration," is eagerly seized upon

by the parties concerned is shown by the enclosed clipping from the *China Weekly Review* of December 25, 1937.<sup>99</sup>

The course of the war itself has demolished another argument that was advanced by the German merchants in China for the retention of the military advisers, namely, that they were the pioneers and trail blazers for a considerable part of our exports to China. Even if, on the Chinese side, purchasing power and the desire to make further purchases in Germany were combined with the technical possibility of achieving this importation, the geographical changes in the Chinese map occasioned by the progress of the war would place a substantial percentage of the market possibilities in the Japanese-occupied territories.

While fully appreciating the significance of our military advisers for our relations with China, which I always made the basis of my cautious judgment of this matter in the first phase of the war, I now advocate, in agreement with the Military Attaché, General Ott, the immediate and general recall of all German military advisers still active in China, for the reasons stated above.

#### 4. DELIVERIES OF WAR MATERIAL

In support of the complete suspension of deliveries of war material to China, there is only a brief statement to be made. From the reports made by the Embassy, it is known how greatly this very question affected German-Japanese relations. The quieting effect of the embargo declared by the German Government has been dissipated by the continuance of deliveries. The temporary relaxation of the pressure applied by the Japanese for complete suspension is approaching its end. On this score the behavior of the military authorities leaves no doubt. Any references to the technical impossibility of effecting the suspension of deliveries of military supplies by measures on the part of the German Government would not be understood here—confidence in the power of authoritarian Germany as against the profiteering tendencies of private capitalism is too great for this. Reasons of political expediency and the need for keeping promises likewise counsel the suspension of deliveries of war material to China. Should there be essential differences of opinion on this point, efforts should be made to clarify them in discussions with Japan.

#### 5. RECOGNITION OF MANCHUKUO

The reorganization of our relations with Japan and China on the basis of the balance sheet that can be drawn up at the moment ought also to give us occasion to recognize Manchukuo before pressure

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<sup>99</sup> Not printed here.

from Japan makes itself felt in an unpleasant fashion. That we shall long be able to avoid granting this recognition, which now means nothing more than the acknowledgment of an existing condition, I consider out of the question. The official *démarche* of the Manchurian Government in Hsinking with Counselor of Legation Knoll is the first sign that recognition is now to be pushed. Italy's course has deprived us, with respect to Japan, of cause for further procrastination, and, with respect to China, has presented us with a decrease of Chinese sensitiveness—in case this should still be a consideration in view of the definite Moscow trend of the Hankow-Chungking Government. The economic agreement and the establishment of the trade mission have skimmed the cream off the economic possibilities inherent in a recognition of Manchukuo by us. The opportunity for a comprehensive economic and political deal with Japan as a result of the recognition of Manchukuo would have arisen if the plans we discussed some years ago had been pursued further. In spite of Italy's prior action, the recognition of Manchukuo can still serve as a friendly gesture toward Japan when the opportunity offers (anniversary of the founding of the Empire) and one that would certainly be appreciated here.

#### 6. REORIENTATION BASED ON NORTH CHINA

The recognition of Manchukuo fits in, at least theoretically, with the further constructive and perhaps most important task with which we are faced through the further course of events in China—the necessity of orienting our China policy to a considerable extent from North China.

We shall have to make allowance for the fact that North China up to the Yellow River and beyond that to the borders of Shantung Province will for a number of years, perhaps decades, be under direct Japanese influence; that Shanghai and its hinterland extending beyond Nanking, in a few months perhaps beyond Hankow, will be occupied by Japanese troops for a long time, perhaps for some years; that the undisputed authority of the government of rump China will begin only beyond a wide combat zone west of this region; and that, finally, conditions in South China, particularly in Canton, will, at least for the duration of hostilities, be very unsettled—for even if military action against Canton is for the time being apparently not to be expected, nevertheless communications between this city and the outer world will be cut off as much as possible by the Japanese.

From this it may be seen that the five provinces of North China will for a long time to come be the most peaceful part of China and the one soonest to be restored to normal life. The further

economic function of Shanghai until the conclusion of peace will, at any rate, have only a fraction of its former significance; what will later become of the commercial center on the Yangtze, we must wait and see. The coastal region of South China, under the impact of military operations—at least air attacks—will hardly have a normal political and economic life. The same will apply to Central China, far removed from the coast.

From this we shall have to draw the conclusion that in our China policy we shall at least have to give stronger economic and political emphasis to North China. We shall have to consider our China problem more from the vantage point of Peking than of Shanghai, Hankow, or Chungking. This does not by any means have to be done in such a way as to give offense to the Chinese Government for all time to come. Outwardly, nothing of importance would have to change. The distribution of the official missions of the Reich would, of course, remain the same. Also, it would be mistaken policy if German firms gave up their branches in Shanghai. The fortunate fact that, besides the Consular offices in North China, there is a diplomatic mission in Peking and that German firms have previously been developing business in North China anyway, provides bases enough for our reorientation.

The most urgent requirement for such development of our interests in North China seems to me to be the establishment of a close liaison with the Japanese military and civil authorities. This will be easily accomplished by expanding the mission at Peking and by appointing to it a mature official experienced in Japanese affairs.

The shifting of our economic interests to North China will to a certain extent be done through the private initiative of our China firms. It will be the task of our Government agencies to further this development. Above all, however, it seems urgent that the possibilities of an economic development of North China, as well as our collaboration in this matter, should, in agreement with the Japanese authorities, be examined by some prominent German experts or by a small, specially constituted delegation.

It cannot be the purpose of this report to treat conclusively the difficult and complicated questions implied in the term, "economic development of North China." I believed that I should indicate, however, that in the kaleidoscopic course of the Japanese-Chinese conflict, a stage has now been reached which makes it a political necessity for Germany to take a number of consistent measures in order to keep pace with this development.

The official missions in Hankow and Hsinking have received a carbon copy of this report through safe channels.

DIRKSEN

No. 565

1929/432733-35

*The German Ambassador in Japan (Dirksen) to the German  
Foreign Ministry*

Telegram

URGENT

Tokyo, February 5, 1938—5 p.m.

VERY SECRET

Received February 5, 1938—12:45 p.m.

No. 62 of February 5

For the Foreign Minister personally.<sup>99a</sup>

I. In the conversation which I concluded this morning with the Foreign Minister, the latter brought up the following questions:

1) In view of the increasing opposition of public opinion to the export of war materials to China (see D.N.B. telegram No. 103 of February 4, and No. (group missing) of February 4), Hirota discussed the fact that substantial German exports were continuing. With all due appreciation for our statements of principle, he now also requested that practical measures be taken to put an end to the export in fact.

2) Likewise pointing to the increasing pressure of public opinion, Hirota suggested that, following Italy's example, we give recognition to Manchukuo, since our considerations with respect to China probably no longer applied.

3) Hirota then alluded very cautiously to the colonial question, inquiring as to our attitude in principle. I referred to our moral claim based on our defamation by the Versailles Treaty, and to our economic needs. I further mentioned discussions with the Western Powers concerning the colonies.

Thereupon the Foreign Minister said that, for the sake of the further strengthening of German-Japanese relations, he was anxious also to clear up the colonial problem pending between Germany and Japan.

He first requested general information regarding our point of view, particularly on the South Sea mandate. As was known, these mandated islands were of the greatest strategic importance to Japan. He requested that Ambassador Togo be informed in detail as to our attitude, in order that the latter, after obtaining instructions from Tokyo, could continue the conversation.

4) On the progress of operations in China, Hirota remarked that perhaps in a military respect great battles were no longer to be expected, but rather a slow advance of the Japanese Army. They wished to reach a certain line and to avoid advancing too far

<sup>99a</sup> On February 4, 1938, Joachim von Ribbentrop replaced Constantin von Neurath as Foreign Minister.

toward Hongkong and inner China. No tendency toward unofficial negotiations was yet apparent on the Chinese side. Increased military aid from Russia, in spite of an outwardly vigorous attitude, was not noticeable. Hirota had no fear with regard to Russia.

5) In a talk afterward the Vice Foreign Minister brought up, among other suggestions for the strengthening of our relations, the termination of the activities of the military advisers.

II. Referring to my courier report 314/38, of January 26, now en route, I advocate German measures in accordance with the Japanese suggestions under numbers 1, 2, and 5. March 1, the anniversary of the founding of the Empire of Manchukuo, seems suitable as the date for the recognition of Manchukuo. On the colonial issue, I adopted a receptive attitude, as instructed. Please advise Ambassador Togo.

In concluding the conversation, I pointed out to the Foreign Minister that the real purpose of the Anti-Comintern Agreement was not to fight China, but rather to proceed jointly against the Soviet Russian Comintern.

DIRKSEN

### No. 566

145/81224-25

*The German Ambassador in China (Trautmann) to the German Foreign Ministry*

Telegram

No. 71 of February 14      HANKOW, February 14, 1938—7:30 p.m.  
Received February 14, 1938—10 p.m.

With reference to your telegram No. 30.<sup>1</sup>

In continuation of our telegram of the 13th, No. 67.<sup>1a</sup>

Shanghai wires with regard to probable effect of German recognition of Manchukuo in its district:

"Recognition would at first probably neither engender a strong anti-German sentiment in the Chinese public, since the press is strictly controlled, nor cause a boycott, since business is at an almost complete standstill and the Chinese economy is for the present more or less paralyzed. Individual acts of terrorism, however, may occur.

"But for the future the most serious consequences are to be feared with regard to the attitude toward us, because confidence in the friendship of Germany will have been shaken. Even if, in economic circles, the view is beginning to prevail that a shift in the balance of power of long duration will make it necessary to make a compact

<sup>1</sup> Not printed. The telegram, dated February 12, informed Trautmann the decision to recognize Manchukuo was probably imminent.

<sup>1a</sup> Not printed. Trautmann warned against early recognition of Manchukuo, arguing that the Chinese military position had improved after the fall of Nanking.

with Japan, their faith in the resurgence of their own strength, especially their economic strength, is nevertheless unswerving. A situation would then develop in which they would not seek our support, but would turn solely to other powers, while we should have to depend for cooperation on Japan, whose aspirations run counter to German interests precisely in Central China, and whose willingness to cooperate has not yet been demonstrated.

"Herr von Dirksen mentioned March 1 as the time possibly suited to recognition. This would be particularly calamitous because the belief is prevalent here that Japan is about to launch a decisive blow against Hankow. If we accent the action by giving recognition now, instead of at least awaiting the outcome of this campaign, the step will be interpreted by enemy propaganda as a liquidation of our position in China and will be so construed by the Chinese."

TRAUTMANN

### No. 567

145/81222-23

*The German Ambassador in China (Trautmann) to the German Foreign Ministry*

Telegram

No. 72 of February 14      HANKOW, February 14, 1938—7:30 p.m.  
Received February 14, 1938—10 p.m.

With reference to your telegram No. 30.<sup>2</sup>

In continuation of our telegrams of the 13th [and 14th], Nos. 67<sup>2</sup> and 71.<sup>3</sup>

Canton wires:

"In the southern provinces the recognition of Manchukuo by Germany before the present conflict is decided would be regarded as an unnecessary challenge to Chinese national pride, particularly since a basis for future negotiations on the part of a China no longer opposed in principle to a later recognition would thus be considerably weakened. The consequences in the Consular district would probably be:

"The general importation of German goods would be absolutely boycotted. Special imports for the industrial development of the southern provinces would cease. The exports—very extensive of late—of ores that are important to us, antimony, wolfram, tin, as well as lumber and oils, which show promise of multiplying in the future, would fall to the British and Chinese business interests, who are already waiting for them. In particular, the quasi-monopolistic preferential position that was recently offered us again in Kwangsi would be forfeited, since friendly German-Chinese relations were only recently made the condition for it. Our recently increased influence in Yunnan would be entirely lost to the French.

<sup>2</sup> Not printed.

<sup>3</sup> Document No. 566, *supra*.

"Culturally, our position in school and university education would become irreparably shaken as a result of increased political alertness on the part of the students, even if Chinese leaders were for the time being to counsel moderation. The outbreak of anti-German feeling would be so much the more violent since, in contrast to the time of Italian recognition, the war situation has for weeks been much more optimistically regarded here, and the failure to declare war and to launch attacks on South China—attacks which were repeatedly postponed, yet which are strategically unavoidable—are interpreted as signs of Japanese weakness.

"Italian experiences do not apply to us, since our position is much more vulnerable; moreover, the greater hope put in Germany at all times, for peace mediation and future development also, must result in much deeper disappointment and bitterness. This gives Soviet Russia her chance."

TRAUTMANN

No. 568

875/208819-26

*Memorandum*

BERLIN, February 16, 1938.

Counselor of Legation Kordt sends word that the Foreign Minister requests the State Secretary to instruct the Colonial Section, Pol. X, to prepare as soon as possible a comprehensive memorandum regarding Japan's position on the colonial question for submission to the Foreign Minister.<sup>3a</sup>

Forwarded for further action to Counselor of Legation Strohm through the Head of the Political Department and the Deputy Head of the Political Department.

FEBRUARY 16, 1938.

[Enclosure]

*Memorandum on Japan and Germany's Colonial Claim*

Since, in the present stage, the discussion on colonial matters aims at the recognition in principle of the claim for a return of all former German colonies, the Japanese Government also had to be approached on this question when the opportunity arose.

An occasion for broaching the subject with the Japanese was offered by a statement to the press on November 27 by Colonial Vice Minister Hagiwara, who declared that assertions regarding the return of the South Sea mandates to Germany were without foundation. The South Sea mandates formed an integral part of Japan.

<sup>3a</sup> A notation indicates that the memorandum which is appended was submitted on February 18.

The Embassy in Tokyo was instructed by telegraph on December 13<sup>4</sup> to speak to the Japanese Foreign Minister along the following lines:

The Japanese Government probably knew that we were about to enter into an international discussion regarding our colonial claims. We could rightly expect our friends to render us assistance in this. Utterances like Hagiwara's did us a disservice.

At the end of December and the beginning of January, the Embassy in Tokyo learned from reliable sources that Japanese circles were considering the idea of returning the South Sea Islands to Germany with the proviso that Japan could immediately acquire them again by purchase. These reports were substantiated by a statement which Commander Maeda, chief aide to the Commander in Chief of the Combined Fleets, made to our Naval Attaché on January 15. Mr. Maeda stated that the German colonial claim would be decided in 1938. Because of her South Sea mandates Japan had an interest in the matter, and Japan, or at least the Japanese Navy, was prepared to contribute to a mutually satisfactory solution of this question, if Germany would speak freely and frankly with Japan. It seemed to Japanese Navy circles to be a conceivable solution that, without regard to the Treaty of Versailles and the League of Nations, Japan should return the South Sea mandate to Germany and then buy it back from Germany.

In reply to this report the Embassy in Tokyo on January 18 received a telegraphic instruction<sup>5</sup> to the effect that Maeda's statements had aroused keen interest here. However, we considered it necessary to direct the matter into an official channel. The Ambassador was therefore instructed to inform the Foreign Minister of the substance of Commander Maeda's statements and to ascertain whether Maeda's ideas were shared by the Foreign Minister or the Cabinet.

This *démarche* has not yet been made, since Herr von Dirksen considered it necessary to inform Commander Maeda before talking with the Foreign Minister. Since the former is absent from Japan on official duty, and will be away for several months, our Military Attaché discussed the matter confidentially on January 24 with the Chief of the Information Division of the Admiralty.

Admiral Nomura confirmed Maeda's statements, and added that conferences along the lines of Maeda's statements had been held on the question of the South Sea mandates by the competent Japanese authorities and would shortly be the subject of a resolution of the Japanese Cabinet. The Japanese Foreign Minister would

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<sup>4</sup> Telegram not printed.

<sup>5</sup> Document No. 560, p. 822.

probably then make Herr von Dirksen a friendly proposal for the definitive settlement of the future of the South Sea mandates.

The Ambassador was instructed to maintain a noncommittal attitude toward such declarations by the Japanese Foreign Minister.

The declaration promised by Admiral Nomura has not been made to Herr von Dirksen. During his conversation with Hirota on February 5,<sup>6</sup> the latter alluded to the colonial question only very cautiously, inquiring as to our attitude in principle. Herr von Dirksen pointed out our moral claim to the return of the colonies and Germany's economic need of colonial activity, and mentioned the discussion of colonial matters which had been begun with the British Government. Hirota replied that, for the sake of further strengthening German-Japanese relations, he was anxious also to clear up the colonial question pending between Germany and Japan. He first requested general information regarding our point of view, particularly on the question of the South Sea mandate. These islands were of the greatest strategic importance to Japan. He requested that Ambassador Togo be informed in detail as to our attitude, in order that the latter, after obtaining instructions from Tokyo, could continue the conversation.

It is evident from what has taken place that there is a possibility of a discussion of the South Sea mandate with Japan and that this discussion will have to be conducted with the Japanese Ambassador here. However, a Japanese offer such as Admiral Nomura had in mind is no longer to be discussed; rather do the Japanese expect suggestions from Germany.

In this connection, the following views should be considered:

1. The proposal made by the Japanese Navy has something of a precedent-setting nature both in a favorable and in an unfavorable sense. The favorable effect would lie in the recognition of the obligation to return former German colonies by one of the Allied and Associated Powers (Britain, France, the United States, Italy, Japan), in whose favor Germany, in article 119 of the Treaty of Versailles, renounced all her rights and claims to her overseas possessions.

2. Direct negotiations with Japan without regard to the League of Nations might be useful in that possible inclinations to deal with the colonial question through the League of Nations would be blocked.

3. The idea of accepting financial compensation in place of retrocession has the disadvantage that in the present early stage of the colonial debate such a financial compromise would detract from our

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<sup>6</sup> See telegram No. 62 of February 5, 1938, from the Ambassador in Japan, document No. 565, p. 832.

colonial claim both politically and morally, and would indicate to other powers, particularly the Union of South Africa, that it was possible to make a mere financial settlement with us. Such efforts could perhaps be counteracted by a realistic differentiation in the retrocession claim, distinguishing between those colonies that are useful to us economically and otherwise, the return of which we therefore demand, and those colonies that, because of lesser economic importance, great distance, etc., would not be of any great value to us. But, in so doing, we could hardly conceal the fact that such a compromise actually became necessary primarily because the Japanese categorically rejected definitive retrocession in view of their own vital interests. Since the South African Union is similarly claiming vital interests, these "sour-grapes tactics" might nevertheless lead to undesirable consequences.

This possibility is in any case so dangerous that our consent to a financial settlement for the South Sea mandates must under no circumstances become known to the other powers at the present time.

The idea of accepting compensation for the waiving of the German claim has already been discussed in other quarters; that is, during his conversation with Lord Halifax, the Führer implied that, if the other side could prove that it had vital interests opposed to the return of a certain territory, he was willing to accept proposals for compensation.

The result of the negotiations to be conducted with Ambassador Togo might therefore be somewhat as follows:

a) A public statement by the Japanese Government that it recognized the justice of the German colonial claim and, on its part, was prepared to discuss with Germany the future of the South Sea mandates;

b) A secret agreement, for the publication of which we reserved the exclusive right, to the effect that we are prepared to waive our claim for retrocession in return for financial compensation from Japan, to be specified more exactly later. This procedure would surely be simpler and more fitting than the ostensible retrocession proposed by the Japanese Navy; the retrocession would have to be demonstrated by German acts of sovereignty on the territory, immediately followed by resale to the Japanese.

This transaction (waiving of a claim for retrocession in return for financial compensation) is a thing apart. It should not be necessary to combine this matter with any other questions pending between us and the Japanese.

How the date and the subject of conversations with the Japanese are to be coordinated with the discussion presently pending with the British Government will have to be examined separately.

Submitted herewith to the Foreign Minister.

BERLIN, February , 1938.

### No. 569

F11/0137

*The Reich Minister and Chief of the Reich Chancellery (Lammers)  
to the Foreign Minister*

Rk. 3248 A

BERLIN, February 17, 1938.

Re cipher telegrams Tokyo No. 62 of February 5, Hankow Nos. 71 and 72 of February 14.

MY DEAR HERR VON RIBBENTROP: After presentation of the above-mentioned telegrams, the Führer declared that he now wished to recognize Manchukuo. I take the liberty of informing you of this, leaving you to decide whether you wish to present the matter to the Führer again.

Heil Hitler!

Yours very respectfully,

DR. LAMMERS

### No. 570

224/150577-80

*The German Foreign Ministry to the German Embassy in China  
Telegram*

No. 39

BERLIN, February 21, 1938.

(zu Pol. I 469 g (VIII), 470)

Drafting Officer: Counselor of Legation von Schmieden.

In yesterday's historic Reichstag speech the Führer and Chancellor announced that Germany would recognize Manchukuo. Formal recognition is therefore imminent.

Now it is a matter of preventing it from producing detrimental consequences for German-Chinese relations. I request you therefore to inform the Chinese Government of the imminent recognition, with the following explanation:

"The German Government is fully aware that this measure may be interpreted by the Chinese Government and the Chinese people in a way not intended by Germany. Because of considerations of over-all German policy, the measure could no longer be delayed. That Germany did not, however, intend this measure to be in any way directed against China is apparent from the structure and the text of the Führer's speech. The recognition of Manchukuo was

taken up in the speech in connection with Germany's League of Nations policy. The Führer's argument was as follows: 'If I decide to take this step (the recognition of Manchukuo) I do so in order to draw a line here, too, between a policy of fantastic absurdities and one of sober respect for actual facts.'

"If it is thus already apparent in this context that the recognition of Manchukuo is merely the result of a policy having nothing to do with our attitude toward the Far Eastern conflict, this is brought out all the more by the Führer's statements with regard to the Far Eastern conflict.

"The Far Eastern conflict is viewed in the Führer's speech exclusively from the standpoint of our attitude toward the world danger of Bolshevism. He said: 'Germany has a treaty with Japan to combat the efforts of the Comintern. She has always had friendly relations with China. I believe we can perhaps best be considered a neutral observer of this drama. I do not need to assure you that we have all hoped and still hope that a condition of relative calm and finally of peace may once more be brought about between the two great East Asiatic peoples.'

"After criticizing the one-sided platonic stand in favor of China expressed by the League of Nations resolutions, by which China was being deluded as to the seriousness of her situation, and after stressing the conviction that Germany, in her position of defense against Communism, would always look upon and value Japan as an element of security, the speech went on:

"Germany has no territorial interests whatever in the Far East. She has an understandable desire to carry on commerce and business. This does not obligate us to take sides in favor of one or the other party. But it surely does obligate us to realize that a victory for Bolshevism here, too, would destroy the last remaining possibilities.'

"The speech thus expressly emphasizes the friendly relations that have always existed between Germany and China, as well as our neutrality, and in conclusion stresses once more the fact that in view of our position in the Far East, it is not necessary for us to take sides in the conflict.

"The German Government hopes that by appreciating our attitude thus far toward the conflict, which has been strongly emphasized by the Führer's speech, China will not mistake our friendly attitude toward her."

Please add that in your opinion the apprehensions which the Chinese Foreign Minister expressed to you (your telegram 85<sup>7</sup>) seem groundless.

At the same time please express the hope that the Chinese Government will, if necessary, use its influence to calm public opinion in China.

The Consular officials in Shanghai, Hong Kong, Canton, and Singapore are being sent the same telegraphic instruction for the orientation of their conversations.

RIBBENTROP

<sup>7</sup> Not printed.

## No. 571

155/130881/3-130881/5

*Memorandum Concerning the Visit of Japanese Ambassador Togo to Foreign Minister von Ribbentrop on February 22, 1938, at 5 p.m.*

RM 129

February 23, 1938.  
(Pol. VIII 418)

1. The Japanese Ambassador first expressed to the Foreign Minister the deepest gratitude of his Government for the willingness to recognize Manchukuo. He emphasized that Japan was aware of what she owed the German Foreign Minister in this connection.

2. The Japanese Ambassador then mentioned the colonial question and pointed out that his Government would gladly do everything possible to aid Germany in achieving her colonial aspirations. In this connection he emphasized, however, that the mandates held by Japan were vitally necessary for her defense and that she therefore could not permanently relinquish these mandates. His Government, however, was prepared to aid Germany in the realization of her demands in every possible way and was awaiting suggestions as to how this might be done. The Foreign Minister expressed his gratitude for this cooperative attitude and stated that he would like to reserve the right to return to this matter later.

3. The Japanese Ambassador then touched upon the present and future economic negotiations between Germany and Japan, pointing out that Ministerial Director Wohlthat<sup>a</sup> had discussed this question with him by order of the Field Marshal, but that he knew that the Foreign Minister was very much interested in the negotiations, and he therefore requested that they be conducted in close consultation with the Foreign Minister. The Foreign Minister endorsed this and instructed Dr. von Raumer to conduct these economic negotiations in cooperation with the competent divisions of the Foreign Ministry and the other Ministries. He emphasized that he had always been of the opinion that the recognition of Manchukuo should not be combined with the economic negotiations, but that this question should be discussed separately and in a large-scale manner. He requested, therefore, that the Japanese conduct the economic negotiations now pending in the same large-scale manner, because the conflict in China and now the recognition of Manchukuo mean considerable losses for business interests in the Far East, and he would appreciate it if by a generous agreement a certain compensa-

<sup>a</sup> Helmut Wohlthat of the Ministry of Economic Affairs and of the Four-Year Plan Organization; economic adviser to Field Marshal Göring.

tion were provided for the losses incurred by the business interests. The Foreign Minister emphasized that during conversations which were conducted in connection with the Anti-Comintern Agreement he had already pointed out to the Japanese gentlemen that in case of cooperation in China he expected Germany to have complete equality with the Japanese in business transactions. The Japanese Ambassador promised to transmit this wish to his Government, and mentioned in this connection that he was authorized by his Government to conduct the economic negotiations, whereas His Excellency Mr. Gojo was not in Germany in an official capacity.

4. The Foreign Minister then brought up the question of the frozen credits. The Japanese Ambassador stated that as much as 60 percent of these credits had been returned, and that he had discussed the disposition of the funds which were still blocked with the Finance Minister, who in turn told him that at present, because of the tense situation in Japan, it was very difficult to make any repayments. However, he hoped that this question could be settled in connection with the agreement regarding payments. The Foreign Minister requested that they should be as broad-minded in this matter as Germany had been on her part.

5. In conclusion, the Japanese Ambassador touched upon the establishment of the international commission<sup>9</sup> and requested that this question be taken up as soon as possible, since it had been discussed in the Japanese Diet, and the Government wished to obtain definite views in this matter as soon as possible, in order to communicate them to the Diet. The Japanese Ambassador went on to say that it was now necessary to establish a commission in Italy also, since Italy had adhered to the Agreement. (Dr. von Raumer's comment on this: I do not consider it desirable to establish a separate commission in Italy. Italy will be represented on the Anti-Comintern Commission here. In my opinion, the creation of a separate commission in Rome would split up the work and increase the danger of independent action by Rome, and would also result in the establishment of a separate commission in each country adhering to the Agreement. The Japanese apparently want this commission because the existence of such a commission would enable Japanese authorities, if necessary, to by-pass the customary diplomatic channels leading through the Foreign Ministry, and to approach directly other Ministries represented on the Commission, as well as to communicate with the authorities of the respective country somewhat more easily.)

VON RAUMER

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<sup>9</sup> Provided for in the supplementary protocol to the Anti-Comintern Pact.

No. 572

1929/432754-56

*Memorandum*

BERLIN, February 24, 1938.

The Chinese Ambassador called on me this evening by appointment to hand me, in the name of his Government, the enclosed note,<sup>10</sup> intended for the Foreign Minister, whom he could not reach in person, since he is absent from Berlin. He referred to his recent conversation of over an hour's duration with the Foreign Minister, in which he had announced a further step on the part of his Government. He had not been able to take this step until today. I accepted the letter without reading it in the presence of the Ambassador, who did not insist that I do so, but who did ask whether he might add a few personal remarks, among which the following are worth mentioning:

1. The Ambassador's assertion that with the recognition of Manchukuo a change had taken place in the foreign policy of the Reich. The former Foreign Minister had always told him that Manchukuo would not be recognized, a statement that had also been made to Prime Minister Kung by other high and even top-ranking personages during his visit to Germany last year. If now, contrary to these earlier assurances, recognition was being given to Manchukuo, it proved that there had been a change in German foreign policy under the new Foreign Minister. I replied to the Ambassador that this argument left out of account the fact that the foreign policy of the German Reich was being laid down not by the incumbent Foreign Minister but by the Führer and Chancellor. The Führer had given, in his address, the reasons for the recognition of Manchukuo at this time, and Herr von Ribbentrop himself had fully explained them to the Ambassador. I could confine myself to referring to that explanation as the best proof that there was no question of any change in our foreign policy toward China. The Führer and Chancellor was pursuing a German policy, and if a general development for which we were not responsible made certain decisions necessary, it was inevitable that such decisions would be displeasing to one person or another. We had to make the best of such reactions. But the view expressed by the Ambassador, that the recognition of Manchukuo was an act unfriendly to China, was entirely erroneous. We had never been in any doubt that it would not be greeted joyfully there. This realization, however, had had to yield to the necessity of recognition, as explained by the Führer and Chancellor in his address.

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\* Enclosure not printed.

2. The Ambassador then sought to draw a parallel between the attitude of the Chinese Government when we requested the non-recognition of the Rhine Republic which was created immediately after the war, and our present attitude toward the Manchukuo question. I interrupted his lengthy arguments with the remark that such a parallel was beyond my comprehension. I pointed out that between what happened here at that time and the developments in the Manchukuo question, there was a difference that precluded any comparison, and that the Ambassador did not seem to realize that in the case of the Rhine Republic it had been a question of an ephemeral creation.

3. The Ambassador then pointed to Marshal Chiang Kai-shek's efforts to exert a moderating influence on the press and public opinion in China so that German-Chinese relations might not become seriously disturbed from the unusually great excitement on all sides. I replied that we should welcome these efforts of the Marshal most heartily, particularly if they were successful. For we also were striving to prevent the recognition of Manchukuo, which had nothing to do with the friendly relations between the Reich and China, from becoming a permanent disturbance in those relations.

The Ambassador concluded his long statements with a reference to the personal efforts that he had made for 2 years to foster German-Chinese relations. He hoped that he would still have our support in this endeavor. I replied that the answer to this wish was to be found in what the Foreign Minister had told him in their conversation the day before yesterday. Furthermore, I wished to call his attention to the fact that during the last few days, even after the recognition, important Chinese officials had expressed their gratitude to Herr Trautmann for our help and our conduct thus far.

MACKENSEN

### No. 573

2910/566137-45

*The German Ambassador in China (Trautmann) to the German Foreign Ministry*

Nr. 170

Aktz. 2722/2366/38

HANKOW, March 8, 1938.

Received March 21, 1938.

(Pol. VIII 554)

Subject: Political proposals of the Embassy at Tokyo on Germany's China policy.

The Tokyo Embassy's report, No. 314/38, of January 26, on the adjustment of German policy to the present stage of the Chinese-Japanese conflict, did not reach me until March 2. "Adjustment,"

according to Nietzsche, is mere reaction, not real action [*eine blosse Reaktivität, kein eigentliches Handeln*]. But, since part of the proposals have already been carried out, discussing them would no longer be worth while.

However, the report is an example of how conclusions are drawn from an alleged change in the political and military situation in the Far East, although such change had not even taken place when the report was written.

# I

The proposals in the report are based on three assumptions:

1. That the peace negotiations had failed and, with the Tokyo Government no longer recognizing Chiang Kai-shek, mediation was no longer possible; we therefore no longer had to take China into consideration;
2. That Japan was emerging from the conflict as the "military victor";
3. That China was slipping farther and farther into the Soviet orbit.

*Re 1:* It is correct that the peace negotiations have failed (n.b., principally because the Japanese broke their word first), and that the Japanese, misjudging the political situation in China and under pressure from their extremists, have given out declarations that they will no longer negotiate with Chiang Kai-shek's government. But those declarations have neither altered the political situation (some day there will have to be peace negotiations between Japan and China) nor settled the matter of our interests in China. The Tokyo report entirely disregards this. The Japanese thought that they would strike such terror into the Chinese with their declarations that the Government here would collapse like a house of cards. Instead of that, this Government has meanwhile been considerably strengthened by the appointment of T. V. Soong to head the Air Force. In the matter of filling the post of Governor of Szechwan, it is true, the Government had to give way temporarily, but its authority is not in any way jeopardized, as Japanese propaganda claims. In Szechwan it is not even noticed that war is being waged; hence the indifference of the population toward the problems connected therewith.

It is an amazing fact that the military offices in Japan are now reversing themselves and showing a certain inclination again to deal with this proscribed Government, because Chiang Kai-shek (see Foreign Ministry telegram No. 47 of March 2<sup>11</sup>) has so far not taken the Communists into the Government. This is, in-

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<sup>11</sup> Not printed.

cidentally, at the same time an admission that the steady stream of Japanese press and radio propaganda, according to which the Chiang Kai-shek Government has already become entirely Red (I shall revert to this later), is a conscious distortion of the truth.

The first assumption of the Tokyo report thus collapses.

*Re 2:* Will Japan really emerge from the conflict as the "military" victor, and just what does that mean? The fact is that since the capture of Nanking, the Japanese troops have no further important military achievements to their credit. Japan would have been in a position, when the Chinese Army surged back in full rout, with a bold thrust to extend her power over Central China. The British Admiral here told me that it would have been impossible to prevent the Japanese cruisers from simply sailing to Hankow and taking it; the tide would have permitted it. A thrust toward Nanchang would also have been possible. Instead of this, the Japanese Army preferred 4 weeks of plundering and burning in Nanking and celebration of the Japanese New Year and their victory; instead of this also, General Matsui occupied himself with matters of tariffs and with the war on European commerce and on the white race in Shanghai. In Shantung the Japanese troops were for months unable to decide to proceed against the poorly armed Chinese provincial troops, who did not want to fight. The capture of Tsinanfu, Tsingtao, Chefoo, etc., was more or less unresisted. At the Tientsin-Pukow Railroad the Japanese obviously had to abandon their plan of seizing Hsüchow after the Chinese had made a flank attack, the result of which was that the Japanese troops had to retreat over the Huai River. Here one might refer to the Shansi operations, which were successful for Japan. But this success, too, is to be taken with a grain of salt. For the Chinese troops, who have only six to eight bad guns to a division and a very small air force, an offensive against the Japanese is very difficult. They have reached their goal when they can offer resistance and cause the Japanese substantial losses. The predictions of the Japanese military that they would encircle and annihilate a Chinese army of 250,000 men have again not been fulfilled. This was the second Tannenberg that the Japanese had predicted but had failed to achieve. Since the Peking-Hankow Railroad has been cut by the Chinese guerrilla war, it will become harder and harder for the Japanese in future to organize supplies of munitions and food for their troops in Shansi. Conditions in the occupied areas in the North are in part anarchistic, as shown by the abduction of the student, Hildebrandt, in the immediate vicinity of Peiping. It seems almost as if the Japanese had lost the confidence in their ability to conclude this campaign

with a real "military victory." The farther their lines extend into the interior, the worse it is for them. The *coup de grâce* of which Hirota spoke in the Diet is still a thing of the future.

There is probably no example in recent history of a victorious general like Matsui being relieved of his command. It is hardly to be assumed that this recall has met with enthusiasm on the part of the Japanese troops in China.

Even if the Japanese troops triumphed in a military sense, it is nevertheless possible that Japan might not be able to end the war in a "political" sense so simply as she had thought. Already Japanese policy toward other powers is more conciliatory. It is addressing America in dulcet tones—in touching fashion, Japanese children are taking up a collection for the victims of the *Panay*;<sup>12</sup> they are trying to spare England, and twice Hirota has voiced his longing in the Diet to "normalize" his relations with the Soviets. On the Russian side, also, there seem to be similar ideas. According to the report of the Embassy in Moscow of January 24 (A/105),<sup>13</sup> relations with Japan were not even mentioned during the review of foreign policy in the Supreme Soviet. The Chinese Ambassador in Moscow stated to the press here that the two countries' diplomacy (Russia's and Japan's) was endeavoring to work toward a settlement. After the Anti-Comintern Agreement had brought the desired results for Japan in the recognition of Manchuria by Germany, Japan adopted a realistic attitude. She seems to have abandoned a campaign against Canton and Hankow. I have the feeling that the climax of the war has already been reached; that by the time the Japanese can and do launch a decisive blow, they will encounter the Chinese main armies, which meanwhile will have been reorganized, and that they would, as it were, to a certain extent have to begin a new war. The Chinese Air Force, too, will be considerably strengthened, and the equipment of the newly organized armies is better than that of the former.

The second assumption of the report of the Embassy in Tokyo thus also collapses.

*Re 3:* Is the third assumption correct, that China is slipping farther and farther into the Soviet orbit? In this respect the Tokyo report is more Japanese than the Japanese General Staff itself, which has said that in this respect, Chiang Kai-shek is not so bad, after all. Everything indeed that has been observed here up until now also refutes this statement. Sun Fo's mission, which was to provide the Leftist wing of the Kuomintang with the opportunity to

<sup>12</sup> The U.S.S. *Panau*, sunk in the Yangtze by Japanese airplanes, December 12, 1937. See *Foreign Relations, Japan, 1931-1941*, vol. I, pp. 517-563.

<sup>13</sup> Not printed.

show whether their hopes can be realized, was a complete failure. Sun Yat-sen's son was not even received by Stalin. The Russians, it is true, are delivering planes and munitions but not much more than other states are doing. That the Chinese are trying to obtain these war materials anywhere they can get them is their legitimate right, and we cannot take it amiss (cf. the telegraphic instructions of that time to Nanking).

It is not true that they have Russian military advisers. It is not ascertainable to what extent the Russians were able to obtain foreign credits for the Chinese.

As far as the domestic political situation is concerned, the Chinese Government is compelled to give the Communists in China, who are obviously conducting successful guerrilla warfare against Japan in the North, somewhat freer rein, but it still has the reins in its hands. The Government is endeavoring to stop the influx of students fleeing from the Japanese-dominated area in North China to the Communist university at Yennanfu. An emissary of the Central Government has gone to Yennanfu in order personally to inform himself as to conditions there. The Communist newspaper here does not dare openly to reveal its Communist tendency. There are no Communist meetings and no open propaganda. Chiang Kai-shek, who killed about a hundred thousand Communists in his campaigns, is still regarded by them with mistrust. The former Soviet Ambassador, Bogomoloff, who signed the Russo-Chinese Nonaggression Pact, is meeting his fate in Moscow.

Thus the third assumption of the Tokyo report has so far also failed of fulfillment. It is obvious, moreover, that if Bolshevism has better chances in the Far East than formerly, these chances were brought about by Japanese policy alone.

## II

From the report of the Embassy in Tokyo, it appears that Japan has thus far been in a predicament which has prevented her from clearly expressing her dissatisfaction with Germany, because she needed Germany as her only support in the world. I believe that we ourselves are releasing Japan from this predicament if we simply grant her demands one after another without asking anything in return, only to keep her in a good mood. With our help she could emerge from her isolation and adjust her relations with England and Russia. Japan would then, from the standpoint of realistic policy, have even less interest in us than heretofore.

From the presentation in the report, it seems further as if so important a decision as that of the recognition of Manchukuo was not even especially appreciated by Japan. For its effect is regarded

even by the Embassy in Tokyo as only that of a "friendly gesture," whereas the reverse side of the picture, namely, the effect on China, which has obviously been written off, is disregarded altogether.

### III

Regarding the suspension of deliveries to China and the recall of the military advisers, so much has been written back and forth that it is not worth while again to go into the reasons which have always been advanced here against these measures. As far as deliveries of war materials are concerned, members of the Chinese Government have told me that it is known here that on the same ships that carry materials to China there is often much more material for Japan. I do not know if this is correct. Since, however, Japan is in a position to procure much more war material from other countries than China, she should not reproach anyone for also selling to China. I do not know what assurances were made to the Japanese in Berlin. Up to now, however, we seem to have got around those difficulties.

If the recognition of Manchuria was only the first act directed against China and the two other acts are to follow, then we can only liquidate our position here. The Chinese would surely have understood if we had told them that we were under heavy pressure from the Japanese and had to throw them a sop by recognizing Manchukuo, but that otherwise our old attitude remained unchanged. At any rate, we ought to let that suffice for the present. "A new chapter in the war" has, in my opinion, not yet begun, and if the Japanese General Staff intends to confine its activity in future to bombing attacks in central and southern China it is not evident when it will begin. If it does begin, however, time will have worked in favor of China and not of Japan.

Solicitude for the reputation of our advisers in China seems to be troubling the Embassy in Tokyo unnecessarily. The advisers themselves probably deprecate it, for their position in China has never been so good as now. The press attacks on the German advisers are entirely the product of Soviet propaganda. I have not reported them at all because they are not taken seriously by the advisers themselves.

The best comment on the advice of the Embassy in Tokyo to shift the emphasis in our political activity in China to North China in the future is the efforts of the Japanese to monopolize the exports of North China and to take them away from foreign firms, including German firms. Any Japanese regime in China will shut the door to foreign trade, all official Japanese assurances to the contrary;

we have been able to observe for ourselves just how things are going in Manchukuo.

The Japanese now want to hold out to us the phantom of an agreement with North China similar to our trade agreement with Manchukuo. If we enter into this before the war is over, we shall destroy the postwar prospects for our much more important trade in the rest of China without receiving the desired compensation in North China. For the import trade to Tientsin, moreover, we have no need of such an agreement; besides, it could only apply to small business, and that is still going well; for the export trade we would have to buy the exports from the Japanese monopoly, with German firms excluded.

I would strongly counsel against considering the proposal made by Tokyo to dispatch a German delegation to North China. Even the trip of the trade expert from Tokyo to Tientsin is entirely superfluous, for our trade expert, von Winterfeldt, will go there shortly. In politics too much zeal is never advisable, and if there is anything I fear it is a new edition of the Heye Mission, which at the time kicked up so much dust in Manchukuo. I recommend that the files on it be reread. At this juncture we ought to avoid any conspicuous or provocative appearance in North China, which, despite the kick of the Japanese boot, has by no means abandoned its patriotism. We would wound Chinese sensibilities even more than we have done heretofore.

Finally, as regards the Tokyo proposals for appointments to the Mission in Peiping, I would like to quote here the Japanese saying: "*Chotto matte kudasai*" (Please wait a little). We have too little patience. If we display our eagerness too clearly and unabashedly, we shall only succeed in making it possible for other nations to win the last rubber. Yet at the beginning of the game it almost appeared as though, through our attempts at mediation, we could secure a very significant political influence in the Far East (a prospect which has, unfortunately, been destroyed for us by the conduct of the Japanese).

The Embassy in Tokyo is receiving a copy of this report by a safe route.

TRAUTMANN

## No. 574

F19/354

*The Chief of the Supreme Headquarters of the Wehrmacht (Keitel)  
to the Foreign Minister*

BERLIN, March 17, 1938.

DEAR HERR VON RIBBENTROP: On the occasion of a report to the Führer, I spoke to him about the present Military Attaché in Tokyo, Major General Ott, particularly since the Army High Command had more than once broached to me the question of using Major General Ott in a high position at home in command of troops.

Because of the fact that, as aide to General Schleicher,<sup>15</sup> he was in a position of close confidence to him, Major General Ott was politically compromised through no fault of his own. During this report, the Führer raised the question of whether Major General Ott, because of his achievements, might not be employed in the diplomatic service in an independent capacity, and asked me to have the competent office of the Foreign Ministry discuss this matter with him.

If, as Foreign Minister, you should be inclined to second the suggestion of the Führer regarding the employment of Major General Ott in the diplomatic service, then steps would be taken here to order Major General Ott home in order that the Führer, if he wishes, may speak with Major General Ott personally.

Heil Hitler!

Yours respectfully,

KEITEL

## No. 575

174/135842-43

*Memorandum of the Conversation Between the Foreign Minister  
and His Excellency Mr. Togo on April 8, 1938, at 5 p.m.*

RM 210

I first acquainted the Japanese Ambassador in general terms with the four points which were to form the basis for a confidential exchange of notes between the German and the Japanese Governments. The Japanese Ambassador objected to our wish to obtain complete parity with Japan, since, if most-favored-nation clauses

<sup>15</sup> General Kurt von Schleicher, Reich Chancellor, December 12, 1932-January 30, 1933; killed by the Nazis June 30, 1934.

were later agreed upon, all other countries could demand this parity with Japan.

I replied that we could of course understand his views and were prepared to consider the primarily military and other special interests, if any, of Japan in Chinese territory, but that we insisted on a certain measure of equality with Japan and a privileged position as compared with all other countries, because of our good relations in other respects resulting from the Anti-Comintern Agreement, and because of the closer cooperation that might prove necessary in the future.

I then told the Japanese Ambassador that he might consider these details more extensively with Minister von Raumer tomorrow.

Following this, the Japanese Ambassador asked me about our present relations with Czechoslovakia. I told him that our further relations depended upon the fate of the Sudeten Germans and that negotiations with a view to the granting of autonomy were now pending. I expressed the hope that clarification and understanding would be reached between the Czechs and the Sudeten Germans.

RIBBENTROP

BERLIN, April 8, 1938.

### No. 576

224/150585-86

#### *Memorandum*

SECRET

BERLIN, April 23, 1938.

(zu W 331 g)

Subject: Deliveries of war matériel to China.

1. The contracts for deliveries of war matériel to the Chinese Government amounted to

64,581,000 Reichsmarks in 1936, and  
60,983,000 Reichsmarks in 1937.

The contracts signed in 1937 pertained to the following types of war matériel:

	<i>Reichsmarks</i>
Machine guns up to 2 cm.	400
Guns up to 15.5 cm.	13,447,700
Antitank guns	4,491,000
Antiaircraft guns	1,655,000
Powder, demolition charges, igniting charges	167,800
Rifle cartridges	19,236,600
2 cm. ammunition	32,500
Artillery ammunition	7,047,700
Aerial bombs	6,337,900

	<i>Reichsmarks</i>
General optical equipment	54,400
Range finders and sights	116,600
Searchlight equipment	1,255,900
Armored reconnaissance cars	121,000
Airplanes	7,019,000
	<hr/> 60,983,500

2. The deliveries of war matériel to China amounted to

23,748,000 Reichsmarks in 1936, and  
82,788,600 Reichsmarks in 1937.

The war matériel delivered in 1937 may be broken down as follows:

	<i>Reichsmarks</i>
Rifles, carbines	148,369
2 cm. machine guns	1,170,000
Guns up to 15.5 cm.	9,332,757
Antiaircraft guns	5,075,000
Antitank guns	3,300,630
Powder, demolition charges, igniting charges	450,804
Rifle ammunition	30,718,691
2 cm. ammunition	1,976,600
Artillery ammunition	15,421,700
Bombs	6,339,475
Range finders and sights	105,888
Data computers and oscillographs	292,162
Searchlights	1,325,528
Tanks	900,000
Armored reconnaissance cars	661,000
Airplanes	2,570,000
Naval craft	3,000,000
	<hr/> 82,788,604

3. The above data are taken from the annual report for 1937 of the Association of Exporters of War Matériel [*Ausfuhrergemeinschaft für Kriegsggerät (A.G.K.)*].

The annual report does not reveal what particular models of guns, planes, tanks, etc., the contracts or deliveries concerned. Inquiries are being made on this subject.

To be transmitted to the Foreign Minister through the State Secretary.

WIEHL

## No. 577

224/150587

*Advisory Staff Nanking (China)*<sup>16</sup>

APRIL 26, 1938.

Ausl

Maximum personnel

in October 1935: 43 officers, and various civilian officials

Total personnel

in August 1937: 30 officers, and various civilian officials

Total personnel

in April 1938: 24 officers, and 9 civilian officials.

## LIST OF GERMAN ADVISERS AS OF APRIL 1938

The advisers are employed by the Chinese Government under private contract

Rank	Name	Since what year in China	Duration of Contract	Remarks
General of Infantry retired	von Falkenhausen	1934	?	Duration of private contracts in force for individual advisers not definitely known here.
Lt. Gen. "	Streccius	1934	1940	
Maj. Gen. "	Starke	1933	1939	
Col. "	Nolte	1931	1939	
Col. "	Wilck	1932	1940	
Lt. Col. "	Voigt-Ruschenweyh	1933	1939	
Lt. Col. "	Newiger	1935	1939	
Lt. Col. "	Aderholdt	1936	1940	
Major "	Baumbach	1933	?	
Major "	Bründel	1933	1938	
Major "	Heinrichs	1934	1939	
Major "	Lindemann	1934	?	
Capt. "	Krummacher	1929	1939	
Capt. "	Meyer	1929	1939	
Capt. "	Baron von Stein	1931	1941	
Capt. "	Stennes	1933	1939	
Capt. "	Arnade	1936	1939	
Capt. of Cavalry "	von Boddien	1931	1938	
1st Lt. "	Bauer	1930	1939	
1st Lt. "	Boegel	1932	1938	
2d Lt. "	Hummel	1928	1939	
2d Lt. "	Stölzner	1928	1939	
2d Lt. "	von Schmeling-Diringshofen	1934	1939	
2d Lt. "	Borchardt	1935	1939	

<sup>16</sup> This table of number and names of the German advisers to the Chinese Government is taken from a file of the State Secretary entitled "Chinese-Japanese Conflict," but presumably originated in an agency of the OKW.

In addition, the following advisers who are not active as officers

Armorer-artificer	retired	Bautz		1939	
Chief horseshoer	"	Bernhardt		1939	
Ordnance sergeant	"	Heinrich		1939	
Shop foreman	"	Kubik		?	
Reserve 2d Lt.	engineer	Lohmann		1939	
Armorer-artificer	retired	Martin		?	
Sergeant	"	Pohle		?	
Chief Government		Senczek		1939	
Inspector	"				
Mess Sergeant	"	Scholz		1939	

In addition (not under the Chief Adviser)

Lt. Col. Reserve	Lebsanft	1937	Hapro	
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No. 578

1929/432802-03

*Memorandum*

BERLIN, April 27, 1938.

The Chinese Ambassador called on me today and immediately asked me about the significance of the newspaper reports from Britain, France, and Czechoslovakia to the effect that the German military advisers had been recalled from China.

I did not consider it advisable to leave the Ambassador in the dark, and bluntly told him that those rumors were not unfounded. After all, we felt that we wanted to maintain a neutral attitude in the Sino-Japanese war, and in the long run it was inconsistent with this attitude if, as a result of the presence and assistance of some thirty former German officers, the world should believe, rightly or wrongly, that we were actively influencing the Chinese conduct of the war.

After a brief digression regarding the statements in the Führer's latest Reichstag speech, the Chinese Ambassador again spoke of how much harm such an instruction to the German military advisers was bound to cause German-Chinese friendship. He hoped that the instruction was not a direct order.

I replied that it was not a military order, since the gentlemen concerned were no longer in German military service, but it was a definite wish of the German Government. However, I did not know whether this wish was already known to the parties concerned.

Since the Ambassador seemed inclined to discuss with me the treatment of this wish of the German Government, I replied that it

might be better to await the reaction of the former German officers concerned to the wish of the German Government, of which they were being informed.

The Ambassador, who maintained an outwardly calm attitude during the whole conversation and interjected only a few veiled but pointed remarks in his Asiatic way, would like to discuss this matter with the Foreign Ministry as soon as Herr von Falkenhausen and the other gentlemen concerned have received their instructions through Herr Trautmann.

WEIZSÄCKER

### No. 579

1929/432801

#### *Memorandum*

BERLIN, April 28, 1938.

On April 27 Ministerial Director von Jagwitz, Chief of the Division of Commercial Policy of the Economic Ministry, informed me that the Commissioner for the Four-Year Plan, Minister President Field Marshal Göring, had forbidden the further exportation of war matériel to China. The Association of Exporters of War Matériel had received instructions to that effect.

Transmitted herewith to the Foreign Minister through the State Secretary.

WIEHL

### No. 580

1929/432804-05

#### *The German Ambassador in China (Trautmann) to the German Foreign Ministry*

##### Cipher Telegram

No. 197 of April 29

HANKOW, April 30, 1938—12:40 a.m.

Received April 30, 1938—1:40 a.m.

With reference to telegram No. 94 of the 22d,<sup>17</sup> in continuation of my telegraphic reports Nos. 190 and 195.<sup>18</sup>

General von Falkenhausen's reply:

1. All advisers are in Hankow or even farther back in the hinterland, as teachers at school, etc. The stationing of any adviser near the front has been scrupulously avoided.

<sup>17</sup> Not printed.

<sup>18</sup> Neither printed.

2. The private contracts of the individual advisers, which run until 1939 and 1940, cannot be terminated unilaterally. Unilateral notice of termination means breach of contract and thus, besides legal liability for damages, loss of the money for the return journey and of all compensation for the intervening period.

3. For the majority of the advisers, termination of their contracts means giving up their vocations and their financial ruin, since to most of them no equivalent position can be offered at home. This is particularly true of advisers whose reinstatement in the *Wehrmacht* has been refused or is impossible.

Because of increased expenditures caused by the war, a number of advisers have had to contract financial obligations, so that, if they broke their contracts, they would be stranded in China, in debt and without traveling money.

4. Almost all the advisers have their homes and the greater part of their property in Nanking and must continue to keep their domestic help there, since otherwise the safeguarding of the property, insofar as it has not already been plundered by the Japanese, cannot be guaranteed. Leaving China would entail the loss of a large part of their possessions, since it is impossible to ship them.

5. The women secretaries in the Central Advisers' Office, who came to China at their own expense, have no money for the return journey and no prospect of other employment.

6. The German Government would therefore have to assume for the advisers the costs of the return journey of the advisers and their families and of the secretaries, compensation for household effects, etc., and any other damages resulting from the termination of the contracts. Furthermore, the arrangement would have to be effected through diplomatic channels, since the advisers themselves have no facilities for that.

7. Since the question of terminating the contracts has never been alluded to before, at the beginning of the conflict and again after the Führer's address of February 20<sup>19</sup> I assured Marshal Chiang Kai-shek, in reply to his inquiry, that I personally would honor my contract.

8. The other advisers, including the generals, have not been informed, in order to spare them concern over the future.

TRAUTMANN

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<sup>19</sup> The tenor of which was favorable to Japan and in which German recognition of Manchukuo was announced.

## No. 581

1929/432809-12

*Memorandum by the German Ambassador in Japan (Ott)*

## I

During my farewell interview today the Foreign Minister handed me the enclosed statement in regard to six points.

He explained that with a view to the further improvement of our cordial relations he would like to communicate to me certain wishes of the Japanese Government for transmittal to Berlin.

*Re point 2* (war supplies) he stated that the reports from the Japanese Mission in Hong Kong show Germany participating in supplying arms and ammunition. Certain lists had been transmitted to the Japanese Government.

I stated that we had also learned of such lists from our Naval Attaché. Examination in Berlin proved that they frequently did not correspond with the truth.

I stated further that, because there had been no declaration of war, the German Government, with the best of intentions, could not cancel previous commercial agreements by business firms without the Reich's assuming full financial liability. In the great task of developing and strengthening the German economy and the *Wehrmacht* it would be difficult for the German Government to assume this additional burden. It would hamper the execution of this task and therefore would also have an adverse effect eventually upon Japan. The situation would be different if compensations were found in the Far East. The Embassy, therefore, was following the Commercial Attaché's investigation of business prospects in North China with great interest.

The Foreign Minister agreed with these statements and expressed the hope that compensations would be found for Germany.

## II

He added that Ambassador Togo had been instructed to push several political questions, among them

1. the question of the German colonies,
2. the Committee for the Execution of the Anti-Comintern Pact.

1. With regard to the question of the colonies, the Japanese Government repeated the views communicated to Ambassador von Dirksen; in its opinion this question between Japan and Germany would be solved with no disadvantage to Germany.

2. The Anti-Comintern Committee is to be established in Berlin; after it has acquired some experience, the establishment of additional committees in Rome and Tokyo would seem advisable.

### III

In answer to an inquiry about the *Japanese* situation, the Foreign Minister gave the following information:

The announcement by the Prime Minister regarding new measures against China meant that Japan had decided to end the deadlock by stepping up her activities.

The statement of January 16<sup>20</sup> remained in full force, and negotiations between the Government and Chiang Kai-shek were out of the question.

It was possible that after another battle Chiang Kai-shek would amend his attitude, and then a new development might begin. It was out of the question for Japan to approach him.

OTT

TOKYO, May 5, 1938.

[Enclosure]<sup>21</sup>

### THE GAIMUSHO, TOKYO

1. The recent decision of the German Government to withdraw military instructors from China is highly appreciated.

2. As to the frequent reports that arms and ammunition of German make are being supplied to China, the Japanese Government have full confidence in the attitude of the German Government.

3. In view of the fact that the Transoceanic News Agency, which is under the management of German nationals, have on numerous occasions carried and still continue to carry a kind of news which is unfavourable to Japan, it is desired that the German Government would be good enough to use their influence so that the Agency may cease such practice which is harmful to the cordial relations between the two countries.

4. It is also desired that the air-service between Japan, Manchoukuo and Germany shall be inaugurated without delay.

5. The co-operation between the two countries on cultural matters by means of a treaty.

6. As to the economic activities of German nationals in North China, should the German Government, by despatching an economic

<sup>20</sup> See telegram No. 27 of January 16, 1938, from the German Ambassador in Japan, document No. 556, p. 819.

<sup>21</sup> The file copy of this memorandum is in English.

mission to inspect the real conditions obtaining on the spot, arrive at some concrete decision with regard to methods of promoting them and approach the Japanese Government on individual questions, the Japanese Government would be fully prepared to give favourable consideration.

## No. 582

1929/432814

*The German Ambassador in China (Trautmann) to the German Foreign Ministry*

Telegram

No. 204 of May 9

HANKOW, May 9, 1938—9:25 p.m.

Received May 9, 1938—9 p.m.

Marshal Chiang Kai-shek asked me to see him today in order to discuss with me the question of deliveries of war matériel. He had received a telegram from Berlin to the effect that it was intended to stop the deliveries of matériel. He stated that even Italy, with which China had most unsatisfactory relations, had not stopped the delivery of supplies which had already been ordered. Only recently nineteen Italian tanks and planes had been shipped. The barter treaty with Germany had been in force for a long time, and it would arouse the greatest disappointment in China if Germany should now discontinue deliveries. Despite the recognition of Manchukuo, the Chinese Government had tried to continue the old friendship. If, at a time when other powers were actually making deliveries to China, Germany terminated the existing contracts, the feelings of the Chinese people toward Germany would be affected very deeply.

If former relations with Germany continued, China was prepared to improve her relations with Germany in the economic field and in other fields, if this corresponded with Germany's intentions, and was prepared to start negotiations in regard to this matter.

I explained the difficulties of our position toward Japan to the Marshal; nevertheless, he urgently requested that I transmit his remarks to my Government.

From Chiang Kai-shek's very earnest statements I gained the impression that we have now reached the decisive turning-point in our relations with China, and that we are risking all our constructive work in China since the war and perhaps in the future if we now act abruptly in regard to the question of the military advisers and the deliveries of war matériel. I shall also discuss this question fully with Ambassador Ott in Hong Kong.

TRAUTMANN

## No. 583

224/150588-89

*The German Foreign Ministry to the German Embassy in China*

Cipher Telegram

SECRET!

No. 104

BERLIN, May 13, 1938.

(zu Pol. I M 1436 g)

For the Ambassador personally.

With reference to telegram No. 197 of April 30.

1. Please inform General von Falkenhausen that the Reich Government expects its request for the return of the military advisers to be complied with as speedily as possible. General von Falkenhausen is requested to communicate this message immediately to the former officers of the Advisory Staff and to have them make the necessary preparations.

2. Since, according to the reply by General von Falkenhausen, the advisers cannot unilaterally terminate their employment, I request that—without emphasizing the legal side—you, as well as the advisers, intervene with the Chinese Government to effect the release of the advisers from the employment prematurely. It may be stated in justification of the German wish that from the beginning of the present conflict Germany had felt the need for neutrality. With the continuation of the conflict, which had meanwhile assumed the nature of a war, it was inconsistent with neutrality for former German officers to be in the Chinese service, thus creating the impression in the world that we were actively influencing the conduct of the war by the Chinese. We expected the Chinese Government, in view of the traditional friendship existing between the two countries, to give due consideration to these well-founded German wishes. The fact that Germany did not proceed to recall the advisers until this time, when the conflict had lasted almost a year, clearly showed how much understanding the Germans had shown for the Chinese situation up to now.

3. The advisers may be informed that the Reich Government, for the sake of fairness, is prepared to pay the cost of the return trip and to grant adequate compensation to all concerned. Please report by wire the amount to be allowed for this.

4. If, as previously reported, Chinese public opinion can be expected as a result of these measures to become so hostile as to cause anxiety for the life of Reich nationals in China, please make provision, in agreement with the *Landesgruppenleiter*, for the departure of the Germans from menaced localities in good time, in order to prevent further aggravation.

5. Strictly secret. For your information:

Strict measures against the officers concerned are contemplated, in case individuals should refuse to comply.

RIBBENTROP

No. 584

1929/432819-20

*The German Foreign Ministry to the German Embassy in China*

Cipher Telegram

No. 106

BERLIN, May 17, 1938.

In continuation of telegraphic instruction No. 104 of the 13th, and with reference to the unnumbered telegraphic report of the 15th from Hong Kong.<sup>22</sup>

1. A gradual withdrawal of the military advisers there is out of the question.

2. I now expect immediate compliance with the instructions given to you in telegram 104 and refer to the additional instructions which will be sent tomorrow.

3. It is the express order of the Führer and Chancellor that the military advisers concerned return immediately. They are expected to leave China immediately ["by the end of May" deleted and replaced by "immediately"].

4. I ask you to urge the Chinese Government to terminate the contracts of the military advisers immediately after the receipt of these telegraphic instructions. Should the Chinese Government make difficulties regarding the termination of the contracts, you may hint personally that your position in China would then become untenable ["your recall could then not be avoided" deleted in text].

I request that you inform the German military advisers that any failure to comply with instructions from the Embassy will have serious consequences for them.

RIBBENTROP

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<sup>22</sup> Latter not printed. Trautmann telegraphed that after conferring with Ambassador Ott in Hong Kong, they agreed it would be preferable to withdraw the military advisers gradually.

## No. 585

145/81149

*The German Ambassador in China (Trautmann) to the German Foreign Ministry*

Telegram

URGENT

HANKOW, May 21, 1938—8:50 p.m.

No. 212 of May 21

Received May 21, 1938—7:55 p.m.

With reference to our telegram No. 208 of May 20.<sup>23</sup>

Since some of the military advisers have already been informed of the decision made, since there is danger of an indiscretion by the press, and since the date of the Marshal's return is uncertain, I could not wait any longer and have informed the Foreign Minister, requesting him to inform the Marshal. He expressed utter astonishment at the decision that had been made. The recognition of Manchukuo had been a heavy blow to China. But since the German Government, in the subsequent exchange of notes, had expressed its willingness to maintain friendly relations with China, the Chinese Government had "gracefully"<sup>24</sup> endeavored to prevent any popular excitement. Now the people would interpret the new German measure as indirect aid to Japan. The Foreign Minister pointed out that legally there was no state of war with Japan, and that the neutrality law would therefore not be applicable. The Foreign Minister also stressed the private status of the military advisers, who, like the French, British, and American advisers, did not obligate their Governments in any way. Besides, the advisers had no influence on the actual conduct of military operations. As far as Communism was concerned, the Chinese Government had pledged itself to carry out a policy of suppressing Communists and would adhere to this policy. But, if the Central Government were really jeopardized, there is danger that the people, driven to desperation, might, against the wishes of the Government, throw themselves into the arms of Soviet Russia.

In reply to this I used the arguments contained in your instructions and requested the Foreign Minister to do everything possible to avoid jeopardizing the relations between our two Governments.

He reserved the reply of the Chinese Government.

TRAUTMANN

<sup>23</sup> Not printed.

<sup>24</sup> The quoted word is in English in the original.

No. 586

2196/473567-68

*The State Secretary in the German Foreign Ministry (Weizsäcker)  
to the German Ambassador in China (Trautmann)*

BERLIN, May 30, 1938.

DEAR HERR TRAUTMANN: I am discourteously answering your friendly letter of April 22<sup>25</sup> by typewriter. The pace here is getting faster and faster. Moments of reflection and of unhurried correspondence are becoming more and more rare.

I know very well that we have recently given you much difficult deliberating to do and I can very well put myself in your place. At the same time, however, you are the only one who can do these jobs and that is our consolation and, I hope, yours too. Ambassador Ott will perhaps give you an oral report shortly about the situation here, for he has our full consent to the plan, discussed by you both, that you see each other periodically when that is possible.

That we are now making ambassadors out of military attachés is probably in accordance with the spirit of the times. (I myself can certainly not criticize this if I think of my own past.)<sup>25a</sup> The connection between the War Ministry and the Foreign Ministry is closer today than ever and I believe there is a very good reason for this. As long as we were only a pawn of foreign policy and by no means in a position to defend ourselves, this connection was perhaps not so important. Our thoughts now move in new channels, however.

It is not my intention here to allude to the last 2 weeks of German-Czech experiences, for if the other side does not force us, we shall prefer the chemical process to the mechanical in this theater.

I, personally, am not thinking of colonies at the present time, for without prior solution or at least a leveling off of the Czech affair, a conversation about colonies will hardly prove productive.

Russia hardly exists in our calculations today. As long as Stalin makes himself as useful as now, we need not particularly worry about him as regards military policy.

Best wishes for you, your family, and your work.

Heil Hitler!

Yours,

WEIZSÄCKER

<sup>25</sup> Not printed.

<sup>25a</sup> Weizsäcker had been Naval Attaché at The Hague prior to his diplomatic career.

E. THE SEARCH FOR A PREFERENTIAL POSITION IN NORTH CHINA,  
MAY-SEPTEMBER 1938

No. 587

174/135831

*Memorandum of a Conversation Between the Foreign Minister and the Japanese Ambassador on May 20, 1938 (Based on Information Given by the Foreign Minister)*

SECRET

BERLIN, June 2, 1938.

The Japanese Ambassador referred to the previous conversations with the Foreign Minister regarding economic cooperation between Germany and Japan in North China and handed the Foreign Minister the *Pro Memoria*,<sup>26</sup> copies of which had already been sent to the parties concerned. In this connection the Japanese Ambassador remarked that this *Pro Memoria* was not intended to be a formal treaty but merely a record of oral statements exchanged. Because of the cumbersome procedure involving the Japanese Privy Council, it was not advisable to conclude a formal treaty. However, even without a formal treaty, the word of honor of the Japanese Government backed up the Japanese assurances contained in the *Pro Memoria*.

Regarding the contents of the *Pro Memoria*, the Ambassador stated that it represented the maximum he had been able to obtain from Tokyo.

The Foreign Minister told the Ambassador that the *Pro Memoria* would be examined and the Ambassador would receive a communication regarding any changes that might be desired. The Ambassador declared his willingness to receive such proposals for amendment, but he did not believe many more changes could be made in the text.

The Foreign Minister gave instructions to treat the *Pro Memoria* as "secret" and to examine it together with the gentlemen thus far consulted (von Rauner, Wohlthat, Schlotterer<sup>26a</sup>). During the conversations with the Japanese Ambassador regarding the proposals for amendment, efforts should also be made to get him to declare that he agrees to a formal manner of procedure (exchange of notes between the Embassy and the Foreign Ministry).

WIEHL

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<sup>26</sup> Printed as Annex, *infra*.<sup>26a</sup> *Ministerialdirigent* Schlotterer, an official of the Ministry of Economic Affairs.

[Annex]

174/185888-39

*Pro Memoria*

SECRET!

Drawn up on May 20, 1938.

Delivered by the Japanese Ambassador.

I. In the repeated conversations which the Foreign Minister, Herr von Ribbentrop, has had with Mr. Togo, the Japanese Ambassador in Berlin, the Foreign Minister recognized the special position of Japan in China and agreed with the Ambassador that Japan and Germany—in the spirit of the Anti-Comintern Agreement concluded between the two countries—should cooperate ever more closely in China in the economic field as well. The Foreign Minister further told the Ambassador that the German Government was prepared to do its very best for economic and technical cooperation with Japan in North China, and at the same time expressed the wish that the Japanese Government for its part would consider economic cooperation between Japan and Germany and the protection of German foreign trade with China in an especially generous and sympathetic manner.

II. After having reported to the Japanese Government the course and the result of the conversations described above, the Ambassador has now received a reply from the Imperial Government. The Japanese Government agrees to the points mentioned in paragraph I and accordingly intends henceforth to adopt the following course in regard to Germany's economic activities and foreign trade in China:

a) The Japanese Government will in the future not only not give Germany the subordinate position of a third power in regard to her economic activities in North China, but will favorably consider German interests where possible in individual cases in which proposals may in future be made by Germany. It should, however, be mentioned that this benevolent treatment could not, of course, be in the nature of precluding cooperation with third powers.

b) The Japanese Government is of the opinion that German foreign trade in the Chinese market should basically be on the same footing as that of the Japanese, and therefore it will do its best to have both countries enjoy the same treatment with respect to customs in China; and to see that, in addition, in case of the application of any special import or export regulation, German interests will be respected and considered as favorably as possible. How-

ever, it should be emphasized that it will be necessary to safeguard any special position of Japan resulting, for instance, from the necessity of preserving the monetary system in North China, which is inseparably connected with the Japanese monetary system.

### No. 588

174/135832-33

*Memorandum of a Conversation Between the Foreign Minister and the Japanese Ambassador on May 20, 1938 (Based on Information Given by the Foreign Minister)*

BERLIN, June 2, 1938.

The Foreign Minister commented along the following lines:

1. German services to Japan: recognition of Manchukuo; military advisers; discontinuance of the exportation of war matériel.

2. Germany's losses in China: foreign exchange payments; loss of contracts for war matériel; China's probable refusal to pay; boycott of German goods in China.

3. Inadequate Japanese cooperation: insufficient release of frozen credits; less favorable treatment in the granting of foreign exchange permits; unfavorable treatment—compared with other countries—in the matter of contracts in Manchukuo; interference with German trade in North China; discriminatory treatment regarding the settlement of German claims for war damages.

4. General expectation of greater Japanese cooperation in economic questions: a clear settlement of the repeatedly promised preferential position in the Japanese continental sphere; announcement of the demand for a larger yield of foreign exchange from the trade between Germany and Japan, in view of the losses sustained in the trade between Germany and China. A proposal to that effect would shortly be transmitted to the chief negotiator of the Japanese.

The Japanese Ambassador:

1. Gratefully acknowledged German services to Japan.

2. Stated, regarding Germany's economic losses in China, that the Field Marshal had already written a letter to General Oshima concerning this matter and assessed the losses resulting from the stopping of deliveries of war matériel at 100 million Reichsmarks. Not until this claim for losses was presented did the Japanese realize how enormous the German deliveries of war matériel to China must have been thus far. The Foreign Minister denied this conclusion and explained to the Japanese Ambassador that the figure of 100 million Reichsmarks concerned not only the losses from

contracts already concluded and now to be suspended but also the loss of profits which could surely have been expected from future contracts.

3. Discussion regarding the individual points of inadequate Japanese cooperation:

Concerning the release of frozen assets, the Ambassador pointed out that considerable amounts had been released here lately. The Foreign Minister, however, insisted that additional releases absolutely had to be made. The Ambassador could not imagine why Germany should be less favorably treated regarding the granting of foreign exchange permits than the United States, for instance, and promised to make inquiry in Tokyo regarding this matter. Regarding the award of Government contracts in Manchukuo, the Ambassador claimed as an excuse that the Japanese Government had no direct influence in the matter.

Regarding interference with German trade in North China by Japanese monopolies, the Ambassador answered evasively.

As to the German claim for war damages, he promised to take the matter up with his Government.

4. With respect to the expectation of greater Japanese cooperation in economic matters, the Ambassador referred, concerning a preferential economic position for Germany in China, to his *Pro Memoria*, which was submitted at the same time (see separate memorandum).

As to the German desire to obtain a larger yield of foreign exchange from German-Japanese trade, the Ambassador pointed out that this question must be discussed further during the pending negotiations regarding a commercial treaty. In this connection he expressed the wish that these negotiations be expedited as much as possible. The Foreign Minister assured him that he fully shared this wish.

WIEHL

No. 589

174/135834-35

*Memorandum of a Conversation Between the Foreign Minister and the Japanese Ambassador on May 28, 1938*

BERLIN, June 2, 1938.

The Japanese Ambassador had made an appointment to see the Foreign Minister. The conversation concerned the German-Japanese economic negotiations. The Ambassador referred to the German memorandum that had been transmitted to the Japanese chief negotiator by Herr Wohlthat since the Ambassador's last conversation with

the Foreign Minister. In that memorandum the demand had been made that half of the payment for the contemplated additional barter transactions be made in foreign exchange. He objected, to begin with, that it was inadmissible thus suddenly to combine the German-Japanese trade negotiations with the Chinese question. In the opinion of the Japanese, German-Japanese trade should rather be kept entirely separate from the negotiations for German-Japanese economic cooperation in China. He was told in reply that Germany had no intention of combining these two complex questions either in form or in practice. Although, in connection with the new German proposal for a larger yield of foreign exchange from German-Japanese trade, reference had been made to German foreign exchange losses because of the present situation in China, the intention had been merely to stress the motive underlying the new German proposal. German foreign exchange losses in China were so serious that they forced Germany to attach greater importance than before to increased foreign exchange revenue, in all pending and future negotiations generally, those with Japan being no exception. From the fact that the new measures, very greatly increasing Germany's foreign exchange losses in China (military advisers, prohibition of the delivery of war matériel), had been taken in the midst of the negotiations with Japan, the new German proposal could be immediately understood, but the combining of the two sets of questions, to which the Ambassador objected, could not be deduced therefrom.

The specific objection of the Ambassador to the new German proposal was that Japan positively could not agree to it because she simply could not raise the required amount of foreign exchange. Two years ago, when Germany found herself in a particularly critical situation as regards foreign exchange, Japan had shown perfect understanding. The Japanese Government could therefore expect Germany today to show like understanding of the even more critical Japanese shortage of foreign exchange resulting from the war in China.

The Foreign Minister replied that we were certainly not lacking in such understanding, and that naturally we could not expect Japan to pay us more foreign exchange than she actually had. We could, however, expect the Japanese, in the distribution of the foreign exchange actually available, to favor us as far as feasible, and, in any case, to give us preference over such countries as were not themselves faced with as serious a shortage of foreign exchange as was Germany.

The Japanese Ambassador admitted this and said that Japan would of course give Germany as much foreign exchange as possible. Both gentlemen agreed that during the pending negotiations the foreign exchange question should be studied thoroughly, to determine the actual amount of foreign exchange that Japan would be able to furnish for her trade with Germany.

In reply to the German memorandum the Japanese Ambassador handed the Foreign Minister another memorandum,<sup>28</sup> copies of which have already been sent to the government offices concerned. The Foreign Minister promised to examine the statements contained therein.

The Japanese Ambassador then mentioned again the objection raised by the Foreign Minister during the conversation of May 20, to the effect that in Japan's allocation of foreign exchange Germany was treated less favorably than, for example, the United States.<sup>28a</sup> He said that he had been informed by Tokyo that this assumption was erroneous and that the competent officials of the Japanese Foreign Ministry had discussed this matter with Dr. von Spindler, the Commercial Attaché of our Embassy.

WIEHL

## No. 590

174/135836-37

### *Memorandum*

SECRET

BERLIN, June 3, 1938.

Minister von Raumer and I called on the Japanese Ambassador today to discuss with him our wishes for revision in the text of the *Pro Memoria* which he handed the Foreign Minister on May 20.

There were two changes, in particular, with which the Ambassador was not in agreement:

a) In the opening sentence of the *Pro Memoria* we had inserted the words "concerning the economic development of the areas of China under Japanese influence," in order to make clear from the very beginning what the general subject matter of the agreement was and to avoid, in the body of the *Pro Memoria*, the frequently used words "in China" or "in North China." We pointed out to the Ambassador that at the present time the area to which the agreement was to apply could not be geographically delimited, since it could not yet be foreseen how far the Japanese would advance in China. The text proposed by us, on the other hand, covered, as to

<sup>28</sup> Not printed.

<sup>28a</sup> See document No. 588, *supra*.

both substance and scope, what was to be agreed upon, namely, the status that Japan would concede to Germany wherever she had influence and however far this influence extended. The Ambassador objected, however, to the expression "areas of influence," with the statement that his Government wished to avoid this expression.

b) Regarding subparagraphs a) and b), the Ambassador objected to the words "preferential treatment" or "better treatment" for Germany. We pointed out to him that actually it was he who in reply to our original demand for parity had always said that although parity was not possible, Germany would be granted preferential treatment over third powers. He admitted this, but maintained that his Government did not wish to insert in the *Pro Memoria* the express promise of preferential treatment. We pointed out that his wording, according to which Germany was not to be relegated to the status of a third power, came to the same thing. He would not admit this and maintained stubbornly that Japan was prepared to treat Germany in the "best manner possible." He stated emphatically that the Japanese Government would not agree specifically in the *Pro Memoria* to preferential treatment, and he requested us to consider a different wording. After a 2-hour discussion, we agreed to examine the possibility of adopting a text to the effect that Germany, as compared with third powers, should be accorded treatment in keeping with the particularly friendly relations existing between Germany and Japan. We promised to inform the Ambassador of the results of our examination after Whitsuntide.

The Ambassador pointed out further that the specific amplification of Japanese promises, proposed by us in subparagraph b) (equality of treatment also with regard to taxes, duties, and tariffs, preferential treatment in regard to import and export regulations, etc.), would be very difficult, but he did not reject it.

When I expressed the desire for an exchange of the assurances contained in the *Pro Memoria*, the Ambassador mentioned of his own accord that the Reich Foreign Minister had proposed that he and the Ambassador initial two copies of the *Pro Memoria*. The Ambassador said that he personally approved of this arrangement and would endeavor to obtain his Government's consent.

WIEHL

## No. 591

1929/432846

*The German Foreign Ministry to the German Embassy in China*  
Cipher Telegram

No. 128

BERLIN, June 10, 1938.

For the Ambassador.

In continuation of our telegram No. 125 of June 8.<sup>29</sup>

We are expecting a definitive reply from you by Monday, June 13, in regard to the date of departure of the military advisers.

WEIZSÄCKER

## No. 592

1929/432855

*The German Foreign Ministry to the German Embassy in China*  
Cipher Telegram

SECRET

BERLIN, June 13, 1938.

No. 136 of the 13th

With reference to telegrams Nos. 248 and 250 of June 12.<sup>30</sup>

1) Any further delay in the departure of the military advisers (in accordance with paragraph 2 of telegram No. 248) is absolutely contrary to instructions from Berlin. The Führer himself expects their immediate departure.

2) If General von Falkenhausen or any advisers should raise difficulties, the Reich Government would resort to the most severe measures at its disposal with regard to them. General von Falkenhausen's appointment as Military Attaché is out of the question.

(For your information: The dispatch of a suitable officer from here as Military Attaché after the departure of the military advisers is meanwhile being considered.)

3) In case Marshal Chiang Kai-shek should continue his opposition to the release of the advisers, please tell him that he must then expect your immediate recall.

RIBBENTROP

<sup>29</sup> Not printed. The telegram asked for renewed pressure on the Chinese Government to release the military advisers.

<sup>30</sup> Neither printed. These telegrams transmitted requests of Chiang Kai-shek that a few of the military advisers, or at least General von Falkenhausen, be permitted to remain an additional period.

## No. 593

1929/432856-57

*The German Ambassador in China (Trautmann) to the German Foreign Ministry*

Telegram

URGENT

HANKOW, June 14, 1938—11:54 p.m.

No. 254 of June 14

Received June 14, 1938—10:30 p.m.

With reference to 136 of the 13th.

1) I informed Falkenhausen of paragraph 1 and paragraph 2, first sentence. He will inform each individual adviser personally and secretly. I have no doubt that all the advisers will obey the order of the Führer and Chancellor immediately. Because of the worsening of the military situation, the regular and usual means of transportation cannot be used. The first possibility of departure is by international train, which leaves in about a week, unless the Chinese Government places a special train at our disposal for the departure of the advisers in a group.

2) Your telegraphic instruction arrived after my conversation with Chiang Kai-shek. I had already informed him emphatically of the desire of the Führer and Chancellor. He replied that, in consideration of the Führer's wish, he agreed that from now on no German nationals would remain in the Chinese military service. Thus Germany's neutrality would be preserved. He will therefore relieve all German military advisers of their functions and allow the majority of the advisers to depart immediately. He will give instructions to Falkenhausen to this effect this very day. At the same time, however, the Marshal wishes to ask four or five of the advisers to remain on for a while longer, after release from their military functions, in order to wind up their affairs. I explained to the Marshal the futility of his proposal and warned him of the consequences. He insisted, however, that his idea be passed on.

3) I have the impression that the suggestion of the Marshal is for him a matter of "saving face." Minister Wang Shih-chui told me that he had already informed the Marshal that noncompliance with our request would endanger my position, and the Marshal apologized to me during the conversation for the difficulties that he was unintentionally causing me personally.

4) Because of the significance for German-Chinese relations of No. 3 of the telegraphic instruction, I cannot undertake from Hankow to decide whether the present behavior of the Marshal might constitute "closing the door" [*"Verschliessen"*] to our wishes.

I should also like to wait for the Marshal's instructions to Falkenhäusen.

I therefore request immediate instructions as to whether I am to carry out No. 3 now. I can do so immediately.

TRAUTMANN

No. 594

224/150590-93

*Memorandum Regarding Deliveries of War Matériel to China*

SECRET

In accordance with instructions from the Foreign Minister, I informed the Economic Ministry, Division Chief Schlotterer, on June 14 that the Foreign Minister maintained the view that all deliveries of actual war matériel to China would have to be stopped, regardless of when the contract for delivery was concluded. The previous communication of May 27, according to which deliveries of outright military equipment under old contracts, i.e., contracts concluded prior to August 1937, might be continued, was the result of a misunderstanding.

Herr Schlotterer took note of this, but remarked that in regard to this question the Economic Ministry was bound by instructions from the Field Marshal.<sup>32</sup> From his further remarks, which I did not wish to discuss in detail over the telephone, I had the impression that these instructions of the Field Marshal that are guiding the Economic Ministry were not so strict as the position now taken by the Foreign Minister, and that, particularly in certain cases, they still permitted the delivery of outright military equipment. I therefore requested Counselor of Legation Count Strachwitz to clarify the following points by consulting the competent official [*Referent*] of the Economic Ministry, Lieutenant Commander Schottky:

1. What are the instructions of the Field Marshal to the Economic Ministry?
2. What deliveries, if any, of outright military equipment have been made since the end of May 1938?
3. What contracts for outright military equipment still exist, which it is now forbidden to carry out?

A memorandum regarding the result is enclosed. From this it appears that, according to instructions of the Field Marshal, no deliveries of outright military equipment have been permitted since the end of May, that no more such deliveries have been made, and

<sup>32</sup> I.e., Göring.

that, under the contracts now terminated, military equipment in the amount of RM 282 million was still to be delivered, i.e., an amount the loss of which, in the opinion of the Economic Ministry, could cripple our armament industry.

Submitted to the Foreign Minister through the State Secretary.

WIEHL

BERLIN, June 16, 1938.

[Enclosure]

MEMORANDUM

In accordance with instructions, I called today on the competent official of the Economic Ministry, Lieutenant Commander Schottky, and submitted the following questions to him:

- 1) What instructions were issued by Field Marshal Göring in regard to deliveries of war matériel to China?
- 2) What further deliveries have been made to China since these instructions were given?
- 3) What delivery contracts have been made with China but have not yet been carried out?

Herr Schottky's replies are given below:

1) The instructions issued by Göring at the beginning of May were to the effect that the exportation to China of war matériel and of goods important in the war economy was to be prohibited immediately, irrespective of the date of conclusion of the delivery contracts. On May 3 these instructions were transmitted to the Control Office by the Economic Ministry. Shortly thereafter, State Secretary Körner informed us orally that the export prohibition was limited to war matériel as defined in the law concerning war matériel and to such goods as were clearly for military and war use (e.g., steel helmets). This supplementary order also was transmitted to the Control Office.

2) Since May 3 none of the commodities coming under the above-mentioned prohibition has been delivered to China. Work is being continued on some orders, e.g., on submarines. It will take years for these to be completed and the question of whether they are to be delivered to China or to be used elsewhere can be decided at that time. This holds true also with regard to torpedoes for the U-boats. Some orders are now being completed; they will not be delivered, but will instead be kept in storage here for possible delivery later, together with the U-boats.

3) Unexpired but uncompleted contracts with China for the delivery of war matériel:

- a) Concluded prior to August 17, 1937  
     Hapro orders ..... 218 million  
     Delivery contracts with German firms..... 5   “  
 b) Concluded after August 17, 1937  
     Hapro orders ..... 47 million  
     Delivery contracts with German firms..... 12   “

Lieutenant Commander Schottky stressed the fact that even the present situation, i.e., the nonfulfillment of delivery contracts for over 282 million, not to mention any tightening of the export ban, not only represents a serious financial loss to the German armament industry, but is a threat to its very existence. In order to be prepared for an emergency, this industry is dependent on exports in peace time. The fact that the industry had broken its contracts with China was already known internationally and was being exploited to the fullest by competitors. Thus, the Netherlands-Indies Government had recently refused to give Rheinmetall a large order, on the ground that it could not really be sure that the German Government would not, on some pretext, stop delivery in this case also.

Herewith submitted to Ministerial Director Wiehl, together with previous document.

VON STRACHWITZ

BERLIN, June 15, 1938.

### No. 595

F10/108-109

#### *Memorandum for the Foreign Minister*

JUNE 18, 1938.

Subject: Conversation with General Oshima on June 17, 1938, at 6 p.m.

1) The Foreign Minister first discussed with General Oshima the question of the *Pro Memoria*. In this connection, both sides agreed that the counterproposal which we drafted, expressly providing for a preferential position for us with respect to third powers, was to be maintained and that Ministerial Director Wiehl and Minister von Raumer were to inform the Japanese Ambassador that we could not depart from our proposal and that we were of the opinion that an official exchange of notes should take place with regard to this proposal.

2) The Foreign Minister informed General Oshima that he had learned from a usually reliable source that Japan and Italy intended to conclude a special agreement, a nonaggression pact or something similar. The Foreign Minister pointed out that he wel-

comed such a step but would like to be informed of it. General O[shima] declared that he knew nothing whatever about it.

3) The Foreign Minister referred to the fact that the newspapers of various countries were printing lies about the authoritarian states in a more and more acrimonious manner. He therefore thought it necessary to consider how we could jointly combat these attacks and suggested that the idea be weighed whether Japan, Italy, and Germany should not collaborate in this field. The Foreign Minister asserted in this connection that, according to his information, the Berlin representative of Domei<sup>33</sup> did not have the stature that was necessary in order to organize this collaboration on a large scale. General O[shima] admitted that the present representative of Domei meant well, to be sure, but did not have the intellectual stature for organizing such collaboration. General O[shima] promised to do his best to comply with the Foreign Minister's suggestion that a special press specialist be assigned to Berlin through the Army.

VON RAUMER

### No. 596

1929/432865

*The German Ambassador in China (Trautmann) to the German Foreign Ministry*

Cipher Telegram

URGENT

HANKOW, June 19, 1938—7:05 p.m.

No. 261 of June 19

Received June 19, 1938—4:15 p.m.

In continuation of our telegram No. 258.<sup>34</sup>

Since the Vice Foreign Minister, by order of the Foreign Minister, who was ill, informed me today that Chiang Kai-shek is insisting on retaining five or six advisers for a while until they have settled their affairs, I have now, as instructed, informed him, for transmittal to Chiang Kai-shek, that if this attitude persists, my immediate recall will have to be expected.

The Vice Foreign Minister promised to transmit the message, but regretted the attitude of the German Government, which might drive China to a *rapprochement* with the other Power. The measure was out of proportion to the significance of the question in dispute.

I expect the Marshal's reply tomorrow.

TRAUTMANN

<sup>33</sup> The principal Japanese news agency.

<sup>34</sup> Not printed.

## No. 597

1929/432868-70

*The German Foreign Ministry to the German Embassy in China*

Cipher Telegram

URGENT

BERLIN, June 20, 1938.

No. 142

With reference to telegrams Nos. 261 and 263.<sup>85</sup>

I hereby order:

1) In case the Chinese Government by next Thursday, June 23, has not given its definitive consent to the immediate departure of all the German military advisers and guaranteed that their departure will be carried out, you are requested immediately to turn the affairs of your office over to a Chargé d'Affaires and leave China for Germany. Please inform the Chinese Government of these instructions immediately upon receipt of this telegram. In doing this you should state that whether diplomatic relations can be maintained at all, or will have to be severed by us, depends on the further development of the question of advisers. For your information I may state in this connection that severance of relations might follow very quickly.

2) I expect all German military advisers to discontinue their services at once, if they have not already done so, and to leave China as soon as at all possible—if necessary, against the will of the Chinese Government. Please inform me by telegram of the exact date of their departure from their present place of residence and from Chinese territory. Should any of the advisers encounter any hindrance on their journey, they are to report the matter immediately to the nearest accessible German mission, giving an exact account of the circumstances.

3) If any of the advisers should, contrary to expectation, fail to comply with the instructions contained in 2) above and issued by the Führer, such flagrant breach of faith toward the Reich would mean that proceedings would immediately be instituted for the revocation of their German citizenship and the confiscation of their property. Please inform the advisers of this in no uncertain terms.

4) I should consider it advisable for General von Falkenhausen to accompany you when you inform the Chinese Government in accordance with 1) in order that he may explain in person to the Chinese that the advisers would be placed in an impossible situation if the Chinese put any obstacles in their way. It will be an easy

<sup>85</sup> Latter not printed. It reported Chiang's insistence on his right to retain some of the military advisers, even after being told this would mean Ambassador Trautmann's recall.

matter for him, especially, to convince the Chinese that the German officers cannot be expected to disobey the Führer's order in any particular.

VON RIBBENTROP

No. 598

198/140829-32

*Memorandum for the Foreign Minister*<sup>26</sup>

JUNE 23, 1938.

Subject: Conversation with Japanese Ambassador Togo on June 22, 1938, at 4 p.m.

I informed His Excellency, in accordance with my instructions, that after thorough study of the counterproposal made to us on the wording of the *Pro Memoria*, the Foreign Minister has come to the conclusion that the Japanese draft does not express what has long been the subject of the negotiations. Anyone unfamiliar with the historical development of the negotiations relative to the *Pro Memoria* would receive the impression that the text submitted to us contains only a kind of most-favored-nation assurance. The negotiations were formulated at the outset from the standpoint of parity, and were conducted from the beginning on the basis of a preferential position; a further attenuation would not, therefore, correspond to the purpose of the negotiations. Most-favored-nation treatment follows inevitably from the relations between Japan and Germany; reaching a written agreement on it was unnecessary.

Ambassador Togo was visibly displeased by these statements and said that he regretted very much that the German negotiators were so unyielding. He did not believe that his Government would comply with the German desires. He then brought up certain details and sought particularly to prove that parity of Germany with Japan in the matter of taxes, levies, fees, etc., in addition to the field of customs, implied extraterritoriality for Germany in China. I replied that Germany had had to abandon extraterritoriality in China as a result of the Treaty of Versailles. It appeared doubtful to me that the Japanese Government was anxious that Germany should try to regain this condition of extraterritoriality, for I believed that I was not wrong in assuming that Japan would try in future, in the Chinese areas under her control, to do away with the special position of third powers, that is, their extraterritoriality. The Japanese Government could therefore hard-

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<sup>26</sup> This unsigned copy of a memorandum is apparently by von Raumer of the *Dienststelle Ribbentrop*. It bears the notation: "To Ministerial Director Wühl for his information. June 23, 1938. v. Raumer."

ly be interested in Germany's having fulfilled the conditions of extraterritoriality and being able to receive parity with Japan in these fields. I further pointed out that on the basis of the *Pro Memoria* we were not asking Japan to grant us parity, but only to give us her support, as implied in the expression "she will consequently do her best." Here, too, I believed that Japan's influence with a future Chinese Government would be more effective if Germany does not demand extraterritoriality than if she does. I could not conceive of a Chinese Government making parity of Germany with Japan dependent on the fulfillment of the demand for extraterritoriality.

The Japanese Ambassador thereupon asked me to give another more detailed statement of a legal and practical kind on the points desired by us which differed from his version. This I promised to do.

I further pointed out that Foreign Minister von Ribbentrop, on the basis of repeated study of the memorandum, had come to the conclusion that the contents were so important that the loose form of a merely initialed document did not do the contents justice. Ambassador Togo replied to this that it was basically immaterial what form the agreement took. The initialed agreement was a statement made on the word of honor of the representative of the Government and had the same value as an exchange of notes. I admitted this and said that for us, too, it was not a question of a more or less binding obligation but solely of arriving at an external form that was suited to the importance of the agreement. Considering the subject matter, mere initialing was, in our opinion, just as much a stylistic error as if a person were to go to some festive occasion dressed in working clothes. Ambassador Togo then said to me in annoyance that he would unfortunately have to inform his Government that the Foreign Minister had changed his earlier view and he was afraid that would not create a good impression. To this I replied very vigorously that it was not a question of a change of view here, but that it was customary in treaty negotiations to find the best and clearest form. Since matters of principle were not involved here, nor material or moral demands on Japan, these formal ideas could not be construed as a change of opinion on questions of principle. On the contrary I had to point out in this connection that Germany, in the course of the negotiations, could speak of a change of view having taken place on the part of the Japanese representatives, for the original negotiations had, at bottom, been based on parity between Germany and Japan. The Japanese had then departed from the principle of parity and taken the stand

that Germany must occupy a position between Japan and all other states. His Excellency's last draft retreated even one step farther, in proposing that Germany receive the best possible treatment. I consequently had to point out very emphatically that if one could speak of a change of view affecting the substance of the agreement, only Germany could object; the purpose of any negotiations, however, was to make formal proposals in the course of the negotiations, especially when these only resulted from the development of the content. The Japanese Ambassador then told me that he had naturally not meant it in that way. Moreover, he had conducted the first negotiations, in which the talk had been of parity, independently, without directions from his Government, in order to have a basis for proposals to his Government, and only then had his Government approved the version proposed to us.

I told Ambassador Togo that we were not making any reproaches on that score. We could not tell what points in the negotiations were discussed by His Excellency with his Government's approval and what points were discussed without it, but had so far made no complaints of any kind despite the changes in principle. So much the more did I want to ask him not to let revisions in form be the cause of any ill feeling. The Ambassador, to whom this last discussion was evidently painful, then went into two more questions which I give in the enclosure.<sup>37</sup>

## No. 599

1929/432877-79

*The German Ambassador in China (Trautmann) to the German Foreign Ministry*

Telegram

No. 270 of June 23

HANKOW, June 23, 1938—10:35 p.m.

Received June 24, 1938—2:30 a.m.

A representative of the [Chinese] Foreign Ministry today delivered a memorandum on the question of the advisers. In it the legal viewpoint is first of all set forth that in these private contracts the rights and duties of the contracting parties cannot be altered by the opinion of a third party.

In view of the friendly relations existing between the two countries, in view of the written declarations of the German Government that it wished to preserve friendly relations with China, and because China did not want German nationals to disobey their own Government, China did not wish to insist on the legal viewpoint.

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<sup>37</sup> Not printed.

She wished to comply as far as possible with Germany's request to terminate the contracts of all advisers and permit them to leave China. It was intended, however, to give five or six advisers instructions to stay in China temporarily in order to wind up their affairs. After they had done so, they, too, would receive instructions to leave China.

The Chinese Government believes that Germany appreciates China's not taking the legal standpoint and respects China's good intentions with regard to the German request. It had not expected that Germany would not be satisfied by the measures taken but would instead insist that all German military advisers leave China immediately and that the Chinese Government, moreover, guarantee that they are able to leave China, stating that Germany would perhaps take unfriendly diplomatic measures. The Chinese Government really did not understand on what grounds of law or sentiment Germany could take such an attitude, and had to deplore it. Every country that treats China as a real friend is definitely also treated as a real friend in China. The Chinese Government takes into consideration the special friendship between China and Germany in the past and therefore respects the German wishes and earnestly hopes that the German Government will also make allowance for the friendly relations existing between the two countries and will take the same attitude (as China).

These are the principal points of the memorandum, the exact text of which will follow by air mail.

Yesterday I explained to the Prime Minister and the Vice Chancellor that it was now only a mere question of prestige. Even if the five advisers stayed here they would no longer be able to do any work for China. I reminded them of the Austrian note to Serbia, which was accepted in nearly all essential points; the World War had then broken out on account of a few remaining points. Diplomacy should never let things come to such a pass that a pure question of prestige is pushed to the extreme.

Both Ministers interceded with Chiang Kai-shek to this effect but he gave them the devil. He thinks that we, too, are pursuing a policy of prestige and does not wish to yield to threats. He would like, moreover, as the Vice Chancellor told me, to detain for a time those officers who have knowledge of the fortification at Hankow and on the Yangtse. No names were mentioned.

Prime Minister Kung yesterday gave a farewell dinner for the advisers, at which he made a speech friendly to Germany and thanked the advisers.

Falkenhausen wishes to close the advisers' office tomorrow and to advise Chiang Kai-shek officially that they are all laying down their work.

I do not believe that Chiang Kai-shek is informed of this intention. That might have changed his mind. Thus he will not come to see until it is too late that his obstinacy has no practical significance and that the severance of diplomatic relations between the two great countries depends on the . . . (group garbled) of the advisers, which has no significance.

The official of the Foreign Ministry who delivered the memorandum stated that I had left "no stone untouched"<sup>88</sup> in order still to arrive at a solution.

I regret that I did not succeed in this, but I am of the opinion that we should be generous to a country which is at the most dangerous moment of its battle for existence against a far superior foe.

TRAUTMANN

## No. 600

1929/432880-81

*The German Foreign Ministry to the German Embassy in China*

Cipher Telegram

No. 146

BERLIN, June 24, 1938.

(zu Pol. I M 2203 g)

Drafting Officer: Counselor of Legation von Schmieden.

With reference to telegram No. 270 of June 23.

1) Since the time limit fixed by telegram No. 142<sup>89</sup> has now elapsed without definitive agreement of the Chinese Government to the immediate departure of all the German military advisers, please carry out the instructions contained in the first sentence of paragraph 1) of the said telegram. You are, however, authorized to stop in Hong Kong on your return trip as long as the state of your wife's health requires. In this connection, you will make it clear to the Chinese Government that any stay you may make in Hong Kong is occasioned merely by consideration for your wife's health and is by no means to be interpreted as a deviation from the attitude we had adopted by recalling you.

2) In effecting the departure of the advisers, the Chargé d'Affaires shall proceed in accordance with the provisions of paragraphs 2 and 3 of telegraphic instruction No. 142.

<sup>88</sup> The quoted passage is in English in the original.

<sup>89</sup> Dated June 20, 1938, document No. 597, p. 878.

Will the Chargé d'Affaires please report to me immediately on the reception accorded by the Chinese Government to Falkenhausen's statements regarding the termination of the services of the advisers, especially whether the departure of the advisers retained for the time being can take place at once. The reason given by the Chinese, that they wish to prevent the withdrawal of those officers who are acquainted with the fortifications at Hankow and on the Yangtse, is to be sharply rejected by the Chargé if any reflection is thereby implied on the sense of honor of German officers.

RIBBENTROP

### No. 601

1929/432895

*The German Foreign Ministry to the German Consulate General at  
Hong Kong*

Cipher Telegram

No. 25

BERLIN, June 29, 1938.  
(zu Pol. I Lu 1923)

With reference to telegram No. 10.<sup>40</sup>

For Ambassador Trautmann.

We have in the meantime stated our agreement to having the military advisers leave Hankow by the direct route on July 5 on the special train placed at their disposal by the Chinese Government. If the departure is carried out without hindrance there will be a possibility of continuing relations.

WEIZSÄCKER

### No. 602

174/135844-48

*Memorandum by the Foreign Minister*

RM 240

Japanese Ambassador Togo, who had announced that he would call, came to see me at 1:30 p.m. today.

He handed me the enclosed *Pro Memoria*. By way of explanation, he added that the Japanese Government would like to avoid the expression "North China" in such a *Pro Memoria* and to replace it by "China." Furthermore, the Japanese Government could, unfortunately, not guarantee Germany, by treaty, preferential treatment over all other powers. Therefore, the formula used at the end

<sup>40</sup> Not printed.

of the *Pro Memoria* had been chosen in order to comply as far as possible with our wishes. I declared that I was not satisfied with the formula.

I discussed with the Japanese Ambassador, among other things, whether the formula contained in subparagraph *a*) of the *Pro Memoria* could not be changed to read: "specially to promote German interests" instead of "to promote German interests as much as possible."

The Japanese Ambassador appeared to consider such a change feasible.

In this connection, he again assured me at epic length that the Japanese Government would do everything necessary to protect German interests. It appeared to me that the gist of his explanations was that in actual practice we were to be granted preferential treatment as compared with all other nations, and that it was also intended to indicate this as far as possible in the text, but that they do not wish to make an unequivocal treaty commitment. The Japanese Ambassador stated also that he would be glad to receive further German suggestions for modifying the *Pro Memoria*.

I told the Japanese Ambassador that at the moment I could not express an opinion with respect to the text of the *Pro Memoria*. The draft did not appear to me to go beyond the most-favored-nation treatment, which, in view of the special position of Germany, was not satisfactory. I would, however, have this draft carefully examined and would then inform him of the result.

The Japanese Ambassador then touched on the present state of the German-Japanese commercial treaty negotiations. Unfortunately, Japan was not in a position at the moment to pay in foreign exchange to any great extent.

I declared that I was not familiar with the details and referred him to Ministerial Director Wiehl.

The Japanese Ambassador then expressed his thanks for the support which Ministerial Director Wohlthat had given him at the Whaling Conference in London.

I then informed the Japanese Ambassador that our military advisers would probably leave Hankow on July 5. It had not been an easy matter to bring about their departure. In connection with the recall of Ambassador Trautmann, there had been a number of conjectures in the Japanese press as to a severing of German-Chinese relations and a recognition of the Peking Government. I should appreciate it if influence could be exerted on the Japanese press to discontinue such conjectures.

The Japanese Ambassador then expressed his optimism regarding the further progress of military operations. It seemed to him that after the capture of Hankow, Chiang Kai-shek's position would become untenable.

RIBBENTROP

BERLIN, June 29, 1938.

[Enclosure]

PRO MEMORIA

SECRET!

BERLIN, June 29, 1938.

I. In the repeated conversations which the Foreign Minister, Herr von Ribbentrop, has had with Mr. Togo, the Japanese Ambassador in Berlin, regarding the economic development of *China*, the Foreign Minister recognized the special position of Japan in China and agreed with the Ambassador that Japan and Germany—in the spirit of the Anti-Comintern Agreement concluded between the two countries—should cooperate ever more closely *in China* in the economic field as well. The Foreign Minister further told the Ambassador that the German Government was prepared to do its best for economic and technical cooperation with Japan *in China*. At the same time, he expressed the wish that the Japanese Government for its part would do likewise, and, in particular, that it would assume an especially generous and accommodating attitude toward German *foreign trade in China*.

II. After having reported to the Japanese Government the course and the result of the conversations described above, the Ambassador has now been charged by the Imperial Government to convey the following information to the German Government: The Japanese Government agrees to the points mentioned in paragraph I and accordingly intends henceforth to adopt the following course in regard to Germany's economic activities and *foreign trade in China*:

a) The Japanese Government will in the future regard Germany's economic activities *in China with special favor and will grant her at least the most favorable treatment enjoyed by third powers (Manchukuo excepted)*, and is further prepared to promote German interests as far as possible in any individual cases in which pertinent proposals may be made by Germany. This treatment of Germany does not, of course, preclude Japanese economic cooperation with third powers.

b) The Japanese Government is of the opinion that German *foreign trade in China* should basically be on the same footing as that of the Japanese. It will consequently do its best to have both

countries enjoy the same treatment with respect to customs and to see that, in addition, in case of the application of any special import or export regulation, foreign exchange control, or other measure for the regulation of the exchange of goods and of payments which makes the equality of Germany impossible in practice—because of the disparity between the German and Japanese currencies, for instance—German interests *will receive particularly sympathetic consideration and will be granted at least the most favorable treatment accorded other powers (Japan and Manchukuo excepted)*.

## No. 603

174/135864

*Memorandum by the Foreign Minister*

RM 246

The Japanese Military Attaché, Oshima, called on me today at 8 p.m. He informed me that the G.P.U. chief who had fled from Siberia was now in Tokyo. According to him, the governmental structure of the Soviet Union was becoming increasingly disorganized. Moreover, he was in a position to give some interesting information about the Ukraine, where he had formerly been G.P.U. chief. General Oshima had already made the necessary arrangements with Counterintelligence for the interrogation of the Soviet official by a German officer.

General Oshima informed me further that the conclusion of the air agreement was shortly to be expected. They wanted to establish air communication before the end of this year via the southern route. A more northerly line would be selected as soon as the Japanese had brought order into the Province of Sinkiang.

I stated to the Japanese Military Attaché that I did not agree to the formula which Ambassador Togo had transmitted relative to the economic development of North China. I would also have to insist on a more favorable position for Germany as compared with all other powers. We could not be satisfied with a mere most-favored-nation arrangement.

The Japanese Military Attaché promised to contact the General Staff.

RIBBENTROP

BERLIN, July 5, 1938.

## No. 604

174/135851-53

*Memorandum of a Conversation With the Japanese Ambassador on  
July 6, 1938*

BERLIN, July 6, 1938.

Mr. Togo, who had made an appointment to see me, referred to the fact that the Foreign Minister, in the conversation of June 29, had told him to see me for details of the pending economic negotiations. He first took up the subject of the present status of German-Japanese commercial treaty negotiations and said that in the last conversations of his Commercial Attaché, Shudo, with Ministerial Director Wohlthat and Counselor of Legation Voss, we had expressed certain wishes that Japan accept German goods within the limits of the 160-million-yen figure proposed by Japan for normal exports, and had declared ourselves willing, if satisfactory consideration was given these wishes by the Japanese Government, to take under advisement the Japanese proposal for an agreement on additional exports in the amount of 150 million yen, half in exchange for Japanese goods, half on credit. He had wired this result of his Commercial Attaché's conversations to Tokyo and recommended that consideration be given to our wishes. When he received instructions he would get in touch with me again.

Then the Ambassador again brought up the subject of the *Pro Memoria* on German-Japanese economic collaboration in China and insisted obstinately and at length on his counterproposal, which he had handed to the Foreign Minister on June 29 and which the Foreign Minister had already termed unsatisfactory. The differences of opinion are on the following points:

1) In accordance with our proposal the *Pro Memoria* should refer to "the areas of China that are under Japanese influence." The Ambassador wishes to replace these words in every instance only with "China" and gave as his reason that the Japanese Government hoped to extend its influence to the whole of China; for general reasons it therefore did not desire to give recognition in this document to the possibility of a partition of China into areas which were under Japanese influence and those which were not. In reply, I emphasized that we had desired by our phraseology only to make it clear that the agreement does not relate to such areas of China as might finally remain without being under Japanese influence. Actually this was self evident, for the Japanese Government could, of course, only assume obligations for those areas over which it had influence. I was therefore prepared to obtain the

decision of the Foreign Minister as to whether he acceded to the Japanese proposal to put only the word "China" in the respective passages of the *Pro Memoria*.

2) The Japanese counterproposal desires to substitute the words "German foreign trade" in various places where our proposal speaks of "German trade" in China. I told the Ambassador that we could not agree to this. The restoration and protection of the business activity of German firms in China was for us an indispensable prerequisite for the economic collaboration in China desired by both Governments. This business activity did not, however, consist only in the export and import of German goods by these firms to and from Germany, but also in the trade within China and in arranging exports of Chinese goods to third countries, to the United States and Britain, for example. The Ambassador finally admitted this and agreed that only "Germany's trade in China" be inserted at the end of article I and in article II before letter *a*), instead of "foreign trade."

3) The Japanese proposals for amendment of *a*) and *b*) constitute the chief difficulty. The Ambassador insisted that the Japanese Government could not promise us a more favorable position as compared with third powers and equal treatment with Japan with respect to taxes, fees, dues, tariffs, etc. In reply, I repeatedly stated that on the basis of our support of the Japanese action in China, which had been given at considerable sacrifice, we considered ourselves entitled to a more favorable position with respect to such powers as not only did not support Japan but, where they could, placed difficulties in her path. At any rate, I was not justified, on the basis of the binding instructions from the Foreign Minister, in departing from this demand. The Ambassador asked me, nevertheless, to obtain the opinion of the Foreign Minister once more and also referred to the fact that Herr von Raumer had promised to examine from a legal standpoint those of his proposals that deviate from our text. I finally expressed my willingness to inform him of the final attitude of the Foreign Minister and of the possible result of this legal review.

4) Finally the Ambassador informed me that he had been authorized by his Government to give the proposed *Pro Memoria* a legally more binding form by having both parties initial it. I replied that I would so inform the Foreign Minister, but I pointed out that the Foreign Minister, as was well known, had proposed through Herr von Raumer the form of an exchange of notes. The Ambassador said his Government considered the form of an ex-

change of notes impractical because of the difficulty and loss of time involved in obtaining the consent of the Royal Council which would then be necessary.

WIEHL

No. 605

174/135857-68

*Memorandum*

BERLIN, July 28, 1938.

On July 27, 1938, I called on the Japanese Ambassador and informed him by order of the Foreign Minister that the Foreign Minister, even after thorough reconsideration, found unsatisfactory the last Japanese proposal for the text of the *Pro Memoria* on North China, by which Germany was only to be promised a "particularly favorable" treatment, and persisted in the demand for the promise of a "more favorable position as compared with third states." This demand was only the natural consequence of the special relations between our two countries and the great sacrifices we were making in supporting the Japanese action in North China. On the other hand, a treatment which was only "particularly favorable" did not take the circumstances sufficiently into account.

To this decision of the Foreign Minister, various reports from our Missions in China had contributed, from which it could be seen that in the portion of North China already pacified all foreign trade was being ruthlessly eliminated in favor of the Japanese and that a more favorable treatment of German trade was by no means taking place. This procedure was creating the impression that the long-range economic policy contemplated by Japan in North China systematically aimed at completely excluding all foreign trade, Germany's included, permitting it only to the extent that Japan herself could not supply or absorb it. In support of this, I handed the Ambassador the minute, copy of which is attached, wherein five grievance cases are cited. On the basis of a detailed memorandum on the situation of German economic interests in North China, I made supplementary oral statements to him, particularly regarding the complete exclusion of Germany, since the Japanese occupation, from two fields in which we have for many years held a dominant position, namely, in deliveries of railroad equipment and in electric power. The net result was that there was no question of particularly favorable treatment, let alone of a more favorable position for Germany in North China.

I added that Ambassador Ott would be authorized to present these complaints in Tokyo and to ask the Japanese Government for information as to its proposed future economic policy in North China. Ambassador Ott, while in Berlin, had been informed of the progress of the conversations here on economic collaboration in North China, and of the differences of opinion still existing with regard to the text of the *Pro Memoria* and would, for his part, inform the Japanese Government in Tokyo of the Foreign Minister's views when the opportunity presented itself.

The latter piece of information was obviously very displeasing to Mr. Togo. When I at first merely hinted it, he countered with several questions about the instructions given to Ambassador Ott, until I explained these instructions to him in the above-mentioned manner.

Concretely Mr. Togo objected that he had heretofore always done his best to remedy such German grievances in North China and that in two cases he had succeeded, too. (I found out subsequently that on point 2 of the enclosure he had actually made an effort, but that the Japanese assurance on that point is not adequate.) He would now also report to Tokyo the grievances enumerated in the enclosure and in my oral statements. If no particularly favorable treatment of Germany in North China had thus far been granted, this was to be explained by the fact that no accord had yet been reached on the *Pro Memoria* in which this particularly favorable treatment was to be agreed upon. I expressed my astonishment at this remark, pointing out that a particularly favorable treatment was a natural corollary of our relations in general, even without an agreement. This the Ambassador admitted after a few evasions, but he asserted that the suspension of deliveries of war matériel to China and, in particular, the withdrawal of the military advisers had taken place so recently that these gestures of friendship had not yet had time to take effect everywhere on the attitude of the Japanese authorities throughout North China. He also assumed that, as a result of these friendly gestures, many things now would automatically improve in the way we desired.

Finally the Ambassador made some more comments on other details of the text of the *Pro Memoria*, from which I gathered that he is, after all, very anxious for further discussion of them here, and that he perhaps still has some concessions in reserve which he has not yet brought out. He also inquired what position the Foreign Minister had taken on the form of the *Pro Memoria*, namely, ratification through initialing by both parties.

I replied that the Foreign Minister had taken no position on these other details, since there was really no object in going more deeply into these questions as long as the main point, namely, the demand for a more favorable position, was rejected by the Japanese. Mr. Togo insisted, however, and it may, after all, be of advantage to hear him out on possible further concessions by the Japanese, now that he seems to have been placed under some pressure by the parallel action of our Ambassador in Tokyo. Therefore I finally promised him that I would obtain the decision of the Foreign Minister with regard to a continuation of the conversation.

WIEHL

To be submitted to the Foreign Minister through the State Secretary with the request for a decision on the last sentence of the memorandum.

Ambassador Ott has been informed by telegram and has been asked to make similar representations to the Japanese Government.

WIEHL

[Enclosure]

1) On May 2 Japan and Britain agreed that a certain portion of the customs receipts in the ports occupied by Japanese troops shall be applied to the payment of foreign loans, among which are the Tientsin-Pukow and the Hukuang loans, for which the maritime customs receipts are secondary security.

On May 5, 1938, the German Embassy in Tokyo proposed to the Imperial Government of Japan that the German block of the Tientsin-Pukow and Hukuang loans, as well as the Tientsin-Pukow advance, for which £678,000 of the Tientsin-Pukow loan of 1910 are pledged as security, should receive the same treatment.

The reply of the Imperial Government has still not been received.

2) Although the regions along the Peking-Suiyuan Railroad and the region between Shanghai, Hangchow, and Nanking have already been pacified to the extent that they can be freely visited by Japanese civilians, access to these areas is still denied to Reich nationals. The German Government desires that the Imperial Government now open up these areas to Reich nationals also.

3) In the occupation of China by Japanese troops, the Japanese military authorities took over a number of plants (for example in Taiyüanfu) which were only partly paid for and for which not inconsiderable quantities of merchandise were en route or in port of refuge.

The German Government is of the opinion that the taking over of the assets of these concerns entails the legal obligation also to take over the liabilities. It therefore expects that the Japanese military authorities or the Japanese trusts which took over these concerns buy the merchandise now en route or stored in ports of refuge and take over the debts of these concerns to the German suppliers.

4) The Consulate General in Shanghai has for a long time been negotiating with the Japanese Consulate General there regarding a number of concerns on which German firms acquired mortgages by virtue of long-standing business connections and of large debts, or the ownership of which they had had transferred to them.

The Japanese Consulate General has refused thus far to recognize the transfers of ownership and the mortgages and is in many cases preventing the resumption of operations through refusal of the necessary passports, permits for light and power supply, etc.

It is the contention of the German Government that German firms can acquire property from Chinese without official permission, even if they have no claims against them. Since in those cases which the Consulate General in Shanghai has examined carefully, concerns are involved which for many years had close business connections with the German firms and were heavily indebted to them, it is all the harder for the German Government to understand how the attitude of the Imperial Japanese Consulate General can be reconciled with the especially sympathetic treatment of German interests promised by the Imperial Government.

The following firms and concerns are involved:

Defag 5 Dyeing Works:

- a) Ting Feng Dyeing Works, 1127 Whahsing Road
- b) Chien Foong Dyeing Works, 125 Paoting Road
- c) Hsie Feng Dyeing Works, 1106 Point Road
- d) Kwang Sing Sung Kee Dyeing & Weaving Co., 10 Ming Sung Road, Chapei
- e) Kuang Hua Dyeing & Mercerising Works, 172 Loo Pang Road, Nantao

Siemssen & Co. Shanghai Portland Cement Works

Carlowitz & Co. China Wool Mfg. Co.

Shun Chang Stone Pulverizing Works.

All these cases are well known to the Imperial Japanese Consulate General. The German Embassy in Tokyo has also been informed.

5) A number of German firms in North China have over a long period of years built up purchasing organizations there which buy up the products of the country on the spot, collect, assort,

and ship them. This organization was valuable to Germany since it saw to it that good quality merchandise suitable for the German market could be delivered.

The Kwantung Army has now given the employees of the Melchers firm the order to leave the area immediately, since the personal security of the employees was not guaranteed. Japanese merchants, however, are staying in the area as usual and are doing business without interference.

The German Government is very anxious that Reich nationals in the already pacified areas, in which Japanese merchants can move about freely, likewise be permitted to stay on undisturbed and do business.

BERLIN, July 26, 1938.

### No. 606

174/135864-67

*The German Foreign Ministry to the German Embassy in Japan*

SECRET

BERLIN, August 9, 1938.

W 738 g

In continuation of our instruction W 605 g of July 10 and telegraphic instructions Nos. 206 and 213 of July 30 and August 5.<sup>41</sup>

For the Ambassador personally.

I. Enclosed I respectfully send you for your confidential information a memorandum<sup>41a</sup> of a discussion that I had with the Japanese Ambassador on July 27 regarding the text of the *Pro Memoria* and the treatment of German economic interests in China. As may be seen, we are maintaining our basic demand for a more favorable position as compared with the other powers in the areas of China under Japanese influence. Regarding the concluding sentence of the memorandum, the Foreign Minister decided that I should continue the conversation with the Ambassador on this basis. As far as the form of the *Pro Memoria* is concerned, he considers a confidential exchange of notes suitable.

You are respectfully requested, when the opportunity offers, to bring the Foreign Minister's view to the attention of the Japanese Government there, too. On this matter, I wish to make the following additional comments.

Ambassador Togo had at the time rejected our demand for parity treatment, referring to the tremendous sacrifices of life and property that Japan had made, but, on the other hand, had spoken of a preferential treatment of German interests. We worded our demand

<sup>41</sup> None printed.

<sup>41a</sup> Document No. 605, *supra*.

accordingly and asked for preferential treatment as compared with third powers (with the exception of Manchukuo). Thereupon Ambassador Togo declared that although Japan was prepared to treat us *de facto* with special consideration in every way, the Japanese Government could not assume a formal obligation to treat us better than other powers. The true reason for this attitude is obviously the fact that such an obligation would stand in the way of an accord with Britain. Indeed, according to confidential reports received in the meantime, it seems that Japan has promised Britain that she will not grant any country a preferential position. Whether, under these circumstances, we shall win our demand for a written assurance of the "more favorable position" appears doubtful. The decision of the Foreign Minister as to whether, in spite of this, our demand is to be upheld or possibly modified, cannot, however, be obtained until next week. In that case, you would receive a telegraphic directive before the arrival of this instruction.

II. How our economic interests in China are actually being treated by Japan is evident from the additional memorandum herewith enclosed.<sup>42</sup> With respect to our fears concerning the Chinese railroads, in the event that Japan refers to the inquiries regarding locomotives and cars which she had made in Germany (as in other countries also), I would like to add by way of qualification that these apprehensions have to do with the future, when Japan will again be able to make deliveries. I presented to Mr. Togo our complaints on five points, of which I enclose a copy,<sup>42a</sup> and he promised me that he would report to his Government and see to obtaining early redress.

I refer further to the reports of the Consulate General in Shanghai, copies of which are in your possession, regarding the Whangpoo Conservancy (No. 132 of May 26), the Japanese seizure of factories (Reports B 274, 314, 324, and 343, of June 10, 29, 30, and July 14) and the interference with German trade by Japanese propaganda (A.A. 98 of July 16).<sup>43</sup> Copies of two additional reports from the Consulate General are respectfully enclosed.<sup>42</sup>

The observations of our Missions in China do not justify us, accordingly, in expecting that the *de facto* preferential position promised us by the Japanese even remotely corresponds to the *status quo ante*. Thus far we have not been able to discover any signs of consideration corresponding to the sacrifices that Germany has made to advance Japanese interests in China.

I therefore respectfully ask that you stress these facts to the Japanese Government and strive for an early elimination of the numerous grievances.

<sup>42</sup> Not printed.

<sup>42a</sup> Printed as enclosure to document No. 605, *supra*.

<sup>43</sup> Reports mentioned not printed here.

Furthermore, I ask that you determine the intentions of the Japanese Government with respect to the future shaping of its economic policy in China. Only after we know these intentions will it be possible to form an opinion of the implications of any promises in the *Pro Memoria*. If Japan should actually intend to exclude all foreign trade, even Germany's, in North China, insofar as it is capable of absorbing Chinese products and supplying Chinese requirements, so limited a significance would attach to such promises that in this case our attitude with respect to the *Pro Memoria* would have to be reexamined.

I should be grateful for a report on the result of your steps.

By direction:

WIEHL

### No. 607

145/81133

*The German Ambassador in Japan (Ott) to the German Foreign Ministry*

Telegram

VERY SECRET

TOKYO, September 16, 1938—7:15 p.m.

No. 343 of September 16

Received September 16, 1938—2:25 p.m.

For the State Secretary.

On the subject of Konoye's statement regarding strengthening of the Axis (see D.N.B. 315), I hear in strict confidence that the Cabinet has decided, on the basis of the alleged feeler by Oshima, that Japan is in principle prepared to extend the Pact, and is striving to direct it exclusively against the Comintern and to avoid a version going beyond that, if at all possible.

I am trying to get adequate confirmation.

OTT

### No. 608

111/116193

*Memorandum*

BERLIN, September 22, 1938.

Counselor of Embassy Count Magistrati,<sup>44</sup> during a call on another matter, today read to me a telegram of early September from the Italian Embassy in Moscow. According to this, a high official of the Soviet Foreign Ministry had again spoken to the Italian Ambassador, upon the latter's return from leave, about the Soviet-Japanese

<sup>44</sup> Count Massimo Magistrati, Counselor of the Italian Embassy in Berlin.

incident. He had added that the Japanese had yielded for two reasons: as a result of Japanese military weakness and as a result of Germany's refusal to lend assistance. When the Italian Ambassador had shown his astonishment at the second reason, the official of the Foreign Ministry had told him that the Soviet Government was informed that the Japanese Ambassador had at the time been visiting the Foreign Minister at his country estate in order to obtain a promise from the Germans of military intervention under certain circumstances. Although the Foreign Minister had expressed to the Ambassador his entire sympathy with the Japanese stand in case of a conflict, he had explicitly refused military assistance from Germany.

I told Count Magistrati that although I knew that the Foreign Minister had expressed to the Japanese Ambassador Germany's fullest sympathy in the conflict that was going on, I considered incorrect the report that the Japanese Ambassador had requested military assistance.

WOERMANN

CHAPTER V  
GERMANY AND THE SOVIET UNION,  
NOVEMBER 1937-JULY 1938

No. 609

1909/429964

*The German Ambassador to the Soviet Union (Schulenburg) to the  
German War Minister (Blomberg)*

BERLIN, November 25, 1937.

MY DEAR FIELD MARSHAL: You were so kind as to be interested in the lecture given at the *Wehrmacht* Academy today. Enclosed I have the honor to transmit the draft of the lecture.<sup>1</sup> I must apologize for the fact that there are so many corrections. I have, however, only this one copy here and therefore would especially appreciate it if you, my dear Field Marshal, would be so kind as to have the enclosure returned to me at your convenience.

With the expression of my high consideration and Heil Hitler, I am, my dear Field Marshal,

Yours very respectfully,

VON DER SCHULENBURG

No. 610

1909/430013-16

*Extracts From an Address by the German Ambassador to the Soviet  
Union (Schulenburg) Before the German Wehrmacht Academy,  
November 25, 1937<sup>2</sup>*

The task assigned to me comprises such an enormous amount of material that it is simply impossible to give a completely clear picture in a lecture of one hour. I shall therefore attempt, in conclusion, to summarize for you in a few short sentences what I have explained to you in detail.

<sup>1</sup> Extracts from the revised text of this lecture appear *infra*.

<sup>2</sup> These extracts are from the revised text of the lecture. Schulenburg's speech, which ranged over every aspect of the Soviet scene, is much too bulky (40 typed pages) to be printed in its entirety. The conclusion, translated here, summarizes his point of view.

The Soviet Union emerged from the World War and the subsequent interventionist and civil wars with *two* convictions. I do not want to offer any opinion as to whether these convictions are justified by the facts. Undoubtedly they are at the root of all political activity of the Soviet Union.

The *first* conviction is that Imperial Russia owed her defeat in the World War to the *lack of an adequate war industry*. This conviction was strengthened by the belief which is widely held in the East that the superiority of the western European peoples is due to the possession of the machine.

The *second* conviction, born partly of respect, partly of fear, is that of the fearful *strength of the German people*.

The *second* conviction derived from the World War, that of the strength of the German people, at first exerted a lesser influence upon the policy of the Soviet Union. Germany was unarmed, encircled by enemies, and at the time of the Weimar Republic [*zur Systemzeit*] was not unfriendly toward the Soviet Union. This situation has completely changed since the assumption of power by National Socialism and since the rebuilding of our armed forces. There is no doubt that the Soviet Union has since then been dominated by a strong fear of us. It was this fear that led to the Soviet-French and the Soviet-Czech mutual assistance pacts. It was this fear that caused the enormous increase in Soviet armament expenditures that I described to you above.

Although the Soviet Union has at its disposal numerous submarines, a great number of tanks and planes, it ought not to be forgotten that the young Soviet industry is still ill prepared for the demands of the greatly increased armed forces and that the Soviet Union has reverted to the old Russian principle of operating on the basis of *quantity* and not of *quality*.

For some time the observer has noted with astonishment that a Soviet patriotism is again being cultivated, which seems to contradict the internationalist aspirations of Communism. There can be no doubt that this revival of nationalist sentiment among the people is only a measure to strengthen the defensive spirit of the nation and is therefore also part of the rearmament effort of the Soviet Union.

The above-mentioned things are evident at once to the attentive observer. It is not so clearly discernible where the new wave of terror sweeping over the Soviet Union has its origin and what its aim is. Most observers believe that all older party members, who experienced the prewar era and the period of pure Communism, as

well as all who still have any connections with foreign cultures—either because they are living as foreigners in the Soviet Union or because they have relatives abroad—are to be removed or rendered harmless. The purpose would be to see to it that the Soviet citizen is deprived of any chance to make comparisons, so that even the slightest improvement in his almost unbearable situation must appear to him as a huge gift from the “mighty” Stalin. Whether this opinion is correct or not, only the future can tell. There is, however, no doubt that the wave of murder and persecution that is still unspent has gravely shaken the organism of the Soviet State and is weakening the political prestige of the Soviet Union. It would be unwise to assume that this downward development *must* be permanent. Today the Soviet Union is politically and economically heading for a depression. As for what may come *tomorrow*, we shall have to wait and see.

## No. 611

522/237473-74

*The Reichsführer-SS and Chief of the German Police in the  
Ministry of the Interior to the Foreign Ministry*

SECRET

SV 6 1/38 469 30g

BERLIN, January 5, 1938.

Received January 10, 1938.

(Pol. I 69 g (V))

Subject: Soviet Russians in Germany.

Reference: Gestapo Instruction II A 4 1792/36 of October 24, 1936.

I request that the State police authorities competent to order expulsion from the Reich be instructed to expel from Reich territory upon 10 days' notice all Soviet Russian nationals in their district who are Jews, on the basis of section 2, paragraph 3, of the law of March 23, 1934, concerning expulsion from the Reich, *Reichsgesetzblatt* I, page 213, without giving further grounds. No postponement is to be permitted by reason of any legal measure which may be instituted. If the departure is not carried out within the time limit, the expulsion shall be carried out by deportation over the Reich boundary. When there are several Soviet Russian nationals who are Jews in the district of a State police authority, the execution of the expulsion shall be appropriately distributed over the period up to February 15, 1938. The holders of Soviet Russian service<sup>3</sup> and diplomatic passports shall be exempt from the expulsion.

<sup>3</sup> A marginal notation reads as follows: “Commercial delegation?”

Gestapo Office II A 3 is to be informed immediately by teletype of the ordering and the execution of expulsion from the Reich, with complete personal data (surname, first name, occupation, date and place of birth, residence, employer) as well as the date of the expulsion order and the date of departure from Germany.

*Supplement for Headquarters of the State Police in Berlin:*

Leo Arinstein (the Soviet Embassy's physician), a Soviet Russian born on November 3, 1872, in Kiev and residing at Schaperstrasse 34 in Berlin-Wilmersdorf, shall be temporarily exempt from the foregoing measure.

By direction:

DR. BEST

By teletype to all State police headquarters and State police offices.  
Copy transmitted for your information.

By direction:

DR. BEST

## No. 612

522/237476-77

*The Counselor of the German Embassy in the Soviet Union (Tippelskirch) to Counselor of Legation Schliep of Political Division V in the German Foreign Ministry\**

Moscow, January 10, 1938.

(Pol. I 163 g (V))

DEAR SCHLIEP: Enclosed I am sending you the manuscript of the lecture which the Ambassador delivered on November 25 at the *Wehrmacht* Academy in Berlin.<sup>4a</sup> It is the manuscript that the Ambassador put at the disposal of Field Marshal von Blomberg at the latter's request and that has now been returned to us directly by him. The manuscript has been revised once again by the Ambassador and is therefore the only authentic text.

In case you want to reproduce it, as you wrote me, we should appreciate your sending us six copies.

With best regards and Heil Hitler!

Faithfully yours,

VON TIPPELSKIRCH

\* Counselor of Legation Martin Schliep was head of Political Division V, dealing with Russian affairs, in the German Foreign Ministry.

<sup>4a</sup> Enclosure not printed. For extracts from the address, see document No. 610, p. 898.

## No. 613

2092/452554-56

*Memorandum on the Status of German-Russian Negotiations*

## CONFIDENTIAL

1. The conversations with the Soviet Trade Mission here regarding the extension through 1938 of the Economic Treaty for 1937 have thus far been fruitless. In 1937 the Russian obligations arising from bills that fell due during that year were paid before maturity by delivery of goods which were foreign exchange assets to us. We are prepared to grant the Russians the same settlement for 1938. The Russians, however, demand that the obligations on bills falling due in 1938 be paid by deliveries of goods of their choice. They therefore no longer intend to adhere to the lists of goods agreed upon for 1937 for the payment of these obligations. Regarding the amount, the problem for 1938 is of considerably less importance, since only obligations on bills in the amount of 12 million Reichsmarks will fall due, compared with 27 million Reichsmarks in 1937. Of these 12 million Reichsmarks, 7 million Reichsmarks are offset by foreign exchange obligations of the Potash Syndicate, so that only 5 million Reichsmarks would have to be paid by deliveries of raw materials. The question has, however, considerable fundamental importance, in relation to the later repayment by the Russians of the last 200-million credit.

2. In order to insure larger raw material imports from the Soviet Union in 1938 at the outset, we have requested that the Russians submit a list to us of those goods which they intend to order in Germany in 1938 and have promised them far-reaching concessions in supplying this list. According to the view of Minister President General Göring, we are even prepared to make further concessions in those fields where we have previously refused to make any. The Russian order list requested by us has not yet been submitted, and in view of the personnel difficulties can hardly be expected soon.

3. Among ourselves, i.e., thus far only within the delegation, we have considered whether the German raw material purchases from Russia could be expanded and put on a firm basis by means of a new credit. In this connection the following plan has been discussed: proposing to the Russians that the last 200-million-Reichsmarks credit, which will not fall due until 1940 and later, be paid now, i.e., before maturity, by raw material deliveries, and making the payment of this credit palatable by granting another 200-million credit. We agreed today that Section Chief Spitta is to submit this idea as soon as possible to Minister President General Göring

and to obtain his decision whether we can make such a proposal to the Russians.

Promises regarding the Russian orders in Germany and credit operations are the only two means of activating the question of raw material deliveries from Russia, since the Russians do not deliver one penny's worth more than is required for the payment of their orders and credit obligations. Whether the Russians will even consider our proposals cannot be foreseen at the present time. In this connection it is a disadvantage that the present Chief of the Trade Mission, Smolensky, hardly dares to express his own opinion and depends upon his Moscow superiors in everything. In Moscow itself the personnel relations in the Commissariat for Foreign Trade are completely unsettled.

SCHNURRE

BERLIN, January 10, 1938.

No. 614

590/244498-99

*The German Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Schulenburg) to the German Foreign Ministry*

Telegram

URGENT

No. 12 of January 13

Moscow, January 13, 1938—6:36 p.m.

Received January 13, 1938—11:10 p.m.

(Pol. V 361)

According to reports in diplomatic circles here, the Commissariat for Foreign Affairs has also requested the Moscow Missions of Afghanistan, Iran, Turkey, and Czechoslovakia to close most of their Consular offices in the Soviet Union.

According to these reports, the closing of three Afghan Consular offices, among them the Consulates General in Tashkent and Merv, has been requested by the Soviet Government, so that there are no more Afghan Consulates left at all in the Soviet Union. Eight Iranian Consular offices, among them the Consulates at Ashkhabad, Erivan, Batum, and Baku, are likewise to be closed; the Soviet authorities stated that of a total of 11 Soviet Consulates in Iran, 10 would also be abolished. Turkey is said to have been requested to abolish 4 of the 5 Consulates at Odessa, Batum, Baku, Erivan, and Leninakan . . . (group missing); it has not yet been decided which of the above-named 5 Turkish Consulates is to be maintained. The Soviet Union would retain one Consular representation at Istanbul. Particularly amazing, however, is the report that the closing even of the Czech Consulate General at Kiev, which was

established only a year and a half ago as the only Czech Consular office, has been requested by the Soviets, in spite of the close relations between Moscow and Prague.

The request for the closing of a total of 22 Consular agencies in the Soviet Union, including the 5 Italian, 5 German, 2 Japanese, and 2 Polish Consulates which have already been closed, indicates the systematic endeavor of the Soviet Government to limit its relations with foreign countries as much as possible.

*Schüle requests that the above report of Moscow D.N.B. representative Schüle be transmitted as soon as possible to the D.N.B. in Berlin.*

SCHULENBURG

No. 615

590/244500-08

*The German Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Schulenburg) to the German Foreign Ministry*

Tgb. Nr. A/73

Moscow, January 17, 1938.  
(Pol. V 487)

Subject: The closing of foreign Consulates in the Soviet Union and the abolition of Soviet Consulates.

In continuation of the previous reports of the 11th<sup>4b</sup> and 13th.

Last summer and fall, the Soviet Government, invoking the "principle of parity," requested Poland, Japan, Germany, and Italy to limit their Consulates to a number corresponding to that of the Soviet Consulates in each of these countries. A total of 14 foreign Consulates (5 Italian, 5 German, 2 Japanese, and 2 Polish) had to be closed.

In the Diplomatic Corps here, this demand by the Soviet Government was interpreted primarily as an action against the States with which the Soviet Government is not on good terms, rather than as a measure arising out of the generally hostile attitude of the Soviet Government toward foreigners. Meanwhile this view has proved erroneous and the Diplomatic Corps now knows better. A few days ago the Deputy People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs, Potemkin, informed the Ambassadors of Britain, Turkey, Iran, and Afghanistan, as well as the Ministers of Czechoslovakia, Norway, Sweden, Estonia, and Latvia, that as regards the States they represented, also, the Soviet Government would carry out the principle of parity in the number of Consulates on either side. According to a com-

<sup>4b</sup> Not printed.

munication from Potemkin to the Swedish Minister here, the Soviet Government will make the same request of Denmark as soon as the newly appointed Danish Minister has assumed his post. Potemkin has also notified the Ambassadors of Turkey, Iran, and Afghanistan that the Soviet Government will abolish the majority of its Consulates located in the countries represented by them.

The fact that the Soviet Government has requested even friendly States such as Czechoslovakia and Turkey to effect parity in the Consular system, as well as the closing of Soviet Consulates in Turkey, Iran, and Afghanistan, which is obviously done merely for the purpose of reducing the number of Consulates of these countries in the Soviet Union, indicates plainly that this procedure against foreign Consulates in the Soviet Union has its origin in the constantly increasing preponderance of the forces hostile to foreigners, in the espionage psychosis, and in the tendencies directed toward as complete isolation as possible from foreign countries. The closing of almost all Consulates in the Near East indicates abandonment of the traditional Russian policy and a great limitation of the possibilities for Soviet activities in these countries. Britain, especially, will be pleased by this voluntary renunciation on the part of her old opponent in power politics.

The Soviet Government's action shows very clearly that foreign policy has to give way to domestic policy. Litvinov has to accommodate himself to this predominance of domestic policy.

I have been able to ascertain the following details regarding the most recent action of the Soviet Government.

In Leningrad the Soviet Government has requested the closing of the British, Estonian, Latvian, and the three Scandinavian Consulates. They are the only Consulates which those countries have in the Soviet Union, except for Norway, which still has a Consulate in Archangel. If the Soviets' demands are met, there will henceforth be only a Polish and a Finnish Consulate in Leningrad. The Soviet Union apparently could not or would not, for the time being, demand the closing of the Polish Consulate in Leningrad, since it concluded an agreement with Poland regarding Consulates as recently as last August. The Finns will apparently be permitted to retain their Consulate because the Soviets do not for the time being wish to give up their Consulate in Viborg.

The demand for the closing of the Norwegian Consulate in Leningrad is in violation of the existing treaties between Norway and the Soviet Union. In the treaty of friendship and consular rights it was agreed that the Consulates which had already been opened at the time of the conclusion of the treaty (i.e., it was a question of Lenin-

grad and Archangel) should continue to exist and that Norway should have the right to establish Consulates in all the cities of the Soviet Union in which there was a Consulate of a third country or in which one might be established. The Norwegian Minister here has told Potemkin that in view of the existing treaty provisions he would advise his Government to reject the Soviet demand for the closing of the Consulate in Leningrad. The closing of the Norwegian Consulate in Archangel has not been requested, since the Soviets have a Consular agent in Spitzbergen.

My Swedish colleague suggested to Potemkin that a Soviet Consulate be opened in Sweden, in order to save the Swedish Consulate in Leningrad. M. Potemkin answered, significantly, that the Soviet Government was not at all interested in the opening of new Consulates. The Soviet Government had decided to close the foreign Consulates in question. This decision was inalterable. Potemkin sought to mitigate the Swedish Minister's protest by a reference to the fact that the Soviet Government had requested even Czechoslovakia, with which it was on close terms of friendship, to close its Consulate in Kiev.

The Czechoslovak Minister here informed me that his Government would close the Consulate in Kiev. He was particularly exasperated by the fact that the Soviets had refused to compensate Czechoslovakia, upon return of the Consular building, for the not inconsiderable funds she had spent in improving it.

Turkey is to close four of its five [*sic*] Consulates (Odessa, Batum, Tiflis, Baku, Leninakan, and Erivan). The Soviets will close their Consulates in Smyrna and Kars and retain only Istanbul. They have suggested to the Turks that they maintain their Consulate in Odessa. This Soviet proposal may be explained by the fact that there is still an Italian Consulate in Odessa, whereas the Consulates in the Black Sea harbors of Batum and Novorossiisk, as well as all the Consulates in the Caucasus except the Iranian Consulate in Tiflis, are to be closed. From the Soviet standpoint, moreover, the existence of a Turkish Consulate in Odessa is relatively unobjectionable, because Turkey has far fewer interests there than for example in Baku, Erivan, or Leninakan, in which localities there are Turkish tribes.

The Turkish Ambassador rejected the Soviet Russian demands, declaring that such a procedure between friendly countries appeared to him to be out of place. The Soviet Government ought rather to carry on friendly negotiations with Turkey in this matter. If it was not inclined to do so, the Turkish Government would presumably forego all Consular representation in the Soviet Union and also

demand the closing of the Soviet Consulate in Istanbul. The Turkish Ambassador hopes that the threat of closing Istanbul will prove to be an effective means of exerting pressure. . . .<sup>5</sup>

The 3 Soviet Consulates in Afghanistan will be closed. The Afghan Government has been requested to close all its Consulates in the Soviet Union. Afghanistan maintains Consulates at Tashkent and Merv at the present time. The Afghan Ambassador told me that Afghanistan has a treaty right to maintain Consulates in Tashkent and Merv. In this treaty 7 places in the Soviet Union in which Afghanistan is entitled to open Consulates are mentioned by name. The Soviets have the right to maintain 5 Consulates in Afghanistan. For 2 years the Afghan Government has been carrying on fruitless negotiations with the Soviet Government for the modification of the existing treaty provisions in order to be able to open Afghan Consulates in places other than those provided for in the treaty. The Afghan Ambassador is of the opinion that, by invoking existing treaties, rejection of the Soviet demand is quite possible. In that case, however, the Soviets would surely embark on a policy of making impossible the Consulates' existence, which is already scarcely endurable, as well as any practical activity.

On the basis of earlier agreements Iran has the right to maintain 9 Consulates in the Soviet Union and the Soviet Union has the right to 11 Consulates in Iran. At the present time there are 5 Iranian Consulates in the Soviet Union (Tiflis, Batum, Baku, Erivan, and Ashkhabad), whereas there are 6 Soviet Consulates in Iran. The Soviets have made known to Iran their intention of continuing the maintenance of a Consulate only in Pehlevi and of closing the rest. At the same time the Iranian Government has been requested to close 4 Consulates in the Soviet Union and to retain Tiflis as its only Consular post. The Iranian Ambassador here expressed himself to me to the effect that his Government was most interested in the retention of Baku. If the Soviets insisted that the only Iranian Consulate in the Soviet Union be located at Tiflis, the Iranian Government for its part would perhaps specify a place of its choice for the only Soviet Consulate in Iran.

In case the second action of the Soviets against foreign Consulates achieves its purpose, 17 more Consulates would cease to exist. That the Soviet Government is firmly resolved under all circumstances to carry out its requested closing of the 17 Consulates is shown by the statements just made in the Supreme Council by Zhdanov, the Leningrad party leader. Zhdanov explained there were many Consuls in Leningrad. Some of them had exceeded their authority and

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<sup>5</sup> Omission indicated in the original.

had done things which were not permissible. Their continued presence in Leningrad was therefore undesirable. The dignity of the Soviet Union required the attainment of parity. In this connection I should like to point out that the Soviet Government uses the "principle of parity" only when it is to its advantage. Thus, for example, the Soviet Government does not apply the "principle of parity" to the United States, since there are 3 Soviet Consulates, in New York, San Francisco, and Los Angeles, while the United States has opened no Consulate in the Soviet Union.

Only the Consulates of China (10) and of Manchuria (2: Blagoveshchensk and Chita) have thus far been exempt from both actions of the Soviet Government. Meanwhile it does not appear to be out of the question that the Soviet Government, in case of the successful conclusion of the present action, will attempt to restrict still further the number of foreign Consulates in the Soviet Union. This would, to be sure, only be possible if the Soviet Government closed some of its own Consulates which it deemed superfluous and then, again invoking the principle of parity, demanded the closing of a corresponding number of foreign Consulates in the Soviet Union.

Aside from this direct procedure aimed at the closing of the Consulates, there are the indirect but none the less systematic efforts of the Soviet Government to try by every possible chicanery to make the existence of the Consulates still remaining and the performance of any Consular work impossible. Thus, for example, the agencies of the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs in Leningrad and Minsk have been closed. The Consulates located there will hereafter have to take all their requests to the chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the White Russian Republic or the chairman of the Leningrad Executive Committee. The position of agent in Khabarovsk has been vacant for a year. The work of the Japanese Consulate General there has been almost completely paralyzed. Inquiries it makes of the local officials remain unanswered.

They are trying to make the further stay of the Japanese Consuls in Vladivostok and Blagoveshchensk impossible by making it very difficult for them to procure food. The Norwegian Consul in Archangel is also the object of a great deal of chicanery. The Norwegian Legation consequently fears that the Norwegian Consulate there can no longer be maintained. The local Soviet officials have attempted to refuse to extend the residence permits of several Italian employees of the Italian Consulate General in Odessa on the very significant grounds that they had already been residents of Odessa prior to their employment at the Consulate. The Italian Embassy hopes that the residence permit will be granted on the basis of its

representations. The difficulties with which our Consulate in Novosibirsk, in particular, and also our Consulate General in Kiev have to contend are well known.

SCHULENBURG

No. 616

522/237475

*The German Foreign Ministry to the German Embassy in the Soviet Union*

SECRET

BERLIN, January 28, 1938.  
(zu Pol. I 69 g (V))

Drafting Officer: Secretary of Legation Baron von Welck.

Enclosed is a copy of a letter of the *Reichsführer*-SS and Chief of the German Police\* for your information.

Through further discussions between the Foreign Ministry and the Gestapo it has been insured that members of the Soviet Trade Mission in Berlin and Hamburg will under all circumstances be exempted from the impending expulsion move.

In case the Soviet citizens expelled should not comply with the deportation order within 10 days, they will be detained pending deportation. The Gestapo, through the mediation of the Foreign Ministry, will then attempt to procure Soviet entry permits and the necessary transit visas for those expelled. Should this not be possible in individual cases, the Gestapo will try to dispose of the expelled persons by sending them across the border illegally.

By direction:  
SCHLIEP

No. 617

1907/429349

*The German Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Schulenburg) to the German Foreign Ministry*

Telegram

No. 33 of February 7

FEBRUARY 7, 1938.  
(A 205/38)

After the Soviet press had confined itself on Sunday to printing without comment foreign press opinions regarding changes of organization and personnel in the Reich Government, the following

\* Concerning the expulsion from the Reich of Soviet citizens who were Jews, document No. 611, p. 900.

views were published today in a *Pravda* article prepared for home consumption:

The political crisis in Germany traces back to June 30, 1934. Among the generals the conviction has constantly grown that the entire economic policy and foreign policy must be changed. The army has abandoned the role of observer. Colonel General von Fritsch has been opposed to the accelerated expansion of the German Army demanded by the Führer. The mood of opposition in the army has apparently increased to such an extent that the Führer has considered the retention of Fritsch and the generals supporting him as dangerous.

The appointment of Ribbentrop amounts to the complete "Hitlerization" of the Foreign Ministry. The appointment of military men as chiefs in the Economic Ministry serves to speed up the preparation of German industry for the "great war." The resignation of "moderates" like Schacht, Neurath, and sober-minded generals is evidence that the Fascist dictatorship is seeking a way out by stepping up war preparations. Foreign Minister von Ribbentrop is an advocate of a strong anti-British and pro-Japanese course. The uneasiness in London is therefore understandable.

SCHULENBURG

### No. 618

598/246693-05

*The German Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Schulenburg) to the German Foreign Ministry*

Tgb. Nr. C IV a Verh. adh.

Moscow, February 7, 1938.

Received February 9, 1938.

(Pol. V 1179)

With reference to the report of January 22, 1938, C IV a Verh. adh.<sup>7</sup>

Subject: Arrests in the Soviet Union.

Since the deportation of Reich-Germans arrested in the Soviet Union has now been going on for 3 months, I take the opportunity to review the history of the question of the prisoners.

The last list of persons arrested that was submitted before the start of the deportations, dated October 8, 1937, showed a total of 382 prisoners, of whom 45 had been sentenced, 326 were in custody pending trial, and 11 were of undetermined citizenship. During October there were 78 additional arrests, minus 2 deportations, so that the list of those arrested showed a total of 458 prisoners as of November 1, 1937. In addition, approximately 50 cases of arrest

<sup>7</sup> Not printed.

must be counted which occurred prior to November 1 but became known only in November and December. It may therefore be assumed that as of November 1, 1937, there were approximately 508 Reich-German prisoners in the Soviet Union.

As is evident from the reports of our Consulate and the Soviet authorities, 98 of these 508 prisoners have already left the Soviet Union, in the course of the deportation proceedings, and 80 more are scheduled for deportation; their departure may be expected in the very near future.

On the other hand, in the months of November, December, and January, 96, 38, and 23 new arrests were made.

The following statement shows the over-all situation:

Those arrested as of November 1, 1937 .....	508	
those who have left the Soviet Union .....	-98	
	<hr/>	410
those scheduled for deportation .....	-80	
	<hr/>	330

The following arrests were reported to the Embassy:

in November 1937	96	
in December 1937	38	
in January 1938	23	
February 1-7, 1938	7	
	<hr/>	
	164	
Of these,	50	
had already been arrested by November		+114
	<hr/>	444
	114	
Other reductions:		
citizenship revoked	21	
Soviet citizenship acquired	5	
released from custody	4	
others	6	-36
	<hr/>	
	36	

Cases still pending on the list of those arrested	<hr/>	408
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However, this figure gives only a partially correct impression. The deportations have shown that there are a number of Reich-German prisoners in Soviet prisons whose arrest has not come to the attention of the Embassy. Of a total number of 263 prisoners deported or scheduled for deportation there were only 178 on the list of persons arrested. It must therefore be assumed that in

addition to the 408 prisoners known to the Embassy there are still a sizable number of additional Reich-Germans in Soviet prisons. The Embassy estimates the number of these unknown prisoners at approximately 200.

It may be mentioned here that in this estimate those political refugees are not included who came into the Soviet Union on forged passports and were arrested. Such cases have not yet been reported to the Embassy for deportation.

Even if, as is evident from the above statement, the success of the deportation proceedings has not come up to the original expectations of an early liquidation of the question of prisoners, an appreciable decrease in the figures can, nevertheless, be noted for the first time, after the number of Reich-German prisoners had steadily increased for months. In addition, the tempo of arrests obviously has also slowed down at present, so that, if the deportation figures remain the same, it may be assumed that in the next few months the number of prisoners will decrease still further.

Furthermore, during my call on February 4, 1938, I again repeated the wishes, expressed previously in my conversation of January 21, 1938, with M. Potemkin, for an acceleration of the deportations. M. Potemkin promised me that he would contact the domestic authorities and that he expected the result of these steps to be favorable.

SCHULENBURG

## No. 619

403/213814-17

### *Memorandum on the German-Russian Economic Negotiations*

BERLIN, February 21, 1938.

I. The German-Russian Economic Agreement of October 12, 1925, forms the contractual basis for trade relations with the Soviet Union. In addition to the normal exchange of goods, German exports to Russia were from the very beginning promoted by the fact that through various successive credit operations the Russian Trade Mission in Berlin was granted credits for the financing of additional orders in Germany, for which the Trade Mission had to negotiate bills of exchange payable in Reichsmarks. The last such agreement, the "Fourth Credit Operation, Special Transaction of 1935," was concluded on April 4, 1935. It placed at the disposal of the Russians until June 30, 1937, credits in the amount of 200 million Reichsmarks, to be repaid during the period from 1940 to 1943. This credit was used to the extent of 183 million Reichsmarks. The

preceding credit operations have been liquidated except for 5 million Reichsmarks, which are to be repaid in 1938.

The normal trade with Russia and the additional trade promoted by the credit operations led to a brisk exchange of goods, which reached its highest point in 1931 (exports to Russia 762 million Reichsmarks, imports from Russia 550 million Reichsmarks). Although it has steadily decreased since that time, it still amounted in 1937 to 117 million Reichsmarks in exports to Russia and 65 million Reichsmarks in imports from Russia. The bulk of the imports from Russia always consisted of raw materials equivalent to foreign exchange, and, even in 1937, 95 percent were raw materials. The Russians always punctually fulfilled the obligations arising from their bills of exchange.

In addition to these agreements, after the introduction of German foreign exchange control, short-term economic agreements (clearing agreements) for the regulation of German-Soviet trade and payments were concluded. The first agreement of this kind was concluded for 1936, and was extended through 1937 in December 1936. It was then agreed, among other things, that the Russian obligations arising from bills due in 1937 in the amount of approximately 27 million Reichsmarks were to be paid with the proceeds from the sale of raw materials especially important to us (manganese ore, lumber, flax, etc.).

II. The Economic Treaty for 1937 could not be renewed for 1938 on time, because the Russians were unable at first to appoint plenipotentiaries for negotiations either in Berlin or in Moscow. The deliveries and orders from Russia, therefore, have been at a standstill since the end of 1937, to the detriment of the German economy. Not until January 5, 1938, did the Russian Trade Mission here declare that it was prepared and authorized to enter into negotiations. In view of our situation regarding raw materials and foreign exchange it is important for us in these negotiations to maintain and, if possible, to increase the raw material purchases from Russia without expending foreign exchange. The Russians on their part are prepared to make further deliveries to us only insofar as this is required for covering their capital obligations and balancing their purchases of goods from Germany. Under those circumstances we stated that we were prepared to accept goods for the settlement of bills falling due in 1938, just as in 1937, but with the reservation that this should not be considered a precedent for the payment of bills falling due at a later date. Since the bills falling due in 1938 amounted only to the comparatively small amount of 5 million Reichsmarks, we suggested to the Russians that the obligations on

bills from the "Fourth Credit Operation," amounting to 183 million Reichsmarks, be paid as early as during the period from 1938 to 1939, instead of during the period from 1940 to 1943, and likewise in goods of our choice. In order to make this palatable to the Russians we offered them—after the approval of Field Marshal Göring had been obtained—a new paper credit in the amount of 200 million Reichsmarks for additional purchases from Germany (i.e., exceeding the normal purchases under the clearing agreement to be renewed). If the Russians agree to this proposal, we should obtain from them in 1938 goods, that is, mainly raw materials equivalent to foreign exchange, for

- a. about 80 million Reichsmarks of the normal imports under the Clearing Agreement,
- b. 5 million Reichsmarks for the payment of bills falling due in 1938,
- c. most of the 183 million Reichsmarks in bills arising from the "Fourth Credit Operation."

According to the present status of the negotiations, it may be expected that an agreement will soon be reached regarding points *a* and *b*, i.e., renewal of the Clearing Agreement and payment of the bills in the amount of 5 million Reichsmarks. Contract drafts for these were handed by us to the Russians on February 18. On the other hand, it is doubtful whether an agreement regarding point *c* can be reached. The Russians, to be sure, have stated that they are prepared to accept an additional credit of 200 million Reichsmarks or more, but have refused the payment of the credit amounting to 183 million Reichsmarks before maturity—a solution which is of course out of the question for us.

Negotiations are continuing.

III. At the request of Party Member Hess a conference was held about 2 weeks ago regarding the status of German-Russian economic relations and of the negotiations, which was also attended by Ministerial Director von Jagwitz and the Chief of the Office for Foreign Commerce of the *Auslandsorganisation*, Party Member Bisse. At first, doubt was expressed as to whether, in view of the political tension with Russia and possible complications, it would really be advisable to grant the Russians further credit. After the situation was explained, however, the line followed during the negotiations was approved by all who attended the conference. Within the framework of the above-mentioned point of view the question of selling abroad the Russian bills of exchange deposited with German banks was also brought up. Such a sale, in the opinion of the Foreign Ministry, would not be advisable, since it would definitely put an

end to the trade with Russia, which is still advantageous to Germany, and since, moreover, the bills could be sold abroad only at such a discount as to make the transaction unprofitable, even from the point of view of foreign exchange.

Submitted through the State Secretary to the Foreign Minister.

W[IEHL]

No. 620

2185/472192

*Memorandum*

BERLIN, February 22, 1938.

To Ministerial Director Prüfer.

The German Military Attaché in Moscow, General Köstring, during his conversation with me today touched upon the question of the closing of our last Consulates in the Soviet Union. With them disappears one of his last sources of information—though they have become more and more inadequate. Under those circumstances he would have to urge especially that nothing be changed in the present arrangement of our courier trips, for what the couriers saw on the way and could then report to him was in the present situation actually the last remaining source of information outside of Moscow. The General seems to have heard some remark implying the intention to restrict the courier trips. I promised to examine the matter.

MACKENSEN

No. 621

2185/472191

*Memorandum*

FEBRUARY 24, 1938.

Under "courier trips" General Köstring had in mind the Berlin-Tokyo and Tokyo-Berlin courier service operating once a month, in which the War Ministry is particularly interested, because it always furnishes the courier escort. Last year doubts were expressed by various offices regarding the security of these couriers on the 12-day trip across Siberia (and not least of all because some courier escorts, despite strict warnings, had made notes and records of their observations on the way and had openly carried these with them). It was therefore intended henceforth to send mail by air via Bagdad to Singapore and thence by ship. However, this plan failed because of the cost, since transportation by air line is considerably more

expensive. Until further notice it is therefore not intended to change anything in the arrangement of the courier service via Siberia. The Embassy at Moscow in a report took the position that at present it had no objections to continuing the courier service; should the situation change they intend to issue a warning in due time.

Respectfully submitted herewith through Ministerial Director Prüfer to the State Secretary.

DIENSTMANN

BERLIN, February 24, 1938.

No. 622

1791/408292-93

*The German Foreign Ministry to the German Embassy in France*

BERLIN, March 29, 1938.

(Pol. V 2214)

Copy to the German Embassy at Paris.<sup>8</sup>

Transmitted for information and with the request that, if an opportunity offers, the contents of the report be utilized orally in an appropriate manner as material for the isolation of the Soviet Union in international affairs desired by us.

Upon instructions from the Führer, the Germans who were mentioned in the indictment or in the trial<sup>9</sup> as being implicated in the treasonable activities of the defendants were, where possible, interrogated under oath. As was to be expected, the hearings proved consistently that the allegations to this effect made in the trial are pure inventions. This applies particularly to the alleged espionage connections of the defendants with the *Reichswehr*. The depositions were not published, as originally planned, because the Austrian events engaged everybody's attention. However, if a suitable opportunity offers during conversations with politicians there, I suggest mentioning the fact of the hearings under oath as well as their result.

In this connection the following is also noted: In anti-German circles the specter of a German-Soviet *rapprochement* is sometimes used. Particularly the French defend the thesis that there is no other choice for France but to adhere to the pact with the Soviets, since otherwise France would be replaced by Germany as ally of the Soviet Union. As confirmation of the alleged willingness of Ger-

<sup>8</sup>The copy translated is from the files of the German Embassy in Paris. Although other copies have not been found, the form of the address suggests that identical instructions were sent to other German Missions abroad.

<sup>9</sup>The trial for treason of twenty-one Russian defendants held in Moscow beginning on March 2, 1938. The charges included alleged plotting with Germany, and a number of Germans were referred to in the course of the trial.

many to reach an understanding with the Soviet Union the completely false claim is made that German military authorities had maintained close contact until the very end with the Soviet generals shot last June. I request that, if necessary, you reply to such statements with a reference to the Führer's speech of February 20,<sup>10</sup> after which nobody can any longer believe in the possibility of political cooperation between Germany and the Soviet Union. Actually, the Führer's well-known basic attitude toward Bolshevism should of itself preclude such assumptions even abroad.

By direction:  
WEIZSÄCKER

### No. 623

1539/375341-42

*The German Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Schulenburg) to the German Foreign Ministry*

CONFIDENTIAL

Moscow, May 16, 1938.

Tgb. Nr. A/732

Subject: Attitude of the Soviet Union in the Abyssinian question.  
Litvinov's speech before the League of Nations Council.

I learned confidentially from the British Embassy here that, some time prior to the beginning of the League of Nations session, the British Government, through its Embassy in Moscow, had handed the Soviet Government a note in which it communicated its intention of dealing with the Abyssinian question during the next session of the League of Nations Council and requested that the Soviet Government make known its position in the matter. The Soviet Government replied that it did not intend, for its part, to oppose bringing up the Abyssinian question in the League of Nations Council, if third powers raised no objections.

In the Abyssinian question Litvinov, therefore, had the difficult task in Geneva, on the one hand, of not creating insurmountable difficulties for the British attempt at a settlement and, on the other hand, of saving his face before the world public, the foreign followers of the Comintern, and particularly the rulers in the Kremlin. Accordingly, his speech, the German translation of which is enclosed,<sup>11</sup> is vague and full of contradictions. The special correspondent sent to Geneva by *Izvestia* could extricate himself from the difficult situ-

<sup>10</sup> Hitler's speech before the Reichstag on February 20, 1938, in which he made a number of pronouncements regarding German foreign policy. A translation appears in *Hitler's Speeches, 1932-1939*, edited by Norman H. Baynes (London, 1942), vol. II, pp. 1389-1409.

<sup>11</sup> Enclosure not printed.

ation only by describing the vague statements of Litvinov as a "politico-juridical masterpiece" which should not be commented upon but read as a whole from beginning to end.

Litvinov's attitude in the Abyssinian question is further evidence of the present weak position of the Soviet Union in international relations. As a result of the bloody domestic events, the specific gravity of the Soviet Union in international politics has been reduced to such an extent that any attempts by Litvinov to win over other countries to the Soviet viewpoint would have been doomed to failure from the very beginning.

The Soviet attitude in the Abyssinian question is, moreover, evidence of the fact that the Soviet Union is trying to avoid opposing a world power like England, even though it suffers a severe loss of prestige thereby.

COUNT VON DER SCHULENBURG

No. 624

1907/429378

*The German Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Schulenburg) to the  
German Foreign Ministry*

CONFIDENTIAL

Moscow, June 18, 1938.

Tgb. Nr. A/872

Subject: Newly appointed Soviet Ambassador Merekalov.

The newly appointed Soviet Ambassador to Berlin, Alexei Merekalov, accompanied by the Assistant Director of Division II for Western Affairs of the Foreign Commissariat, Michels, paid a visit to me on June 16. I gave a luncheon for him on the following day which was attended by the Director and Assistant Director of Division II for Western Affairs of the Foreign Commissariat, as well as the Chief of Protocol, in addition to several members of the Embassy.

During the conversation Merekalov mentioned that he intended to leave next week with his wife and his 14-year-old son for Berlin. Merekalov has never been abroad before and speaks no foreign language; he stated, however, that he was learning German and hoped to have accomplished this within five or six months. Although he is still young and socially inexperienced, he gives the impression of self-assurance in spite of his reserve.

During his first visit with me Merekalov stated that he was happy over the confidence of his Government, which sent him as Ambassador to such a great country as Germany. After I had drunk to his

health at the luncheon and had wished him a pleasant journey, Merekalov replied that he hoped German-Soviet relations would be expanded and strengthened.

COUNT VON DER SCHULENBURG

No. 625

1907/429381-82

*The Press Adviser of the German Embassy in the Soviet Union  
(Stein) to the German Foreign Ministry*

Tgb. Nr. A/898

Moscow, June 20, 1938.

Subject: Soviet reports regarding German war preparations.

Whereas the Soviet press was long accustomed to quote reports regarding Germany's "warmongering" mainly from foreign Marxist or *émigré* papers, Soviet reports have also appeared lately. They are put under the continually recurring headline, "Germany's War Preparations." These reports are distributed by the Soviet news agency *Tass* and invariably originate in Prague.

In these reports it was stated on June 14, for instance, that all reservists called to active duty on March 10, prior to the "annexation of Austria" and subsequently released had again been mobilized. In Dresden reservists of the classes of 1916 and 1917 had been called to active duty. In some regions of Saxony and Silesia the local organizations of the Hitler Youth were put "on a war footing"; they were armed and brought closer to the Czechoslovak frontier. In Munich a decree was issued according to which all men 38 years of age had to attend short-term "military training courses."

Further reports on June 16 stated that new troop units, mainly artillery, had been moved to the Czechoslovak frontier in Saxony and Silesia. Furthermore, a secret order to plant managers was reported, according to which they had to report immediately how many men in their plants could be replaced by women. In Berlin, it was further stated, meetings of several organizations of the Labor Front had been held, at which speakers had strongly attacked the Soviet Union and other countries which were preventing a squaring of accounts with Czechoslovakia. Following reports about a "propaganda campaign" against Czechoslovakia, it was said that this campaign did not find favor with the lower National Socialist organizations; this was proved by the fact that many SA-men did not attend a test mobilization of the SA on May 20 and 21 in some cities of Bavaria and Saxony. In one Bavarian town a battalion of SA-men had refused to march to the frontier and had therefore

been dissolved. Similar incidents, which had led to numerous arrests, had also occurred in Central Germany.

STEIN

Seen: Count von der Schulenburg.

No. 626

442/221377-80

*The German Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Schulenburg) to the State Secretary in the German Foreign Ministry (Weizsäcker)*

Moscow, June 23, 1938.

MY DEAR HERR VON WEIZSÄCKER: The American Chargé d'Affaires in Moscow, Kirk, 2 days ago informed me of the following:

The well-known American journalist, Knickerbocker, who at present is in Prague as representative of the Hearst press, reported from there that Germany would soon normalize her relations with the Soviet Union and propose to the Soviet Union the conclusion of a political treaty or agreement. The Hearst correspondents in Berlin and Moscow were thereupon instructed to check the correctness of the Knickerbocker report. A few days ago the Moscow representative of the International News Service went to the Press Section of the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs and inquired there as to how the Soviet Union would react to such an offer from Germany. When he had not received any answer after 2 days, he presented to the Chief of the Press Section of the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs, Gnedin, a telegram he had drafted, in which he expressed the opinion that the reply of the Soviet Government would presumably be negative. Gnedin in his capacity as censor revised the telegram and suggested to the Hearst correspondent, Brown, approximately the following version: Any proposal by Germany that promoted world peace would presumably be favorably received by the Soviet Government. Any proposal by Germany amounting to a weakening of world peace would be rejected by the Soviet Government, since new unrest in the world would thereby be created and the front of the peace-loving powers would be weakened.

I told the American Chargé, Kirk, who seemed to consider Knickerbocker's report not unlikely, that in view of the well-known ideological conflicts between National Socialism and Bolshevism and of the world-wide danger of Communism, a *rapprochement* between Germany and the Soviet Union was out of the question.

On the following day, by order of Mr. Kirk, a secretary from the American Embassy called on a member of the Embassy in order to

discuss Knickerbocker's report with him. The American secretary expressed the opinion that an understanding between Germany and the Soviet Union was entirely within the realm of possibility. He could imagine Germany and the Soviet Union concluding an agreement similar to that which Poland and Germany had reached shortly after the seizure of power [*Machtergreifung*].<sup>12</sup> The revision of the Hearst correspondent's telegram by the Chief of the Press Section of the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs, Gnedin, was significant, since it indicated that the Soviet Union on its part did not intend to close the door to negotiations with Germany definitively. Since the Press Section of the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs had made a statement after 2 days' delay, it could certainly be assumed that Gnedin had made his proposals for revision after consultation with Litvinov.

I should assume that Knickerbocker's report was not unwelcome to M. Litvinov; it gave him the opportunity once more to hold up before the French ally the specter of a German-Soviet understanding.

From the conversation with Mr. Kirk and from the fact that Mr. Kirk, in spite of my denial, sent another member of his Embassy to us, it is evident that the diplomats here are still reckoning with the possibility of a German-Soviet *rapprochement*. On January 24 [?], 1938, I wrote to Herr von Mackensen, then State Secretary, about similar matters in a private letter.<sup>13</sup>

With best regards and Heil Hitler I remain, my dear Herr von Weizsäcker,

Yours very respectfully,

F. W. SCHULENBURG

No. 627

1791/408306-09

*The German Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Schulenburg) to the  
German Foreign Ministry*

Tgb. Nr. A/924

Moscow, June 27, 1938.  
(Pol. V 4941)

Subject: Litvinov's speech concerning the international situation.

On the occasion of rallies for the elections to the Supreme Council of the Great Russian Republic, on June 23 People's Commissar Litvinov delivered in his Leningrad constituency a speech lasting several hours, regarding the international situation and the policy of the Soviet Union.

<sup>12</sup> i.e., the coming to power in Germany of the Nazis on January 30, 1933.

<sup>13</sup> Not found in the Foreign Ministry files.

Litvinov's speech was not given because of any reason or necessity of foreign policy. But neither did it spring solely from the purpose of giving the Leningrad voters such a detailed picture of foreign affairs; on the contrary, it probably is to represent, beyond the circle of actual listeners, a justification of Litvinov's policy—a justification which could hardly have been addressed to the Opposition critics only. The many failures of Soviet policy in the immediate past presumably caused Litvinov to regard the occasion of the election rally at Leningrad as favorable, vis-à-vis the Politburo, for putting the blame on the "mistaken policy of others."

Of special interest are Litvinov's statements regarding his attitude toward Germany and the restoration of her position as a world power. He stated that Moscow had no part in the struggle of imperialist interests; it had no thought of annexing any foreign territory, "and therefore it is naturally immaterial to us which power exploits some particular colony, gains certain foreign markets, subjugates some particular weak country." The issue was rather that Germany not only tried to recover her rights, which were trampled on at Versailles, and her old frontiers, but that she based her foreign policy on "unlimited aggression" and even intended to subordinate all other races and nationalities to the so-called Germanic race. Germany "*openly pursued a mad anti-Soviet policy*" and "*openly indulged in dreaming of the Ukraine and even of the Urals.*" Neither did Japan limit her aggressiveness to China but dreamed now and then of Soviet territories. "However, we do not want Soviet land to become the object of anyone's dreams and fancies." When there were countries in the world with "unlimited aggressive ambitions," which spoke of their aim to dominate entire continents and of their efforts to destroy entire nationalities and races, no country, however strong or however far removed it might be, had any guarantee that the waves of such "mad aggression" would not reach its own borders, even if it be in the distant future. "This is our immediate interest in the events which are unfolding."

The statements regarding the pacts with France and Czechoslovakia are also noteworthy. In this connection Litvinov now rejects the idea prevailing at the time of the conclusion of the pacts, that mutual assistance pacts meant greater security for the Soviet Union. In the endeavor to preserve the peace *collectively* and in the realization that without the Soviet Union no stable balance of power, before which aggression would retreat, could be established in Europe and in the world, the Soviet Government had declared its willingness to participate in regional mutual assistance pacts. "When the proposed regional pact for the East had been blocked by Germany

and Poland, the Soviet Union concluded mutual assistance pacts with France and Czechoslovakia." If French reactionary politicians tried to represent these pacts as a kind of gift or privilege for the Soviet Union, they overlooked (or at least pretended to overlook) whose positions the aggressor countries were pressing against. In addition to mutual assistance in case of war, the above-mentioned pacts also aimed at eliminating or reducing the danger of war. In view of the threat to Czechoslovakia the whole world had to realize that the Soviet-Czech Pact fulfilled this function, that it was the strongest, if not the sole, factor brightening the atmosphere around Czechoslovakia.

Since the Soviet suggestions frequently fall upon deaf ears among the Western Powers, Litvinov absolves the Soviet Union from any "responsibility for further developments" and *thereby reserves his freedom of action*: The Soviet Union constantly pointed out the mistakes in the policy of other countries which encouraged aggression, and showed the way to *check and eliminate aggression*. Only recently it had pointed out to the peace-loving powers the necessity for speedy collective measures to save mankind from the danger of another war. This appeal had gone unheeded—"but the Soviet Government is at least *relieved of the responsibility for further developments*. It should, however, be pointed out that the Soviet Union does not request anything for itself, that it invites nobody to be a partner or ally, but only *declares it is prepared for collective cooperation*; for the situation has become especially dangerous, not to itself, but first to the small countries and secondly to the powers responsible for the international postwar order."

After many references to the peace endeavors of the Soviet Union, Litvinov concludes that an immediate danger to the Soviet interests and borders is not very likely. The international situation caused anxiety, Litvinov said in concluding his speech, because of the *gambling of one party and the alarm and agitation of the other*. Nor could the Soviet Union, in view of its urgent desire not to see the peace disturbed anywhere, avoid uneasiness. However, it did not have to be especially apprehensive for its own interests or its own borders. Whatever the conflicts which arose among the capitalist countries, the aggressors would seek new successes where positions were weakly defended. "The present aggressors absolutely need quick successes in a war, as a result of their domestic weakness and lack of resources; they need short distances and weakly defended territories." The Soviet Union—by pursuing a peaceful policy free of provocations, by continuously increasing its defensive strength, by developing its economic successes, by forging together the peoples

of the Union more and more, and by eliminating the spies and subversive agents of enemy countries—would show these countries the high level of military preparedness of every inch of Soviet territory and thereby keep them away from the frontiers.

The tone of the speech has remarkably little aggressiveness and strives to leave open all possibilities. The attempt to arrive at an objective attitude toward the policy of the Third Reich is striking.

COUNT VON DER SCHULENBURG

No. 628

523/237755-58

*The German Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Schulenburg) to the German Foreign Ministry*

Tgb. Nr. A/954

Moscow, July 4, 1938.

Received July 6, 1938.

(Pol. I 1535 g (V))

With reference to instruction Pol. I 4175 of August 14, 1937. In continuation of my report Tgb. Nr. A/49 of January 15, 1938.<sup>14</sup>

Subject: Additional changes in the Commissariat for Domestic Affairs (G.P.U.).

In the last few months additional and very extensive changes have taken place in the Commissariat for Domestic Affairs. It is reported that the Deputy Commissar for Domestic Affairs, Zakovski, appointed only at the end of January 1938, has been dismissed and even arrested. Two former high officials of the G.P.U., Balitski, for many years Ukrainian Commissar for Domestic Affairs, and Sapadny, the Deputy Regional Chief of the Commissariat for Domestic Affairs for the Far East, were recently branded as "enemies of the people." In a trial held at the beginning of June at Khabarovsk the latter was sentenced to death for "treason and espionage."

In the last 6 or 7 months the G.P.U. chiefs have been changed in 13 federal and autonomous republics and in 26 regions, and the "dismissals" probably were punitive measures in many cases. Probably it was also a question of disciplinary punishment in the case of B. Bermann, the Commissar for Domestic Affairs of the White Russian Republic, who was removed from his position a few weeks ago. Contrary to differing rumors and foreign press comments, Redens, the former Chief of the Central Administration of the Commissariat for Domestic Affairs of the Moscow Region, who was appointed Commissar for Domestic Affairs of Kazakhstan in

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<sup>14</sup> Not printed.

February 1938, continues in office and has even been registered as a candidate for the Supreme Soviet of that Republic. His successor in the Moscow Region is the Chekist, Zessarski, who is still young and has not yet made his appearance before the public. The "Lieutenant Colonel of Public Safety," Litvin, who previously had been employed in Armenia, was sent to Leningrad in place of Sukovski. In the Ukraine, A. I. Uspenski, the former G.P.U. Chief of the Orenburg Region, has been in office since the end of January 1938.

Of the nineteen higher G.P.U. officials who had been appointed commissars of public safety, first or second class, in November 1935, only the above-mentioned Redens, the Georgian Commissar for Domestic Affairs, Goglidse, and the Deputy Commissar for Domestic Affairs of the Soviet Union, Belski, are still in office. All the others are missing or have been shot.

It is indicative of the constantly increasing influence of the G.P.U. that three People's Commissariats of the Soviet Union are headed by G.P.U. men. These are the People's Commissariat for the Lumber Industry, headed by the former Deputy Commissar for Domestic Affairs, M. I. Ryshov, since the end of last year; the People's Commissariat for Railroads, of which, as an additional office, Deputy Commissar for Domestic Affairs Belski has been the First Deputy Commissar since April 1938; and the People's Commissariat for Water Transport, which, after Pakhomov's dismissal, has been headed by Commissar for Domestic Affairs Yeshov as an additional office.

Elsewhere, too, the appointment of G.P.U. men to high State and Party positions can frequently be observed. Thus, in Rostov-on-Don, in Cherkess, in Kuibyshev, in the Volga-German Republic, and in the Ukraine former members of the Cheka are at the head of the Party committees. Dalinger, the President of the Council of People's Commissars of the Volga-German Republic, who was recently dismissed; Rapava, the President of the Central Executive Committee of Abkhazskaya; and Bulganin, the President of the Council of People's Commissars of the Great Russian Republic, also came from the Cheka or the G.P.U. M. A. Volkov, who was appointed Deputy Commissar for Transport in April 1938, worked in G.P.U. agencies from 1919 until 1938. On the occasion of the elections to the Supreme Soviet of the Great Russian Republic, the biography of Shukovski, Deputy Commissar for Domestic Affairs of the U.S.S.R., was published. There it was stated that from 1932 until the summer of 1938 he was deputy to the trade representative of the Soviet Union in Berlin. The well-known leader of the Arctic expedition, Papanin, was also active in the Cheka of Odessa. The newly appointed presi-

dent of the Committee of Motion Pictures, connected with the Council of People's Commissars of the U.S.S.R., Dukelski, stressed in an election speech that "he had served his people for 20 years in the Cheka, then in the G.P.U., and finally in the Commissariat for Domestic Affairs."

Notwithstanding all personnel changes, the G.P.U. is still a domain of the Jews: Compared with the 15 high G.P.U. officials with Jewish names who recently were dismissed or who disappeared, there are 14 Jewish officials of the Commissariat for Domestic Affairs who were newly appointed or were mentioned in the press for the first time.

SCHULENBURG

No. 629

403/213818-21

*Memorandum*

(e.o. Pol. V 5134)

To: Deputy Head of the Political Department  
State Secretary.

Original to Protocol Department.

Respectfully resubmitted with a draft for the reply of the Führer and Chancellor, as well as a memorandum concerning political and economic relations between Germany and the Soviet Union, and suggestions for the conversation of the Führer and Chancellor with Ambassador Merekalov.

SCHLIEF

BERLIN, July 5, 1938.

[Enclosure 1]

*Draft*

REPLY OF THE FÜHRER AND CHANCELLOR

MR. AMBASSADOR: I have the honor to accept from you the letter accrediting you with me as Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

I have noted with gratification your declaration that you wish to direct your efforts toward the creation and maintenance of normal relations between Germany and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and I agree with you that this is in accord with the interests of both countries and that it will promote the cause of general peace. I assure you, therefore, Mr. Ambassador, that in the per-

formance of the tasks which you have set for yourself you will receive the necessary support from me as well as from my Government.

[Enclosure 2]

# MEMORANDUM

## 1. Political and Economic Relations between Germany and the Soviet Union.

The legal basis of our relations with the Soviet Union is still the Rapallo Treaty of April 16, 1922, which inaugurated the establishment of normal diplomatic relations with Germany and which was later expanded by the treaties of October 12, 1925. The so-called Berlin Treaty of April 24, 1926 (a neutrality agreement in the event of an unprovoked attack on one of the signatories), which originated as a counterbalance against Locarno, was extended for an indefinite period by the Protocol of June 24, 1931.

Since 1933, the foreign policy of the Soviet Union has been strongly influenced by the fear of a Germany steadily increasing in strength and by the fear of a conflict with Japan. The domestic situation, the economic difficulties, and the changes on the international scene are forcing the Soviet Government into a defensive position. At the same time, however, it tries to compensate for this loss of prestige by entering European politics.

The volume of the German-Soviet trade has declined considerably in recent years. In millions of Reichsmarks it was as follows:

	<i>Exports from Germany</i>	<i>Imports into Germany</i>
1936	126.1	93.2
1937	117.4	65.1

On March 1, 1938, the German-Soviet Trade Agreement of December 24, 1936, was extended to December 1938, in its present form as a commodities and clearing agreement. In order to secure from the Soviet Union the flow of raw materials that are important to us, negotiations were entered into with the Soviet Trade Mission in March for the granting of a rather large credit to the Soviet Union for the purchase of German-finished goods. Because of the dilatory treatment by the Soviets, however, it has not been possible yet to conclude these negotiations. At present, negotiations are also pending regarding the integration of trade between the former Federal State of Austria and the Soviet Union into the system of German-Soviet trade agreements. In this matter, too, difficulties arising from the attitude of the Soviet negotiators do not give promise of an early conclusion of these negotiations.

2. Suggestions for the conversation of the Führer and Chancellor with the Soviet Ambassador.

Ambassador Merekalov, who up to now has held the position of Deputy People's Commissar for Foreign Trade, remarked to the German Ambassador in Moscow, Count von der Schulenburg, that it was not the intention of the Soviet Government to allow German-Soviet trade relations to subside completely; on the contrary, he believed that by means of the negotiations conducted in Berlin, a revival of commercial relations could be achieved.

Further topics of conversation might be the following:

The trip of the Ambassador, as well as his family (wife and son), to Berlin.

### No. 630

351/202434-35

*Memorandum by the German Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Schulenburg) Concerning Litvinov's Speech on Foreign Policy of June 23, 1938<sup>15</sup>*

Tgb. Nr. A/962

(Pol. V 5585)

From the well-known speech on foreign policy which Litvinov gave in his constituency of Leningrad on June 23, the statements regarding German foreign policy and German-Soviet relations as well as the attitude of the Soviet Union toward the democratic countries are especially important.

German successes in the struggle for putting an end to the Treaty of Versailles are correctly described by Litvinov. He states that per se the Soviet Union is indifferent to the struggles for power among the capitalist states in connection with the peace treaties concluded by them and takes no part in them. If the Soviet Union has sided with the democracies and the League of Nations during the last few years, it has done so because Germany aims not merely at the restoration of her prewar boundaries and the rights denied her by the Versailles Treaty but also pursues an open and "mad" anti-Soviet policy and a policy of unlimited aggression.

Litvinov cites common interest in the preservation of peace as an additional reason for the Soviet Union's cooperation with the democratic Great Powers. The Soviet Government is opposed to a forcible change in the present status regardless of whether this status is good or bad, since an armed conflict over the Treaty of Versailles would not in the long run leave the Soviet Union unaffected.

<sup>15</sup> See Schulenburg's despatch of June 27, 1938, p. 921.

In his speech Litvinov subjects the democratic Great Powers, England and France, as well as the League of Nations, to severe criticism. From his statements, the disillusionment over the collaboration of the Soviet Union with the democratic countries and the League of Nations is evident. England and France have not done what the Soviet Union expected of them and, contrary to Soviet advice, have adopted a compliant attitude toward the aggressor nations. Litvinov indicates that Soviet policy, whose aim it was only a few years ago to collaborate as closely as possible with the democratic Great Powers and to be admitted to the circle of these States itself, will henceforth—without abandoning the principle of collective security—break with the policy of the Western Powers and decide in each case whether its own interests require cooperation with England and France.

SCHULENBURG

Moscow, July 5, 1938.

## No. 631

1907/429383-86

*The German Ambassador in France (Welczeck) to the German Foreign Ministry*

A 2740

PARIS, July 6, 1938.  
(Pol. V 5235)

Subject: Article concerning Soviet-German relations.

The *Revue des Deux Mondes* of July 1 has an article, "After the Moscow Trials. German-Russian Relations," signed by Jean de Saint-Chamant. The article develops the following ideas, which are only loosely connected with each other: In Germany there was and still is, particularly in the army, a strong tendency in favor of good relations with the Soviet Union. The Moscow trials, whatever might be said against their preparation and procedure, have clearly proved that the enemies of Stalin were in close contact with Germany. The Soviet Marshal, Tukachevski, actually maintained relations with the German General Staff. In Berlin Karachan had stated the conditions for German help in overthrowing Stalin. The conspirators were prepared to grant Germany territorial and economic concessions. According to rumor, the G.P.U. was informed of the relations between Tukachevski and the German General Staff by *Reichsführer* Himmler, who thereby intended to deal a blow to the influence of the German generals on domestic policy.

On February 4 some of the generals who favored a *rapprochement* with the Soviet Union were liquidated in Germany. However, it is

by no means impossible that the Führer himself is prepared for a *rapprochement* with the Soviet Union. At any rate, National Socialist Germany plays an important role in the economic relations of the Soviet Union. In the Soviet Union, Stalin's enemies who were in contact with Germany were liquidated, but probably their main crime was that they intended to execute the secret designs of the Soviet dictator prematurely.

I enclose the article,<sup>18</sup> the reasoning of which is partially contradictory, because I learn from a reliable source that it was written with the concurrence of the Quai d'Orsay. The author is said to be Georges Luciani, correspondent of the *Petit Parisien* in Moscow for many years, who writes for the *Temps* under the name of Pierre Berland. He published an article in the *Temps* of July 1 concerning the chief of the G.P.U., Nikolai Yeshov, in which he assumes that the existence of relations between the enemies of Stalin and Germany is proved.

The question arises as to the purpose of the Quai d'Orsay in connection with this article. Although only German-Soviet relations are mentioned in it, nevertheless certain conclusions regarding Soviet-French relations are no doubt to be suggested to the French reader. The author by no means professes to be particularly Russo-phile. He does not deny that the trials are evidence of a serious internal convulsion in the Soviet Union, and particularly in his final sentence he intimates that Stalin cannot be absolutely depended upon. He thereby confirms a view which by now has been generally accepted by most average Frenchmen. It would be quite natural to conclude that the Soviet Union is no useful ally for France. However, this is precluded by the suggestion, presented to the reader unobtrusively but emphatically, from the most varied points of view, that Germany has secret relations with the Soviet Union or strives for such relations. There is an ineradicable obsession here that any increase in German influence, wherever it may appear, endangers French interests. The article, therefore, must arouse the fear that the Rapallo policy, so much detested here, might be revived. This fear instinctively leads to the following conclusion: France, which felt so uneasy even about the cooperation between the disarmed Germany and the Soviet Union, under no circumstances can permit a rearmed National Socialist Germany to ally herself with the Soviet Union, so rich in raw materials. France, therefore, must adhere to the Franco-Soviet Pact. The article, therefore, represents a defense of this Pact. It should be all the more effective since it omits many arguments in favor of the Pact which previously were

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<sup>18</sup> Enclosure not printed.

often raised and refuted (strength of the Red Army, League of Nations policy, rear cover for Czechoslovakia, and the like) and confines itself to underpinning the basic concepts of French policy in regard to Russia during the last few years, which may be summarized as follows: National Socialist Germany must be kept away from the Soviet Union's reservoir of raw materials and manpower.<sup>17</sup>

H. WELCZECK

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<sup>17</sup> Copies of this despatch were sent by the Foreign Ministry on July 25, 1938, to the German Diplomatic Missions in London, Rome, Warsaw, Moscow, Bucharest, Prague, and Brussels, with a statement that "The article in the *Revue des Deux Mondes* was answered by an article in the evening edition of the *Berliner Tageblatt* No. 335 of the 18th, entitled 'Stalin's Secret Love; Paris Offers Clue to Soviet Trials'."

CHAPTER VI  
GERMAN RELATIONS WITH THE HOLY SEE,  
MARCH 1937-SEPTEMBER 1938

A. THE ENCYCLICAL ON THE CONDITION OF THE CHURCH IN  
GERMANY, MARCH-MAY 1937

No. 632

1608/386136

*The German Ambassador to the Holy See (Bergen) to the German  
Foreign Ministry*

Telegram

URGENT

No. 18 of March 22

ROME (VATICAN), March 22, 1937—1:40 p.m.

Received March 22, 1937—5:35 p.m.

(Pol. III 1466)

The encyclical on the condition of the Catholic Church in the German Reich which was read from the pulpits in Germany yesterday will appear in the *Osservatore Romano* tonight.<sup>1</sup> I hear that the previous strict secrecy was the result of an express instruction from the Vatican in order to prevent a ban on its being read.

This papal encyclical may well be the first result of the statement contained in the note from the (group missing) No. 645 of February

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<sup>1</sup> Pope Pius XI's encyclical "On the Condition of the Catholic Church in the German Reich," also referred to by its opening words: "*Mit brennender Sorge*," was issued on March 14, 1937. The German text will be found in the *Acta Apostolicae Sedis*, April 10, 1937, vol. 29, pp. 146-167, and an English translation of the most pertinent passages is reprinted in *Principles for Peace* (National Catholic Welfare Conference, Washington, 1943), pp. 498-510.

The encyclical sharply and unequivocally assailed the persecution of the Church, and the neopaganism that had sprung up in Germany. In particular, the "open campaign waged against the denominational school guaranteed by the Concordat," was condemned in the most outspoken terms.

The Pope stated that he had been following these developments in Germany "with burning anxiety." The Concordat of 1933 had not borne the desired fruit, and the lessons of the past year had made clear where the responsibility lay, having disclosed "machinations that from the beginning had no other aim than a war of extermination."

For the German text of the Concordat of 1933, see *Reichsgesetzblatt*, September 18, 1933, part II, No. 33, pp. 679-690; *Acta Apostolicae Sedis*, September 10, 1933, vol. xxv, No. 14, pp. 383-441, or Joseph Wenner, *Reichskonkordat und Länderkonkordate* (Paderborn, 1937). An English translation has been published in A.S. Duncan-Jones, *The Struggle for Religious Freedom in Germany* (London, 1938), pp. 277-289. For a brief analysis of the Concordat, see Nathaniel Micklem, *National Socialism and the Roman Catholic Church* (London, 1939), pp. 62-83.

25, 1937, "The Holy See is tired of such treatment of its complaints and of the eternal waiting." I refer in this connection to report No. 47 of February 25, as well as telegrams Nos. 15 and 16 of the 6th and 8th.<sup>1a</sup>

BERGEN

No. 633

2134/466926

*Memorandum*

BERLIN, March 23, 1937.

I seriously and emphatically told the Apostolic Nuncio<sup>2</sup>—who called on me today to discuss a pending matter—that I did not consider myself in a position to conduct conversations with him at present. We had learned that under date of March 14 a papal encyclical "On the Condition of the Catholic Church in the German Reich" had been issued, the exact text of which we did not yet know but which, according to the information received, took a very strong stand against the Reich Government and would have to be considered almost a call to battle against the Reich Government. A very serious situation had been created by the publication and dissemination of this encyclical, especially in the midst of discussions between the Reich Government and the Curia on a number of questions—discussions which had by no means been concluded.

The Nuncio was very embarrassed and attempted to represent the encyclical as a kind of defense. I refused to enter into any discussion.

DIECKHOFF

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<sup>1a</sup> Documents referred to in this chapter which bear a date earlier than March 22, 1937, are not printed in this volume.

<sup>2</sup> Monsignor Cesare Orsenigo.

## No. 634

1608/386154-53

*The German Ambassador to the Holy See (Bergen) to the German  
Foreign Ministry*

Telegram

URGENT

No. 19 of March 23

ROME, March 23, 1937—8:45 p.m.

Received March 23, 1937—11:30 p.m.

(Pol. III 1484)

In continuation of my telegram of the 22d, No. 18.

I transmitted the German text of the papal encyclical by mail yesterday. I learn that the Nuncio in Berlin was instructed to decide on the manner of publication. According to the reports received in the papal Secretariat of State, the reading from the pulpits in German churches proceeded without incident.

The Vatican had provided for wide dissemination of the contents abroad by releasing an official summary in French, English, and Italian yesterday afternoon to the representatives here of the Italian and foreign press through the Secretariat of State. The Fascist press here—apparently by order of higher authority—has so far confined itself to an abbreviated publication of the summary, whereas it published the article from yesterday's *Völkischer Beobachter* in great detail in several newspapers. I learn that the Vatican's displeasure at this behavior will be expressed in an inspired article appearing in the *Osservatore Romano* tonight written by its editor in chief, della Torre, in which it will be emphasized that such reporting gives a completely erroneous picture of the impression the encyclical had upon the Catholic and even Protestant population not only of Germany but of other countries also.

In addition, the publication of the encyclical resulted in alarming rumors here regarding the impending termination by Germany of the Concordats with the Reich and with the German States, as well as the severance of diplomatic relations with the Holy See.

In the Vatican it is asserted that, although this step had become necessary, now as before there was the desire and willingness not only to maintain relations but also to bring them back to normal by relaxing the tension.

Encyclicals to certain countries on church matters have, as is well known, been issued frequently and, if the matter is of sufficient importance, have been addressed to the Catholic Episcopate of the whole world. In this connection I may especially recall the exceedingly sharp encyclical regarding Catholic Action, which the Pope issued in July 1931, during the conflict which had arisen with Italy after

the Lateran Treaties because of the Catholic organizations. (See my telegram of July 4, 1931, No. 26.)

In my opinion the most advisable course of action for us would be to continue as far as possible outwardly to ignore the encyclical, in spite of all the mordant passages it contains, particularly since the measures taken for its distribution abroad by the Vatican amount to an attempt at intimidation. If this policy is adopted, I may leave it to your discretion to neutralize the unfavorable effects to be expected, particularly in the foreign press, by timely, purely factual replies.

BERGEN

### No. 635

1608/386137

*The Reich and Prussian Minister for Ecclesiastical Affairs to the  
Bishops of German Dioceses*

Special Delivery Letter

m G II 1502

BERLIN, March 23, 1937.

The papal encyclical of March 14, 1937, to the archbishops and bishops of Germany represents a serious violation of the agreements contained in the Reich Concordat. It is in flat contradiction to the spirit of the Concordat and to its express provisions.

The encyclical contains serious attacks against the welfare and interests of the German nation. It attempts to diminish the authority of the Reich Government, to harm the interests of the German nation abroad, and, above all, to endanger the internal peace of the community by means of a direct appeal to the Catholic citizens by a party to the treaty with the Reich Government. For such a hostile attitude the Reich Concordat grants no license. This is covered neither by its spirit nor by its express provisions.

Pursuant to article 16 of the Reich Concordat of July 20, 1933, the bishops and other ordinaries are hereby forbidden to print, reproduce, or disseminate the encyclical in any form.

By direction:

MUHS

## No. 636

1608/386150-51

*The German Ambassador to the Holy See (Bergen) to the German Foreign Ministry*

Telegram

No. 21 of March 24

ROME, March 24, 1937—7:25 p.m.

Received March 24, 1937—10:45 p.m.

(Pol. III 1517)

With reference to instruction of March 16, Pol. III 1340, received today, and with reference to telegram No. 10 of March 24.<sup>3</sup>

I learn confidentially from well-informed sources that the decision of the Pope to go before the public with the encyclical on the condition of the Catholic Church in Germany resulted from the fact that, in spite of its failure to reply to several notes from the Vatican, the Reich Government repeatedly and explicitly refused to enter into oral negotiations regarding the interpretation of controversial provisions of the Concordat. That the Vatican has prepared further measures in this direction can be very clearly deduced from the following passage of the encyclical:

"When once the time shall have come to place before the eyes of the world these Our endeavors, all right-minded persons will know where they have to look for those who kept the peace, and where for those who broke it."<sup>4</sup> Actually, as a reliable informant reports to me, a "Yellow Book" containing the notes addressed to us has already been completed; in case of complications this is to be distributed to the diplomatic representatives accredited to the Vatican and released to the general public.

I therefore again recommend that the memorandum suggested by me in telegram No. 16 of March 8—which would now also have to contain a sharp protest against the attacks and distortions contained in the encyclical—be transmitted to the Vatican as soon as possible through the Embassy. It would probably be best if this memorandum followed the basic idea that by the Reich Concordat the Catholic Church was granted a certain independence and certain rights but only within the framework of the laws applicable to all; this limitation was necessary to prevent the Church from becoming, as it were, a State within the State, and the clergy from considering itself a privileged caste, above the laws of the State and subject primarily to the Holy See. In this connection I may refer to the

<sup>3</sup> Neither printed.

<sup>4</sup> Translations of papal utterances occurring in this section have been compared with the texts used in *Principles for Peace*.

statements of the Foreign Minister in his letter of February 19, 1936, to the Nuncio (instruction of February 19, 1936, II Vat. 163), as well as to the enclosure to my report No. 66 of February 14, 1936. Concern for the nation's security is decisive for the policy of the Reich in all fields; the Catholic clergy in Germany must conform to this necessity.

BERGEN<sup>5</sup>

### No. 637

1608/386153

*The German Foreign Ministry to the German Embassy to the Holy See*

Telegram

PRIORITY

BERLIN, March 25, 1937.

No. 12

(Pol. III 1520a)

For the Ambassador personally.

Please do not participate in ceremonies at Easter; and you might go on leave until further notice.

NEURATH

Note: Dictated by the Foreign Minister over the telephone.

### No. 638

1608/386152

*The German Foreign Ministry to Various German Diplomatic Missions in Europe and the Consulate General at Geneva*

Cipher Telegram

BERLIN, March 26, 1937.

(Pol. III 1520)

1. Germadiplo, Paris, No. 90
2. German Embassy, London, No. 118
3. Diplogerma, Rome, No. 76
4. Diplogerma, Warsaw, No. 34
5. German Embassy, Salamanca, No. 113
6. Diplogerma, Brussels, No. 29
7. " Bern, No. 20
8. " Lisbon, No. 48
9. " Vienna, No. 41
10. " Budapest, No. 28
11. " Prague, No. 24

<sup>5</sup> A marginal notation by Neurath, apparently dated March 25, reads as follows: "How is the memorandum coming?" Directly underneath, another marginal notation, apparently in Dumont's hand, reads: "The draft has been sent to the Foreign Minister."

- 12. " Belgrade, No. 29
- 13. " Bucharest, No. 46
- 14. German Legation, Copenhagen, No. 21
- 15. Consugerma, Geneva, No. 12
- 16. German Legation, Dublin, No. 3

Drafting Officer: Counselor of Legation Dumont.

For information and orientation of conversations.

The Nuncio here was told seriously and emphatically that the German Government had to consider the Pope's encyclical on the condition of the Catholic Church in the German Reich as a call to battle. The Vatican created a very serious situation by publishing and disseminating it, particularly in the midst of discussions between the Reich and the Curia on a number of questions—discussions which had by no means been concluded.

The encyclical contains attacks of the severest nature upon the German Government, calls upon Catholic citizens to rebel against the authority of the State, and therefore signifies an attempt to endanger internal peace. Such behavior conflicts with the spirit and the express provisions of the Concordat.

The attitude which the German Government will take in view of the Vatican's procedure is reserved for a further instruction.

DIECKHOFF

### No. 639

1609/886201-06

*The Chairman of the Fulda Conference of Bishops (Bertram) to the Foreign Minister*

BRESLAU, March 27, 1937.

Received April 1, 1937.

(Pol. III 1612)

MY DEAR HERR REICH MINISTER:

YOUR EXCELLENCY: Since the encyclical of His Holiness Pope Pius XI of March 14, 1937, on the condition of the Catholic Church in Germany has aroused very earnest interest on the part of the Foreign Ministry, I take the liberty, in view of the cooperation displayed by the German Episcopate at the time of the conclusion of the Reich Concordat, of respectfully submitting the enclosed copy of a reply which, as present chairman of the Plenary Conference of Bishops, I directed to the Reich Ministry for Ecclesiastical Affairs in answer to the special delivery letter of March 23, by which the printing and circulation of this encyclical was forbidden.

Trusting that you will take favorable cognizance of the matter,  
I remain

Most respectfully

Your Excellency's very devoted

A. CARDINAL BERTRAM

[Enclosure]

*The Chairman of the Fulda Conference of Bishops (Bertram) to the  
Reich and Prussian Minister for Ecclesiastical Affairs (Kerrl)*

BRESLAU, March 26, 1937.

Replying to the special delivery letter of March 23, No. G II, 1502, addressed to the bishops of all German dioceses, which forbids the printing, reproduction, and dissemination of the encyclical of His Holiness Pope Pius XI, of March 14, I have the honor, as Lord Bishop of the Archdiocese of Breslau and in the light of the agreement existing among all the heads of dioceses united in the Fulda Plenary Conference of Bishops, to reply as follows:

Facts known to the whole world show that more and more, on many fronts, both concealed and open, a struggle against Christianity and particularly against the Catholic Church is being waged in high places and in broad, influential circles of the German Reich and is being spread among the people.

It is this struggle that endangers the internal peace of the German community. This struggle threatens the welfare and the interests of the German nation with disastrous harm. This struggle must necessarily impair the authority of the Reich Government if the latter does not finally put a stop to it; for this struggle is in irreconcilable conflict with the meaning, spirit, and letter of the Concordat solemnly concluded by the German Government with the Holy See, with the corresponding law of the Reich, and with public declarations and assurances of the highest authorities of the German Reich.

Against this struggle the papal encyclical is essentially directed. Written with apostolic candor and in an impressive form, it deals above all only with the religious and moral interests of Christianity and the Catholic Church in the German Reich, which are menaced by this battle and have already, in part, suffered severe injury—interests which it is the duty of the Holy See and the German bishops to protect, the latter, in particular, supported by the existing law of the Reich and the solemn assurances of the highest authorities of the Reich.

To be sure, the encyclical contains extremely serious charges regarding occurrences of the past years in violation of the Concordat. But it is significant that the formulation is based on facts which, as the encyclical itself attests, were treated unsuccessfully in a great number of frank remonstrances that the Holy See addressed in unbroken succession to the Reich Government.

If the encyclical speaks of the infringement of certain articles of the Reich Concordat, the Episcopate requests that the facts presented by the Holy See in its remonstrances be compared with the aims which both High Contracting Parties undeniably, on concluding the Reich Concordat, envisaged in the drafting of the individual articles.

If the struggle against the Catholic faith, waged in high places and tolerated by the Reich Government, is called a battle of annihilation, I may—by way of example—refer to the petitions addressed also by the Episcopate to all the Reich Ministries concerned, regarding the anti-Catholic nature of obligatory training courses, which have remained unanswered for over a year.

The same holds true of the unsuccessful efforts to obtain loyal fulfillment of the article of the Concordat relating to schools and its provisions regarding Catholic organizations.

The same holds true of the efforts, which are becoming more and more pronounced and extensive, to oust the Church from all spheres of public life, of the life of the people, and of youth education, and to render ineffectual even in religious publications the voice of the Church in the life of the people.

Accordingly, the severe reproaches contained in the special delivery letter of March 23 against the contents of the papal encyclical cannot be considered justified; they would be formally justified only if the Reich Government wished to identify itself with the authorities and circles which, despite Concordat, Reich law, and public declarations, strongly combat Christianity and the Church in the German Reich, against the true welfare and interest of the latter and without consideration for the German people.

Like the Holy See, the German bishops have thus far, in numerous remonstrances addressed to the competent authorities of the Reich Government, tried with tactful restraint to bring about a relaxation of this struggle. But as these remonstrances were not published and have also, unfortunately, produced no perceptible result, a straying away from the authority of State and Church of people faithful to Christ and the Church was imminent—an alienation equally dangerous to the interests of State and Church.

It therefore seemed to the German bishops, as to the Holy See, that a public enlightenment of the faithful Catholic people was necessary, a publication dedicated solely to the preservation of those spiritual values which, according to Christian doctrine, constitute the greatest spiritual good of mankind. It is not a question of a fight against the German political system, but of a call, emanating from deepest anxiety, for a return to the principles and purposes which were solemnly proclaimed by both sides at the time of the conclusion of the Concordat.

The papal encyclical was communicated to the Catholic people by the German Episcopate, too, in the hope that the Reich Government would take it as the occasion for finally calling a halt to the campaign of the authorities and circles hostile to Christianity and the Church, thus assuring internal peace to the German community and safeguarding the welfare and interest of the German State in a religious sense also.

The Episcopate wishes dutifully to submit this, its conviction, to the Reich Government, without thereby anticipating the attitude of the Holy See. Jealous of its honor, the German Episcopate, however, very firmly rejects particularly the reproach contained in the concluding paragraph of the special delivery letter, that the dissemination of the encyclical of His Holiness Pope Pius XI of March 14 violates the obligations of the bishops under article 16 of the Reich Concordat.

*The Archbishop of Breslau*  
A. CARDINAL BERTRAM

### No. 640

1608/386171-73

*The German Ambassador to the Holy See (Bergen) to the German Foreign Ministry*

Telegram

URGENT

ROME (VATICAN), April 1, 1937—1:15 p.m.

SECRET

Received April 1, 1937—3:35 p.m.

No. 25 of March 31

(Pol. III 1724)

From a well-informed source I have received the following information, which I have been requested to keep strictly confidential:

"1. The encyclical 'On the Condition of the Catholic Church in the German Reich' was completed while the Pope was staying in Castel Gandolfo last summer. Publication was delayed, however, for the following reasons:

"The Pope wished first to exhaust all possibilities of reaching an understanding through diplomatic channels, in the hope that the

Reich Government would understand that it was impossible for the Head of the Church to yield in certain essential matters; besides, he desired to spare Germany as much as possible.

"On the other hand, the necessity of an express condemnation by the Holy See of Communism in all its forms and workings was becoming more and more urgent. The Vatican, however, feels that certain features of National Socialism might lead to communist theories, to which the Church could not remain indifferent: A condemnation of Communism therefore necessitated a like action against the similar phenomena which, intentionally or unintentionally, were resulting from it, as was just done by the Pope's encyclical on the situation in Mexico, which appeared at Easter.

"The Pope had therefore hoped to come to an understanding with Germany and to be able to avoid taking a step similar to that taken in the case of Russia and Mexico; since Germany, however, had not renounced certain methods that were intolerable to the Holy See, to his sincere regret the Pope found himself compelled to act as his sense of duty dictated. It was to be foreseen that this would be exploited by Germany's enemies; however, the responsibility for this cannot be placed on the Holy See, since its desire for an understanding, repeatedly demonstrated, had been in vain.

"2. During the Consistory recently held, with the Pope presiding, on the occasion of the regulation of the ecclesiastical hierarchy in Ethiopia, the condition of the Church in Germany was also discussed. Several cardinals recommended the inclusion of the very strongest protest in the encyclical, which was shown them. Others even advised the severance of diplomatic relations. The Pope called these suggestions excessive; he wished to confine himself in the document, without necessary acrimony, to positive statements in accordance with the facts. He still loved the German people and wished to live at peace with them in spite of what had happened.

"3. At the same Consistory the feeling prevailed that the Holy See could not intervene with foreign Governments for the return of the colonies to Germany so long as the Catholic Church in Germany was being oppressed and the Concordat disregarded. Britain and France were taking advantage of the situation to present to the Holy See conciliatory proposals for replacing German missionaries in former German colonies by their own nationals."

So much for my informant's communications.

The present foreign situation—particularly the repercussions to be expected in Italy, which are already apparent in the open expression of regret at German Church policy in private conversations—makes intensification of the conflict, denunciation of the Concordat, or severance of relations appear inadvisable. Such internal political measures as are considered necessary can be carried out without such steps. I take the liberty [of proposing that] in the memorandum which I suggested—after mentioning what has prompted it, maintaining our point of view in all respects, and duly repudiating the high-handed conduct of the Vatican with respect

to a power that maintains diplomatic relations with it—we state that the Pope's concern over attacks against the Catholic religion and Christianity is unjustified, and that the Reich Government has never lost its willingness adequately to protect the religious interests of the Catholic element of the population. A passage in the papal sermon delivered by Faulhaber on February 14 in St. Michael's Church in Munich might be mentioned here. He stated: "Peace, of course, comes only if both sides have the will to peace. This will to peace can be proven very soon, when all young people will be incorporated in the State Youth Organization." Referring to article 31 of the Reich Concordat, the Cardinal continued: "In carrying out the law of December 1, 1936, on the absorption of youth into a national organization, safeguards must therefore be provided in advance that Catholic youth will not be estranged from their Church by incorporation in the National Youth Movement."

Furthermore, I suggest that you consider to what extent it is still possible to revert to the concessions that were offered by the Government in the agreement (rejected at the time by the Vatican) with the representatives of the German Episcopate on June 29, 1934, or in the later counterproposals of the Ministry of the Interior.

In the memorandum it might be advisable to state our position with respect to all the more important questions pending and to the Vatican's objections, and to discuss fully the negative attitude of the German clergy toward the movement before and after the Party's assumption of power, as well as their obligations toward the State (cf. enclosures to report No. 66 of February 14, 1936). The memorandum of January 15, 1934, already contained statements of principle. Drawn up along these lines, the memorandum could perhaps be published and used after delivery to the Cardinal Secretary of State.<sup>7</sup>

BERGEN

No. 641

1608/286159-61

*Memorandum*

BERLIN, April 5, 1937.  
(e.o. Pol. III 1649)

The Apostolic Nuncio called on me today, avoided speaking of the contents of the encyclical, which I would have refused to discuss at the present moment, and confined himself to handing me the enclosed *Pro Memoria*, which concerns some countermeasures of

<sup>7</sup> Cardinal Pacelli.

German authorities against the publication of the encyclical. The point particularly emphasized by the Nuncio was point 5 (prohibiting the printing and publishing of the bishops' official publication for a period of 3 months in the dioceses of Münster and Hildesheim). The Nuncio stated that such a prohibition made it impossible for the bishops to make any official announcement to their dioceses for 3 months, an intolerable situation.

I avoided discussing the separate points, but I promised the Nuncio that I would inquire into point 5.

DIECKHOFF

To: The Foreign Minister

The Head of the Political Department (with a request to check the accuracy of the points brought up by the Nuncio)

The Head of the Legal Department

[Enclosure]

#### PRO MEMORIA

The following countermeasures have been taken by the German police or the Ministry for Ecclesiastical Affairs against the publication of the papal encyclical, "On the Condition of the Catholic Church in the German Reich," of March 14, 1937:

1. Confiscation of copies of the above encyclical, including those available in the bishops' offices.

2. Strict orders to all German bishops not to distribute copies of this papal encyclical to their flocks.

3. Closing of the printing establishments (effective immediately) that printed this encyclical; namely, in Münster, Westphalia (*Regensberg'sche Druckerei*, Münster, Westphalia), in Ermland (*Druckerei und Verlagsbetrieb der Ermländischen Zeitungs- und Verlagsdruckerei*, Braunsberg, East Prussia), in Munich (*Druckerei Höfing*; proprietor, Dr. Valentin Mayer, Munich). The Apostolic Nunciature here has learned that in the dioceses of Bamberg and Augsburg the same measures have been taken against the printing establishments that participated in the reproduction of the papal encyclical.

4. Confiscation of the bishops' official publication, which, quite properly, printed the papal encyclical; for example, in Münster, Westphalia, and in Hildesheim.

5. Prohibition to print and publish the bishops' official publication for a period of 3 months, particularly in the dioceses of Münster, Westphalia, and in Hildesheim.

6. Stopping the printing of the encyclical in the bishops' official publication in Freiburg, Breisgau, and in Berlin.

7. *Entry of churches* by the police for the purpose of confiscating the encyclical; namely, St. Benno's Church in Hannover-Linden, the Cathedral of Frauenburg (East Prussia), and the parish church of Frauenburg (East Prussia).

8. Taking the papal encyclical *by force* from the hands of the priest reading it from the pulpit by the police officer present in the parish church of the village of Hauenhorst near Rheine in Westphalia.

(STAMP) APOSTOLIC NUNCIATURE

BERLIN, April 5, 1937.

### No. 642

1879/424403

*The German Foreign Ministry to the German Embassy to the Holy See*

Cipher Telegram

No. 13 of the 7th

BERLIN, April 7, 1937.

(e.o. Pol. III 1732 I)

Drafting Officer: Counselor of Legation Dumont.

For your information.

The Ministry of Justice yesterday received instructions from the Führer and Chancellor to resume the foreign exchange and immorality trials pending against Catholic clergymen. These trials have been dormant since last July. Hitherto only the charge had been filed; now in all cases the date for the trial will be set. The number of immorality trials is in the hundreds; there are only isolated cases of foreign exchange law violations.

DIECKHOFF

### No. 643

1809/386208-14

*The Reich and Prussian Minister for Ecclesiastical Affairs (Kerrl) to the Chairman of the Fulda Conference of Bishops (Bertram)*

BERLIN, April 7, 1937.

The letter of March 26, 1937—C.A. 2084<sup>s</sup>—in which, "in the light of the agreement existing among all the heads of dioceses united in

<sup>s</sup> A copy of this letter appears as an enclosure to the letter of March 27, 1937, from Cardinal Bertram to the Foreign Minister, p. 938.

the Fulda Plenary Conference of Bishops," you protest against the measure I took by special delivery letter of March 23—No. G II 1502—addressed to the German bishops, prohibiting the reproduction and dissemination of the encyclical of Pope Pius XI of March 14, 1937, compels me to make the following statements:

1. The papal encyclical of March 14, 1937, is inherently so unjustified and in such crass contradiction to the welfare and the interests of the German political system that its distribution in Germany can under no circumstances be tolerated.

The fact that this papal encyclical is addressed not only to the German bishops, but to all the prelates of the Roman Catholic Church, proves that the Head of the Roman Catholic Church wanted to rally the world against the New Germany. There are therefore involved in this encyclical not only religious but, in the last analysis, political objectives.

The repercussions of this encyclical throughout the world, among the opponents of our foreign policy as well as in ordinarily anti-Catholic circles, should give the German Episcopate pause. I should have assumed that this would have prompted you, Cardinal, to exercise greater restraint in writing your letter of protest.

Both the text of the papal encyclical and other publications reveal that the Holy See for its part has no thought of abandoning the advantages of the Concordat. It is all the more surprising, in view of this attitude, that, contrary to all diplomatic usage and furthermore, in the midst of diplomatic discussions, the Holy See does not hesitate to appeal directly to the Catholic people in Germany and to incite them against the Government of the Reich.

I regret to have to state that even these facts did not cause the German Episcopate to exercise a restraining and moderating influence on the Holy See out of concern for the good of the Fatherland, but that the German Episcopate, on the contrary, takes its stand behind the papal encyclical and makes itself the willing executive organ of the supreme authority of its Church.

The secrecy which surrounded the sending of the encyclical and the accompanying note by the Holy See and the printing and circulation by the responsible diocesan authorities proves sufficiently that all the offices in question were fully aware of the illegality of their procedure. Such a procedure on the part of German citizens means an attack upon the State, and for German bishops means a violation both of their oath of loyalty and of their civic obligations.

I am therefore compelled to sustain to the full the reproof contained in my special delivery letter.

2. It is perhaps comprehensible that the Supreme Pontiff of the Catholic Church, who lives outside Germany and is dependent solely upon reports for forming his judgment, maintains in the encyclical that "the object lessons of the past years disclose machinations that from the beginning had no other aim than a war of extermination (against the Catholic Church)." It is, however, just as incomprehensible as it is unpardonable that you, Cardinal, being the representative of the German Episcopate, have no word of criticism to find, either with regard to the encyclical as a whole or, in particular, with regard to this appalling claim, which completely defies all facts.

I am therefore compelled to point out to you that it cannot have escaped your knowledge that the Führer of the German State has since 1933, in word and deed, repeatedly manifested and proved his desire for peace with the Church. Of this desire for peace, the Concordat itself is an extraordinary proof. Even on questions in dispute in the Concordat, efforts were made to reach agreement; particularly with regard to the execution of article 31, an agreement was reached by the Reich in June 1934—Party officials and the German Episcopate concurring—which, judging from the reiterated declaration of the bishops concerned, was acceptable to the Episcopate in every way. The fact that this accord was not concluded formally was the fault of the Holy See, which did not approve it.

After the establishment of the Ministry of Ecclesiastical Affairs, I had a conversation with you, Cardinal, in the summer of 1935, in which you cannot have failed to become convinced that no war of extermination was to be waged by the State, but that my intentions, in accordance with my authority, were definitely directed at the settlement of all disputes with the Catholic Church.

Since a complete consolidation of the National Socialist order had meanwhile taken place in Germany and the Agreement of 1934 could therefore not be taken up again in the same form, I attempted, through negotiations with the bishops designated by the Episcopate, to find a basis for an agreement in harmony with the altered circumstances. You, Cardinal, know precisely that such an agreement with the German Episcopate on the basis of the altered circumstances was not unattainable through any fault of mine. You, Cardinal, must know very well that the behavior of the Catholic clergy in the past few years made it more difficult to bring about an agreement for the reason that very numerous words and deeds of the clergy revealed their hostile attitude toward the National Socialist State.

I must point out to you that in the period from January 1, 1936, to March 31, 1937, alone, the Ministry of Ecclesiastical Affairs received from the Reich Ministry of Justice 2,877 notices of criminal proceedings being instituted for punishable acts of Catholic clerics. Police investigations and penalties are not included among them. You will have to admit that this figure fully and completely confirms the statement I made above.

I must call your attention to the fact that Catholic clergymen, members of Orders, and laymen have, with astounding cleverness, been conducting a deliberate attack upon the economic security of the German Reich through misdemeanors and felonies in foreign exchange matters. You remember that I expressed to you my astonishment at the fact that only *one single* member of the German Episcopate has found occasion to state publicly his aversion to these misdemeanors and felonies.

You know that I have had to complain to you that, on the contrary, the culprits repeatedly received protection, both from the Holy See and from the German Episcopate. You yourself proposed to me the pardoning of convicted wrongdoers, and I had to reply to you that the behavior of the spiritual superiors of the Catholic Church toward the culprits seemed to justify the assumption that Jesuitical morality is put into practice in the Catholic Church, according to which the so-called punitive laws (military, game, and revenue laws) can be transgressed without the danger of incurring ecclesiastical and spiritual penalties. I have had to call your attention to the fact that if this should be the case, it is entirely impossible for the State to contemplate a pardon for the wrongdoers, that the State would, on the contrary, be compelled to consider whether such a mode of procedure did not conflict with the moral sense of the German people. You did not even consider it necessary to reply to me on this question. But you, Cardinal, did not even then consider a public condemnation of the foreign exchange violations necessary, any more than did the German Episcopate.

It must also have been known to you, Cardinal, that an unprecedented number of offenses against morality have taken place within various Orders. This is not a matter of individual cases, which can always occur here and there, but rather of an incredibly great number of wrongdoers, more than one thousand in number. Here, too, a public condemnation of the culprits by the ecclesiastical superiors was never forthcoming, and, as in matters of foreign exchange violations, no publicity was given to the necessary measures for the prevention of similar occurrences.

In view of this situation and the fact, known to the whole Episcopate, that nowhere in the German Reich is an open or concealed combat being waged by the leaders of the Reich or the Party against Christianity or, in particular, against the Catholic Church, I do not understand how you, Cardinal, have the courage not to direct a word of criticism against the papal encyclical, but rather, in your letter of protest, find words with which to support this encyclical in every respect.

You, Cardinal, will therefore have to understand that, after taking note of this letter of protest, and in conjunction with all I have experienced since taking over the Ecclesiastical Ministry, I can no longer cherish the conviction that the German Episcopate ever places its concern for the welfare and the interests of the German State above the supposed interests of its Church.

I see no reason to amend the measure which I decreed in my special delivery letter of March 23.

KERRL

No. 644

1609/386192

*The German Ambassador in Italy (Hassell) to the German  
Foreign Ministry*

Telegram

No. 97 of April 9

ROME, April 9, 1937.

(Pol. III 1756)

(Transmitted by air mail to save expense)

Today I spoke with Ciano about the Vatican's harsh policy toward the Third Reich and its incomprehensible weakness in Spain, for instance, as well as its apparent lack of influence with the Catholic Basques. Ciano replied that the Vatican had lost considerable ground in Spain. As regards Germany, he recently told the Nuncio here that he did not understand the Vatican's policy with respect to Germany, the only country besides Italy that was actively fighting Communism. The question was important for Italy, too, since the Vatican's attitude toward Germany, Italy's friend, hampered Italian policy also.

HASELL

## No. 645

1609/386225-26

*The Reich and Prussian Minister for Ecclesiastical Affairs (Kerrl)  
to the Foreign Ministry*

G II 1720/37

BERLIN, April 9, 1937.  
Received April 17, 1937.  
(Pol. III 1881)

With reference to the letter of April 6, 1937, Pol. III 1649.\*

Subject: *Pro Memoria* of the Nuncio of April 5, 1937.<sup>10</sup>

I consider both the fact that the Apostolic Nuncio, on April 5, 1937, presented the *Pro Memoria* containing complaints concerning the defensive measures taken by the Government against the papal encyclical of March 14, 1937, and the contents of this *Pro Memoria* not only unabashed effrontery but also indicative of the fact that the Nuncio apparently does not realize the state of Church matters since the issuance and reading of the papal encyclical against National Socialism.

I recommend answering the Nuncio quite briefly approximately as follows: "On April 5, 1937, Your Excellency handed us a *Pro Memoria* concerning the defensive measures that Germany was obliged to take against the papal encyclical of March 14, 1937. You apparently intended, on your part, to show that nothing had changed in the relations between Germany and the Catholic Church since the issuance and reading of the encyclical in question.

"May I refer, in this matter, to the reply of the German Government to the papal encyclical, which was sent to the Holy See on (the date of the reply to the Holy See to be inserted here [in handwriting: April 12]). With reference thereto, and repeating that Germany can under no circumstances submissively accept the encyclical, I must decline to discuss the contents of the *Pro Memoria*."

For your information I may tell you that in my circular letter of March 23, 1937, to the German Catholic bishops, which was sent to you for your information, the "printing, reproduction, and distribution of the papal encyclical in any form was prohibited." All further measures by the police or in the field of the press were ordered by the Gestapo or the Propaganda Ministry, to which copies of this letter are being sent.

KERRL

\* Not printed.

<sup>10</sup> The *Pro Memoria* appears as an enclosure to the Dieckhoff memorandum of April 5, 1937, p. 943.

[Notations in longhand:]

A written reply to the Nuncio's *Pro Memoria* of April 5, 1937, would probably be out of the question; besides, the replies of the Propaganda Ministry and the Gestapo to our letter of April 6 should be awaited. Dumont

To be submitted again after receipt of the replies. v[on] N[eurath]

No. 646

1608/386179-84

*The German Foreign Ministry to Various German Diplomatic Missions and Consular Offices*<sup>10a</sup>

BERLIN, April 15, 1937.

(Pol. III 1739, III)

In the question of the papal encyclical "On the Condition of the Catholic Church in the German Reich," our Ambassador at the Holy See transmitted to the Cardinal Secretary the note herewith respectfully enclosed for your information and the orientation of your conversations. Publication of the note is not contemplated here at the moment. A decision on this matter is, however, reserved for a later date.

DIECKHOFF

[Enclosure]

The German Government has learned with the greatest astonishment of the encyclical of March 14 of His Holiness the Pope "On the Condition of the Catholic Church in the German Reich." It feels compelled to state that it most severely condemns and most firmly disapproves this procedure on the part of the Holy See.

The encyclical has the character of a political document, if only for the reason that it is addressed not only to the archbishops and bishops of Germany, but also to all "other prelates who live in peace and communion with the Apostolic See." The attempt is thus

<sup>10a</sup> The addressees of this instruction were—

The German Embassies in Buenos Aires, Nanking, Rio de Janeiro, Rome (Holy See), Santiago.

The German Legations in Asunción, Bagdad, Bangkok, Bogotá, Caracas, Ciudad Trujillo (Santo Domingo, Chargé d'Affaires ad interim), Guatemala, Havana, Kabul, Cairo, La Paz, Luxembourg, Mexico, Montevideo, Panama, Port-au-Prince (Chargé d'Affaires ad interim), Pretoria, Lima, Quito, Teheran, Tirana.

The German Consulates General in Batavia, Beirut, Danzig, Jerusalem, Calcutta, Memel, Singapore.

The German Consulates in Colombo, Hong Kong, Lourenço Marques, Luanda-Angola.

made to arouse the world against the New Germany. The political opponents of the Reich, even those who are at the same time opponents of the Catholic Church, understood this appeal, joyfully welcomed it, and thereby received new encouragement in their political fight against the Reich. In this way the encyclical destroyed the effect of the papal encyclical against Communism, issued just previously, and dealt a dangerous blow to the defense front against the world menace of Bolshevism, so very desirable for the Catholic Church in particular.

But quite apart from these international consequences, it is unacceptable to the German Government, in view of the existing Concordat relations, that the ecclesiastical party to the Concordat, contrary to all diplomatic usage and in the midst of discussions still pending on a number of difficult points in the Concordat, going over the heads of the authorities for the discussion of differences of opinion, should address itself directly to the Catholic citizens and incite them against their own Government. There is a glaring inconsistency in the Holy See's alleging, on the one hand, that it wishes to adhere to the Concordat, and at the same time violating the most elementary principles of the Concordat in so obvious a manner as was done in the writing, publication, and reading of the encyclical.

The fact that the printing and distribution of the encyclical was shrouded in the greatest secrecy proves that the ecclesiastical authorities responsible for the writing and circulation were fully aware of the illegality of their procedure and the violation of their obligations as citizens.

Moreover, the encyclical represents, in tone and substance, so open a challenge to German political administration, administration of justice, and educational and press policy, that the German Government does not deem it compatible with its dignity and sovereignty to go into detail with regard to the encyclical.

With regard to world public opinion also, the German Government can dispense with a rectification of the many distortions and misleading statements contained in the encyclical. If the Holy See introduces its lengthy statements with the assertion that "the object lessons of the past years disclose machinations that from the beginning had no other aim than a war of extermination (against the Catholic Church)," it is easy for the German Government to convince world public opinion to the contrary. All that is needed for this is the reference to the fact, also recognized by the Holy See, that the Catholic Church of Germany has been rescued by National Socialism from the chaos of Bolshevism. Also to be re-

called is the great spirit of cooperation manifested by the German Government in word and deed toward the Catholic Church in drawing up the essential provisions of the Concordat and in the negotiations concerning an accord in the summer of 1934, which finally collapsed through no fault of the German Government. Finally to be recalled are the many new church buildings and the foundation of many new parishes since 1933, the great financial services to the Catholic Church, exceeding the heavy obligations arising out of the Concordat, and the extensive assistance of the Government in the levying of Church taxes, through which the Church is guaranteed a very considerable part of its economic support. The National Socialist State needs in no wise to fear comparison with other states, even purely Catholic states, with regard to its attitude toward the Catholic Church and its services to it. It is therefore natural that it should meet the calumny and aspersions cast on it by the Church with all the means at its command, whether these calumnies and aspersions emanate from circles that had to surrender their political power to National Socialism, or whether they originate in circles abroad which for reasons sufficiently well known can have no sympathy for the New Germany nor wish to have any.

The German Government has more reasons than one to remind the Holy See that in all spheres of public life, of public administration, of the administration of justice, and of educational and press policy, the authoritarian German State has finally broken with the concepts and methods of liberalist-parliamentary democracy. The Holy See has, however, never even made the attempt to understand the National Socialist ideological world and to project itself into the special German situation. On the contrary, the encyclical of March 14, just like many of the preceding notes of the Holy See, reveals the lack of any good will to bring about such an understanding, which must really be regarded by the German Government as the first requirement for the friendly relations envisaged in the Reich Concordat.

The German Government must consider it a further prerequisite for a harmonious collaboration between State and Church that the servants of the Church always and in every case acknowledge their civic obligations of loyalty. The rights granted to the Catholic Church in the Reich Concordat, according to the provision expressly agreed upon there, must be maintained "within the framework of the laws applicable to all." Only thus, in a State with a population of mixed faiths, can the community be kept from being torn asunder, the Church from becoming a sort of State within the State, and the clergy from considering itself a privileged caste above the national

laws. The encyclical of March 14 is a new proof of the fact that the Holy See not only does not hold the higher and lower clergy to the fulfillment of their political obligations of loyalty but even takes a stand in opposition to the authority of and the oath of loyalty to the State. No self-respecting State could tolerate such conduct on the part of the Church without jeopardizing its sovereignty.

To sum up, the German Government must therefore affirm that the encyclical of March 14 constitutes a grave violation of the contractual obligations of the Holy See, arising from the Reich Concordat, and that if these are not respected, the other party to the agreement cannot be expected to fulfill its contractual obligations. In the interest of the German people, the Reich Government, in future also, cannot therefore put up with such serious breaches of the contractual obligations without drawing the inevitable conclusions. It has again set forth above in brief the principles that it considers natural prerequisites for a successful collaboration between State and Church. Only if the Holy See can decide to recognize the justice of these principles and act accordingly will it be possible to create an atmosphere such as the execution of the Concordat requires. The German Government has always desired such an atmosphere, for in it alone can both entities, State and Church, work for the welfare of the Germans as a nation and as members of the Church. The encyclical of March 14 consciously created the opposite condition. It now behooves the ecclesiastical party to the Concordat alone to bring about a change in this respect by evincing a really honest desire to observe its contractual obligations. The Holy See thus has it in its power to decide what the future relations between State and Church are to be in Germany.

### No. 647

1609/386223-24

*The German Ambassador to the Holy See (Bergen) to the German Foreign Ministry*

Telegram

No. 28 of April 15

ROME (VATICAN), April 15, 1937—9 p.m.

Received April 15, 1937—11:30 p.m.

(Pol. III 1850)

In a lengthy talk which I had today with the Cardinal Secretary of State and which, pointing to our long personal relationship, I purposely indicated to be of a private nature, I stressed the fact,

in the sense of our note of April 12<sup>11</sup> addressed to him (Report 89 of April 12<sup>12</sup>), that the encyclical "On the Condition of the Catholic Church in the German Reich" and, in particular, the manner of its publication, not only had greatly heightened the existing tension between Germany and the Holy See, but had also made further negotiations extraordinarily difficult. Ill feeling had been increased in Germany by the fact that foreign countries, particularly the Austrian Episcopate, had again used this occasion to agitate, publicly and from the pulpit, against the National Socialist regime in Germany. Cardinal Pacelli declared in his reply that the Pope had felt obliged, after considerable hesitation, to make the weighty decision to go before the public with the question of Church policy in Germany, since all attempts of the Holy See to remove the existing tension and differences of opinion through diplomatic channels had failed because of the evasive and repeatedly negative attitude of the competent German authorities. Various notes of the most serious import, some of them now over a year old, had remained unanswered; thus it would seem that Germany had taken the first step in deviating from diplomatic usage. If regret was expressed in our note that the encyclical had been issued during negotiations, he wondered just what had been the subject of the negotiations. The Government had declared on various occasions either that negotiations had not taken place or that it could promise no positive results from further discussion of this or that matter. The Cardinal gave as an example the Foreign Minister's letter of March 10 to the Nuncio (see instruction Pol. III 1024 V) on the question of private schools in Berlin.<sup>13</sup> This enigmatic conduct on Germany's part had finally decided the Pope to issue the encyclical. The Holy See was still willing, however, to return to the normal method of negotiation. It would, therefore, reply to our note, although the date and tenor had not yet been decided upon.

Since the Vatican's answer will in all probability be in the sense of the Cardinal's utterances, and since, furthermore, the appearance of the Yellow Book must still be taken into account, I once more ask you to consider whether it does not appear advisable to send to the Vatican the memorandum recommended by me, covering as far as possible all the unresolved questions, or to prepare it to the extent that it can be used publicly at any time in case the Yellow Book appears.

BERGEN

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<sup>11</sup> For text, see the enclosure to the circular instruction, *supra*.

<sup>12</sup> Not printed.

<sup>13</sup> Not printed here.

## No. 648

1609/386215-16

*The German Foreign Ministry to Various German Diplomatic Missions*<sup>14</sup>

BERLIN, April 23, 1937.  
(zu Pol. III 1612, 1783)

Drafting Officer: Dr. Dumont, Counselor of Legation.

The Reich and Prussian Minister for Ecclesiastical Affairs in a circular letter of March 23 to bishops and other ordinaries, citing article 16 of the Reich Concordat, has prohibited the printing, reproduction, and distribution of the papal encyclical of March 14 "On the Condition of the Catholic Church in the German Reich." Cardinal Bertram has protested against this measure in a letter,<sup>15</sup> a copy of which is enclosed for your information. The Reich and Prussian Ecclesiastical Minister replied to it in a letter of April 7, 1937,<sup>16</sup> a copy of which is also enclosed. I respectfully suggest using the arguments there set forth in stating our position on the questions raised by the papal encyclical.

By direction:  
D[UMONT]<sup>17</sup>

## No. 649

1609/386239-58

*The Papal Secretary of State (Pacelli) to the German Ambassador to the Holy See (Bergen)*<sup>18</sup>

No. 1625/37

THE VATICAN, April 30, 1937.  
(Pol. III 2242/37)

YOUR EXCELLENCY: In reply to the note delivered under date of April 12,<sup>19a</sup> I have the honor to make the following statements and corrections.

1) The above-mentioned note is evidently based on the unproved and undemonstrable assumption that the Holy See, in its previous relations, and especially in its publication of the encyclical "*Mit brennender Sorge*," had allowed itself to be guided or influenced by

<sup>14</sup> List of addressees not printed.

<sup>15</sup> Enclosure to document No. 639, p. 938.

<sup>16</sup> Document No. 643, p. 945.

<sup>17</sup> A marginal notation in Dumont's hand reads as follows: "Dr. Muhs agrees to the use of the letter of April 7 in the manner here described."

<sup>18</sup> Received in the Foreign Ministry as an enclosure to report No. 95 of May 4, from the German Ambassador to the Holy See; report not printed.

<sup>19a</sup> Printed as an enclosure to the circular instruction of April 15, 1937, document No. 646, p. 951.

a hostile attitude toward the German people or the German State. The Holy See, for the sake of its own dignity and for the sake of the truth, must reject such interpretations. Every step of the German people on the way toward true well-being, every aim and action of their Government which serves that goal, is certain of the understanding approval and the moral support of the Holy See. Anyone who is willing to follow the arguments of His Holiness in their entirety will see that they are marked by genuine anxiety and calm objectivity, and that even the passages which describe the origins of the present critical situation and the extent of the crisis are only the inevitable diagnosis of a diseased condition, a diagnosis of which the only purpose is an early, complete, and certain cure. The frank diagnosis of such lesions does not preclude the recognition of accomplishments which serve the welfare of the German people. The German Government, particularly, which has its own ideas with regard to the dividing line between the religious and the political realms, will not take it amiss if the Holy See imposes upon itself moderation in passing political judgments which are not required by religious necessities.

2) If the papal encyclical was addressed, not only to the archbishops and bishops, but also to "the other prelates who live in peace and communion with the Apostolic See," this form of address is the usual formula in encyclicals to single nations. The canon-law advisers on the note of April 12 forgot that in Germany, not only the archbishops and bishops, but also the *Praelatus Nullius* of Schneidemühl, the archiepiscopal Vicars-General of Katscher and Glatz, the interim *Administrator Apostolicus* for spiritual affairs in the armed forces, and others are among the ordinaries, in accordance with can. 198, sec. 1, C.J.C. To characterize the encyclical as a "political document" on the basis of such a form of address, or even to go so far as to conclude that "the attempt is thus made to arouse the world against the New Germany," is as erroneous as it is indicative of the attitude with which the authorities responsible for this part of the note evaluated the encyclical. Moreover, the German Government and the party sustaining it have never drawn geographic limits to their propaganda even in ideological questions. It is therefore doubly incomprehensible how it can feel injured by an expository [*aufklärende*] defense on the part of the Church.

3) Continuing on the basis of that fallacy, the note of April 12 states: "The political opponents of the Reich, even those who are at the same time opponents of the Catholic Church, also understood this appeal, joyfully welcomed it, and thereby received new encouragement in their political fight against the Reich." The Holy

See, on the other hand, believes it can insist that, for anyone reacting to the encyclical without prejudice, its religious aim, devoid of any political tendencies, is unequivocal and clear. Many foreign voices have emphatically stressed just that. Tendentious misinterpretations of others cannot change this. That the Holy See can unfortunately not prevent improper political interpretations of its official statements and official acts is continually demonstrated by the German press, which is under Ministerial control and guidance, and nevertheless is guilty of painful distortions. The Holy See is neither accustomed nor willing to be guided in its doctrinal statements by any point of view other than the conviction of their spiritual necessity. In this procedure its only ally is the truth. And its aim in the present case also was anything but a direct or indirect injury to the German people. Its intention was and is the elimination of the damage and an end to the disturbances arising in present-day Germany from the fact that public authorities and the movement sustaining the State have increasingly become involved with ideas, forces, tendencies, and ideological groups whose declared or actual purpose is the enslavement of the Church and the destruction of the Christian faith. From the fact that persons in power in the State and leading representatives of the political movement sustaining the State have not yet been able to decide to terminate the calamitous symbiosis which makes them the spiritual bondsmen and servants of these anti-Christian currents, there arose the tragic situation which, after long waiting, with inexorable necessity demanded a clarifying and orientating word from the supreme ecclesiastical authority. If the note of the 12th had wanted to evaluate in their entirety the statements on the encyclical by the non-German press, it would not have omitted those utterances which recognized and appreciated the clarity of the statements concerning the history of the Concordat, the doctrinal expositions and the general tendency of the encyclical, which was consciously directed toward peace and understanding.

4) The note of Your Excellency of the 12th asserts that the encyclical "*Mit brennender Sorge*" has "destroyed the effect of the papal encyclical against Communism issued just previously, and dealt a dangerous blow to the defense front against the world menace of Bolshevism, so very desirable for the Catholic Church in particular." This thinking, too, represents a deplorable error of judgment. The Holy See does not fail to recognize the great importance of the formation of inherently sound and vigorous defensive political fronts against the danger of atheistic Bolshevism. The efforts of the Holy See to conquer these errors proceed from concern for the salvation of souls and work with spiritual means,

and therefore have their own laws and direction. The Holy See realizes, however, the important mission and task of the political power which stands on the side of order in face of the illegal use of power which is the purpose of both open and secret revolutionary plotting, as well as the systematic mobilization of that political power so that it may be used to advantage against the Bolshevik danger. At a time when those who are now vociferous opponents of Bolshevism were consciously or unconsciously its pacemakers, the Holy See revealed with unflagging zeal the cultural and social, as well as the religious dangers of that system. Similarly, and up to the present moment, the Holy See has let no opportunity go by to strengthen and expand the spiritual defensive front of the faithful against atheistic Bolshevism. The Holy Father owes it to the dignity and essential impartiality of his Supreme Pontificate, however, while condemning the Bolshevistic system of delusion and revolution, not to close his eyes to errors that are beginning to insinuate themselves into other political and ideological movements and are pressing for supremacy. The fact that such errors are also found within political defensive fronts which have a general anti-Bolshevist orientation cannot constitute a justification for tolerating or ignoring them on the part of the highest authority on religious teaching. Such partiality, not justifiable to the Christian conscience, would, in the last analysis, also work to the detriment of those who today, as in the case of the German note, in shortsighted self-deception demand such an attitude from the Church and, when it is not forthcoming, choose to call it an anti-German act. Nothing would be more disastrous to the internal and external cohesiveness and to the continued existence, despite great strain, of a strong defensive front against the world danger of atheistic Communism, than the erroneous belief that this defense can be based solely upon external power and that the spiritual powers can be denied their rightful place in it. There is nothing more misguided than to restrict, among the spiritual powers of the world, the field of operations of Christianity and of its inherent values of truth and life, and to prevent the Church from fully utilizing the powers latent in it and ready for action to overcome spiritually, as a blessing of the nations, the errors and misconceptions inherent in Bolshevism. It is precisely to this error and to the false attitude resulting from it that leading circles in present-day Germany have to an alarming extent succumbed. It is not only that the freedom of action of Christianity is interfered with more and more. Beyond that, under the eyes of the political authority, tolerated and encouraged by it, a school of literature, a favored press, and a whole complex

of organizations are waging a systematic war against Christianity and the Church which, in its general outlines and method, in hatefulness and malevolence, is reminiscent of models from the very camp which one claims to be fighting. Since the German Government has welded together press, literature, and organizations as never before, and consequently must be better acquainted from daily official experience with the details of this gloomy picture than the Holy See, whose documentary evidence fills volumes, we can refrain here from further explanations. For the sake of truth, however, one statement cannot be omitted: between the official theory of the anti-Bolshevist defensive front and the practice described, there are contrasts that are as eloquent as they are distressing. When the Supreme Pontiff of the Catholic Church laid his hand on this open wound and raised his voice in honest concern over the dangers threatening the welfare of the German people from this direction, his sole and dutiful aim was not exposure and denunciation, but healing and salvation. Viewed in this light, the assertion in the German note that the encyclical "*Mit brennender Sorge*" has "dealt a dangerous blow to the defensive front against the world menace of Bolshevism" shows a misunderstanding of the facts and a self-deception which, in the interest of the German nation, one can only hope will soon yield to a just and dispassionate appreciation.

5) The note of Your Excellency terms it unacceptable "that the ecclesiastical party to the Concordat, contrary to all diplomatic usage and in the midst of discussions still pending on a number of difficult points in the Concordat, going over the heads of the authorities competent for the discussion of differences of opinion, should address itself directly to the Catholic citizens and incite them against their own Government." This assertion and the reproach expressed therein is only explicable if it comes from a Government representative who either is unfamiliar with the course of the negotiations between the Holy See and the German Government or, with astonishing unconcern, disregards what he knows. The Holy See believes it is as good a judge of the legal obligations and the considerations of tact arising out of diplomatic usage as any other office. It would be easy for it to prove by documents how, in the 4 years following the Concordat, it endeavored, with unflagging solicitude and a patience which many people felt went too far, to take advantage of every possibility for reaching a defensible understanding, even when methods of negotiation and practices of governmental mediators more than once made this patience more difficult and rewarded it negatively.

In view of the fact that a great number of individual and collective petitions and representations on the part of the Episcopate have been ignored,

In view of the failure, for which the State is responsible, of repeated personal contacts between ecclesiastical and Government representatives in Germany,

In view of the frequent failure to answer notes of the Holy See, which, "contrary to all diplomatic usage," had become customary in the transaction of business with the Third Reich, a failure which had already reached proportions unknown in diplomatic intercourse with other powers and which more recently, on educational matters of the greatest importance, had occurred to the extent of deliberate discourtesy,

In view of the repeated and futile appeal by the Holy See to article 33, the article of accord contained in the Concordat and therefore mandatory,

In view of the demonstrably systematic protraction of negotiations and the practice of deferring discussions devoted to Concordat questions of the greatest importance, with both the Apostolic Nuncio and the representatives of the Episcopate,

It is an astonishing, diplomatically impossible undertaking to describe the encyclical that resulted from this whole situation as the statement by the Holy See of a position contrary to the Concordat, inspired, or at least influenced by political motives, and to make the hopeless attempt to characterize it as such before world public opinion.

When the note of Your Excellency chooses to speak of breach of diplomatic usage and of "discussions still pending," it forgets the much more obvious application of these words to the conduct of the governmental authorities. In this connection the question arises: Is it in accord with "diplomatic usage" and respect for "discussions still pending" when the governmental party—although officially informed regarding the different opinion of the ecclesiastical party to the Concordat—by unilateral legal and administrative measures restricts the jurisdiction of the Church, which was fixed by agreement; when it violates the legal and actual status of the Catholic Church by the method which is convenient, but contrary to the agreement, of producing accomplished facts; when in the basic questions of Christian education and the confessional school it disregards the free rights of Catholic parents by intimidation and worse (for which there is documentary proof), and then expects the Church to see in such fraudulent results, brought about in such an extraordinary way and by such reprehensible methods, facts

unobjectionable under the Concordat? To put the question is to answer it: but it is also proof that the accusations directed at the Holy See are without foundation in fact.

6) The German note of the 12th claims to see in the behavior of the Holy See with regard to the writing, publication, and reading of the encyclical, "*Mit brennender Sorge*," a "violation of the most elementary principles of the Concordat." The note does not even shrink from the strange conclusion: "The fact that the printing and distribution of the encyclical was shrouded in the greatest secrecy proves that the ecclesiastical authorities responsible for the writing and circulation were fully aware of the illegality of their procedure and the violation of their obligations as citizens." The Holy See emphatically rejects this imputation. It protests against the charge of illegal action. It knows of no article in the Concordat which requires that encyclicals must be indited publicly. So far as the "secrecy" of the printing and the circulation objected to in the note corresponds with the facts, the documents in its possession furnish no evidence of the violation of a legal press regulation. The same State police that tolerates and countenances anti-Church publications to the greatest extent has long pursued a method in the treatment of the pastoral letters of German bishops that was tantamount to the denial of rights protected by the Concordat. In view of these continued abuses of a vexatious and obviously partisan police practice, only one thing can be concluded from the procedure of the Most Reverend Bishops of Germany—that they endeavored to preserve the enlightening, guiding, and, despite its candor, benevolent Pastoral Word of the Pope from the fate that many pastoral letters had unjustly met. If the Gestapo did not prevent the reading in the churches, it was probably partly for the reason that from the beginning they were unable to find any factual errors in the text of the papal encyclical. It is incomprehensible to the Holy See how the German Government can now justify the reproach that the papal encyclical "represents, in tone and substance, so open a challenge to German political administration, administration of justice, and educational and press policy, that the German Government does not deem it compatible with its dignity and sovereignty to go into detail with regard to the encyclical." The method employed in this comment makes it much easier for the German Government to answer, or more precisely, to evade answering and refuting the encyclical. But it also deprives its position of all power to convince. This is the continuation of that practice which in the past, in countless instances, evaded objective discussion and thereby contributed decisively to the tension in the relations between

Church and State. The Holy See is most unwilling to assume that the German Government, the German judiciary, the German schools, and the German press could have an interest in identifying themselves with the obvious errors and abuses mentioned in the encyclical. As long as the Government does not do this, there is no occasion to consider objective discussions of these abuses as directed against it. The form of these discussions in the encyclical and the Holy See's efforts, which did not go unnoticed in other quarters, not to connect directly with the State as such or with the movement that sustains the State, the wrong developments that the Holy See dutifully opposed, would have caused anyone who took the encyclical as a unified whole and sought dispassionately to appraise the positive guidance contained or implied therein to consider without prejudice and without undue sensitivity how a way could be found out of the confusions of the very recent past and the menacing growth of tension in the present. The intentions of His Holiness the Pope, as also the well-being, the peace, and the progress of the German people and State would thus have been better served than by the irritated misconstructions, purely negative in orientation and therefore necessarily reaching out into and leading into the void, which characterize the note of April 12.

7) The reference in the papal encyclical to "machinations that from the beginning had no other aim than a war of extermination" is answered by the German Government in a number of individual statements from which its positive attitude to the Church is to be inferred. A careful review of the text of the encyclical will convince the Government of the fact that only the existence of such machinations was asserted, without the Government as such being identified with them. It is enough to know the literature and speeches of certain leading personages and organs of the National Socialist movement and of the groups of public opinion favored by it in order to establish the regrettable fact that the statement in the encyclical is true. It lies in the power of the Government to remedy this unfortunate state of affairs, as is evidenced by statements of highly placed personages in the administration of the State to representatives of the Church. The Government has thus far not taken advantage of this possibility.

As proof of its positive attitude toward the Church, the note avails itself of "the reference to the fact, also recognized by the Holy See, that the Catholic Church of Germany has been rescued by National Socialism from the chaos of Bolshevism." The Holy See is not unaware that the present German Government has successfully eliminated Communism as a public organization. To what

extent German Communism at the time of the National Socialist seizure of power represented a direct danger which could not be overcome by other means is a question of fact that the Holy See does not of itself have to decide. In any case, it appreciates every honest effort in the direction of order and peace.

The note of the 12th refers to "the great spirit of cooperation manifested by the German Government in word and deed toward the Catholic Church in drawing up the essential provisions of the Concordat." It may be recalled, in this connection, that the Reich Concordat concluded by the present Government contains no new financial stipulations and merely retains in force what former governments had agreed upon. The Reich Government is aware that the same holds true for payments outside the Concordat on the basis of former laws, for the levying of church taxes, for the establishment of new parishes, and so on. Nor will it be able to deny that substantial reductions have been made. Moreover, it may be stated that through a number of legislative and administrative measures, losses of the most serious kind have accrued to property and income of Church institutions and societies, the statistical determination of which is reserved for later. Moreover, the Holy See may, in this connection, without having to fear misunderstandings, call attention to the fact that for it the questions which are here brought into prominence by the Reich Government are not questions of interests, but questions of law, and that a correct appraisal of the German settlement of these issues is impossible without going back to the legal titles arising out of secularization and other facts. It is not necessary then to point out that, for the Church, its freedom in the fulfillment of its mission of salvation is of prime importance and that no material interests can deter the Church from demanding this freedom as its divine right rather than begging for it as alms from every state, whatever its individual constitutional form. This freedom is in the interest also of the state and the people themselves.

8) When the note of April 12 believes it must remind the Holy See that "in all spheres of public life, of public administration, of the administration of justice, and of educational and press policy, the authoritarian German State has finally broken with the concepts and methods of liberalist-parliamentary democracy," it strangely misunderstands the intentions of the papal encyclical. It is not here that the actual or potential sources of conflict between the Catholic Church and the German State are to be found. The Holy See, which has friendly, correct, or at least tolerable relations with states of one or another constitutional form and orientation, will

never interfere in the question of what concrete form of government a certain people chooses to regard as best suited to its nature and requirements. With respect to Germany also, it has remained true to this principle and intends so to continue. The papal encyclical simply laid down the principle that the organic law of every state is subject to the law of God. If this fundamental truth is recognized by the German Government in principle and administered in practice, then conflicts between the conscientious duty of the Christian and the obligation to loyalty of the citizen will be precluded. A government, however, that would wish to evade this fundamental demand of every moral order of law and society, in principle or practice, creates, consciously or not, tensions and antagonisms which make impossible the development of the communal spirit desired by it and encouraged also by the Church with all the means permitted.

In summary, the Holy See states as the most essential fact: the note of the 12th has not factually refuted a single one of the statements contained in the encyclical, "*Mit brennender Sorge*." It has sought, by political misinterpretations both of the substance of the encyclical and of the purposes of His Holiness the Pope, to conceal the violations of the Concordat that have taken place and are taking place in Germany, by asserting that the said encyclical represents a violation of the Concordat. A more amazing reversal in a diplomatic document of all the basic concepts of contract law than that attempted here is hard to imagine. After 4 long years of vain pressing for a correct observance of the Concordat; after repeated confidential indications that the Holy See would be compelled to take a public stand if the Government continued its tactics; after numerous attempts to substitute a solution defensible for both sides with regard to the Catholic associations in place of the weakening of the Concordat sought by the State in June 1934; after repeated efforts, through personal contact by representatives of the Episcopate with high-ranking persons in the Government, to ease the tension that had set in; after many unsuccessful appeals to the conciliation authority provided for in article 33 in the face of precipitate and repeated unilateral Government measures in the field of education and in various other important questions, His Holiness the Pope spoke the Supreme Pastoral Word, in accordance with his official duty and his contractual right. By his high order, it is my duty to reject the unjust criticism leveled at his encyclical in the note of April 12 and also the form of this criticism. On the factual side it must be maintained, in conclusion, that the basic defect of vision responsible for the whole viewpoint of the German

Government is that of seeing the source of the existing conflicts in the political sphere, and in political trends and aspirations on the German ecclesiastical side. The more rapidly and definitively the German Government can decide to exclude this element of journalistic polemics from its official deliberations and its negotiations with the Holy See, so much sooner can an atmosphere be created, in which, as the note of the 12th says, "both entities, State and Church, work for the welfare of the Germans as a nation and as members of the Church." The first and essential condition for the attainment of this goal, desirable in the interest of both parties, is the release of the leadership of the State, and of the movement sustaining the State, from the ever tightening embrace and the increasing penetration of ideological and anti-Christian currents which draw their strength from the struggle against the Church and which seek to make of this struggle a law of life and a condition of life for the German State bearing their mark and animated by their spirit. This diagnosis of the situation which produces the conflict is not presented to the State for the first time here. It is only repeated with the urgency dictated and demanded by experience. It rests with the German State and its leaders now finally to make the decisions which have heretofore been repeatedly evaded. Thus the State and not the Holy See has the power to decide what the future relations between Church and State shall be.

With the expression of my high consideration I have the honor to remain

Your Excellency's most devoted

E. CARDINAL PACELLI

No. 650

1609/386260

*Memorandum by the Foreign Minister*

RM 331

(Pol. III 2347)

Mussolini, in the interview yesterday, introduced the Church question. He pointed out the harmful effect on public opinion abroad of the unpleasant disputes with the Catholic and the Protestant Churches in Germany. If he might be allowed to give a bit of advice, it would be to reach an understanding with the Church on the following basis: Politics is the exclusive preserve of the State; religion the province of the Church. It goes without saying that the education of youth is the affair of the State. However, the Church must be given an opportunity to furnish religious instruction in the schools. He himself had, after delicate discussions with the Vatican, reached agreement along these lines with

good results. Through small favors to the higher clergy, for example, free railway tickets, occasional tax concessions, etc., he had won them over, so that they even declared the war in Abyssinia a holy war.

I explained to Mussolini the difficulties that exist in our country, but declared that we also wished to make peace with the Churches.

BARON VON NEURATH

ROME, May 4, 1937.

No. 651

1607/386064

*The German Ambassador to the Holy See (Bergen) to the German Foreign Ministry*

CONFIDENTIAL

Nr. 97

ROME, May 11, 1937.

Received May 15, 1937.

(Pol. III 2308)

Subject: Demonstrations against the alleged persecution of the Catholic Church in Germany.

I have heard from a well-informed source that the Episcopates of several countries—France, Britain, and the United States were mentioned—have, among themselves, discussed a plan to address a collective letter to the German Episcopate, deploring the persecution of the Catholic Church by the German Government. The Vatican, however, has informed the bishops concerned that such a step would not be advisable at this time. In the event that Germany, under cover of the imminent morals trials, opens a general attack on the Church, it is apparently proposed to organize counter-demonstrations abroad and to use this opportunity to start a press campaign against Germany.

BERGEN

## B. THE SPEECH OF CARDINAL MUNDELEIN, MAY-OCTOBER 1937

No. 652

1607/386070

*The German Ambassador in the United States (Dieckhoff) to the  
German Foreign Ministry*

Telegram

VERY SECRET

No. 123 of May 20

WASHINGTON, May 20, 1937—9:18 p.m.

Received May 21, 1937—6:30 a.m.

(Pol. III 2643)

Only for the State Secretary.

The immediate and strong German reaction to Mundelein's speech<sup>19</sup> has been noted here and probably widely understood, too, since many decent Americans doubtless condemn the bad taste of the Cardinal's utterance. We must see, however, that the polemics do not overreach themselves and that quiet gradually returns, as, otherwise, we should weaken our originally strong position. Furthermore, if friendly mention of the brave and chivalrous assistance rendered by the Lakehurst officers and men were made at the memorial service in Hamburg for the Hindenburg dead, it would have a good effect.

DIECKHOFF

No. 653

1607/386065-66

*The German Foreign Ministry to the German Embassy to the  
Holy See*

Cipher Telegram

IMMEDIATE

No. 25

BERLIN, May 21, 1937.

(e.o. Pol. III 2640)

According to a D.N.B. despatch from New York, Cardinal Mundelein spoke<sup>20</sup> before more than 500 priests of the Archbishopric of Chicago in an outrageously insulting manner of the Führer, the members of the Reich Government, and the proceedings against the Catholic Church in Germany. M[undelein] declared that the German Government had complained bitterly of the Allied atrocity propaganda during the World War, but was now making use of this same kind of propaganda against the Catholic Church and was giving out, through a crooked Propaganda Minister, stories of wholesale immorality in religious institutions, in com-

<sup>19</sup> See document No. 653, *infra*.

<sup>20</sup> For extracts from this speech, see the *New York Times* of May 19, 1937.

parison to which the war propaganda sounded almost like a nursery tale. M[undelein] said: "Perhaps you will ask how it is that a nation of 60 million intelligent people will submit in fear and servitude to an alien, an Austrian paper hanger, and a poor one at that, and a few associates like Goebbels and Göring, who dictate every move of the people's lives." Mundelein concluded: The prayers of the congregations would prove more effective than the weight of the malicious propaganda that proceeds from the Third Reich; American Catholics must fight back.

The Embassy at Washington has made representations to the State Department against this outrageous new case of insulting the Chief of a State.

Please take corresponding steps there and point to the inevitable repercussions on the relations between Germany and the Curia.

WEIZSÄCKER

### No. 654

1607/386069

*The German Ambassador in the United States (Dieckhoff) to the German Foreign Ministry*

Telegram

URGENT

No. 124 of May 21

WASHINGTON, May 21, 1937—7:12 p.m.

Received May 22, 1937—4:20 a.m.

(Pol. III 2642)

In answer to 88 of the 21st.<sup>21</sup>

With the obvious intention of making as much of the Mundelein case as possible and of spreading confusion in the German camp, some American newspapers are maintaining, according to the familiar method, that there is a difference of opinion between Berlin and the Embassy. There is, of course, not a word of truth in this. Immediately after the publication of Mundelein's statements concerning the Führer, I made serious representations (cf. my telegram No. 119 of May 19<sup>21</sup>), on my own initiative, through Thomsen, to the Chief of the Western European Division. In the present case I purposely refrained from making a formal protest to the United States Government, as was done in the La Guardia case, because Cardinal Mundelein, unlike the Mayor of New York, according to the interpretation prevalent here, holds an office that has absolutely no connection with the United States Government and is not dependent on it, and because the Cardinal is therefore regarded by the United States Government merely as a private person. In his

<sup>21</sup> Not printed.

*démarche* (cf. report No. 620 of May 20<sup>23</sup>) Thomsen pointed out, in particular, how seriously such offensive utterances of prominent Americans are to be judged, and how much German-American relations would be disturbed thereby.

The D.N.B. despatch of May 20 is misleading. I explained, in answer to a question from correspondents, that we were not interfering in American affairs and would not take it tragically if German affairs were criticized by some unimportant American source [*Stelle*] (there was no question of an organization), but that in the case of Mundelein it was a matter of a prominent American and of an insult to our Chief of State; in all such cases I would continue to make representations to the State Department.

DIECKHOFF

### No. 655

1607/386071-74

*The German Ambassador to the Holy See (Bergen) to the German Foreign Ministry*

Telegram

No. 41 of May 25

ROME (VATICAN), May 25, 1937—7 p.m.

Received May 25, 1937—11:30 p.m.

(Pol. III 2646)

In continuation of my telegram No. 38 of the 24th.<sup>23</sup>

The Cardinal Secretary of State has transmitted to me the promised written version of his prepared statement in answer to my *démarche* concerning Mundelein's speech. It contained several phrases and expressions not used in the oral reply, such as "malicious" slander and "disgraceful" calumnies. The sharper tone probably resulted from the impression made by my unequivocal criticism of Mundelein's utterances.

The memorandum of the Cardinal Secretary of State reads as follows:

"To the communication just made to me with regard to a speech by His Eminence Cardinal Mundelein, I may reply by a statement and a counterquestion:

"1) I am not accustomed to comment on speeches the absolutely correct text of which—as in the present case—is not yet available.<sup>24</sup>

<sup>23</sup> Not printed.

<sup>24</sup> A marginal notation, apparently in Mackensen's hand, reads as follows: "Facelli has obviously done nothing to procure the text as quickly as possible, as would have been his duty."

"2) Even if the text were already available I would not be in a position to take a stand with regard to your communication until I receive a clear, definitive, and satisfactory reply to the following question: What has the German Government done, and what does it intend to do in the future against the malicious slander and defamation, against the disgraceful calumnies directed at churches, ecclesiastical institutions, the Pope, the cardinals, bishops, priests, etc., which appear day after day in German newspapers and periodicals and in the speeches of prominent personages?

"I shall facilitate Your Excellency's task by answering the first part of the question myself: The German Government—regardless of all representations—has done nothing against all that. On the contrary, it is itself responsible, since State and Party authorities, and particularly the Propaganda Ministry, organize and direct a large part of this printed and spoken campaign and, as for the rest, they at least favor and in all possible ways further it.

"The second part of the counterquestion, which refers to the future, can only be answered by the German Government itself. As stated, the Holy See is expecting a clear, definitive, and satisfactory reply."

In yesterday's conversation I replied to the Cardinal Secretary of State that I would forward his statements, which greatly astonished me, to my Government immediately upon receiving the written text and would have to reserve the right to reply after learning its point of view. As for myself, I could only reiterate the suggestion I had made so frequently during the last few years—to make the general charges specific and to instruct the Nuncio, as the competent authority in such instances, to bring any cases involving grievances of the Vatican to the attention of the Government of the Reich, for without knowledge of alleged acts neither investigation nor remedy was possible. But in any case I was not aware of a single instance where any leading personage in Germany ever used insulting or offensive language against the person of the Pope, against the Cardinal Secretary of State, against other members of the College of Cardinals, etc. In the ensuing brief conversation, which was expressly kept private, I made the remark that a further exacerbation of the already severe tension in the relations between the Vatican and Germany was fraught with the gravest danger.

I may suggest a reply to the note of the Cardinal Secretary of State in the following vein:

"The Government of the Reich has with the greatest astonishment taken cognizance of the reply of the Cardinal Secretary of State to the representations of the Ambassador concerning the utterances of Cardinal Mundelein. It regrets to learn therefrom that the Holy See, under the pretext of not being acquainted with the speech,

which it could long ago have obtained and the contents of which were adequately communicated in the world press and exploited against Germany, declines to censure the indescribable attacks of the Cardinal, his insults to the German Chief of State and members of the Government.

"The Government of the Reich expresses the most emphatic protest against the insulting tone and substance of the charges and imputations which the statement contains. It requests the Cardinal Secretary of State immediately to specify and to justify the charges made and, in particular, to indicate precisely the insult offered to the Pope by 'a prominent personage'."

I should like to suggest that I be instructed to transmit the reply to the Cardinal Secretary of State in the form of a note soon after the celebration of the Pope's birthday on May 31. I would appreciate your instructions, and information as to the treatment of the matter in our press.

I hear that the representative of the Associated Press here was told by a spokesman of the Vatican in an interview dealing with Mundelein's pronouncements that prelates of the Catholic Church were perfectly free to express themselves as they considered advisable in the interest of their ecclesiastical functions.

BERGEN

No. 656

1607/386075-76

*Memorandum*<sup>25</sup>

(zu Pol. III 2646)

The Government of the Reich asks the Curia what it has done and what it intends to do to counteract and to prevent in the future the outrageous moral corruption in monasteries and institutions and on the part of individual priests, which has been verified beyond dispute and is known to the Curia.

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<sup>25</sup> In Neurath's hand; undated.

## No. 657

1607/386085

*The German Ambassador to the Holy See (Bergen) to the German Foreign Ministry*

Telegram

VERY SECRET

No. 43 of May 26

ROME (VATICAN), May 26, 1937—5:50 p.m.

Received May 26, 1937—8:25 p.m.

(Pol. III 2680a)

With reference to your telegram No. 27 of the 25th.<sup>26</sup>

For the State Secretary.

In view of the results of my *démarche* in the matter of Cardinal Mundelein, as described in telegram No. 41 of the 25th, I had intended, as per telegram No. 42 of the 25th,<sup>26</sup> to postpone my vacation trip. However, in accordance with your request, I shall now leave for Germany.

In our conversation on Monday I told the Cardinal Secretary of State that I would travel via Merano to Berlin, where I had to discuss official business. The fiction of my absence on official business is therefore maintained.

BERGEN

## No. 658

1607/386081-83

*The German Foreign Ministry to the German Embassy to the Holy See*

Cipher Telegram

URGENT

TODAY

No. 29 of May 27

BERLIN, May 27, 1937.

(zu Pol. III 2646)

With reference to telegram No. 41.<sup>27</sup>

Without regard to the date of the Pope's birthday and immediately after the departure of the Ambassador, which, I assume, has already taken place, please transmit to the Cardinal Secretary of State a note containing the following text:

"The German Ambassador at the Holy See recently made representations to Your Excellency against the fact that Cardinal Mundelein, before more than 500 priests of the Chicago Archdiocese, referred to the German Chief of State, members of the Reich Government, and certain occurrences in the domain of church affairs in Germany in outrageously insulting terms. In particular, the

\* Not printed.

" Dated May 25, 1937, p. 970.

German Ambassador expressed his astonishment that a prelate of Cardinal Mundelein's rank allowed himself to indulge in indescribable insults to the German Chief of State.

"Your Excellency thereupon gave the German Ambassador at the Holy See an oral reply later confirmed in writing, to which, on instructions from my Government, I reply as follows :

"The German Government, in the *démarche* which it instructed its Ambassador to make in the interest of the relations between Germany and the Vatican and which the Ambassador carried out in that spirit, proceeded on the assumption that no one should be more concerned than the Holy See to prevent the harm to the relations between Germany and the Vatican certain to result from the base attacks of the Cardinal against the German Chief of State. The German Government thought it a foregone conclusion that the Holy See would dissociate itself from the utterances of the Cardinal, which had become known all over the world; that it would correct them and express its regrets, as has always been proper form in international relations. However, to its very great surprise and profound astonishment, the Holy See chose to turn the representations of the German Ambassador aside without a reply, using as a pretext some general, unsubstantiated, and incorrect but all the more injurious remarks to the effect that at the most the Cardinal had retaliated in kind.

"The German Government is therefore forced to state that the Holy See is permitting those indescribable public attacks against the person of the German Chief of State on the part of one of its highest prelates to stand uncorrected and is thereby actually endorsing them in the eyes of the world.

"The Holy See will realize that its unexpected and incomprehensible conduct in this matter, as long as it is not remedied, has eliminated the conditions necessary for a normal state of relations between the German Government and the Curia. The full responsibility for this development rests solely with the Curia.

"Accept, etc."

I request the Chargé to transmit this note in writing. Oral amplifications are unnecessary.

The treatment of the matter in the press will be handled from here.

NEURATH

No. 659

1607/386088-89

*The Chargé d'Affaires of the German Embassy to the Holy See  
(Menshausen) to the German Foreign Ministry*

Telegram

URGENT

ROME (VATICAN), June 9, 1937—11:30 p.m.

VERY SECRET

Received June 10, 1937—1:35 a.m.

No. 55 of June 9

(Pol. III 3005/37)

With reference to telegram 53 of the 8th.<sup>28</sup>

For the State Secretary personally.

Strictly confidential reports which have reached me confirm the impression that after the arrival of the authentic text of the Mundelein speech a certain inclination toward conciliation is noticeable in the Vatican. Thus, influential personalities in the Secretariat of State have already said to their close associates that Mundelein might better have confined himself to the first part of his speech, which, in exoneration of the Orders involved in immorality trials, stresses the great services of the German members of the Orders who are active in the United States in the cultural and charitable fields.

Symptomatic of the inclination toward conciliation is also the fact that yesterday the *Avvenire d'Italia*, immediately following the semi-official announcement reported by me, carried an article by the well-known Jesuit, Father Yves de la Brière, which appeared in the Paris *Excelsior*, on the situation of Catholicism in Germany, in which the author admits that Mundelein's words "were somewhat violent and lacked diplomatic finesse."

The authentic text of the Mundelein speech, which is now available at the Vatican, is identical—as I am assured by reliable sources—with the text published in Catholic newspapers of America a few days after the speech.

This evening the *Giornale d'Italia*, under the caption: "Improved Relations Between Germany and the Vatican," prints a short despatch from Berlin on an article appearing in the *Völkischer Beobachter* today which is said to speak of the favorable effect upon influential Vatican authorities of the energetic attitude of the Reich Government. For obvious reasons I should like to suggest that you recommend to the press there the utmost reserve in judging the situation, pending further clarification. For us to talk publicly

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<sup>28</sup> Not printed.

of an improvement in the situation seems altogether premature, to say the least, and could, moreover, cause the Vatican again to assume a stiffened attitude.

MENSHAUSEN<sup>29</sup>

### No. 660

1607/386091-102

*The Chargé d'Affaires of the German Embassy to the Holy See  
(Menshausen) to the German Foreign Ministry*

No. 135

ROME, June 25, 1937.

Received June 28, 1937.

(Pol. III 3313)

Subject: Reply of the Vatican to the note of protest concerning the speech by Cardinal Mundelein.

With reference to the other report of today's date.<sup>30</sup>

I have the honor to transmit herewith a copy of the note of June 24, No. 2368/37, from the Cardinal Secretary of State, which I received today in reply to our note of protest of May 29.<sup>31</sup>

MENSHAUSEN

[Enclosure]

*The Papal Secretary of State (Pacelli) to the German Embassy to the Holy See*

No. 2368/37

THE VATICAN, June 24, 1937.

M. LE CHARGÉ D'AFFAIRES: I wish to reply as follows to the note of May 29 concerning statements by His Eminence Cardinal Archbishop Mundelein of Chicago, the complete text now being at hand:

1. The *démarche* of May 24 by the German Ambassador referred, as shown by the *aide-mémoire* presented, only to "telegraphic reports from New York." A complete text was not submitted, nor could the exact circumstances of the speech, especially with reference to the form of its publication, be reliably ascertained. On a basis so incomplete the Holy See could not take the responsibility for an immediate statement of its position.

<sup>29</sup> A marginal notation, apparently in Dumont's handwriting, reads as follows:

"In accordance with instructions from Counselor of Legation Wolf (Press) I stated that we absolutely shared the opinion in the last paragraph of the above telegram and requested that he notify the Propaganda Ministry accordingly."

<sup>30</sup> Not printed.

<sup>31</sup> For the text of this note, see telegram No. 29 of May 27, 1937, from the German Foreign Ministry to the German Embassy to the Holy See, p. 973.

2. The memorandum presented by the German Ambassador did not contain any demand for intervention by the Holy See. The charge expressed in the note of May 29, that the Holy See had evaded an official request sent to it, is therefore without any basis.

3. Before the *démarche* with the Holy See the German Government, according to press reports, addressed itself to the Government of the United States. It did not draw any inferences from the failure of the Federal Government to make any reply to its step, but rather accepted this in silence. While no change whatever took place in German-American relations as a result of the failure to take any stand, it is stated with reference to the Holy See that by not replying to the representations of the Ambassador it has "eliminated the conditions necessary for a normal state of relations between the German Government and the Curia." Without wishing to discuss the *démarche* made with the Government of the United States, the Holy See cannot refrain from pointing out that the application of such a double standard is more than unusual. And all the more so as the part of the speech which is most strongly objected to by the German Government departs from the field of Church policy and contains statements and remarks of a different character by a prominent American citizen, who made use of the right guaranteed him by his country's Constitution to express his opinion freely in the sphere of publicly known facts. The Holy See has ascertained that the speaker made these statements on the assumption that in this case as well as in others his speech was not intended for the public. The partial publication of the speech, without his previous knowledge, was not according to his intention.

4. Moreover, the reply of the Holy See to the German Ambassador did not in any sense contain a refusal to discuss the present case. The remark "that at the most the Cardinal had retaliated in kind," which is alleged in the note of May 29, was never made by the Holy See. In order to enable the incorrectly informed public to judge for itself, the Holy See reserves the right to publish this note, following the example of the German Government. Of course, it was already plain from the text of the first reply, of May 24, that the Holy See, far from avoiding a discussion, was rather anxious to make it so thorough that, if possible, an improvement in relations, long seriously impaired, might have been expected from it.

5. The relations between the Holy See and the German Reich, which, according to the Preamble of the Reich Concordat and according to the still unchanged wish of the Holy See, were to be friendly, have long been heavily burdened by the circumstance that

the Head of the Catholic Church, Church institutions and officials, Church beliefs and practices, have been exposed to the most violent insults and gibes, and that it has never been possible to obtain any action against this abuse from the governmental authorities appealed to.

a) In *Pro Memoria* No. 1544/34, of May 14, 1934, the Holy See made protests because in official training courses the speaker appointed by the authorities had made the statement that "the present Pope is a half Jew and a Mason [einer von der Loge]." This untruth and insult to the Head of the Church did not move the German Government even to make a reply.

b) The book by Rosenberg, *The Myth of the 20th Century*, which is prescribed as basic in official courses of instruction, contains—among countless other insults—descriptions of the Head of the Catholic Church as a "medicine man" and "Etruscan haruspex." Representations by the Holy See, in *Pro Memoria* No. 322/34, of January 31, 1934, for example, against the official circulation of the book and its use as a basis of instruction, were answered by the remark that it was a question of a "private work."

c) In a memorial by the whole Episcopate and in an accompanying communication by His Eminence Cardinal Archbishop von Faulhaber, of August 23, 1935, the attention of the highest Government office was called to the "constantly increasing insults against the Pope, bishops, and everything Catholic"—among them the charge of a secret understanding between the Holy See and Moscow, made publicly by the official Party organ. The cardinals and bishops of Germany are still without a reply.

d) During the year 1936 several memorials (among others, those of January 13, February 25, March 13, April 2), as well as oral representations against the continued defamation of Church authorities and institutions, have also been without any effect.

6. In the last 2 years these insults—especially in the *Schwarze Korps*,<sup>32</sup> in the *Durchbruch*,<sup>33</sup> in the works of the Ludendorff Publishing House, etc.—have reached such proportions as can only be compared with the literature of Bolshevism. Because of this fact, and because of these experiences, the Holy See continued its hitherto futile efforts and took advantage of the *démarche* of the German Ambassador to get the German Government, at least in connection with this individual case, to recognize the total problem and attack it with determination. The counterquestion of what the German Government intended to do in the face of this situation, at least for

<sup>32</sup> Organ of the SS.

<sup>33</sup> A publication anti-Christian in tenor and close to the German Faith Movement.

the future, was not raised to signify a refusal to deal with the case now in question, but to obtain reliable guarantees that no other principles and practices will be applied for the protection of the honor of the German Chief of State and German Government officials than those followed by the State with respect to the Head of the Church and Church officials. The generosity which caused the Holy See, with a critical review of the past, to place the decisive accent on the shape of the future, was obviously not appreciated by the German Government. But upon a closer examination of the whole situation the German Government will not deny that an essential condition of the protection of honor which it demands is the guarantee of faithful reciprocity.

7. Without giving the Holy See time for the investigations which it began immediately, a defensive campaign was started in Germany against the statements of Cardinal Mundelein, which by its sharpness of tone and its undisciplined manner of writing served neither the rightly understood interests of Germany nor the further development of normal diplomatic steps. The intemperateness of this defense has given the incident, which otherwise would have remained limited to very local effects, a world echo which has surprised the speaker himself. The services that the Cardinal rendered to the German people in the difficult postwar period, which are thereby brought to mind again, make it all the harder for wide circles abroad to understand what interest the German Government can have in permitting such a personality, who is one of the former benefactors of its people, to be denied any credit for good faith and veracity through such a violent press feud, which shrinks from nothing. If the press feud is now causing a repercussion on the American side which is not in the interest of Germany, the Holy See is powerless in the face of this development, for which it is not responsible.

8. The Holy See is all the more powerless because those parts of the statements of Cardinal Mundelein which deal with the propagandistic exploitation of certain morals cases are concerned with facts which are in substance irrefutable. The different handling of such cases by the German Ministries of Propaganda and Justice, depending on whether Church defendants or members of the N.S.D.A.P. and its affiliated organizations are involved, is unfortunately an indubitable fact. It would be highly advisable if all such cases were conducted with the public excluded. But judicial practices and judicial reporting which make public exhibitions, with compulsory coverage by the press, out of one class of trials, while they treat the others as a sort of State secret, are themselves to blame if this double system, as soon as it becomes known outside

of Germany, leads to correspondingly critical and at times spirited appraisals and, in the long run, to characterizations which are displeasing to those who are officially, if not in every individual case personally, responsible for this unequal treatment. The increasing coarseness of tone in the controversies of the day, conducted in the press and on the rostrum, is a fact which the Holy See has often deplored, and has protested against to the German Government innumerable times, orally and in writing, and which it has sought to remedy. It has always found deaf ears. If the German Government will take the trouble to examine its own officially controlled literature critically and give it only a part of the attention which it devotes to the Church papers and the public statements of the Church officials, it will find where the start should be made if there is a desire to bring about a normalizing and cleansing of public controversies. In the present special case, however, the first and indispensable condition for setting minds at rest and silencing voices abroad that are critical of German justice will be: the return to a practice of justice which, in procedure and reporting, honestly observes the equality of citizens before the law and definitively eliminates the vexatious differentiation which has hitherto existed. The content and the form of the present trial propaganda, which calls itself the champion of public morality, will have the inevitable consequence of bringing with it an incomparably greater danger to the morals of the people as a whole, especially of youth, which is the hope of the nation. The defamation of the Church and of religion as a whole weakens the greatest moral factors of order and resistance in the fight against Bolshevism, and in the eyes of the world casts a shadow on the great German nation, which no one who has its welfare genuinely at heart can wish.

9. The Cardinal of Chicago, as already remarked, made his speech without any intention of publication, only as an informative speech to his priests in opposition to the one-sided and false propaganda about the morals trials. He takes full personal responsibility for what he said. Although as a bishop he is under the authority of the Holy See, he is not an official of the Holy See, such as a nuncio or an apostolic delegate. How scrupulously the Holy See itself and its representatives are accustomed to observing the line between objective controversies and those colored by personal factors is clearly evidenced by its statements on the very questions which concern Germany. Consciously and on principle it refuses "to retaliate in kind." Ungrudgingly it leaves to the polemics of its opponents the unfortunately overfrequent violation of the law of tact and propriety. That it desires that this attitude might be the guiding rule

of other Church officials as well, finds a proof of very recent date in the encyclical "*Mit brennender Sorge*." In harmony with such principles His Eminence the Cardinal Archbishop of Chicago has also stated that he would have omitted certain personal remarks if he had intended the speech for the public. As an American citizen he claims for himself the right—especially in the face of the excesses of German anti-Church propaganda and the bitter criticism by other political groups of the institutions of his country—to make appraisals of his own and show his fellow citizens the peculiarities of different political systems.

10. In conclusion the Holy See declares that neither has it avoided a discussion of this case in the past nor does it intend to avoid it in the future. What it has sought and seeks is only not to have this case taken out of the factual and psychological conditions which distinguish it. A diplomatic discussion of this case has meaning and promise of success only if the entire series of causes from which the present situation of conflict has developed is examined calmly and objectively. From this more comprehensive viewpoint, the only correct one, the Holy See has chosen its position with respect to the *démarche* of the German Ambassador. Within the framework of a frank and objective exchange of views a way would perhaps have been found—and could still be found, given a serious desire—of eliminating the collective causes of the present tensions as well as of arriving at a correct evaluation of the present special case. Through the form and content of the press campaign started in the meantime, and not least of all through certain speeches of Government officials, disturbing elements have been brought into the diplomatic discussion, the seriousness of which the Holy See cannot pass over in silence before the German Government. The elimination of these disturbing elements is an essential condition for the normalizing of the situation, as well as for the creation of that calm atmosphere in which alone further discussions can lead to positive objectives.

With the assurance of my high consideration, I am, Sir,

Very faithfully yours,

E. CARDINAL PACELLI

## No. 661

533/238838-40

*Memorandum*

BERLIN, June 30, 1937.

During my conversation today in the Ministry for Ecclesiastical Affairs I at first talked with Reich Minister Kerrl only; State Secretary Muhs did not join us until the latter part of the conversation.

The main results of the conversation may be summarized as follows:

1. The Führer wishes the facts which justify us in concluding that certain provisions of the Concordat have become inapplicable to be more strongly emphasized in the note. To this end the first part of the note is to be revised again by the Ministry for Ecclesiastical Affairs. Reich Minister Kerrl is then to resubmit it to the Führer at the Obersalzberg. So far the dates mentioned are July 7 or 8. In reply to my question, Reich Minister Kerrl confirmed that there was no intention of making the tone of the note more polemical. Only a stronger emphasis on individual facts was planned; in particular, some of the Curia's statistical claims were to be corrected on this occasion. The Curia had, for instance, spread the report that the percentage of persons in monastic houses indicted for certain crimes was extremely small, but it based this on a round figure of 100,000 members of the Orders. This distorted the picture quite considerably, because the number taken for comparison should not be the 100,000 members of Orders, but the male members of Orders, i.e., not 100,000 but only about 11,000. Likewise, certain material from the violations of the foreign exchange legislation is to be incorporated. I called attention to the danger that under these circumstances the note might become too long and pointed out the possibility of putting this material into a communiqué to be published simultaneously with the note. Reich Minister Kerrl, however, seemed to feel bound in this respect by certain instructions from the Führer.

2. A quite considerable change in the contents of the note in another respect is contemplated after the conversation between the Führer and Reich Minister Kerrl. The note is not to be equivalent to a declaration of the invalidity of the entire Concordat, but is to declare four or five particularly important articles intolerable and therefore no longer binding on us; for the rest, however, it will leave the Concordat in force. The Führer is considering further action as follows: work on a law concerning the relations between State and Church would be begun immediately; as soon

as this was completed the Concordat would be officially denounced; and 24 hours later the Reich law would be published. Supported by State Secretary Muhs I pointed out to Reich Minister Kerrl that a note in this form deviated fundamentally from what we had discussed heretofore, according to which the Concordat in its entirety was to be declared invalid and it was to be explained clearly, in several individual points, by what rules the State would be willing henceforth to assure the position of the Church. Reich Minister Kerrl tried to minimize the difference between the original draft and the intended new version. He argued mainly the necessity, which the Führer also felt, of not creating an interim status with no law in effect, such as would have occurred, on the basis of our first draft, before the promulgation of a Reich law. However, he permitted himself to be convinced by State Secretary Muhs and myself that the proposed new draft involved considerable dangers, particularly by the express retention of certain parts of the Concordat, and was finally willing to present to the Führer and Chancellor two drafts, one of which corresponded with the line of reasoning discussed thus far between us, and the second of which was to incorporate the ideas developed in the conversation between the Führer and Reich Minister Kerrl. It would then be up to the Führer to make a decision.

Reich Minister Kerrl showed understanding for the necessity explained to him of transmitting the note as expeditiously as possible.

MACKENSEN

## No. 662

1879/424424-25

### *Memorandum by the Foreign Minister*

RM 605

(e.o. Pol. III 3449)

The Nuncio called on me today and complained of violations of the Concordat through searches and confiscation of files in the offices of the Vicar-General in Cologne and the Bishops of Trier and Aachen. The Nuncio stated that articles 4 and 9 of the Concordat had been violated by these searches and confiscations. Cardinal Schulte of Cologne had also complained to the Minister of the Interior as early as June 12 and received a reply from the Minister for Ecclesiastical Affairs stating that complaints about violations of the Concordat had to be made by the Nuncio through diplomatic channels. But at the same time the Minister for Ecclesiastical Affairs had stated that a violation of the Concordat had not occurred, without, however, giving any justification. In reply to my

question regarding the reason for the searching and the confiscations of files, the Nuncio declared that the Gestapo had allegedly wanted evidence for the trial of priests. But in Trier, for instance, 63 volumes of files had been confiscated which did not have even a superficial connection with the personal data on priests. And for that reason 44 volumes had been returned after a few days. The Nuncio's complaint was directed quite generally against the activity of the Gestapo. Article 4 of the Concordat expressly guaranteed immunity for all documents connected with the pastoral activity of priests and ecclesiastical authorities. To the question whether in his opinion these would also include the documents in which evidence of crimes and misdemeanors by priests were contained, the Nuncio replied that insofar as this evidence had been obtained in connection with pastoral activities the files on it, in the opinion of the Church, came under the items protected by article 4. He had to reject as erroneous the interpretation of articles 4 and 9 of the Concordat contained in the letter from Reich Minister Kerrl of June 16. He therefore requested that there be no further searches in the offices of Vicars-General and bishops' secretariats.

I told the Nuncio that I would investigate the matter and send him a reply in due time.

BARON VON NEURATH

BERLIN, July 3, 1937.

### No. 663

1879/424428-35

*The German Ambassador to the Holy See (Bergen) to the German Foreign Ministry*

Nr. 145

ROME, July 6, 1937.

Received July 10, 1937.

(Pol. III 3611)

Subject: The trial before Criminal Court II of the Frankenthal District Court.

I have the honor to transmit herewith a copy of the note of July 3 from the Cardinal Secretary of State, No. 2513/37, which I received today, concerning the trial before Criminal Court II of the District Court of Frankenthal. May I request instructions.

I would suggest that *Gauleiter* Bürckel<sup>34</sup> be informed of the note from the Cardinal Secretary.

BERGEN

<sup>34</sup> Josef Bürckel, *Gauleiter* of the Saar Palatinate.

[Enclosure]

*The Papal Secretary of State (Pacelli) to the German Ambassador  
to the Holy See (Bergen)*

No. 2513/37

THE VATICAN, July 3, 1937.

**EXCELLENCY:** According to newspaper reports of the last few days the *Gauleiter* of the Saar Palatinate, Herr Bürckel, made statements before Criminal Court II of the District Court of Frankenthal which the Holy See in the interest of truth cannot leave uncontradicted.

1. Producing the photostat copy of a letter from the Most Reverend Bishop of Speyer to the Holy See (April 15, 1935), opened in violation of the Concordat, Herr Bürckel said of certain unimportant remarks in the letter, which dealt mainly with ecclesiastical matters, "that it was not only a question of domestic politics here, but that atrocity stories were obviously being directed abroad—atrocity stories which could then be read again in the *Osservatore Romano*" (D.N.B. report of trial). The Holy See declares that not a single word from the letter of the Most Reverend Bishop of Speyer was either published or used in the *Osservatore Romano*.

2. If a bishop, in describing the situation of the Church, occasionally makes use of other incidents or rumors in order to characterize the situation as a whole, this alone does not by any means constitute an "atrocity story." The decisive basis for judgment is the general purpose and the main content of the letter. The remark about the prohibition of the *Stahlhelm* referred to a publicly known fact. The remark about the SA was introduced by "it is said" and thus was of no importance, quite apart from the fact that it could be of no great interest to the Holy See. The information about the attitude toward Church policy adopted at a conference of *Gauleiter* and leaders at Munich was within the framework of Church reporting. The Holy See in its reply of April 22, 1935, intentionally confined itself to the ecclesiastical field and stressed its endeavor "to avoid anything reflecting on its neutrality in a political question." It is all the more distressed by the statements at Frankenthal, which distort the total situation and are disseminated by the official reports of the trial. Finally, the attempt indirectly to charge the Holy See with violation of the Concordat is most emphatically rejected.

3. As proof of the fact that "the Vatican has in fact acted toward Germany as a foreign power, and in this case in frankly hostile manner," *Gauleiter* Bürckel refers to the reception of the

editor, Hoffmann, in November 1934.<sup>35</sup> Both the description itself and the conclusions drawn from it are incorrect. In view of the agreements concluded in the League of Nations Council, as well as between Germany and France, regarding the guarantee of a free plebiscite, only the principle of strictest neutrality was admissible for the Holy See in the political question of the plebiscite. In applying this principle it could not refuse either side the opportunity of presenting its viewpoint. Any other procedure would not have benefited even German interests. After the *Neue Saarpst* had published articles which did not fully correspond with the principle of the neutrality of the Holy See, the undersigned decided to avail himself of the next opportunity that presented itself in order to prevent further mistakes in this direction. In accordance with this viewpoint it had been decided: *a*) that the purely private and confidential nature of the reception was to be impressed upon Herr Hoffmann and that he be made to realize that an official conversation with him was out of the question; *b*) that the representatives from the Saarland were to be informed that any claim to Vatican support of their political position would force the Holy See to make a public disclaimer. A matter of mistaken identity, which resulted from wrong instructions to a servant, gave Herr Kiefer, Herr Levacher, and Herr Müller the opportunity of observing the vigor with which the undersigned performed the first part of his task. Only the clearing up of the mistaken identity interrupted this conversation. It is incomprehensible to the Holy See how under those circumstances one can speak of an anti-German attitude. All the more since the official party press itself repeatedly acknowledged at the time that the claim to the support of the Holy See by the adherents of the *status quo* was entirely unjustified and contrary to the intentions of the former. During the plebiscite and in its preparatory stage the Holy See made it clear that its neutrality in a free plebiscite regulated by international agreements between the governments most closely involved did not restrict the right and liberty of the German bishops and priests to act in accordance with their conscience in the issue involved. During the said conversation of November 7, 1934, the Saar Commissioner's adviser, Herr Müller-Neustadt, fully appreciated the attitude of the Holy See. Very prominent members of the Episcopate and not least of all the Most Reverend Bishop of Speyer himself, who is now being attacked, knowing this attitude of the Holy See, made use of this liberty and thereby contributed substantially to the result of the plebiscite.

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<sup>35</sup> Hoffmann had been editor of the *Neue Saarpst* and a leader of the group favoring retention of the *status quo* in the Saar plebiscite campaign.

The Holy See is certain that the office within the German Government which is charged with the conduct of foreign affairs and which is better informed about the situation and events at the time, cannot endorse *Gauleiter* Bürckel's statements, which are erroneous as regards the facts and not in harmony with good international usage. It expects that a way will be found which will assure public clarification and satisfaction to the Holy See, which has been unjustly attacked.

4. In the trial proceedings Herr Bürckel also referred to the attempt he made after the Saar plebiscite to reach a conciliatory agreement with the Bishops of Trier and Speyer. In this connection the attempt was made to create the impression that clerical negligence was responsible for the failure of these negotiations. This was by no means the case. The negotiations concerned were from the very beginning hampered by Herr Bürckel's statement that the Reich Concordat did not apply to the Saar region. The bishops were unable to give an opinion on this question, which comes under the jurisdiction of the Holy See, and they therefore made reservations which were obligatory under canon law. Nevertheless, and with the approval of the Holy See, they were quite ready to discuss positive conditions for conciliation. They were all the more willing to do this, since *Gauleiter* Bürckel, through his adviser, Müller, had told them in the conversations of April 18 and 20 that "the *Gauleiter* guaranteed that in the *Hitlerjugend* no anti-Church and antireligious influence whatever could be exerted on the young people, that the spirit of Baldur von Schirach and Rosenberg would not be introduced, that the anti-Church periodicals for young people would be prohibited," etc. In return, the consent of the Church to membership in the *Hitlerjugend* for members of Catholic organizations and all Catholic young people in general was contemplated. The bishops, reserving the rights of the Holy See, quite actively encouraged the negotiations and replied to a draft by Reich Commissioner Bürckel with supplementary proposals. In view of experiences on other occasions, they merely insisted that they receive a written reply from the Reich Commissioner to their supplementary draft and stated that after its receipt they would again be ready immediately for oral negotiations. The Holy See, as late as June 21, 1935, notified the bishops concerned that as long as the basic question of the application of the Reich Concordat to the former Saar region was not prejudged, there were no objections to the continuation of the consultations which had been started. The failure of these discussions, therefore, can by no means be attributed to the Church, but to the refusal of the Government

office to put its initial promises into a written and unambiguous form, in conformity with the legal provisions of the Concordat.

Accept, Excellency, the renewed assurances of my highest consideration.

E. CARDINAL PACELLI

No. 664

1611/386346

*The German Ambassador to the Holy See (Bergen) to Counselor of  
Legation Dumont of the German Foreign Ministry*

ROME, July 7, 1937.

(zu Pol. III 3768)

DEAR HERR DUMONT: Many thanks for your kind letter of July 2,<sup>36</sup> which arrived today by courier; the enclosure interested me very much.

The Cardinal Secretary of State has recently supplied us with several notes, which are probably to serve to augment the "Yellow Book."

The mood of the Vatican (particularly that of the Cardinal Secretary of State) is more irritated than ever; the chief preoccupation of the Pope at the present time, I am told, is fear that a "third" faith is being organized and encouraged in every way by the State, to the detriment of the Evangelical and Catholic faiths; the arrest of Pastor Niemöller is interpreted in this sense.

With best regards,

Sincerely,

BERGEN

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<sup>36</sup> Not printed.

## No. 665

1607/386110-11

*The German Ambassador to the Holy See (Bergen) to the German  
Foreign Ministry*

No. 156

ROME, July 20, 1937.

Received July 22, 1937.

(Pol. III 3798)

(Pol. III 3818)

Subject: Statements of Pius XI regarding Spain and Cardinal  
Mundelein.

With reference to previous report:<sup>27</sup>

On Saturday, July 17, in one of his customary general audiences, Pius XI received among others several Spanish Sisters of the Sacred Heart of Jesus and a group of American pilgrims from the Archdiocese of Chicago. Regarding the welcoming words which the Pope addressed to these two groups, the *Osservatore Romano* (No. 166 of July 19/20) reports as follows:

"The Holy Father first welcomed the Spanish Sisters of the Sacred Heart of Jesus and called upon all to pray that the desolate period of trials for their great and noble country might soon come to an end and in its place days of peace might follow.

"Thereupon the Pope welcomed the pilgrims who had come from distant America and was pleased to point out the greatness of their city and—why not say it?—the greatness of their estimable Cardinal Archbishop, who is so solicitous and zealous in the defense of the rights of God and of the Church and in the salvation of souls."

The Catholic newspaper here, *Avvenire d'Italia* (No. 165 of July 20), reports the speech of the Pope in the same words, whereas the other Roman newspapers contain only a short notice that the audience was held but do not mention the Pope's address.

BERGEN

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<sup>27</sup> Not printed.

## No. 666

1807/386109

*The German Foreign Ministry to the German Embassy to the Holy See*

Cipher Telegram

IMMEDIATE

No. 35

BERLIN, July 21, 1937.

(zu Pol. III 3726 II)

With reference to telegram No. 65.<sup>38</sup>

The contents of the Pope's address to the pilgrims from Chicago in your telegraphic report of July 17 are confirmed by the *Osservatore Romano* and *Avvenire d'Italia*, as well as by other foreign press reports. So the correctness of these reports cannot very well be doubted.

This address by the Pope is in striking contrast with the need, asserted in the note of June 24 from the Vatican on the Mundelein case, for a frank and objective exchange of views, and for the elimination of speeches which disturb diplomatic discussion. We must consider the discourse of the Pope as an authoritative interpretation of those methods by which the Curia strives for a normalization of the situation. An equivalent reaction here is inevitable.

Please impress this upon the Cardinal Secretary of State at the earliest opportunity.

MACKENSEN

## No. 667

1611/386347-49

*The German Ambassador to the Holy See (Bergen) to the German Foreign Ministry*

Cipher Telegram

No. 66 of July 23

ROME, July 23, 1937—7:15 p.m.

Received July 23, 1937—11:30 p.m.

(Pol. III 3844)

With reference to your telegram of the 21st, No. 35.

The improvised discourses of Pius XI, often delivered emotionally and with utter disregard for political considerations, were already a nightmare for the late Cardinal Secretary of State Gasparri. In answer to a question I once asked him about the significance of a papal discourse, Gasparri told me in a confidential private conversation: Most of the time he received information

<sup>38</sup> Of July 17. For substance, see *supra*.

about the Pope's editorial committee [*sic*] only from the *Osservatore Romano*; then he had to defend it, particularly vis-à-vis the diplomats. At the time of the conflict with Italy after the conclusion of the Lateran Treaties, the Pope frequently made speeches containing the most violent attacks and reproaches against Mussolini and Fascism. Nor has the present Cardinal Secretary of State succeeded in persuading the aging, self-willed, and irascible Pope to exercise greater caution and reserve in his discourses. On the contrary, the lack of political insight, the poor understanding of the problems of our time, the brusqueness and unpredictableness of the Pope, who considers himself infallible, will always be dangerous elements of surprise and disturbing factors.

I am convinced that the content and form of the welcoming words of the Pope to the pilgrims from Chicago caused unpleasant surprise in the Secretariat of State. This is indicated by the fact that publication in the *Osservatore Romano* on the day when the pilgrims were received was—as I learn confidentially—postponed at the instance of the Secretariat of State and did not occur until 2 days later, after consultation with His Holiness and after a slight change in the text. According to the report of the *Osservatore Romano*, the Pope stated that Cardinal Mundelein was *solicitous and zealous* in the defense of the rights of God and of the Church, whereas in reality he did not call him *solicitous and zealous* but “*courageous*.”

In striking contradiction to the behavior of the Pope, however, are the statements of the Cardinal Secretary of State during the call that I made on him on the 16th, i.e., on the day before the Pope's discourse. This was the first call after my return, and the conversation was of a private nature. Pacelli received me with decided friendliness and emphatically assured me during the conversation that normal and friendly relations with us would be restored as soon as possible; this applied particularly to him, who had spent 13 years in Germany and had always shown the greatest sympathy for the German people. He would also be prepared at any time for a discussion with outstanding personages such as the Foreign Minister and Minister President Göring. I replied that I hoped the time would come when such a meeting could be arranged. Speaking frankly, I personally considered it impossible at the present time in view of the serious controversy caused by the encyclical, “*Mit brennender Sorge*,” and other events, and in view of the extreme tension. When I mentioned the interpellation [*interpretation*] given his trip to France by the French press (for instance, the *Journal* and the *Humanité*), Pacelli animatedly replied that the

trip had been of a purely religious nature and—he could assure me of this most definitely—had served no political purpose; the Vatican had never thought of even an indirect demonstration against Germany, let alone any attempts at encirclement as had been claimed in the *Angriff*. If a religious festival of significance equal to that in Lisieux should some day be arranged in Germany, he would be most happy to go there.

I carried out today the instructions issued to me under No. 35. The Cardinal Secretary of State, to whom the subject was obviously very embarrassing, replied that he had not been present at the audience given to the pilgrims from Chicago, and that he knew the discourse of the Pope only from the *Osservatore Romano*. The Pope when receiving pilgrims often praised their bishop; thus, in the present case, too, he had wanted to show his recognition of the fact that Mundelein, *sollecito e zelante*, was defending the rights of the Church; for, while he did not wish to discuss Mundelein's controversial address, the latter had the reputation of being an excellent priest and spiritual leader. The Pope's address had been interpreted by a part of the foreign press in a way different from that intended. For in reality the Pope had been speaking neither of Germany nor of Mundelein's speech. In the last analysis, however, only the Pope himself could give an interpretation of the discourse.

In the course of my short conversation today with the Cardinal Secretary, I pointed out that announcements, declarations, and discourses of the Head and Ruler of the Church were, of course, considered much more important by world public opinion and their effect was much greater than that of the newspaper articles and speeches to which the Cardinal Secretary of State had objected in his note of June 24 as a disturbing factor and a serious danger, and the elimination of which he had called an essential condition for normalizing the situation. The Cardinal admitted this, with the remark that he would be happy if a frank exchange of opinions free from disturbing factors could be arranged.

BERGEN

No. 668

1607/386112

*Memorandum*

(e.o. Pol. III 3818)

Ministerial Counselor Roth (Ministry for Ecclesiastical Affairs), whom I informed of the instructions we sent to the Embassy at the Holy See in Rome regarding the address of the Pope to the pilgrims from Chicago and the reference to Cardinal Mundelein's speech, told me, in reply to a question of mine, that Minister Kerrl had gone to Bayreuth and there intended to discuss with the Führer our attitude toward the Vatican and the steps contemplated by us.

DUMONT

BERLIN, July 23, 1937.

No. 669

1607/386113-14

*The Reich and Prussian Minister for Ecclesiastical Affairs to the Foreign Ministry*

G II 3960/37

JULY 24, 1937.  
(Pol. III 3893)

Subject: Exchange of notes with the Holy See.

With reference to the letter of July 1, 1937, Pol. III 3313.<sup>39</sup>

The statements of Cardinal Mundelein of Chicago, slandering the Führer and Chancellor personally and disparaging the German State, moved the Reich Government to send a note to the Holy See on May 29, 1937,<sup>40</sup> stating that "the conditions necessary for a normal state of relations between the Reich Government and the Holy See" no longer existed. The Reich Government could rightly expect satisfaction from the Holy See.

However, this was not given; on the contrary, the Holy See in its answering note of June 24, 1937,<sup>41</sup> attempted indirectly to support Cardinal Mundelein and to combine the Mundelein affair with pending ecclesiastical affairs in general. Indeed, the Head of the Catholic Church himself did not hesitate, during the reception of American pilgrims to Rome from Chicago on July 17, to become an advocate of Mundelein, to speak of the greatness of the estimable Cardinal Archbishop, who "is so zealous in the rights of God and the Church as well as in the salvation of souls."

<sup>39</sup> Not printed.<sup>40</sup> For text, see document No. 658, p. 973.<sup>41</sup> Enclosure to document No. 660, p. 976.

On the other hand, the Holy See in its diplomatic relations with the Reich Government acts as if nothing had happened and as if "the conditions necessary for a normal state of relations between Reich Government and Curia" were restored. Nuncio Orsenigo still lodges his oral complaints with the Foreign Ministry (cf. your letter of July 7, 1937, Pol. III 3449<sup>42</sup>), the Holy See still maintains its exchange of diplomatic notes (cf. note of June 25, 1937,<sup>42</sup> regarding religious instruction in Württemberg; note of June 26, 1937,<sup>42</sup> regarding the diocesan boundaries of the Archbishopric of Breslau) as if the note of May 29 did not exist.

It cannot be reconciled with the prestige and dignity of the Reich Government for it to continue relations with the Holy See in the form customary prior to May 29, to disavow tacitly the content of its own note, and to be taken in by the obvious tactics of the Curia in ignoring the above-mentioned passage in the note of May 29, without receiving any sort of satisfaction.

The Reich Government, in our opinion, cannot, therefore, consider representations, complaints, and notes from the Holy See or the Nuncio so long as the previous relation between the Reich Government and the Curia is not restored by an appropriate step of the Holy See in the Mundelein affair.

I suggest that this be communicated briefly in writing to the Holy See, either separately or in connection with the contemplated note dealing with the basic attitude toward the Concordat.<sup>43</sup>

By direction:

MÜHS

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<sup>42</sup> Not printed.

<sup>43</sup> A marginal note in Weizsäcker's hand reads as follows: "Between 'relations which are not normal' and 'suspension of diplomatic business,' there is a difference which the Ministry for Ecclesiastical Affairs acknowledged in practice in other communications to the Foreign Ministry."

A further marginal notation in Weizsäcker's hand reads as follows: "If this note is sent, we no longer need concern ourselves with the suggestion of the Reich Ministry for Ecclesiastical Affairs."

## No. 670

533/238856

*The German Foreign Ministry to the German Embassy to the  
Holy See*

Cipher Telegram

No. 36 of July 24

BERLIN, July , 1937.  
(Pol. III)

Drafting Officer: Dr. Dumont, Counselor of Legation.

For your confidential information.

We are informed by the Ministry of Justice that, upon instructions from the Führer and Chancellor, until further notice no more trials [*Hauptverhandlungen*] will be held in the immorality proceedings against Catholic priests.

WEIZSÄCKER

## No. 671

1607/386119-21

*The Foreign Ministry to the Reich and Prussian Ministry for  
Ecclesiastical Affairs*

BERLIN, August 5, 1937.  
(Pol. III 3893)

With reference to your letter of July 24, G II 3960/37.

I do not share the opinion of your office that representations, complaints, and notes from the Holy See or the Nuncio should be ignored unless, by an appropriate step of the Holy See in the Mundelein affair, the former relation between the Reich Government and the Curia is restored.

The Foreign Ministry, like the Ministry for Ecclesiastical Affairs, proceeds from the fact that thus far no redress for the incomprehensible attitude of the Holy See in the Mundelein affair has been forthcoming. It also is conscious of the fact that the discourse of the Pope to the pilgrims from Chicago is in striking contradiction to the Curia's desire, expressed in the Vatican's note of June 24, for a frank and objective exchange of opinion, eliminating speeches that introduce disturbing factors into diplomatic discussions (cf. letter of the Foreign Ministry of July 1, Pol. III 3313<sup>44</sup>).

The Foreign Ministry, therefore, is very well aware of the fact that the conditions for a normal state of relations between the German Government and the Curia do not exist. As the Ministry

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<sup>44</sup> Not printed.

for Ecclesiastical Affairs knows, the German Ambassador to the Holy See made the Pope's address the subject of a *démarche* and pointed out to the Cardinal Secretary of State that we had to consider this discourse as an authoritative interpretation of the methods by which the Curia was striving to normalize the situation, and that an appropriate reaction here was inevitable.

While handling the Mundelein case with the Curia in this manner, further steps regarding the Concordat have been prepared according to plan.

From the fact that our relations with the Curia are not normal, we cannot, however, conclude that all diplomatic business must now be suspended. As long as diplomatic relations with the Curia continue, we must, in the regular course of business, accept notes of the kind mentioned in your letter, grant audiences to the Nuncio, and make proper replies, just as we must demand that the Curia accept our complaints and representations and dispose of them properly. In practice, moreover, the Reich Ministry for Ecclesiastical Affairs itself also acknowledges the difference between "relations which are not normal" and "suspension of diplomatic business." In this connection I refer to the letter of July 19, 1937, H.B. No. 2513/37,<sup>45</sup> regarding the passing of legislation concerning private schools, in which the Ministry for Ecclesiastical Affairs suggests that the Nuncio be given certain explanations regarding the application of the Private School Law to Catholic private schools.

Hence, there can be no question of the Foreign Ministry's having tacitly abandoned the viewpoint held until now and not having recognized tactical maneuvers of the Curia. Rather is it in accordance with the most fundamental rules of diplomatic procedure that the Foreign Ministry continue such diplomatic relations as still exist with the Curia.

Whether a new situation will arise in regard to our diplomatic relations with the Curia on the basis of the contemplated note to the Curia containing the basic German views on the Concordat remains to be seen.

By direction of the State Secretary:  
[This copy not signed]

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<sup>45</sup> Not printed.

## No. 672

1661/386355-56

*The Reich and Prussian Minister for Ecclesiastical Affairs to the Foreign Ministry*

G II 4473/37

August 6, 1937.

Received August 10, 1937.

(Pol. III 4086)

Subject: Report of the German Embassy at the Holy See of July 23, 1937.

With reference to the letter of July 26, 1937, Pol. III 3844.<sup>46</sup>

I have taken note of the telegraphic report transmitted to your office on July 23, 1937, by the German Ambassador to the Holy See.

I must consider as unsatisfactory and incompatible with the prestige of the Reich the manner in which the telegraphic instruction of July 21 and the Mundelein case, the gravity of which was recently increased by the papal discourse of July 17, have been disposed of.

The fact that the Pope often delivers discourses "emotionally and with utter disregard for political considerations," as he did on July 17, can be neither offered nor accepted as an excuse. Papal addresses must be judged by statesmen according to their repercussions and their effect on the world and not according to the standards and aims of the Curia's diplomacy.

Until normal, friendly relations between the Reich Government and the Holy See are restored by appropriate action of the Holy See in the Mundelein case, no exchange of views such as the Cardinal Secretary desires can in my opinion be made nor would it be opportune to "meet halfway" other wishes of the Holy See. The expectation of the Holy See that the Catholic Action weekly, *Der Katholik* (German Embassy's letter No. 150 of July 7, 1937, communicated under Pol. III 3616 of July 14<sup>47</sup>), would again be admitted is an incomprehensible and unreasonable request to make of the Reich Government at this time.

Cardinal Secretary of State Pacelli's statement that his visit to France had no political motive whatever, is contradicted by the fact that in his address at Lisieux on July 11 he spoke, with an unmistakable allusion to Germany, of a nation which "bad shepherds desired to lead into race idolatry," an expression which was very well understood in the France of the Popular Front and

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<sup>46</sup> Not printed.

<sup>47</sup> Neither printed.

in the anti-German world. This fact might very appropriately have been pointed out to the Cardinal Secretary of State.

To my regret, as a result of the above-mentioned Embassy report, I am obliged to repeat my frequently expressed opinion that the National Socialist German Reich is today not represented at the Holy See with the requisite firmness, determination, and fervor which are essential in the far-reaching discussions regarding religious policy.

By direction:  
MUHS

No. 673

1611/386357-58

*The Foreign Minister to the Reich and Prussian Minister for  
Ecclesiastical Affairs (Kerrl)*

Temporarily at LEINFELDEN ON THE ENZ,  
August 13, 1937.  
(zu Pol. III 4086/37)

With reference to the letter of August 6, 1937.

I, too, consider such a contact as the Cardinal Secretary of State suggested in conversation with Ambassador von Bergen a mistake, at least until a settlement of the Mundelein case satisfactory to us has been made by the Holy See. I also share your opinion that the Cardinal Secretary's assertion that the purpose of his visit to France was nonpolitical is refuted by his statements on that occasion.

That Ambassador von Bergen's retorts thereto are not expressly stressed in his telegram is in accordance with the practice followed in reports of my officials on the execution of instructions, according to which they generally confine themselves to reporting the other party's reaction to their statements. Although I am entirely of the opinion that firm language is advisable in dealing with the Vatican, I do not, as you know, share your opinion regarding the tone to be used. What may be appropriate for authorities at home is by no means suitable for intercourse with the outside world, as we have had to discover repeatedly to our cost.

BARON VON NEURATH

## No. 674

1611/386359

*The German Ambassador to the Holy See (Bergen) to the German  
Foreign Ministry*

Telegram

CONFIDENTIAL ROME (VATICAN), August 21, 1937—11:25 a.m.  
No. 68 of August 20 Received August 21, 1937—2:20 p.m.  
(Pol. III 4206)

In the course of a strictly private conversation, the Cardinal Secretary of State mentioned the rumors disseminated by the non-German press and reported by foreign diplomats in Berlin, according to which demonstrations against the Catholic Church were planned for the Party Rally. These rumors caused him the gravest anxiety and uneasiness, particularly in view of the fact that any anti-Catholic attacks originating in a higher quarter would produce violent reactions here (the Cardinal meant by the Pope) and corresponding public counterdemonstrations.

I replied that nothing was farther from the intention of our Government than the desire to destroy the Catholic religion and Church; the saying of Frederick the Great, that everyone could choose his own way to heaven, could be applied to us. I did not know the origin of the rumors; on the other hand, I had also read in the foreign press that the forthcoming Party Rally might come to be called the Party Rally of Peace.

BERGEN

## No. 675

1611/386360

*The German Ambassador to the Holy See (Bergen) to the German  
Foreign Ministry*

Telegram

VERY SECRET ROME, August 22, 1937—12:30 p.m.  
No. 71 of August 22 Received August 22, 1937—2:30 p.m.  
(Pol. III 4270a)

In continuation of my telegram No. 68 of the 20th.

For the State Secretary.

Confidential. During my last stay in Berlin the possibility was mentioned that questions of religious policy, the attitude of the State toward the Christian denominations, etc., might be discussed at the forthcoming Party Congress at Nuremberg. The postponing of the Concordat note planned in June also seems to point in this direction. If this should prove to be the case, I should consider

it advisable not to take the intended trip (your telegram No. 39 of the 19th<sup>48</sup>), so as to be able to act here at once and to carry out possible instructions—for which I should be grateful—without loss of time.

The present relative outward calm should not deceive us into forgetting that the critical tension in Vatican-German relations has by no means been eased. I was recently assured of this by a (group missing) source, who added: various conversations had led to the impression that the Vatican intended to maintain a certain reserve for a time, in order to give us time and opportunity to compromise and, if possible, to bring about a settlement, which was very much desired by the Vatican. But for the Pope there was “in the background” the battle for which he was preparing and which he would fight stubbornly if he believed that the Christian faith was being further endangered in Germany.

I think this is the correct analysis of the situation.

BERGEN

### No. 676

533/238878

#### *Memorandum*

BERLIN, August 26, 1937.

Following the conversation with State Secretaries Muhs and Zschintzsch<sup>49</sup> in my office today, I called up State Secretary Lammers this evening and informed him that our conversation had shown the necessity of following a very definite order in the measures relating to the Church, so as not to jeopardize our action with respect to the Vatican. For example, the promulgation of the Reich School Law by the Führer and Chancellor would have to be postponed for the time being, as we all agreed that this law and the provisions for carrying it out must precede [*sic!*] our contemplated note to the Vatican. I would send Herr Lammers a report of our conversation today, written in this sense.

Herr Lammers stated that there was no danger of the Reich School Law being signed within the next 24 hours; on the contrary, he was not reporting again before next week, but even then the signing could not be counted on. At any rate, he was expecting my letter.

MACKENSEN

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<sup>48</sup> Not printed.

<sup>49</sup> The former was State Secretary in the Reich and Prussian Ministry for Ecclesiastical Affairs and the latter State Secretary in the Reich and Prussian Ministry for Science, Education, and Public Instruction. Concerning this conversation, see document No. 677, *infra*.

## No. 677

533/238879-80

*Memorandum*

On the afternoon of Thursday the 26th, the State Secretary invited State Secretary Zschintzsch of the Ministry of Education and State Secretary Muhs of the Ministry for Ecclesiastical Affairs to a conference on the promulgation and implementation of the Reich School Law. In the course of the discussion it became apparent that a definitive decision concerning the Reich School Law was not possible until the Reich Government had presented to the Curia its proposed declaration concerning the nullity of the Reich Concordat. It was shown that, in the regulations for carrying out the Reich School Law, the educational provisions of the Concordat would have to be treated as no longer in force, which would anticipate in an important point the declaration concerning the nullity of the Concordat and would be bound greatly to impair the effect of the over-all action contemplated; otherwise, in the directions for execution, the Concordat would have to be treated as in force for the present, which would make an immediate declaration concerning the nullity of the Concordat, or one following shortly thereafter, almost impossible.

Those present were unanimous on this point, and consequently agreed to ask the State Secretary to address a letter to State Secretary Lammers requesting him not to present the Reich School Law to the Führer for signature until the Führer had made a definitive decision on the note to the Vatican. The unanimous feeling was that for Germany it was of the utmost importance to choose the following *modus procedendi*:

1. Earliest possible dispatch and publication of the note to the Vatican concerning the nullity of the Concordat;
2. Immediately thereafter, the promulgation of the new Reich School Law and of the provisions for its execution in a form that no longer takes the Concordat into account.

BISMARCK

BERLIN, August 27, 1937.

No. 678

1611/386361

*The German Ambassador to the Holy See (Bergen) to the German  
Foreign Ministry*

Telegram

VERY SECRET

ROME (VATICAN), August 30, 1937—7:30 p.m.

No. 74 of August 30

Received August 30, 1937—11:20 p.m.

(Pol. III 4305)

For the State Secretary.

In continuation of my cipher report No. 172 of the 28th.<sup>50</sup>

Today I discussed with the Cardinal Secretary of State the reports from Berlin concerning German-Vatican relations; these reports, some of them alarming, have been published by the Italian newspapers during the last few days as if in accordance with special instructions. The Cardinal assured me that to date he had received no information on the progress of the Fulda Conference of Bishops or on the reported trip to Rome of a delegation of the German Episcopate for the purpose of presenting a report. For example, the United Press despatch from Berlin, published in the *Basler Nachrichten* of the 27th, according to which a rather long communication from the Pope had been read at the Fulda Conference of Bishops, was fabricated out of whole cloth. Neither the Pope nor he himself had addressed such a communication to the Episcopate. I then pointed out that a possible pastoral letter of the German Episcopate, also announced in the press, would, according to its content and wording, have the effect of either easing the tension or poisoning the atmosphere. Otherwise I saw no cause for uneasiness. We were certainly not aiming at a sharpening of the conflict, but were seeking a normalization of our relations. The Cardinal replied emphatically that the Holy See also sincerely desired an adjustment of differences and peace. The reports constantly reaching the Vatican concerning rumors circulating in Berlin that a great blow at the Vatican was being planned for the Party Rally, a declaration of the separation of Church and State, for instance, were causing the Vatican great uneasiness, which he himself shared, particularly since the Pope had told him that his immediate reply to a blow at the Church would be a public counter-demonstration. The consequences would be incalculable.

In conclusion, the Cardinal expressed the hope that there would not be an increase of tension but rather an easing thereof and

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<sup>50</sup> Not printed.

again declared his readiness at all times to discuss the matter with a person in authority, such as the Foreign Minister or Minister President Göring.

BERGEN

No. 679

1611/386363-64

*The German Ambassador to the Holy See (Bergen) to the German Foreign Ministry*

Nr. 186

Rome, September 19, 1937.  
(Pol. III 4589)

Subject: The Pope's discourse to the German pilgrims.

At his usual Saturday audience the Pope received, among others, 48 German pilgrims, 30 Austrian railway men, and 37 Dutch pilgrims.

The *Osservatore Romano* (No. 219) reports today that the Pope addressed the Dutch, Austrians, and Germans in German. He praised Holland for her services to Catholic Missions and expressed his confidence that Holland would always remain true to her Church and to the Catholic doctrine and discipline. Even in Holland there were those who were leading the country into temptation and seeking to lead it astray; but the people were abiding in their old faith, the faith of their fathers, the faith of the glorious era. The Pope bestowed the same praise on the Austrian pilgrims, whom he wished to greet cordially, more cordially than ever. Austria would always remain a Catholic country, a glorious representative of the Catholic faith in the center of Europe, which so sorely needed such examples.

The Pope then turned to the German pilgrims. He wondered just what he should say or, rather, leave unsaid in an hour like this, which was so grave, so painful for our religion and for all who wanted to remain true to it. These good pilgrims were particularly welcome at this time, when a writer who was attacking everything that was Catholic and Christian had been raised on the shield and crowned as the new prophet of the Fatherland.<sup>51</sup>

A somewhat different version of the papal address is given by the *Avvenire d'Italia* (No. 218 of September 19), which emphasizes the "Holy Father's stern admonition on German racism" in a headline and reproduces the address to the German pilgrims as follows:

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<sup>51</sup> The reference was to Alfred Rosenberg; see document No. 680, *infra*.

"What should we say or, rather, what should we leave unsaid in this hour, which is so grave, so painful for the Catholic religion and for all who want to remain true to the Church of Rome?" The pilgrims were particularly welcome to the Pope at this hour, "when in their homeland a new false prophet was being raised on the shield, who, as everyone knew, was opposing by word and deed everything that was Catholic and Christian."

BERGEN

No. 680

533/238884-85

*The German Ambassador to the Holy See (Bergen) to the State Secretary in the German Foreign Ministry (Mackensen)*

ROME, September 21, 1937.

DEAR HERR VON MACKENSEN: The general situation in my zone of operations has undergone no real change; the Vatican's stand is clearly defined in an article in the *Osservatore Romano*, "After the Nuremberg Party Rally" (Report No. 184 of September 14<sup>52</sup>), inspired from above: The much-dreaded blow at the Church of Rome did not fall at Nuremberg; "the last bridges, which, under the Concordat between the two Powers, are still standing in Germany," have not been burned. This moderation, dependent on tactical considerations, should not lead to "optimistic conclusions concerning the further development of relations between Church and State in Germany." Through the award of the first national prize to Rosenberg the Government has "declared its entire, solemn, and unqualified solidarity with Rosenberg's literary productions." This identification tends to "nullify the necessary conditions and premises for the religious conciliation for which the Holy See has sincerely striven and is striving."

The honoring of Rosenberg, interpreted as an official recognition of his ideological program, has made a very deep impression on the highest Church officials and has shattered the already slight hopes of a settlement. An open fight for the threatened faith seems inevitable, and aroused spirits are preparing for a struggle of increased violence. We must take account of the possibility that the Holy See will now study more intensively the question of how far the ideological program of National Socialism is irreconcilable with Catholic doctrine, and that at the proper time it will proceed to have the theses that conflict with the basic principles of the Church condemned by the "Sanctum Officium." Such an anathema will not

\* Not printed.

further agitate the Protestants, but the effect on many Catholics must be differently estimated. For the moment the Curia is still imposing upon itself a certain reserve; perhaps it expects favorable results for itself, too, from Mussolini's trip to Germany.

In the present situation I should consider it inadvisable to send the Concordat note, which was conceived under different conditions and which in the draft by the Ministry for Ecclesiastical Affairs seems to assume more and more the form of a belligerent act.

The Pope is to return to Rome as soon as it becomes too damp at Castel Gandolfo. Cardinal Pacelli intends to take a vacation at the beginning of October, perhaps to Rorschach in Switzerland.

With best regards and Heil Hitler!

Sincerely yours,

BERGEN

No. 681

533/238882-83

*Memorandum*

BERLIN, September 29, 1937.

On the occasion of the parade today I asked Reich Minister Kerrl, who happened to be my neighbor on the stand, about the fate of the famous note to the Vatican. The Reich Minister said that he expected to get an opportunity in the next few days to bring to a definite conclusion the conversations which he had had in Bayreuth with the Führer on this subject and which, as it turned out now, had been rather exhaustive. The protracted treatment of the whole matter seemed to be caused mainly by the fact that the Führer, in agreement with Reich Minister Kerrl, intended in the near future to settle the matter of Church and State as a whole. This settlement is to take place in the form of a fundamental speech in the Reichstag by the Führer—for historical reasons presumably scheduled for Reformation Day. The Führer is said to have stated that in its effect this speech would greatly eclipse Luther's ninety-five theses and that it was to complete the work of the Reformation in the German spirit. Reich Minister Kerrl expressly confirmed that nothing was to be changed in the Party principle according to which the Party was based on positive Christianity. On the contrary, the fight from the ranks of the Party against the Church was to be stopped and each Reich citizen was to be guaranteed true freedom as regards his religious denomination. Thus this point of the Party program would be supplemented to the effect that no Reich citizen should be discriminated against because of his denomination, but, conversely, neither should he be able to obtain any advantage

through membership or nonmembership in one of the churches. Rather is the principle of full freedom to choose a religious denomination to be carried out completely.

The churches would remain incorporated bodies under public law; however, they would lose their right to taxes, without prejudice to the right to collect voluntary contributions. In the future there could be no question of the State's officially carrying any burden whatsoever for the Church.

On the day of the speech planned by the Führer the Vatican is to be given the note in which the Concordat will be described as outdated by the course of developments.

Reich Minister Kerrl promised to keep me informed of further developments.

VON MACKENSEN

No. 682

133/238888

*The State Secretary in the German Foreign Ministry (Mackensen)  
to the German Ambassador to the Holy See (Bergen)*

BERLIN, October 1, 1937.

DEAR HERR VON BERGEN: Thank you for your interesting letter of September 21. Acknowledgment of its receipt has unfortunately been somewhat delayed owing to the Mussolini visit. Through your account we can see how, in your opinion, the situation looks on the other side today.

If the Holy See has hoped for a result from Mussolini's trip to Germany that would be favorable to it as well, the Vatican will have to bury this hope, for Mussolini has avoided broaching the subject of our relations with the Vatican in any form.

From a rather long conversation with Reich Minister Kerrl I have gained the definite impression during the last few days that nothing will happen regarding the Concordat note before the end of this month. But it looks as if things will start moving all along the line at the expiration of that period, for certain reasons not related solely to the Vatican. To say any more seems to me to be risky at a moment when the last word has not yet been spoken here.

With best regards and Heil Hitler!

Sincerely yours,

VON MACKENSEN

No. 683

1607/388125

*The Foreign Ministry to the Reich and Prussian Ministry for  
Ecclesiastical Affairs*

BERLIN, October 7, 1937.  
(Pol. III 4713)

Drafting Officer: Counselor of Legation Dr. Dumont.

With reference to communication G II 5337 of September 4.<sup>55</sup>

It is the opinion here that there is no reason to take up the Mundelein case. The matter as such was closed by our note of May 29, in which we informed the Cardinal Secretary of State of our view regarding the attitude of the Curia in the Mundelein case and the deductions which we made from this attitude. The note of reply from the Curia, dated June 24, does not provide the remedy demanded by us. The conclusions in our note of May 29 regarding the relations between the Reich and the Curia therefore remain unchanged (cf. communication of August 5, 1937—Pol. III 3893).

Furthermore, it does not seem opportune to take up the Mundelein case again. It would, rather, be advisable to await the decision on our joint plan of finding a new form for our relations with the Curia. For the time being, precisely the state of indecision in our relations with the Curia caused by the Mundelein case is best suited to serve the needs of our further action.<sup>55a</sup>

By direction:  
VON MACKENSEN

**C. RELATIONS KEPT IN A STATE OF INDECISION,  
OCTOBER 1937—MAY 1938**

No. 684

583/238887

*Memorandum by the Foreign Minister*

RM 798

The Apostolic Nuncio called on me today and complained bitterly of the fact that he received no replies or only evasive replies to all the complaints he lodged with us. I asked him which case he had in mind; as far as I knew he had always received replies and

<sup>55</sup> Not printed.

<sup>55a</sup> Nothing further of significance has been found in the archives of the Foreign Ministry either on the projected Concordat note or on the speech by Hitler which was presumably to have been delivered on Reformation Day, except a draft of the projected Concordat note found among papers dating from April to May 1938 and printed as document No. 705, p. 1032.

information, whenever it had been at all possible. The Nuncio referred to a memorandum which he had submitted to us in August this year<sup>54</sup> regarding the discontinuation of state subsidies to churches and church institutions in Saxony. In this memorandum he had requested a conversation with the Saxon state authorities but had so far received no reply. I told the Nuncio that I knew nothing of the matter. I would make inquiries and then let him have a reply.

Then the Nuncio complained of the tone and contents of the articles in the *Schwarze Korps*, which constantly contained attacks on the Pope personally, the Church, and the Catholic religion. I told the Nuncio that these constant complaints over articles in the *Schwarze Korps* were incomprehensible to me. I had to state that the Vatican found its chief occupation in calling each newspaper article in Germany and each thoughtless remark by any person in uniform a serious attack on the Church and religion, while in regard to the occurrences in Spain it had first observed complete passivity and had only much later taken a very half-hearted position. Hence, a double standard was evidently used in the Vatican. Would the Nuncio therefore in the future refrain from getting excited over newspaper articles. To the extent that these articles overshot the mark they lost their effect of themselves, and I could not observe that Catholic people in Germany had become less religious than before because of the articles in the *Schwarze Korps*.

The conversation between the Nuncio and me was rather sharp in tone this time.

BARON VON NEURATH

BERLIN, October 16, 1937.

No. 685

533/238893-95

*Memorandum*

BERLIN, November 10, 1937.

The Nuncio called on me today and brought the following points up for discussion.

1) In section 67 of the Civil Status Law promulgated within the last few days the performance of the church wedding before the civil ceremony is made punishable, and exemption from punishment is granted only in cases where one of the betrothed is critically ill and postponement is impossible. This is in conformity with the old Civil Status Law but does not take into consideration the pro-

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<sup>54</sup> Not printed.

vision made in the meantime by the Reich Concordat. For, aside from cases of critical illness, article 26 of the Reich Concordat also considers cases of extreme moral emergency a reason for exemption from punishment. Perhaps the nonobservance of this Concordat provision was due only to an oversight. He requested an explanation of this point.

I told the Nuncio that I did not know anything about the reasons for the wording of section 67 of the new Civil Status Law, but that I would look into the matter.

2) The Nuncio called my attention to the regulations under the Real Estate Tax Law issued by the Reich Ministry of Finance in July. On the Catholic side, only the dioceses were listed therein as religious corporations entitled to certain tax privileges, and not the Orders and the Catholic congregations. The latter two were on the contrary expressly denied the classification of religious organizations and only given the classification of religious associations, without any right to tax exemption. The matter did not interest him so much from the point of view of tax law, but rather as a question of principle. The Orders and congregations were as much organs of the Catholic Church as the dioceses themselves; they were as a rule not incorporated in the latter and occupied an independent position alongside of them. At the moment he did not intend to make any definite proposals on this point but would for the time being only point out that the differentiation between the dioceses on the one hand and the Orders and congregations on the other was not in conformity with the concept of canon law.

3) The Nuncio again mentioned the question which he had previously discussed with Herr Dieckhoff and thereafter with Herr von Weizsäcker too: whether the Catholic clergy, in spite of their obligation to protect the secrecy of the confessional, would be required to give information, as provided in the draft of the penal code.

In the sense of my previous memorandum<sup>54a</sup> (zu R. 13997) I let him understand that I could not see how and with what justification the Curia could raise objections to this provision of the penal code. The Nuncio emphasized that he did not at present intend to make any proposal in this matter, either, but that he would investigate it further and would have to reserve the right to return to it if need be.

GAUS

BERLIN, November 10, 1937.

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<sup>54a</sup> Not printed.

## No. 686

1978/439302-67

*The German Ambassador to the Holy See (Bergen) to the German Foreign Ministry*

No. 230

ROME, November 29, 1937.  
Received December 1, 1937.  
(Pol. III 5597)

Subject: Ban on religious instruction by Catholic priests.

I have the honor to enclose herewith a copy of a note of November 26 from the Cardinal Secretary of State—No. 4690/37—concerning the ban on religious instruction by Catholic priests. I respectfully request instructions.

BERGEN

[Enclosure]

*The Papal Secretary of State (Pacelli) to the German Ambassador to the Holy See (Bergen)*

No. 4690/37

THE VATICAN, November 26, 1937.

EXCELLENCY: During the past two years individual Catholic priests at various localities in Germany have been prohibited, by unilateral governmental administrative orders, without consultation with ecclesiastical authorities, from giving religious instruction. The reason given was that the priests concerned did not offer sufficient assurance, as required by the State, that the young people would be educated and trained in the National Socialist spirit. In addition to these individual interdictions, the Reich and Prussian Minister for Science, Education, and Public Instruction, in a decree of July 1, 1937, addressed to the educational authorities of all the German states and concerning the future teaching of religion in the regular curriculum, has now ordered:

1. That, by preference, those teachers who are prepared to take over this instruction be used for this purpose;
2. That priests are to be used only if other teachers are not available.

Pursuant to this decree, in several sections of Germany further religious instruction at public elementary schools was generally taken away from priests after this year's summer vacations and turned over to secular elementary school teachers.

In the central field of religious education of the young, a course has thus been taken which is undeniably contrary to the agreements existing between State and Church, and forces the Holy See to remind the secular party to the Concordat of the obligations assumed and to safeguard the recognized rights of the Church.

The Holy See does not wish to discuss the legal situation and practices, which are by no means uniform, in the various German states. It merely points out emphatically that, regardless of the substantially different regulations in the various states, the teaching of the Catholic religion in public schools, pursuant to article 149, paragraph 1, sentence 3, of the Reich Constitution, was to be in conformity with the "principles of the religious body concerned," and thus, in the case of the Catholics, with the dogma and moral doctrine of the Catholic Church. Pursuant to this constitutional principle the German Reich agreed in article 21, paragraph 1, of the Reich Concordat to arrange that instruction in the Catholic religion at public schools "is given in accordance with the principles of the Catholic Church." The State is bound by treaty to this agreement, i.e., to safeguard and protect the strict conformity of instruction in the Catholic religion with the principles of the Church. What kind of religious instruction corresponds to this basic requirement, and what kind does not, is not a political but an ecclesiastical question. What Catholic dogma is, how it must be taught, who offers sufficient assurance that it is properly taught can, in the last analysis, only be determined by the Church by virtue of its own competence. Religious instruction is in conformity with the principles of the Catholic Church only if its basic nature, curriculum, and teaching method correspond to the all-important general clause of article 21, including the selection of teachers, upon whom as living interpreters of the dogma depends to a substantial degree the positive or negative tendency of the instruction.

The above-mentioned decree is in formal contradiction to the provisions of the Concordat in that the State unilaterally and without consulting the ecclesiastical party to the Concordat, i.e., without insuring that its action is in conformity with the principles of the Church, proceeded to issue new regulations regarding the future teaching of the Catholic religion and the appointment of instructors.

In substance this decree cannot be reconciled with the provisions of the Concordat, because the general exclusion of priests from religious instruction, and the general transfer thereof to secular instructors, not only does not comply with the Church law but definitely violates it. According to Church law, it is primarily the priests who are called upon to teach the Catholic religion, as

holders of those ecclesiastical offices (pastorships) whose official spiritual duties automatically include religious instruction. Regulating the subsidiary cooperation of laymen is primarily the responsibility of the ecclesiastical authority. The above-mentioned decree takes the opposite course; by the general exclusion of priests from religious instruction in the regular curriculum and the general transfer thereof to lay teachers it runs counter to the law of the Church and the obligation of the State under the Concordat.

Aside from these legal considerations, the Holy See cannot refrain from stating that there are many indications that the above-mentioned decree seeks to open the way to religious instruction which, as to material and content, not only would no longer be in conformity with the principles of the Catholic Church but, under the title of "instruction in the Catholic religion," would be tantamount to a definite subversion of the Catholic faith. What the Holy See has learned regarding the religious or rather anti-Christian instruction in certain teachers' colleges, what is reliably reported regarding statements against the Church and Christ by "instructors in religion" appointed by the Government, is so distressingly painful and so obviously unlawful that the Catholic Church can surely not be expected to accept this subversion of religious instruction, and the conversion of the latter to its opposite, without protest and without a last-minute attempt to stop, as far as lies in its power, the resultant evils to the younger generation of Germany.

On the other hand, it was demanded of the priests of Württemberg, for example, that they also assume in their loyalty oath the obligation to teach in conformity with all Government decrees, even those of an ideological nature, although the "liberalization of religious instruction" and the elimination of subjects which "offend the morality of the Germanic man" demanded by the educational authorities are in obvious contradiction to article 21 of the Reich Concordat. Since these priests were willing to take the loyalty oath required by the State only with the reservation, in accordance with the law and their duties, to give religious instruction "in conformity with the principles of the Church," the Minister of Education of Württemberg decreed the exclusion of these priests from religious instruction in the regular curriculum and the discontinuance of Government subsidies.

The German Government will understand if the Holy See considers the decree of the Reich Minister of Education of July 1, 1937, in the light of the above facts and therefore—aside from the formal incompatibility thereof with existing treaty obligations—reaches a conclusion which compels it to make a formal protest.

Requesting that you inform the German Government that the Holy See under those circumstances, in order to be relieved of any responsibility for developments not in accordance with the Concordat, again invokes article 33,2,<sup>55</sup> which it has invoked before in connection with school questions covered by the Concordat.

I am, with the expression of my highest consideration,

Very truly yours,

E. CARDINAL PACELLI

No. 687

1620/387746-50

*The German Ambassador to the Holy See (Bergen) to the German Foreign Ministry*

No. 256

ROME, December 26, 1937.

(Pol. III 5966)

Subject: Christmas allocution by the Pope.

In the allocution which Pius XI delivered on December 24 at the customary reception of the College of Cardinals he vigorously complained of the "persecution" of the Catholic Church in Germany. Even the welcoming and congratulatory address which the Dean of the Sacred College read on behalf of his colleagues at the beginning of the audience contained a reference to the "pernicious intrigues and aberrations of a developing neopaganism." The Pope replied extemporaneously, so that the *Osservatore Romano* (No. 300 of December 25), from which the following report was taken, remarked that it was reporting the allocution as it had been possible to take it down.

After a few words of thanks, the Pope stated that it would have been necessary to say no more, "if there were not so many, unfortunately not pleasant, reasons for making two further statements, as he had been compelled to do on other occasions and under other circumstances: a statement to establish certain facts, and then a statement of fundamental importance, which would be a formal protest.

"First, the statement to establish the facts, since facts had been distorted, denied, and twisted for some time past, especially one fact which was as great as it was far reaching, a fact far reaching in space, a fact painfully great and serious in the deepest spiritual sense of the word.

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<sup>55</sup> A pencilled notation reads as follows: "Friendly settlement by mutual agreement."

"By that he meant the painful, most painful fact of religious persecution in Germany, 'for,' said the Holy Father, 'let us call things by their real names; it shall not be said of Us, in the words of an ancient historian, *Vera etiam rerum perdidimus nomina*.

"No,' His Holiness continued, 'by the grace of God We have not forgotten the true names; We shall call things by their names. In Germany there is indeed a real religious persecution. For some time past it has been said and pretended that there is no persecution. We know, however, that it does exist and that it is serious; only rarely has there been a persecution so serious, so fearful, so grievous, and so calamitous in its far-reaching consequences. This is a persecution in which neither brutality, nor violence, nor the deceits of cunning and falsehood have been lacking.'

"He, the Pope, would have preferred not to dwell upon such grievous matters, but he had nevertheless wanted to add this statement for those who needed it, for no one should suppose that the Vicar of Jesus Christ, in discussing such important and serious matters so closely affecting his responsibilities, could appear uninformed or say anything incorrect.

"The Holy Father then took up the second point, the question of fundamental importance, which was on the same subject and connected with the first point (establishing certain facts) and likewise concerned with Germany. Almost everyone in Germany knew, and elsewhere, too, it was often repeated and very much stressed that he had always been a great friend of Germany. In fact, with only a few countries had he become as well acquainted as with Germany, and from a select and representative side, from a side which was propitious by its knowledge, intellect, education, and scholarship. Those whom he admired were legion, not only because they had come to him as pilgrims, but also because he had become acquainted with them in their native country, in their libraries, their great institutions, and their large cities.

"For that reason it was sad, doubly sad, for him to have to think of everything that was being committed in that country against truth, against a truth that not only concerned him personally—that would be the least serious—but which concerned him much more seriously insofar as it concerned what was dearest to him, what occupied all his thoughts and his feelings, for which he carried the whole responsibility before God and men, namely, the Catholic hierarchy, the Catholic religion, the Holy Church, which God in His kindness entrusted to the guardianship of His Vicar on earth.

"It was said that the Catholic religion is no longer Catholic but that it was political, and this characterization was offered to justify the persecution, as though there were no persecution but only, so to speak, a defense movement. His beloved sons had agreed and were agreeing with their Father that this was the same accusation made against our Lord when He was brought before Pilate, when all accused Him of engaging in politics, of being a usurper, a conspirator against the Government, an enemy of Caesar. 'And Pilate at first indicated that he did not understand the meaning of the matter, or at least he pretended that he did not understand, and therefore his question: Therefore, art thou a King? In other words: Have you come as a great political leader, as a political agitator, to overthrow the reign of Caesar? And the Lord in His divine calm replied to this: My kingdom is not of this world. It is not of the world which you mean or seem to mean. If my kingdom were of this kind, my followers would have resorted to arms in assisting me.'

"'We'—His Holiness continued—'could say the same thing. If We concerned Ourselves with politics, which is charged against Us and which is attributed to Us, then in these discussions of re-arming and of war, perhaps there would be a place, however narrow and small, also for Us. No, the Supreme Pontiff has no need of that: My kingdom is not of this world. The Pope does not engage in politics: he does not live, he does not work to engage in politics but to render testimony to the truth, to teach the truth: that truth which the world so little appreciates and cares for so little while it cares for everything else, just as Pilate did not wait for an answer to his question: What is truth?

"'The Supreme Pontiff wishes to state and to repeat, to protest loudly in the face of the entire world: We do not engage in politics; on the contrary, to return to the words of Our Lord Jesus Christ, if it were so, Our people—and throughout the world are found Our people, very dear sons, pious, faithful, believing worshippers of God—would come to Our help. But none of these sons of Ours, scattered as they are over the entire world, believes that We are engaged in politics; rather can they all see and testify again and again that it is religion with which We are concerned, and nothing else.

"'Of course'—the Holy Father added—'for this very reason it must be emphasized that the ordinary citizen must adjust his life as a citizen to the law of God and Jesus Christ; is that religious or political activity? It is certainly not politics.

"'We further desire'—His Holiness continued—'that in national, private, and social life the rights of God which are also the rights of the human soul should always be respected. This and nothing else is what We have always done. If someone thinks and says anything different, it is contrary to the truth.'

"And it was this that deeply dismayed the Pope: that the accusation of abusing religion for political purposes, one of the worst ideas that could occur to anyone, was repeatedly made, that this slander—to use the right word—was hurled against so many of his dear brethren in the Episcopate, against respected members of the Sacred College, against so many priests, against so many of the faithful, who had no other thought than obeying God's law, spreading the knowledge of this divine law, and being good Christians and, thus, of course, excellent citizens; for they realized that even for these civic and social duties they were responsible not only to men but also to God himself.

"Therefore, the Holy Father declared, his solemn assertion to the entire world could not be explicit and vigorous enough: 'We concern Ourselves with religion, We do not engage in politics: everyone knows this; everyone sees it who wants to see it.

"'And may this loud proclamation of the truth'—the Pope continued—'bring consolation to all Our brethren in the Episcopate, to the priests and to the faithful, who have to suffer so much from this persecution which is so baseless and so distressingly negative and who are suffering, above all, under this slander, real slander, the most severe suffering which could have been added to the sufferings and difficulties of all kinds resulting from the persecution.

"'May they know that the Pope is with them, that he knows their visitations, that he suffers with them, and that it is his greatest sorrow to know that they are so afflicted, so wounded by the accusations leveled against them.'

"The Pope closed with a reference to God's mercy and patience and an appeal to prayer and hope."

BERGEN

No. 688

1620/387739-40

*Memorandum*

(Pol. III 5916)

In accordance with instructions received, I asked Auditor Colli of the Nunciature to call on me and informed him that we would have been entirely willing, in accordance with the wish of the

Nuncio, to have published in a German newspaper the text of the papal allocution of December 14, 1937, to the Consistory, although this allocution, too, had been unfriendly to Germany. Instructions had already been issued when the papal Christmas allocution had become known. In view of the sharp attacks against Germany in this allocution of the Pope, it was impossible for us to influence the German press in favor of the Holy See. Orders had therefore been issued to refrain from the intended publication of the papal allocution of December 14. Moreover, he himself had probably seen that the German press had not reacted to the attacks in the Pope's Christmas allocution.

Respectfully submitted, with documents P 10912 II<sup>56</sup> to the Foreign Minister, via the Director, Political Affairs, the Head of the Political Department, and the State Secretary.

H[AIDLEN]

BERLIN, January 5, 1938.

No. 689

1620/387756-61

*The German Ambassador to the Holy See (Bergen) to the German Foreign Ministry*

No. 14

ROME, January 20, 1938.  
Received January 29, 1938.  
(Pol. III 294)

Subject: The decline of German influence in the institutions of the Catholic Church.

Enclosed I have the honor to present a copy of a memorandum which was submitted to the Embassy by a local Reich-German priest familiar with conditions in the Vatican and in constant touch with the institutions of the Curia. The statements of this informant, concerning whose positive attitude toward Germany there is no doubt, deal with the effects of the dispute with the Church, as shown by several examples, and especially with the view of the Italian masses concerning the situation of the Church in Germany, and with the decline of German and the rise of French influence within the Church.

Even though I do not fully share the reporter's interpretation, his statement nevertheless quite correctly confirms the advance of France, which is seeking as much as possible to displace the German element in the important positions of the Church and is purposively exploiting the present German-Vatican tension to this end.

BERGEN

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<sup>a</sup> Enclosures not printed.

[Enclosure]

I take the liberty of drawing the attention of the German Embassy at the Holy See to incidents and facts, together with the harm they do to the German cause, which come to my attention here in Rome.

1) *Germany's decline in the sphere of religious activity from the standpoint of Italian public opinion.*

Whereas from other countries pilgrim trains continue to be directed toward Rome, in contrast to former years, there have been none at all from Germany in the last three or four years. At best, only small groups of pilgrims are still coming now and then. Numerically they are too insignificant to constitute a religious demonstration which might give the lie in Italian public opinion to the utterances and speeches concerning the fight against religion, especially the Catholic religion, by the present Reich Government.

For anyone who has lived in Italy for any length of time and has any wide acquaintance with the people, the conclusion is inescapable that the mentality of the uniformly Christian Italian people is strongly religious in its basis and orientation, even though a great many individuals neglect the religious mode of life. A struggle against religion and Church is something inconceivable to the Italian people. They reject it from the very bottom of their hearts. Therein lies the reason that the present friendship between Germany and Italy remains only an outward and superficial friendship on the part of the Italians. It does not go any deeper. This is not altered in the least by the increased exchange of state visits. It finds an echo only in the press, where it is and can be ordered, but not among the masses of the people. They persist in their rejection of the Third Reich, as a power which fights the Church. They follow its ideological policies critically. Occasionally they express doubts even to Germans whether Germany is the right ally for Italy, when, through the internal division which Germany fosters by her religious strife, she reduces her military striking power.

In the same sphere in which Germany has withdrawn before the eyes of the Italian public—that of religious demonstrations—France has since been establishing herself more and more. In the course of the last year numerous French pilgrim trains visited Rome. The French Leftist governments placed no obstacles in their way. In the last few months French bishops could be seen here constantly. They made frequent appearances on festive occasions and drew favorable attention to France. It is quite evident that France is drawing closer to the Italian people precisely in that field which

separates them from the German people. The "Latin Sister" knows better how to reach the heart of the Italian people. What will be the outcome of this some day in an hour of danger and decision?

It should not prove difficult to make a change here for the good of the German cause. Much ground would thereby be cut from under French propaganda in Italy.

2) *Germany's injury to herself in withholding mission funds.*

For years I have belonged to the Supreme Council of the Papal Action for the Propagation of the Faith, which is engaged in the work of giving economic support to the Catholic missions throughout the world. Working for it in Germany are the *Franziskus-Xaveriusverein* in Aachen and the *Ludwig-Missionsverein* in Munich. I regularly take part in the sessions of the Council. Through them there runs like a red thread the complaint that Germany was obstructing as much as possible, if not preventing altogether, the exportation of mission funds that have been collected from her Catholics. The discussion of her attitude in the sessions of the Papal Action, in which the entire civilized world is united through representatives of the individual countries, always amounts to an unmasking of the Third Reich before the world. The Third Reich takes on the appearance of a power engaged in a struggle with the Church. Through the loss of the mission funds—they amount to about one million—Catholic missions abroad can no longer be allotted what they previously received. They make representations and are consoled by the assurance that they would receive additional funds as soon as the German funds become available. Thus all mission posts and missionaries, including those in the remotest lands, recognize the New Germany as the party responsible for the continuation of their economic difficulties. Those who suffer most are the missionaries who have gone forth from Germany herself. Under the present state of affairs they are considered only after the others and find themselves faced by a situation of acute need. They no longer know how they can maintain their schools, educational establishments, hospitals, and other welfare agencies as aids to their missions. Their missionary achievements suffer, but so does their personal influence in the entire mission field, and the reputation of the German name, which they personified there! At that, the Papal Action for the Propagation of the Faith would be willing to send absolutely everything that comes from Germany to the German missions abroad!

In conclusion, one more thought: what effect will the attitude of the Reich Government have on the German missionaries themselves? Will not these Germans abroad, who indeed represented

their fatherland at advanced posts under innumerable difficulties and privations, become thoroughly embittered? Can it be hoped that these Germans, especially the ones who are working in the former German colonies, will become ardent advocates of the return of these colonies to the sovereignty of the Reich? And what does not the Reich spend on its propaganda abroad! How many irreplaceable German assets could be salvaged with the one million spent for the German missions!

I am certainly no passionate admirer of France. It is therefore all the more painful for me to be obliged to point again to her example. Regardless of whether she happens to have a Rightist or a Leftist government, regardless of whether or not the government in power is engaged in a struggle with the Church at home, France always supports her religious missions abroad, if not for religious, then at least for political reasons. She always knows how much they contribute to her influence in the world and to spreading French culture abroad. Therefore she does not restrict their economic basis but maintains it for them. Another example of the way France knows how to appreciate and use the foreign activities of her religious communities: when, at the conclusion of the peace treaties after the World War, Turkey again had to open her doors to the nationals of the former enemy states, whom did France send there first of all? Businessmen, physicians, professors, artists? No—her religious congregations which are engaged in the instruction and education of youth! She chose them as her pacemakers!

3) *A threatening consequence of the action of the Reich Government against the monasteries inside Germany.*

Several years ago the Reich Government had a number of court proceedings conducted against monastic communities for violations of foreign exchange regulations. Subsequently it became known, at least abroad, that industrial circles as well were guilty of such violations, but in their case forbearance was practiced. Now, some of the religious societies affected, which have their general headquarters and central administration in Germany, are considering the idea of transferring these abroad. They justify it on the grounds that in view of the necessary economic relations between the highest administrative office and the monasteries abroad, on the one hand, and the rapidly changing foreign exchange regulations—often unintelligible, at least to laymen—on the other, to remain in Germany would be fraught with the constant great danger of again running afoul of some foreign exchange law and incurring the very serious disadvantages to the community that would result therefrom. Be-

sides, the official opening of the correspondence with the monasteries abroad is an extremely annoying and distressing matter. If the plans for these transfers are carried out, one of the first results will be that the general headquarters established abroad will be staffed with foreigners and no longer with Germans. The German influence which thus far has dominated these societies in their foreign establishments as well, and in many places in the world has successfully promoted German manners and customs, will be discontinued. Foreign influence will replace it and win control of the society. The monasteries in Germany as well will eventually be subordinated to this foreign influence without legal means here of repelling it. The channels through which it gains ground are subtle and undetectable. And naturally the contributions from the monasteries abroad for the purposes of the general headquarters will then no longer be sent to Germany. A not inconsiderable loss of foreign exchange will accompany the damage to opportunities for German activity in the world.

## No. 690

1620/387764-65

*Memorandum*

(Pol. III 492)

Drafting Officer: Counselor of Legation Dr. Schwendemann.

The legal basis of our relations with the Vatican is the Reich Concordat of July 7, 1933, with its concluding protocol and the state concordats (the Bavarian Concordat of March 29, 1924, the Prussian Concordat of August 3, 1929, the Baden Concordat of October 12, 1932, and the Anhalt Agreements of January 4, 1932).

All the concordats are formally in force, as they have not been denounced by any of the parties thereto. Diplomatic relations with the Vatican continue. To an assertion by the Reich and Prussian Minister for Ecclesiastical Affairs on January 4, that because of the last Christmas allocution of the Pope, to act on Vatican notes and representations of the Apostolic Nuncio "could now no longer even be considered," the Reich Foreign Minister replied that he had to "adhere to the view already expressed previously that the regular business relations with the Vatican or with its representative here must be maintained as long as diplomatic relations have not been broken off. As long as diplomatic relations continue, we must, in the regular course of business, accept notes from the Holy See and the Nuncio, grant audiences to the Nuncio, and make replies, just as we must demand that the Holy See accept our communica-

tions and representations and reply to us. To what extent under existing circumstances an objective treatment of the matters brought up by the Curia will be possible is a question on which I must reserve my decision for each case as it comes up."

A large number of individual questions, which have been raised during the last few months by notes from the Holy See to our Embassy at the Vatican, or through *démarches* with the Foreign Ministry by the Nuncio here, are pending with the Vatican.

It is not expected that the Nuncio will broach the individual current questions at his first meeting with the Foreign Minister.<sup>56a</sup>

Herewith submitted to the Foreign Minister, through the Head of the Political Department and the State Secretary.

SCHWEN[DEMANN]

BERLIN, February 13, 1938.

No. 691

1620/387770

*Memorandum*

BERLIN, February 14, 1938.

During my report today, I called the Foreign Minister's attention to the fact that on the question of a "visit to the Pope by the Führer" an orientation of conversation was gradually becoming necessary, since I knew that, e.g., the topic was being discussed with animation here in the Diplomatic Corps. We agreed that such a visit is out of the question. The Foreign Minister requests Ministerial Director Gaus to make suitable suggestions for the orientation of conversation. He is inclined to seek the reason primarily in the fact that the Führer is acting upon an invitation from the King of Italy and has no reason for visiting other sovereigns on non-Italian territory on this occasion. To point out that, after all, no invitation has hitherto been forthcoming seemed to us inadvisable as it involves the risk that the Vatican might then extend such an invitation.

MACKENSEN

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<sup>56a</sup> i.e., Ribbentrop, who replaced Neurath on February 4, 1938.

## No. 692

1620/387767-68

*The Head of the Political Department in the German Foreign Ministry (Weizsäcker) to the German Ambassador to the Holy See (Bergen)*

BERLIN, February 26, 1938.  
(e.o. Pol. III 548)

DEAR HERR VON BERGEN: In connection with the visit of the Führer and Chancellor to Rome, the question has often been discussed in the foreign press, whether the Führer would visit the Vatican, too. Such a visit is, of course, out of the question. As for an explanation, it would be most natural to place the main emphasis on the fact that the visit of the Führer is the return of Mussolini's visit of last year, and that both visits are meetings between the creator of National Socialist Germany and the creator of Fascist Italy and result from the close connection between National Socialism and Fascism. These meetings are, therefore, of a very special nature and not to be compared with ordinary state visits. In view of this special character of the Führer's trip, the question of a visit to the Vatican does not even arise.

Through such emphasis on the special nature of the Führer's visit, which was also expressed in the statements on the occasion of Mussolini's visit, comparison with earlier trips to Rome by Chiefs of State could be averted from the very beginning.

We should be grateful to you if you would make use of this line of reasoning in reply to inquiries with respect to a visit by the Führer to the Vatican.

WEIZSÄCKER

## No. 693

1620/387771-73

*The German Ambassador to the Holy See (Bergen) to the Head of the Political Department in the German Foreign Ministry (Weizsäcker)*

ROME, March 3, 1938.  
(Pol. III 744)

DEAR HERR VON WEIZSÄCKER: Many thanks for your friendly letter of February 26, Pol. III 548, regarding the question whether the Führer and Chancellor, on the occasion of his visit to Rome, would also make a visit to the Vatican. We shall not fail to use the point of view expressed in your letter in replies to inquiries on the subject.

The two sets of views and arguments prevailing in Roman circles for and against the visit to the Vatican have been repeatedly and very aptly described by the *Temps* correspondent here, most completely in the issue of February 6. I enclose the above-mentioned article<sup>67</sup> in case you are not familiar with it. He recites in the main the arguments that the Embassy also has for months been advancing to explain and justify the omission of a visit. These viewpoints, based on the settlement of the "Roman question," have doubtless not missed their mark here and have been termed legally irreproachable even in Vatican circles.

Despite all this, however, it is clear that, except for our opponents in the game here, in particular the French Ambassador, a visit to the Pope is still hoped for. This would also seem to be indicated by the fact that the program drafted by the Italian Government for the Führer's visit has, in accordance with previous practice, left one day open, which it is customary for Chiefs of State to use for a visit to the Vatican. One can also infer from the division of the program into two parts that the first part of the visit is to be regarded as one by the German Chief of State to the Italian Chief of State, and that consequently, despite previous reports to the contrary, the Führer will reside at the Quirinal. Not until the second part of the sojourn in Italy would the visit have the character of a meeting between the Führer of National Socialism and the Leader of Fascism. Characteristic of the view prevailing in diplomatic circles here is the comment of the Spanish Chargé d'Affaires at the Holy See to a member of the Embassy staff, that he regards the visit of the Führer to the Vatican as a matter of course.

In the Vatican, as I heard repeatedly and from the most diverse sources, they would welcome a visit by the Führer. It is even pointed out there that tension in relations between the Vatican and any other States has never constituted an obstacle to a visit of Chief of State to Chief of State; that, on the contrary, such a visit had always brought about a *détente*. At any rate, there is no doubt that the omission of a visit will mean a very distressing precedent for the Holy See, will be received as a decided mark of unfriendliness because of the lapse from previous usage, and will probably put a further strain on our already tense relations. It is also to be expected that, as previously indicated, the resultant increased tension will be exploited diplomatically to the full by our adversaries.

Nevertheless, in conversations with people here, I have always explained that, in view of the harsh and, in fact, often almost hos-

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<sup>67</sup> Not printed.

tile attitude of the Holy See, particularly in recent public announcements of the Pope, I could not advocate a visit of the Führer to the Vatican and that I would prefer it if an opportunity should arise at some later date for a thorough discussion that held good promise of success.

With best regards and Heil Hitler!

Your very sincerely,

BERGEN

[A marginal notation in Haidlen's handwriting reads as follows:]  
No action to be initiated for the present.

No. 694

1978/439426

*Memorandum*

(Pol. III 769)

Drafting Officer: Haidlen, Counselor of Legation.

Father Gehrman of the Nunciature called me up in order to ask what action had been taken on the memorandum from the Bavarian Conference of Bishops, handed to the Foreign Minister by the Nuncio on February 1,<sup>58</sup> and the note of February 6, addressed to Ambassador von Bergen by the Cardinal Secretary of State regarding the schools of the Catholic Orders in Bavaria.<sup>59</sup> The Nuncio was especially anxious to stress the fact that he was prepared to conduct the negotiations proposed in the concluding sentence of the said note.

I replied that the note had been transmitted to the competent domestic authorities for their reaction. In view of the great scope of the questions treated, it must be expected that the reply from the domestic authorities would not be forthcoming for some time. The matter would be kept in mind by us.

H[AIDLEN]

BERLIN, March 9, 1938.

Resubmitted: April 20

Resubmitted: June 1, 1938

Resubmitted: August 15

File. H[aidlen], August 15

<sup>58</sup> Not printed.

<sup>59</sup> Not printed. The note protested against the reduction or closing of a number of schools conducted by Catholic Orders or congregations in Bavaria on the ground that the action was a violation of the Concordat.

## No. 695

1620/387774

*Minute*

BERLIN, March 9, 1938.  
(Pol. III 770)

The Italian Counselor of Embassy today brought up the question whether, in connection with the Führer's visit to Rome, one had thought about the Curia in any way. From the remarks of Count Magistrati it was not evident whether he spoke under instructions or of his own initiative. He protested that he wanted to make no suggestions, but then nevertheless said quite plainly how very much Catholicism in Italy would be pleased if the German Government or the Führer should find it possible, perhaps before or during the journey, to make a gesture toward the Curia showing that the Führer was not entering Rome in an anti-Catholic frame of mind. It was true that in the past months there had been no overt hostility toward the Curia apparent in the German press or in acts of the German Government. Along with this negative side, however, there had been nothing positive. Magistrati seems also to have reported to Rome to this effect.

I answered the Counselor of Embassy in the sense of our instruction to Ambassador von Bergen, that the Führer's visit to Italy was a matter of returning Mussolini's visit of last year to Germany and was an action of a special kind since, in spite of the invitation extended by the Italian Sovereign, the Führer of National Socialist Germany was calling upon the Leader of Fascist Italy.

Magistrati confirmed this view and admitted that there did not seem to be any time left for an official act with respect to the Curia, but he repeated his views, as given above.

WEIZSÄCKER

## No. 696

969/302550

*The German Ambassador to the Holy See (Bergen) to the German Foreign Ministry*

Telegram

ROME (VATICAN), March 15, 1938—12:50 p.m.

No. 6 of March 14

Received March 15, 1938—3:10 p.m.

The Austrian Minister to the Vatican, Herr Kohlruss, called on me this evening in order to tell me that he had instructions to inform the Cardinal Secretary of State of the incorporation of

Austria into the German Reich and then place his Legation at the disposal of the Reich Embassy. I replied that I had to obtain instructions before taking further action. I request appropriate instructions.

The Cardinal Secretary of State merely took official cognizance of the notification. He will presumably take the formal position that the Holy See must reserve its stand until the plebiscite is carried out in Austria.

Herr Kohlruss, who, with words of emotion, expressed his deep joy at the union of all Germans, has always made it a point to maintain the best of relations with the Embassy and to express his . . . (group missing, perhaps "interest") in important events in Germany. Toward me he never concealed his sympathies for the movement. Prevented by his position from direct participation, he tried indirect means; for example, in order to help National Socialist refugees, he referred them to me and they then received assistance from me.

I suggest considering the transfer of Herr Kohlruss to the service of the Reich.

BERGEN

No. 697

1620/387776-77

*Memorandum by the Foreign Minister*

RM 201

The Apostolic Nuncio called on me today at 12:30 p.m. in order to communicate to me the following:

Austria's *Anschluss* had brought up the question of future representation of the Vatican in Vienna. He asked me to consider whether in future a member of the Berlin Nunciature—a priest—could take up residence in Vienna and whether, under these circumstances, the right of extraterritoriality both for his person and for his residence could be assured him by the German Reich.

I told the Nuncio that I was prepared to study the question. It seemed somewhat difficult to comply with this request, though, since in future we would in principle no longer have any diplomatic missions in Vienna.

The Nuncio then handed me the enclosed document dealing with an article in the semimonthly publication likewise enclosed.<sup>60</sup> In

<sup>60</sup> The enclosures do not appear with the file copy of this memorandum. The article referred to appeared in the publication *Wille und Macht*.

this article, entitled "Infallibility in Hatred," the person of the Pope is disparaged.

I replied to the Nuncio that the utterances of the Catholic Bishop of Chicago had at the time also affected us very unpleasantly here and that we further found the Christmas message of the Pope unfriendly. I was of the opinion that it would be a good thing to desist from attacks on both sides as far as possible.

The Nuncio then inquired further whether a reply to the note of the Nunciature, No. 448 of February 3, regarding educational matters in Prussia, etc., and another note, No. 489 of March 6 [*February 6*], regarding the schools in Bavaria,<sup>61</sup> would be forthcoming.

I promised the Nuncio to inquire about this.

The Nuncio then entered upon general discussions on the question of the Concordat, but stated that he did not wish to go into the matter further at the moment, since Herr Heide<sup>62</sup> had told him we wanted to give closer study to the matter.

RIBBENTROP

BERLIN, March 25, 1938.

### No. 698

533/238918

*The German Ambassador to the Holy See (Bergen) to the German Foreign Ministry*

Telegram

No. 15 of April 1

ROME, April 1, 1938.

Received April 1, 1938—8:45 p.m.

*Osservatore Romano* publishes this evening a short official notice to the effect that the declaration of the Austrian Episcopate was issued on its own initiative and the Holy See was not consulted in the matter either beforehand or subsequently.<sup>63</sup>

BERGEN

<sup>61</sup> Neither printed.

<sup>62</sup> A marginal notation reads as follows: "presumably Haidlen."

<sup>63</sup> The declaration by the archbishops and bishops of Austria, read in churches on March 27, 1938, had stated that "On the day of the plebiscite it will be for us bishops a national duty to declare ourselves, as Germans, for the German Reich and we expect also from faithful Christians a sense of their debt to their race." For text of the declaration, see *Survey of International Relations, 1938* (London, 1941), vol. 1, p. 246.

## No. 699

533/238920

*The German Ambassador to the Holy See (Bergen) to the German Foreign Ministry*

Telegram

No. 16 of April 2

ROME (VATICAN), April 2, 1938—2 p.m.

Received April 2, 1938—5:35 p.m.

I wired to Minister Wolf, Vienna, at his request, excerpts of the text of the Vatican radio broadcast regarding political Catholicism,<sup>64</sup> transmitted last evening by the D.N.B. representative here, as well as a translation of the complete text of the official communiqué in the *Osservatore Romano*. I request that you take under consideration, possibly after consulting with Cardinal Innitzer, counteracting through D.N.B. or a German radio broadcast the utterances of the Vatican radio station, which, even if they were not official, were undoubtedly inspired. In the natural effort to support and encourage Cardinal Innitzer and the Austrian bishops in their patriotic attitude, we must not let it appear as if we wanted to drive the Austrian Episcopate into conflict with Rome with the possible aim of inducing the former to found a national church. The situation of the bishops would thereby be rendered much more difficult, if not untenable.

BERGEN

## No. 700

533/238923

*The German Ambassador to the Holy See (Bergen) to the German Foreign Ministry*

Telegram

No. 20 of April 4

ROME (VATICAN), April 4, 1938—5:30 p.m.

Received April 4, 1938—9 p.m.

With reference to telegram No. 19 of April 3.<sup>65</sup>

In a rather long conversation today with the Cardinal Secretary of State, I pointed to the unrest, apprehensions, and ill feeling that had been engendered by the inopportune utterances of the Vatican broadcasting station. The Cardinal replied that he under-

<sup>64</sup> A report of this broadcast may be found in the *Times* (London) of April 2, 1938, and a summary in *Survey of International Relations*, 1938, vol. I, p. 248. The broadcast had noted the danger of churchmen falling under the influence of the mighty and successful figures of the day and abusing their doctrinal authority in attempting to convince the faithful of the truth of certain statements concerning only practical questions of political and social life.

<sup>65</sup> Not printed.

stood that the purely coincidental appearance of the communiqué in the *Osservatore Romano* (telegram 15 of April 1), for which he assumed responsibility and which contained only a statement of fact, at the same time as the observations of the Vatican broadcasting station might well have created the impression that the Vatican had somehow been responsible for the latter. But he most definitely assured me that these remarks, occasioned by the extremely unfriendly attacks of the *Schwarze Korps*, were neither official, nor semiofficial, nor inspired by the Vatican, and that the Pope also had nothing to do with them. The Vatican broadcasting station was not under the Secretariat of State, but was an autonomous institution with private functions. The Cardinal added in confidence that after this unpleasant surprise he would try to institute some control over the Vatican station. The Cardinal repeatedly protested his fervent wish for peace with Germany.

BERGEN

## No. 701

533/238931

*The German Ambassador to the Holy See (Bergen) to the German Foreign Ministry*

Telegram

URGENT

ROME, April 6, 1938—2:40 p.m.

No. 25 of April 6

Received April 6, 1938—4:30 p.m.

In continuation of my telegram No. 24 of April 6.<sup>67</sup>

Since Cardinal Innitzer's audience with the Pope and the subsequent conference with the Cardinal Secretary of State were very lengthy, I was able to speak to Innitzer only quite briefly before his departure. I took the opportunity to express to him—at our very first meeting after he was made a Cardinal he had made no secret of his Greater German attitude—my joy at the fact that his statements with respect to the forthcoming plebiscite were highly suited to advance the work of conciliation between State and Church.

I have the impression that the Cardinal, who seemed very exhausted from the conversations in the Vatican, had had a hard struggle there. In connection with the statement of the Austrian Episcopate I hear that the *Osservatore Romano* will, probably this

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<sup>67</sup> Not printed.

evening, publish a communiqué in which the protection of the rights of the Church and the faithful will be reiterated.<sup>68</sup>

BERGEN

### No. 702

533/238932

*The German Ambassador to the Holy See (Bergen) to the German Foreign Ministry*

Telegram

CONFIDENTIAL

ROME (VATICAN), April 6, 1938—6 p.m.

No. 26 of April 6

Received April 6, 1938—9:30 p.m.

In continuation of my telegram No. 25 of the 6th.

As I learned confidentially, the communiqué which is to appear this evening in the *Osservatore Romano* was wrested from Cardinal Innitzer with pressure that can only be termed extortion. Innitzer resisted to the utmost, but was able to effect only a few concessions. In this matter, too, the Pope had allowed himself to be swayed by his morbid irritation with Germany. I would suggest that continued confidence be placed in Innitzer and that he be supported.

BERGEN

### No. 703

533/238933

*Memorandum*

CONFIDENTIAL

BERLIN, April 8, 1938.

President of the Senate Greiser<sup>69</sup> came to see me on his return trip from Rome to Danzig in order to supplement his written report regarding his talk with the Cardinal Secretary of State by the following oral report: Pacelli had repeatedly and emphatically made plain to him, Greiser, the desire for a settlement between the Vatican and the Reich, and went so far as to state that he, Pacelli, was prepared to come to Berlin for negotiations, if it were so desired.

Greiser added that he had not, for his part, wished to commit this far-reaching statement of Pacelli's to writing.

WEIZSÄCKER

\* The statement by Cardinal Innitzer, which it was stated he was making in his own name and in that of the Austrian Episcopate, in order to remove uncertainties arising from the previous declaration by the Austrian bishops (see footnote 63, p. 1028) declared that the previous statement should not be understood as expressing approval of what was not in consonance with the law of God or the liberty and rights of the Catholic Church and that neither State nor Party should exploit it for propaganda purposes.

\* Arthur Greiser, President of the Danzig Senate.

## No. 704

533/238934

*Memorandum*

BERLIN, April 19, 1938.

The Italian Chargé d'Affaires spoke to me casually today about the course of German policy toward the Vatican. In so doing, he mentioned the false assertions in the French press of the past week, which were known here, to the effect that the Foreign Minister had discussed with the Nuncio here the German Vatican policy and a possible visit of the Führer to the Pope.

I told Count Magistrati that these French press reports were pure fantasy and, for my part, protested against the fact that the Italian press in the last few days had printed a report emanating from America, to the effect that the Führer intended paying a visit to the Pope.

WEIZSÄCKER

## No. 705

533/238935-38

*Proposal for a Note to the Vatican on the Nullity of the Reich Concordat, Using the Arguments Suggested by the Foreign Ministry on June 11, 1937*<sup>70</sup>

The differences of opinion that cropped up very soon after conclusion of the Reich Concordat on interpretation and execution of its provisions have in the past 4 years grown constantly in importance and bitterness. Developments have brought it about that in place of the friendly relations between the Reich and the Holy See which, in accordance with the will of both contracting parties, were to strengthen and advance the Reich Concordat, a condition has arisen in which it is impossible any longer even to speak of normal relations.

The Reich Government has therefore found it necessary to examine the problem of the relation between the German State and the Catholic Church in its entirety, over and above the various individual questions, with the object of remedying the present untenable condition. It has by this process arrived at the conviction that the continuation of the present method of discussion on the basis of the Concordat no longer promises success and that new bases must be found for the relations of the State to its

<sup>70</sup> This undated, unsigned draft may have been made in the Ministry for Ecclesiastical Affairs. Apparently it is one of a number of drafts. It was filed in the State Secretary's collection of papers on relations with the Holy See among papers dating from April to May 1938. No other copy has been found.

Catholic citizens, if the religious well-being of these citizens, which remains close to the heart of the Government of the German Reich, is to be secured.

In reviewing the tensions existing in the relations between State and Church, the Reich Government must very objectively and dispassionately establish the following facts as incontestable:

1. The internal political development in all fields affecting the relations of the Reich to the German states has created a situation which in 1933 could not be anticipated in its details and in its tempo, and which today can no longer be compared in any way to the situation existing at the time of the conclusion of the Concordat. The states have been divested of their sovereign rights, the executive as well as the judiciary has to a large extent been centralized. Although the development in this direction is not yet fully completed today, it is nevertheless certain that all the constitutional and factual prerequisites for a further justification and application of the concordats with the states, as provided for in article 2 of the Reich Concordat, have disappeared. It cannot, of course, be the intent and purpose of the Reich Concordat to obstruct the internal political development of the Reich or, in the special field of ecclesiastical policy, to maintain constitutional and political conditions which otherwise belong to the past.

2. The well-known criminal proceedings against members of the Orders and of religious societies have revealed conditions of which the Reich Government has heretofore not been even remotely aware. Without wishing to go into detail, the Government must state that if, when the Reich Concordat was concluded, it had had even a suspicion of the existence of such conditions it would have had to regard it as incompatible with its responsibilities toward the people and the State to give such extensive assurances with respect to the Orders and religious societies as are contained in articles 15 and 25 of the Reich Concordat.

3. In the field of education, too, conditions in Germany have become such that essential provisions of the Reich Concordat are deprived of their foundation. With the progressively increasing mixture of religious faiths in the German population resulting from the reorganization and expansion of communications, the unification of the Reich, the resettlement policy, and other things, the elementary school system in Germany can no longer be organized on principles of former times, when religious groups settled as units. And the persons entitled to education can no longer be granted that choice in questions of educational policy that article 23 of the Reich Concordat upholds, on the basis of the precedent established in article 146, paragraph 2, of the now defunct Weimar Constitution of the Reich.

4. Article 31 of the Reich Concordat, too, affirms notions and conditions of parliamentary democracy which have been overcome in Germany, such as the several-party system and the religious grouping of professional and labor organizations, principles which lapsed as a result of the building of the new German social order.

The past few years have made it more and more plain to the Reich Government that to conquer the political problems assumed by National Socialism requires rigid consolidation of the whole nation. It has become increasingly necessary to extend the influence of the State also to those fields that were formerly more or less left to the activity of private institutions. The realization that the vast work of reconstruction begun in Germany cannot be completed by the present generation but must be taken up and carried out by succeeding generations makes it incumbent upon the Reich Government to attend to the education and training of the whole rising generation in a manner consonant with the unity and solidarity of the German social community.

5. Over and above these individual problems, however, it has become more and more manifest that between the Reich Government and its organs, on the one hand, and the Holy See and the Catholic clergy in Germany, on the other, there is quite generally a wide divergence in the fundamental conception of the meaning and the purpose of the settlement envisaged by the Reich Concordat; indeed, on many important points, they are completely opposed to each other. Dispensing with polemical repetition of details, the fact remains that on questions of such decided significance as that of the obligation of the clergy to loyalty toward the State and the question of the dividing line between religious or pastoral and political activity, on both sides a difference in attitude has arisen which can now only be called open dissent with regard to the arrangements made.

In view of the situation presented above, both parties to the Reich Concordat must squarely face the fact that this compact, which was concluded years ago with the best intentions on both sides, is today obsolete and must therefore be regarded as void. Instead of providing a basis for peaceful and fruitful collaboration, it has become an instrument of dissension. The elimination of this condition, which is displeasing to both parties, requires that the well-being of the Catholic segment of the German people and the satisfaction of its religious needs be secured on a new basis.

To this end, the Government of the Reich will apply the following principles, in its solicitude for its Catholic citizens:

1. It will guarantee freedom of religion;
2. It will protect and encourage the pastoral activity of the clergy;
3. It will guarantee the support and training of priests;
4. It will guarantee the public corporate rights necessary for the existence of the parishes;
5. It will guarantee religious instruction in the elementary, intermediate, and higher schools;
6. It will permit freedom of development of the religious life in the parish.

## No. 706

1620/387782

*The German Ambassador to the Holy See (Bergen) to the German Foreign Ministry*

Nr. 107

ROME, May 5, 1938.  
Received May 7, 1938.  
(Pol. III 1474)

Subject: Attitude of the Vatican toward the state visit of the Führer and Chancellor to Italy.

The *Osservatore Romano* has thus far made no mention at all of the state visit of the Führer and Chancellor to Italy. But in its issue of May 5 (No. 104), it published an address which the Pope had delivered in yesterday's public audience and which contains an allusion to the decking-out of the Italian capital with flags in honor of the Führer and Chancellor. According to the report in the *Osservatore Romano*, the Pope declared that very sad things were happening both far and near, among them the fact that "it was not found too inappropriate and untimely, on the day of the Holy Cross, to raise another cross, which is not the Cross of Christ." This would suffice to show how necessary it was to pray and pray again that the mercy of God descend in full measure.

BERGEN

## D. A CONSISTENTLY NEGATIVE POLICY, MAY-SEPTEMBER 1938

## No. 707

1990/441309-10

*The Reich and Prussian Minister for Ecclesiastical Affairs to the German Foreign Ministry*

G II 2277/38

BERLIN, May 5, 1938.  
Received May 9, 1938.  
(Pol. III 1483)

Subject: Catholic Bishop Sproll of Rottenburg, Württemberg.<sup>11</sup>

Catholic Bishop Sproll of Rottenburg (Württemberg) on April 10, 1938, aroused the greatest indignation among all fellow Germans as the only nonvoter in the Rottenburg district, setting the worst example of civic conduct, for the Catholic element in par-

<sup>11</sup> The editors have omitted many papers concerning the numerous "routine" conflicts between the Vatican and Berlin. However, this and following documents on the Sproll case have been selected for inclusion as being typical of other such cases. Bishop Sproll had not participated in the plebiscite of April 10, 1938, or the "reunion" of Austria with the Reich.

ticular. By remaining away from the plebiscite—conduct which can only be considered a demonstration—he violated, in addition, the sense of the bishop's oath of loyalty, as set forth in article 16 of the Reich Concordat.

The Bishop was compelled to evade the just wrath of the people and leave his diocese. It is to be feared that, if he returns and makes a public appearance, unrest and demonstrations will again occur. The German police cannot be expected to protect a man who has disregarded his most fundamental obligations toward people and Führer from the crowds that turn against him in just indignation. Nor can the German authorities be expected to have any official dealings with a bishop who has in this way excluded himself from the social community. It is not to be expected that this bishop will ever be able to perform useful work in his diocese.

I therefore recommend that it be suggested to the Holy See, either through the Apostolic Nuncio or through the German Embassy at the Vatican, that it influence Bishop Sproll to resign from his diocese as soon as possible.

By direction:

MUHS

No. 708

1620/387794

*The German Ambassador to the Holy See (Bergen) to the State Secretary in the German Foreign Ministry (Weizsäcker)*

ROME, May 18, 1938.

(Pol. III 1673)

DEAR HERR VON WEIZSÄCKER: I hear confidentially—the information comes from a Cardinal—that Mussolini had the Pope sounded out with respect to a possible visit by the Führer, receiving the answer (after several Cardinals had been consulted) that he, the Pope, was prepared to return from Castel Gandolfo to Rome and receive the Führer there if the latter first made an agreed statement on the treatment of the Catholics and the Catholic Church. The Pope had definitely been counting on the visit of the Führer, from Florence, after conclusion of the official program.

To various feelers, I expressed myself in accordance with my instructions and left no room for doubt that a visit was out of the question. (The Cardinal Secretary of State avoided direct questions during our conversations, but evidently expected a statement from me.) I still hold to the view that the omission of the visit was not only implicit in the general situation but was also tactically

quite correct, despite the secondary effects which are temporarily unavoidable.

With best regards and Heil Hitler!

Yours very sincerely,

BERGEN

No. 709

1990/441313-14

*Memorandum*

BERLIN, May 18, 1938.  
(zu Pol. III 1483)

Drafting Officer: Dr. Haidlen, Counselor of Legation.

1) On a copy of this document,<sup>72</sup> insert:

"Copy respectfully transmitted to the German Embassy at the Holy See, Rome, for its information in continuation of our instruction—Pol. III 1254—of April 26."<sup>73</sup>

"Please inform the Holy See that, because of the untenable situation which Bishop Sproll created for himself through his behavior, in the opinion of the Reich Government it seems necessary that the Bishop should immediately renounce his episcopal see. In so doing, please refrain from referring to the Reich Concordat.

By direction:  
(Woermann)"

2) On separate copies of No. 1) insert:

"Copy respectfully transmitted to:

a) the Reich and Prussian Ministry for Ecclesiastical Affairs in reply to letter G II 2277/38, of May 5, for its information.

By direction:  
(Drafting Officer)

b) the Chief of the Security Police, Prinz Albrechtstr. 8, Berlin W. 11, with reference to letter of April 14—II B 1/574/38<sup>74</sup>—for his information.

By direction:  
(Drafting Officer)"

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<sup>72</sup> i.e., the letter of May 5, 1938, from the Minister for Ecclesiastical Affairs to the Foreign Ministry, document No. 707, p. 1035.

<sup>73</sup> Instruction not printed.

<sup>74</sup> Letter not printed.

## No. 710

1620/387784-86

*The German Ambassador to the Holy See (Bergen) to the German Foreign Ministry*

No. 117

ROME (VATICAN), May 23, 1938.

Received May 25, 1938.

(zu Pol. III 1645)

With reference to the instruction of the 18th, Pol. III No. 1521.<sup>75</sup>

The Vatican had expected that the Führer and Chancellor, in accordance with the customs heretofore observed by chiefs of state, heads of governments, etc., would pay a visit to the Pope, too, on the occasion of his presence in Rome; I understand that the Pope had hoped for that until the last moment. The omission of the visit deeply impressed him and further increased the deep displeasure with us already existing in the Vatican. The slighting of the Vatican led the latter to ignore the state visit outwardly and not to mention it at all in the *Osservatore Romano* (cf. reports No. 106 and No. 110 of April 30 and May 12<sup>76</sup>). The closing of the Vatican museums and galleries during the Führer's visit and particularly the Pope's complaint in his public discourse of May 4 that on the day of the Finding of the Holy Cross, swastika flags had been hoisted all over Rome, are indicative, too, of how much Pope Pius XI was offended by having been completely ignored (cf. report No. 107 of May 5). This complaint was leveled against the Italian Government, and the latter, as is evident from the answer given in the *Popolo d'Italia*, understood it as such and rejected it (cf. report No. 110 of May 12, pages 4-5). In Vatican circles the allusion of the Pope was interpreted to the effect that he did not intend to protest against the hoisting of the German national flag, but to express his regret that Christianity is being combated under the sign of the swastika.

There is no definite proof of the correctness of the report that the Holy See suggested that its Nuncio at the Quirinal not participate in official receptions and festivities in honor of the Führer. Such instructions would at any rate have been superfluous, because no invitations to the official festivities were sent to the diplomatic missions not directly concerned, just as, so far as I know, during Mussolini's visit to Berlin.

The Embassy, in accordance with your instructions, replied very clearly to a discreet and indirect inquiry that a visit by the Führer was out of the question. I myself, as is well known, expressed my-

<sup>75</sup> Not printed.

<sup>76</sup> Neither printed.

self in favor of omitting the visit, although I anticipated the effects; in view of the present German-Vatican tension and the repeated brusque statements of the Pope, omitting the visit appeared to me appropriate and the only dignified course.

It is another matter what our attitude toward the Vatican should be in the immediate future, and whether from considerations of foreign policy it does not appear advisable to avoid a break and to aim at tolerable relations with the Vatican in the foreseeable future, safeguarding our interests, of course, and upholding politically necessary rights. A decision on this question, if only as a guide to further action on pending affairs, appears indispensable to me. I should appreciate instructions on this subject.

BERGEN

No. 711

533/238939-44

*The German Ambassador to the Holy See (Bergen) to the State Secretary in the German Foreign Ministry (Weizsäcker)*

ROME, May 25, 1938.

DEAR HERR VON WEIZSÄCKER: The Reich Ministry for Ecclesiastical Affairs has again instructed the Reich office for foreign exchange control not to approve bills of exchange drawn in favor of the rector of the German Foundation here, S. Maria dell'Anima. The bills are in payment of sums which the German bishops owe him as representative of the German Episcopate at the Curia (report No. 12 of January 15, 1938<sup>77</sup>). The justification given is that: "The international organization of the Catholic Church, which draws money to Rome from all over the world for the most varied reasons, is undesirable for National Socialism and therefore cannot be recognized or supported by the New Germany through general grants of foreign exchange." (Instructions of February 19, 1938, Pol. III 550, and of May 17, 1938, Pol. III 1529.<sup>78</sup>) This decision was made after the Reich office had stated regarding the application that "in view of the favorable balance of the Miscellaneous Transfers account, there are no objections now to the requested transfer from the point of view of foreign exchange control." Consequently, the decisive factor in this matter was not our situation in regard to foreign exchange, but the objection of the Ministry for Ecclesiastical Affairs on a question of principle.

<sup>77</sup> Not printed.

<sup>78</sup> Neither printed.

Regarding the grounds given for this objection, I should like to state the following: If according to the statements of the Ministry for Ecclesiastical Affairs the international organization of the Catholic Church is "undesirable" for National Socialism, its actual existence nevertheless has to be taken into account. As is well known, the leading French policy makers also oppose the Catholic Church on principle. Nevertheless, particularly because of experience acquired during the period when relations were severed between France and the Vatican at the beginning of this century, they have recognized the necessity of good relations with the Holy See and after the resumption of diplomatic relations during the World War they cultivated them most meticulously. Their ideology, undoubtedly deviating substantially from that of the Catholic Church, did not prevent them from recognizing the universal Catholic Church's position of power in foreign affairs and its corresponding influence. Particularly during the war, non-Catholic countries, such as England in particular, reached the same conclusion. In spite of their views opposing the Catholic Church on principle, these countries considered it both advisable and necessary, from the point of view of foreign policy, to cultivate permanent friendly relations with this power. Not only Germany, but also other countries maintaining relations with the Vatican have had to defend themselves in the past and more recently against the interference of the Church with the domain of the State in domestic matters. This struggle between ecclesiastical and secular power has always existed, and it will always remain the task of the State to refer the Church to its proper place in domestic policy. However, for this reason the State, in my opinion, must not, unlike the rest of the world, incur the enmity of the great spiritual power of the Church, which definitely exists: the State should rather be anxious to make the influence of the Church and of its institutions serve the interests of the State in regard to foreign policy.

Thus, other countries have recognized the Catholic missionary organization as nearly indispensable to the cultural work in their colonies and therefore are endeavoring to exert their national influence upon the Orders and missionary societies as much as possible. It can hardly be denied that the German missionaries, even after the loss of our colonies, enjoy a very good reputation in the missionary countries, and have accomplished outstanding results there, not only as apostles of Christianity, but also as representatives of German culture, particularly in the Far East, and in many respects are still indispensable to us.

From a similar point of view we must also judge our German Foundations in Rome, and it appears erroneous to me if the Ministry for Ecclesiastical Affairs states that we no longer need them because the "care of Germans abroad, and the advancement of German culture abroad, have been taken over primarily by the *Auslandsorganisation* of the National Socialist Party on a much larger scale, and apart from all professional and religious differences." The advancement of German culture in the ecclesiastical National Institutes in no way interferes with the *Auslandsorganisation*, but it does appear as an important and necessary pillar of German influence in Rome's international atmosphere, which definitely exists.

It might perhaps be advisable to explain and expound the ideas sketched above to the Ministry for Ecclesiastical Affairs some time. In its decisions regarding Vatican and Roman ecclesiastical affairs only the "spirit that perpetually negates" can be discovered. Proposals of the Embassy are disposed of in short order, notes and complaints of the Curia are not answered at all, and the very few and exceptional answers are quite insufficient and biased; we owe the tension with the Curia, as well as the sharpness of the encyclical "*Mit brennender Sorge*," largely to the lack of respect that, according to diplomatic usage, this attitude implies. However, no positive work can be performed by a consistently negative attitude. It would therefore be desirable for the Ministry for Ecclesiastical Affairs to change now to the positive course I have suggested, for the treatment of the affairs with which we are concerned. The Ministry for Ecclesiastical Affairs should realize that we are not only surrendering to other countries (especially to France, which is particularly active in this respect) essential opportunities to influence events. More than that, the present religious situation in Germany inevitably has repercussions beyond the frontiers of Germany, and not only at the Vatican. It has great influence on our relations with foreign countries, even burdens them now. The Foreign Ministry must, therefore, have a decisive voice in this situation.

For these reasons it seems to me entirely wrong that we should assume an indiscriminately negative attitude toward the German clergymen active here. Instead, I should like to urge that we adopt a reasonable attitude. According to the experience of the Embassy, there is even among them quite a number of nationally minded men. It seems to me an absolute necessity to keep them in our camp, as well as, so to speak, to utilize them for our national aims. In the first speech which Minister President Göring delivered before the Germans in Rome, and which deeply impressed them, he stated

that the revolution also implied a change of spirit, a contest for souls, and the endeavor to interest and win for the new Reich those who thus far had remained aloof for some reason. The Embassy has endeavored to act and to seek recruits in accordance with this noble thought, and above all to win over the German priests at Rome. The accomplishment of this task is impaired by the serious tension in German-Vatican relations; however, I am happy and satisfied to state that the number of those who are not only seeking an approach to the new Reich, but who also desire to work for it is steadily increasing. The strong participation of the German priests at Gaeta in the plebiscite (cf. report No. 105 of April 25, 1938) is the best proof of this.<sup>79</sup> For this national activity, which appears natural to us, they are being reproached by the Roman priests of other nationalities and even by some of their own countrymen. They are being accused of "National Socialist infection," and are beginning to be harassed and to have obstacles placed in their way to an increasing extent. In my opinion, we have consequently the duty of helping the nationally minded priests, of strengthening those who are still wavering, and not discouraging, embittering, and alienating them by bad treatment and disappointments. In this connection especially I recommend giving favorable consideration to the two German institutes which are the centers of German Catholic life here, the *Campo Santo* and the *Anima*, and exerting influence upon the Ministry for Ecclesiastical Affairs to make certain that these places, for centuries centers of German culture, are preserved as going concerns and are supported in their national endeavors. Because of his outstanding qualities we should also try to make use—although with caution—of the well-known rector of the *Anima*, Bishop Hudal, who certainly not without just reason was severely criticized by Germans on many counts, but who, on the other hand, as an Austrian bishop, advocated a Greater Germany. He, as well as numerous priests, seeks to approach us; we should be willing generously to welcome all the genuinely sincere: those who are convinced, and those who are still searching.

In conclusion I should like to point out further that the statement by the Ministry for Ecclesiastical Affairs in its letter of January 5<sup>80</sup>—that the New Germany could not "recognize" and support the international organization of the Catholic Church by general grants of foreign exchange—can only be contrasted with the fact that

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<sup>79</sup> Report No. 105 not printed. The plebiscite was that on the unification of Austria with the Reich, held in Germany on April 10, 1938. For Germans outside the Reich special arrangements were made for casting ballots at earlier and later dates.

<sup>80</sup> Not printed.

through diplomatic relations with the Holy See and the Reich Concordat such recognition still exists and that to us it is not a matter of supporting the interests of the Holy See, but of German influence in this "international organization."

To describe the present attitude of the Vatican, I enclose a copy of my report No. 117 of May 23, 1938, as well as a copy of the report concerning the resignation of the Bishop of Rottenburg<sup>81</sup> desired by the Ministry for Ecclesiastical Affairs, in case they should not yet have reached you.

With best regards and Heil Hitler!

Sincerely yours,

BERGEN<sup>82</sup>

No. 712

1620/387795

*Memorandum on Matters Pending With the Vatican*

URGENT

JUNE 9, 1938.  
(e.o. Pol. III 1832)

Drafting Officer: Counselor of Legation Dr. Haidlen.

Complaints concerning the subjects enumerated below have been brought up by the Vatican or the Nuncio here; these complaints, in accordance with instructions, have been left pending thus far:

Reduction of Government subsidies to the Catholic Church in Bavaria and Saxony,

Introduction of public schools in Trier and Cologne,

Violation of the Baden Concordat by the Baden law of January 29, 1934, concerning elementary and advanced schools,

Closing of the Bishop's main office (Canisius House) in Düsseldorf,

Disciplinary punishment of priests because of their sermons,

Abolition of Catholic schools maintained by Orders in Bavaria,

Transformation of denominational schools into public schools in Prussia,

Abolition of Catholic schools in East Prussia,

Prohibition of religious instruction by Catholic priests,

Search of the offices of the Vicars-General of Cologne and Trier,

Start of general negotiations regarding the concordats.<sup>82a</sup>

In accordance with instructions, submitted herewith to the Foreign Minister.

BERLIN, June 9, 1938.

<sup>81</sup> Latter not printed.

<sup>82</sup> A marginal notation in Weizsäcker's hand reads as follows: "Herr Kessel: I should like to call on Minister Kerri and State Secretary Muhs in the near future and have a date set."

<sup>82a</sup> The last item has been added in an unidentified hand.

## No. 713

1990/441324

*The German Ambassador to the Holy See (Bergen) to the German Foreign Ministry*

Nr. 128

ROME, June 10, 1938.  
Received June 13, 1938.  
(Pol. III 1886)

With reference to the instruction of May 18, 1938, Pol. III 1483,<sup>83</sup> concerning Bishop Sproll.

I discussed the matter with the Cardinal Secretary of State, who could not be reached until today.

The answer of the Cardinal contains the arguments which I outlined in the second paragraph of my report No. 118 of May 23<sup>84</sup> and which he described as the arguments of the Bishop. The Cardinal, who was very reserved, according to all indications did not approve the Bishop's actions, but he remarked that according to reports he had received the participation in plebiscites was a voluntary act, and therefore no legal obligation had been violated.

In clerical circles the Bishop's conduct is called very inept, and the opinion is expressed that it would have been more expedient, although less honest, to participate in the plebiscite and to cast an empty ballot.

BERGEN<sup>85</sup>

## No. 714

533/238951-53

*Memorandum by the Foreign Minister*

RM 235

The Nuncio, who called on me today, first discussed the question of the fate of the present Nunciature in Vienna. He expressed the desire whether [*sic*] it would not be possible to transform the Nunciature into a kind of consulate, as the other powers had done. He had already called on the Foreign Ministry to this end, some time ago. I replied that this was a question of principle which appeared very difficult to me. I could make no promise whatever, but would examine it and in due time would send a reply.

<sup>83</sup> For content, see the Foreign Ministry memorandum of that date, document No. 709, p. 1037.

<sup>84</sup> Not printed.

<sup>85</sup> A marginal notation in Haidlen's handwriting reads as follows: "It is not stated above whether the Vatican will comply with our request for recall."

The Nuncio then touched upon his recent communication to the Foreign Ministry concerning the appointment of an administrator for the bishopric in Aachen. In this connection he mentioned that in cases of negative answers to proposals for the filling of vacancies we had never informed the Curia of the reasons for the rejection. This was not in accordance with international usage. Prior to submitting such proposals officially, he would gladly have a friendly discussion with us, and he asked to consider whether this course could not be taken. If, however, there were objections to this, he requested that henceforth a statement of reasons be included in negative answers. In this case, too, I promised examination of the situation.

Finally, the Nuncio asked me whether we could not resume conversations regarding a general settlement of the existing difficulties between the Third Reich and the Curia. I ended the rather long discussion which then ensued concerning the general situation of the Catholic Church in the world and in Germany, with the remark that at present many problems were still to be solved, and that it appeared to me that the time for such a settlement, which I considered possible some day, had not yet come. It was then agreed that we would have further discussions concerning this subject.

RIBBENTROP

BERLIN, June 10, 1938.

Respectfully submitted through:

State Secretary

Under Secretary

Head of Legal Department.

In his discussion with the Foreign Minister, the Nuncio, among other things, broached the following question:

In cases of negative answers to proposals of the Curia regarding the filling of vacancies no reasons for rejection were given (cf. RM 235). The Foreign Minister, if there were no special objections, would be inclined to make a concession to the Nuncio on this point.

BRÜCKLMEIER

BERLIN, June 13, 1938.

## No. 715

533/238954

*Memorandum*

BERLIN, June 21, 1938.

I told the Nuncio yesterday that his wish, expressed to the Foreign Minister on June 10, that a sort of consulate or branch office be maintained in Vienna, could not be complied with. The Nuncio then asked me to give him this answer of mine in writing with a statement of reasons for it, if no change could really be made in this decision. I reported to the Foreign Minister once more. A written refusal is now to be given.

Submitted herewith to the Protocol Department with the request that a letter be submitted.

WEIZSÄCKER

## No. 716

533/238948-49

*The State Secretary in the German Foreign Ministry (Weizsäcker)  
to the German Ambassador to the Holy See (Bergen)*

BERLIN, June 23, 1938.

DEAR HERR VON BERGEN: Without referring to the arguments contained in your letter of May 25, which reached me after some delay, I utilized them to make inquiries at the Ministry for Ecclesiastical Affairs regarding the views prevailing there at present. On the whole, I found that opinions actually do not differ very greatly. So long as our fight with the Catholic Church is not yet in the nature of a frontal attack, that Ministry—I talked with State Secretary Muhs—seems to be quite inclined to separate the sheep from the goats and not treat the German Catholic priests who desire to show their national convictions in the same way as the incorrigibles. Likewise I encountered much understanding regarding religious foundations, insofar as they represent German cultural interests.

Of course, as can be seen from Pacelli's note of June 14,<sup>86</sup> this does not mean that we may not become involved in a wider controversy with the Curia, in consequence of the actual situation in Austria, than is desirable for us at present. Of course, we are not in a position to stop the assimilation of Austrian laws to ours, particularly in the field of marriage, out of consideration for the former Austrian Concordat. On the contrary, it may be expected that a law regarding this subject will soon be enacted which will

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<sup>86</sup> Not printed.

challenge the Curia. Whether or not this will be the signal for a large-scale combat with the Curia (many people believe the Curia will now turn to the offensive) remains to be seen. At any rate, I believe that at the beginning of July we shall again hear more about ecclesiastical matters than fortunately has been the case in the last few months.

Best regards and Heil Hitler!

Yours very sincerely,

WEIZSÄCKER

*Prior to mailing*

TO THE FOREIGN MINISTER

State Secretary Muhs inquired whether a conversation could not be held regarding our policy toward the Vatican after Reich Minister Kerrl's return from his vacation in about one month. A report to the Führer on this matter by the two competent Reich Ministers appeared advisable to him.

W[EIZSÄCKER]

BERLIN, June 23, 1938.

No. 717

1990/441828

*The German Foreign Ministry to the German Embassy to the Holy See*

BERLIN, July 11, 1938.

(Pol. III 1886 II)

With reference to the telegraphic report of June 10, No. 128.<sup>87</sup>

The answer of the Cardinal Secretary of State to our request for the recall of Bishop Sproll is not considered satisfactory here, since the Cardinal Secretary of State refrained from any definite stand. I therefore respectfully ask that our request for the recall of Bishop Sproll from his diocese be presented to him once more.

By direction:

BISMARCK

<sup>87</sup> A number of the reports which the German Embassy to the Holy See sent to the German Foreign Ministry were forwarded telegraphically and in code, but are a part of the Embassy's report series rather than in its telegram series.

## No. 718

1620/387796-97

*The German Ambassador to the Holy See (Bergen) to the State Secretary in the German Foreign Ministry (Weizsäcker)*

ROME, July 15, 1938.

(Pol. III 2411)

DEAR HERR VON WEIZSÄCKER: Many thanks for your kind letter of June 23.

Pacelli, as I hear, made some very excited remarks about the fact that his note of June 14 regarding the Austrian Concordat had not yet been answered; the ignoring of letters from the Secretariat of State, which had become a habit, meant want of respect for the Vatican and violated the most elementary rules of diplomatic courtesy and international custom. If his most recent suggestion, to establish official contact and then to resume negotiations, did not meet with a response, he would make no further efforts; he would lay his hands in his lap and let things drift.

In the Secretariat of State they are beginning to occupy themselves with a protest—unavoidable for the Curia—against our new marriage law; the *Osservatore Romano* has already published two preliminary articles. I am curious about the argument and wording of the note but I do not believe it will form the point of departure for a bigger diplomatic offensive against us. A factor dangerous because of its unpredictable nature, however, is always the temperament of the very angry Pope; I hope he will not allow himself to be carried away again and make one of his injudicious attacks.

The numerous recent German visits offered me the opportunity for detailed conversations with prominent persons and their entourage regarding Vatican questions (only Herr Muhs thought that, without special authority from his Minister, he could not call on me or participate at a luncheon in honor of Ley<sup>88</sup>); my arguments followed the ideas described in my letter to you of May 25. I also frankly described the serious tension in German-Vatican relations, the dissatisfaction of leading persons, and the effects on foreign policy. The interest in Vatican affairs was obviously strong.

With best regards and Heil Hitler

Very sincerely yours,

BERGEN

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<sup>88</sup> Dr. Robert Ley, head of the German Labor Front and *Reichsleiter* of the political division of the Nazi Party.

## No. 719

1990/441336-39

*The Chief of the Security Police (Heydrich) to the Foreign Ministry*

Special Delivery Letter

II B 1-574 38

BERLIN, July 20, 1938.  
(Pol. III 2474)

Subject: Bishop Sproll of Rottenburg.

Reference: My report of April 14, 1938—II B 1-574/38.<sup>99</sup>

In continuation of my report of April 14, 1938, in which I reported the incidents in Rottenburg on the occasion of Bishop Dr. Sproll's abstention from the plebiscite on April 10, 1938, I wish to inform you that Bishop Sproll returned to Rottenburg on July 16, 1938. As the result of an accident, he had been in the Marienhospital at Stuttgart since May 17, 1938—a hospital which is run by Catholic Sisters. The Bishop informed the Reich Commissioner and the competent State Police authority of his intended return, pointing out that he was moving to his bishopric on express instructions from the Apostolic See, which had reached him via the Nuncio in Berlin.

The return of the Bishop resulted in a protest action by the Party. The competent State Police authority had been informed that the necessary preparations had been made and excesses were not to be feared.

On July 16, 1938, toward 6:30 p.m., a crowd numbering about 150 to 200 people, which was composed mainly of Party members from out of town and approximately 40 to 50 *Hitlerjugend* members from Rottenburg marched to the Bishop's palace through the adjoining streets. Here they formed choruses, shouting, among other things:

"A bishop for sale here, cheap!" "Who is a traitor? Bishop Sproll!" "We want a German bishop!"

The crowd also carried placards expressing similar sentiments. No participation of the population of Rottenburg in this demonstration could be observed. A crowd of about 100 curious people gathered before the Bishop's palace, however, and after dark grew to approximately 300 to 400 persons without actively participating.

Toward 10 p.m. approximately 100 persons, mostly members of the *Hitlerjugend*, forced their way into the palace, after two persons had gained entry into the palace through a little-known back door and had opened the main door to the wing of the palace. The crowd which invaded the palace searched the rooms for the Bishop

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<sup>99</sup> Not printed.

and forced open locked doors. The windows were smashed with stones, the beds were ransacked and thrown about in the bedrooms. Finally the crowd reached the palace chapel, the locked door of which was forced open. In the chapel, the Bishop was at prayer. Editor Haaga of the weekly *Die Flammenzeichen*, who was among the demonstrators, urged the Bishop to come along with him, as he wanted to discuss his conduct with him. He guaranteed the safety of the Bishop even at the risk of being mistreated by the crowd. The Bishop rejected this request and asked Haaga not to disturb him at prayer. After some demonstrators had passed the Bishop's hat from head to head, the crowd left the palace at the instance of a few SS members in civilian clothes, who had meanwhile been ordered there.

Thereupon an official of the State Police Headquarters went to the Bishop, again pointed out the threatening attitude of the crowd, and suggested that in his own interest he leave Rottenburg as soon as possible and take up residence outside his diocese. The Bishop refused, pointing out that he had returned to Rottenburg on express instructions from the Holy See and that this letter stated that the return was to be made even at the risk of physical or other molestation. At any rate, he would not leave Rottenburg voluntarily. They could hang him, beat him to death, or shoot him. He had expected the crowd to drag him away and kill him. Finally, he regretted that he was not given protection by the State.

Reich Commissioner and *Gauleiter* Murr, with whose approval the demonstrations against Bishop Sproll had been staged, stated that he strongly disapproved the excesses and that he had expressly pointed out previously that such excesses were to be avoided. The demonstrations would be continued by the Party during the next few days, but he would once more issue strict instructions to the effect that no such excesses must occur again.

On Sunday, July 17, 1938, an announcement regarding the incidents was read from the pulpits of the Catholic churches in Rottenburg, in which it was pointed out that the Bishop had suffered grave injustice, but that he had acted manfully. The faithful should behave like the Bishop in case of further excesses.

The Minister President as well as the Führer's Deputy and the Minister for Ecclesiastical Affairs have received the same report.

HEYDRICH

## No. 720

1990/441332

*Memorandum*

BERLIN, July 21, 1938.

(Pol. III 2457/38)

The Nuncio, leaving the enclosed memorandum,<sup>90</sup> today brought up the demonstrations which recently took place against the Bishop of Rottenburg. I told the Nuncio that these demonstrations only confirmed our opinion that the Bishop's position had become untenable, after he had abstained from voting. I reminded him of our demand for his recall. The Nuncio took an entirely negative position toward this. Among other things, he pointed out that the Bishop, as far as he was informed, had called upon the members of his diocese to participate in the election, and that, further, there was no obligation to vote. I told him the matter should not be considered from a purely legal point of view; politically, abstention was to be considered as a demonstration.

The Nuncio requested that the Bishop be protected against further demonstrations. The fact that the demonstrators had in part been brought from neighboring communities by truck showed that these were not spontaneous but organized demonstrations. And the periodical *Flammenzeichen*, the editor of which had participated in one of the demonstrations, had continuously incited the population against the Bishop.

WOERMANN

## No. 721

1990/441334

*Memorandum for the State Secretary Regarding Bishop Sproll*

(Pol. III 2457 Ang. I)

Drafting Officer: Counselor of Legation Dr. Haidlen.

Our request that Bishop Sproll of Rottenburg be recalled was brought up by Ambassador von Bergen for the first time on June 10, 1938, in a conversation with the Cardinal Secretary of State, who gave no clear answer.

On May 18 Bishop Sproll informed Reich Commissioner Murr that the Pope had instructed him to return to his diocese. Accordingly, he had returned to Württemberg, staying mainly in the Marienhospital in Stuttgart. According to information from the

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<sup>90</sup> Not printed.

Reich Commissioner, Sproll, upon instructions from the Vatican, returned to his bishopric in Rottenburg on July 15.

Ambassador von Bergen, by written instruction of July 11, was again ordered to urge the recall of the Bishop. A report regarding the execution of this instruction has not yet been received.

The fact that the Vatican on or about July 15 ordered Bishop Sproll to return to Rottenburg, as well as the Nuncio's attitude during his visit on July 21, indicates that for the time being the Curia does not intend to recall Sproll. A draft of telegraphic instructions to the Ambassador at the Holy See is in preparation.

BERLIN, July 23, 1938.

### No. 722

1990/441345-48

#### *The German Ambassador to the Holy See (Bergen) to the German Foreign Ministry*

No. 163

ROME, July 26, 1938.  
(Pol. III 2559)

For the State Secretary.

In reply to your telegram No. 29 of the 25th.<sup>91</sup>

Instruction Pol. III 1886 of the 11th reached me only yesterday by courier.

The Curia's stand was explained in reports 118 and 128 of May 23 and June 10 respectively.<sup>92</sup> The Vatican is still of the opinion that Bishop Sproll did not violate the law, that the demonstrations were artificially staged, and that nothing had been done by the competent authorities for the protection of the Bishop. Even major criminals are customarily protected against spontaneous mob violence. I should therefore appreciate the additional information requested in report 118. I know nothing of the demonstrations to which the Nuncio again objected.

I recently learned that the Pope is said to have stated that the complaints against Bishop Sproll had not given proof of unlawful behavior and that he therefore did not intend to order the Bishop's resignation. This should also explain Sproll's return to Rottenburg.

I pointed out to the Cardinal Secretary of State that in the opinion of the Government no useful activity by the Bishop or cooperation with the authorities of the State and the Party was possible. He has therefore been warned. However, I consider it more expedient not to force the matter and to refrain from demand-

<sup>91</sup> Not printed.

<sup>92</sup> Former not printed.

ing the Bishop's recall, since it would only increase the resistance of the Curia; it would rather be advisable, not so much by demonstrations as by completely sidetracking and ignoring the Bishop and by discontinuing all personal and written communication with him, to show the Curia practically that the position of the Bishop has actually become untenable and that it is in the interest of *the Church* to bring about his resignation. I shall continue to prosecute the matter here accordingly, but I recommend explaining this to the Nuncio there, too. Thus, we also prevent the Bishop from getting the halo of a martyr.

SECRET. In addition to the objective and tactical objections against forcing the issue there are the following considerations. I learned secretly from private sources that at present negotiations are pending between representatives of Reich Commissioner Bürckel<sup>93</sup> and the Austrian Episcopate which aim at reaching a *modus vivendi* in Austria by way of mutual declarations, i.e., by the Party and the bishops. The Pope is said to have objected at first, but later on to have approved the draft of the declaration of the Austrian bishops which was amended here, provided the declaration to be made by the Reich Commissioner was changed. I do not know any details—the matter is being treated as secret here—but the Cardinal Secretary of State seems to want a statement included regarding the Austrian Concordat. These negotiations strike me as important; a favorable result could relieve the situation. The Vatican is unquestionably ready for peace. I should therefore like to avoid, on the side of the State, injection of unnecessary disturbing elements in these negotiations. In view of the extraordinary tension in German-Vatican relations I consider it opportune not to make matters of secondary importance, which can be settled by different means, the subject of new and serious conflicts.

BERGEN

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<sup>93</sup> Josef Bürckel, at this time Reich Commissioner for Austria.

## No. 723

1990/441349

*The German Ambassador to the Holy See (Bergen) to the German Foreign Ministry*

Nr. 167

ROME, July 30, 1938.  
(Pol. III 2708)

For the State Secretary.

In continuation of report No. 163 of the 26th.

From confidential sources I learn that Bishop Sproll declared his willingness to the Holy See to resign "for reasons of health." The Pope refused the offer and instructed the Bishop to return to his diocese. In addition to the reasons mentioned in . . . (group missing)<sup>94</sup> this decision was also motivated by the fear that such a far reaching and quick concession would create a dangerous precedent which, in the last analysis, would redound to the disadvantage of the Vatican by encouraging the anti-Church elements to proceed similarly in other dioceses and oust undesirable priests by the convenient device of staging demonstrations against them. The Pope's attitude confirms my opinion that the Bishop's recall could best be achieved by suspending all official relations and ignoring him.

The secret negotiations between the representative of Reich Commissioner Bürckel and the Austrian Episcopate as well as the Cardinal Secretary of State and the Pope are continuing. Difficulties seem to have arisen from the fact that the Cardinal Secretary of State wishes to include additional matters in the official declaration of the Party and that the bishops demand prior cessation of unlawful measures of lesser authorities. Unfortunately, my informant has left Rome for several weeks, as is the custom of Italian priests in summer.

BERGEN

## No. 724

533/238957-58

*Memorandum*

BERLIN, August 4, 1938.

With regard to the question of establishing a diocese in Innsbruck, the Ministry for Ecclesiastical Affairs was first asked for an expression of opinion. Unless the domestic authorities, particularly the Reich Commissioner in Vienna, assume a different attitude,

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<sup>94</sup> The report appears to have been sent telegraphically and in code. See footnote 87, p. 1047.

probably the Nuncio should be told that we intend to defer the question for the moment. The only argument for the establishment of the diocese would be that in the relations between Germany and the Vatican, which are taking an entirely negative course, for once something positive would be achieved, and in connection with a question which implies no concession in principle. In this matter questions of the Concordat could perhaps be avoided; that this corresponds to the attitude of the Vatican, too, is a conclusion that can be drawn from the desire of the Curia to negotiate again regarding a question the principle of which was already settled in the Austrian Concordat.

An argument against this, however, is the fact that the establishment of a diocese in Innsbruck would mean a further step in the advance of the Catholic Church in Austria which was started in the Dollfuss era. Fulfillment by the Reich Government of the promise made in the Concordat signed by Dollfuss and Schuschnigg would probably not be understood in Austria.

According to a confidential report from our Ambassador to the Vatican,<sup>95</sup> negotiations are said to be pending between representatives of Reich Commissioner Bürckel and the Austrian Episcopate, which aim at reaching a *modus vivendi* in Austria by means of statements from both parties. We have no information from German sources regarding this matter; inquiries have been started. We should wait to see whether the question of the diocese of Innsbruck might perhaps become important in this connection.

Conclusion: First await the opinion of the domestic authorities; if they have no wishes to the contrary, inform the Nuncio that we considered it more appropriate not to discuss the question in detail "at the present time."

Submitted through the State Secretary to the Foreign Minister.

WOERMANN

No. 725

1990/441352-53

*Memorandum*

VERY URGENT

BERLIN, August 15, 1938.  
(Pol. III 2882)

A conversation regarding the case of Bishop Sproll in Rottenburg was held at the office of Reich Minister Kerrl today. Reich Minister Kerrl called the conference apparently because the Führer's attention, too, had been called from various quarters to the demonstra-

<sup>95</sup> Document No. 723, *supra*.

tions and excesses against the Bishop. The conference was attended by State Secretary Muhs, Reich Commissioner Murr, the official of the Ministry for Ecclesiastical Affairs who was dealing with the subject, and myself.

Reich Minister Kerrl analyzed the situation by stating that the excesses against the Bishop were undesirable, but that the affair could not simply end with a victory of the Vatican, after the latter had refused to recall Sproll.

There was general agreement that the excesses should cease. Appropriate instructions have already been given.

Regarding further steps, there was agreement that renewed steps with the Vatican would not lead to success. Therefore, two courses were discussed: either a boycott of the Bishop by all State and Party authorities with simultaneous continuation of the demonstrations, which should not be permitted to lead to excesses; or a prohibition for Bishop Sproll to reside in the area of the State of Württemberg, which coincides with his diocese.

Unanimity was reached on the decision that the second course should be taken. An argument against the first course is that, as was generally acknowledged, demonstrations cannot be continued for years and that therefore outwardly the Church would have been victorious.

The measure will be carried out by first asking the Bishop whether he is willing to leave Württemberg voluntarily; if he should refuse this, he would be quietly removed from the State of Württemberg by officials of the Gestapo.

Outside of Württemberg, the Bishop shall then remain unmolested. The fact of the residence ban shall be published only in the Württemberg press, which is to refer to the history of the case, and to mention that the Vatican had not taken any action on the request for recall. The Foreign Ministry is to cooperate in drafting the communiqué.

Should the Foreign Minister not agree to this procedure, Reich Minister Kerrl would like to have a personal discussion with him immediately. At any rate, particularly because the Führer's attention had been drawn to the case, he would have a short telephone conversation on the matter with the Foreign Minister on Tuesday (August 16).

WOERMANN

## No. 726

1990/441356-57

*The Reich Minister for Ecclesiastical Affairs (Kerrl) to the Reich Minister for Public Enlightenment and Propaganda (Goebbels)*

August 17, 1938.

Subject: Bishop Sproll of Rottenburg (Württemberg).

Ever since Bishop Sproll refused to cast his vote on April 10, 1938, being the only citizen in the district of Rottenburg and presumably the only German bishop to do so, the population of Württemberg has expressed its indignation in repeated public demonstrations. Unfortunately, it must be admitted that during these demonstrations the necessary reserve was not always maintained. In order to restore quiet and order in the State of Württemberg, I have found myself compelled to obtain a ban against residence in Württemberg by Bishop Sproll.

It is necessary to inform the population of the State of Württemberg of these events. I should like to request that on the morning after the residence ban has been carried out, you have the following note published in the Württemberg press:

"During the election of April 10, 1938, in which the German people with unanimous enthusiasm expressed to the Führer its gratitude for and endorsement of his policy, by means of which Greater Germany was created, Catholic Bishop Sproll in Rottenburg—as is well known—was the only citizen of the district who considered it appropriate to remain away from the election. Even before this fact became known, on the eve of election day, the Bishop left his diocese in order to evade the understandable and justified indignation of the people at his irresponsible behavior.

"Whenever he has returned and appeared in public the population of Württemberg has expressed its indignation at the behavior of the Bishop in repeated demonstrations.

"Thus far, the Holy See has not complied with the repeated request by Germany that it suggest to Bishop Sproll that he resign from his bishopric for the sake of quiet and order in State and Church.

"In the interest of restoration of quiet and order and in view of the fact that a bishop cannot be tolerated who grossly violates his civic duties, the competent authorities have issued a residence ban against the Bishop for the State of Württemberg, after he refused to give up his diocese of his own accord."

KERRL<sup>98</sup>

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<sup>98</sup> A marginal notation in Woermann's handwriting reads as follows: "I informed Counselor Roth of the Ministry for Ecclesiastical Affairs that the Foreign Minister agrees to the intended measure. Today Counselor Roth brought me this draft in which I have concurred."

## No. 727

1978/439527

*The Reich Minister for Ecclesiastical Affairs to the Reich Minister  
for Science, Education, and Public Instruction*

G II 5899/38

BERLIN, September 26, 1938.

Subject: *Note verbale* of the Apostolic Nunciature of June 18, 1938,  
regarding school policy in Bavaria.<sup>97</sup>

I am returning the draft of a reply to the Apostolic Nunciature, E II a No. 2046/38 Z II a. I agree with the statements made, but have not added my signature. I recommend that the *note verbale* of the Apostolic Nuncio of June 18, 1938, not be answered for the time being. In view of the anti-German attitude of the Vatican, which manifested itself particularly during the visit of the Führer to Rome, we have recently not answered notes from the Vatican and complaints of the Nunciature, as a general rule, even in matters which were more important than matters of school policy in Bavaria.

By direction:

DR. MUHS

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<sup>97</sup> Not printed.

## CHAPTER VII

### GERMANY AND THE GREAT POWERS OF WESTERN EUROPE, MARCH-AUGUST 1938

#### A. ITALY BETWEEN GERMANY AND THE WESTERN DEMOCRACIES, MARCH-APRIL 1938

No. 728

F14/007-008

#### *Memorandum for the Führer*

RM 168

The Italian Counselor of Embassy, Count Magistrati, called on me at 12 o'clock today and informed me of the following:

The Anglo-Italian negotiations had meanwhile been taken up. The British Ambassador at Rome, the Earl of Perth, upon instructions from his Government had suggested that the following points be placed on the agenda for the negotiations:

*1. Reduction of Italian armed forces in Libya.*

The Italian Foreign Minister had refrained from taking any position regarding this proposal. However, he had pointed out that the increased concentration of Italian troops in Libya was not the cause but only the result of Anglo-Italian tension. To my question whether in the event of an Anglo-Italian *détente* a reduction of Italian armed forces would be considered, Count Magistrati replied that this was not out of the question. At any rate, it was possible.

*2. Italy's adherence to the London Naval Treaty of 1936.*

Count Ciano had reserved his final decision on this point, too.

*3. No anti-British policy in Palestine.*

Count Ciano had received this proposal with the greatest reserve.

*4. No changes in the status quo in Arabia and on the Red Sea.*

Italy had not yet made any decision on this demand either, nor on

*5. The British demand for the discontinuance of all anti-British propaganda.*

*6. Spain. England desired only the withdrawal of the foreign volunteers.*

On this point, too, Count Ciano had reserved the right to make a decision later.

*7. Recognition of the conquest of Abyssinia.*

In case of a settlement of the remaining points of the program, the British Government had declared its willingness to insure that the difficulties standing in the way of recognition by the League of Nations would be removed, and that it would then extend this recognition on its part.

I informed Count Magistrati in broad outline of the conversations which I conducted in London.<sup>1</sup>

RIBBENTROP

LONDON, March 17, 1938.

No. 729

3153/605886-99

*Memorandum*

BERLIN, March 29, 1938.

(Pol. IV 2375)

At his request, I called on the Italian Ambassador at his home last night. (As a result of his illness the Ambassador is still not able to get about much.) Referring to my impending trip to Rome, M. Attolico remarked that as a colleague and friend he wanted particularly to impress upon me a matter which required our fullest attention. If during my first meeting with the Duce and Count Ciano I could take the opportunity of making reassuring statements regarding this subject, he would consider it a particularly fortunate beginning.<sup>2</sup> Moreover, the situation was such that, quite independently of my taking over the Embassy, it would have a good effect if Germany decided on certain measures. To be specific, it was the question of the South Tyrol. He was telling me nothing new if he said that Italy's acquiescence [*Sich abfinden*] in the events of March 13 was possible only with a man like Mussolini. What had happened was by no means popular in Italy. We should therefore meet this situation by counteracting a source of danger that was undeniably developing. I remarked that the letter and the telegram from the Führer and Chancellor to Mussolini,<sup>3</sup> as well as the Führer's other statements regarding the Brenner border, which were unequivocal in every respect, surely offered absolute security to the Italians in this question. The Ambassador replied that it was not a question of Mussolini or of responsible people in Rome, who knew the real situation, but of the broad masses of

<sup>1</sup> See chap. I, pp. 253-277.

<sup>2</sup> Mackeusen had been appointed Ambassador to Italy, but had not yet assumed his post.

<sup>3</sup> Document No. 352, p. 573.

the Italian people; with them in mind, he could only suggest very seriously that certain propaganda in favor of the return of the South Tyrol to the Reich be discontinued as quickly as possible. After my interjection that a case recently mentioned by Count Magistrati in this respect had immediately been investigated by us and that this investigation had furnished no evidence whatever of such propaganda, M. Attolico handed me the enclosed memorandum, which, he said, contained the material that Count Ciano had sent to him only yesterday on this question. The memorandum described some incidents which had been verified beyond any doubt. The serious thing about them was that, even if the German Government was not behind these incidents, surely some Party office or other was, and, contrary to the clear policy of the Führer, was thus injecting into German-Italian relations elements of discord which might have the most serious consequences. In this connection the Ambassador mentioned a "headquarters" which was not known to him definitely; it was said to be located at Dresden, and was engaging in activities which gave rise to serious misgivings. He particularly stressed also the case of the Stecher Clinic, mentioned at the end of the memorandum.

I replied to the Ambassador that we would, of course, investigate the incidents described by him, as we had recently done as a result of a communication from Count Magistrati. However, I could not believe that, if such incidents had really occurred, they originated with Party officials, none of whom would dare to disturb the development of the Führer's policy, which was clear and generally known. I was nevertheless very grateful for this hint, because it afforded me an opportunity to request specifically from the Foreign Minister instructions which I could then use in my conversations with the Duce and Count Ciano.

I had the impression that the Italian Ambassador not only takes the matter very seriously himself, but made his statements as Count Ciano's mouthpiece, although he repeatedly characterized them as a mere hint from a friend and colleague.

MACKENSEN

[Enclosure]\*

(Pol. IV 2375)

It is difficult to determine how the report that Italy had ceded the South Tyrol to Germany outright was disseminated in Austrian territory. The fact is that on the afternoon of Friday the 11th the incredible story of the unconditional cession of the South Tyrol spread like wildfire in Salzburg, Linz, and Innsbruck. According to a well-informed source, the Austrian telegraph offices disseminated this report among themselves through private channels, which did not, however, prevent its becoming known immediately everywhere—in public places, in offices, and in families. Denied, confirmed, exaggerated, it was enthusiastically received by everyone, particularly in South Tyrol circles. According to official statistics, the native South Tyrol population residing in the Tyrol amounts to 5,000 people, of whom at least 3,000 reside in Innsbruck. The majority of these people, however, are of Austrian nationality, for which they opted in accordance with the provisions of the Treaty of St. Germain; only a small minority is Italian, or at least in possession of Italian passports, although it is definitely German in sentiment and strongly opposed to our country and Fascism. Among these people and in this particular atmosphere the report was easily accepted, because of the psychosis of the moment and the state of exaltation created by events. The entry of the German troops and the report of troop units marching up the highway to the Brenner Pass served to increase the state of excitement among the people, who thronged the streets and public squares. There were extraordinary scenes; the report, which went from mouth to mouth, caused enthusiasm everywhere. The people embraced each other, and shouts of "Long live Hitler," "Long live Mussolini," and "Long live Italy" could be heard from the jubilant crowd. In the late afternoon dense crowds gathered under the balcony of the Government Building; another group, among it many South Tyrolese, went up to the Italian Consulate General, where Consul Rotini and the officials had to make strenuous efforts to convince the excited crowd. In the meanwhile, the demonstration under the windows of the Government Building, where a few hours before the new Governor had been installed, assumed such proportions that the latter at last addressed the crowd, denying most categorically the report of the cession of the South Tyrol and threatening with severest reprisals persons who spread this tendentious report. The

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\* Translated from the Italian.

A marginal notation reads as follows: "Handed to me this evening by the Italian Ambassador. M[ackensen], March 28."

crowd refused to believe this; the words of the Governor, however, had the effect of a cold shower. The arrival of motorized police detachments restored quiet. However, all evening in public places and in their homes, the people spoke of nothing else.

A really extraordinary scene occurred about halfway up the national highway leading to the Brenner Pass. Italian Consul Rotini, who had been on an official trip to the frontier and was returning to Innsbruck in his automobile, met a column of cars full of excited people shouting and waving swastika flags and Italian flags. They were people from the South Tyrol who were now convinced that the South Tyrol had been ceded to Germany and were on their way to the frontier. Our officials had to make every effort here to prove the contrary.

German military authorities have accused Catholic circles of having spread the report for the purpose of disturbing relations with Italy, and the official report regarding the matter in the press confirms this. As a matter of fact, however, nothing concrete has been proved in spite of the arrest of a number of persons. The official report by *Gauleiter* Denze says that in spite of a thorough investigation it has not been possible to ascertain the actual source of the rumors put in circulation. However, this much is sure—the report reached Innsbruck by wire from Salzburg.

At any rate, these facts show the extreme delicacy of the situation now created at the gates of Italy. The presence of so many natives of the South Tyrol, a large proportion of whom migrated to Austria after we had taken possession—obviously for political reasons—constitutes a problem of exceptional importance. It must be observed very closely, because of the wide repercussions it might have. In fact, it cannot be denied that all these people have maintained relations of kinship and family and important interests on this side of the border. The idea of the South Tyrol's liberation hitherto has been kept alive by a subtle propaganda which originated from Berlin rather than Vienna. Although there was little hope, the spirit of revenge has been kept alive, and the Irredentists never renounced their aspirations. Pan-German propaganda has been active, and the agitators have always found favorable terrain here.

The future of these people is difficult to foresee, but it may be presumed that the union between Austria and Greater Germany will raise even greater hopes and will provide material for maneuvers against our country.

Germany officially denies the existence of any South Tyrol problem; however, this does not prevent special offices from organizing a propaganda network, the effects of which are evident and well

known to our higher authorities in the South Tyrol. It would certainly be interesting to know the reasons for the presence in Innsbruck of the notorious Bossi Fedrigotti in the last few days. He has been seen by many people in the company of Bavarian police officers.

There is no doubt, therefore, that the German propaganda in the South Tyrol will be secretly favored and supported.

Meanwhile the Nazi legions in the various cities and even some units of Bavarian mountain troops have been singing a very significant refrain in the streets of Innsbruck, Salzburg, and Linz: "One, two, three, the Tyrol's free." This allusion was so widely understood to be aimed at the South Tyrol that the Nazi authorities duly and strictly prohibited the song.

At the same time, reports from very reliable sources confirm that *Gauleiter* Dr. Egon Denze clearly admitted in one of the first meetings relating to the directives for the plebiscite in the Tyrol, that "it will be necessary to exploit to the limit all political factors which may insure the outcome of the vote, including Tyrolese aspirations for the South Tyrol."

As an example, the following case is added:

At Bad Kreckelmoos, approximately half an hour from Reutte (near the old Austro-German border), there is a clinic the head of which is a certain Dr. Stecher. The clinic specializes in various diseases, particularly intestinal diseases. It is a sanatorium and at the same time difficult operations are performed there. Until a few days ago, Dr. Stecher had an assistant who is either of Ladin origin or has a Ladin name. The latter comes from the South Tyrol and has an Italian passport. After the entry of the German troops into Austria the individual in question, whose name is not yet known, believed it to be in his own best interest to become a German citizen. He went to Munich and solicited the intervention of the authorities of the Nazi Party in order to obtain German citizenship in the shortest possible time. But the Party authorities not only refused to help him and pointed out to him that his idea of being able to increase his professional activities by changing his nationality was mistaken, but also urged him strongly to remain an Italian citizen, revealing that he was on the list of select intellectuals who will be charged from now on with the work of propaganda in the South Tyrol. As a result of the meeting with the Nazi authorities of Munich, the above mentioned doctor has resigned from his position with the sanatorium at Bad Kreckelmoos and placed himself at the disposition of the National Socialist Party.

From this and other indications it appears that the propaganda for the South Tyrol has been placed on a basis essentially different from that in the past.

## No. 730

3153/665901

*Memorandum From the Office of the Foreign Minister to the Head of the Political Department, via the State Secretary*

(zu Pol. IV 2375)

The Foreign Minister has taken note of the enclosed memorandum on Ambassador Attolico's *aide-mémoire* written in Italian.<sup>6</sup> He would appreciate an investigation to determine whether the complaints made by M. Attolico are justified. The Foreign Minister requests that, in accordance with the Führer's instructions, the severest measures be taken against all circles acting contrary to the policy of the Reich in regard to the question of the South Tyrol. He requests a report on the measures taken.

ERICH KORDT<sup>7</sup>

BERLIN, March 29, 1938.

## No. 731

580/241917-19

*The German Foreign Ministry to Various German Diplomatic Missions<sup>8</sup>*

BERLIN, March 31, 1938.

(Pol. X 1113)

In continuation of the instruction of November 11, 1937, Pol. X 4323.<sup>9</sup>

I am enclosing a memorandum<sup>9</sup> of an address delivered by Lord Noel Buxton, a member of the British House of Lords, at the invitation of the *Auslandsclub* in Stuttgart on March 10—i.e., prior to the Austrian events—on the subject of Germany's colonial claims.

These statements are deserving of attention, inasmuch as there are various indications that similar views have been under dis-

<sup>6</sup> The enclosure to document No. 729, p. 1060.

<sup>7</sup> A marginal notation in Mackensen's handwriting reads as follows: "The Foreign Minister, to whom I reported the matter orally yesterday, above all wishes to have the identity of 'Gauleiter Denze' (p. 3 of Attolico's memorandum) established."

<sup>8</sup> List of addressees not printed.

<sup>9</sup> Not printed.

cussion in British Government circles. To that extent the address by Noel Buxton may be considered a trial balloon designed to bring a British colonial program before the German public.

In this program, the principle that the colonial question can be solved only in connection with other current questions is known to us. We may assume that among such questions the British also have in mind subjects in the field of limitation of armaments.

More important, however, than these general political intimations are the statements pertaining to the satisfaction of our claim itself. According to these statements, there is no inclination on the part of the British to solve the question in the simplest manner by re-establishing the *status quo ante*, that is, by returning all our prewar colonies. In the opinion of Lord Buxton this is particularly true with regard to our possessions in East Africa. To compensate for these possessions, the idea of an exchange of territory in Central Africa is being considered, the extent of which, however, is not given in detail. Even here there is no thought, according to the present statements, of restoring or establishing unlimited German sovereignty in particular Central African territories, but rather of an international regime which is to be based on the fundamental principles of the Congo Acts of 1885 and to extend approximately over the Congo Basin as understood in those Acts. The nations participating in the administration of this territory are to assume obligations in accordance with the idea of trusteeship for the benefit of the natives, an idea which appears constantly in modern British colonial theory. Questions such as the legal position of the natives, their cultural development, and native industry, among others, are to be subject to an international agreement and to international control; and the principle of free and equal economic opportunity is likewise to be guaranteed in this territory.

In case similar ideas are expressed there, I request that you call attention, as described in detail in the above-mentioned instruction, to the fact that we are advancing a legal claim to the return of all our colonies, and that we make no claim whatever to any but our own former colonial territories. Nor could we for the present imagine that countries which exercise sovereignty over colonial territories in Central Africa would allow themselves to be persuaded by the British Government to return these territories to an international regime.

Finally, if at the time Noel Buxton delivered his address, the British were influenced in part by the idea of diverting Germany from other problems by the introduction of the colonial question, the answer would be that the solution of the colonial question is

not of such pressing importance to us, from the point of view of time, that we would be forced to show interest in a partial or unsatisfactory solution.

WEIZSÄCKER

### No. 732

635/253198

*The Deputy Head of the Political Department in the German Foreign Ministry to the German Ambassador in France (Welczeck)*

BERLIN, April 2, 1938.

(e.o. Pol. V 2511)

DEAR COUNT WELCZECK: Counselor of Embassy von Toppelskirch, Moscow, informs us in a private letter that the Diplomatic Corps there describes the relations between France and the Soviet Union as "the worst imaginable." A member of the French Embassy even said that Paris was seriously considering the abrogation of the Franco-Soviet Mutual Assistance Pact.

This information, which was transmitted to us with great reservations, I pass on to you in the same manner and I would appreciate receiving your reaction to it. French Ambassador Coulondre has been in Paris for about two weeks.

(Complimentary close)

*Deputy Head of the  
Political Department*<sup>10</sup>

### No. 733

813/190096-97<sup>11</sup>

*Memorandum by the Foreign Minister*

RM 207

The Italian Chargé d'Affaires, Count Magistrati, called on me at 5 p.m. today to inform me of the following:

The Anglo-Italian negotiations had recently made good progress so that their conclusion could be expected between April 10 and April 20—about April 15, according to Count Ciano.

Count Ciano had instructed him to inform me that he would communicate the draft of the agreement to the German Government in advance.

I mentioned to Count Magistrati the alleged details of the agreement published in the *Daily Mail*: Withdrawal of troops from

<sup>10</sup> This draft, prepared for the signature of the Deputy Head of the Political Department, was initialed by several officials of the Political Department of the Foreign Ministry and a marginal notation indicates that it was sent.

<sup>11</sup> The copy in F14/039-038 is in part illegible.

Libya, agreement on fortifications in the Mediterranean, discontinuance of propaganda, and agreement on Arabia.

Count Magistrati was unable to give any details in this connection. He only confirmed that of the Italian troops in Libya, 20,000 men had been furloughed. At present there were still two Army Corps in Libya, which would remain there at peacetime strength. For the time being all organizational measures necessary to bring the two Corps back to wartime strength, such as maintenance of staffs, etc., would be kept up.

At the beginning of the Anglo-Italian negotiations the British Government had proposed including the French Government also. The Italian Government had rejected this proposal, however, and had insisted that the negotiations be strictly confined to the delimitation of Anglo-Italian interests. The British Government then no longer insisted. All reports of the possible participation of France or of negotiations concerning this were therefore incorrect.

At my question regarding his general impression of the Anglo-Italian negotiations, Count Magistrati explained that the future Anglo-Italian agreement would essentially be based on the Gentlemen's Agreement of January 31, 1936. The agreement would perhaps be more precise on some matters.

RIBBENTROP

BERLIN, April 4, 1938.

### No. 734

3153/665902-04

#### *The Foreign Ministry to the Deputy of the Führer (Hess)*

URGENT

BERLIN, April 6, 1938.

(zu Pol. IV 2375)

In continuation of the letter of March 17, Pol. IV 1739 Ang. II, as well as with reference to your letter of March 24, Ltg./Gr.<sup>12</sup>

Before starting on his vacation, the Italian Ambassador here handed Ambassador von Mackensen a memorandum, a translation of which is enclosed,<sup>13</sup> on the question of certain propaganda for the return of South Tyrol to the Reich. Orally he also mentioned a "headquarters," about which he had no further information; it was said to be located at Dresden and to be engaged in "extremely dubious activities" in connection with the question of South Tyrol.

The Foreign Ministry would appreciate an investigation as soon

<sup>12</sup> Neither printed.

<sup>13</sup> The enclosure to document No. 729, p. 1060.

as possible to determine the extent to which the complaints made by the Italian Ambassador are justified. In this connection it is especially requested that the identity of "Gauleiter Denze," mentioned on page 3<sup>14</sup> of the memorandum, be established.

The Italian Embassy also transmitted the enclosed periodical, the *Südtiroler Heimat* of February 1938, as evidence of anti-Italian propaganda concerning the South Tyrol.<sup>15</sup>

Finally another Italian source has referred to Irredentist propaganda in Innsbruck. According to the Italian account, no official agencies are involved; rather, the propaganda originates with circles which, after Italy's occupation of South Tyrol, opted for Austria and emigrated to that country. The Italians have requested that we see to it that this propaganda is suppressed.

In view of the great importance which must under present circumstances be attached to the prevention of anti-Italian propaganda in the South Tyrol, I should appreciate it if all the authorities concerned were again given general instructions to insure that such anti-Italian propaganda cease. If necessary, it is requested that the severest measures be taken against all circles acting contrary to the policy of the Reich in this respect.

By direction:  
VON BISMARCK

### No. 735

634/252891-92

*The German Chargé d'Affaires in France (Bräuer) to the German Foreign Ministry*

Telegram

No. 203 of April 13

PARIS, April 13, 1938.

Received April 13, 1938—9:40 p.m.

(Pol. IV 2584)

In the course of a visit on other business, Massigli<sup>16</sup> informed me that France would not recognize the conquest of Abyssinia until the League of Nations had approved such recognition. However, the question of dispatching a French ambassador to Rome was now under examination. Two alternatives were being considered: One was the Belgian solution of accrediting and dispatching the ambassador with a letter of credence to the King of Italy and Emperor of Ethiopia. Simultaneously it would be stated that the French

<sup>14</sup> I.e., page 1063.

<sup>15</sup> Not printed here.

<sup>16</sup> René Massigli, associate director of political and commercial affairs in the French Ministry for Foreign Affairs.

Government did not regard this as a *de jure* recognition of the conquest of Abyssinia and was reserving that question for decision by the League of Nations. The other alternative would be the dispatch to Rome of the person selected for the post of ambassador to negotiate the questions of accreditation and recognition. The second method appeared less likely to be chosen, for it is anticipated here that Italy will object to it. In any case, it seems to be intended to appoint an ambassador prior to the visit of the Führer. Among the persons being considered for the ambassadorship, the leading name at present is that of former Navy Minister Pietri, who is from Corsica.

The resurgence of the question of an ambassador is typical of the trend toward a *rapprochement* with Italy which lately has also found expression in most of the newspapers here.

BRÄUER<sup>17</sup>

### No. 736

635/253199-202

*The German Chargé d'Affaires in France (Bräuer) to the German Foreign Ministry*

A 1522

PARIS, April 14, 1938.  
Received April 19, 1938.  
(Pol. V 2916)

With reference to the private letter of April 2 to Ambassador Count Welczeck, Pol. V 2511.<sup>18</sup>

Subject: Franco-Soviet relations.

French policy with respect to the Soviet Union is guided by strictly rational considerations. No sympathy for Bolshevism as an economic or a political system is harbored either by the Government or by the vast majority of the people. But in the opinion of the French the Soviet Union is a power factor which in the event of a German-French conflict might carry a certain weight. This weight should be applied, if possible, on the French side of the balance. France therefore welcomed with some relief the end of the so-called Rapallo policy, and incorporated the Soviet Union into the French system, notably by the Treaty of Mutual Assistance of May 2, 1935.

This new friendship has so far not proved to be a source of pure joy for France. The Treaty has not exactly eased her international

<sup>17</sup> An attached note indicates that a copy of this telegram was forwarded by the Foreign Ministry to the German Embassy in Italy on April 14, 1938.

<sup>18</sup> Document No. 732, p. 1067.

situation. It was not welcomed by Poland, France's ally, or by Yugoslavia and Rumania. England, which had been a benevolent godfather to the Treaty, viewed it with increasing coolness as time went on. Germany made the Franco-Soviet Pact the occasion for reestablishing her sovereignty in the Rhineland. Moreover, the French Government very soon came to realize that while the Soviet Union is resolutely in favor of an active French policy, particularly toward National Socialist Germany and Fascist Italy, she proceeds with great caution in her own affairs. In the Spanish question the Soviet Union, disregarding the Nonintervention Agreement she had signed, pursued a Comintern policy pure and simple, which was by no means always convenient for French policy, especially as it increased domestic tension in France itself. Occasional Soviet gestures, such as Molotov's statements regarding the White Russian organizations in France at the January 1938 session of the Supreme Soviet of the Soviet Union, were resented as a deliberate affront and repudiated.

In addition, during the past year serious doubts have arisen with respect to the firmness of the Soviet regime, the strength of the Red Army, and the good faith of the Soviet Government. The execution of generals whom the French General Staff regarded as able officers and the numerous trials of former leading Bolsheviks demonstrated to French public opinion the precariousness of a regime in which prominent persons, as asserted by the regime itself, had for years been engaged in sabotage and treason. This was particularly true of the last trial, in which, among others, former Ambassador Rakovski, who was well known in many quarters here, was convicted.

Under such circumstances the question was frequently asked whether, in view of the present military and political situation, the Soviet Union was a useful and reliable ally. Even aside from the domestic turmoil, the country is hampered in its military freedom of movement, too. In the Far East it is menaced by Japan, and in Europe it has no common frontiers with its French and Czechoslovak allies. It could only assist them if Poland or Rumania were to permit the passage of Red forces, but neither of these two Powers seems inclined to do so.

All these misgivings are clearly expressed in the French press, too. Papers, such as *Le Journal*, *Action Française*, *Le Matin*, *La République*, *Le Jour*, *L'Emancipation Nationale*, *Liberté*, are forever using sharp words against the Soviet Union and demanding the denunciation of the Soviet Pact. Other newspapers, such as *Figaro* and the *Epoque*, are calmer in tone, but they are quite unim-

passioned in judging the situation in the Soviet Union, her domestic "achievements," and her foreign policy. Even the *Temps* has occasionally intimated that apparently the Soviet Union would not be sorry to see a conflict between Germany and France, since this would divert the German menace from Russia. It goes without saying that this lightning-rod policy is not viewed sympathetically. The only pro-Russian papers are *Humanité*, *Ce Soir*, *Oeuvre*, and, with certain reservations, *L'Ordre*.

To sum up, it must be said that feeling toward the Soviet Union is far from cordial. Nevertheless, all French governments of recent years have firmly adhered to the Franco-Soviet Pact. The policy statement of the first Popular Front Government in 1936 referred to the "powerful support of our friends of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics." Similar declarations were also made by the subsequent governments.

The latest instance was the policy statement of the Daladier Cabinet made on April 12, which again stressed France's faithful adherence to all pacts and treaties.

These unvarying assurances do not preclude occasional variations in the temperature of this relationship. The degree of warmth is chiefly regulated by the relations to Germany at the given time. When France has hope of a *détente* with Germany, relations with the Soviet Union are put into cold storage. But when Germany arouses apprehension, they are warmed up in a hurry. This again became evident after the unification of Austria with Germany, which was resented by France as a grave loss of prestige. During the days after the *Anschluss* and during the Lithuanian-Polish conflict,<sup>19</sup> Paul-Boncour, the Minister for Foreign Affairs in the short-lived second Blum Cabinet and one of the spiritual fathers of the Soviet Pact, received the Soviet Ambassador practically every day. In the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Chamber, he praised the Soviet Union's efforts toward a peaceful solution of the Lithuanian-Polish conflict. France immediately concurred in the Soviet Union's proposal to call a meeting of the Great Powers to consult on safeguarding the peace, although England declined. Finally, together with the diplomatic representatives in Warsaw, Prague, Belgrade, and Bucharest, the French Ambassador in Moscow was called to Paris after the *Anschluss* of Austria for consultations concerning further French policy. He was instructed to sound out Moscow with regard to their ideas on the practical implementation of assistance to Czechoslovakia in case of an attack. Nor has the hope

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<sup>19</sup> Documents of the German Foreign Ministry on the Polish-Lithuanian crisis of March 1938 will appear in a subsequent volume.

been entirely abandoned yet that France, by prevailing upon her eastern allies and Turkey, could after all enable the Soviet Union in the event of war to intervene in Europe directly. At any rate, the French representatives in Turkey and in Rumania were instructed to ascertain the attitude of these countries in case Czechoslovakia found herself threatened, especially in regard to the possible passage of the Red Fleet through the Dardanelles and the use of Rumanian territory in the event of Soviet assistance to Czechoslovakia (cf. previous report No. 192 of April 8<sup>20</sup>).

This policy does not seem to meet with opposition in the French General Staff. As far as we could find out, the French experts do not quite agree in their estimate of the Red Army, in part probably because the possibilities of impartial observation are very limited in Russia. Nevertheless they do attach a certain importance to it, as is evident from the commendatory statement made in the session of March 24 in the Chamber by Daladier, then Minister of War and now Premier (cf. enclosure<sup>21</sup>). Even if the active assistance that may be expected from Russia is not too highly assessed, the military are nevertheless in favor of keeping the Treaty in force because it will keep Russia, that vast reservoir of raw materials, closed to Germany, and because in the event of war a part of the German Army will be tied down by the Soviet Union.

That the Daladier government should veer from this political course is all the less likely since two of its most prominent representatives, Paul Reynaud and Georges Mandel, are well-known supporters of the Franco-Soviet Pact.

All these circumstances offer ample proof that France still considers the Soviet Union as an important factor in her political system and that, though the relationship may not be founded on mutual sympathies, she does not at present intend to discard this card in her hand.

BRÄUER

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<sup>20</sup> Vol. II, document No. 119, p. 215.

<sup>21</sup> Enclosure not printed.

## No. 737

634/252898

*The German Ambassador in Italy (Mackensen) to the German Foreign Ministry*

Telegram

No. 107 of April 15    ROME (QUIRINAL), April 15, 1938—8:55 p.m.  
Received April 16, 1938—12:15 a.m.  
(Pol. IV 2612)

In continuation of No. 106.<sup>22</sup>

In today's conversation Ciano also touched on the question of the form in which France would seek to join the Italo-British negotiations. Officially the French had not approached the Italians so far, but the French Chargé d'Affaires had recently asked him about his engagements for the next few days, adding that he would presumably have a very important announcement to make to him during the course of the coming week.

Moreover, during the drafting of yesterday's communiqué regarding the conclusion of the economic negotiations, the French had submitted a draft which strongly pointed toward a political *rapprochement*. Ciano had ruthlessly eliminated all such passages from the communiqué and had confined it to the subject matter at hand. He added that Italy had no intention whatever of letting herself be led into negotiations with France through any side roads.

The French should first send an ambassador, then the rest could follow.

MACKENSEN

## No. 738

109/115030

*Minute*

Count Magistrati today handed me a copy of the Italo-British Agreement which is to be signed in Rome this evening. We looked over the texts cursorily together.<sup>22a</sup>

Concerning the agreements on Spain, I inquired of Magistrati about the meaning of the word "*mira*." According to the definition given by Magistrati, "*mira*" could be roughly translated as "aims," but Magistrati could not state how his Government intended now to treat its secret agreement with Spain of the late fall of 1936.

<sup>22</sup> Not printed.

<sup>22a</sup> A detailed analysis of the Anglo-Italian Agreement, prepared in the German Foreign Ministry on April 27, 1938, is printed as document No. 755, p. 1097.

Magistrati pointed out that only Anglo-Italian interests had been settled in the agreement, France not having entered into consideration at all.

According to Magistrati, publication is to take place in England and Italy on Sunday morning, April 17.

In order to forestall possible German sensitiveness, Magistrati referred me to the text of the speech which the Duce intended to deliver during the Führer's visit; simultaneously Magistrati handed me the draft of this speech (it will be treated at greater length elsewhere). Magistrati also made a remark intended to present the visit of British Minister Hore-Belisha as an event of minor importance.

I thanked Count Magistrati for informing me of the texts of the Agreement, called them very interesting, and told him that one could congratulate the Italian Government on the success achieved.

BARON VON WEIZSÄCKER

BERLIN, April 16, 1938.

### No. 739

634/252902-03

#### *The German Ambassador in Italy (Mackensen) to the German Foreign Ministry*

Telegram

SECRET

No. 109 of April 17

ROME (QUIRINAL), April 17, 1938—7:40 p.m.

Received April 18, 1938—12:30 a.m.

(Pol. IV 2688)

In continuation of telegram No. 107 of the 15th.

Ciano summoned me this morning to communicate the following to me for the immediate information of my Government:

Contrary to his expectations (cf. my telegram No. 107) the French Chargé d'Affaires<sup>23</sup> had most urgently requested a conversation with him yesterday morning and had handed him the *aide-mémoire*, the text of which, given to me by Ciano with the request for strictly confidential treatment, I am wiring separately under No. 110.<sup>24</sup>

He explained in connection with paragraph 1, and thus in connection with the question of the "tripartite character" desired by France, that Great Britain had continuously insisted on this. Perth had concluded 14 of the 16 conversations with the urgent request that the French be included, but had always encountered the same determined rejection, since the view was consistently held here that

<sup>23</sup> Jules Blondel.

<sup>24</sup> See document No. 740, *infra*.

only the direct approach was open if the French wanted anything. In particular he had rejected British suggestions that France be permitted to enter through a back door, namely via the detour of adherence to the Mediterranean Pact or via Syria, i.e., by extending the Anglo-Italian agreements regarding Palestine to Syria also. He once even countered another attempt by asking whether Perth was prepared in this connection also to discuss the German colonies. At that the Englishman had only raised both hands as though defending himself. Italy would not have evaded a direct exchange of views with France even earlier, provided that the Empire was first recognized.

Ciano stated that—if only in order to draw a clear distinction between the Anglo-Italian conversations just concluded and possible future Franco-Italian conversations—he had for the time being merely taken note of Blondel's statements, reserving all decisions, although Italy was already clear as to her attitude toward France's wishes. He would give a reply to the Chargé d'Affaires on Tuesday, and Mussolini had agreed with that. France had been prudent enough to abandon the idea of entrusting a prominent French politician, to be sent here *ad hoc*, with the initiation of negotiations; this would have met with very determined opposition here. They were prepared to listen to the Chargé without waiting for an ambassador to be appointed, and were waiting to hear what he would have to say. He, Ciano, aside from the recognition of the Empire, really knew of no pending question of importance in their relations with France, except for controversial points of minor significance; the question of the Djibouti Railroad, for example, which could easily be solved, since Italy needed the railroad a few years longer and the French were glad to see the capital invested there bring in a profit during that period. Ciano added that in possible future negotiations he would, of course, leave no doubt that they would have to be based on the Axis, which had been proved to be unshakable by the *Anschluss*, and also by the result of the Italo-British negotiations.

Magistrati will be informed accordingly today.

MACKENSEN

No. 740

634/252904-05

*The German Ambassador in Italy (Mackensen) to the German  
Foreign Ministry*

Telegram

SECRET

ROME (QUIRINAL), April 17, 1938—7:40 p.m.

No. 110 of April 17

Received April 18, 1938—12:30 a.m.

(Pol. IV 2689)

In continuation of telegram No. 109 of the 17th.

The text of the *aide-mémoire* handed the Italian Foreign Minister yesterday by the French Chargé d'Affaires is as follows:<sup>25</sup>

"The French Government has always considered with favor the principle of Anglo-Italian negotiations and has, since their initiation, continued to desire their success. It would have wished that they might assume a tripartite character as regards the questions which were of equal interest to the three Governments. The Italian Government did not think that it could enter upon this course and, moreover, did not consider it possible to include in the arrangement being drafted certain provisions relating to questions of special interest to France, for which the British Government, in accord with the French Government, had expressed the desire. The Italian negotiators have in this respect indicated their preference for direct Franco-Italian negotiations.

"These negotiations, which for practical reasons could not take place before the conclusion of the Anglo-Italian conversations, are now possible. The French Government would earnestly desire, particularly in connection with the impending session of the Council of the League of Nations, that these negotiations be opened as early as possible, and is therefore prepared, as far as it is concerned, to start them very shortly either in Paris or in Rome.

"Should the Italian Government choose Rome, the French Government is prepared to this end immediately to give all instructions and full power to its diplomatic representative at Rome and at the same time provide him with all the necessary technical assistance.

"The French Government wishes to demonstrate again, in making this proposal, its sincere desire to facilitate between the two countries any settlement that might generally improve the psychological conditions for frank and cordial collaboration and to hasten for France in particular the possibility of officially accrediting an ambassador to Rome. The French Government has no doubt that, if the Italian Government is itself inspired at the present time by the same desire for an understanding, the questions which have affected the relations between the two countries can be quickly settled<sup>26</sup> in their common interest."

MACKENSEN

<sup>25</sup> The quoted passage is translated from the French.

<sup>26</sup> "Etu" appears in the text possibly for "résolu."

## No. 741

634/252899-901

*The German Ambassador in Italy (Mackensen) to the German Foreign Ministry*

Telegram

No. 112 of April 18    ROME (QUIRINAL), April 18, 1938—7:15 p.m.  
Received April 18, 1938—9:30 p.m.  
(Pol. IV 2630)

Mussolini received me today for the first time. The official nature of the visit was stressed by the Italians by the fact that the Chief of Protocol called for me at the Embassy. Ciano was present. The Duce welcomed me heartily and, after a few introductory remarks of a personal nature, had Ciano confirm to him that the latter had fully informed me of the Anglo-Italian conversations and of the result for Italy. Then, in characteristic manner he took up the French attempts at *rapprochement* with a great show of temperament. His comments were almost literally the same as Ciano's yesterday (cf. telegram No. 109 of April 17). In strong terms he especially denounced the French attempts, supported by Great Britain, to reach an exchange of views with Rome by the back stairs. The rejection had been completely unequivocal. Ciano should receive the French Chargé d'Affaires (tomorrow) and calmly listen to what he wanted.

In addition to the Djibouti Railroad, which was a side issue for Italy, there was really no topic of conversation, aside perhaps from a few other colonial questions. "Europe at any rate will not be discussed." He would, moreover, leave no doubt that he would enter no discussion that was not in full conformity with the spirit and the letter of the Axis.

He strongly condemned France's attempt to question the enthusiasm of the Italian people for the Führer's visit. The Führer could rest assured that he would be welcomed with the greatest possible enthusiasm. Following this remark I conveyed to the Duce the Führer's regards and, in accordance with the instructions given to me in Munich, the Führer's statement that if the Duce were to come to Germany today, in view of his attitude toward the events of March 13, he would find an enthusiasm which would even surpass the reception accorded to him in the fall. Mussolini was visibly pleased with this statement with which Ciano ostentatiously concurred. Then, in accordance with instructions, I explained the Führer's unequivocal stand regarding the question of German propaganda in the South Tyrol. The Duce vigorously expressed

his thanks and characterized the communication as valuable, since, in the best interests of both parties, uncertainty in this respect was dangerous, because third powers would be delighted to exploit this immediately. Moreover, he took the same stand regarding the Italian minorities in Dalmatia and therefore had excellent results in his relations with Yugoslavia. He had suppressed Italian propaganda there entirely in the interest of a complete and, to his satisfaction, successful settlement of Italo-Yugoslav relations. For this purpose, however, he had had the leading figures in this propaganda summoned in person and had silenced them, among them even Garibaldi's grandson, who, although greatly prejudiced emotionally, had yielded unconditionally. Stoyadinovich had personally expressed his great satisfaction that in 12 months he had not had a single cause for complaint in this respect. With the same frankness he had discussed with Stoyadinovich the Croatian emigrants, who had been protected by him until that time. He had blocked their political future once and for all. In order to prove to Belgrade his complete loyalty, he had taken on a Yugoslav police official from there and put him in charge of the Croatian question, which was under the Italian police.

At the end of the half-hour conversation I congratulated Mussolini, for obvious reasons, on the most recent successes of the Italian troops. The Duce was pleased to take up the subject, stating that the Italian achievements were to be valued all the higher, since the troops were not fighting directly for their homeland but in a "political war" and, besides, there had for months been talk of their imminent return home. He was thinking of publishing numerous telegrams reaching him from the families of men killed, as evidence of the spirit of sacrifice of the Italian people.

MACKENSEN

## No. 742

28/19216

### *The German Foreign Ministry to the German Legation in Czechoslovakia*

#### Telegram

No. 74 of April 19

BERLIN, April 19, 1938—10:22 p.m.

Received Prague, April 19, 1938.

For the orientation of your conversations. The result of the Italo-British negotiations, which were aimed at the mutual settlement of old complaints and at removing difficulties in the Mediterranean and the Near East, has, in these areas, created the basis

for neighborly relations between the two countries as free from friction as possible. Of course, the decisive factor will be the future implementation of the Agreements. When the Agreement will come into force depends upon the final settlement of the Spanish question, which, however, seems well along the way toward solving itself by Franco's victorious advance.

We have been kept informed in broad outline by the Italian Government of the progress of the negotiations and welcome the result. Considering the community of interests with Italy, based on the Axis, we see an advantage for ourselves, too, in the elimination of Italo-British difficulties. It may be remarked that the initiation and successful conclusion of the negotiations are essentially the result of Chamberlain's realism, which attained freedom of action by Eden's dismissal, and that in this case, too, the method of bilateral agreements has justified itself. There are indications that France desires a parallel Italo-French action. But it could only take up such problems as are of minor importance and claim less interest. In your conversations, please avoid anything which might give the wrong impression that we were dissatisfied with Italo-British understanding or that we saw a need for similar German-British negotiations.

Further instructions reserved until after closer examination of the details of the treaty.

WEIZSÄCKER

No. 743

2134/467066

*Memorandum*

BERLIN, April 19, 1938.

The Italian Chargé d'Affaires called my attention today to the Sudeten German publication, *Die Zeit*, which on April 7 had reprinted an article from the *Pravo Lidu* claiming that through the Austrian *Anschluss* with Germany the Führer's prestige had risen, whereas that of Mussolini had decreased. The Duce knew of the matter and was, of course, not very pleased about it. Count Magistrati added, however, that he did not know the context from which the protested remark had been taken. He only intended to inform me of the matter.

WEIZSÄCKER

## No. 744

1519/373089-90

*The German Ambassador in Italy (Mackensen) to the German Foreign Ministry*

2100/38

ROME, April 20, 1938.  
(Pol. IV 2760)

Subject: Report from an informant regarding the Italian reaction to alleged German intentions toward the South Tyrol.

An informant reported the following, pointing out that it concerned matters of interest to German-Italian relations:

1) From Vienna and Budapest there had been sent to Rome maps made in Germany, in which the regions ethnologically belonging to Greater Germany had been printed in red; these regions included that of Bolzano;

2) The Italian military intelligence service had reported that small maps were being distributed in German schools, on which the area of Bolzano had been marked as belonging to Germany and even the old Austrian borders, including Trento and Trieste, had been indicated by red dots;

3) An Italian intelligence officer, on a trip to Berlin, had heard German officers laughingly say: "Now that we are friends, you will return Bolzano."

The above reports had made an extremely unfavorable impression in Rome in military circles (with General Pariani<sup>26a</sup>) and in the Palazzo Chigi. After the Führer's statements they had been reassured, but now they were again concerned about the security of the Italian northern and northeastern frontiers.

The informant added that the Italian reaction to such reports might have significant consequences.

It is therefore all the more important that only yesterday, by order of the Führer, I was able once again to assure the Duce of the former's unequivocal decision to suppress as energetically as possible any propaganda from the Reich relative to the South Tyrol. It might be well to investigate points 1) and 2) and to inform the Supreme Headquarters of the *Wehrmacht* of point 3).

V. MACKENSEN

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<sup>26a</sup> Under Secretary of State for War and Chief of Staff.

## No. 745

1519/373098-100

*The German Ambassador in Italy (Mackensen) to the State  
Secretary in the German Foreign Ministry (Weizsäcker)*

ROME, April 20, 1938.  
(Pol. IV 2873)

MY DEAR FRIEND: I am enclosing some not uninteresting information from our trusty informant, whom I have known for a long time, concerning certain states of mind in the Palazzo Chigi. His statements seem interesting to me because they prove how much it will mean if the Führer and Chancellor would take advantage of his visit to Rome to supplement his clear statements concerning the Brenner boundary with the information known to you concerning the future general orientation of our policy as stated to me by the Führer and Chancellor in Munich.

Heil Hitler!

Your faithful

MACKENSEN

[Enclosure]

## MEMORANDUM

In the Palazzo Chigi it is expected that after the approaching plebiscite on Austria's *Anschluss* with Germany the German-Czech problem will come to a head very swiftly. In this connection it can already be stated that Italy will cause no difficulties whatsoever with respect to the solution which Germany deems most suitable.

On the other hand, information has been received in Rome concerning a certain uneasiness and anxiety in Hungary. Thus the Italian Minister in Budapest notes some rumors current to the effect that Germany intends not merely to absorb the Sudeten Germans, but at the same time wishes to make all Czech territory [*Tschechei*] a satellite and accessory in her own eastern policy. Hungary's aspirations to Slovakia would thereby be jeopardized.

On the other hand, the Italian Minister in Prague reports on a very stormy conversation between Beneš and his Chief of Staff, who, when questioned, told Beneš quite clearly that Czechoslovakia's military position was absolutely untenable, since neither Russia nor France could send him direct aid. It was therefore time to abandon the policy hitherto pursued by Prague and to seek an understanding with Germany.

In the Palazzo Chigi many persons feel today that it is a matter of course that Germany must solve her German question now—not only as a question of space but, above all, with the objective of creating new resources for her economic, and therefore also political, independence. Basically, all large states have shown like tendencies in this direction. This problem, it is said, cannot be solved even by satisfying Germany's colonial claims.

As far as the historical decision on this problem and its effects on the immediate and the more distant future are concerned, there are, in the opinion of these circles, two possibilities only: either by way of Russia, or else by way of the old *Drang nach Südosten* in the direction of Constantinople, Bagdad, the Persian Gulf. Should Germany choose the first course, no conflicts or clash of interests could be expected. Should Germany enter upon the path of the old *Drang nach Südosten*, however, then one would have to be on the lookout for a complex of clashes (*complessità di interferenze*) with Italian interests in the Balkans, in the Mediterranean, and in the Near East. In these circles there is a feeling that, from Constantinople, Germany will, so to speak, press on Italy's flank in the Mediterranean—a very delicate and touchy matter with Italy. In this latter event there might in time develop a community of impaired interests (*una comunità di interessi lesi e compromessi*) which would paralyze German-Italian collaboration. One simply cannot, in the opinion of the informant, consider this historical question too soon from this point of view. Even though these ideas are not being considered for the time being either by Mussolini or by Ciano, it is a fact, nevertheless, that such considerations are already being entertained in the offices of the Palazzo Chigi.

## No. 746

634/252908

*The German Ambassador in Italy (Mackensen) to the German Foreign Ministry*

Telegram

No. 116 of April 21

ROME, April 21, 1938—11:30 p.m.

Received April 22, 1938—3:40 a.m.

(Pol. IV 2738)

In continuation of telegrams Nos. 109, 110, and 112.<sup>27</sup>

Today I sounded out Ciano, who had summoned me for a different reason, in regard to his conversations with Blondel. He denied

<sup>27</sup> Documents Nos. 739, 740, and 741, pp. 1075, 1077, and 1078.

the press report which claimed that Blondel was to see him for a second time today. The latter had called on him only once so far, on April 19, and had been informed by him in the sense of his communication to me on April 17 (cf. final paragraph of telegram No. 109). The Chargé d'Affaires had been visibly disappointed at the reserved reception of the French overture. Although the eager desire of the French Government to make quick progress appears evident to him, Ciano does not expect Blondel's next visit until a few days from now. In his opinion subsequent conversations will take several weeks.

MACKENSEN

No. 747

348/201495

*The German Ambassador in Italy (Mackensen) to the German Foreign Ministry*

Telegram

No. 117 of April 21

ROME, April 21, 1938—11:30 p.m.

Received April 22, 1938—3:40 a.m.

In continuation of telegram No. 115 of the 21st.<sup>28</sup>

Ciano, who had asked me to see him today for the purpose, repeated Giannini's<sup>29</sup> statements to the experts regarding economic discussions, with the most urgent request that Germany not initiate any Austrian measures affecting Italian interests before the date fixed for the negotiations. Mussolini, whose handwritten instructions to him he showed me, considered this question as of a political nature, above all, and liable, if wrongly handled, to impair the atmosphere for the Führer's visit in certain centers such as Trieste, Venice, and Milan, where the intimate connections with Austrian economy are particularly strong. The Duce had surely proved sufficiently that he had understanding for "abrupt" solutions of political problems; however, in economic matters appreciably affecting a considerable group of people, a gradual, easy solution seemed more expedient to him. Everyone here would understand our bringing the economy of Austria into harmony with the economy of the former Reich area. It was for this very reason, after all, that negotiations were arranged. In regard to the question of obligation to register, he—Ciano—wished, furthermore, to refer to the prin-

<sup>28</sup> Not printed.

<sup>29</sup> Amedeo Giannini, head of the Trade Department of the Italian Foreign Ministry.

ciple of reciprocity. Italy, in analogous regulations, had expressly excepted municipalities.

Ciano expressed the hope that the Foreign Minister would agree with the Duce's interpretation, and—possibly by appeal to the Führer—cause the necessary steps to be taken.

MACKENSEN

No. 748

119/119008-11

*The German Consul General at Milan (Bene) to the German Foreign Ministry*

MILAN, April 21, 1938.

By courier.

Subject: Report on feeling in the South Tyrol.

Since my last official visit, on March 20-22, the situation has very perceptibly become more tense. At every move one feels a nervous and electric tension between the Italians and the South Tyrolese. The result of the plebiscite in Germany, and in Austria in particular, has made the Italians even more uneasy and has augmented their fear of a surprise attack from without or within. They no longer feel themselves safe in the possession of the South Tyrol. Their hatred of everything German has, if possible, been enhanced even more. They have allowed themselves to be carried to incredible brutalities or, by provocative action, have themselves irritated the population into committing rash acts, so that they can then intervene. The Italians know perfectly well that the South Tyrolese population is more firmly determined than ever to belong to the Reich, and that it wishes to decide its own fate; they know the strength and the stubbornness of the population and they feel that they themselves have failed and that they can scarcely hope any longer ever to make loyal Italian citizens of the South Tyrolese. All of the South Tyrol is buzzing with rumors and "news." It is as though every blow received by *one* South Tyrolese is felt at the same time by *all* 250,000 South Tyrolese.

I am enclosing a report which was left at my office by "an unknown person" during my visit. This gives a very good picture of the sentiment. The statements regarding Italian deeds of violence correspond to the truth. I call attention to the report on the Stricker case, which is enclosed, too.<sup>30</sup>

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<sup>30</sup> Enclosures not printed.

An even more severe attitude is expected of the Italians after the Führer's visit in Rome, unless the Führer puts in a good word with the Duce.

The childish belief that the Duce will transfer the South Tyrol to the Führer in Rome is widespread. Apparently the rumor circulating in this form is based on the fact that at one time England, in discussing the question of colonies, called the attention of Italy to the fact that she herself might make the beginning in the restoration of colonies (i.e., the South Tyrol). The Duce is said to have spoken of a gift for the Führer which would amaze the world. In the opinion of the South Tyrolese, such a present can be only the South Tyrol. How great will be the disappointment after the Führer's visit!

During the Führer's trip and his stay in Rome, the South Tyrol population intends to maintain iron discipline, unless the "foreigners" provoke them.

For the Reich-Germans in the South Tyrol (adding in the Austrians, there are probably 10,000), the situation is also very difficult. So far they have been lumped together with the South Tyrolese by the Italians. It is indeed difficult to undertake a very fine differentiation, since most of them have lived for years, decades, and many for generations in the South Tyrol and are related to the South Tyrolese by blood and by marriage and are indistinguishable from them. During my official visit I always call on the prefect and attempt to explain to him that he must make a distinction between Reich-Germans and South Tyrolese; perhaps he wants to, but he is such a dyed-in-the-wool Germanophobe that he will hardly be able to do so. He will have to learn to do so, for without this separation there will be difficulties sooner or later. He must be patiently helped, and the Reich-Germans must display the utmost discretion and a great deal of tact. I believe they will do so. The trip of the 6,500 to Innsbruck for the plebiscite went off without any incident at all. The prefect's press officer, with whom I spoke, made special mention of this discipline. From his words one could deduce partly pleasure that the day which was so difficult for the area had passed off so well, yet partly a certain worry that with such discipline the Reich-Germans might become a danger after all. And it appeared as if the large number of new Reich-Germans is causing the Italian authorities uneasiness. They never counted on the Austrians ever becoming a factor. Now they are. For an Italian, 10,000 disciplined Reich-Germans under strict leadership are something to worry about. I told Dr. Curré, the press officer, who received me in the absence of the prefect and who had been

present at earlier conversations because he speaks German, what Minister von Ribbentrop had told me in Berlin. That seemed to satisfy him. He is hoping that there will be some change in the material published in Germany; as an example of what it should not be like, he showed me a book, *Südtiroler Landschaften*, published by Brückmann, Munich, and written by R. von Klebbelsberg. On almost every page of this book there was something underscored that is objectionable to Italian eyes and ears. I called Dr. Curré's attention to several minor occurrences involving Reich-Germans. He promised relief.

Very characteristic of the attitude of the Italians is the following incident:

By agreement with the office of the prefect, the local groups of the N.S.D.A.P. had issued invitations for the celebration of the Führer's birthday. The Bolzano group's celebration took place in an inn situated halfway up the mountain outside the city. I was present at this celebration. About 1:00 a.m., when half of the approximately 800 guests had left, a group of 25 wild-looking Italians suddenly appeared, without having asked permission. One could see that they were Fascist storm troops, with some Spartacus characters among them. They came in in a very challenging way and made themselves very much at home, placed themselves haughtily on the platform beneath the banners and the Führer's picture, and made gestures indicating that they wanted to clear the place. Then they sat down conspicuously at an empty table. The Germans kept quiet and waited. I had the policeman who is present at every meeting of the Reich-Germans asked to see to it that the group left the premises at once and did not interfere with the occasion. The group was then given to understand by him very plainly that the German Consul General was present, and they withdrew, grumbling. In front of the building the roughnecks then sang their songs of defiance, and did not take their leave until I had told the policeman that I would get in touch with the prefect at once. The Germans remained an hour longer so that they could go home unmolested. The political leaders, who still had to remove the banners, etc., later had to encounter some insults down in Bolzano, but did not react.

The purpose of the attempt was quite evidently to cause trouble, so that they could then cut loose. Afterward the Germans would of course have been blamed for everything.

Similar groups were on the move in Merano and in the valleys, where they provoked the South Tyrolese population.

I have informed the prefect's office of this, so that it may take precautionary measures for later meetings.

In the speeches in the first part of the program, the leader of the group (a very sensible and calm man) and I pointed out that there must be no meddling in Italian affairs, and that the strictest discipline was to be maintained, in order not to give any welcome ground for friction of any kind. If like action is taken on the Italian side, there will be no difficulties in the future either. As I know from earlier conversations with the various officials, the local groups of the N.S.D.A.P. have the reputation with the prefect of keeping their people well in hand and not giving any ground for complaint.

What the fate of the South Tyrol will be cannot be predicted at present.

The Embassy at Rome has received a carbon copy.

A clipping from the *Alpenzeitung* of April 9, 1938, is enclosed.<sup>31</sup>

BENE

No. 749

119/119021-26

*The German Ambassador in Italy (Mackensen) to the German Foreign Ministry*

2259/38

Rome, April 22, 1938.  
(Pol. IV 2801/38)

Subject: German propaganda in the South Tyrol.

Pursuant to my conversation of the day before yesterday with Prince Philip of Hesse, which is recorded in the attached memorandum, I yesterday asked Count Ciano, who had invited me to call on him for another reason, about the incident which had been reported to me. According to his statements to Prince Philip of Hesse, members of the resident Racial-German population allegedly had come to blows with Fascist Party members recently in a town in the South Tyrol. I expressly asked the Foreign Minister on this occasion whether he had reason to assume that any influence from the Reich was involved in this incident. Also, Prince Philip had not been able to give me the exact name of the town mentioned. Count Ciano thereupon stated that he had not taken up this matter with Prince Philip because he suspected any influence from the Reich, but merely in order to call his attention, for possible conversations in Germany, to the exceedingly tense situation in the Alto Adige. The incident, of which he wanted to give me a brief outline, took place in a locality not far from Bolzano, known as Lasa. A Racial-German local resident had repeatedly appeared at the railroad sta-

<sup>31</sup> Not printed here.

tion when trains carrying German travelers were passing through and greeted the travelers with "Heil Hitler" and certain expressions voicing the hope of the South Tyrolese for an early reunion with the German Reich. Recently this man, while again busying himself in this manner, was detained and interrogated. When released by the police, he had marched with a bugle through the streets of his village, with the astonishing result that at once about 250 other Racial-Germans had gathered around him and together marched on the local Fascio House, which was set upon by the crowd. A regular brawl ensued, making it necessary for the police to intervene. There were no serious injuries, but naturally some material damage. The whole thing was a significant indication of the critically strained feelings of the Racial-Germans in the Alto Adige. This had given the Government much food for thought, particularly since experience proved that such events are rapidly exaggerated by rumor and, under the influence of ill-intentioned third parties who were lying in wait for just such an opportunity, a local brawl in Lasa is reported in Verona as a fight, in Florence as a battle, and finally, by the time the rumor reaches Rome, as the beginning of a war. Besides, Count Ciano added, hardly a day went by that he did not receive reports from the Alto Adige telling of some demonstration or other by German tourists, mostly in automobiles, in favor of the return of the South Tyrol to the Reich. I thereupon reminded Count Ciano of what, in his presence, I had communicated to the Duce on this subject a few days ago by direction of the Führer, and especially reminded him of what I had also stressed to Mussolini, namely that we could only take positive action if the Italians would furnish us with specific facts going beyond general allegations. I imagined that in the cases cited by him it ought to be possible at least to take down the license numbers of the automobiles, perhaps also to determine the names of the owners from their passports. After the clear and unmistakable declaration of the Führer's intent I had no doubt whatever that we would take appropriate steps upon such specific information. Count Ciano agreed that general allegations were of little use and promised me to see to it that specific data are included in the reports made to him, which he would then forward to us.

On this occasion he dropped a remark to the effect that it might perhaps be a good thing if, at least in the immediate future, the Consul General at Milan would make less frequent appearances in Bolzano than hitherto. I replied that it was part of the Consul General's duties to pay official visits there on certain days and that, in view of the personality of the present Consul General, I had not

the slightest doubt that he would do nothing that might admit of any misconstruction of his activities. Count Ciano said that he was far from asserting any such thing; he only wanted to point out in this connection that, particularly in the first weeks after the *Anschluss*, excitement among our fellow Germans in the Alto Adige was at a high pitch and this excitement quite naturally became more intense when a representative of the Reich appeared anywhere, even if he conducted himself in an entirely correct manner and confined himself to assisting German nationals. He could only repeat over and over again that the events of March 13, occurring so suddenly, had carried widespread unrest into the Racial-German sector of the local population. As Mussolini had told me in Ciano's presence, out of his own deep conviction he had refrained from placing any obstacles in the path of the natural outcome of the Austrian question, but now he hoped that we in turn were doing everything possible to ease the consequences of his decision at that time, which, as he frankly hinted, was meeting with criticism in many quarters here. He therefore again requested that we give our full attention to these matters. He could also imagine that we might perhaps find a possibility of exerting an influence on the leading minds of the Racial-German movement in the South Tyrol, who probably were known to us, in the same way as Mussolini had told me a few days ago he had dealt with the Italian minority in Dalmatia.

I replied to Count Ciano that I would, of course, submit the contents of his communication to my Government and, knowing the Führer's unequivocal attitude, could declare even now that we were prepared to do whatever lay in our power to do. In the first place I had in mind a definite stop to all propaganda from the Reich, insofar as any still existed. But dealing with Italian nationals of German descent appeared rather to be a matter for the Italian Government.

There can be no doubt that the present excitement in the South Tyrol seriously worries the Duce. He surely does not for a moment doubt the clear statements of the Führer, but still imagines he sees certain difficulties which, in his opinion, it would be possible for us to eliminate. Count Ciano's view that the Duce's attitude in the decisive days of March met with criticism in many quarters here is quite correct. Such critics, of course, are just waiting for an opportunity to confront him with a trite "we told you so," if any difficulties should arise. This is one of the reasons why Mussolini personally is so deeply concerned that we do not create a situation with respect to the two well-known economic questions (tariffs and compulsory registration of securities—reference my telegram No.

117 of yesterday) which would justify his critics here in accusing him of having incurred disadvantages for Italy even in the field of economics by his attitude on March 13.

Like Count Ciano, I believe it is not impossible that the present excitement prevailing in the South Tyrol will gradually yield of itself to a calmer state of mind. Nevertheless, it seems advisable to me, particularly during the first few weeks, but especially before the visit of the Führer, that we do anything in our power which will promote tranquillity. Whether it is advisable to recommend to the Consul General at Milan a certain reserve in his official visits to Bolzano, at least for the next few weeks, I leave to your discretion. I myself am inclined to think that, in view of the personality of the present Consul General, we are not running the risk of becoming involved in an unpleasant situation on account of these official visits. It rather seems to me that such opportunities can be used to enlighten and thus to have a calming effect.

V. MACKENSEN

[Enclosure]

MEMORANDUM

ROME, April 21, 1938.

Prince Philip of Hesse, in accordance with our arrangement, called on me last night in order to inform me of the matters discussed in his conversation with Count Ciano that morning. Ciano had in somewhat emotional terms pointed out to him the dangers which are bound to result for Italo-German relations unless all steps were taken to stop forthwith the propaganda which is still apparent in the South Tyrol. Without indicating in express terms that agencies in the Reich had a hand in this, he chiefly dwelt upon an incident supposed to have occurred recently in the South Tyrol. In a town the Italian or German name of which Prince Philip unfortunately did not understand, a wild brawl, in which several persons were injured, had broken out between some native South Tyrolese and members of the local Fascio. It was of particular importance that the South Tyrolese were using "Heil Hitler" as their battle cry. Under the impression of the conversation, which evidently had been conducted in great earnestness by Ciano, Prince Philip requested me to forward an appropriate despatch to Berlin immediately, if possible by yesterday's courier. I replied to the Prince that for this the facts did not yet appear sufficiently clear to me; besides, only a few days ago, by direction of the Führer, I had given assurances in this respect to the Duce in person. I was

willing, however, to take up with Count Ciano, whom I was to see today, the statements he had made to the Prince and to ask him for further details; for I had already emphasized to Mussolini that we could, of course, take steps only if it was a matter not of general allegations of illicit propaganda by German agencies but of specific facts with which the Italians would have to provide us. Prince Philip consented to my suggestion, but again stressed that judging from his general impressions and not only from his conversation with Ciano, he could only emphasize that we had to devote our full attention to this question.

V. MACKENSEN

### No. 750

1585/382721-23

*The German Chargé d'Affaires in Great Britain (Woermann) to the German Foreign Ministry*

A 1896

LONDON, April 22, 1938.  
Received April 25, 1938.  
(Pol. II 1182)

With reference to the report of February 25, 1938—A 967.<sup>32</sup>

Subject: Under Secretary Butler on German-British relations.

I had a long conversation today with the new Parliamentary Under Secretary in the Foreign Office, Mr. Butler, in the presence of Counselor of Embassy Kordt. Mr. Butler resumed a conversation which I had had with him recently at his country home. At that time, however, the presence of other persons prevented a franker discussion from developing.

Mr. Butler said that he knew from close association with Chamberlain and Lord Halifax that both, now as in the past, held fast to the idea of a real understanding with Germany and that the events in Austria had not altered this in any way. He made himself the spokesman, as it were, of the younger generation in England—that is, a spokesman, as he said, of the intelligent, not the intellectual class. In contrast with the actual intellectuals, among whom there was now as in the past a strong antipathy to the authoritarian states, the circles close to him fully understood that Germany had to pursue her national aims in her own way. The German and the British peoples were of the same blood—which in itself meant a bond of unity. To the circle close to him it was

<sup>32</sup> Not printed. For an account of an interview by a member of the German Embassy in London with Mr. Butler on February 24, 1938, see document No. 128, p. 223.

inconceivable that Germany and England should meet again on the battlefield.

Butler then tried discreetly to direct the conversation to Czechoslovakia but immediately inserted the remark himself that we probably could not yet speak frankly about certain subjects. But immediately thereafter he said that England was aware that Germany would attain "her next goal." The manner in which this was done was, however, decisive for the reaction in England. In this connection, he brought up the subject of the newspaper reports according to which Schuschnigg was to be brought before a court, and said that the reaction against this in England would be very strong. I told him that according to my information Germany had no such intention.

Mr. Butler said in conclusion that he was always available for contributing to an improvement in relations between Germany and England.

Mr. Butler, who, incidentally, knows Germany and speaks some German, too, has always expressed his views on Germany frankly, even before he was appointed to his post by Chamberlain and Lord Halifax. His appointment as Parliamentary Under Secretary in the Foreign Office may therefore be regarded as a certain indication of the plans of the British Prime Minister and the Foreign Secretary.

To characterize the personality of Butler, I wish to add also that his father is a master of Pembroke College, Cambridge, and that several other members of his family, too, are closely connected with Cambridge University. As a result of his marriage to a Courtauld, Butler is in a very independent financial position.

WOERMANN

## No. 751

634/252907

### *The German Ambassador in Italy (Mackensen) to the German Foreign Ministry*

Telegram

No. 120 of April 23      ROME (QUIRINAL), April 23, 1938—3:40 p.m.  
Received April 23, 1938—7:45 p.m.  
(Pol. IV 2780)

The French Chargé d'Affaires paid me his first official call today. He said that the purpose of his first visit with Ciano had been to take up the Italian readiness—expressed repeatedly to the British Ambassador—to discuss with the French, apart from the Italo-

British discussions, certain questions affecting Franco-Italian relations, and to declare that the French were ready to hold such conversations. On his second visit he had merely accepted Ciano's statement that Italy was ready for such conversations. Lastly, in the conversation yesterday, he had developed to Ciano certain general ideas on getting these discussions started. Ciano had reserved the opinion of the Italian Government and, in particular, of the Duce. Ciano's impending trip to Albania and the subsequent visit by the Führer would inevitably mean a certain delay. The Chargé does not expect an ambassador to be named before the Council of the League of Nations adopts a decision on the question of recognition.

On the content of the coming discussions, he remarked that there really were no weighty political problems between Italy and France; it was more a matter of clearing the atmosphere and of individual questions connected with the French attitude as a Mediterranean Great Power, which had already been touched upon in the Italo-British negotiations. He mentioned Syria among other things. With regard to methods, there were two possibilities: either to take up "boldly" all pending questions at the start, or, and he appeared to consider this method more probable, for the time being merely to come to a sort of good-neighbor agreement as a basis for subsequent discussions of details.

MACKENSEN

## No. 752

2058/447791-92

### *The German Foreign Ministry to the German Embassy in Italy*

Cipher Telegram

No. 135

BERLIN, April 23, 1938.  
(zu W III SE 2942, 2953)

With reference to 115<sup>33</sup> and 117.<sup>34</sup>

1. Please inform Count Ciano, for transmittal to Mussolini, that we are of course prepared to take Italian interests into consideration as far as is at all possible, in connection with economic measures in Austria. In those cases where, for urgent general reasons, Italian interests will inevitably be affected by German measures, we shall, at any rate, postpone such measures until the Italians are given an opportunity to express their views on these questions in the impending negotiations. However, we are counting on the agreed

<sup>33</sup> Not printed.

<sup>34</sup> Document No. 747, p. 1084.

date for opening the negotiations, May 9, not being further postponed.

2. The following remarks supplementing yesterday's telephone message, may be made on individual questions:

a) The German agenda, as is customary when agendas are submitted before the start of negotiations, includes those questions whose settlement *we* considered urgent. Our agenda was, of course, only a suggestion and we are prepared to discuss just as thoroughly all questions placed on the agenda by the Italians.

b) The postponement beyond May 9 of the final date for Italians residing in Austria to register their foreign assets gives proof of our efforts to find a way for taking Italian wishes into consideration even when, as in the present case, there are most serious and basic economic arguments against compliance with these wishes.

c) The postponement of tariff measures in Austria until after negotiations with Italy also involves for us serious economic disadvantages and prevents uniformity of tariffs, which is urgently required for the sake of peaceful economic development. We hope, therefore, that the conversations proposed by us for April 25 at Munich between the two railroad administrations will lead to agreement on individual issues.

RIBBENTROP

### No. 753

375/208860-61

*The German Ambassador in Italy (Mackensen) to the German Foreign Ministry*

Telegram

No. 123 of April 24

ROME (QUIRINAL), April 25, 1938—3 p.m.

Received April 25, 1938—5:15 p.m.

Hore-Belisha,<sup>35</sup> whom I met last night at the reception given in his honor by the British Ambassador, asked me rather abruptly in the course of our conversation, which had been nonpolitical up to that point, about the possibilities of a German-British settlement. He declared himself a confirmed supporter of the new course in British policy, inaugurated by Chamberlain, which, in aiming at an understanding, was ridding itself of the old phraseology and not only had a clear conception of existing realities but also drew the logical conclusions from them. Chamberlain was not asking in this policy of his whether he was dealing with democracies or

<sup>35</sup> Leslie Hore-Belisha, Liberal (later Liberal National) Member of Parliament for Devonport, 1923-1945; Secretary of State for War, May 1937-January 1940.

dictatorships, but took things as they were, without trying to "make a lamb out of a lion." Of course, Hore-Belisha continued, it was not clear whether Germany was genuinely interested in such a settlement. Moreover, in any case, developments were now influenced by the fact that British public opinion had suffered a great shock by the Austrian events. Taking up this remark, I replied to Mr. Hore-Belisha that in the long run, in my personal opinion, the events in Austria could only have a favorable effect on possible German-British conversations once the first shock had subsided, for, just as with other thinking people outside the borders of the Reich, in England, too, the realization would gradually awaken that the Führer's action of March 13 had delivered Europe from one of its most burning problems and to that extent had cleared the path for a German-British settlement. At this point Hore-Belisha made a gesture indicating assent. As far as our general attitude to the question of a German-British settlement was concerned, I needed only to refer to the clear statements of the Führer and to what the Foreign Minister had said in the March conversations in London. I was far from casting any doubt on Chamberlain's good intentions or his sense of realism, but he would have a hard time bringing British public opinion into line with his policy, for it was no secret that even some of his Cabinet Members were following him only with hesitation. Hore-Belisha thereupon remarked that differences of opinion within the Government were not uncommon in countries under parliamentary rule, but that Chamberlain's position was steadily growing stronger. In any event, however, the whole question would take a long time.

In conclusion we agreed that this did not preclude a continuation of the efforts undertaken so far.

MACKENSEN

## No. 754

2058/447793

*The German Ambassador in Italy (Mackensen) to the German Foreign Ministry*

Telegram

No. 124 of April 24 ROME (QUIRINAL), April 25, 1938—1:40 p.m.  
Received April 25, 1938—3:15 p.m.

With reference to telegram No. 135 of the 23d.

Yesterday evening I informed Ciano, who is leaving very early tomorrow morning for Albania, of the content of the above telegram. He appeared satisfied and promised to inform the Duce at once.

MACKENSEN

## No. 755

348/201537-44

*Memorandum*<sup>36</sup>THE ITALO-BRITISH AGREEMENT OF APRIL 16, 1938<sup>37</sup>

I. Essentially, the Italo-British Agreement of April 16, 1938, is a treaty settlement of the situation created in northeast Africa and the Red Sea area by the Italian conquest of Abyssinia—a settlement which is to go into effect after two important political conditions are met. The settlement is accompanied by a number of declarations and supplementary agreements, almost all of which are closely connected with this real objective of the Agreement. Only the exchange of notes concerning Italy's accession to the Naval Agreement of March 25, 1936, is outside this framework.

II. The two important political conditions on the fulfillment of which depends the entry into force of the entire Agreement are stated in the exchange of notes concerning Italy's policy regarding Spain. They consist of the obligation of Italy to withdraw from Spain at the end of the Civil War without securing any privileges for herself there, and the promise on the part of England to make possible the recognition of Italian sovereignty over Abyssinia by the members of the League of Nations. To be sure, it is not expressly stated in this connection that on her part England will then likewise grant such recognition, but this is implied. This recogni-

<sup>36</sup> This unsigned memorandum is from a file of the State Secretary consisting of papers assembled in preparation for the Führer's visit to Rome.

<sup>37</sup> The text of the Anglo-Italian Agreement of April 16, 1938, and accompanying documents are printed in the British White Paper, Cmd. 5726; also in *Documents on International Affairs*, 1938, vol. II, pp. 141-156.

tion, to judge by the entire contents of the Agreement of April 16, is in substance already taken for granted, even though its execution is still held in abeyance. The entry into force of the Agreement will, therefore, automatically imply formal recognition.

The obligations which Italy has now assumed in regard to Spain go beyond the exchange of notes of December 31, 1936, and the so-called Gentlemen's Agreement of January 2, 1937; these, by the way, have again been expressly confirmed in Annex 1 of the Agreement of April 16. In the Gentlemen's Agreement of January 2, 1937, England and Italy already pledged themselves to make no attempt to change the territorial *status quo* in the Mediterranean; in addition, the exchange of notes of December 31, 1936, contains the supplementary Italian pledge to leave Spanish territorial integrity intact and unchanged under all circumstances. The notes now exchanged as part of the new Agreement go farther, and contain, for one thing, the obligation to evacuate Spanish territory at the conclusion of the Civil War at the latest (that is, to evacuate the volunteers as well as all Italian war matériel). Furthermore, the pledge concerning Spanish territorial integrity is now, more clearly than in 1936, extended to all Spanish territory, including the Balearic Islands, Morocco, and overseas possessions. In addition, Italy now expressly renounces all special political, military, and economic privileges in these regions.

These further concessions on the part of Italy in the Spanish question are balanced by the fact that all these pledges, including those of December 1936, and January 1937, now are dependent for their effectiveness on the fulfillment by England of the condition necessary to putting the Agreement into effect, i.e., the basic elimination of the difficulties still facing the formal recognition of Italian sovereignty over Abyssinia.

III. The settlement of the situation created in northeast Africa and the areas bordering on the Red Sea by the Italian conquest of Abyssinia is taken up in the Agreement of April 16, 1938, mainly in the texts of two separate agreements: 1) the Italo-British agreement concerning certain areas in the Middle East, and 2) the Italo-British-Egyptian "good neighbor" agreement concerning East Africa.

The agreement concerning certain areas in the Middle East, that is, Arabia and the Red Sea, is the only text among the otherwise quite unsystematic series of agreements which is formulated in articles corresponding to the form customary in international law. In content this agreement guarantees the *status quo* in Arabia and the area of the Red Sea. It is, in effect, an agreement in favor

of third parties, namely of Saudi Arabia and Yemen; but at the same time it actually amounts also to a renunciation by Italy of the pursuit of political objectives on the east coast of the Red Sea. England is paying for this renunciation by limiting to a certain extent her freedom of movement in Arabia (articles 2 and 6) and by conceding to Italy a most-favored-nation status in the Protectorate of Aden. For the rest, the agreement may be denounced after 10 years; it therefore regulates the situation in Arabia only for a limited period.

The "good neighbor" agreement between Italian East Africa, the Sudan, and British East Africa, concerning East African questions, is much less complete than the agreement concerning Arabia and the Red Sea. In essence it only forbids raids and acts of violence, and assistance to the organization of [guerrilla?] bands and slavery on the borders of Abyssinia. It is to be supplemented by the negotiations stipulated in the Agreement of April 16; these concern the demarcation of frontiers in East Africa and the clarification of the Italian, British, Sudanese, and Egyptian interests there, as well as commercial relations between Italian East Africa and the British Empire, including India.

But in spite of the incomplete condition of the last-mentioned agreement, it must be recognized that in the Agreement of April 16, the pacification of the whole sphere of northeast Africa and Arabia has been accomplished. Only the relatively small area of the French Somali coast has not been included within this framework.

IV. Some of the statements annexed to the Agreement of April 16, 1938, have direct bearing on the two agreements just described. Among them are, first of all, the statement concerning the Suez Canal which confirms the continuance in force of the Constantinople Convention of 1888; the statement concerning the Tana Sea, which likewise only confirms the previous agreement thereon; and the statement concerning freedom of religion and the treatment to be accorded British religious bodies in Italian East Africa. Likewise to be considered as a direct supplement to the two agreements is the declaration concerning military duties of natives in Italian East Africa, according to which the natives may only be employed in local police duty and in the defense of the territory. It has its counterpart in article 6 No. 1 b) of the agreement on certain areas in the Middle East, where England assumes the same obligations concerning the natives in the British protectorates of southeastern Arabia. Since these provisions permit the use of natives for the defense of the territory, they do not themselves shut the door to the organization of native armed forces.

V. Aside from the Italian accession to the Naval Agreement of March 25, 1936, already mentioned at the outset (which failed to take place at the time solely because of the Abyssinian War) the following items in the Agreement of April 16 go beyond the narrow framework of the two agreements concerning Arabia and East Africa: the agreement concerning the exchange of military information, the exchange of notes concerning the decrease in the number of Italian troops in Libya, the statement concerning propaganda, and the "oral" declarations concerning Palestine. These arrangements really represent provisions for carrying out the Mediterranean Agreement of January 2, 1937, the so-called Gentlemen's Agreement, which in consequence of the Spanish Civil War has hitherto remained a dead letter and which is now to be infused with new life by the Agreement of April 16. The practical significance of these agreements, particularly of the agreement concerning military information and the declaration concerning propaganda, will essentially depend on the spirit in which they will be put into practice. The declaration concerning propaganda can easily become the source of numerous misunderstandings.

VI. In summary, an evaluation of the Italo-British Agreement of April 16, 1938, will of necessity lead to the conclusion that this Agreement, in case of loyal observance on the part of the contracting parties, leaves no room in the immediate future for any further Italian expansionist policy in the Mediterranean, in North Africa, or in the Near East, at least not for an expansionist policy at the expense of England or of British interests. To this extent the Italo-British understanding is the expression of the well-known statement of Mussolini to the effect that Italy now belongs to the satiated powers. It is clear, however, that an agreement put together in such a mosaic-like fashion with elastic arrangements such as, for instance, the declaration concerning propaganda, leaves sufficient possibilities for declaring it void some day when it is no longer consistent with the over-all policies of the contracting Powers. For the time being, however, it gives both Powers a breathing spell, and also a basis on which positive cooperation would be possible with third powers.

Essentially, the British *quid pro quo* is the abandonment of the doctrine, hitherto defended at Geneva, of nonrecognition of conquests made by force of arms. Thus British policy, at any rate in regard to Italy, returns to an attitude of political realism; this may prove to be important in the future for other questions, too—for instance in East Asia, where British policy, in conformity with that of the United States, still holds fast to this

doctrine (Stimson Doctrine). For British policy the Agreement also signifies a renewed rejection of the idea of organizing blocs on an ideological basis.

In addition to this limitation of its objectives, the result of the Agreement for Italian policy is an easing of the situation, which will give Italy greater freedom of movement in questions of Central and Southeastern Europe. For the time being the specter of a still impending settlement of accounts with England has receded into the background; this may also weaken Italian feeling of entire dependence on German support. The Berlin-Rome Axis retains its significance for Italy; it assumes, however, more the character of a draft payable in the future and is for Italy no longer to the same extent as heretofore something imperatively demanded by the situation of the moment.

From the point of view of German policy, the Italo-British Agreement is advantageous as an important contribution to the easing of the international situation. The risk of possibly being drawn into a British-Italian conflict has considerably lessened for us. In like manner, the efforts of Italian policy to maintain the Berlin-Rome Axis intact, which were obvious at the conclusion of the Agreement, are in complete accord with our interest. Since the effort is still being made to convince us that only comprehensive general settlements, with the participation of all interested parties, should be considered, we may count as a gain the new vindication of the idea of bilateral arrangements which this Agreement represents. In any case, it may be hoped that the execution of this Agreement will further discredit these methods of the past, which are doomed to sterility; this would facilitate our future work in the field of foreign affairs.

BERLIN, April 27, 1938.

#### B. THE AXIS STRENGTHENED, APRIL-JUNE 1938

No. 756

2529/520267-68

*The State Secretary in the Office of the Commissioner for the Four Year Plan (Körner) to the Foreign Ministry*

St. M. Dev. 2932

BERLIN W 8, April 30, 1938.

I am enclosing a copy of a letter from State Secretary Brinkmann for your information. I too consider it necessary that, during the conversations in Rome, no legal acknowledgment of Austria's political debts be made to the Italian Government, in order not to establish

any precedent which would render negotiations with other states more difficult. However, it seems to be the general understanding of the agencies concerned that the Italians can and must be given assurances that they will suffer no loss.

KÖRNER

[Enclosure]

*The State Secretary in the Reich and Prussian Ministry of Economics (Brinkmann) to the Office of the Commissioner for the Four Year Plan*

St. M. Dev. 2032

BERLIN, April 29, 1938.

I request that before his departure for Rome, the Führer and Chancellor be informed that, according to an investigation which has just been concluded by the competent agencies of the Reich, acknowledgment of legal succession to the State debts of the now extinct independent Austrian State of St. Germain can be rejected on the basis of general principles of international law. Such rejection is therefore contemplated, if only in the interest of the German foreign exchange situation. It would from the very beginning decisively jeopardize the coming German negotiations with the creditor states concerned, above all Great Britain, and would bring about unbearable sacrifices of foreign exchange, if the succession to the Austrian State debts, particularly the three bond issues of the Federal Government, were acknowledged in the case of Italy. The representatives of the Italian Government have already demanded such acknowledgment in the negotiations recently broken off. The refusal of Germany to take a positive stand on the question of legal succession at this time has led to a suspension of the negotiations. The danger therefore exists that the Head of the Italian Government may use the opportunity of the Führer's visit to secure German concessions on this point. I therefore urgently request that the Führer and Chancellor be informed promptly.

Heil Hitler!

BRINKMANN

No. 757

664/257281-82

*The German Chargé d'Affaires in Great Britain (Th. Kordt) to the  
German Foreign Ministry*

Air Mail Telegram

No. 228 of April 30

LONDON, April 30, 1938.

Received May 1, 1938—5 p.m.

(Pol. II 1265/38)

In conclusion,<sup>38</sup> the information available here gives the following picture of the most important results of the conferences between the British and French Ministers:

1. *Military cooperation.*

No new assistance obligations were undertaken by Britain; however, the cooperation provided for in the Agreements of March 19, 1936, and April 1, 1936, will be intensified, particularly in the field of aviation and in the furnishing of war matériel.

2. *The Czechoslovak question.*

Both Powers will exert pressure on Prague to go beyond the concessions suggested by the Czechs. Berlin will be informed of the details. Great Britain is not prepared to undertake new commitments in support of Czechoslovakia beyond those made by Chamberlain on March 24, 1938.<sup>39</sup> England is vitally interested in the Czechoslovak question insofar as the peace of Europe is jeopardized by what she considers "rough" treatment of the problem by Germany. In all probability a German attack would result in intervention by England in the course of French assistance.

3. *Spanish Civil War.*

The question of the withdrawal of war matériel from Spain was touched on and is to be pursued further—whether in direct negotiations or in the Nonintervention Committee is not clear. Besides, France is prepared to abandon her previous demands for withdrawal according to categories, and to be accommodating in the question of retaining the frontier control beyond 30 days after the count [of volunteers] begins.

4. *Stresa Front.*

The French tried to win over the British to the idea of reviving the Stresa Front. England does not seem to be interested in this;

<sup>38</sup> Earlier telegrams on the visit of MM. Daladier and Bonnet to London are printed in vol. II, documents Nos. 139 and 143, pp. 246 and 252.

<sup>39</sup> In the House of Commons. For extracts, see *Documents on International Affairs, 1938*, vol. II, p. 120.

on the contrary, she is seeking closer cooperation of the two Axes under British and German leadership.

5. *Russia.*

Russia has not been informed about the nature of the Anglo-French Conferences. There are indications that the British have suggested to the French that they become more aloof from the Russians.

TH. KORDT

No. 758

2058/447809-12

*Memorandum*<sup>40</sup>

The present close German-Italian relationship found its first concrete expression in the conversations carried on in Berlin in October 1936, with the Italian Foreign Minister, Count Ciano. The factors in this political relationship are as follows:

No bloc directed against any third party, but, on the other hand, complete armed solidarity of interests against any attempt at disturbance by third parties; defense against the Third International as a common enemy; and constructive cooperation with all European states for whom European peace is as important as for Germany and Italy.

German-Italian friendship has since developed vigorously—partly because of the course of international events (the Spanish question)—and has been especially deepened by the visit of the Duce to Germany last September. By the accession of Italy on November 6 to the German-Japanese Anti-Comintern Pact of September 25, 1936, the Berlin-Rome Axis became a world-wide political triangle.

The Berlin-Rome Axis stood its test above all in the Austrian question by virtue of the favorable attitude of Mussolini. In its statement of March 13, the Fascist Grand Council characterized the reunion of Austria with Germany "as the result of an a priori situation and as the clear expression of the feelings and the wishes of the Austrian people, which have been unequivocally confirmed by the mighty public demonstrations with which these events were greeted." The Führer accordingly, in his speech before the Reichstag on March 18, expressed his particular thanks to the Duce for his attitude. He pointed out that a community of interests and ideologies had become an indissoluble friendship, and he called the bound-

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\* Marginal notations read as follows: "For the Führer's visit [to Italy]," and "Respectfully submitted to Counselor of Legation Clodius for his information, in accordance with telephone instruction of April 30. [Initial illegible] May 2."

aries of Italy inviolable for us. The question of the South Tyrol thereby was removed from all German-Italian discussions. All German propaganda in favor of the South Tyrol is forbidden.

The emphasis of Italian policy, which formerly was directed toward Central Europe, has since the Abyssinian War (from October 5, 1935, to May 9, 1936) shifted somewhat to the Mediterranean area. On March 25, 1937, Mussolini concluded a treaty with Yugoslavia by which the Adriatic question was settled peaceably, a treaty which was welcomed by Germany. The policy of friendly cooperation between the two States, initiated by the conclusion of this treaty, was again confirmed by the visit of the Yugoslav Prime Minister to Rome last December. The Anglo-Italian agreements signed in Rome on April 16 serve the purpose of easing the strained Anglo-Italian relations dating back to the policy of sanctions against Italy, invoked on British initiative. The first attempt to settle the strained Anglo-Italian relations was the conclusion on January 2, 1937, of the Anglo-Italian agreement concerning the Mediterranean. The contemplated negotiations concerning a general Anglo-Italian understanding suggested in the exchange of letters between Chamberlain and Mussolini toward the end of July 1937, were postponed again and again. It was not until this April that the Anglo-Italian negotiations, which aimed at a mutual clarification of old points of difference and the settlement of difficulties in the Mediterranean and the Near East, led to any result. The Anglo-Italian Agreement, which is welcomed by us, does not, of course, indicate any community of interest. It has, however, created a basis for the two countries to live as neighbors in the above-mentioned areas with a minimum of friction. The entry into force of the Treaty still hinges on the final settlement of the Spanish question, which, however, is well on the way to solving itself through the victorious advance of Franco.

France, too, is now seeking an understanding with Italy, and has initiated conversations with the Italian Government for that purpose. These conversations, however, will probably result largely in improvement of the general atmosphere, since the problems to be discussed are of lesser importance.

The Italian Empire has thus far not been recognized by the League of Nations or by a part of its members. Italy therefore withdrew from the League of Nations on December 11, 1937, a step which was specially acclaimed in the German Government's official declaration of December 13, 1937. As far as the recognition of the Italian Empire is concerned, the British Government has pledged itself in the Agreement of April 16 to take steps to clear up the question with

the member states at the next session of the Council of the League of Nations.

Treatment of the pending economic problems between Germany and Italy must be reserved for later intensive discussion between the participating delegations. These questions are for the most part complicated and difficult to solve.

As far as the cultural relations between Germany and Italy are concerned, they are to be deepened and intensified by a cultural agreement which is in preparation.

No. 759

348/201643

*The State Secretary in the German Foreign Ministry (Weizsäcker),  
Temporarily in Rome, to the German Foreign Ministry*

Telegram

VERY SECRET

ROME (QUIRINAL), May 9, 1938—1:55 p.m.

URGENT

Received May 9, 1938—5:05 p.m.

No. 135 of May 9

Delegation No. 1

For the Under Secretary personally.

For your personal information. A draft political agreement relating to mutual German-Italian relations which Ciano handed to the Reich Foreign Minister at the beginning of our stay in Rome was immediately laid aside and called meaningless, particularly by Mussolini.

A German draft of totally different content (the attitude of Germany and Italy toward third powers) was handed to Ciano a few days later for study. However, the Reich Foreign Minister is by no means pressing for the conclusion of an agreement; and, as a matter of fact, the idea has now been abandoned.

The real political result of the Italian visit is reflected and made definite in the two great speeches of the evening of May 7 in the Palazzo Venezia. The Führer's words concerning the Alpine frontier and the meaning of our friendship made a very lasting impression here.<sup>40a</sup>

In his coming speech in Genoa, Mussolini will summarize the significance of the Führer's visit and perhaps also intimate that it might still be given expression in a written agreement. On our part nothing will be said about that for the present.

<sup>40a</sup> Extracts from the speeches of Mussolini and Hitler on May 7, 1938, are printed in *Documents on International Affairs, 1938*, vol. II, pp. 32-34.

German journalists here are being referred entirely to the above-mentioned speeches and asked to let those speeches and the boundlessly magnificent reception given the Führer throughout all of Italy speak for themselves.

WEIZSÄCKER

No. 760

2129/464327-28

*Counselor of Legation Braun von Stumm to the Head of the Information and Press Department in the German Foreign Ministry (Aschmann)*

ROME, May 11, 1938.

DEAR HERR ASCHMANN: As agreed, I am reporting to you on my visit to the informant, who is known to you. He expressed himself to me with his accustomed frankness. To start with, he said quite bluntly that at the beginning of the visit the atmosphere in all circles of the population had been decidedly bad. Everyone had cursed openly that millions were now being spent to honor Hitler for having played a trick on Italy in the Austrian question; but just because the time had appeared so inopportune, the visit had been all the more necessary to prevent the incipient feeling of hostility from penetrating further. There was added to this political ill feeling the fact that the population had felt itself seriously inconvenienced by numerous police measures.

This unpropitious atmosphere had been suddenly changed when the whole Italian people heard the speech of the Führer and Chancellor from the Palazzo Venezia. It was not so much a matter of the concrete content of the statements; they were, after all, fundamentally a repetition of what was known. The decisive factor was the inspired form, which had made an impression of greatest sincerity on even the last doubter. In a people as emotional as the Italians, all circles had been gripped by its effect. It could be said today that the shock that the Italian people had suffered as a result of Austria's *Anschluss* had been compensated for by the Führer's trip, and that the old relationship of confidence between Germany and Italy again existed. He was therefore looking forward cheerfully to his coming return to Berlin.

As far as the Sudeten German question is concerned, great caution appeared advisable to the informant for the present, at any rate as far as active operations were concerned. In this connection he was thinking less of possible reactions in Italy than of the great tension that had been produced in the other powers by the lightning-like

settlement of the Austrian question, which might (under unfavorable circumstances) have led to a military coalition of all against Germany. To be sure, the whole world saw today that the kind of rule which M. Beneš might still have in mind was over and done with, once and for all. It would therefore be up to Germany to support with effective logic the demands which the Sudeten Germans could make for right and justice for themselves. A great deal depended nowadays on who placed himself in the wrong.

Finally the informant mentioned the great amount of ill feeling toward France being felt in Italy recently and particularly right now. The gigantic shipments of arms to Spain that France had now set in motion without any hesitation not only were to blame for the fact that peace and quiet could not return to that sorely tried country, but in the last analysis had caused the extraordinarily heavy losses among the Italian volunteers. The French would not be easily forgiven for that.

With best wishes and Heil Hitler!

BRAUN VON STUMM

### No. 761

348/201436-38

*The German Foreign Ministry to All German Embassies (Except Rome, Tokyo, Hankow, Rio de Janeiro, Buenos Aires, and Santiago)*

Cipher Telegram

BERLIN, May , 1938.<sup>41</sup>  
(e. o. Pol. IV 3210/38)

For your information.

The Führer's visit to Italy is to be accounted a great success, and not merely because of its brilliant official course. During repeated intimate conversations of the Führer with the Duce, and during his detailed discussions with the Duce, Ciano, and other authoritative personages, the Rome-Berlin Axis proved to be a solidly reliable component of our future policy. The friendship between the Führer and the Duce has become even firmer. The common basis of the National Socialist and Fascist ideologies guarantees a similarity of interests.

Austria is eliminated as a problem between Germany and Italy. Mussolini evaluated realistically her political liquidation. Both parties are now securing benefits from the settlement of this last

<sup>41</sup> Probably about May 12. Weizsäcker, in his memorandum for Woermann of May 12, *infra*, mentions that the Rome speeches "are being supplemented for our Missions by the informational telegram e.o. Pol. IV 3210."

point of difference. After the Führer again solemnly proclaimed inviolability of our common frontier and this declaration has been appreciated in Italy in its full significance, the only remaining task is the stabilization of the present German-Italian frontier, the inviolability of which is an integral part of German-Italian friendship. We shall severely suppress all propaganda violating this policy. Mussolini for his part has promised to guarantee the cultural interests of the population of South Tyrol in regard to language and schools.

The close German-Italian political and diplomatic cooperation needed no new formal declaration, since it has been proved in practice and is already established custom. Whether and to what extent the conversations held will give rise to later concrete agreements remains to be seen. Whatever references may be made by Mussolini in his speech shortly to be delivered in Genoa should be interpreted in this sense.

The settlement of outstanding political accounts between Italy and England, as well as the approaching settlement of minor African questions between Italy and France, facilitates our common policy directed toward a peaceful future. Consequently, the Italians would welcome it if a German-British settlement were arrived at, too, although they did not press for it. The conversations about military intentions which have been alleged by the foreign press did not take place and are not contemplated, either.

As far as the Sudeten German question is concerned, the conversations clearly brought out the fact that the Italians understood our concern for the fate of Sudeten Germans. The claims of the foreign press about a delimitation of spheres of influence in the Danube region and the Balkans are untrue. Situation in Southeastern Europe was not discussed in detail. Nor did the Spanish question offer any cause for new decisions either.

The vigilance of the Italian and German Governments will continue unchanged and manifest itself in unreduced armament.

The banquet speeches in the Palazzo Venezia on May 7 will remain authoritative in regard to the orientation of your conversation.

RIBBENTROP

## No. 762

848/201441-42

*The State Secretary in the German Foreign Ministry (Weizsäcker)  
to the Under State Secretary (Woermann).*

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

BERLIN, May 12, 1938.

The political result of the Führer's visit to Rome is in the main contained in the banquet speeches of the Führer and Mussolini in the Palazzo Venezia. These basic principles are being supplemented for our Missions by the informational telegram e. o. Pol. IV 3210.<sup>42</sup>

I should like to lay down a few more points for confidential departmental use.

From remarks of Mussolini and Ciano it was unequivocally apparent that in case of a conflict between Germany and Czechoslovakia, Italy means to remain at "order arms"; she does not have the intention of hindering the German action, but also not of actively supporting the German aims regarding Prague.

On the basis of the conversations of the Führer with Mussolini and of the Reich Foreign Minister with Ciano and Mussolini, we interpreted this Italian attitude that the Italians do not think that there is any very great danger of a German-Czech clash. Italy was confident that we would handle the Czechoslovak affair without any European conflict and that France and England would probably not be prepared to intervene by armed force in favor of Czechoslovakia.

The conversations showed, furthermore, that Italian policy, for the time being, is directed toward consolidation, peace, and at the same time further security and armament. It should not be deduced from the above that later on, as well, Italy is to be considered as satiated in the Mediterranean area, although Italy's long-range objectives in the Mediterranean seem not yet to be determined. However, they must presumably be sought in a policy which is directed principally against France, while England will probably be spared as much as possible.

No appetite for Spanish possessions was apparent. The Spanish policy of Italy as well as her Chinese policy appears to be unchanged; dissatisfaction was the dominant tone toward the United States, and contempt toward Russia. French domestic developments were viewed as decadent and as driving toward civil war.

WEIZSÄCKER

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<sup>42</sup> Document No. 761, *supra*.

No. 763

634/252908-09

*The German Ambassador in France (Welczeck) to the German  
Foreign Ministry*

Telegram

No. 242 of May 16

PARIS, May 16, 1938.

Received May 16, 1938—4:45 p.m.

Ever since the beginning of the Franco-Italian negotiations, their prospects were purposely depicted here as brilliant, and their immediately impending conclusion was announced time and again. During the Führer's trip to Italy, an alleged weakening of the Berlin-Rome Axis was frequently referred to in the French press, and fables were spun of clashes between German and Italian interests. In this way, hopes were formed among the French public—and probably in official circles too, at times—that the attachment of Italy to the Western Powers in some way or other had again moved within the realm of possibility.

The effect of Mussolini's Genoa speech<sup>43</sup> was therefore all the more crushing in France. Astonishment and disappointment, in some cases even bordering on consternation and dejection, prevail among Frenchmen friendly to Italy, that is, from the Right far into the Center. Among Leftist circles the failure of the so-called realistic politicians, Daladier and Bonnet, is emphasized; the malignant joy that is expressed over this cannot, however, hide the feeling of disappointment that undoubtedly exists even in the parties of the Left over the rebuff given France by Mussolini.

In papers of all shades of party opinion, the first reaction of the French press to the speech was sharp. In the overwhelming majority, the comment was that, as a result, the prospects for further efforts of France vis-à-vis Mussolini were becoming smaller and smaller.

As late as Saturday night, a soothing special report was given out by the Havas Agency, saying that influential French circles did not draw any pessimistic conclusions from the speech. The difference of tone toward Great Britain and France could be regarded as a tactical move with respect to the French negotiators. Mussolini's assertion regarding the French attitude toward the Spanish Civil War was incorrect; France was the founder of the policy of non-intervention; she had proved this at Geneva toward del Vayo,<sup>44</sup> and in London by accepting the land control. The Spanish question

<sup>43</sup> See document No. 764, *infra*.

<sup>44</sup> Julio Alvarez del Vayo, Spanish Minister for Foreign Affairs.

could not form a stumbling block between France and Italy, since the latter had made commitments on this point toward England, and France could limit herself to taking note of those commitments. With regard to Mussolini's statements on ideological warfare, it is pointed out that it was the three democracies who had always spoken out against the crusading spirit and bloc policies. The speech was to be considered an expansion of Mussolini's Rome toast; it indicated that the German-Italian entente was closer than had been assumed up to this time.

In commenting on the speech, yesterday's and today's newspapers in the great majority follow the above statements. The attitude of today's *Populaire* is characteristic. It says that one cannot speak of a united France that desires the victory of Red Spain, but at most of two French parties, one of which is for the Reds, the other against them. Rome correspondents point out above all that the demand for Franco-Italian negotiations is not lessened by the speech; prospects for their satisfactory conclusion have not disappeared, but at worst have been only somewhat postponed. Special attention is paid to the report of the *Temps*' Rome correspondent printed under "*Dernières Nouvelles*" in the *Temps* of May 16. He characterizes Mussolini's speech as a rejection of joint action with the democratic states, particularly of a four-power pact and as a proclamation of new faith in the destiny of the totalitarian states, as well as an indication of closer cooperation of the Rome-Berlin Axis. He justifies this statement by some remarkable reasoning.

WELCZECK

### No. 764

1486/368623-26

*The German Ambassador in Italy (Mackensen) to the German Foreign Ministry*

2681/38

ROME, May 17, 1938.  
Received May 20, 1938.  
(Pol. IV 3442)

### POLITICAL REPORT

Subject: Mussolini's speech at Genoa on May 14.

On May 14, at Genoa, Mussolini delivered his great speech, notice of which had already been given in the conversations during the Führer's visit here. Its content is known to the Foreign Ministry

from the press. I am enclosing the Italian text in a clipping from the *Messaggero* of May 15.<sup>45</sup>

After a brief introduction, Mussolini turned to foreign policy. For the sake of completeness, I reproduce below the essential statements on that subject:

On March 11, Italy had been faced with a decision which, depending on its outcome, might have resulted in the maintenance of peace or in the outbreak of war. In response to a diplomatic step (what is meant, of course, is the French attempt to bring about a united front of France, Great Britain, and Italy against Germany) Italy had given an immediate and sharp "No," and not simply because she could not act otherwise, but of her own free will. Since 1934 the situation had changed fundamentally; sanctions had been applied, which Italy had not yet forgotten; Stresa was dead and buried, and would never rise again. Italy could not afford the luxury of attempting to prevent the course of a national revolution (developments in Austria) and of thus taking over for an unlimited period the "odious task" of Hapsburg Austria. Germany and Italy had now become next-door neighbors. Their friendship was lasting. The Italian people had wished to prove this by the reception prepared for the German Chancellor. The speeches that had been made at the Palazzo Venezia on May 7 were more than "diplomatic statements"; they represented something solemn and historically final.

The "Axis," to which Italy would remain loyal, had not prevented Italy from carrying on a policy of understanding with those powers that honestly wanted an understanding, such as Yugoslavia and Great Britain. The recent Agreement between the two world Powers, Great Britain and Italy, would doubtless endure. As for relations with France, he did not know whether the present conversations would lead to a positive result, particularly as the two countries took opposite stands on the Spanish question.

Italy wanted peace, just as Germany did. But, in order to insure peace, it was necessary to be armed. If the democratic countries wanted to wage a war against the authoritarian states, which perhaps was not really the case, the latter would immediately combine into a bloc and would hold together to the end.

By this speech, Mussolini intended to sum up the results of the Führer's visit in front of the whole world. He has once more defended his attitude in the decisive days of March; this, as is known, has been severely criticized here. At the same time he has laid down the policy which he intends to follow after the Führer's visit. He has once more referred with all possible emphasis to the toasts of

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<sup>45</sup> Not printed here.

May 7, and has set them forth as an act of solemn and final character, of historic importance, above diplomacy and politics. The extraordinarily happy effect of the Führer's words of May 7 is confirmed to me again and again by the most varied sources. This is shown clearly in the fact that the distrust of many Italians (and not least of certain circles in the army) with regard to the events of March 13 is increasingly being transformed into an understanding of the Duce's realistic attitude. This effect, becoming more and more evident, has probably contributed toward the decision of Mussolini to refrain from even mentioning in his speech the possibility of a written bond going beyond those solemn assurances (see telegraphic report No. 135 of May 9—Delegation telegram No. 1<sup>46</sup>). Whether the desire for a bond in writing will again awaken here some day will depend partly on whether we succeed in maintaining the sentiment within the country as changed by the Führer's words of May 7. Not the least important requirement will be that in our future actions incorporating Austria, we grant to Italian interests the political, economic, and cultural consideration which Mussolini thinks himself justified in expecting from us in response to his gesture of March 13. And it will be necessary, above all, that all authorities in the Reich, when dealing with the South Tyrol, constantly keep in mind the solemn words of the Führer.

It corresponds entirely with our view that the Duce, when he speaks of the Axis as the foundation of Italy's future policy, also emphasizes his freedom of action with regard to other countries which show an honest desire for understanding. It is gratifying that, at the same time and with the directness peculiar to him, he again repudiates the idea of the Stresa Front; this proves that in making use of his freedom of movement he has no idea of having the Rome-Berlin Axis impaired.

The motive that led him to handle the French with icy coldness in his speech, at a time when the Italo-French conversations have hardly gone beyond some first contacts, should probably be sought in the reports that have reached him regarding the enormous shipments across the Franco-Spanish frontier with which the Red Party was recently supported and is still being supported.

It may attract notice that the speech passes over certain questions of Italian foreign policy that are, after all, of importance, such as Abyssinia and the Rome Protocols. The probable explanation would seem to be the Duce's wish not to weaken the impression of his remarks on his relationship toward us, as he sees it after the Führer's visit, by statements on other questions.

V. MACKENSEN

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<sup>46</sup> Document No. 759, p. 1106.

## No. 765

223/150218

*The German Ambassador in Italy (Mackensen) to the German Foreign Ministry*

Telegram

No. 139 of May 18

ROME, May 18, 1938—11:30 p.m.

Received May 19, 1938—5 a.m.

With reference to 162.<sup>47</sup>

Giannini's deputy, in reply to an inquiry, informed the Embassy specialist that Italy left the conference of the guarantor states at the express wish of the Head of the Government, first, because the conference was an appendage of the League of Nations; second, because, in conformance with Axis policy, Italy did not want to do anything that would damage German interests; and third, because Italy hoped to be able to settle the question of the Austrian loan directly with Germany. The other guarantor states are said to be continuing to negotiate without Italy. As these negotiations are secret, it will be hard to learn anything.

Giannini's deputy requests, referring to the above accommodating attitude, that Germany show an equally accommodating attitude with regard to Italian wishes during the present Berlin negotiations. Guarneri<sup>48</sup> regrets that Germany is very stiff in these negotiations.

Attolico, who called on me today, touched on the Berlin negotiations with the remark that in case no agreement has been reached by the time of his return to Berlin, which will be soon, he would have to turn to the Führer, by direction of the Duce. In view of his unconditionally clear attitude on March 13, Mussolini expected from the Führer corresponding consideration for Italian interests which, trusting in the Führer, he had neglected to safeguard before taking his positive position on the Austrian question.

MACKENSEN

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<sup>47</sup> Not printed.

<sup>48</sup> Felice Guarneri, Italian Minister of Finance.

## No. 766

634/252911-12

*The German Ambassador in France (Welczeck) to the German  
Foreign Ministry*

Telegram

No. 247 of May 19

PARIS, May 19, 1938.

Received May 19, 1938—5:45 p.m.

(Pol. IV 3430)

Italian reticence in the matter of the Italo-French conversations is daily accentuating the uneasiness of the French public and is beginning to cause the Government worry and difficulties. After Franco-Italian agreement had been represented as easily attainable, it must now be generally admitted that the negotiations are at a standstill or, as various Rome correspondents of newspapers here report, have been interrupted. Italy is said to consider an understanding impossible as long as the French Government tolerated and encouraged the supply of ammunition and war matériel for Red Spain across the Pyrenean frontier and through French Mediterranean coastal waters. The press states plainly that for these reasons Italy is placing the blame on France for failure to reach an understanding. The defense is comparatively lame: some of the arguments used are that Mussolini has not given up or diminished nonintervention [*sic*] for Franco either, or that reports of the French Government's toleration of deliveries of arms are not correct. The hope of reaching an understanding is maintained, but increasingly with a tone of discouragement. British support and mediation are called desirable and partially in operation. In this way, too, the alleged aim of Italian and German policy, that of driving a wedge between Paris and London on the question of Spain, is to be counteracted.

An interesting light is cast on the feeling of the French Government on this question by remarks Foreign Minister Bonnet made to me yesterday when we met socially. The assiduity with which Bonnet made his statements caused them to appear almost like a formal reckoning, and might create the impression that they were intended to create a favorable atmosphere in Rome, detoured via Berlin. M. Bonnet said that he did not understand the doubts expressed in various quarters regarding the honesty of the French Government's non-intervention policy. After all, he had opposed the Spanish Foreign Minister, del Vayo, with extraordinary vigor at Geneva and had most sharply combatted his proposal, which would have put an end to the nonintervention policy. He had been specially indignant that

—despite the continued adherence of England and France to the policy of nonintervention, which had been stated quite plainly during the discussion—the Spaniards had attempted to create confusion by introducing a resolution. As far as the delivery of arms to Red Spain was concerned, he could solemnly assure me, in the name of Daladier too, with whom he had discussed the matter thoroughly, that neither the French Army nor French plants supplying the army were delivering arms to Spain. French stocks of matériel and French production were much too low for that. Production scarcely met the needs of France herself and the requirements of France's allies (Rumania and Czechoslovakia), who were procuring arms from France. I called it to the Minister's attention that the fact that new . . . (group garbled) deliveries had taken place had been verified by concurring reports and listings, and that deliveries had assumed greater scope than ever before. I said that I had been informed by eyewitnesses of convoys of trucks headed for the Pyrenean frontier, carrying French and Red Spanish flags. Bonnet admitted large Russian shipments and asked for details on the truck convoys that had been noted; I shall send those details to him.

WELCZECK

### No. 767

2529/520256-59

*Memorandum of the Meeting of May 19, 1938, on the South Tyrol,  
Under the Chairmanship of the Foreign Minister*

SECRET

(zu Pol. I 1225 g Ang. 1)

#### RESULT OF THE FÜHRER'S TRIP TO ROME

A list of those present is attached.

I. The Foreign Minister introduced his remarks by stating that he had had lengthy conversations with Mussolini and Foreign Minister Ciano regarding the South Tyrol during the Führer's trip to Rome. The result of the conversations was as follows:

1. The territorial aspect had been definitely settled by the Führer's speech.

2. In cultural matters, Mussolini wished to cooperate with the South Tyrolese. The people did not need to give up their Germanism. Mussolini did not intend to pursue a policy of Italianization. Developments to date had shown that this German racial stock was unassimilable. Mussolini did not view the presence of a population of 230,000 Racial-Germans as a serious problem for a nation of 45 million people.

3. The South Tyrolese had to fit into the Italian political organism, however, and preserve discipline in asserting their desires. Incidents of an inflammatory nature had to be avoided.

4. The population should not expect improvement in its lot to come about as a result of influence being exerted from Germany. Accommodation could, on the contrary, only be a product of German-Italian friendship.

Mussolini had pointed out that he had at the time come to a similar agreement with the Yugoslav Government. He had met the Yugoslav minority in Italy halfway in the field of education and the Church. He had also sent for the leading Italian propagandists in Yugoslavia and had clearly and emphatically told them about the matter. He had also taken a Yugoslav official into his police force as specialist. The results of this pacification were good, as Prime Minister Stoyadinovich had expressly confirmed to him.

II. The Foreign Minister further stated that the Führer was determined to have his policy in this question respected at all points. Deviations from it would be punished without regard to the possible underlying patriotic motives. On the eve of the Führer's trip, therefore, the two gentlemen who had published the familiar map had to be arrested. The subject of the South Tyrol was closed as far as we were concerned and it was therefore necessary to desist from opening up the question in any form. There could, as far as we were concerned, no longer be a "South Tyrolese question."

Although Mussolini had not expressly requested this, the Führer was prepared to receive a delegation of South Tyrolese leaders in order to make a declaration to that effect to them. The reception could take place when the Führer was going to be in Berchtesgaden.

Following the Foreign Minister's statements, there was a discussion of the course to be pursued and the composition of the delegation. The result was as follows:

Our further procedure and the composition of the delegation are to be agreed upon between our Ambassador in Rome and Foreign Minister Ciano.

It is intended to dispatch *SS-Gruppenführer* Kaltenbrunner, who is a South Tyrolese, and *SS-Oberführer* Behrends to the South Tyrol, accompanied by an official of the Consulate General in Milan. With the permission of the Italian Government, and in agreement with the local Italian authorities, he is to tour the different valleys in order to ascertain who are the leading personages there. Those regions are to be particularly considered in which clashes have occurred. A delegation of 20 to 30 persons is contemplated. *Oberführer* Behrends mentioned a number of persons who are known to the *Volksdeutsche Mittelstelle* as leaders.

III. Since it cannot yet be foreseen just what form Mussolini's accommodation in the cultural field will take, this aspect was only touched upon in the discussion. The following questions were brought up:

1) Would Mussolini permit the South Tyrolese to have a cultural organization?

2) Would it be expedient to suggest a mixed commission of South Tyrolese and Italians which (like the mixed commissions of the commercial agreements) could settle minor matters as they arose?

3) Could a German official be included?

BERLIN, May 20, 1938.

#### LIST OF THOSE PRESENT

(Meeting of May 19, 1938, Regarding the South Tyrol)

Chairman: The Minister for Foreign Affairs

State Secretary von Weizsäcker

Minister Stieve

Minister Prince Bismarck

Counselor of Legation von  
Twardowski

} Foreign Ministry

Consul General Lorenz

Consul Weber

} Consulate Gen-  
eral at Milan

SS-Obergruppenführer Lorenz

SS-Oberführer Behrends

} Volksdeutsche  
Mittelstelle

Herr Hildebrandt

V.D.A.<sup>40</sup>

SS-Gruppenführer Kaltenbrunner

Dr. Haushofer

No. 768

2129/464378-79

*Memorandum by the Foreign Minister*

SECRET

RM 223

At the review of the fleet at Naples, I spoke to Mussolini on the battleship *Cavour* about the further treatment of the South Tyrolese. Mussolini declared that territorially the matter was closed once and for all as far as Italy was concerned. For the rest, the 240,000 [*sic*] South Tyrolese presented no problem for Italy. Italy was ready to grant them their cultural autonomy, which would include schools and the press. Nor did he intend to Italianize the South Tyrolese.

\* Volksbund für das Deutschtum im Ausland.

Foreign Minister Ciano, with whom I also discussed the South Tyrolese matter, referred to the Yugoslav-Italian settlement as an example. Mussolini had summoned the leaders of the Italian minority in Yugoslavia and told them that a territorial revision of the Italo-Yugoslav border was henceforth out of the question. He had, moreover, placed a Yugoslav official in the Italian Ministry of the Interior, who was charged with handling grievances. I replied to Ciano that even before the trip to Rome we had given the South Tyrolese to understand that they had to reconcile themselves to the situation. We would, moreover, follow the Italian example and invite influential South Tyrolese to Berlin in order to make clear to them the decision taken. Since Ciano spoke of the possibility of German officials bringing influence to bear in the South Tyrol, I asked him to tell us openly about any such individual cases of unjustified interference that might occur, so that we could take energetic action. I then told Ciano that I would explain to the South Tyrolese that a pacification of the South Tyrol would result from German-Italian friendship; I hoped that Ciano also saw it in this way and that the Italians would do everything to effect such a pacification. Ciano assented to this.

RIBBENTROP

BERLIN, May 20, 1938.

No. 769

1519/373105-12

*The German Ambassador in Italy (Mackensen) to the German Foreign Ministry*

2843/38

ROME, May 20, 1938.  
(Pol. IV 3514)

Subject: An informant's memorandum on Italo-German and Italo-French relations.

I have the honor to enclose a copy of a memorandum of the informant repeatedly mentioned in the Embassy's reports, discussing the attitude here toward Germany in connection with the Führer's visit, Mussolini's Genoa address, and Italo-French relations. Since the informant maintains close relations with the Palazzo Chigi, his communications concerning the views there are by and large probably correct.

V. MACKENSEN

[Enclosure]

## MEMORANDUM

ROME, May 19, 1938.

In Rome a very clear distinction is drawn between the mood before and after the toasts in the Palazzo Venezia. So much weight is placed on the distinction that in the Palazzo Chigi one can hear the view expressed that the Führer's Palazzo Venezia address should have been delivered on the very first evening after his arrival in Rome. Then the Führer would have found an altogether different reception during his entire visit—as enthusiastic and natural a reception as he had the opportunity to experience in Florence on the day he left. Mussolini's address in Genoa is characterized as a direct continuation and consequence of the Führer's toast in the Palazzo Venezia.

The significance of the toasts and the diplomatic implications of the German-Italian understanding and in particular of the guarantee of the Brenner boundary are seen in the fact that "the balance, somewhat shaken and compromised" by the *Anschluss* has been re-established. Thus Mussolini, since he no longer needs to have any apprehensions concerning the northern border, has a free hand in other directions, especially as regards France and England. In the Palazzo Chigi, to be sure, the opinion is also held that the German-Italian understanding affords Germany like freedom of action. Now that Berlin no longer needs to have any worries concerning Italy and her intentions, it has achieved freedom of action as regards France, England, and Russia. Basically, therefore, the understanding, which has come about on the basis of actualities, is "good business for both States." In this connection one also recalls the events of March 1936, when England and France were able neither to oppose the remilitarization of the Rhineland nor to enforce the application of sanctions. Then, too, there was a similar situation, which was equally advantageous for Germany and for Italy. It is further said in the Palazzo Chigi that as long as the Rome-Berlin Axis remains intact nobody will attack Germany or Italy. Assuming that they hold together, the two Powers will, on the contrary, inspire fear and respect in all. If, however, discord were to arise between the two Axis Powers, then England and France would immediately intensify their pressure on Germany, while Italy would be held in check, that is, placed in a position in which she would have no freedom of action vis-à-vis France and England.

All in all, Mussolini is pleased and gratified, since the Brenner boundary and the settlement between Italy and Germany have strengthened his diplomatic freedom of action vis-à-vis Paris and

London, as well as in all other spheres. In the Palazzo Chigi it is, to be sure, thought that it will be necessary to wait a few months to see whether Hitler's words really have the value of historical finality. They are thinking above all of the Irredentist propaganda in the Bolzano area and hope that it will stop and not flare up anew. Trust is placed, then, in the course of events, and there is the desire to have this trust further confirmed by experience.

As far as Mussolini's Genoa address is concerned, it is seen, above all, as an adherence to, and an establishment of, the following guiding principles of Italian policy:

The successful test of the Rome-Berlin Axis before history;

The burial of the Stresa Front;

Peace with Yugoslavia;

Scrupulous observance of the agreements with England;

Reservations and caution vis-à-vis the France of the Popular Front, as well as a veiled condition for continuing the negotiations to the effect that France is to discontinue supporting and supplying Red Spain;

Finally, in the event of an ideological war by the democracies, Mussolini gives advance notice that Germany and Italy with their friends, Japan and Nationalist Spain, will unite in a bloc, make an all-out effort, and carry on to the very end. (In this passage is seen a clear reply to the United States Secretary of War.<sup>49a</sup> This stand also reveals one of the points of the confidential understanding between Mussolini and Hitler.)

The booing of France at the Genoa mass demonstration has—as the Palazzo Chigi has learned from Paris—made an enormous impression in France. In fact, the conduct of the audience betrays the true sentiment of the Italian people. One should of course consider the fact, too, that Mussolini himself, by the tone of his voice and emphasis upon certain words, deftly attracted the attention of the audience and produced the desired demonstration. Mussolini wanted to puncture all the intrigues of the French press like a soap bubble, since dozens of special correspondents of the French press, in conformity with the whisperings of the Quai d'Orsay, had tried to make it appear as if the Italian people were in no way in harmony with the Germans and as if, secretly, the friendship with France continued.

But Mussolini wanted to achieve another aim as well: being strong through his friendship with Germany and the resultant support, Mussolini intends, upon achieving peace with Yugoslavia and

<sup>49a</sup> Harry H. Woodring: this presumably refers to his address on May 5 to the United States Chamber of Commerce, in which he gave a warning that continued aggression by the dictatorships might drive the democracies to war and that the United States must be prepared.

England, to force upon France a solution in Spain based on Franco. Having been able to settle the Abyssinian question with a splendid success militarily and diplomatically, he had now made up his mind to bring the Spanish War and the Spanish question to a completely successful conclusion as well. For that purpose the Axis is a welcome tool, with which he intends to hold England in check and force the France of the Popular Front to discontinue supplying and supporting Red Spain. (The Axis, so it is thought in the Palazzo Chigi, will be a no less useful and welcome instrument for Germany, in her showdown with Czechoslovakia.) Mussolini's words to France are therefore interpreted in Government circles in plain terms as follows: either an end to the shipment of supplies to Red Spain, or else no Italo-French agreement.

In the Palazzo Chigi there is a report that Blondel has received instructions from his Government to demand of Ciano an explanation of the reasons for Mussolini's utterances in Genoa aimed at France. Blondel himself appears to be surprised by Mussolini's statements or, rather, acts as if he were surprised by them.

In the Palazzo Chigi it is thought, however, that France is making one mistake after another, and this because she is under the erroneous impression that she can lay down conditions to Italy at a time when Paris—among other things, because of the unknown factor of Czechoslovakia—is in a weakened position. In reality, however, it is Mussolini who can lay down his conditions to France and can even treat her "in a humiliating manner, without any need for worrying over a possible break."

Mussolini and the Paris Popular Front are playing a game of power politics over the Spanish question. The Freemasons, the Jews, and the Muscovites of the Second and Third International, under whose influence the French Government stands, are intent upon checking Italy and preventing Italo-British understanding. The intention of Moscow, which is being promoted in Paris by Herriot, Mandel, and Reynaud, and by all other Jewish-Freemason obscurantists, is to prolong the war in Spain in order to pin Italy down there and dangle an apple of discord back and forth among the four principal Powers, and thus to continue thwarting a European settlement.

Another serious blunder on the part of France, it is emphasized in the Palazzo Chigi, is the view that she is in a position to make demands. Against this pretension Mussolini has hurled his *quos ego!* and made his conditions known.

Italian annoyance, however, also has its origin in the fact that France has raised demands not only with regard to the Mediter-

anean and Spain but also with regard to the Red Sea, where Paris demands the same obligations that Italy has assumed toward England. In the Palazzo Chigi these demands are considered as evidence that the Quai d'Orsay wants to reach agreements with Italy similar to, if not identical with, those set forth in the Anglo-Italian Agreement, in order to create the tenaciously sought possibility of speaking of a tripartite understanding, a tripartite pact, which would then somehow have the appearance of "a sort of Stresa Front, without and against Germany." This, too, may give a better understanding of Mussolini's utterances addressed to France.

The mentality of a Léger and of the other prominent officials of the Quai d'Orsay is branded in the Palazzo Chigi as outdated and as harking back to the Versailles period, that is, as anti-German and anti-Italian. The political directives of these men have remained unalterably the same: encirclement of Germany through integrating Italy into the ranks of the allies and vassals of a French hegemony. This program no longer fits the present period at all. Mussolini therefore condemned it at Genoa by placing to the foreground the driving youthful forces of the new Europe, the German and Roman systems, these strong and allied sources of energy, and their collaboration.

Mussolini's Genoa address therefore constitutes the end of a long period of struggle, in which Italy and Germany have regained their full equality among the great powers. It signifies at the same time the beginning of a new historical period in which the German and Roman worlds constitute the basic foundation and represent the understanding which is decisive.

According to confidential information of the Palazzo Chigi, the Polish Ambassador here, Wisocky, said: On the one hand France is arming the Spanish Reds against the Italian volunteers; on the other, she wants friendship and collaboration with Rome. The two aims taken together are in inner contradiction with each other.

In conclusion, Mussolini's saying, "He who stands still is lost," is interpreted in official circles here as follows. After the conquest of the Empire Italy cannot halt; Italy must not stand still. Her place cannot therefore be on the side of the conservative states which are in a static condition, that is, not on the side of England and France, but on the side of the dynamic forces, that is, on the side of Germany. Incidentally, with regard to the Danube region, the view is held in Rome that Yugoslavia, Hungary, and perhaps also Bulgaria are to be counted among the dynamic forces, while Czechoslovakia, Rumania, Greece, and Turkey are in a static condition.

No. 770

634/252921-22

*The German Ambassador in Italy (Mackensen) to the German Foreign Ministry*

Telegram

No. 141 of May 23

ROME, May 23, 1938—11:30 p.m.

Received May 24, 1938—3:05 a.m.

(Pol. IV 3532)

I called on Ciano today for the first time since his return from Genoa in order to learn about the status of the Italo-French exchange of views and the substance of his conversation with Perth reported by the press. He said that there had been (group garbled) no change in the situation since the days of the Führer's visit and his communications at that time to the Foreign Minister. The Genoa speech had merely dotted the *i's*. He had not received Blondel again since then, although Perth, also, had strongly pressed him several times. However, he did not wish to receive him, particularly at the present time, because the French press would at once link this to the Czech question and make foolish conjectures. Ciano interjected here that he had also stressed very plainly to Perth that the Czech question was of no interest to Italy, and he did not, moreover, inquire from me about its present status. With regard to France, he had now again told Perth quite clearly that France's constant attempts to negotiate here on the Spanish question or the Red Sea would always meet with a flat refusal, for a discussion regarding Spain was impossible with a country that was sabotaging nonintervention in such a manner, whereas England, after all, "was behaving more or less correctly." There would have been some point in an agreement on the Red Sea with England, who, like Italy, was heavily interested there, but there was not any basis for such an agreement with France. Since the French, however, still persisted in the idea of a discussion . . . (group garbled) could not make any progress. It was true that he still owed Blondel a reply. But if, for this reason, he would receive him again in the foreseeable future, it was by no means in order to enter into such conversations, but rather to put a definitive stop to them. Moreover, it was a matter of complete indifference to the Italians whether a French ambassador appeared here again in half a year or in three years or even later.

In answer to my question whether Perth had said anything about British recognition of the Empire after Geneva, Ciano replied that Perth had evaded answering his express question by referring to lack of instructions. Obviously the British wanted to defer recognition

until the Spanish question was settled—Ciano said this without criticizing the British attitude—and thus link in time these two conditions for the entry into force of the Protocol.

MACKENSEN

No. 771

2120/464356-57

*The German Foreign Ministry to the German Embassy in Italy*

SECRET

BERLIN, May 24, 1938.

Received May 29, 1938.

(Pol. I 1225 g Ang. 2)

In view of the conversations regarding the South Tyrol that took place during the Italian trip between Mussolini and Ciano, on the one hand, and the Reich Foreign Minister, on the other, it is the intention to receive a delegation of South Tyrolese leaders at Berchtesgaden in order to explain to them emphatically the German standpoint in the sense of the agreements with Mussolini.

The question arises as to how this delegation is to be constituted.

The German population of the South Tyrol does not possess any racial organization such as the other German groups in Europe. The formation of a suitable delegation is therefore a difficult matter.

We must avoid giving the Italian Government the false impression that there has been an all-embracing secret German organization, the leaders of which are the members of the delegation. This could also lead to serious disadvantages later on for the members of the delegation themselves and their acquaintances.

For these reasons alone it is necessary to send out the invitation only in agreement with the Italian Government.

As far as the composition of the delegation is concerned, I might point out that after the decisive victories in Abyssinia Mussolini himself received a delegation of leading South Tyrolese in order to learn their desires and grievances. According to the report of the *Agenzia Stefani*, of April 17, 1936, Count Toggenburg, Walther, and Posch, among others, were invited; they could also be considered for the reception at Berchtesgaden. To these might be added the former deputy, Tinzl, as well as Baron Sternbach, who was at one time exiled because of his attitude on racial cultural questions.

Besides these well-known leaders of the older generation, it is proposed that other leaders be summoned from the various regions of the South Tyrol. The intention is to have SS-*Gruppenführer* Kaltenbrunner, who is a South Tyrolese himself, and SS-*Oberführer* Behrends of the *Volksdeutsche Mittelstelle* tour the various valleys

in the company of an official of the Consulate General in Milan in order to seek out appropriate persons. The delegation could consist of a total of twenty to thirty persons.

Naturally this can only be done in closest agreement with the Italian Government and with the concurrence of the local authorities.

May I therefore ask that you arrange further steps with Foreign Minister Count Ciano.

Should any agency in Germany or in former Austria—now re-integrated into Germany—heretofore have had special agents in the South Tyrol, these, I might state confidentially, would in proper manner also be informed of the Führer's view.

A memorandum of a meeting on the 19th dealing with these questions, at which the Foreign Minister presided, is enclosed for your information.<sup>50</sup>

The reports of April 20 and 22, 1936, of the *Volksbund für das Deutschtum im Ausland*, with enclosures regarding the above-mentioned reception by Mussolini, are also enclosed.<sup>51</sup>

The Consulate General in Milan is receiving a copy.

WEIZSÄCKER

## No. 772

348/201443

### Memorandum

BERLIN, May 25, 1938.

Count Magistrati informed me today of a telegram from Count Ciano to the Italian Ambassador, in which the Italian Foreign Minister stated that he had told Lord Perth, with regard to the Führer's visit, that even though no agreement had been signed between Germany and Italy, the result of the visit had been "the confirmation in every respect of Axis policy."<sup>52</sup>

One reason for this explanation had been a statement by Chamberlain in the House of Commons, mentioning only that no agreement had been signed between Germany and Italy.

Count Magistrati added that the Chiefs of other Foreign Missions in Rome had been informed to the same effect.

The Italian Embassy was expressly instructed to forward this information to the Foreign Minister.

WOERMANN

<sup>50</sup> Document No. 767, p. 1117.

<sup>51</sup> Enclosures not printed.

<sup>52</sup> The quoted passage is in French in the original.

## No. 773

2058/447821-22

*The German Foreign Ministry to the German Embassy in Italy*

Cipher Telegram

No. 193

BERLIN, May 30, 1938.

(e. o. W III 3936)

For your information:

The most important points in the treaty concluded on May 28:

1) Far-reaching special treatment has been conceded to Italian citizens in Austria in the registration and transfer of capital.

2) Austrian government bonds in Italian possession will be bought back.

3) Through tariff agreements, the Adriatic ports are assured an appropriate share of the freight in Austria's foreign trade.

4) The question of customs has been settled to our satisfaction by the incorporation into the German commercial treaty of the most important Italian treaty tariffs in favor of Austria.

5) Trade between Austria and Italy was fixed at 60 million for Austria's exports to Italy (a reduction of Austrian exports by one-third) and 50 million for Italy's exports to Austria.<sup>53</sup>

6) The whole system of payments will soon be incorporated in German treaties.

We have the impression that the Italian delegation, and in particular Giannini himself, left satisfied and that the negotiations therefore produced the results required politically.

1) and 2) are to be treated as very secret.

CLODIUS

## No. 774

1519/373117-18

*Memorandum by the Foreign Minister*

RM 229

(Pol. IV 4006)

I. The Italian Ambassador, Attolico, called on me at 7 o'clock this evening. He stated that he wished personally to take up the following matter. It seemed to him to be especially desirable if our missions abroad collaborated as closely as possible. It was gratifying that in most places close contact already existed. In the case of some missions, however, an improvement in mutual relations was to be desired. It was necessary, above all, to avoid creating the im-

<sup>53</sup> An added notation in Clodius' handwriting reads as follows: "We were not able to do better in spite of strong pressure."

pression that the representatives of the two Powers were engaging in some sort of competition to undermine each other. He asked that his statement not be regarded in any way as a complaint. He took the liberty, however, of calling my attention to Tirana, since in this capital relations perhaps left something to be desired—which was not in the interest of the Axis. Thus, for example, the German Minister at Tirana had neglected to meet the Italian Foreign Minister upon his arrival, when he had come to Tirana to attend the wedding of the King of Albania, although the ministers of all the friendly states, and even the British Minister, had been present. Our relations in Sofia, too, it appeared to him, could be improved.

I replied to the Italian Ambassador that I took note of his personal remarks and would examine them. I was certain that our representatives abroad were all endeavoring to work in harmony with their Italian colleagues.

II. The Italian Ambassador then spoke to me about the memorandum transmitted by the Grand Master of the Order of Malta. I replied that the matter was still being investigated.

III. The Italian Ambassador then mentioned the German-Italian conversations held on the occasion of the trip to Rome. As far as he knew, there had been an exchange of drafts. He wished to inquire personally about the status of the matter. He gave no hint as to whether he was acting on instructions from his Government.

I told the Italian Ambassador that our conversations had remained rather vague. But even without being reduced to written form, the solidarity of the policy of the two Axis Powers was quite clearly and unequivocally established. A written statement seemed to me useful, therefore, only if it also meant an outward strengthening of the Axis. The draft first handed me by Ciano had not, in my estimation, fulfilled this requirement. I had thereupon given him my conception of the possible contents of an agreement. The conversations did not, however, develop anything more concrete. Ciano had pointed out that the Duce would perhaps take the opportunity to revert to the subject at Genoa. This had apparently not been done, however. Ciano had spoken of possibly coming to Berlin some day, and I had told him that he was cordially welcome here at any time.

In conclusion, I stated to the Italian Ambassador that the matter did not seem to me of decisive importance, since German and Italian policy was clearly and unequivocally defined through the Axis.

IV. I then also mentioned to the Italian Ambassador that the president of the International Associations of Front-Line Fighters, the Italian, Delcroix, had concerned himself particularly with the

interests of the German Front-Line Fighters. The German Front-Line Fighters had asked me to convey their thanks to M. Delcroix through the Italian Government. I should be grateful to him if he would comply with this request of our Front-Line Fighters.

RIBBENTROP

BERLIN, May 31, 1938.

### No. 775

223/150231-32

#### *The German Ambassador in Italy (Mackensen) to the German Foreign Ministry*

Telegram

No. 149 of May 31 ROME (QUIRINAL), June 1, 1938—12:30 a.m.  
Received June 1, 1938—6 p.m.

With reference to instruction Pol. I 1225 g Angabe 2 of the 24th.

When I called on Ciano this evening in connection with your telegraphic instruction No. 192,<sup>55</sup> I discussed with him the question of a reception by the Führer of South Tyrolese contact men. I used as a starting-point the Duce's familiar account at my first audience with him of how he dealt with the minorities in Dalmatia, and similar conversations during the Führer's visit. Ciano interrupted me very soon with the remark that he had already been informed of our ideas through Attolico, who had reported to him a conversation with the Reich Foreign Minister on this subject. Much as the Italian Government appreciated our intended contribution to pacification in the Alto Adige, it had misgivings about the idea of having special emissaries select suitable representatives on the spot for the interview with the Führer. This might under certain circumstances merely cause new excitement. Nor had Mussolini at the time received contact men from the Yugoslav minorities area. What he had done was to receive persons who, either as native Dalmatians or as persons who for other reasons had interests there but were living in Italy, had directed the Dalmatian minorities movement from here and whose influence on the minorities had been strong enough to put through the Duce's policy. I replied that such a course was not possible for us for the simple reason that we did not have such persons at our disposal, because there had never existed an organization of persons of German stock south of the Brenner Pass which they could have influenced as a unit. Where individual ties had extended from the Reich to the South Tyrol, they had, as the Foreign Minister himself had told him, been rigorously

<sup>55</sup> Not printed.

and successfully suppressed and would continue to be suppressed. In this way, therefore, we would not make any progress. Ciano interrupted me here with the remark that the situation had, moreover, undergone a fundamental change since the Führer's speech of the 7th. The speech had eliminated up to 85 percent (later he said even 95 percent) of the nervousness. The Italian Government was therefore entirely satisfied and expected no further steps from us. He dropped several casual remarks to the effect that the Government would also, for its part, do everything to tranquilize the situation, provided that the German minority assumed a loyal attitude toward the State. Already there were quite a number of members of the minority in important posts as judges, administrative officials, etc., a statement which he sought to prove by means of a list of names which, he said, he had requested for conversations with me and which consisted of several pages of German names. I replied that I, too, had noted with special pleasure the extremely quieting effect of the Führer's speech, more in the rest of Italy, to be sure, than in the Alto Adige. I was still getting reports from there of the great nervousness prevailing, especially in Fascist Party agencies, accompanied by unfortunate manifestations, just as on the other hand I could still observe a very great unrest among the South Tyrolese. It seemed imperative to me, however, that he should consider whether failure to take advantage of the Führer's important offer did not mean passing up a good opportunity. Nothing could be so effective in reassuring and enlightening the South Tyrolese as a word from the Führer himself to their contact men. For only in this way was the final enlightenment necessary for this pacification to be achieved. Ciano deliberated a few moments and then stated that he much preferred to have another quiet talk with the Duce and then revert to the matter. At any rate, he was very grateful for our initiative. He had to emphasize once more, however, that the Führer's speech had worked wonders here and that the Italian Government was satisfied with the present situation. We agreed on a possible resumption of our talk on the matter after Whitsuntide.

MACKENSEN

## No. 776

1486/368627-28

*The German Chargé d'Affaires in Italy (Plessen) to the German Foreign Ministry*

3121/38

ROME, June 3, 1938.  
Received June 4, 1938.  
(Pol. IV 3924)

Subject: Foreign-policy speech of Count Ciano in Milan.

Yesterday at Milan, at the opening of the second annual meeting of the Institute for the Study of International Policy, founded 2 years ago, the Italian Foreign Minister, Count Ciano, made a speech on foreign policy, the substance of which is known to the Foreign Ministry through the press. I enclose a clipping from today's *Messaggero* giving the Italian text.<sup>56</sup>

Count Ciano stressed the fact that Italy would continue to collaborate closely with Germany, in accordance with Axis policy. The common boundary united the two countries more strongly than before. Germany and Italy were fighting jointly in Spain against Bolshevism. In the larger arena Japan had joined in this fight. Count Ciano then mentioned Italy's relations with Hungary, Albania, and Yugoslavia, and spoke appreciatively of the policy of British Prime Minister Chamberlain. The agreements recently concluded with England had placed the relations of the two countries on a clear and realistic basis.

Although Count Ciano's statements contain nothing essentially new, they are nevertheless not without interest as giving renewed emphasis to the guiding principles of Italian foreign policy. From our standpoint, the speech, to which Count Ciano called the Ambassador's attention in advance, is to be thoroughly welcomed.

By direction:  
PLESSEN

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<sup>56</sup> Not printed here.

No. 777

634/252924

*The German Chargé d'Affaires in Italy (Plessen) to the German Foreign Ministry*

Telegram

No. 151 of June 3

ROME (QUIRINAL), June 3, 1938—8:45 p.m.

Received June 4, 1938—1 a.m.

Ciano asked me to come to see him today in the absence of the Ambassador and asked that I transmit the following information to Berlin:

1) Reports in the British press regarding pending deliveries of Italian planes to England, which were intended to create the impression that Government contracts were involved, were incorrect. The truth of the matter was that a Dutch agent, representing British firms, had approached the Caproni works. Negotiations were taking place on a purely commercial basis.

2) On the question of mediation in Spain, which was at present being discussed in the press, the British Government had thus far not approached the Italian Government. Should this occur, the Italian Government would refuse.

3) Published statements of the French Foreign Minister regarding resumption of Italo-French conversations were incorrect. There was no question of a resumption in the foreseeable future:

- a) because there was no basis for an understanding,
- b) as long as the Spanish question was not settled, and
- c) because every time the French Chargé d'Affaires appeared in the Foreign Ministry, the press asserted that the conversations were directed against Germany. It was therefore more correct to speak of a breaking off of the conversations than of an interruption, as the French Foreign Minister had done.

PLESSEN

No. 778

2184/472022

*The German Ambassador in Italy (Mackensen) to the German Foreign Ministry*

CONFIDENTIAL  
3355/38

ROME, June 13, 1938.  
Received June 16, 1938.  
(Pol. IV 4219)

Subject: Alleged plan of Italy to annex Albania.

A usually well-informed confidant told me he could assure me with all certainty that the political program of Mussolini and Ciano contemplated the annexation of Albania as soon as the international situation permitted it. The annexation would be effected through a revolution within the country, necessitating Italian intervention. Territorial aggrandizement by Italy was considered necessary and possible because changes were to be expected in the Danube region.

Without wishing to ascribe any immediate importance to it, I am forwarding the above information because it comes from a source with excellent connections. Although Count Ciano, in a conversation with me some time ago on the subject of Albania, stressed the fact that Italy had no present plans whatsoever going beyond a determined adherence to the position attained in the course of years, it is, in my opinion, entirely within the realm of possibility that more extensive plans are being considered for a later date. The Duce might perhaps regard the time as ripe if further territorial changes in Central Europe should follow the events of March 13.

V. MACKENSEN

No. 779

634/252925-26

*The German Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Schulenburg) to the German Foreign Ministry*

Tgb. Nr. A/863

Moscow, June 13, 1938.  
Received June 15, 1938.  
(Pol. IV 4183)

In continuation of the report of May 16, 1938, Tgb. Nr. A/732.<sup>57</sup>

Subject: Attitude of the Soviet Union toward the Franco-Italian negotiations.

According to reports in the German and foreign press, French Foreign Minister Bonnet is said to have declared before the Foreign

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<sup>57</sup> Not printed.

Relations Committee of the Chamber of Deputies at the beginning of this month that Litvinov had informed Coulondre, the French Ambassador in Moscow, that the Soviet Government would welcome an Italo-French *détente*, since this would necessarily lead to a weakening of the Rome-Berlin Axis. Furthermore, Litvinov is said to have recommended to Coulondre that a French ambassador be sent to Rome as soon as possible.

I have been able to obtain confidentially the following information in this regard:

Prior to the session of the League of Nations Council, at the end of April and early in May, the French Ambassador here repeatedly called on Litvinov and by order of his Government asked him not to obstruct the discussion and settlement of the Abyssinian question during the session of the League of Nations Council. Coulondre had pointed out that the settlement of the Abyssinian problem was one of the conditions for the success of the impending Franco-Italian negotiations for a settlement and also for the coming into force of the Anglo-Italian Agreement. As the Embassy stated in the above-mentioned report, the British Government had taken a similar step through its Moscow Embassy. Litvinov replied to the French Ambassador that any *détente* in Europe was in accordance with Soviet policy and that the Soviet Government could therefore only welcome a Franco-Italian settlement. In spite of certain reservations, Litvinov assured the French Ambassador, just as he had the British Ambassador, that the Soviet Government would put no obstacles in the way of the settlement of the Abyssinian question during the session of the League of Nations Council. M. Coulondre confidentially informed one of his colleagues here that Litvinov had made no mention to him of the question of sending a new French ambassador to Rome. Nor had Litvinov expressed the opinion that the Franco-Italian settlement would lead to a weakening of the Rome-Berlin Axis. Even if Litvinov did not express this to Coulondre, he certainly had hoped at that time that the *détente* between France and Italy would reduce the importance of the Rome-Berlin Axis. Mussolini's and Ciano's speeches at Genoa and Milan, however, should meanwhile have destroyed these hopes.

SCHULENBURG

## No. 780

2129/464434-35

*The German Foreign Ministry to the Head of the Volksdeutsche Mittelstelle*

BERLIN, June 18, 1938.

(Pol. I 1284 Ang. II)

In continuation of the letter of May 24, 1938, Pol. I 1225 g Ang. 2.<sup>58</sup>

The question of the Führer's receiving a delegation of leading South Tyrolese was discussed with the Italian Foreign Minister, Count Ciano, by our Ambassador at Rome. Count Ciano, however, stated that, much as the Italian Government appreciated our intended contribution to the pacification of the South Tyrol, it had misgivings about the idea of having special emissaries select suitable representatives on the spot for the interview with the Führer, since under certain circumstances this might merely cause new excitement. Count Ciano also pointed out that the situation had changed fundamentally since the Führer's speech of June 7, 1938; the Führer's speech had had a very quieting effect, so that the Italian Government was quite satisfied and expected no further measures by Germany. In this connection he indicated several times that the Italian Government on its part would also do everything to tranquilize the situation, provided the German minority assumed a loyal attitude toward the State.

The Italian Ambassador here expressed similar doubts and stated that it would be better to let the matter rest.

Under these circumstances the plan will not be further pursued for the time being. The Embassy in Rome has been given instructions to that effect.

The *Volksdeutsche Mittelstelle*, however, is requested, in case any office in the old Reich or in reincorporated former Austria has had special contact men in the South Tyrol, to explain Germany's position to them emphatically, in the sense of the agreements with Mussolini.

In accordance with a suggestion from the Italian Ambassador here, it is further requested that if leading South Tyrolese should for some reason happen to be present in Germany, they should be individually informed of the Führer's view.<sup>59</sup>

By direction:  
WOERMANN

<sup>58</sup> Not printed. See document No. 771, p. 1128.

<sup>59</sup> An appended note indicates that a copy of this letter was sent to the German Embassy in Italy for its information.

## No. 781

348/201444

*Memorandum*

SECRET

BERLIN, June 18, 1938.

The Italian Ambassador spoke to me last night after dinner about the exchange of views which had taken place during the Führer's trip to Italy on the subject of possible German-Italian written agreements on general policy. Attolico asked whether the ideas then discussed had progressed further in the meantime, and whether there had been any new developments with regard to Count Ciano's trip to Munich or Berlin, which had been casually mentioned on that occasion.

I answered Attolico that the problem was left unsettled at the time. I was convinced that we would welcome Count Ciano in Germany at any time. The subject matter was still in a state of flux and needed to be worked over in every respect. As I was about to expand on this theme, Attolico interrupted me and stated that a written agreement resulting from a visit by Ciano would of course have to be suitable for publication and so worded as to show a tangible strengthening of the Rome-Berlin Axis—not merely a lame repetition or even a weakening of former agreements.

Herewith submitted to the Foreign Minister.

WEIZSÄCKER

C. AXIS POLICY STRENGTHENS THE ENTENTE,  
JUNE-AUGUST 1938

## No. 782

109/115035-38

*The German Ambassador in Italy (Mackensen) to the German  
Foreign Ministry*

Telegram

(Forwarded by plane to save expense)

SECRET

ROME, June 22, 1938.

No. 169 of June 22

Received June 23, 1938—7:35 p.m.

With reference to No. 220 of June 20.<sup>60</sup>

Ciano, who could not receive me until this morning, described as completely incorrect those press reports according to which Rome and London had supposedly discussed the idea of expediting the coming into force of the Anglo-Italian Agreement by seeking a

<sup>60</sup> Not printed.

solution of the question of the volunteers through withdrawing the Italians from the line of battle while still retaining them for the time being on Spanish territory. The idea had never been discussed; it might have its origin in the fact that the Italian volunteers had actually been in the rear areas for some time now. Moreover, he understood from a telegram just received that their employment in the front line was again imminent and he added that Italy, as he had already indicated to me recently (cf. my telegraphic report of June 9, No. 152<sup>61</sup>), was at present again sending a certain number of reinforcements.

Regarding the actual status of the Anglo-Italian conversations he could give me the following information:

In his conversation with Perth on June 3 he had pointed out to the British Ambassador, among other things, that Italy on her part had now completely fulfilled all her obligations under the Agreement; troops were being withdrawn from Libya, propaganda in regard to Arabia which had displeased the British had been discontinued, and Italy had long since unconditionally accepted the British proposal<sup>62</sup> in the Nonintervention Committee. On the other hand, Great Britain was now released from her obligations toward Geneva in regard to the question of recognition. This situation seemed to him, Ciano, sufficient reason for England to consider whether she should not draw the logical conclusions and regard the conditions for the coming into force of the Agreement as fulfilled, especially since a delay in the entry into force impaired the value of the Agreement. On this occasion he had also mentioned to the Englishman that it caused surprise here to find statements in the French press to the effect that Great Britain was to make the coming into force dependent upon a prior Franco-Italian Agreement; this had never been mentioned by a single word in the negotiations and had even been flatly rejected by the Italian Government. Perth had replied at that time that he would submit the subject to his Government.

Last Monday (hence, as Ciano emphasized, not as early as Sunday, and only once, not twice, as the press claimed) Perth had again called on him to present the British Government's reply. It was contained in two memoranda, of which Ciano confidentially gave me copies; they will be sent by air mail to the State Secretary tomorrow. Ciano stressed as important in the British answer the acknowledgment that the Italian Government had fully com-

<sup>61</sup> In vol. III of this publication.

<sup>62</sup> Concerning the withdrawal of foreign volunteers and the granting of belligerent rights.

plied with the conditions. The British Government considered as the only obstacle the difficulty in defining what was meant by "settlement of the Spanish question."<sup>63</sup> In consideration of British public opinion, the London Government had to proceed very cautiously, particularly since the bombings of the last 2 weeks had produced an unfavorable reaction. The British Government therefore could by no means consider as a settlement Italy's unconditional acceptance of the British plan in the Nonintervention Committee. However, it wished to submit three proposals to the Italian Government as to how the question might, perhaps, be solved, given the necessary accommodation by the Italians.

1. The execution of the plan of the Nonintervention Committee; this, however, in practice meant postponement of the solution for an indefinite period.

2. The *unilateral* withdrawal of the Italian volunteers, based on the Italian acceptance of the British plan. The British Government, however, fully realized the difficulties confronting the Italian Government with regard to such a project.

3. The arrangement of an armistice, concerning the nature of which Lord Perth had made lengthy statements.

Just as Perth seemed to expect, Ciano, pending a decision by Mussolini, had immediately given the British Ambassador his purely personal opinion that he considered proposal 1 as impractical and proposal 2 as out of the question. As to the question of the armistice, he could only say that it was impossible for Italy to urge an armistice on Franco, unless it was based on unconditional surrender by the other side—a consideration which presumably eliminated this proposal, too.

He, Ciano, would immediately report to Mussolini, who was to return to Rome this evening, but he could tell me that a short telephone conversation with the Duce had already shown that the latter approved "100 percent" the provisional reply he had given to Perth as his purely personal opinion at the moment. He would therefore only have to confirm officially to the British Ambassador, tomorrow or within the next few days, the answer he had already given.

Lord Perth had then reverted to Ciano's remark regarding the connection between the coming into force of the Agreement and a positive outcome of the Italo-French conversations (cf. memorandum B regarding this matter). According to his statement, the British Government had definitely rejected the intimation that any such connection was intended, and had also clearly stated this

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<sup>63</sup> The quoted passage is in English in the original.

in Paris. The British Ambassador, however, had once more emphatically stressed the great importance which the British Government attached to a settlement of Italo-French relations, emphasizing that, according to a recent report from the British Ambassador in Paris, France's support of Red Spain, to which Italy objected, had meanwhile ceased as a result of the actual closing of the Pyrenean border. The British Government hoped that Rome would be prepared to continue the interrupted conversations with Paris.

Ciano says that he countered these statements by stating that in his opinion the conversations had not been interrupted but broken off, since the attitude of the French had made it impossible for the Italians to continue. He had also pointed out that France, in spite of the Geneva decisions, had had no ambassador in Rome for 18 months now. It was entirely immaterial to Rome whether this situation lasted 18 months or 18 years. Ciano added that this answer also, first given as purely personal, had already been approved over the telephone by Mussolini.

Ciano mentioned in conclusion that the negative result of the conversation had made a very strong impression on Lord Perth. Ciano added that during his first years the British Ambassador, in complete ignorance of the real situation and still prejudiced by the background of Geneva, had shown no understanding whatever for Italy; recently he had developed more and more into a realistic politician who now personally judged matters correctly and reported accordingly to London. In particular, he had reliable evidence that during the entire discussion preceding the Agreement Lord Perth had "fenced well," and was considering the Rome-Berlin Axis as an unalterable fact in his political stocktaking. The Italians evidently are informed about the telegraphic reports of the British Ambassador.

MACKENSEN

## No. 783

2129/464634-35

*The German Ambassador in Italy (Mackensen) to the German Foreign Ministry*

SECRET

ROME, June 22, 1938.

Botsch/Htm.

3714/38

In continuation of my other reports of today.

Subject: Italy and the withdrawal of troops from Libya.

During today's conversation Count Ciano also commented on the present strength of the Italian troops in Libya. He said that in the discussions which had preceded the well-known Agreement, the British had originally insisted that the Italian troops withdraw one complete army corps of their troops stationed in Libya, which consisted of one army corps of colonial troops and two army corps of troops from the mother country. Italy had flatly refused this demand for the reason that it interfered with the free will of the Italian nation in the organization of its armed forces. It had thereupon been agreed that the reduction, approved as such by the Italians, be carried out by reducing the two army corps of troops from the mother country from wartime to peacetime strength. In Ciano's opinion this would have meant that within a certain period their strength would have been reduced from about 60,000 to about 30,000 men. In fact, since the signing of the Agreement, the Italians had withdrawn 1,000 men weekly (Count Ciano remarked, surprisingly, that a promise of this weekly number had been given to the British), hence a total of 11,000 men thus far. In view of political developments, which, contrary to Italian expectations, still admitted no prediction of the date for the entry into force of the Agreement, the Italian Government had now stopped further withdrawals.

V. MACKENSEN

## No. 784

100/64389-70

*The State Secretary in the German Foreign Ministry (Weizsäcker)  
to the German Ambassador in Italy (Mackensen)*

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

BERLIN, June 23, 1938.

DEAR FRIEND: From telegraphic instructions of yesterday evening to Rome you will perceive that there is a good deal of interest here regarding the eagerness with which the Italian Government is seeking to bring its Agreement with England into force. Is this Agreement so important to her that she is really prepared to decrease her effort in Spain? If so, what apprehensions or hopes induce her to do so?

Up to the present it is probably safe to assume that the destiny of Italy is really quite closely connected with that of Germany, i.e., that the Italians would probably not be in a position, in case of a serious engagement of Germany elsewhere, to consider themselves entirely unaffected. The fact is that during the somewhat exciting days of the last half of May, the Italian Missions—not only in Berlin but also in other places—evinced a lively interest. Perhaps Attolico was again thinking of Czechoslovakia when, about a week ago, he somewhat abruptly posed the question of what had happened to the conversations carried on during the Italian visit of the Führer regarding a general German-Italian political arrangement. You will recall that toward the end of the Führer's visit you received instructions from Herr von Ribbentrop that you were not to resume these negotiations for the time being, and we also have avoided doing so here. After this question from Attolico the Foreign Minister merely asked the Ambassador rather informally about Italy's ideas at present. Herr von Ribbentrop made no proposals to Attolico, nor did he give him any concrete hints, but he did refer to the value, as a preventive of war, of every action which would appear to the outside world as a further strengthening of the Axis. Whether Attolico will react to this and, if so, in what way, remains to be seen. For your part there is nothing to be done in regard to the matter at the present time. I am telling you about what has happened, with the approval of the Foreign Minister, exclusively for your personal information, and I also request you to treat this letter entirely as such.

Cordial greetings and Heil Hitler.

Your faithful

WEIZSÄCKER

## No. 785

2129/464437

*The Chief of Staff of the Head of the Volksdeutsche Mittelstelle  
to the Foreign Ministry*

SECRET

BERLIN, June 27, 1938.  
(Pol. I 1487 g)

Your file number: Pol. I 1284 Ang. II of June 18, 1938.

Our file number: I 1 a T/Ka

The chance presence of a prominent figure from the South Tyrol enabled us as early as June 25, in accordance with your letter of June 18, emphatically to communicate Germany's position—and the Führer's view—in the sense of the agreements with Mussolini.

The South Tyrolese received the statements with the greatest seriousness and promised to exert all his influence to have the prescribed line followed in the South Tyrol.

Heil Hitler!

By direction:  
DR. W. LUG

## No. 786

F20/128-129

*Memorandum by the Foreign Minister*

RM 243

During Ambassador Attolico's visit today I also talked over with him the questions recently discussed at Sonnenburg.<sup>68</sup> Ambassador Attolico told me that if my wife and I were to visit the Villa d'Este on Lake Como privately at the end of July, Count Ciano would be glad to discuss thoroughly with me the problems in German-Italian relations. He had given an exhaustive report to Ciano about our latest conversation, and this report had also been submitted to Mussolini personally. Mussolini and Ciano were very much interested in the questions discussed by us, and Count Ciano thoroughly welcomed a conversation concerning these matters.

I told Ambassador Attolico that my trip to Lake Como was not yet definite, but if it did take place, it would be necessary for the Italian Ambassador and me to discuss the questions beforehand a good deal more. I then agreed with Ambassador Attolico that he would call on me during my leave at Sonnenburg in July.

<sup>68</sup> A marginal note in Ribbentrop's hand reads as follows: "Main line of future German-Italian cooperation. R."

To my question whether Count Ciano still planned the trip to Berlin discussed earlier, Ambassador Attolico replied that such a trip was difficult for the Italian Foreign Minister at the present time. However, after a discussion with me at Lake Como, Count Ciano would perhaps make his visit to Berlin.

RIBBENTROP

BERLIN, June 30, 1938.

No. 787

635/253210

*Memorandum by the German Ambassador in the Soviet Union  
(Schulenburg)*

Tgb. Nr. A/963

(Pol. V 6451)

In the report of December 14, 1937, Tgb. Nr. A/2248,<sup>69</sup> the Embassy reported that the journey of Delbos, the French Foreign Minister, which took him to Warsaw, Bucharest, and Belgrade without touching Moscow, had caused great resentment in authoritative quarters here. In December 1937, it was said in the Diplomatic Corps at Moscow that Litvinov had urged Delbos during his last stay in Geneva to visit Moscow (cf. private letter of January 24 to the then State Secretary von Mackensen<sup>70</sup>). As I quite recently learned in confidence from an American diplomat who attended the Brussels Conference in November 1937, Litvinov during the first few days of the Conference did indeed invite Foreign Minister Delbos to Moscow, but received a refusal. Delbos informed the American delegate, Norman Davis, of this. Litvinov, who originally had not intended to attend the Brussels Conference and had come to Brussels mainly in order personally to persuade Delbos to visit Moscow, left Brussels prematurely in a huff over the refusal he had received. This irritation on the part of Litvinov was partly responsible for the Soviet attempt to interfere in the French Cabinet crisis in January 1938, and to bring about the removal of Delbos. I communicated the details of this Soviet intrigue to former State Secretary von Mackensen in the above-mentioned letter of January 24.

SCHULENBURG

Moscow, July 1, 1938.

<sup>69</sup> Document No. 73, p. 122.

<sup>70</sup> Not printed.

No. 788

109/115048-50

*The German Ambassador in Italy (Mackensen) to the German  
Foreign Ministry*

Telegram

(Forwarded by plane to save expense)

No. 181 of July 2.

ROME, July 2, 1938.

Received July 4, 1938—9:35 a.m.

In continuation of telegraphic reports Nos. 169 and 177 of June 22 and June 30, 1938.<sup>71</sup>

Ciano, who received Perth today at 7 p.m., handed me at 7:30 p.m. the text of the memorandum communicated to the Ambassador with the official answer of the Italian Government to the two British memoranda of June 20. The memorandum, he said, was drafted word for word by the Duce himself.

The substance of the memorandum, divided into four points, is as follows:

1. The Government took note of the British statement that Italy had complied with the points in the Agreement considered essential by England, such as the question of the troops, Libya, *désintéressement*, Palestine, and discontinuation of undesirable propaganda.

2. On the other hand, it had to note that the British had done nothing on their part, either after the Geneva resolutions regarding the Abyssinian question or after Italy's acceptance of the British plan concerning the withdrawal of the volunteers, for the non-application of which not Italy but other countries were responsible.

3. Regarding the three British proposals Italy declared:

(a) That it was out of the question to propose an armistice to Franco, unless the terms were unconditional surrender by the Reds, in which case Italy could exert a moderating influence, as after the fall of Bilbao;

(b) That the unilateral withdrawal of the Italian volunteers was unacceptable at the present moment;

(c) That the entry into force of the Agreement of April 16 would therefore have to await the conclusion of events in Spain, either through the Nonintervention Committee or by a continuation of the war. Regarding this matter the Government had to state, not without regret, that such a delay, for which Italy was not responsible, threatened to compromise the moral effects of the Agreement.

4. On the question of France: The Government again stated that there was not and could not be any connection between possible

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<sup>71</sup> Latter not printed.

Italo-French agreements, or even the mere resumption of Italo-French conversations, and the coming into force of the Italo-British Agreement. Such a connection, which had never been mentioned, also involved the risk of ruining Italo-British understandings as well. The resumption of Italo-French conversations might be possible *after*, but under no circumstances prior to, the coming into force of the Italo-British Agreement.

The memorandum closes with the statement that under these circumstances the Italian Government was determined to wait in the hope that an undue delay would not reduce or even nullify the value of the Agreement.

On handing the memorandum to Perth, Count Ciano added the following:

1. The Duce expected an answer.
2. The Duce no longer considered himself bound to make his attitude conform to the Agreements of April 16. Ciano remarked to me that in this connection they were thinking primarily of the halting of troop withdrawals from Libya, whereas regarding other points the intention was to wait a while longer.
3. The Duce reserved the right to publish the Italo-British conversations since June 3, should there be occasion to do so. (To my question Ciano replied that this would be done only if the British failed to give a satisfactory reply within a reasonable time.)

To my question as to what Perth had answered, Ciano replied that he had confined himself to a weak attempt to deny the Italians the right not to be bound in their attitude by the Agreement.

Ciano finally remarked that the Duce had chosen to answer in such an unequivocal and clear manner because he was tired of the seesaw policy of the British Government, which claimed to be the prisoner of its own public opinion and thus not to be bound itself, while, lately in particular, England had been pursuing a policy in the Mediterranean—he cited Turkey and Greece, as well as supplies of arms to Bulgaria—which was not in accordance with the spirit of the Agreement. The attitude in the French question was so strongly negative because France's attempts at making the coming into force of the Agreement dependent upon the success of Italo-French conversations continued up to the very present. The Duce, however, mindful of the Axis, which France apparently still hoped to weaken, intended to eliminate any uncertainty.

Ciano was quite pessimistic about the chances of the Agreement coming into force, although the Duce would have liked to put it into effect, and he said that the situation was serious.

The text of the memorandum will follow by air mail.

MACKENSEN

No. 789

2129/464638-39

*The German Ambassador in Italy (Mackensen) to the German  
Foreign Ministry*

SECRET

ROME, July 4, 1938.

4041/38

In continuation of report of June 22—3714/38—and telegraphic report No. 181 of July 2.

Subject: Italy and the question of troop strength in Libya.

As reported by wire, the Duce, in connection with the delay in the entry into force of the Anglo-Italian Agreement of April 16, had Count Ciano inform the British Ambassador the day before yesterday that he would no longer be guided in his political behavior by the contents of that Agreement, but was resuming his freedom of action. Count Ciano interpreted this to me as meaning that Mussolini had first of all put a stop to those measures that tended gradually to reduce the transportation of Italian troops in [to?] Libya to the proportion agreed upon with the British. For the rest, however, he wished to watch things a little longer before taking action in other spheres (Palestine question, etc.) in a direction deviating from that of the policy agreed upon. Count Ciano was thus repeating what he had already told me on June 22 on the question of troop strength in Libya. If I nevertheless revert to this question once more, it is because in the conversation of the day before yesterday relative to the figures on what had already been done in the matter of the reduction of troop strength in Libya, the Foreign Minister gave me information inconsistent with what he had told me on June 22. Accordingly, the Italians have already withdrawn almost 20,000 men from Libya. For the weekly evacuation, as Count Ciano told me this time, amounted not to 1,000, but to 1,500 men. As against the maximum figure that England could expect, there were, accordingly, only a little more than 10,000 men, i.e., a third, to be shipped home.

V. MACKENSEN

## No. 790

351/202431-33

*The German Chargé d'Affaires in the Soviet Union (Tippelskirch)  
to the German Foreign Ministry*

CONFIDENTIAL  
Tgb. Nr. A 996

Moscow, July 11, 1938.  
Received July 13, 1938.  
(Pol. IV 4720)

## POLITICAL REPORT

In continuation of the report of June 13, 1938, Tgb. Nr. A/863.

Subject: Attitude of the Soviet Union toward Italy and the Franco-Turkish accord.

Up to the time of the Führer's visit to Italy, it was possible to read between the lines of the Soviet press the hope of a weakening of the Rome-Berlin Axis. After Austria's *Anschluss*, particularly, they seemed to count on such a development here. The Italo-British Agreement and the prospect of an impending Italo-French *détente* were at first regarded by Moscow as signs of a loosening of German-Italian relations. The standstill in the negotiations between Italy and France and the speeches of Mussolini and Ciano in Genoa and Milan have destroyed these Soviet expectations. Litvinov, in the important speech on foreign policy which he made to his constituents at Leningrad on June 23, 1938, expressed this in unmistakable fashion when he declared that Italy had *definitively* severed herself from the coalition of the Western Powers.

As I hear in strict confidence from a member of the Italian Embassy here, Litvinov expressed his disappointment with Italian policy in remarks of some length, made to Rosso, the Italian Ambassador, who paid him a farewell call on July 7 before beginning his vacation and who did not intend on that occasion to discuss political questions. Litvinov had been particularly disturbed by Mussolini's speech at Aprilia.<sup>72</sup> He had openly admitted to M. Rosso that after Austria's *Anschluss* he had expected a conflict of interests between Germany and Italy in the Danube region and over South Tyrol, and had assumed that a weakening of the Berlin-Rome Axis would result. Today he no longer entertained illusions of any kind on that score.

Litvinov then expressed himself to M. Rosso as being much encouraged by the Franco-Turkish accord in the matter of the Sanjak

<sup>72</sup> In his speech at Aprilia on July 7, Mussolini had said that in the anti-Italian and anti-Fascist front there were banded together the outcasts of all nations, but that the calculations of these elements and those of the pluto-democracies had failed.

of Alexandretta and the conclusion of the Pact of Friendship between the two countries.<sup>78</sup> The Italian Embassy here presumes that Litvinov had used his influence in Paris and Ankara to bring about a friendly settlement.

Just why the Franco-Turkish *détente* and *rapprochement* are regarded here as a fortunate event may be seen from an article entitled "France and Turkey," which appeared in the official Government paper, *Izvestia*, on July 8 and was very probably written by the Chief of the Press Division of the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs. The aggressor states, the article explains, and Italy primarily, had eagerly speculated upon Franco-Turkish dissension. The Agreement regarding the Sanjak of Alexandretta, as well as the over-all settlement between France and Turkey, was a heavy blow to Italy and the Rome-Berlin Axis as a whole. The Franco-Turkish Pact could serve to maintain the equilibrium in the Eastern Mediterranean, where Italy was attempting, with the approval of the British Conservatives, to carry out far-reaching aggressive plans.

The article lauds the Pact as a valuable contribution to the strengthening of collective security. The Pact had come about in the spirit of the agreements that the Soviet Union had concluded with France, Turkey, and a number of other neighbors.

It is evident from the following passage of the article that Moscow official circles are not looking forward with unalloyed optimism to the further development of Franco-Turkish relations. "It is self-evident that agreements have practical significance only if they are faithfully fulfilled. To illustrate this idea it is only necessary to recall that France has a treaty of alliance with Poland, but that the policy of M. Beck has succeeded in reducing almost to zero the practical significance of this agreement." In conclusion, the article then expresses the hope that the execution of the Agreement between France and Turkey will have beneficent effects.

The Turkish Ambassador here, to whom I spoke about the Agreement with France, expressed himself somewhat skeptically and remarked that for the time being everything was only on paper.

VON TIPPELSKIRCH

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<sup>78</sup> The Franco-Turkish Agreement signed July 3, 1938, regarding the form of government and garrisoning of the Sanjak of Alexandretta, and the Franco-Turkish Treaty of Friendship signed July 4, 1938.

No. 791

109/115051-53

*The German Ambassador in Italy (Mackensen) to the German  
Foreign Ministry*

Telegram

No. 186 of July 12

ROME, July 13, 1938—12:30 a.m.

Received July 13, 1938—4 a.m.

Ciano asked me to call on him this evening in order that he might inform me of yesterday's conversation with Perth. "In order to avoid long-winded discussions," and referring to the candor that had characterized their conversations so far, the Ambassador had left for his perusal the instructions he had received from London. As a result of this perusal, Ciano prepared a condensed memorandum for the Duce which, returned by the latter, he let me examine.<sup>74</sup> According to this, the seven points in the British instruction are as follows:

1) The British Government was surprised at the latest position that Mussolini had taken; it did not, however, wish to engage in unproductive polemics, but regretted, with Italy, that they were not farther along the road toward a solution.

2) England had from the start (Ciano immediately contradicted this yesterday) understood by "settlement" that the actual withdrawal of volunteers had to take place, and rejected the Italian thesis that the mere acceptance of the British plan by Italy sufficed. Indeed, Italy had unfortunately not accepted the three British proposals designed to start things moving.

3) It was not true that Italy alone had fulfilled all the prerequisites and that England had done nothing at all. London had done its part by its stand at Geneva and the success of its stand. The question of the reduction of troops in Libya, the Spanish question, British action at Geneva, and the Naval Agreement had been accepted as points to be taken up by both parties immediately after the signing of the Agreement of April 16 (Ciano immediately contradicted this view, too, yesterday).

4) The Italian Government incorrectly construed the British view with respect to the relation between the Anglo-Italian Agreement and the Italo-French discussions. England had never made the entry into force dependent on the success of the Italo-French conversations, but had simply pointed out, once more on this occasion, that the success of such negotiations would be extremely favorable to world peace, and that the present Italian attitude could easily be construed as meaning that Italy still hoped, contrary to all assurances, to be able to drive a wedge between London and Paris. Even

<sup>74</sup> Since the English translation is made from a telegraphic German summary of the condensed Italian memorandum summarizing the English instructions, ambiguities are unavoidable.

to give the appearance of doing this, as did Italy's present attitude, was dangerous.

5) Accordingly, the only thing to do was to await the effect of the British plan, and Great Britain would do its best to expedite all measures. Things such as the Duce's address at Aprilia and the subsequent polemics in the Italian press did not, of course, serve to create a calm atmosphere.

6) The Italian theory that further delay diminished the value of the Agreement was not shared by the British Government; it did, however, perceive very serious danger in Italy's announcement that she might publish the exchange of views to date. This exchange of views was confidential and had taken place from the standpoint that the substance of the conversations would be secret and would remain within the Chancelleries, especially where the interests of third parties, particularly France ("were" probably missing) concerned.

7) The British Government was prepared, now as before, to study any new Italian suggestions and, if possible, to accept them without allowing itself to be diverted by matters of secondary importance.

Aside from the interjections already quoted, Ciano simply replied to the Englishman that he would submit to the Duce the British reply (for which, by the way, no final time limit had been set, contrary to the belief prevailing in the Diplomatic Corps here) and that he could say personally only that he in no way considered it satisfactory.

Ciano commented to me that matters had thus reached an impasse. Italy was not contemplating any new suggestions, but would, rather, wait and see how things developed. Each of the two parties was now free to play the game as it saw fit. In answer to my question whether that meant that Mussolini was in practice as well freeing himself from obligations so far adhered to, Ciano replied that no further reduction was being made in the troops in Libya, but that in other questions they were not for the present going beyond a certain loosening up and, in particular, did not yet wish to resume active propaganda on the radio. He concluded his account with the remark that within the next few days a new and strong assault, primarily by Italian troops, would take place, with Valencia as its goal, and would perhaps hasten the march of events. On the question of supplying Franco with men and material, Mussolini was making full use of his regained freedom of movement. Ciano told Prince Philip of Hesse yesterday that the reinforcements recently sent to Spain numbered 5,000.

MACKENSEN

No. 792

109/115054-55

*The German Ambassador in Italy (Mackensen) to the German  
Foreign Ministry*

Telegram

SECRET

No. 191 of July 18

ROME (QUIRINAL), July 18, 1938—1:25 p.m.

Received July 18, 1938—3:30 p.m.

Mussolini availed himself of the quarter hour's wait at the railroad station this morning, before the arrival of the Hungarian Prime Minister, to converse with me regarding developments in Spain and the Italo-British conversations.

Obviously elated by the last reports concerning the successes of the three Italian divisions that are playing a decisive part in the present operations against Sagunto, he judged Franco's military prospects to be very favorable and seemed to expect the capture of Valencia in a few weeks; this would be of the greatest importance from the point of view of morale. With respect to the task of national reconstruction then awaiting Franco, the situation was also more favorable for Franco today, for, though there were certainly considerable differences between Falangists and Requetes, the Spanish people by and large stood behind Franco. If the British had put their money on Negrin in this great gamble, they had only demonstrated, once more that they persistently bet on the wrong horse, in which connection he mentioned the Negus and Chiang Kai-shek and added smilingly that the British would fare exactly the same with Beneš.

Anglo-Italian discussions are obviously a thing of the past for the Duce. In this connection, enumerating what Italy had already done in faithful fulfillment of the Agreement of April 16, he repeated almost verbatim Ciano's statements (see telegraphic report No. 118 [181] of July 2<sup>75</sup>). Chamberlain was lacking in the courage that was after all indispensable to bold action. The Agreement was well on its way toward "petering out." He added abruptly that the British were undoubtedly splendid sailors, but it was something else again to fight in the desert at 50° centigrade. His Italians were accustomed to it, and the state of health of the Italian troops in Libya and also in Abyssinia was excellent. Lastly, he stressed twice in strong language the fact that he would never think of resuming talks with the French before the entry into force of the Agreement of April 16.

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<sup>75</sup> Document No. 788, p. 1145.

The question of Franco's attitude toward the British plan was not touched upon by the Duce.

MACKENSEN

No. 793

875/208868-79

*The German Ambassador in Great Britain (Dirksen) to the German Foreign Ministry*

SECRET

A 3161

LONDON, July 18, 1938.

(Pol. II 2271/38)

POLITICAL REPORT

In continuation of my report of June 10, 1938, A 2589.<sup>76</sup>

Subject: The present state of Anglo-German relations.

- I. The disturbance of the foundations of Anglo-German relations.
- II. The reasons for the crisis in Anglo-German relations.
  1. General tendencies in Europe making for war.
  2. Psychological aftereffects of the *Anschluss* of Austria.
  3. British rearmament and air defense propaganda.
  4. Penetration of Anglo-German relations into British domestic politics.
- III. The conditions for an Anglo-German settlement.
  1. Is the Chamberlain Cabinet still willing to negotiate a settlement?
  2. How strong is Chamberlain's position?
- IV. Summary.
  1. It is urgently necessary to remove Anglo-German tension.
  2. The Chamberlain Cabinet is willing to negotiate a settlement, unless a German-Czech war should open the question of France's treaty obligation and England's participation.
  3. It is urgently necessary to negotiate a settlement with England.

I

There has hardly been a time in the history of Anglo-German relations in which these relations in their totality have in so short a time been so thoroughly thrown open to debate—one might almost be inclined to say shaken—as has been the case during the last 3 months. The *Anschluss* of Austria and the Czech crisis have put a strain on political relations; the question of taking over Austrian debts has opened the problem of economic and financial relations between the two countries; England's abrogation of the passport agreement has jeopardized tourist travel and thus endangered an important opportunity for closer understanding; the military and economic war preparations of the British Government—especially the organization of the A.R.P.—have called up before the public the specter of an imminent war. As a result of the reintegration of

<sup>76</sup> Vol. II, document No. 250, p. 403.

Austria and the "Niemöller case,"<sup>77</sup> half-forgotten propaganda theses such as the Jewish and the Church questions have been brought up. The foundations on which Anglo-German relations were erected have been shaken. They have been threatened from the outside; for the first time since the end of the World War it was not a Franco-German, but an Anglo-German conflict (with the participation, of course, of France, Czechoslovakia, etc.) which the spotlight of the world press brought into glaring relief.

This development, which is a threat to peace, took place in spite of the fact that Germany, even in the opinion of her enemies, has by no single action endangered peace, and in spite of the fact that in England the Chamberlain-Halifax Cabinet is in power, the first and most important point of whose program was and still is a settlement with the totalitarian countries.

Thus it is urgently necessary to examine the causes which have led to this development, as well as the means for eliminating this dangerous condition.

## II

The main reasons for this development in Anglo-German relations which is driving toward a crisis, are in my opinion the following:

1. The three forces—Jewry, the Communist International, and nationalistic groups in the various countries—who wish to incite a world-wide coalition to war against Germany in order to destroy her before she has finished building up her position in the world, have not for a long time been so effectively and feverishly active as in the last few months. After a number of abortive attempts such as the bombardment of the cruiser *Leipzig*, the circulation of propaganda stories about German plans in Morocco, and the attempt of the second Blum Cabinet in March of this year to start a world war by employing active French divisions in Spain, the same forces made a renewed attempt to unleash a world coalition against Germany by staging the Czech week-end crisis.<sup>78</sup> This undertaking was prepared for, accompanied and, after the conspiracy failed, continued by an organized press campaign using as material the revived Jewish problem in Austria and the church conflict in Germany.

2. British public opinion was all the more receptive to these obscure machinations since the *Anschluss* of Austria had stirred to the very depths the political convictions of the British; old empty phrases about the right to existence of small nations, about democ-

<sup>77</sup> Pastor Martin Niemöller, naval officer in World War I, Lutheran pastor in Berlin-Dahlem, outspoken opponent of many of the Nazi Government's ecclesiastical measures, was imprisoned in a concentration camp.

<sup>78</sup> For German documents on the "week-end crisis," see vol. II, chap. III.

racy, the League of Nations, and the mailed fist of militarism took a new lease on life and deeply excited and moved the average Englishman, who is fooled by every appeal to his sentimentality. Of greater consequence was the fact that England's political leaders felt that they had been tactically outwitted and that their position on the Continent was endangered. Together with the purely human reaction "not to be taken in again," the political decision took firm shape to oppose—even at the price of war—any further attempts to shift the balance of power on the Continent without a previous understanding with England. This decision was expressed for the first time during the Czech crisis.

3. Besides this general attitude of British public opinion, there was the state of mind which is bound up inseparably with arming in a democracy. The people had to be aroused, in order to eliminate opposition, obtain appropriations for rearmament, and encourage the necessary volunteers for the army and for air defense. This objective could only be reached by displaying to the people, not merely a theoretical danger of war, but a threat from a definite enemy. All of these considerations and tendencies led to the creation of an atmosphere which resulted in a fear psychosis with regard to a possible attack by a possible foe—and this possible foe could only be Germany.

4. This development was intensified by the fact that the totality of Anglo-German relations entered more and more into the thick of British domestic politics. Having proclaimed it his main task to reach a settlement with the authoritarian states outside the League of Nations, and having dismissed Eden on this score, Chamberlain was at the same time presenting to his opponents, after the conclusion of the Anglo-Italian Treaty, a German-British settlement (or the impossibility of such a settlement) as the next and most important point of attack. For if such a settlement were not reached it meant that Chamberlain's most important thesis was reduced to absurdity. Therefore the attacks of the British press on the alleged rape of Austria and on the German plans to annex Czechoslovakia were at the same time grist to the mill of Chamberlain's enemies.

The following tactical reasons stemming from domestic politics are also responsible for the fact that these opponents chose as their point of attack, both directly and indirectly, Anglo-German relations. The Opposition in Parliament, the Labor Party and the Liberals, had been led by a rather complicated development to make foreign rather than domestic policy the point of departure for their attacks; in this field Germany was the logical objective of their hatred of authoritarian government. The same applies, even though

for quite different reasons, to Chamberlain's enemies within his party, Eden and the Churchill group. Eden and his followers, proceeding from the assumption that the authoritarian countries can be kept in check only by the direct threat of war, follow in the wake of the Parliamentary Opposition. Churchill, with his followers, considers that the best possibility of ousting Chamberlain and putting himself in the saddle lies in accusing the Cabinet of negligence in providing adequate defense of the country against possible attacks—by Germany, of course. Naturally these charges are concerned with the threat from the air, a subject on which the average Englishman is as sensitive today as he was about the "German luxury fleet" before the war. Therefore Chamberlain was obliged to save himself from the attacks of the Opposition by dismissing his Air Ministers, Winterton and Swinton; therefore, too, the attacks of Member of Parliament Sandys because of insufficient antiaircraft guns.

All of these maneuvers, mainly caused by purely domestic politics, have to a great extent made Germany appear to the average Englishman as the enemy whom he will probably have to fight, perhaps in the near future.

The result of this internal and external development of Anglo-German relations is that the relations of the two countries are in a complete state of suspense. The attempts at settlement which were made in the conversations from the autumn of 1937 to 1938 were interrupted by Chamberlain's declaration of March 23, 1938, after the *Anschluss* of Austria. The two main supports which had hitherto carried the swaying structure of foreign relations, even in critical periods, were the Economic Treaty and the Naval Agreement. Of these two, the Economic Treaty was thoroughly shaken by the question of the Austrian debts, but was given a stronger foundation than before by the new Agreement, with favorable secondary effects in general. The Naval Agreement is subject to changes caused by developments in the naval armament policy of the Great Powers; its political value was undermined by the recognition, increasingly widespread in England during recent years and particularly during the last few months, that the air force rather than the navy of a possible enemy has now become the greatest threat to England's security.

No long explanations are necessary to realize that a general adjustment of Anglo-German relations will have to be striven for if dangerous developments involving a considerable threat of war are to be avoided.

## III

The prerequisites for the possibility of a general settlement of the problems existing between the two countries are indicated by the following questions, as far as the British side is concerned:

1. Have the developments of the last few months diminished or eliminated entirely the readiness of the Chamberlain Cabinet to attempt a settlement with Germany?

2. Is the Chamberlain Cabinet sufficiently strong to carry out a policy directed at a settlement with Germany?

Re 1: The shock of the *Anschluss* of Austria resulted in the well-known setback; however, it was overcome within a relatively short time. The mistakes of British foreign policy during the Czech week-end crisis were soon recognized as such, and attempts were made to overcome them by recognition of the good faith shown by Germany, by silence in the face of the strong attacks in the German press, by an address friendly to Germany delivered by Halifax in the House of Lords, by his remarks before the Royal Institute of International Affairs which took into account the German standpoint to a large extent, by Chamberlain's speech in Kettering, and by Halifax's remarks to the press on July 11.

All of these statements by responsible British statesmen, strengthened and elaborated in conversations with me, show the continued desire for a settlement with Germany; however, there is a growing tendency to leave to Germany the initiative in resuming these discussions. The time for doing so is dependent on some clarification of the Czechoslovak question. Before approaching such a far-reaching new political undertaking as the attempt at a settlement with Germany, London wishes to see the Czech question, as a possible source of a new world war, removed from the direct danger zone, at least by a temporary truce agreement between the Sudeten Germans and the Czechoslovak Government.

Re 2: The Chamberlain Cabinet has been subjected during recent months to increasingly violent attacks by its opponents without having any correspondingly conspicuous successes. The only great and permanent achievement so far, the agreement with Ireland, has been passed over in silence. The Anglo-Italian Treaty has not yet gone into effect, since the condition connected with developments in Spain was not realized. It was just as difficult to exploit the adoption of the plan to "comb out" the volunteers [in Spain], since its execution is doubtful, and even under the most favorable circumstances will take months. Far from being settled, relations with Germany were strained; Germany was the object of a steadily rising crescendo of suspicion and insults from the Opposition and the

press. Chamberlain's foreign program, settlement with the totalitarian countries, has thus not yet succeeded entirely anywhere; at best, the balance sheet shows promissory notes on the credit side, the cash value of which is dubious.

On the other hand, the Cabinet has suffered many a grievous wound from the attacks of the Opposition: Air Ministers Winterton and Swinton had to be dismissed in order to protect the Cabinet from the accusation of insufficient activity in air armaments; the Sandys-Hore-Belisha dispute over violation of military secrecy (or over parliamentary privilege) is at best a draw at present; Chamberlain's statements about the agricultural potentialities and limitations of England brought the British farmers, the backbone of the Conservative voters, up in arms.

In spite of all attacks, however, it is unlikely that the Cabinet will be in serious danger before the summer vacation. The vacation months, if they pass without dangerous international incidents, will have a calming influence. The faith which a very large proportion of the British voters have in Chamberlain's integrity and in his firm hand will combine with the realization that there is no one in the Opposition who can hold a candle to him. Among the broad masses of the British people the desire for a settlement with Germany exists and is popular.

After a certain interval Chamberlain and Halifax will have both the will and the necessary home support to tackle the last and most important task of British policy, a settlement with Germany.

#### IV

In summary the following can be stated:

1. Anglo-German relations as a whole are in a state of suspense and are full of tension. They require a settlement, or at least an attempt at settlement, if the British Government, either this one or the next, is not to become convinced, as it did before 1914, that the defeat of Germany by a world-wide coalition is the prerequisite to the security of the British Empire.

2. The present British Cabinet is the first one since the war to make a settlement with Germany one of the most important points on its program; it thus shows the greatest understanding for Germany that is possible in any group of British political leaders of Cabinet caliber. The present Cabinet possesses sufficient strength at home to carry out this task. In essential points it has approached the guiding principles represented by Germany: elimination of the Soviet Union from decisions on the fate of Europe; elimination of the League of Nations from the same task; advisability of bilateral

negotiations and treaties. It is showing growing understanding for the demands of Germany in the Sudeten question. It would be willing to make great sacrifices to satisfy Germany's other legitimate demands—on the *one* condition that these objectives are sought by peaceful means. If Germany should resort to military means to reach these objectives, then England would without any doubt resort to war at the side of France. Preparations in both the military and the economic fields have advanced far enough for this; British public opinion has been sufficiently schooled for such a possibility, as recent months have proved; in addition, the diplomatic trial mobilization during the Czech crisis has shown that the drawing-up of forces in the field of foreign affairs has reached at least the strength of the coalition of 1914.

3. The attempt to reach a settlement with England will therefore have to be the most urgent task of our foreign policy, as soon as the proper atmosphere has been created in the near future.

VON DIRKSEN

### No. 794

1579/382068-70

*The German Ambassador in France (Welczeck) to the German Foreign Ministry*

A 2951

PARIS, July 21, 1938.

Received July 23, 1938.

(Pol. II 2263)

Subject: Correspondence between Daladier and Chamberlain.

Two different sources, usually well informed, gave me similar reports on the correspondence between French Premier Daladier and British Prime Minister Chamberlain as follows:

France is very much displeased with the policy of Italy, who still refuses to negotiate with France and does not seem to be willing to curtail Italian participation in the Spanish Civil War, although France had actually closed the Pyrenean border. But France considers her vital communications threatened as long as foreign powers participate in the civil war in Spain. France would feel that the Italian attitude was being encouraged if the Anglo-Italian Agreement should come into force before the Spanish question was settled.

France is very much alarmed, furthermore, by the reports being received from various sources regarding the acceleration in German armament, particularly in the German fortifications on the French border. They gather from these German measures that Germany

intends to take military steps against Czechoslovakia in the near future.

These political developments moved Daladier to explain to the British Prime Minister the French views on all important questions now pending, in order to clear the political atmosphere as much as possible before the royal visit to Paris. His letter of the end of June to Chamberlain is said to discuss the following problems with great frankness and clarity:

Regarding the Spanish question, Daladier stated again specifically that France approved the British plan and would support it in every way possible. French interests, however, required that foreign intervention in Spain cease, a goal which could only be achieved by Anglo-French cooperation. The interventionist powers could not be allowed to gain the impression that France and England could be separated in this matter.

In this letter, Daladier is also said to have emphasized, in referring to German armaments, that France continued to feel bound by her treaty obligations toward Czechoslovakia, and in case of a German attack would definitely march on Germany. France could understand England's having certain scruples, but France would necessarily have to act. The letter urges the British Government to consider what it would do in such an event. In particular, the letter is said to contain new suggestions about closer cooperation between the two General Staffs and the correlation of their armament programs.

Chamberlain's answer is said to have been precise and conciliatory beyond expectations. The British Prime Minister allegedly gave assurance that the conditions prerequisite to the Italian Agreement's going into effect would be determined in close cooperation with France. He is also said to have stated that Great Britain could not stay out of a European war.

On the basis of this correspondence Daladier is said to have decided to make the speech in which he recognized Germany's peaceful attitude, but also gave renewed assurance that France would adhere to her alliance with Czechoslovakia. According to my informants, the speech was meant to express just as much France's readiness to solve the controversial European issues together with Germany and England by peaceful means, as her determination to intervene in case of an attack on Czechoslovakia. In other words, it was meant both as an invitation and a warning.

The correspondence was treated with notable discretion in France. The first mention of it did not appear until July 14 in an article by Fernand de Brinon in *L'Information*. The French press did not

go into detail about the correspondence until after some statements as to its probable contents had appeared in the British press. The editorial in the *Temps* of July 18, which deals with Franco-British relations, does not discuss the contents of the correspondence directly, but does emphasize that it confirmed the unified course of action decided upon during the visit of the French Ministers to London at the end of April.

Both the Quai d'Orsay and the press have been unusually optimistic since this correspondence. It is claimed that Anglo-French cooperation is assured as never before. The entire political situation is thought to be so clarified that no difficulties could arise in the conversations during the royal visit.

WELCZECK

No. 795

1550/376800-12

*The German Chargé d'Affaires in Italy (Plessen) to the German Foreign Ministry*

4520/38

Rome, July 26, 1938.  
Received July 28, 1938.  
(Pol. IV 5024)

#### POLITICAL REPORT

Subject: Visit of the Hungarian Ministers Imrédy and de Kanya to Rome.

The state visit of the Hungarian Prime Minister Imrédy and Foreign Minister de Kanya to Rome lasted from the 18th to the 21st of July. I shall make a separate report on the official course of the visit. From the impressions that I have received here, the following may be said regarding the significance of the visit and the subject matter of the discussions:

The occasion of the visit was that the Hungarian Prime Minister, after assuming his office, wanted to present himself personally in Rome. Its especial significance lies in the fact that it is the first direct Italo-Hungarian contact since the reunion of Austria with the German Reich and since the beginning of the Czechoslovak crisis. It was undoubtedly a primary purpose of the Hungarians to ascertain whether both circumstances, as well as the improvement in Italo-Yugoslav relations, had wrought a change in the attitude of Italy toward Hungary, and what attitude Italy would take in case the Czechoslovak crisis became more acute.

Count Ciano, as well as the Hungarian Chargé d'Affaires, told me that the final communiqué<sup>79</sup> contained all the essentials. The questions of interest to both countries had been thoroughly discussed. Nothing had been signed or agreed upon, and no change had been made in the existing situation. Count Ciano added that he had noticed that the Hungarians were very suspicious of Yugoslavia, as well as "jealous" of the latter's relations with Italy and Germany. Even though Count Ciano was not very communicative in the conversation with me, I have no reason to assume that his statements did not correctly present the final result of the conversations with the Hungarians. Regarding their substance, I have learned the following from a usually well-informed source:

1) The Italians had promised the Hungarians, hesitantly, to be sure, to use their influence in Bucharest and Belgrade to the end that Rumania and Yugoslavia would remain neutral in the event of an armed conflict between Hungary and Czechoslovakia;

2) The Italians had tried to induce the Hungarians to withdraw from the League of Nations and adhere to the Anti-Comintern Pact. The Hungarians had rejected both proposals on the grounds that they could not venture to antagonize France and, above all, England;

3) The Italians had originally not had the intention of mentioning the Rome Protocols in the final communiqué, since they had regarded the Protocols as over and done with, but had then let themselves be persuaded by the Hungarians to do so after all. In the discussion of this question, Prime Minister Imrédy had revealed that, although he honestly wanted to collaborate with Germany, he was nevertheless afraid of coming entirely under the influence of Germany both politically and economically. The Italians had therefore wanted to meet him half way. They had, in so doing, selected a formula which they assumed would cause no annoyance in Berlin.

4) As far as Number 2) is concerned, the Hungarian Chargé confirmed to me that the question of Hungary's withdrawal from the League of Nations was discussed. He said that Hungary would not withdraw; press reports to the contrary were incorrect. As regards the statement under 3), when I remarked that it had attracted a good deal of attention here that the Rome Protocols had not received a word of mention in the toasts and in the press, but had then been mentioned in the final communiqué, Count Ciano replied that this had no significance.

5) Nevertheless, the Hungarian Ministers, if they struck a balance for the visit, presumably went home with the feeling that on this

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<sup>79</sup> For the text of the communiqué, see *Documents on International Affairs, 1938*, vol. I, p. 279.

occasion also it had been evident that Italy's interest in Hungary had abated and that, to use the words of my above-mentioned informant, "for Italy, the Rome-Berlin Axis occupies the first place, the Anti-Comintern Pact and Italian-Yugoslav friendship the second, and Italo-Hungarian friendship only the third place." It has been generally noticed here what a prominent position the Italians gave to the relations of Italy with Yugoslavia during the visit of the Hungarian Ministers. Thus, in his toast at the state banquet in the Palazzo Venezia on the 18th, Mussolini expressly mentioned Italy's understanding with Yugoslavia, while the Hungarian Prime Minister spoke only in general terms of the neighboring states, which had the same desire to keep the peace. It was further noticed that the visit of the Italian warships to Cattaro was announced in the press while the Hungarian Ministers were still in Italy.

I enclose clippings from the *Messaggero* of the 19th and the 21st, giving the Italian text of the toasts, as well as the final communiqué.<sup>80</sup>

PLESSEN

No. 796

1580/382075-82

*The German Ambassador in France (Welczeck) to the German Foreign Ministry*

A 3046

PARIS, July 30, 1938.

Received August 1, 1938.

(Pol. II 2349)

In continuation of my report of July 22, 1938.<sup>81</sup>

Subject: Political evaluation of the visit of the British King and Queen to Paris.

On June 28, 1938, the nineteenth anniversary of the signing of the Versailles Treaty, the British King and Queen were to have been received in Paris, which was festively decorated for the occasion. The British ruler's first state visit after ascending the throne, before he had visited any of the Dominions or his Indian Empire, was reserved for the French Republic. The death of the Queen's mother caused the visit to be postponed for 3 weeks, and so the well-staged spectacle took place from July 19 to July 22. France surrounded these days with all possible brilliance to please the royal couple, to honor the friendly nation, and to offer the world a display of French hospitality and greatness. A big parade gave

<sup>80</sup> Enclosures not printed here.

<sup>81</sup> Not printed.

an impressive picture of France's military strength. At the Tomb of the Unknown Soldier and at the dedication of the Australian War Memorial in Villers-Bretonneux the brotherhood in arms of the World War was recalled. The 3 days were one long glorification of Anglo-French friendship, a demonstration of the firmness of the alliance, which was designed for its effect on foreign countries as well as on the British and French people.

This demonstration was very painstakingly prepared. Just as, in Paris, every unevenness in the ground was smoothed over and every object which might offend the eye was removed or hidden for the entry of the royal couple, so the political stage was also carefully cleared and put in order, the roles memorized, and every cue prepared.

The policy which was to be visibly strengthened by the visit had been determined mainly during the visit of French Premier Daladier and Foreign Minister Bonnet to London on April 28 and 29, and had been confirmed by the exchange of letters between Daladier and Chamberlain at the end of June. In order to attain a political evaluation of the royal visit it is useful to define briefly once more the character of this policy.

The results of the London visit, during which the French Ministers were particularly honored and were introduced to the royal couple, are recorded in the communiqué of April 29.<sup>82</sup> It contains the basic statement that France and England are allied not only by close mutual interests but also by common ideals. The British and French Ministers agreed on a common policy in Central Europe. The French Ministers approved of the Anglo-Italian Treaty as a contribution to the peace of Europe; the British Ministers expressed the hope that a Franco-Italian agreement might also be reached, which would make it possible to solve the Spanish question. Finally, an intensification of the General Staff conferences inaugurated after the occupation of the Rhineland was contemplated; also—not mentioned in the communiqué—France submitted a memorandum about strengthening the economic influence of England and France in the Balkans.

Daladier declared to reporters in London: "There has never been a more real, far-reaching, and deeper understanding between France and Great Britain."<sup>83</sup>

Since the London Conferences France has largely left it to England to champion the agreed foreign-policy line. However, in the Czech and the Spanish questions she has exercised a profound influence on the British decisions.

<sup>82</sup> Text in *Documents on International Affairs, 1938*, vol. I, pp. 228-229.

<sup>83</sup> The quoted passage is in French in the original.

The London Agreements stood their first test on May 21, when France and England believed that Czechoslovakia was threatened and agreed on a common course of action. The Agreements were confirmed lately in the correspondence between Daladier and Chamberlain (report of July 21, A 2951<sup>84</sup>), in which England gives assurance that the Anglo-Italian Treaty would not go into effect before the Spanish question had been settled and the threat to French communications with North Africa had thus been eliminated.

Hence all clouds were dispersed for the moment and the royal visit could proceed, in an atmosphere of political harmony, as a festival of friendship with calculated long-distance effect, unhampered by questions of political detail, which can change in character from day to day. The technical details of diplomacy were entirely subordinated to basic policy. Only three of the numerous pronouncements and events showed a political trend in a narrower sense: the after-dinner speeches at the President's banquet in the Elysée, the communiqué on the conferences of Lord Halifax with Daladier and Bonnet, and the conversations of British War Minister Hore-Belisha and high British officers with Gamelin, the Chief of the General Staff, and Daladier, the Premier and Minister of War.

The after-dinner speeches celebrated the Franco-British friendship in the warmest manner. The King said, much as Daladier said last April in London: "We could not now recall a period in which our relations were closer."<sup>85</sup> The two Chiefs of State announced the common desire to work toward the maintenance of the peace "with respect for international law"<sup>85</sup> as the President said, and "by means of international agreements,"<sup>85</sup> as the King put it. In both speeches it is emphasized that Anglo-French friendship is not directed against any other power. To that extent the speeches are within the usual bounds. In addition, however, they contain an avowal of nothing less than a common ideology. The President of the Republic spoke of the "friendship which is animated by the same ideals of liberty and peace," of a "solidarity which can only stem from an identical conception of human values." In his answer the King emphasized "adherence to democratic principles" common to both countries and "faith in the blessings of individual liberty."

There is something new in these statements. In the past both countries have always avoided attaching decisive importance to ideological trends in international relations. In the after-dinner speeches the highest representatives of the two nations for the first

<sup>84</sup> Document No. 794, p. 1159.

<sup>85</sup> The quoted passage is in French in the original.

time in this solemn way characterize faith in democracy as an essential element in political cooperation. This amounts to an announcement that there is a front of the democracies. The King's allusion to the United States ("this policy which we share with other great nations"<sup>80</sup>) further emphasizes this concept. The two nations thus represent themselves not only as defenders of their mutual interests but also as guardians of an ideal of civilization. The comment can be heard that these talks are an answer to the ideological solidarity between National Socialism and Fascism stressed during the Führer's visit to Rome.

The political conversations between Lord Halifax, Daladier, and Bonnet were connected with the King's visit more in time than in subject matter. All international questions such as Spain, Czechoslovakia, and the relations to Italy and Germany are in a state of flux. They have been handled up to the present time through diplomatic channels, and they will continue to be dealt with in the future in the diplomatic discussions held almost daily between the two Governments. - The personal contact of the Ministers could advance the discussions, but could not bring about a final solution.

A new subject for discussion, not originally intended, was furnished by Captain Wiedemann's visit to London,<sup>87</sup> concerning which Lord Halifax reported to his French colleagues. In his statements on this subject to representatives of the Parisian diplomatic press, Foreign Minister Bonnet, clearly hinting at the close relations between the Foreign Office and the Quai d'Orsay, stressed the fact that Lord Halifax had confidentially and frankly explained to the French statesmen all details of the visit and the statements of Captain Wiedemann, even before the British Foreign Minister's report, which was filed in Paris, reached Chamberlain. At first the French press looked upon the Wiedemann visit with suspicion, calling it a German maneuver to make trouble. The British explanations evidently had a calming effect, however. In addition, Lord Halifax brought along, as a new proposal, the British plan to send a British representative as mediator between the Czechoslovak Government and the Sudeten Germans.

The short communiqué on the conferences records the desire of the Governments to continue the "work of appeasement and conciliation,"<sup>88</sup> and states that the agreement reached at the end of April remains valid to the fullest extent.

Nothing has been made known about the subject matter of the military conferences that were also mentioned in the London com-

<sup>80</sup> The quoted passage is in French in the original.

<sup>87</sup> Captain Wiedemann arrived in London on July 18.

muniqué. It is rumored that air armament and the supreme command on land and sea in case of war were discussed. It is also said that in the near future a British military commission is to come to France to discuss the supply of war matériel and raw materials.

The effects of the royal visit are understandably pictured as very important by the French. In the first place, the visit represents a success in the psychological field. The French people were united to a rare degree during those 3 days. Even the Communist *Humanité* and the Socialist *Populaire* published warm greetings for the royal couple. The atmosphere grew more cordial from day to day and became really enthusiastic at the end. The attitude of the French, as the press emphasized, showed once more that the opposing elements within the country, which divide the French people in the opinion of the outside world, become immediately unimportant when a significant event in foreign relations comes to the fore.

The British people, whose character usually seems somewhat unapproachable to the Gallic temperament, have suddenly been brought closer to the French. The likable appearance of the royal couple, their dignified manner, together with their personal amiability and simplicity, contributed a good deal to this result. From this sudden sympathy for England and the British character there also grew a stronger interest in political cooperation with England. The Anglo-French policy agreed on in the cold sphere of diplomacy is now also approved and welcomed emotionally by the broad masses of the people. The Government can only gain from this. One newspaper wrote correctly that the Anglo-French policy was ratified by the French people during the visit.

England's profession of unwavering political and ideological solidarity with France also satisfies the French desire for recognition, strengthens their self-confidence, and complies with their perpetual wish for security. It was not for nothing that in his after-dinner speech the President celebrated the understanding between the two peoples as "an essential element of security."<sup>88</sup>

In England the enthusiastic French reception of the British royal couple called forth results similar to those here, in the opinion of the French press. The royal couple is said to have formed the most agreeable impression from the warm reception and from the personalities of the French President and his wife, so that the invitation to President Lebrun to visit London is said also to represent a personal honor for him. The British visitors were particularly pleased, according to the general impression, with the military

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<sup>88</sup> The quoted passage is in French in the original.

parade at Versailles, which gave a direct conception of France's military importance and strength.

Finally foreign countries, in the unanimous opinion of the French press, must have been clearly shown by the visit that Anglo-French friendship is unshakable, and that every attempt to separate the two countries is doomed to failure from the start. The certainty that an aggressor in Europe would confront the combined Anglo-French power must act as a deterrent to all those eager for war, and must provide food for thought for all vacillating allies.

In a comprehensive evaluation of Anglo-French relations since the British royal couple's visit to France the following should be stated:

The visit resulted in no new agreements between the two nations. However it did confirm the fact that Anglo-French relations are closer than almost ever before. The *Entente Cordiale* has been revived in the consciousness of the people. It is certainly no accident that since the visit the *Temps* has assiduously called the Anglo-French relationship by this prewar name of unhappy memory, which has hardly been used since the war ended. The new entente is in the opinion of the French not only an agreement about current questions, but also an alliance in the truest sense. This alliance is supposed to be a community of interests and ideologies. In emphasizing democratic principles the entente between France and England is also to provide an ideological counterweight to the Berlin-Rome Axis and to extend a bridge to the United States and all other democracies of the world. The fact that nothing at all was said about the League of Nations does not seem to bother anybody at the moment.

Undoubtedly France will still have frequent cause for anxiety when the dreaded realism of the British again and again casts doubt upon mutual decisions which France would like to consider final. Undoubtedly England, too, will often enough be embittered by the French tendency to wish to settle everything legally and finally. Decisive, however, is the fact that the two Governments are fully resolved to reach—regardless of all differences of opinion—a unified course of action in every case.

Can this Anglo-French entente be expected to have a real understanding for the necessary new order in Europe? It can reasonably be doubted that the impulse for a wise new order would emerge from the French Government. France's self-confidence is now so strengthened that she does not see any necessity for changing her policy. She is firmly relying on England's taking no important step—including any step toward Germany—without French ap-

proval. The French Government will certainly not close its ears to emphatic British suggestions, at least in the near future, particularly since these yielding tactics have had the result of causing England to support positions in Central Europe today with which a short while ago she would, as a matter of principle, have nothing to do. Essentially, however, France is still clinging to her old dream of arranging the world as she desires in conjunction with England. France gives assurance of her readiness to live in peace with all peoples, but of course "with due regard for international law," that is, in a world where there are no revisions, no surprises, and no *faits accomplis*. France announces her love of peace and will make many a friendly gesture, such as sending the Chief of the General Staff of the Air Forces to visit Germany now. For the time being, however, even since the royal visit, her whole political wisdom is expended in the thought of a *règlement général*, which is supposed to settle the most varied questions at once and force all of Europe once more into a rigid order.

In all this it should not be forgotten, however, that the new *Entente Cordiale* is founded on the particular fears caused by Germany's regained strength and by the policy of Italy, which threatens France's Mediterranean communications. The April visit of Daladier and Bonnet to London, which has just been crowned by the royal visit, was caused by two events which had aroused French anxiety to the highest degree: the *Anschluss* of Austria, with the resulting increased danger to Czechoslovakia, and Franco's military successes, achieved with the assistance of Italian and German arms. This is the real background of the *Entente Cordiale*, and explains how France and particularly England could drop their inhibitions with regard to the shackles of an *Entente Cordiale*, in which France sacrifices a good part of her leadership and independence in foreign policy and England has overcome her dislike of continental ties. This also explains the fact that differences in the interests of the two countries have been overcome and—especially noticeable in France—domestic and political difficulties have been pushed into the background. On the other hand, however, the impression arises that the strength of the *Entente Cordiale* and the revival of tensions internally, as well as in the relations between the two countries, can be greatly influenced by Berlin and Rome—and perhaps only by them—either through the removal of certain fears and the resulting international pressure or by undertaking positive steps for clearing the horizon. It should not be forgotten that Paris will play an important, if not decisive, role in such developments.

WELCZECK

## No. 797

F20/120-122

*The Italian Ambassador in Germany (Attolico) to the German  
Foreign Minister*<sup>90</sup>

PRIVATE AND CONFIDENTIAL

R. AMBASCIATA D'ITALIA

15th of August.

MY DEAR RIBBENTROP: Many thanks again, to your wife and yourself, for having come the other day to the Balbo dinner. Balbo is now in Italy!

Herewith enclosed is a letter to you from Ciano. Much to his regret, he cannot (incidentally, he has not been well in the last few days) go to Nürnberg.

I consider this *very* unfortunate, the more so as—apart from any other specific reason—the European and world situation appears to me such as to make it *essential* that the Foreign Ministers of Germany and Italy should meet to consider and exchange their views upon it, thereby giving also the external evidence of that *politique concertée* which is one of the happy characteristics [*sic*] of the Rome-Berlin Axis. Meetings of the kind, between French and British Ministers, are quite frequent (at least every 3 months only through Geneva).

If you allow me to express my opinion, I wish you would stick to your original idea of going to Como as soon as possible. Ciano, who is only too anxious to go to Germany himself, would certainly follow (I understand he may be going to Warsaw). And, when meeting, you would of course discuss *all* the rest.

I am at your entire disposal in case you should wish to see me.

Very sincerely yours

B. ATTOLICO

*Congratulamini mihi!* Today is the 3rd anniversary of my arrival in Berlin! B.A.

[Enclosure]

*The Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs (Ciano) to the German  
Foreign Minister*<sup>91</sup>

No. 6833

ROME, August 8, 1938—XVI.

MY DEAR RIBBENTROP: I very much appreciated the kind invitation you sent me in your letter of July 30 to attend the Party Rally at Nuremberg.

<sup>90</sup> The letter is in English in longhand on a letterhead of the Italian Embassy. A typed copy appears on F20/118-119.

<sup>91</sup> The letter is in Italian. A German translation appears on F20/117.

FROM NEURATH TO RIBBENTROP

1171

I should have been particularly happy to be present at this great manifestation of German life, and I regret very much that my duties at the time of the Party Rally do not permit me to accept your very kind suggestion.

On the other hand, as Attolico will tell you, I expect to have the pleasure of seeing you soon in Italy.

My wife joins me in expressing the most sincere thanks, and I extend to you, dear Ribbentrop, my very best regards.

Most cordially yours,

CIANO

No. 798

2129/464478-79

*The German Chargé d'Affaires in Italy (Plessen) to the German Foreign Ministry*

Cipher Telegram

SECRET

Rome, August 16, 1938.

No. 206 of August 16

Pl./Kr.

The *Chef de Cabinet* asked me to see him today and informed me on behalf of the Foreign Minister that the Czechoslovak Air Attaché had inquired of the Air Ministry a few days ago, in accordance with instructions, whether the Italian Government would approve the sale of the following aviation matériel:

- 30 Savoia S-73 airplanes without motors, with radio installations;
- 100 Fiat G-50 airplanes with motors, without armament;
- 20 Breda bombers without armament;
- 100 Fiat or Alfa Romeo motors of more than 1,000 H.P.

At the personal direction of the Head of the Government the inquiry of the Air Attaché was being answered in the negative, in view of German-Italian relations.

The *Chef de Cabinet* added that the 30 airplanes first mentioned were civilian planes and Italy was of course losing an important export sale. He requested that the matter be treated confidentially.

PLESSEN

No. 799

634/252928-29

*The German Ambassador in France (Welczeck) to the German  
Foreign Ministry*

A 3326

PARIS, August 16, 1938.

Received August 18, 1938.

(Pol. II 2535)

Subject: Status of Franco-Italian relations.

Beginning at noon today French citizens will need a special exit visa for trips to Italy. The French Government calls this a retaliation measure against the practice whereby Italian citizens have for some time been denied by their Government the necessary passports for trips to France. At first it was said in the French press that these passports were denied because Italian tourists placed too heavy a burden on the exchange rate of the lira, i.e., primarily for financial reasons. Now, it is admitted that Italian foreign-exchange regulations adequately guarantee the protection of the lira and that the Italian measure therefore represents a deliberately unfriendly political act. That this opinion is also shared by the Quai d'Orsay is evident from the tone of the enclosed communiqué.<sup>92</sup> According to this it is a question of nothing less than a Franco-Italian "passport war"—which throws a glaring light on present relations between the two countries.

When Franco-Italian negotiations started at the end of April, the French press, as you know from my reports, first displayed an exaggerated show of optimism. It continued to do so even when the negotiations became deadlocked shortly after their start. This attitude of the press was without doubt officially inspired. Some responsible French circles at that time sincerely wanted to come to an early settlement with Italy and believed that was possible; others yielded, more or less against their will, to a British request which was urgently expressed here. When it then became obvious that no progress could be made by their own efforts, refuge was taken in the position that the coming into force of the Anglo-Italian Agreement allegedly depended upon the conclusion of an identical Franco-Italian agreement. Failure was definitely acknowledged only after Mussolini's speech at Genoa, which seriously annoyed especially those circles here that were striving for a settlement with Italy and was grist to the mill of his adversaries.

After this speech the attitude even of the pro-Italian press changed. Even in their reports, unfavorable items on the economic

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<sup>92</sup> Not printed here.

and financial situation in Italy now take up more space than previously. The pro-Italian press criticized the new Italian racial policy, just like the leftist press, and—frequently with malicious satisfaction—claimed it proved that Mussolini now had to dance to the tune of Berlin. Marshal Balbo's trip to Germany also received very unfavorable comment and was attributed, among other things, to the alleged Italian wish to neutralize the visit of General Vuillemin<sup>23</sup> in advance.

All this, and particularly the "passport war" which has just broken out, indicates that for the present even pro-Italian circles—which more or less include M. Bonnet, in contrast, for instance, to M. Leger—have abandoned the hope of getting anywhere with Italy by continuing to run after her. If, as mentioned above, a British request certainly was partially responsible for the beginning of negotiations with Italy and their continuance, in spite of obvious failures, the changed attitude now openly encountered indicates that even in England they have given up hope for an early Franco-Italian settlement. As a result, the anti-Italian circles in France are receiving a new encouragement, so that, unless there are new developments, it can hardly be expected in the near future that the French will do much for the improvement of relations with Italy.

H. WELCZECK

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<sup>23</sup> Gen. Joseph Vuillemin, French Chief of Air Staff, had visited Germany in July 1938.

## APPENDICES

## Appendix I

### ANALYSIS OF THE FOREIGN MINISTRY ARCHIVES

The schedule attached to this note gives a rough picture of the captured Foreign Ministry archives. When captured, the documents were, for the most part, packed in bundles. On average, each bundle contains some six files or volumes, totalling perhaps a thousand to fifteen hundred pages. The schedule purports to show only whether there is much or little material. Qualitatively, the table tells nothing: one bundle may be more important than a hundred other bundles.

No thorough qualitative analysis has yet been attempted of the materials dating from 1867 to 1936. To 1920, the files seem intact. In the German destruction list of April 1945, the most important files from 1932 to 1936 were included, but only three bundles are known to have been destroyed. Unfortunately, these bundles comprised a large part of the material on armament questions; four bundles on this subject survive. While the Germans were moving the secret political files for 1920-1936 and those of the Cultural Department, an explosion destroyed some and damaged others; the surviving files suggest that the loss was not as serious as the classification of the documents suggests. With these exceptions, it can be tentatively stated that the evacuated archives of the Foreign Ministry are intact from 1867 to 1936.

As far as possible, the files of the years from 1936 have been examined. The Foreign Ministry filing system was reorganized in that year to conform to a radical change in the structure of the Political and Economic Departments of the Ministry. The filing system, therefore, can be most clearly studied in relation to the organization of the offices it served. The division of responsibility within the Foreign Ministry on December 1, 1937, is shown at Appendix II.

At the top was the Reich Foreign Minister (Neurath until February 1938, then Ribbentrop). The files of his personal secretariat bore the general title "Office of the Reich Foreign Minister" (*Büro RAM*). Part of these files were destroyed on Ribbentrop's orders, and only a fragment was captured. It is obvious that the collection contained material of great importance. Some of this material is recorded on the German microfilm mentioned in the General Introduction, but it has not been possible to establish the exact relation of the film to the files. However, interrogation of officials of Ribbentrop's staff has shown that most of the documents they considered important have been recorded on the film. In any case the film, whose authenticity has been fully established, is of the greatest value, since it contains many highly important documents of which no other copies have been found. The last documents recorded on the film date from 1943; after that we have a few records of important conferences and other documents of similar quality preserved in a box belonging to Paul Otto Schmidt, the senior interpreter at the Foreign Ministry. Unfortunately, the records of the personal staff which accompanied Ribbentrop on his various moves in the latter stages of the war (while the *Büro RAM* remained in Berlin) are not in our possession.

Next under the Foreign Minister came the State Secretary. Dieckhoff was Acting State Secretary August 1936–March 1937, when Mackensen was appointed and served until February 1938; his successors were Weizsäcker (1938–1943) and Steengracht von Moyland (from March 1943). The State Secretary's office (*Büro des Staatssekretärs*) kept extensive files which are almost complete. They include both the State Secretary's own memoranda and correspondence and also copies of telegrams and other documents handled by the different departments of the Foreign Ministry. The only known gap is the file on Anglo-German relations, probably from the spring of 1938 until April 1939. Some of this material, however, is preserved in other files. It is, moreover, important to note here that German Foreign Ministry practice, unlike that, for instance, of the British Foreign Office, involved the preparation of copies of documents for each interested department instead of the circulation of a single document which returned to a central registry of files. Thus, the same document may be found in the files of several different departments, a fact of great assistance when dealing with incomplete archives. On the whole, the State Secretary's files form the most important single collection for the period after 1936.

Of the other major departments of the Foreign Ministry, the most important was the Political Department (*Politische Abteilung*). Until February 1938, the Director of this Department was Weizsäcker, and he was succeeded by Woermann, for whom the title of Under State Secretary (*Unterstaatssekretär*) was revived. The Under State Secretary had his own files, but these do not in general compare with those of the State Secretary in range and value. By 1938 the Political Department was divided into ten sections, though this number was increased by a further seven during the war. The bulk of these sections (II to X) dealt with geographical regions, and their responsibility until September 1943 was divided as follows: II. Western Europe, including France and Great Britain; III. Southern Europe (except Italy); IV. South-eastern Europe (divided into two sections, (a) Albania, Bulgaria, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Rumania, Yugoslavia, and (b) Austria and Czechoslovakia); V. Eastern Europe; VI. Scandinavia and the Baltic States; VII. Orient (excluding the Far East); VIII. Eastern Asia and Australia; IX. America; X. Africa. The only section of the Political Department which, before the war, was not concerned with a particular geographical area was Pol. I. In addition to dealing with general policy, Pol. I comprised subsections dealing with military (*M*) and air (*L*) questions. It had a section dealing with the League of Nations (*Vbd*) until 1939, and other *ad hoc* sections were added from time to time including one for National Defense (*Landesverteidigung*).

Secret documents of the Political Department kept at the departmental level were apparently kept together in the *Pol. Geheim Büro*. Most of its files are not in our possession as they were not passed to the Political Archives for evacuation with the remainder of the files.

The files of the remaining departments have less importance. The secret files of the Legal Department (*Rechtsabteilung*), headed for many years by *Ministerialdirektor* Gaus, are missing, since all 23 bundles listed for destruction were actually destroyed. This is unfortunate, since distribution lists on other documents show that the Legal Department received many of the most important political papers.

The files of the Personnel Department (*Personal- und Haushalts-Abteilung*) were also partly destroyed, but this is probably a less serious loss.

NOTE : The gap in the files on Anglo-German relations from the spring of 1938 to the spring of 1939, mentioned on p. 1178, line 8 from top, has now been filled. The State Secretary file on the Halifax visit, November 1937—April 1939, has been identified as the file thought to be missing and is identical with film serial No. 375 (cf. Appendix III, p. 1200) and was used in the preparation of this volume.

The files of the Press and Cultural Departments (*Presse- und Kulturpolitische Abteilungen*) are apparently complete, except for the secret files of the Press Department.

The secret files of the Economic Policy Department (*Wirtschaftspolitische Abteilung, Handelspolitische Abteilung*) were destroyed, but a large number of non-secret files survived. In addition, the *Handakten*, or special personal files compiled for the Director, Wiehl, and his deputy, Clodius, contain copies of secret and top secret documents of some importance. There are many such *Handakten* for officials of other departments, normally reflecting their own special interests, but sometimes containing copies of important documents not circulated elsewhere.

In January 1937 Ernst Wilhelm Bohle, the chief of the organization concerned with Reich-Germans living abroad (*Auslandsorganisation*), entered the Foreign Ministry, and in December 1937 was given the title of State Secretary. In spite of the fact that he ranked level with the State Secretary and reported directly to the Foreign Minister, Bohle's files have yielded little of value and, indeed, he sometimes complained himself that he was inadequately informed of current Foreign Ministry activities.

For many years there had existed a special internal office in the Foreign Ministry (*Sonderreferat Deutschland*) responsible for questions concerning the relations between foreign and domestic policy. In December 1938 Ribbentrop added another special office for Party questions (*Referat Partei*) responsible for liaison between the Foreign Ministry and all Party organizations. Its chief was Martin Luther, an old collaborator of Ribbentrop in the *Dienststelle Ribbentrop*. In May 1940 these two offices were amalgamated into one (*Abteilung Deutschland*), and during the war years Luther succeeded in increasing the scope of his activities, including, in 1942, control over a directorate of propaganda abroad (*Auslandspropagandaleitstelle*). However, in February 1943 Luther was arrested and sent to a concentration camp on charges of plotting against Ribbentrop. The place of the *Abteilung Deutschland* was taken by two "groups" (*Gruppe Inland I und II*) directly under the Minister. The files of these various offices, though numerous, are far from complete.

The files of the German diplomatic missions abroad are comparable in bulk with those of the Foreign Ministry and are very important for filling gaps in the Foreign Ministry records. The files of the Embassies in Rome and Moscow, and of the Legation in Prague, are particularly valuable. Most of the secret files of the Paris Embassy were destroyed by the German archivists in accordance with the order of April 10, 1945, but those that survive contain documents of the war years not available elsewhere. The files of the London Embassy were not mentioned in this order, but no secret files later than 1936 have been found; it is possible that, in this and similar cases, the files had already been destroyed at the Embassy.

Of the files from other sources in the collection, the largest are those of the Old and New Reich Chancellery (*Alte and Neue Reichskanzlei*). These are mainly concerned with internal affairs, but those of the Old (pre-Nazi) Reich Chancellery contain minutes of Cabinet meetings at which foreign policy was discussed.

It will be noted that few of the files continue to the last years of the war. Presumably the current files remained in Berlin or in the Muhlhausen area. If not destroyed, these files may be in the hands of the Soviet Government. The British and American Governments have in their possession certain papers

dating from the last weeks of the war when Doenitz's Government was functioning at Flensburg, and these will be used for the later volumes of this series. However, in the present collection the record for the last months of the Nazi regime must inevitably remain incomplete.

*Schedule of Documents in the Custody of the Foreign Office  
and the Department of State<sup>1</sup>*

No.	Division	Subdivision	Period <sup>2</sup>	Bundles
<b>A) DOCUMENTS OF THE FORMER GERMAN FOREIGN MINISTRY</b>				
<b>I. DOCUMENTS PRIOR TO 1920</b>				
1	I a	Pol.	1867-1920	4296
2		World War	1914-1918	547
3		General Headquarters	1915-1918	58
4		Welfenfonds	1870-1914	20
5	Treaties	Pol.	1867-1920	107
6	Friedensabteilung		1919-1920	7
7	II—Restakten		1853-1920	252
8	Missions	Bogotá	1913-1918	58
9		Petersburg	1816-1914	206
10		Tangier	1845-1914	88
11		Cetinje	1906-1914	1
12	Conferences		1890-1920	22
<b>II. DOCUMENTS 1920-1936</b>				
13	World War		1921	16
14	Office of the Reich Minister		1920-1936	175
15	Office of the State Secretary		1920-1936	100
16	Handakten of various Heads and Deputy Heads of De- partments	Ritter (Sonderreferat W)	1920-1936	63
17		Heads of Departments II-IV	1917-1935	50
18		Gaus (Department V— Legal)	1914-1930	64
19		Miscellaneous Hand- akten (so-called Kleine Archive)	1914-1932	85
20	Special Departments and Sections	Friedensabteilung (later Department II F)	1920	140
21		Friedensvertrag	1920-1921	50

<sup>1</sup> For the period before 1936, the schedule of documents was compiled from fragmentary German lists, not from the documents themselves. Since the documents have not yet been examined, it is possible to speak with certainty only of the number of bundles; it is impossible to describe with precision the contents of each part of the schedule.

<sup>2</sup> The dates indicated in the fourth column are the extreme dates of the first and last document in each series. For instance, for practical purposes the *Pol.* files numbered 80-91 end with December 1940. Isolated documents only are found after this date. Similarly, the *Inland* series numbered 69-74 are of most value for the period after 1938, though a few documents go back to 1929.

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No.	Division	Subdivision	Period	Bundles
22		Referat Deutschland	1920-1936	89
23		Sonderreferat W— (Transportation and Shipping Questions, pre- viously in Depart- ment IV)	1920-1936	840
24		W Rep. (Reparations)	1920-1936	230
25	Secret papers of Depart- ment F and the Geo- graphic Divisions		1920-1936	467
26	Department II	II. Pol.	1920-1936	634
27		II W	1920-1936	514
28		II be (occupied areas)	1920-1936	470
29		II F Air	1921-1936	104
30		II F Military, Navy	1921-1936	130
31		II F Secret	1932-1936	4
32		II F Disarmament	1921-1936	100
33		League of Nations (previously Sonder- referat)	1923-1936	400
34	Department III	III Pol.	1920-1936	449
35		III W	1920-1936	167
36	Department IV	IV Pol.	1920-1936	892
37		IV W	1920-1936	278
38	Treaties	Department II	1920-1936	150 <sup>a</sup>
39		Department III	1920-1936	42 <sup>a</sup>
40		Department IV	1920-1936	160 <sup>a</sup>
41		Shipping	1920-1936	24
42	Commissions <sup>a</sup>		1920-1924	300
43	Delegations <sup>a</sup>		1920-1932	130
44	Plenipotentiaries, Commissioners <sup>a</sup>		1921-1923	140
45	Representatives of the Foreign Ministry <sup>a</sup>		1920	17
46	Plebiscite Area in Upper Silesia <sup>a</sup>			
47	War Guilt Section		1920-1936	131
48	Committee of Inquiry into the War Guilt Question		1923-1925	12
49	Reichstag Investigating Committee		1914-1926	20
III. DOCUMENTS 1936-1945				
50	Reich Foreign Minister		1936-1943	9
51	Dienststelle Ribbentrop		1935-1944	36
52	State Secretary		1936-1944	127

<sup>a</sup> Reckoned in files; an estimated figure.

<sup>a</sup> Mostly relating to peace negotiations and treaties.

No.	Division	Period	Bundles
53	Head of the Auslandsorganisation in the Foreign Ministry	1937-1943	40
<i>Miscellaneous Handakten</i>			
54	Ettel	1939-1944	3
55	Etzdorf (Representative of the Foreign Ministry to the OKH)	1939-1944	6
56	Hencke	1922-1944	9
57	Hewel	1937-1943	9
58	Keppler	1930-1944	5
59	Krümmer	1934-1943	2
60	Künsberg	1938-1943	29
61	Luther	1936-1943	18
62	Megerle	1934-1942	7
63	Rahn	1942-1943	2
64	Ritter	1938-1945	14
65	Schmidt (Press)	1938-1943	10
66	Schmidt (Interpreter)	1938-1944	12*
67	Representative of the Foreign Ministry to the Reich Commissioner for the Ukraine	1941-1944	4
68	Liaison Office of the Commissioner for Information Services	1940-1943	16
<i>Groups Inland I and II</i>			
69	Inland I D	1938-1945	22
70	Inland I Partei	1929-1944	101
71	Inland II A and B	1935-1945	355
72	Inland II C	1933-1945	51
73	Inland II D	1929-1945	47
74	Inland II Geheim	1936-1945	117
75	Referat D VI (Bauten)	1938-1943	21
<i>Papers of the Political Department</i>			
76	Under State Secretary Pol.	1936-1943	27
77	Pol. I League of Nations	1936-1940	6
78	Pol. I M	1936-1944	56
79	Pol. I Air	1936-1940	56
80	Pol. II	1936-1944	43
81	Pol. III	1936-1942	79
82	Pol. IV	1936-1944	110
83	Pol. V	1936-1944	144
84	Pol. VI	1936-1944	26
85	Pol. VII	1936-1943	10
86	Pol. VIII	1936-1941	27
87	Pol. IX	1936-1944	15
88	Pol. X	1936-1944	5

\* Reckoned in files.

<i>No.</i>	<i>Division</i>	<i>Period</i>	<i>Bundles</i>
89	Pol. XI (War Guilt Question)	1941-1943	3
90	Pol. XII (Preparations for Conclusion of Peace)	1941-1945	1
91	Pol. XIII (Russland Gremium)	1936-1942	11
92	Pol. Geheim	1936-1943	25
93	Directives Pol. II	1940-1943	18
94	Handakten Wiehl	1921-1943	62
95	Handakten Clodius	1921-1945	65
96	Handakten Collection (Ha. Pol.)	1914-1944	76
97	Papers of the Economic Policy Department	1936-1945	825
98	Papers of the Legal Department	1880-1945	3264
99	Papers of the Cultural Policy Department	1890-1945	1885
<i>Treaties</i>			
100	Political Department	1936-1944	80*
101	Economic Policy Department	1936-1944	44
102	Legal Department	1920-1943	400
103	Cultural Policy Department	1920-1941	28
104	Press Department	1915-1944	520
105	Protocol Department	1920-1944	227
106	Personnel Department	1860-1945	5042
107	Accounts Division	1920-1944	1100
108	Politisches Archiv (Geschäftsakten)	1920-1944	185
109	Referat Pers. (Historisches Referat)	1937-1939	4
110	Asservate zum Politischen Archiv <sup>†</sup>	1920-1944	15
111	Politisches Archiv (Geschäftsakten Meisdorf, Friedland, Degnershausen)	1936-1944	6
112	Asservate <sup>†</sup>	1860-1945	122
113	Nachlässe <sup>‡</sup>	1860-1945	300
<i>Missions</i>			
114	Ankara	1875-1943	213
115	Athens	1927-1940	28
116	Belgrade	1876-1944	71
117	Bern	1854-1943	860
118	Brussels	1845-1940	89

\* Reckoned in files.

† Small miscellaneous accessions to the archives from various sources.

‡ Documents of defunct sections or former officials.

No.	Division	Period	Bundles
119	Budapest	1910-1944	209
120	Bucharest	1867-1940	177
121	Hague	1858-1944	172
122	Helsinki	1889-1944	27
123	Copenhagen	1862-1944	139
124	Kovno	1895-1941	246
125	Lisbon	1869-1943	277
126	London	1861-1937	433
127	Luxembourg	1879-1940	61
128	Madrid	1865-1942	580
129	Moscow	1921-1941	216
130	Oslo	1890-1940	610
131	Paris	1871-1944	1433
132	Prague	1918-1939	333
133	Pressburg	1922-1944	390
134	Reval	1919-1941	207
135	Riga	1868-1941	273
136	Rome (Quirinal)	1818-1943	1517
137	Rome (Vatican)	1849-1943	179
138	Sofia	1879-1944	113
139	Stockholm	1825-1941	368
140	Warsaw	1920-1939	193
141	Washington	1870-1938	504
142	Vienna	1867-1939	758
143	Zagreb	1921-1944	773

*Missions—Secret Papers*

144	Antwerp	1931-1939	1
145	Athens	1937-1938	1
146	Bern	1939-1942	5
147	Bucharest	1936-1942	3
148	Ciudad Trujillo	1941	1
149	Lisbon	1928-1943	8
150	Madrid	1936-1943	9
151	Moscow	1937-1941	18
152	Paris	1938-1944	26
153	Prague	1938-1939	1
154	Rome (Quirinal)	1920-1943	66
155	Rome (Vatican)	1903-1942	7
156	Sofia	1931-1938	1
157	Tirana	1924-1943	6
158	Zagreb	1940-1944	28
159	Special Commissioner Southeast	1944	1
160	Consulates	1845-1944	4270*
161	Miscellaneous Documents		800*

## B) DOCUMENTS NOT ORIGINATING IN THE FOREIGN MINISTRY

162	Handakten Epp	1900-1945	36
163	Handakten Frank	1918-1945	86
164	Handakten Speer	1936-1945	18

\* Estimated figure.

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<i>No.</i>	<i>Division</i>	<i>Period</i>	<i>Bundles</i>
165	Ibero-Amerikanisches Institut	1933-1945	69
166	Alte Reichskanzlei	1920-1933	3665 <sup>a</sup>
167	Neue Reichskanzlei	1933-1945	1630 <sup>a</sup>
168	Präsidialkanzlei	1919-1940	125
169	Chancellery of the Deputy of the Führer	1933-1942	168 <sup>a</sup>
170	Office of the Führer's Adjutants	1935-1940	328 <sup>a</sup>
171	Party Offices	1930	15
172	Various documents of foreign origin	1912-1945	95

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<sup>a</sup> Reckoned in files.

## Appendix II

### ORGANIZATION OF THE GERMAN FOREIGN MINISTRY ON DECEMBER 1, 1937<sup>1</sup>

#### THE REICH FOREIGN MINISTER

Baron von Neurath

*Attached:* V. L. R. von Kotze

*Office:* L. S. Dr. von Marchtaler  
A. R. Köppen

#### THE STATE SECRETARY OF THE FOREIGN MINISTRY

Dr. von Mackensen

*Office:* L. S. Dr. Siegfried  
A. R. Reifegerste

#### THE HEAD OF THE AUSLANDSORGANISATION IN THE FOREIGN MINISTRY

E. W. Bohle, Gauleiter

*Attached:* L. S. Dr. Ehrich  
R. O. I. Rust

*Chief Clerk:* H. R. Schönhertz

#### *Protocol*

Diplomatic Corps in Berlin. Foreign consuls in the German Reich. Audiences with the Führer and Chancellor. Ceremonial, Decorations:

Gesandter I. Kl. von Bülow-Schwante; V. L. R. Dr. Boltze; L. S. von Kessel; L. S. Ritter von Reichert; Ref. Pappritz; H. R. Pingel; A. R. Propp; A. R. Splettstösser; A. R. von der Seipen; A. R. Vogel.

Internal German Affairs (Referat Deutschland).

Gesandter I. Kl. von Bülow-Schwante; V. L. R. Dr. Hinrichs; L. R. Dr. Schumburg; H. R. Jüngling; R. O. I. Klee.

#### PERSONNEL AND BUDGET DEPARTMENT (PERS.)

Personal data on members of the foreign service. Matters relating to pay and welfare. General administration of the Foreign Ministry and of diplomatic missions abroad. Questions relating to budget, finance, and accounts. Political archives. Library. Cipher service. Language service. General questions concerning the organization of the foreign service.

Head of Department:

Ministerialdirektor Dr. Prüfer.

<sup>1</sup> This organization plan has been translated from the German Foreign Ministry organization circular of that date. The original is filmed as serial 1780, frames 406709-25. The initials and terms preceding the names in this list indicate the title or grade of each official, and are explained in the Glossary, Appendix V. For a table of the organization of the Foreign Ministry on June 1, 1938, see vol. II, Appendix II.

Deputy Head of Department:	V. L. R. Dr. Dienstmann.
Attached:	A. R. Stempel.
Head of budget and financial affairs:	V. L. R. Schellert.
Special assignments:	V. L. R. z. D. Schroetter.
Pers. H      Organization of the foreign service abroad. Training of candidates for the higher service. Personal data of higher officials, of honorary consuls, experts, etc. Information center:	V. L. R. Dr. Rohde; L. R. Ramm; H. R. Dr. Schwarz; A. R. Eich; A. R. Diederich.
Pers. M      Personal data on other officials and employees. Organization and simplification of working of the Ministry:	L. R. Schroeder; A. R. Rock; A. R. Kownatzki (Walther); R. O. I. Voigt; K. S. Erlewein.
Pers. R      Drawing-up and general administration of the budget. General questions relating thereto. Fee and income revenues. General cash and accounts. Preliminary examination of accounts. Administration of funds for official requirements, newspapers and books, postal, telegraph and telephone charges, household expenses, etc., for missions abroad, courts of arbitration and mixed commissions, subsidies in foreign countries, welfare organizations and repatriation costs. Currency matters for the Foreign Ministry and for missions abroad. Collections in foreign countries:	V. L. R. Kammler; L. R. Rieger; H. R. Pfeiffer; H. R. Edert; Rechn. R. Lachnitt; H. R. Engel; A. R. Stadelmann; A. R. Guenther; A. R. Schulz (Erich); A. R. Klauenberg; A. R. Nachtingal; A. R. Bartsch; A. R. Niemandt; A. R. Frensch; A. R. Blenk; A. R. Krüger; R. O. I. Ressler; R. I. Dittmann; R. I. Jasiek.
Pers. B      Salaries and wages, welfare and maintenance, travel and removal expenses of officials and employees of the foreign service and other persons. Official expenditure of honorary consulates:	L. R. Dr. Bischof; A. R. Fischer; Kzler. Lehmann; A. R. Brose; A. R. Entrodacher; A. R. Reinicke (Georg); A. R. Wegener; A. R. Roethig; A. R. Drewski; Kzler. Buchholz; R. O. I. Bunze; O. I. Göhring (Max); R. O. I. Belling; R. O. Royle; O. I. Scholz; R. O. I. Blaack; K. S. Eichler; K. S. von Gross.
Pers. D      Administration of funds for official requirements, newspapers and books, postal, telegraph and telephone charges, household administration and sundry expenses of the Foreign Ministry. Unbud-	L. R. Balser; G. K. Baron von Ungelter; K. z. D. Dr. Bergfeld; A. R. Winzer; H. R. Steinicke; A. R. Bähre; A. R. Ullrich (Bruno); A. R. Herold; A. R. Panten;

A. R. Viertel; A. R. Sevser;  
A. R. Schütz; R. O. I.  
Thiele; O. I. Blessing; R. I.  
Hoffmann; M. Kzl. S. Riese-  
weber.

Pers. S Couriers; security questions at Ref. Mors; M. Kzl. O. S. Ober-  
home and abroad: jürgen.

V. L. R. Kammler.

Accountant: A. R. Eger.

H. R. Kiem.

Cashier: A. R. Hintze.

O. R. R. Dr. Holleck-Weithmann; Bibl. Piske; Bibl. Dr. Wender; Bibl. Insp. Lubig; Bibl. Insp. Hanfand.

L. S. Dr. Frauentdienst; Dr. Ullrich (Joh.); H. R. Glasow; A. R. Langner; A. R. Heinrich.

V. L. R. Selchow; O. R. R. Schauffler; R. R. Langlotz; R. R. Dr. Kunze; R. R. Paschke; R. R. Steinbrinck; R. R. Scherschmidt; R. R. Hoffmann (Ernst); R. R. Dr. Kasper; R. R. Dr. Rov.

H. R. Sergeois; H. R. Klambunde; H. R. Schultz (Willy); A. R. Oehlandt; A. R. Hübscher; A. R. Pellmann; A. R. Mieschel; A. R. Rad-dünz; Kzler. Zorn; R. I. Papiersch; techn. Insp. von Ahsen.

H. R. Lührs; H. R. Pifrément;  
A. R. Ziem.

O. R. R. Gautier; L. R. Dr.  
Schmidt (Paul); R. R. Dr.  
Schultheiss.

A. R. Kniestedt.

H. R. Schimpke; H. R. Heyer;  
A. R. Schmidt (Wilh.);  
A. R. Dux; A. R. Hoppe;  
A. R. Reiner.

Head of Chancellery: M. Kzl.  
O. S. a. D. Baumbach.

Messenger Service:

Head of Messenger Service:  
Günther (Friedrich).

Housekeeper's Department:

Building supervisor:  
Fasewalk.

POLITICAL DEPARTMENT (POL.)

Head of Department:

Ministerialdirektor Baron von  
Weizsäcker.

Deputy to Head of Department:

Ges. I. Kl. Prince von Bis-  
marck.

For special assignments:

V. L. R. von Lieres und Wil-  
kau; L. R. Mackeben.

Pol. I League of Nations. Military ques-  
tions. Armaments. Aviation.  
Defense:

V. L. R. von Kamphoevener;  
L. R. Schultz-Sponholz;  
L. R. Dr. Baron von der  
Heyden-Rynsch; L. S. von  
der Damerau-Dambrowski;  
A. R. Eckhardt; A. R.  
Steinmeyer; A. R. Grimm.

Pol. II Western Europe (Great Britain,  
Ireland, British possessions—  
unless dealt with elsewhere—  
France, with North Africa, Mo-  
rocco, and Tunis, Belgium, Neth-  
erlands, Switzerland, Luxem-  
bourg):

V. L. R. von Rintelen; L. R.  
Baron Marschall von Bie-  
berstein (Adolf); L. S. Dr.  
von Holleben; A. R. Gu-  
dohr; A. R. Rose.

Pol. III Southern Europe  
a) Spain, Portugal:

L. R. Dr. Schwendemann;  
-----; <sup>2</sup> A. R. Haack.

b) Vatican:

L. R. Dr. Haidlen.

Pol. IV Southeast Europe (Albania, Bul-  
garia, Greece, Italy—Ethiopia,  
Libya—Yugoslavia, Austria, Ru-  
mania, Czechoslovakia, Hun-  
gary):

V. L. R. Dr. Heinburg; L. R.  
Dr. Busse; L. R. Dr. Alten-  
burg; L. S. Dr. Mohrmann;  
A. R. Gläser.

Pol. V Eastern Europe (Poland, Danzig,  
Soviet Union):

V. L. R. Dr. Schliep; L. R.  
Bergmann; L. S. Baron von  
Welck; Amts-u. Landg. R.  
(Att.) Dr. Schaffarczyk;  
H. R. Wenger; H. R.  
Giesche; H. R. Brembach.

Pol. VI Scandinavia and border states  
(Denmark, Sweden, Norway, Ice-  
land, Finland, Estonia, Latvia,  
Lithuania, Memel Territory):

V. L. R. Dr. von Grundherr;  
L. R. Count von Hohenthal;  
L. S. Dr. Doertenbach;  
Assess. (Att.) Graf; R. O. I.  
Bornstedt.

Pol. VII Middle East (Egypt, Afghanistan,  
Arabia, Ceylon, Cyprus, Pales-  
tine, Syria, Turkey, India, Iraq,  
Iran, Sudan):

V. L. R. Dr. von Hentig; Dr.  
Schlobies.

<sup>2</sup> Marks of omission appear in the original.

- Pol. VIII Far East and Australia (Japan, Japanese mandated territories, China, Manchukuo, Mongolia, French Indo-China, Siam, Straits Settlements, Malay States, Netherlands East Indies, Philippines, Australia, New Zealand, South Sea territories): V. L. R. Dr. von Schmieden; L. R. Dr. Count Strachwitz; L. R. Dr. Voskamp.
- Pol. IX America  
 North America (United States with possessions—except Philippines—Canada), Central and South America, Cuba, Haiti, Dominican Republic: V. L. R. Freytag; L. S. Dr. Anderson; L. S. von Stempel; R. O. I. Wildegans.  
 Questions concerning confiscated German property in the United States. German-American Mixed Claims Commission: Ges. z. D. Rohland.
- Pol. X Africa (except Morocco, Algiers, Tunis, Italian possessions, Egypt, Sudan). Mandate and colonial questions: L. R. Dr. Strohm; L. R. Dr. Zeitschel; Kzler. Larssen; A. R. Mannes Schmidt; R. O. I. Metz.
- Chief Clerk: H. R. Kownatzki (Erich).

## ECONOMIC POLICY DEPARTMENT (W)

- Head of Department: Ministerialdirektor Wiehl.
- Attached:
- Deputy to Head of Department: V. L. R. Dr. Clodius.
- Directly subordinate to Head of Department; V. L. R. Dr. Hemmen.  
 Leader of delegations for commercial treaty negotiations:
- W I General section for questions concerning economics and finance: L. R. Dr. Wingen; L. S. Dr. Baron von Maltzahn; L. S. Dr. Pawelke; Assessor (Att.) Dr. Allardt; A. R. Granass.
- W I Raw materials: L. S. Dr. Rahn.
- W II Western and Southern Europe except Great Britain and Italy (Belgium, including colonies and mandated territories, France, including colonies, protectorates and mandated territories, Luxembourg, Netherlands, including colonies, Portugal, including colonies, Spain, including colonies): V. L. R. Sabath; Ges. R. Dr. Kreutzwald.
- Switzerland: L. R. Dr. Wingen.

- W III Southeast Europe with Italy and Near East (Albania, Bulgaria, Greece, Italy with colonies, Yugoslavia, Austria, Rumania, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Afghanistan, Egypt, Arabia, Cyprus, Iraq, Iran, Palestine, Sudan, Turkey, Yemen): V. L. R. Moraht; K. z. D. Dr. Kalisch; L. S. Dr. Junker; L. S. Dr. Janz; L. S. Dr. Riegner; A. R. Schwenn.
- W IV Eastern Europe (Danzig, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Memel, Poland, Russia): V. L. R. Dr. Schnurre; L. R. Baron von Behr; Assess. (Att.) Dr. Bottler; Assess. (Att.) Dr. Bruns; H. R. Bienotsch.
- W V Northern Europe (Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, Sweden). Also, monopoly problems: L. R. Dr. van Scherpenberg; H. R. Bienotsch.
- W VI Great Britain, Dominions and British possessions except Canada (Australia, Ceylon, Great Britain, British India, Ireland, Malay States, New Zealand, Straits Settlements, South Africa): V. L. R. Rüter; L. S. Dr. See-los.
- W VII Far East (China, Hong Kong, Japan, Manchukuo, Philippines, Siam, South Sea territories): L. R. Dr. Voss; A. R. Grunwald.
- W VIII America  
a) North America, including Canada and Mexico (Canada, Cuba, Dominican Republic, Haiti, Liberia, Mexico, United States), also promotion of tourist traffic:  
b) South America, including Central America (Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Salvador, Uruguay, Venezuela): V. L. R. Dr. Davidsen; V. K. Krienen.  
L. S. Dr. Rahn; L. S. Dr. Pamperrien; L. S. Dr. Maciejewski; A. R. Autzen.
- W IX Shipping: V. L. R. Bleyert; H. R. Zornow; R. O. I. Dietzler (Alfred).
- W X Reich Office for Foreign Trade. (Economic news and information service; chambers of commerce abroad): V. L. R. Dr. Bosenick; H. R. Grunow.
- Chief Clerk: A. R. Voss.

## LEGAL DEPARTMENT (R)

- Head of Department: Ministerialdirektor Dr. Gaus.
- Deputy to Head of Department: V. L. R. Dr. Albrecht.
- R I International law, cooperation in conclusion of treaties. League of Nations law. Peace organization. Arbitration courts, and the Permanent Court of International Justice. Laws of war and neutrality. Red Cross. Advancement of jurisprudence. The Academy for German Law and the National Socialist League of Guardians of the Law. Publication of documents on foreign policy:
- R II Index of foreign treaties: A. R. Kayser.
- a) Consular law (except as dealt with under R VI). Law applying to diplomatic missions. Extraterritoriality. Trade treaties and concessions. International traffic law, except international motor vehicle traffic. Settlement of questions of German property in former enemy countries, including liquidation agreements and laws relating to war damage. Termination of mixed claims courts and claims by neutrals for damages arising out of the war. Revalorization of foreign loans in German hands. Industrial protective laws. Copyright law.
- b) Tax law. Civil Service Law. Private insurance law. Opium and other narcotics. Customs matters affecting German and foreign diplomats:
- R III a) Nationality. Constitutional and administrative law. Ecclesiastical law.
- b) Penal law. Legal aid in criminal cases. Extradition cases. Criminal proceedings in Germany against Germans for offenses committed abroad and against foreigners abroad for offenses committed in Germany. Reports on criminal proceedings:
- V. L. R. Dr. Siedler; L. R. Dr. Kastner; H. R. Jander; H. R. Hanck; R. O. I. Dahms; O. I. Lang.
- L. R. Dr. Lohmann; L. S. Dr. Stahlberg; A. R. Steinseifer.
- L. R. Busch; L. R. Günther; A. R. Breitfeld; H. R. Schaub; A. R. Kayser.

- R IV Compulsory military service. Compulsory labor service. Registration abroad of those liable for military service. German war graves abroad. Persons suffering war injuries. Prisoners of war (cases still pending from the World War). Welfare. Social insurance law. Hunting and fishing legislation. Gun licenses. Hereditary health law: V. L. R. Dr. Sethe; Ger. Ass. (Attaché) Dr. Hecker; A. R. Lindemann; R. O. I. Schild; R. I. Markeffsky.
- R V Labor law. The International Labor Organization. Industrial law. Police, particularly Aliens Section. Counterfeiting. White slave traffic. Child welfare. Pornographic literature. International motor vehicle traffic. Universal Postal Union. International Telecommunication Union. Passport law. Refugee questions. Welfare law. Reception (*Uebernahmesachen*): V. L. R. Rödiger (Gustav); L. R. Fischer (Rob.); A. R. Schaarwächter; A. R. Zarbock.
- Passport office of Foreign Ministry: H. R. Reimke.
- R VI Consular jurisdiction in matters of civil law and lawsuits. International legal protection and legal aid in civil matters. International private law. Standardization of international law in matters of civil, commercial, maritime, and aviation law. Foreign law on civil status. Matters relating to marriage laws and civil status, especially enforcement of law concerning race protection and certification of health before marriage. Law officers' opinions in matters of civil law and civil cases of the Foreign Ministry. Agreements regarding credentials: L. R. von Haeften; L. S. von Nostitz; A. R. Hasenei.
- Credentials office of the Foreign Ministry (cf. passport office): H. R. Reimke.
- R VI Na Matters of inheritance. Procuring of documents abroad relating to civil status and proof of descent: L. S. von Nostitz; A. R. Dietzler (Egon).
- Special assignment: Reform of consular legislation. Preparation of manual for the consular service: Gesandter z. D. Dr. Kraske.
- Chief Clerk: H. R. Schuhmacher.

## CULTURAL POLICY DEPARTMENT (KULT.)

Head of Department:	Gesandter I. Klasse Dr. Stieve.
Deputy to Head of Department:	V. L. R. Dr. von Twardowski.
Kult. Gen. General questions of cultural policy. Cultural conventions. Cultural treaties, their implementation and effect. Cultural policy of other powers. Interstate societies:	L. R. Dr. Resenberg; R. O. I. Garbe.
Kult. A Position of German racial groups abroad and of minorities in the Reich. Press and literature of German racial groups abroad. Political work abroad by Reich-German agencies. Scientific work on questions of race. Work of ecclesiastical organizations on questions relating to Germanization. International racial group policy. German Houses. German libraries abroad:	Gen. K. Dr. Lorenz; L. S. Dr. v. Fries; Dr. Goeken; A. R. Fleissner; R. I. Dr. Schatz.
Kult. B Economic questions relating to Germanization:	L. R. Dr. Schwager; K. z. D. Buttman.
Kult. E Emigration and repatriation. Settling abroad. Germanism in Russia. Persons of German stock in the Soviet Union and care of refugees of German stock from Russia:	L. R. Dr. Kundt; Kzl. Fischer.
Kult. H Administration of funds of the department. (School funds. Funds for cultural purposes. Goethe House funds. Foreign Institute of the University of Berlin. School building program in Poland):	i. V. L. R. Dr. Roth; H. R. Krüger; R. I. Aurich; R. I. Werlich.
Kult. J Youth movement at home and abroad. Cultural relations of Hitler Youth with foreign countries. International youth rallies at home and abroad. Youth excursions. Boy Scout matters. Youth congresses:	K. Dopffel; R. O. I. Scholz.
Kult. Nf Enquiries abroad about Reich-Germans and foreign nationals. Reich-Germans and those of German race who have immigrated or wish to immigrate:	L. R. Dr. Kundt; Dr. Baron v. Bodman.

- Kult. S      German educational system abroad. Matters affecting German schools abroad. Subsidies for schools abroad and for language teachers. Supplies to schools abroad of books, magazines, and school material. Questions relating to examinations and credentials. Committee of awards. Foundations. German Academy. Personal data on language teachers, exclusive of questions regarding payments. Educational systems of foreign countries. School books. Collection of reports of foreign schools. Educational periodicals. German Pedagogic Office, foreign section. Exchange of students and teachers. Travel of students. Exchange of correspondence by students. Selection and care of foreign students in Germany. Tuition fees for foreign students. International pedagogic exhibitions, meetings, and congresses. Travel of educators to congresses. Budget and financial affairs of schools abroad. Questions of payment to language instructors and teaching staffs abroad. Travel of instructors for schools abroad. Applications for assistance by teachers and former teachers residing abroad and returning home. Placement and leaves of absence for teachers trained in higher institutions of learning. Placement and leaves of absence for those not so trained. Questions pertaining to instructors in German schools abroad and to language teachers, exclusive of financial questions:
- Kult. U      University affairs (Congresses, exhibitions, and festivities). Exchange of visiting professors with foreign countries. German lecturers at foreign universities and the reverse. All questions
- V. L. R. -----;<sup>\*</sup>  
 L. R. Dr. Holm; K. Dopffel;  
 L. S. Dr. Paul; H. R. Blum;  
 H. R. Unruh; A. R. Barthol;  
 A. R. Walden; A. R. Filke;  
 R. O. I. Scholz; Hilfsarb. Lohmann.
- K. Dr. Schaefer-Rümelin;  
 A. R. Hiemke; A. R. Stichler.

<sup>\*</sup> Marks of omission appear in the original.

Kult. W      General scientific relations with foreign countries. Scientific congresses and exhibitions. Research journeys and expeditions. Scientific institutes. Honoring of foreigners. Reich Central Office for Scientific Information. Lectures by German scholars abroad and by foreign scholars in Germany. Health questions. Sanitary agreements. German hospitals and German medical personnel abroad. Archaeology. Museums. Books and libraries. Periodicals. The promotion of books and exhibitions of books abroad:

L. R. Dr. Roth; L. R. Dr. Pfeleiderer; Dr. Stünzner; A. R. Zachowius; R. O. I. Grabowsky.

**A. R. Hemmerling.**

**Head of Department:**

**Deputy Head of Department:**

**I** Southeast Europe (Albania, Bulgaria, Greece, Yugoslavia, Austria, Rumania, Czechoslovakia, Hungary):

II Western Europe except Netherlands and Switzerland, (Belgium and colonies, France and colonies, Italy, Luxembourg, Morocco, Vatican), also *Deutsche diplomatisch-politische Korrespondenz*:

### III Great Britain with Dominions, protectorates, and colonies:

IV Eastern Europe (Baltic States: Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania; Danzig, Poland, Soviet Union):

V Scandinavia (Denmark, Iceland, Norway, Sweden), Finland, also Netherlands:

## VI Portugal, Spain, Central and South America:

V. L. R. Pistor.

VII	United States of America:	i. V. L. R. Dr. Bömer.
VIII	Near East (Turkey, Egypt, Ethiopia, Afghanistan, Iraq, Iran, Palestine, Syria):	Ges. z. D. Dr. Kirchholtes.
IX	Far East (China, Japan, Siam, India, Netherlands Indies). Switzerland. Currency matters:	V. L. R. z. D. Dr. Katzenberger.
X	Economic and colonial questions. League of Nations. International treaties. Periodicals dealing with foreign politics:	V. L. R. Dr. Dumont.
XI	Verbal and written reporting on press:	Dr. Schacht.
	Chief Clerk:	H. R. Warnick.

## Appendix III

### LIST OF GERMAN FILES USED

The following table identifies the German file from which each document has been derived. The documents of the Foreign Ministry were bound into volumes by the Germans. The documents in these volumes have been micro-filmed, and each film of a file has been identified by a film serial number, while each page of the documents has been identified by a frame number stamped on the original at the time of filming. The documents published in this collection are identified by printing the film serial number and frame numbers in the upper left-hand corner of each document. By reference to the following table of film serial numbers the location in the German Foreign Ministry archives of the copy of the document used in this publication may be determined.

<i>Film Serial Numbers</i>	<i>German File</i>
28	German Legation in Czechoslovakia: Telegrams to and from the Foreign Ministry and other Authorities.
33	Reich Foreign Minister: Memoranda on Visits of Foreign Statesmen.
49	Head of the <i>Auslandsorganisation</i> .
74	German Embassy at the Holy See: Secret Papers, Political Papers, Miscellaneous Papers.
100	German Embassy in Italy: Mackensen Papers.
109	State Secretary: Anglo-Italian Relations.
111	State Secretary: Chinese-Japanese War.
115	Reich Foreign Minister: Austria.
119	Head of the <i>Auslandsorganisation</i> : Italy.
120	State Secretary: Austria.
145	Under State Secretary: East Asia Conflict.
147	Reich Foreign Minister: Poland, Poland Conflict, Poland-Danzig.
151	Under State Secretary: Nine Power Conference.
153	Under State Secretary: China/Japan.
155	<i>Pol. VIII</i> : Political Relations between Japan and Germany.
174	State Secretary: Japan.
198	Economic Policy Department: Clodius, Japan.
210	Under State Secretary: Nine Power Conference.
223	State Secretary: (1) Austria, <i>Handakten</i> . (2) Visit of Austrian State Secretary Guido Schmidt to Berlin, 1936, <i>Handakten</i> .
224	State Secretary: Chinese-Japanese Conflict.
296	Political Department: France, Socialism, Communism, etc., in France.
313	Under State Secretary: French, Italian, British Negotiations.
325	State Secretary: Mussolini Visit.
348	State Secretary: (1) Visit of Italian Foreign Minister Ciano to Berlin. (2) Material for Führer's Visit to Rome. (3) Visit of the Führer to Rome.

*Film Serial  
Numbers*

*- German File*

- 351 *Pol. V: Russia, General Foreign Policy.*
- 375 *State Secretary: Halifax's Visit and its Consequences.*
- 403 *Pol. V: Russia, Russian Commercial Mission in Germany.*
- 418 *German Embassy in the Soviet Union: German Internal Politics, Defense, the Anti-Comintern.*
- 438 *State Secretary: Correspondence between the State Secretary and German Diplomatic Representatives Abroad.*
- 442 *State Secretary: Correspondence between the State Secretary and German Diplomatic Representatives Abroad.*
- 522 *Pol. geheim: Russia.*
- 523 *Pol. geheim: Russia.*
- 533 *State Secretary: Relations with the Holy See.*
- 580 *Colonial Affairs.*
- 590 *German Embassy in the Soviet Union: Russian Diplomatic and Consular Representatives Abroad.*
- 598 *Pol. V: Russia, Arrests.*
- 605 *Pol. II: France, General Foreign Policy.*
- 621 *Pol. II: France, Political Relations between France and Germany.*
- 625 *Pol. II: France, Endeavors to bring about Franco-German Understanding.*
- 631 *Pol. II: France, Political Relations between France and Poland.*
- 634 *Pol. II: France, Political Relations between France and Italy.*
- 635 *Pol. II: France, Political Relations between France and Russia.*
- 664 *Pol. II: France, Political Relations between France and Czechoslovakia.*
- 710 *Pol. IX: United States, Political and Cultural Propaganda, U.S.A.*
- 740 *Pol. II: France, Political Journeys of Foreign Statesmen.*
- 809 *Head of the Auslandsorganisation: Files on United States of America, Ireland, France, Deutsches Auslandsinstitut, Verein für das Deutschtum im Ausland, Büro Chef AO, Cultural Policy Department of the Foreign Ministry, Reich-Germans in the Netherlands Indies—Reprisals.*
- 860 *State Secretary: German Foreign Minister's Visit to London. -*
- 905 *Under State Secretary: Halifax Visit.*
- 969 *Head of the Auslandsorganisation: Austria.*
- 1041 *Pol. IX: United States, Political Relations between the United States and Germany.*
- 1097 *Pol. VIII: Anti-Comintern Pact.*
- 1146 *Pol. IX: United States, Germanism Abroad.*
- 1249 *Pol. II: England, Ministries.*
- 1282 *State Secretary Keppler: Files on Austria.*
- 1291 *State Secretary Keppler: Files on Austria.*
- 1387 *Pol. II: Britain, General Foreign Policy.*
- 1479 *Ambassador Hewel Papers: Germany.*
- 1486 *Pol. IV: Italy, General Foreign Policy.*
- 1500 *Pol. IV: Italy, Political Relations between Italy and Germany.*
- 1518 *Pol. IV: Italy, Mussolini's Visit to Germany, September 1937.*
- 1519 *Pol. IV: Italy, Political Relations between Italy and Germany.*
- 1539 *German Embassy in the Soviet Union: General Foreign Policy of the Soviet Union.*

*Film Serial**Numbers**German File*

- 1549 Reich Chancellery: Austria.
- 1550 *Pol. IV:* Italy, Political Relations between Italy and Hungary.
- 1558 *Pol. II:* Great Britain, Lord Halifax's Visit to Germany in November 1937.
- 1579 *Pol. II:* Great Britain, Political Relations between Britain and France.
- 1580 *Pol. II:* Great Britain, Political Relations between Britain and France.
- 1585 *Pol. II:* Great Britain, Political Relations between Britain and Germany.
- 1595 *Pol. II:* Great Britain, Political Relations between Britain and Germany.
- 1607 *Pol. III:* Holy See, Mundelein Incident.
- 1608 *Pol. III:* Holy See, Political Relations of the Holy See with Germany.
- 1609 *Pol. III:* Holy See, Political Relations of the Holy See with Germany.
- 1611 *Pol. III:* Holy See, Political Relations of the Holy See with Germany.
- 1620 *Pol. III:* Holy See, Political Relations of the Holy See with Germany.
- 1649 *Pol. geheim:* Austria.
- 1661 Political Department: Confidential Papers.
- 1687 *Pol. I Vbd.*
- 1716 German Embassy in France: Reunion of Austria with the Reich.
- 1726 *Pol. geheim:* East Asia, the Sino-Japanese Conflict, 1937, Peace Feelers.
- 1744 *Pol. IV:* Austria, Political Relations between Austria and Germany.
- 1788 *Handakten* of Dr. Arthur Seyss-Inquart.
- 1791 German Embassy in France: Russia, Secret File.
- 1798 *Pol. IV:* Austria, Political Relations between Austria and Germany.
- 1824 Ribbentrop, Miscellaneous Papers.
- 1879 *Pol. III:* Holy See, Prosecution of Roman Catholic Priests Accused of Moral Delinquency.
- 1907 German Embassy in the Soviet Union: Political Relations between Germany and the Soviet Union, General.
- 1909 German Embassy in the Soviet Union: Political Relations between Germany and the Soviet Union, Secret.
- 1927 State Secretary: War between China and Japan.
- 1928 State Secretary: War between China and Japan.
- 1929 State Secretary: War between China and Japan.
- 1958 *Pol. IV:* Austria, Domestic Politics, Parliamentary and Party Systems.
- 1959 *Pol. IV:* Austria, Domestic Politics, Parliamentary and Party Systems.
- 1978 *Pol. III:* Holy See, Educational Affairs.

*Film Serial  
Numbers**German File*

- 1990 *Pol. III: Holy See, Actions against anti-Nazi Attitude of Roman Catholic Priests.*
- 1997 *State Secretary Keppler: Austria.*
- 2000 *Economic Policy Department: Wiehl, America.*
- 2017 *Pol. IV: Austria, General Foreign Policy.*
- 2020 *Pol. IV: Austria, Visits of Statesmen.*
- 2021 *Pol. IV: Austria, Political Visits of Austrian State Secretary Guido Schmidt.*
- 2039 *German Embassy in France: Italy.*
- 2058 *Economic Policy Department: Clodius, Italy.*
- 2062 *Pol. IV: Austria, Domestic Politics, Parliamentary and Party Systems.*
- 2070 *Pol. IV: Austria, National Socialism, Fascism, and Kindred Movements.*
- 2091 *Pol. IV: Austria, National Socialism, Fascism, and Kindred Political Movements.*
- 2092 *Economic Policy Department: Wiehl, Russia.*
- 2127 *German Embassy in Italy: Secret Documents.*
- 2128 *German Embassy in Italy: Secret Documents.*
- 2134 *State Secretary: Memoranda on Diplomatic Visits.*
- 2179 *Under State Secretary: Schmidt Visit.*
- 2184 *Pol. IV: Albania, Political Relations between Albania and Italy.*
- 2185 *State Secretary: Memoranda on Internal Directives, Views on Specific Questions, Telephone Conversations, etc.*
- 2196 *State Secretary: Political Correspondence of the State Secretary with Officials of the Foreign Service.*
- 2227 *Pol. IV: Austria, National Socialism, Fascism, and Kindred Political Movements.*
- 2232 *Pol. IV: Austria, National Socialism, Fascism, and Kindred Political Movements.*
- 2234 *Pol. IV: Austria, National Socialism, Fascism, and Kindred Political Movements.*
- 2258 *Under State Secretary: Halifax Visit.*
- 2303 *Pol. IV: Austria, National Socialism, Fascism, and Kindred Political Movements.*
- 2307 *Pol. IV: Austria, National Socialism, Fascism, and Kindred Political Movements.*
- 2308 *Pol. IV: Austria, National Socialism, Fascism, and Kindred Political Movements.*
- 2311 *Reich Foreign Minister: Austria.*
- 2422 *Pol. IX: United States, Political Relations between the United States and Germany.*
- 2431 *Pol. IX: United States, General Foreign Policy.*
- 2529 *Under State Secretary: The Führer's Visit to Italy.*
- 2554 *Under State Secretary: Colonies.*
- 2809 *Reich Chancellery: North America.*
- 2810 *Pol. IX: United States, Germanism Abroad.*
- 2871 *Political Department: Treaties.*

<i>Film Serial Numbers</i>	<i>German File</i>
2910	<i>Pol. VIII:</i> China, Political Relations between China and Germany.
3153	<i>Pol. IV:</i> Italy (South Tyrol).
3454	<i>Pol. IV:</i> Austria, Political Tour of Austrian State Secretary Guido Schmidt.
C 81	Reich Chancellery Documents, England, volume 6, 1937.
F 1, 6, 7, 8, 11, 14, 17, 19, 20	German Foreign Ministry film of files of the Reich Foreign Minister's Secretariat.

## Appendix IV

### LIST OF PERSONS<sup>1</sup>

- ABETZ, Otto, Paris representative of the *Dienststelle Ribbentrop*.
- ADAM, Colonel Walter, Head of Austrian Government press service.
- ALFIERI, Dino, Italian Minister for Popular Culture, 1936-1939.
- ANTONESCU, General Ion, Chief of Rumanian General Staff, 1933; Minister for Defense in Goga cabinet, 1937, and in Miron Cristea cabinet; resigned 1938.
- ATTOLICO, Dr. Bernardo, Italian Ambassador in Germany, September 8, 1935-May 18, 1940.
- BAAR-BAARENFELS, Eduard, Austrian, Vice Chancellor in Schuschnigg cabinet, May 1936.
- BARGEN, Dr. Werner von, Counselor of Legation in German Legation in Belgium.
- BASTID, Paul, French Radical Socialist Deputy from 1924; President of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Chamber; Minister of Commerce in the Blum cabinet, June 1936.
- BECK, Colonel Jozef, Polish Foreign Minister, 1932-1939.
- BECK, Colonel General Ludwig, Chief of the General Staff of the German Army, 1935-1938.
- BENES, Dr. Eduard, Czechoslovak Foreign Minister, 1918-1935; also Prime Minister, 1921-1922; President of the Czechoslovak Republic, December 18, 1935-October 5, 1938.
- BERGEN, Dr. Carl Ludwig Diego von, German Ambassador to the Holy See, April 1920-April 1943.
- BEST, Dr. Werner Karl, former judge, dismissed 1932; Nazi Party member from 1930; official at Gestapo Office in Berlin.
- BLOMBERG, Field Marshal Werner Eduard Fritz von, Reich War Minister, 1933-1938, and Commander in Chief of the *Wehrmacht*, April 21, 1935-February 2, 1938.
- BLONDEL, Jules-François, French Counselor of Embassy in Italy, 1935-1938; Chargé d'Affaires and Minister Plenipotentiary in Italy, 1936-November 18, 1938.
- BLUM, Léon, French Prime Minister, June 1936-1937, Vice President of the Cabinet, June 1937-January 1938; Prime Minister and Minister for the Treasury, March-April 1938; President of the French Socialist Party.
- BÖHME, Franz, General of Infantry, Head of Austrian Intelligence Service.
- BONNET, Georges, French Minister of Finance in the Chautemps cabinet, June 1937-January 1938; Minister of State, January-March 1938; Foreign Minister in the Daladier cabinet, April 1938-September 1939.
- BÖTTICHER, Lieutenant General Friedrich von, German Military and Air Attaché in the United States, 1933-1941.

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<sup>1</sup> The biographical details given relate principally to the period and subjects covered by the documents in this volume. For positions of officials in the German Foreign Ministry, see Appendix II.

- BRAUCHITSCH, Colonel General Walter Heinrich von, Commander in Chief of the German Army, 1938-1941.
- BRÄUER, Dr. Curt, Counselor of Embassy in the German Embassy in France.
- BULLITT, William Christian, American Ambassador in France, September 13, 1936-1940.
- BÜRCKEL, Josef, *Gauleiter* of Saar Palatinate, Reich Commissioner for Austria.
- BÜRCKNER, Naval Captain Leopold, Head of the *Ableitung Ausland* of the OKW.
- BUTLER, Richard Austen, British Member of Parliament (Conservative) from 1929; Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, February 1938-1941.
- CADOGAN, Sir Alexander, Deputy Under Secretary of State in the British Foreign Office, October 1936; Permanent Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, January 1, 1938-1946.
- CANARIS, Admiral Walther Wilhelm, Head of the Bureau of Foreign Affairs and Intelligence of the OKW.
- CHAMBERLAIN, Neville, British Member of Parliament (Conservative), 1918-1940; Leader of the Conservative Party; Prime Minister, May 28, 1937-1940.
- CHAUTEMPS, Camille, President of Radical Socialist Group of French Chamber, 1934; Minister of State in Blum cabinet, June 1936-June 21, 1937; Prime Minister, June 22, 1937-January 15, 1938, and January 18, 1938-March 10, 1938; Vice President of Council of Ministers and Minister of Coordination in Daladier cabinet, April 11, 1938-1939.
- CHURCHILL, Winston Spencer, British Member of Parliament (Liberal and Conservative) since 1900; Prime Minister, 1940-1945.
- CHIANG KAI-SHEK, Marshal, Commander in Chief of Chinese forces and member of Central Executive Committee of the Kuomintang.
- CIANO DI CORTELLAZZO, Count Galeazzo, Italian Foreign Minister, 1936-1943.
- CINCAR-MARKOVIC, Aleksander, Yugoslav Minister in Germany, December 19, 1935-1939.
- CORBIN, Charles, French Ambassador in Great Britain, May 24, 1933-July 4, 1940.
- COT, Pierre, French Radical Socialist Deputy from 1928; Minister for Air in Daladier, Sarraut, and Chautemps cabinets, 1933-1934, in Blum cabinet, June 1936-June 1937, and in Chautemps cabinet, June 1937-January 1938; Minister of Commerce, January-April 1938.
- COULONDRE, Robert, French Ambassador in the Soviet Union, November 1936-November 1938; French Ambassador in Germany, November 1938-September 1939.
- CSAKY, Count István, Chef de Cabinet to Kanya, Hungarian Foreign Minister; Hungarian Foreign Minister on latter's resignation, December 10, 1938; in Imredy and Teleki cabinets until his death in February 1941.
- DALADIER, Edouard, French Radical Socialist Deputy from 1919; Minister of National Defense, 1936-1938; Prime Minister and Minister of National Defense, 1938-1940.
- DARANYI, Dr. Kálmán, Hungarian Prime Minister and Minister for Agriculture, October 12, 1936-May 14, 1938.
- DARRÉ, Walther, German Minister for Food and Agriculture, 1933-1942; Reich Peasant Leader.
- DAVIES, Joseph E., American Ambassador in the Soviet Union, 1936-1938; Ambassador in Belgium, July 20, 1938-1940.

- DELBOS, Yvon, French Radical Socialist Deputy from 1924; Foreign Minister in Blum cabinet, June 1936-1937, and in Chautemps cabinets, June 22, 1937-January 15, 1938, and January 18, 1938-March 10, 1938.
- DIECKHOFF, Dr. Hans Heinrich, Head of the Political Department of the German Foreign Ministry, April-August 1936; Acting State Secretary, August 1936-April 1937; Ambassador in the United States, May 18, 1937-December 11, 1941 (absent from his post from November 1938).
- DIETRICH, Dr. Otto, State Secretary and Head of Press Division in Reich Ministry of Propaganda; Reich Press Chief of the Nazi Party.
- DIRKSEN, Dr. Herbert von, German Ambassador in Japan, September 1933-February 1938; Ambassador in Great Britain, May 5, 1938-September 3, 1939.
- DODD, William E., American Ambassador in Germany, June 13, 1933-December 29, 1937.
- DRAXLER, Dr. Ludwig, Austrian Minister of Finance in Schuschnigg cabinet.
- EDEN, Anthony, British Member of Parliament (Conservative) from 1923; Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, December 1935-February 1938.
- EISENLOHR, Ernst, German Minister in Czechoslovakia, February 5, 1936.
- ERDMANNSDORFF, Otto von, German Minister in Hungary, May 11, 1937-July 31, 1941.
- FABRICIUS, Dr. Wilhelm, German Minister in Rumania, April 9, 1936-January 29, 1941.
- FALKENHAUSEN, Alexander von, German General of Infantry, military adviser to the Chinese Government, 1934-1938.
- FIERLINGER, Zdenek, Czechoslovak Minister in the Soviet Union, October 7, 1937-March 16, 1939.
- FISCHBÖCK, Dr. Hans, Austrian bank president, Minister of Commerce in the cabinet of Seyss-Inquart.
- FLANDIN, Pierre Etienne, Leader of the French Left Republican Party; Deputy from 1914; Minister for Foreign Affairs, January-June 1936; former Vice President of the Chamber of Deputies.
- FORSTER, Albert, Nazi *Gauleiter* of Danzig.
- FORSTER, Dr. D., Counselor of Embassy in the German Embassy in France, 1936-1938.
- FRANÇOIS-PONCET, André, French Ambassador in Germany, 1931-1938; Ambassador in Italy, November 18, 1938-June 10, 1940.
- FRICK, Dr. Wilhelm, Reich Minister of the Interior, January 30, 1933-August 1943; Protector of Bohemia-Moravia, 1943-1945; executed October 16, 1946.
- FUNK, Dr. Walter, State Secretary in the Reich Ministry of Propaganda, 1933; Reich Minister of Economics, November 1937-1945; President of the Reichsbank, 1939-1945.
- GAMELIN, General Maurice Gustave, Chief of the French General Staff and Vice President of the Conseil Supérieur de la Guerre from January 1935.
- GILBERT, Prentiss B., Counselor of Embassy in the American Embassy in Germany, July 19, 1937-February 24, 1939.
- GLAISE-HORSTENAU, Major General Edmund, Austrian Minister of the Interior and Minister without portfolio in Schuschnigg cabinet; Vice Chancellor in Seyss-Inquart cabinet.
- GOEBBELS, Dr. Josef, Reich Minister of Propaganda, 1933-1945.

- GÖRING, Hermann Wilhelm, Reich Marshal, member of the Reichstag from 1928; President of the Reichstag from 1932; Minister President of Prussia and Reich Minister for Air from April 1933; appointed Commander in Chief of the Luftwaffe from May 1935; commissioner for the Four Year Plan; October 1936; Chairman of the War Cabinet and nominated successor-designate to Hitler, September 1, 1939.
- GOGA, Octavian, Prime Minister of Rumania, December 28, 1937–February 10, 1938; died May 7, 1938.
- GRANDI, Count Dino, Italian Ambassador in Great Britain, 1933–1939.
- GREISER, Arthur Karl, Nazi President of the Danzig Senate.
- HABICHT, Theodor, former leader of the Austrian N.S.D.A.P.
- HALDER, General of Infantry Franz, Chief of the General Staff of the German Army, 1938–1942.
- HALIFAX, Edward Wood, 3d Viscount, member of British Conservative Party; Lord Privy Seal, November 1935–May 1937; Lord President of the Council, 1937–1938; Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, February 1938–December 1940 (created Earl of Halifax, 1944).
- HAMMERSTEIN-EQUORD, Hans, Austrian, Minister of Justice in Schuschnigg cabinet, May 1936.
- HASSELL, Ulrich von, German Ambassador in Italy, November 8, 1932–February 17, 1938.
- HEEREN, Viktor von, German Minister in Yugoslavia, 1933–1941.
- HEMPEL, Eduard, German Minister in Eire, July 8, 1937–May 1945.
- HENCKE, Andor, Counselor of Legation in the German Legation in Czechoslovakia, November 12, 1936–March 16, 1939.
- HENDERSON, Sir Nevile, British Ambassador in Germany, April 30, 1937–September 3, 1939.
- HENLEIN, Konrad, founded the *Sudetendeutsche Heimatfront*, September 30, 1933, to replace banned Nazi Party in Czechoslovakia, renamed Sudeten German Party, 1935; appointed Reich Commissioner for Sudeten German territories, October 1, 1938; *Gauleiter* of the Sudetengau and Reich Commissioner, May 1, 1939.
- HERRIOT, Edouard, Honorary President of French Radical Socialist Party; Deputy from 1919; Mayor of Lyons, 1905–1941; member of various cabinets, 1916–1936; President of the Chamber of Deputies, 1936–1942.
- HESS, Walter Richard Rudolf, member of the Nazi Party from 1920; Hitler's Deputy, 1933–1941; member of the Reichstag; Reich Minister without portfolio, 1933–1941; member of the Secret Cabinet Council, 1938–1941.
- HESSE, Prince Philip of, son-in-law of the King of Italy, employed as a special envoy between Hitler and Mussolini.
- HEWEL, Walter, Counselor of Legation, Chief of the Personal Staff of the Reich Foreign Minister; plenipotentiary of the Foreign Ministry with the Führer.
- HIMMLER, Heinrich, *Reichsführer*-SS and Chief of the German Police from June 1936 with the rank of State Secretary in the Ministry of the Interior; Reich and Prussian Minister of the Interior, August 1943; member of the Reichstag from 1930.
- HITLER, Adolf, Führer and Chancellor of the German Reich from January 30, 1933; became Chief of State on death of Hindenburg, August 2, 1934; assumed command of *Wehrmacht* February 4, 1938, and of the Army December 1941.

- HODZA, Dr. Milan, Prime Minister of Czechoslovakia, November 6, 1935–September 22, 1938; member of the Agrarian Party.
- HORE-BELISHA, Leslie, British Member of Parliament (Liberal and Liberal National) 1923–1945; Secretary of State for War, May 1937–January 1940.
- HORNOSTEL, Theodor, Head of Political Division in the Austrian Foreign Ministry.
- HOERTY DE NAGYBANYA, Admiral Nicholas, Regent of Hungary, 1920–1944.
- HUEBER, Dr. Franz, Austrian Nazi, Minister of Justice in Seyss-Inquart cabinet.
- HULL, Cordell, United States Secretary of State, 1933–1944.
- IMREDY, Dr. Bela, Hungarian Prime Minister, May 14, 1938–February 1939.
- INNITZER, Cardinal Theodor, Archbishop of Vienna.
- JANSA, Alfred, *Feldmarschallleutnant*, Chief of Austrian General Staff.
- JODL, Colonel Alfred, Chief of the National Defense Section in the High Command of the Armed Forces, 1935–October 1938, executed at Nuremberg October 16, 1946.
- JURY, Dr. Hugo, Austrian Nazi, Minister of Social Administration in Seyss-Inquart cabinet.
- KANYA, Kálmán, Hungarian Foreign Minister, 1933–November 16, 1938.
- KEITEL, Colonel General Wilhelm, Head of *Wehrmachtsamt* in Reich War Ministry; appointed Head of the *OKW*, February 4, 1938; executed at Nuremberg October 16, 1946.
- KENNEDY, Joseph P., Chairman, United States Maritime Commission, 1937–1938; United States representative, International Wheat Advisory Committee, 1938; United States Ambassador in Great Britain, January 17, 1938–November 30, 1940.
- KEPPLER, Wilhelm, appointed to the Reich Chancellery to deal with economic questions, July 7, 1933; given special task of employing economic measures to replace raw materials from abroad with home products, November 13, 1934–October 18, 1936; State Secretary for special duties in the Foreign Ministry, March 19, 1938; *Reichsbeauftragter* for Austria.
- KIENBÖCK, Dr. Viktor, President of the Austrian National Bank.
- KIOSSEIVANOFF, Dr. Georgi, Bulgarian Foreign Minister, April–November 1935; Prime Minister and Foreign Minister, 1935–1940.
- KIRK, Alexander Comstock, Counselor of Embassy in the American Embassy in the Soviet Union, 1938–1939.
- KIRKPATRICK, Ivone Augustine, First Secretary at the British Embassy in Germany, August 30, 1933–December 14, 1938.
- KLAUSNER, Major Hubert, *Landesleiter* of the Austrian N.S.D.A.P., State Secretary for Political Instruction in Seyss-Inquart cabinet.
- KORDT, Dr. Erich, Secretary of Legation, 1936, and Counselor of Legation, 1937, in the German Embassy in Great Britain; assigned to Ribbentrop's staff in the Foreign Ministry, March 9, 1938.
- KORDT, Theodor, Counselor of Embassy in the German Embassy in Great Britain, April 20, 1938–September 3, 1939.
- KROFTA, Dr. Kamil, Czechoslovak Foreign Minister in the Hodza cabinet, 1936–1938.
- KÜHLENTHAL, Lieutenant General Erich, German Military Attaché in France; previously Head of the Intelligence Branch of the Reich War Ministry.
- LAMMERS, Dr. Hans Heinrich, State Secretary and Chief of the Reich Chancellery, 1934–1937; Reich Minister and Head of the Reich Chancellery, November 1937; member and Secretary of the Secret Cabinet Council, February 1938.

- LAVAL, Pierre, French Independent Senator, 1926-1940; Prime Minister and Foreign Minister, June 1935-January 1936.
- LEBRUN, Albert, President of the French Republic, May 1932-July 1940.
- LEOPOLD, Captain Josef, Leader of Austrian N.S.D.A.P.
- LEY, Dr. Robert, Leader of the German Labor Front from 1933.
- LIPSKI, Josef, Polish Ambassador in Germany, November 15, 1934-September 1, 1939.
- LITVINOV, Maxim Maximovich, People's Commissar of Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union, 1930-1939.
- LORENZ, SS-Obergruppenführer Werner, Head of the *Volksdeutsche Mittelstelle*, January 1937; Head of the Foreign Relations Department of the Nazi Party on the Staff of the Führer's Deputy; member of the Reichstag.
- LUBOMIRSKI, Prince Stephen, Counselor of Embassy in the Polish Embassy in Germany.
- LUKASIEWICZ, Juljusz, Polish Ambassador in France, July 1936-1939.
- MACKENSEN, Hans Georg von, son of Field Marshal von Mackensen; German Minister in Hungary, September 30, 1933; State Secretary in the German Foreign Ministry, April 15, 1937; Ambassador in Italy, April 1, 1938-September 8, 1943.
- MAGISTRATI, Count Massimo, Counselor of Embassy in the Italian Embassy in Germany.
- MASSIGLI, René, Director of the Political Section in the French Foreign Ministry, 1937-1938.
- MASTNY, Vojtech, Czechoslovak Minister in Germany, 1932-1939.
- MENGHIN, Professor Oswald, Austrian Nazi, Minister of Education in Seyss-Inquart cabinet.
- MIKLAS, Wilhelm, Austrian Federal President, 1928-1938.
- MILCH, Colonel General Erhard, German State Secretary and Deputy Air Minister.
- MOLTKE, Hans Adolf von, German Ambassador in Poland, November 14, 1934-September 1, 1939.
- MOSCICKI, Ignacy, President of Poland, June 1, 1926-1939.
- MOTTA, Dr. Giuseppe, Head of the Political Department of the Swiss Federal Council (Foreign Minister).
- MUFF, Wolfgang, Lieutenant General, German Military Attaché in Austria.
- MUSSOLINI, Benito, Founder of the Italian Fascist Party; Prime Minister from October 1922.
- NEUMAYER, Rudolf, Minister of Finance in the Schuschnigg cabinets of November 3, 1936, and February 15, 1938, and Seyss-Inquart cabinet of March 12, 1938.
- NEURATH, Constantin, Baron von, Reich Foreign Minister, June 2, 1932-February 4, 1938; appointed President of Secret Cabinet Council, February 1938; Reich Protector of Bohemia and Moravia, March 1939-1941.
- NEUSTÄDTER-STÜRMER, Odo, Austrian, Minister of Security in Schuschnigg cabinet, November 3, 1936-March 20, 1937.
- OSHIMA, Hiroshi, General, Japanese Military Attaché in Germany 1934-1938; Japanese Ambassador in Germany, 1938-1939 and 1940-1945.
- OTT, Eugen, Major General, Military Attaché in the German Embassy in Japan, 1934-1938, Ambassador in Japan, April 28, 1938-1942.
- PACELLI, Cardinal Eugenio, Papal Nuncio in Berlin, 1920-1929; Cardinal Secretary of State, 1930-1939: Pope Pius XII, 1939.

- PAFEN, Franz von, Military Attaché in the German Embassy in the United States, 1913-1915; Reich Chancellor, June-December 1932; Vice Chancellor in the Hitler cabinet, 1933-1934; Plenipotentiary for the Saar, November 1933-June 1934; German Envoy (later Ambassador) on Special Mission in Vienna, August 16, 1934-March 13, 1938.
- PAUL, Prince, Regent of Yugoslavia, 1934-1941.
- PAUL-BONCOUR, Joseph, French Foreign Minister in the Blum cabinet, March 13, 1938-April 10, 1938.
- PEMBAUR, Dr. Walter, Austrian, Head of the *Volkspolitisches Referat* of the Fatherland Front.
- PERNTER, Dr. Hans, Austrian, Minister of Education in the Schuschnigg cabinets of November 3, 1936 and February 15, 1938.
- PERTH, Earl of, Sir Eric Drummond, British Ambassador in Italy, October 26, 1933-May 1, 1939.
- PFUNDTNER, Hans, State Secretary in the German Ministry of the Interior, 1933-1943, permanent Deputy of the Minister.
- PHIPPS, Sir Eric, British Ambassador in Germany, 1933-1937; in France, April 28, 1937-October 16, 1939.
- POTEMKIN, Vladimir P., Vice Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union, 1937-1940.
- RAAB, Julius, Austrian, Minister of Commerce in Schuschnigg cabinet of February 15, 1938.
- REYNAUD, Paul, French Left Republican Alliance Deputy, 1928-1940; Minister of Justice in Daladier cabinet, April-November 1938; Minister of Finance, November 1938-March 1940.
- RIBBENTROP, Joachim von, German Ambassador in Great Britain, October 1936; Reich Foreign Minister, February 4, 1938-May 1945; executed October 16, 1946.
- RICHTHOFEN, Herbert, Baron von, German Minister in Belgium, May 7, 1936-October 14, 1938.
- ROOSEVELT, Franklin Delano, President of the United States, March 4, 1933-April 12, 1945.
- ROTHERMERE, Esmond Cecil Harmsworth, Viscount, British newspaper proprietor, owner of *The Daily Mail* and other daily newspapers.
- ROTT, Hans, Austrian, Minister without portfolio in Schuschnigg cabinet of February 15, 1938.
- RÜMELIN, Dr. Eugen, German Minister in Bulgaria, March 10, 1923-May 20, 1939.
- RUNCIMAN, Walter, Viscount, former Member of Parliament (Liberal and Liberal National); Head of the British Mission to Czechoslovakia, 1938.
- SARGENT, Sir Orme, Assistant Under Secretary of State in the British Foreign Office, 1933; Deputy Under Secretary of State, 1939.
- SCHACHT, Dr. Hjalmar, President of the Reichsbank, March 17, 1933-January 20, 1939; Minister of Economics, August 1934-November 1937.
- SCHMIDT, Guido, Austrian State Secretary for Foreign Affairs, July 1936-February 1938; Minister for Foreign Affairs, February-March 1938.
- SCHMITZ, Richard, Mayor of Vienna.
- SCHULENBURG, Friedrich Werner, Count von der, German Ambassador in the Soviet Union, October 3, 1934-June 22, 1941; executed after the attempt on Hitler's life, 1944.

- SCHUSCHNIGG, Kurt von, Austrian Federal Chancellor, July 1934–March 11, 1938.
- SCHWERIN VON KROSIGK, Lutz, Count, Reich Minister of Finance, 1932–1945.
- SELZAM, Dr. Eduard von, Counselor of Legation in the German Embassy in Great Britain.
- SEYSS-INQUART, Dr. Artur, Austrian Nazi; Minister of Interior in Schuschnigg cabinet, February 15, 1938; Austrian Federal Chancellor, March 12, 1938; executed at Nuremberg October 16, 1946.
- SIMON, Sir John, British Member of Parliament (Liberal and Liberal National), 1906–1940; Leader of the Liberal National Party until 1940; Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, 1931–1935; Chancellor of the Exchequer, 1937–1940.
- SINCLAIR, Sir Archibald, British Member of Parliament (Liberal), 1922–1945; Leader of Liberal Parliamentary Party, 1935–1945.
- SKUBL, Dr. Michael, Austrian, Police President of Vienna; State Secretary for Security in Schuschnigg cabinet of February 15, 1938, and Seyss-Inquart cabinet of March 12, 1938.
- SPAAK, Paul Henri, Belgian Minister of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 1936–1938; Prime Minister, May 1938–February 1939; Socialist Deputy for Brussels.
- STALIN, Josef Vissarianovich, General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party since 1922; member of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics since 1925.
- STOCKINGER, Fritz, Austrian, Minister of Commerce and Transport in Schuschnigg cabinet, May 1936.
- STOYADINOVICH, Dr. Milan, Yugoslav Prime Minister and Foreign Minister, June 24, 1935–June 1939.
- STUCKART, Dr. Wilhelm, State Secretary in the Reich and Prussian Ministry of the Interior.
- SZTÓJAY, Major General Döme, Hungarian Minister in Germany, December 19, 1935–1944.
- TATARESCU, Dr. Gheorghe, Rumanian Prime Minister, January 1934–December 1937; Deputy Prime Minister, February–March 1938.
- TAUCHER, Dr. Wilhelm, Austrian, Minister of Commerce and Transport in Schuschnigg cabinet of November 3, 1936.
- TAUSCHITZ, Stephan, Austrian Minister to Germany.
- TAVS, Dr. Franz, attorney, Austrian N.S.D.A.P. leader.
- THOMSEN, Hans, Counselor of Embassy in the German Embassy in the United States.
- TIPPELSKIRCH, Werner von, Counselor of Embassy in the German Embassy in the Soviet Union.
- TRAUTMANN, Oskar, German Ambassador in China, 1935–1938.
- VANSITTART, Sir Robert, British Permanent Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, 1930–1938; chief diplomatic adviser to the Foreign Secretary, 1938–1941.
- WEIZSÄCKER, Ernst, Baron von, Head of the Political Department of the German Foreign Ministry, August 1936–March 1938; State Secretary, April 1, 1938–April 1943.
- WELCZECK, Johannes, Count von, German Ambassador in France, April 30, 1936–September 3, 1939.
- WELLES, Sumner, United States Under Secretary of State.
- WIEDEMANN, Captain Fritz, aide to Hitler.
- WIESNER, General Friedrich von, leader of Austrian Monarchist movement.

- WILSON, Sir Horace, Chief Industrial Adviser to British Government, 1930-1939; seconded to the Treasury for service with the Prime Minister, 1935-1939.
- WILSON, Hugh R., United States Ambassador in Germany, January 17, 1938-January 31, 1940 (absent from his post from November 1938).
- WOERMANN, Dr. Ernst, Counselor of the German Embassy in Great Britain, 1936-February 1938; Head of the Political Department of the Foreign Ministry (Under State Secretary), March 1938-1943.
- WOLF, Dr. Wilhelm, Austrian Nazi, Foreign Minister in Seyss-Inquart cabinet.
- WÜHLISCH, J. von, Counselor of Embassy in the German Embassy in Poland.
- ZEHNER, Wilhelm, General of Infantry, Austrian, State Secretary for Military Affairs in Schuschnigg cabinet.
- ZERNATTO, Guido, Austrian, General Secretary of the Fatherland Front, Christian Social Party, and Minister without portfolio in Schuschnigg cabinet.

## Appendix V

### GLOSSARY OF GERMAN TERMS AND ABBREVIATIONS<sup>1</sup>

- A.A., Auswärtiges Amt  
Abteilung, department  
Abteilung Ausland, Foreign Department in the Bureau (Amt) of Foreign Affairs and Intelligence of the OKW  
Abwehr, Intelligence Department in the Bureau (Amt) of Foreign Affairs and Intelligence of the OKW  
a.D., ausser Dienst  
Alte Reichskanzlei, pre-Hitler Reich Chancellery  
Amtsleiter, director of an agency; also, N.S.D.A.P. functionary  
Amtsrat, grade in the gehobener Dienst  
Amts- und Landgerichtsrat (Amts-u. Landg. R.), Local and District Court Counselor (judge)  
Angabe (Ang.), additional item in a file  
Anschluss, union, annexation; particularly of Austria by Germany  
A.O., Auslandsorganisation  
A.R., Amtsrat  
Assessor (Assess.), first stage of employment in the höherer Dienst  
Att., attaché  
Aufklärungsausschuss der Schuldfrage, Committee for Inquiry into the War Guilt Question  
Ausland/Abwehr, Bureau (Amt) of Foreign Affairs and Intelligence of the OKW  
Auslandsdeutscher, ethnic German living outside Germany, regardless of citizenship  
Auslandsorganisation, foreign organization of the N.S.D.A.P. concerned with German nationals living abroad; the 43d Gau  
ausser Dienst, retired  
Auswärtiges Amt, German Foreign Ministry  
BRAM, office of the Reich Foreign Minister  
Brigadeführer, SA and SS rank equivalent to U.S. brigadier general  
Bundesgesetzblatt, Austrian law gazette  
Büro, office; clerical service in an agency  
Büro RAM, office of the Reich Foreign Minister  
Chef der Auslandsorganisation im Auswärtigen Amt (Chef AO), Head of the Auslandsorganisation in the Foreign Ministry  
Deutsche diplomatisch-politische Korrespondenz, German Diplomatic and Political Correspondence (press releases of the Foreign Ministry)  
Deutsches Auslandsinstitut, German Foreign Institute in Stuttgart, for research and propaganda among Auslandsdeutsche  
Deutsches Nachrichtenbüro, semi-official German news agency  
Dg. Pol., Dirigent der Politischen Abteilung  
Dienststelle Ribbentrop, office of Ribbentrop in his capacity as foreign affairs adviser to Hitler; of decreasing importance after his appointment as Foreign Minister

<sup>1</sup> Abbreviations are explained by giving the full German terms. These terms are explained at their proper alphabetical listing.

**Direktor der Politischen Abteilung**  
(Dir. Pol.), Head of the Political Department

**Dirigent der Politischen Abteilung**,  
Deputy Head of the Political Department

**D.N.B.**, Deutsches Nachrichtenbüro

**e.o.**, *ex officio*; where this precedes the file number, it indicates a draft for which there are no preceding papers (cf. zu)

**Flüchtlingshilfswerk**, refugee relief organization of the N.S.D.A.P.

**Führer**, leader

**Führerprinzip**, leadership principle of the N.S.D.A.P. ("Responsibility of the subordinate to the superior; authority from the superior to the subordinate"—Göring)

**g.**, geheim

**Gau**, one of the 43 regional divisions of the N.S.D.A.P.

**Gauamtsleiter**, head of the Gau office of an N.S.D.A.P. organization

**Gauleiter**, highest N.S.D.A.P. official in a Gau

**Gauleitung**, regional N.S.D.A.P. leadership

**geheim**, secret

**geheime Reichssache**, top secret

**Geheimer Regierungsrat**, honorary title conferred on officials of the höherer Dienst

**Geheime Staatspolizei (Gestapo)**, secret political police

**gehobener Dienst**, "upper service" in the German Civil Service, between the mittlerer Dienst and the höherer Dienst, consisting of the following grades in ascending order: (1) Inspektor, e.g., Technischer Inspektor, Bibliothekinspektor, Regierungsinspektor, Verwaltungsinspektor, Konsultatssekretär (A.A.); (2) Oberinspektor, e.g., Regierungsoberinspektor, Verwaltungsoberinspektor, Regierungsoberrevisor, Konsultatssekretär I. Kl. (A.A.); (3) Amtmann, e.g., Regie-

rungsamtman, Verwaltungsamtman, Kanzler (A.A.), Ministerialkanzleivorsteher; (4) Amtsrat

**Generalkonsul (Gen. K.)**, consul general

**Gerichtsassessor (Ger. Ass.)**, Assessor whose training has been in law rather than government

**Gesandter**, minister; *see* höherer Dienst

**Gesandter I. Klasse**, minister first class; *see* höherer Dienst

**Gesandtschaftsrat**, counselor of legation; *see* höherer Dienst

**Geschäftsakten**, official file, as distinct from private or personal file

**Ges.R.**, Gesandtschaftsrat

**Gestapo**, Geheime Staatspolizei

**G.K.**, Generalkonsul

**g.Rs.**, geheime Reichssache

**Gruppe**, group, department; also, SA and SS formation equivalent to Army Corps

**Gruppenführer**, SA and SS rank equivalent to U.S. major general

**Handakten**, file maintained by an individual official

**Handelspolitische Abteilung (Ha. Pol.)**, Economic Policy Department of the Foreign Ministry, renamed Wirtschaftspolitische Abteilung between March and June 1938

**Hauptsturmführer**, SS rank equivalent to U.S. Army captain

**Heimatblock**, political organization stemming from the Austrian Heimwehr

**Heimatschutz**, local semi-military organizations in Austria which were merged with the Heimwehr

**Heimwehr**, semi-military organization oriented in general toward an independent Austria organized along authoritarian lines

**Hilfsarbeiter (Hilfsarb.)**, temporary employee

**Hitlerjugend (H.J.)**, Hitler youth organization

**Hilfswerk der N.S.D.A.P.**, relief organization of the N.S.D.A.P.

**Hofburg**, Austrian imperial palace  
**Hofrat**, court counselor, high grade in the Austrian Civil Service; also, pre-1919 grade in the German Civil Service, superseded by **Amtsrat**

**höherer Dienst**, "higher service" in the German Civil Service, consisting of the following grades in ascending order: (1) **Regierungsrat**, **Bibliothekar**, **Gesandtschaftsrat** (A.A.), **Konsul**, **Legationsrat** (A.A.), **Vizekonsul** (A.A.); (2) **Oberregierungsrat** as **Ministerialbürodirektor**, **Gesandtschaftsrat** I. Kl. (A.A.), **Konsul** I. Kl. (A.A.), **Legationsrat** I. Kl. (A.A.); (3) **Ministerialrat**, **Botschaftsrat** (A.A.), **Generalkonsul** (A.A.), **Gesandter** (A.A.), **Vortragender Legationsrat** (A.A.); (4) **Ministerialdirigent**, **Generalkonsul** I. Kl. (A.A.), **Gesandter** I. Kl. (A.A.); (5) **Ministerialdirektor**, **Gesandter** I. Kl. as head of a mission (A.A.); (6) **Staatssekretär**, **Botschafter** (A.A.)

**H.R.**, **Hofrat**

**Ibero-Amerikanisches Institut**, Ibero-American Institute, founded in Berlin in 1929 to further relations with and interest in Latin America, Spain, and Portugal

**Inland**, department of the Foreign Ministry dealing principally with the N.S.D.A.P. and its agencies, and with the police  
 in **Vertretung** (i.V.), by direction; acting

**K.**, **Konsul**

**Kanzlei**, copying and mailing office of a Ministry

**Kanzler**, chancellor; head of a **Kanzlei**; grade in the **gehobener Dienst**  
**Konsultssekretär**, grade in the **gehobener Dienst**

**Konsul zur Disposition**, consul awaiting assignment

**Kreis**, political subdivision; also, largest subdivision of an N.S.D.A.P. **Gau**

**K.S.**, **Konsultssekretär**

**Kulturpolitische Abteilung** (Kult.), Cultural Policy Department of the Foreign Ministry

**K.z.D.**, **Konsul zur Disposition**

**Kzler.**, **Kanzler**

**Landesführer**, provincial leader (of the Austrian Fatherland Front)

**Landesgruppe**, N.S.D.A.P. organization for a foreign country, controlled by the **Auslandsorganisation**  
**Landesgruppenleiter**, leader of an N.S.D.A.P. **Landesgruppe**

**Landeshauptmann**, (Austrian) provincial governor

**Landeskreisleiter**, leader of an N.S.D.A.P. **Kreis** in any country outside Germany

**Landesleiter**, leader of the Austrian N.S.D.A.P.

**Landesleitung**, Austrian N.S.D.A.P. leadership

**Landesinspekteur**, pre-1934 title, changed to **Landesleiter**

**Legationskasse**, accounts division of the Foreign Ministry

**Legationsrat**, counselor of legation; *see höherer Dienst*

**Legationssekretär**, secretary of legation; *see höherer Dienst*

**L.R.**, **Legationsrat**

**L.S.**, **Legationssekretär**

**Luftwaffe**, German air force

**Maifeld**, section of the Reich Sport Field in Berlin, used for open-air demonstrations

**Min. Dg.**, **Ministerialdirigent**

**Min. Dir.**, **Ministerialdirektor**

**Ministerialbürodirektor**, chief clerk

**Ministerialdirektor**, ministerial director, grade in the **höherer Dienst**; usually head of a department in a Ministry

**Ministerialdirigent**, grade in the **höherer Dienst**; usually deputy head of a department

**Ministerialkanzleiobersekretär**, grade in the **mittlerer Dienst**, serving in the **Kanzlei** of a Ministry

Ministerialkanzleisekretär, grade in the mittlerer Dienst, serving in the Kanzlei of a Ministry

Ministerialrat, ministerial counselor, grade in the höherer Dienst

Ministerrat, (Austrian) Council of Ministers

mittlerer Dienst, "intermediate service" of the German Civil Service, consisting of the following grades in ascending order: (1) Assistent, e.g., Regierungsassistent, Verwaltungsassistent; (2) Sekretär, e.g., Regierungssekretär, Verwaltungsssekretär, Kanzleivorsteher, Ministerialkanzleisekretär; (3) Obersekretär, e.g., Regierungsobersekretär, Verwaltungsobersekretär, Ministerialkanzleiobersekretär.

M.Kzl.O.S., Ministerialkanzleiobersekretär

M.Kzl.S., Ministerialkanzleisekretär

Nationalrat, (Austrian) National Council

Nationalsozialistische Deutsche Arbeiterpartei (N.S.D.A.P.), National Socialist German Workers' Party  
Neue Reichskanzlei, New Reich Chancellery

Nr. (Nummer), number

N.S.D.A.P., Nationalsozialistische Deutsche Arbeiterpartei

Oberführer, SA and SS rank approximately equivalent to U.S. colonel  
Obergruppenführer, SA and SS rank equivalent to U.S. lieutenant general

Oberinspektor, grade in the gehobener Dienst

Oberkommando des Heeres, Supreme Command of the Army; Supreme Headquarters of the Army

Oberkommando der Kriegsmarine, Supreme Command of the Navy

Oberkommando der Wehrmacht, Supreme Command of the Wehrmacht; Supreme Headquarters of the Wehrmacht

Oberregierungsrat, grade in the höherer Dienst

Obersalzberg, Hitler's mountain home near Berchtesgaden (Berghof)

Obersturmbannführer, SA and SS rank equivalent to U.S. lieutenant colonel

O.I., Oberinspektor

OKH, Oberkommando des Heeres

OKM, Oberkommando der Kriegsmarine

OKW, Oberkommando der Wehrmacht

O.R.R., Oberregierungsrat

Ortsgruppe, subdivision of an N.S.D.A.P. Kreis, comprising Party membership in a locality

Ortsgruppenleiter, head of an N.S.D.A.P. Ortsgruppe

Partei, party, in particular the N.S.D.A.P.

Personal- und Haushalts-Abteilung (Pers.), Personnel and Budget Department of the Foreign Ministry

Politische Abteilung (Pol.), Political Department of the Foreign Ministry; subdivided according to geographical areas, each designated by a Roman numeral (see Appendix II)

Politisches Archiv, Political Archives of the Foreign Ministry

Präsidialchef, Head of the Presidential Chancellery

Präsidialkanzlei, German Presidential Chancellery, attached to Hitler as Chief of State in 1934

Promi, Reichsministerium für Volksaufklärung und Propaganda

Putsch, uprising, e.g., the July 25, 1934, uprising of the Austrian Nazis in which Chancellor Dollfuss was killed

RAM, Reichsaussenminister

Rechnungsrat (Rechn. R.), pre-1919 Civil Service grade, equivalent to Amtsrat

Rechtsabteilung (Recht.), Legal Department of the Foreign Ministry

Referat, division within a department of a German Ministry in charge of a particular field of work; in the Foreign Ministry, usually dealing with a specific country or group of countries

Referent, drafting officer, expert, specialist, competent official (according to context); also, head of a Referat, usually with title of Legationsrat or Vortragender Legationsrat

Regierungsinspektor, grade in the gehobener Dienst

Regierungsoberinspektor, grade in the gehobener Dienst

Regierungsrat, grade in the höherer Dienst

Reich, empire; Germany

Reichsaussenminister, Reich Foreign Minister

Reichsführer-SS, commander in chief of the SS (Himmler)

Reichsgesetzblatt, German law gazette, published by the Ministry of the Interior

Reichshauptamtsleiter, head of a central department of the N.S.D.A.P.

Reichsjugendführer, German Youth Leader, head of the Hitlerjugend

Reichsleiter, highest N.S.D.A.P. rank; director of an N.S.D.A.P. function for the Party as a whole

Reichsmark, German mark; official rate of exchange about 40 cents in 1936-38

Reichsministerium für Volksaufklärung und Propaganda, Ministry for Public Enlightenment and Propaganda

Reichspressechef, Reich Press Chief

Reichsschatzmeister, N.S.D.A.P. treasurer

Reichsschatzmeisterei, N.S.D.A.P. treasury

Reichstag, German Parliament

R.I., Regierungsinspektor

Rm., Reichsmark

RM, Reichsminister; Reichsmark

R.O.I., Regierungsoberinspektor

R.R., Regierungsrat

Russland Gremium, Special Committee on Russia

SA, Sturmabteilung

SA-Hilfswerk Nordwest, relief organization for Austrian refugees, maintained by the SA

Schutzstaffel (SS), Elite Corps of the N.S.D.A.P. (black shirts), used for military and police purposes

Sicherheitsdienst (SD), security service; intelligence and counter-intelligence agency of the SS

Sicherheitshauptamt, central police organ of the SS

SS-Grenzüberwachung, guard maintained by the SS on the Bavarian-Austrian border

Staatssekretär (St. S.), State Secretary; the permanent undersecretary of a Ministry, and its highest non-political official

Stabsleiter, personal assistant to the head of a central department in the N.S.D.A.P.

Standarte, SA and SS unit equivalent to a regiment

Sturm, SA and SS unit equivalent to a company

Sturmabteilung (SA), Storm Troops of the N.S.D.A.P. (brown shirts)

Tagebuch (Tgb.), daily ledger, listing incoming and outgoing mail

Teinfaltstrasse, Vienna headquarters of the N.S.D.A.P.

Unterstaatssekretär (U.St.S.), Under State Secretary

Untersturmführer, SA and SS rank equivalent to U.S. second lieutenant

Vbd., Völkerbund

VDA, Volksbund für das Deutschtum im Ausland

Verein für das Deutschtum im Ausland, *see* Volksbund für das Deutschtum im Ausland

Vizekonsul (V.K.), vice consul

V.L.R., Vortragender Legationsrat

**Völkerbund**, League of Nations

**Volksbund für das Deutschtum im Ausland**, "League for Germanism Abroad", a pre-1933 Pan-German organization which became allied with the N.S.D.A.P. and was used by the Auslandsorganisation to unite Germans everywhere; called "Verein für das Deutschtum im Ausland" until 1933

**Volksdeutsche Mittelstelle (VOMI)**, central agency for problems concerning Volksdeutsche, ethnic Germans of non-German citizenship; formed as the Büro von Kursell in 1936, renamed and placed under SS-Obergruppenführer Lorenz in 1937

**Volkspolitische Referate**, sections set up in the Austrian Fatherland Front during 1937 to facilitate entry of Nazis into the Front

**Vortragender Legationsrat**, Counselor of Legation, grade in the höherer Dienst; Foreign Ministry equivalent of Ministerialrat; frequently title of head of a Referat

**Waffen-SS**, SS units organized for combat service

**Wahlkonsul**, honorary consul

**Wehrmacht**, German armed forces

**Wehrmachtsamt**, Armed Forces Office in the War Ministry

**Welfenfonds**, Guelph Fund; fortune belonging to King George V of Hanover, seized by Prussia when he was dethroned in 1866

**Wirklicher Amtsrat (Wirkl. A.R.)**, pre-1919 designation to distinguish "actual" from titular Amtsrat

**Wirtschaftspolitische Abteilung (W)**, see Handelspolitische Abteilung

**Zelle**, cell; subdivision of N.S.D.A.P. Ortsgruppe

**zu**, in connection with; where this precedes the file number it indicates that the previous papers on the subject have this file number

**zur Disposition (z.D.)**, awaiting assignment

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